INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM PROSPECTS FOR THE 7TH SPECIAL SESSION OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000300060006-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 16, 2000
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: August 27, 1975
• Content Type: IM

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Intelligence Memorandum
Prospects for the 7th Special
Session of the UN General Assembly
irw~liaF
1,: 0
August 27, 1975
No. 0253/75
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Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
Additional Warning
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Clessif led by 005827
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E. 0. 11652, exemption category:
q 58 (1), (2), and (3)
Automatically declassified
.on: Date Impossible to Determine
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Prospects for the 7th Special
Session of the UN General Assembly
August 27, 1975
Summary
The 7th Special Session of the UN General Assembly on economic cooperation
and development that convenes in New York on September 1 will provide an
opportunity to reverse the pattern of increasing confrontation between developing
and developed countries that has marked major international gatherings on eco-
nomic issues in the last several years. Failure of the session to produce even limited
agreements on issues of importance to the developing states may aggravate the
political atmosphere at the regular General Assembly. An abortive Special Session
will not only affect the outcome of such issues as the suspension of Israel, but would
damage prospects for subsequent, smaller international discussions where the de-
veloped countries hope to work out realistic policies on a broad range of issues.
Preparations for the Special Session have been under way for the past year with
states on all sides working to coordinate positions. The developed countries have
concentrated on finding ways to respond to some if the demands put forward by
the developing states, while holding the line against costly concessions. These efforts
have probably produced a measure of better mutual understanding, but the lack of
real progress indicates that a consensus has yet to be reached on the fundamental
question of transfer of resources from the wealthy states to the poor.
Radicals among the poor insist that what they want is a larger share of the
world product. Others among the poor agree with the rich, for the most part, that
sustained growth is the best guarantee the poor have of developing their economics.
The tone of the Special Session will largely depend on the outcome of the meeting
of the nonaligned foreign ministers in Lima-which opened August 25. More than
eighty participants and over twenty observers are attending the Lima conference
where some developing countries may press for endorsement of "extreme" demands.
Under the leadership of Algeria, the nonaligned movement has in recent years
become increasingly preoccupied with economic issues. Looming large at the Lima
meeting will be the need to reach agreement on a common front for the 7th Special
Session. If the nonaligned nations are able to agree on a common position in Lima,
they will almost certainly not break solidarity at the UN session-even if the
industrialized states subsequently present proposals otherwise acceptable to many of
the developing countries.
7) is memorandum was prepared in the Office of Qirrent Intelligenee::nd coordinated within the
'mtral Intelligence Agency. It was discussed but not coordinated with officers in the Bureau of
Intelligence and Research. Comments and queries may be addressed to
_ code 143, extension 5205.
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Prospects now appear to be somewhat brighter than earlier this year that the
nonaligned may adopt a less belligerent line at Lima. At last month's meeting in
Geneva of the UN's Economic and Social Council, those developing countries who
have generally avoided rhetorical excesses were able to exert some influence over the
policy of the developing-country caucus. The c~c,nciliatory atmosphere was main-
tained in a meeting of the Trade Development Board of UNCTAD in the week
following ECOSOC and at the third meeting of 1 he preparatory conference for the
Special Session, which opened August 18. In fuet, delegates to the latter meeting
elected to extend the conference into the following week, so as to coincide with the
Lima conference. This move may undercut attempts by states such as Algeria to use
the Lima session to pick a fight with the industrialized states on issues related to the
7th Special Session. Nevertheless the Algerians should not be underestimated. In
informal sessions at ECOSOC the radicals, led by Algeria, were uncompromising, and
most of the less extreme developing states remain skeptical of their ability to
moderate the deliberations in Lima.
A successful session-.in the view of most industrialized states and the majority
of developing states-?would set a constructive tone for subsequent agreement on at
least some contentious issues in other, more restricted forums. Few countries, in
fact, expect substantive negotiations to take place during the Special Session, but
most realize that a major determinant of any future negotiations will be the
atmosphere created in New York.
If the voices for negotiation rather than confrontation among the developing
states are to retain what little influence they have and the developing-country caucus
is to be persuaded of the value of dialogue, the industrialized nations will probably
have to make concessions-perhaps in the commodities field.
