INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM: THE FOURTH NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000300060002-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 16, 2000
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: February 21, 1975
• Content Type: IM

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Intelligence Memorandum
The Fourth National People's Congress
"ftmotwo
Febr'u'Ary 21, 1975
No. 0071/75
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Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classifi: d by 005827
Exempt from general declassification schedule
of E. 0. 1 1652, exemption category:
? 5B (1), (2), and (3)
Automatically declassified
on: Date Impossible to Determine
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The Fourth National People's Congress
February 21, 1975
The Fourth National People's Congress (NPC), held in Peking between January
13 and 17, provides China with an approved government structure, a state constitu-
tion, and a government leadership succession, at least at the highest level. The long
delay in convening the Congress- it was to have been soon after the Ninth Party
Congress in April 1969 and the initial secrecy connected with it suggest that
leadership differences have yet to be ironed out. The congress was preceded by the
Comments and queries on the contents of this publication are welcome. They mai' be addressed to
25X1A9a code 143, extension 6507.
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Date:
Number of delegates:
Permanent chairmen
of Presidium:
Secretary general
of Presidium:
Chairman of Standing
Committee of NPC:
Vice chairmen of NPC
Standing Committee:
Major Reports:
January 13 to 17 in Peking.
Preliminary meetings held January 5 to 11.
2,885-of whom 2,864 attended.
At least one delegate died during the sessio,i.
23 persons, headed by Chu Teh.
218 deputies named.
Chu Teh.
22 persons.
Revision of the constitution-Chang Chun-chiao;
Regarding the work of the government-Chou En-lai.
Text of all documents can be found in FBIS Daily Report for China, January 20, 1975.
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second plenum of the "Tenth Central Committee, held January 8 to 10, which passed
recommendations to the congress on the composition of the leadership and the final
wording of the documents.
Chairman Mao Tse-twig did not attend the plenum or the congress; his absence
may have been related to differences with the dominant forces in Peking over how
hard to push the campaign against the military. The communique issued at the
conclusion of the congress makes relatively little mention of Mao personally. The
guiding role of "Mao Tse-tung Thought" was written into the new constitution,
however, and the chairman of the party was designated commander of the armed
forces. One provision of the constitution was included at Mao's behest, so he
obviously had a