In the absence of what the developing countries take to be serious discussions
of economic issues, the solidarity of the developing states will be reinforced, and
they are likely to vent their frustrations by initiating political resolutions or pushing
for UN structural changes.
The Soviets and East Europeans-with the exception of Romania and Yugo-
slavia-will maintain a low profile at the 7th Special Session, as they have at previous
meetings dealing with these issues. They will express solidarity with the developing
states but will also be careful to avoid costly economic commitments. The Chinese,
for their part, will be a strong supporter of the developing countries' positions, but
they will not assume a leadership position. Peking will also certainly use the session
to continue its attacks on the Soviets.
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Background
The UN General Assembly formally called for the 7th Special Session in
a resolution adopted at its 28th session in December 1973. The initiative for
the meeting, however, came from the nonaligned movement which-at its
Fourth Summit in Algiers three months earlier-had proposed a special
session "to be devoted exclusively to the problems of development." At that
time, the nonaligned accepted the International Development Strategy as the
guide for sucJt discussions. The IDS was adopted by the General Assembly in
1970 as the bass for the UN's second development decade and was generally
accepted by the developed countries.
Since the September 1973 nonaligned meeting, however, the position
of the IDS as the cornerstone of development strategy has been superseded
by a number of other-and far more controversial-documents. The 6th
Special Session of the General Assembly, held during April and May 1974,
promulgated the Declaration for a New International Economic Order
(NIEO) and a Plan of AcJon to achieve it. The declaration presents the
demands of the developing countries for a larger share of the world's wealth
and for greater participation in the activities of international economic
forums. Despite the reservations of many industrialized states, the Plan of
Action endorses unrestricted nationalization of resources, producer cartels,
and the linking of export prices of raw materials to prices the developing
countries pay for imported manufactured goods (indexation).
Buoyed by their success in securing approval of these documents, the
developing states, during the past year, have continued to add to their canon
of economic declarations.
? The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, the brain-
child of Mexican President Echeverria, was steamrollered through the
General Assembly last year. The charter ;repeats many of the contro-
versial demands of the NIEO Plan of Action and insists that each state
must have permanent and full sovereignty over all its resources.
? In February a conference of nonaigned and developing states in
Dakar produced another declaration and program of action that, in
addition to Ftrongly reiterating NIEO demands, called for a special fund
to finance buffer stocks of raw materials and commodities and en-
couraged the developing states to form cartels of producer associations
and an umbrella council to coordinate them.
? At the Second General Conference of the UN Industrial Develop-
ment Organization (UNIDO) in Lima this spring, the developing coun-
tries passed the Lima Plan of Action setting forth the goals and demands
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of the developing states in the field of industrial development and calling
for the conversion of UNIDO into a UN specialized agency.
There has been little progress in the three meetings of the preparatory
committee for the 7th Special Session. The developed countries have argued
that they were still working out their positions on most of the issues the
developing countries wanted discussed. The developing countr+(-.s, on the
other hand, presented in early May their position paper, outlirJng and
prejudging the topics they wanted discussed in September. They have ac-
cepted few changes since then.
The recent ECOSOC meeting in Geneva, nevertheless, witnessed a more
cooperative atmosphere between the rich and poor nations. The Algerians-
perhaps for tactical reasons-uncharacteristically remained in the background
during negotiations between the developing and developed countries on an
agenda for the special session, and the less radical developing states-notably
Yugoslavia, Brazil, and Pakistan-were able to take the lead to accommodate
some of the industrialized countries' concerns. A tentative agenda was
adopted that lists the issues to be discussed without the usual political
commentary. The addition to the agenda of an item on food and agriculture,
a principal aim of the US, was agreed upon, and it was tentatively agreed to
set up a special intergovernmental group to negotiate the statutes for UNIDO
after the Special Session itself.
Although the Algerians, for the most part, permitted other developing
states to conduct negotiations with the industrialized countries in the formal
ECOSOC session, within the developing-country caucus itself-the Group of
77-and in informal discussions with selected developed states they took a
harder line. They forcefully argued against allowing modifications of the
position paper adopted by the Group of 77. A number of African countries
demanded particular reference to the problems of the poorer developing
countries, but the Algerians--bent on excluding issues that might divide the
developing bloc-refused to include such an item and even deleted the few
references to it in the original paper.
This position paper-the so-called Co.iference Room Paper 1-Adden-
dum-reiterates the standard complaints by the developing countries about
the international economic system and presents vague solutions for its
restruct.,ring. Among the other major issues outlined in the paper are
improvement of the developing countries' terms of trade, international
pricin;; patterns, real resource transfers, international financial arrangements,
and the transfer of technology.
A fundamental concern of the developing countries remains the prob-
lem of commodities, and on this issue-as on many others-the developing
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countries have been unable to come up with a unified position or n solution.
While agreed that a method must be established to guarantee earnings from
the export of raw materials, the developing countries are divided over the
means to achieve this.
A number of approaches to the problem have been presented in
different forums. The Dakar Conference endorsed producer cartels; in March
the EC countries implemented a elan-favored by many developing states-
that would stabilize export earnings of some products for 46 developing
states associated with the EC through the Lome agreement. During the past
year the UNCTAD secretariat has drafted an integrated commodity program
under which a fund would be used to purchase surplus stocks of various
commodities to stabilize prices on the world market.
Another basic demand is indexation, which establishes a link between
the prices the developing countries receive for their raw material exports and
the prices they pay for their imports of manufactured goods. The developing
countries argue that their long-term development planning requires some
siabilization of what they can expect to earn from exports.
The Lima Prelude
While the Algerians assumed a back seat in formal negotiations at
ECOSOC, their handling of differences within the Group of 77 is probably
more indicative of the approach they will take at the Lima meeting of
foreign ministers of the nonaligned nations. Under Algeria's chairmanship,
the nonaligned group has increasingly dominated the formulation of develop-
ing-country positions on economic issues. The nonaligned movement is
smaller than the Group of 77, which in fact includes over 100 developing
states. The tighter organizational structure of the nonaligned, as well as
Algeria's forceful leadership, has contributed to the influence of the smaller
group. Algeria has tried to capitalize on its role as a broker between the oil
exporters and the developing countries to enhance its status as spokesman,
but the very success of the nonaligned group is leading to competition for
influence within the group.
The nonaligned foreign ministers' discussion of their joint positions for
the Special Session may thus not turn out to be the expected pro forma
approval of positions already workefl out by the nonaligned steering commit-
tee. Among the members of the steerng group itself, the only country likely
to have argued for less extreme and inflexible positions was Malaysia.
Confrc,ntcd by such hard-liners as Senegal, Algeria, and India, any effort by
the Malaysians to tone down proposed resolutions in the steering group was
probably unsuccessful. The full conference, however, may tone down the
steering group's position if it can avoid being dominated by the Algerians.
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Political relationships among the developing states themselves are
evolving, and this may hold the most promise for less extreme demands
coming Out of Lima. Algeria has not gained any substantial economic
concessions for its a!l:es nor delivered much from it:, OPEC partners. Realiza-
tion of these facts may gradually weaken Algeria's strength as a visible and
vociferous advocate of economic change who has focused the attention of
the industrial world on the concerns of the Third World.
Actions in two different forums recently may signal the start of this
process. After African demands for accommodation of their concerns regard-
ing the poorer states were ignored at ECOSOC, the OAU heads of state in
Kampala rejected an Arab-backed resolution to suspend Israel at the ,e)a
General Assembly. Many African leaders opposed to the move against Israel
based their arguments on concern for the future of the UN itself. Africans ?n
Geneva, however, in a search for bargaining power, have specifically referred
to holding support or opposition to the expulsion of Israel "hostage" against
getting adequate attention paid to the problems of the poorer states.
Another factor militating against a strictly hard-line position coming
out of Lima may be the current world-wide depression in commodity
markets, although in recent weeks some upward movement has occurred.
The developing countries, in any case, are not united on an approach to the
important issue of commodity prices. There are indications that to the
developing states, ultimately, the stability of export prices may be more
important than rigid indexation schemes.
Nevertheless, developing countries of all stripes share a common set of
beliefs that their poverty is due to past exploitation and can be overcome by
persistent opposition to efforts by the industrialized states to perpetuate
trade and financial structures favorable only to the rich. The "radicals" and
"moderates" diverge only in their perception of developed country attitudes
to these beliefs. "Radicals" hold that the developed countries are con-
sciously hostile to development efforts of the poor, while "moderates"
believe that the international systen, works automatically to perpetuate
inequality. Moderates thus allow that some degree of cooperation with
industrialized states is both possible and necessary. The government-con-
trolled newspaper of the "moderate" Ivory Coast summarized this: "...the
alternative is not between the status quo and economic justice but between
peaceful and violent means to economic justice."
Developed Country Perspective
The main goal of the industrialized states-essentially the 24 members
of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development-at the 7th
Special Session will be to find a way to avoid a fight with the developing
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states. They will be careful, however, not tc concede too much, particularly
in areas likely to be expensive to them, or to compromise their stand for
future international meetings. They recognize the impact of a breakdown of
the Special Session on relations between rich and poor states-in and out of
the UN system-but are also mindful that the meeting is not an end in itself.
Most of the industrialized nations recognize that the results of the Lima
meeting will be critical to the outcome of the Special Session and have been
looking for ways to lobby for a conciliatory approach to the session.
For the developed states, the search for compromise with the develop-
ing states will focus on raw materials issues, where most industrialized states
feel they can come closest to satisfying developing country demands at the
least immediate financial cost. The demands of the developing countries for
special financial aid, transfer of technology, increased investment together
with reduced industrial country control over those investments will be
harder for most OECD countries to accept. The willingness of the indus-
trialized states to find a common ground with developing states on com-
modity issues will be reinforced by their desire to find ways to secure
reliable access to raw materials in the future.
Guaranteed access to supplies may nevertheless be less important a
factor in the thinking of the developed states than it was at the 6th Special
Session. At that time commodity prices were near historic highs, and the
recent success of the OPEC cartel in forcing oil price increases was viewed by
developed and developing alike as readily translatable to other raw materials.
In this atmosphere, under the leadership of a radical Algerian leader, the
developing states seemed cloaked in an aura of invincibility.
Since that time, however, commodity prices have fallen sharply-they
have recovered somewhat lately-and on further consideration many states,
both developed and developing, have come to realize that the industrialized
states are equally important suppliers of raw materials, that all industrial
states are not import-dependent, and that not all developing states are
exporters of raw materials.
Getting through the 7th Special Session without a serious fight would
allow the developed states to focus their policy toward the Third World in
more restricted forums where the developing states have not dominated as
they have in the UN. Except for relatively restricted meetings the developed
countries have been unable to achieve the same degree of unity as the
developing states.
One such forum which has been viewed as a model for cooperation in
other areas is the World Food Council. Established by the World Food
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Confere,.ce in Rome last November, the 36-member body was intended to
give practical effect to the resolutions adopted in Romc. Those decisions,
which aim at encouraging increased global food production and reserves, are
regarded by the developing countries as an example of what can be achieved
when rhetorical extremes are avoided.
Before the 7th Special Session, some developed states hope to set a date
to resume the conference of oil producers and consumers which collapsed
last April. At that time a coalition of developing states and oil producers
demanded that the conference be expanded to include talks on other raw
materials and the problems of developing countries. The industrialized
natiors resisted, but since then, most have accepted a US proposal that
would establish several parallel, but distinct, commissions to negotiate these
issues.
Setting a date for the new energy conference before or even during the
course of the Special Session would benefit the developed states in several
ways. It would allow them to point to a "concession" while, in fact,
channeling future talks into more manageable forums. Setting a date would
also steal some of the thunder from the nonaligned meeting and might even
help develop resistance to Algerian confrontational tactics. Any early
announcement might also strengthen the positions of states opposed to large
oil price increases at the September 24 OPEC meeting to consider oil prices.
The industrialized states, however, are not of one mind on development
or raw materials policies. Nor have they all prepared for the Special Session
to the same degree. Most agree on one point-shared by most developing
states: it is up to the US to take the next initiative. The Europeans and
Japanese feel that the US has consistently maintained the hardest line against
the demands of the developing countries, and they have only reluctantly
backed the US on economic issues in UN meetings; none, in fact, voted with
the US at the UNIDO meeting in Lima last April.
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The policy of the European Community toward the Special Session has
been in the planning stage since last year, but the only points on which the
Nine have yet agreed are essentially restatements of German policy. In late
July, the EC Council agreed to guidelines for a policy that would allow the
community to "examine" individual commodity issues and to endorse a
proposal to extend to all developing states, through the IMF, the EC's own
plan for helping to stabilize the earnings of developing countries from
exports of certain raw materials. Germany will insist that such a scheme be
financed through the sale of gold held by the IMF-something which seems
unlikely at present.
The OECD states agreed at a ministerial meeting last May to establish
high-level groups to examine raw materials policies and overall relations with
developing states. These groups, however, have done little to prepare for the
Special Session, having focused instead on the long term. This means that the
industrialized states will have to rely on ad hoc consultations during the
session to coordinate policy. It also means, however, that they will depend
on the US to take the lead in framing positive initiatives to keep a dialogue
going with the poor on development issues.
Notwithstanding the attempts of the industrialized states to avoid
substantial commitments in New York, real movement on raw materials and
development issues will eventually be necessary. If the moderate developing
states in fact do blunt the Algerian offensive at Lima and at the Special
Session, they will be on the spot to show other developing states that they
can gain concessions not possible through Algeria's confrontatio ial
approach. In the absence of any significant concessions, the radicals' argu-
ment for a return to confrontational tactics will be irrefutable.
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The Members of the Nonaligned and Group of 77
Membership of the nonaligned group (*) and of the Group of 77-the caucus of
developing states in the UN system-is difficult to estab;ish because neither group is
rigidly structured and because status of membership sometimes varies with changes
in political regimes. In addition, UN membership is not necessarily a prerequisite to
membership in either group. This list counts 84 members of the nonaligned group
and 105 members of the Group of 77. (UNCLASSIFIED)
*Afghanistan
*Ethiopia
*Mauritania
*Algeria
Fiji
*Mauritius
*Argentina
*Gabon
Mexico
Bahamas
*Gambia
*Morocco
*Bahrain
*Ghana
*Mozambique 1
*Bangladesh
Grenada
*Nepal
Barbados
Guatemala
Nicaragua
*Bhutan
*Guinea
*Niger
Bolivia
*Guinea-Bissau I
"Nigeria
* Botswana
*Guyana
*Oman
Brazil
Haiti
Pakistan
*Burma
Honduras
*Panama 4
*Burundi
*India
Paraguay
*Cambodia
* Indonesia
*Peru
*Cameroon
Iran
Philippines
*Cape Verde
* i raq
* Qatar
Islands
*Ivory Coast
Republic of
*Central African
*Jamaica
Korea
Republic
*Jordan
*Republic of
*Chad
* Kenya
Vietnam
*Chile 2
*Kuwait
*Rwanda
Colombia
* Laos
*Sao Tome
* Congo
*Lebanon
Principe I
Costa Rica
* Lesotho
*Saudi Arabia
*Cuba
* Liberia
*Senegal
*Cyprus 3
* Libyan Arab
*Sierra Leone
*Dahomey
Republic
*Singapore
*Democratic Yemen
*Malagasy Republic
*Somalia
Dominican Republic
*Malawi 2
*Sri Lanka
Ecuador
*Malaysia
*Sudan
* Egypt
Maldives
*Swaziland
El Salvador
*Mali
*Syrian Arab
*Equatorial Guinea
*Malta 3
Republic
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Thailand
*
*United Arab
Venezuela
Togo
Emirates
Western Samoa
*Trinidad and
*United Republic
*Yemen
Tobago
*
of Tanzania
*Yugoslavia
Tunisia
*
*Upper Volta
*Zaire
lUganda
Uruguay
*Zambia
1. New States that are listed as attending the Lima conference of nonaligned Jbreign ministers as
members.
2. Nonaligned members that are not attending the Lima conference.
3. Cyprus and Malta are members of the nonaligned group but not of the Group of 77
4. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam, North Korea, Panama, and the Palestine Liberation
Organization became members of the nonaligned group onAugust 2S, 1975.
Members of tho 0r9anization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
Australia
Iceland
Spain
Austria
Ireland
Sweden
Belgium
Italy
Switzerland
Canada
Japan
Turkey
Denmark
Luxembourg
United Kingdom
Finland
Netherlands
United Stat's
France
New Zealand
*Yugoslavia is a
West Germany
Norway
member with
Greece
Portugal
special status
(UNCLASSIFIED)
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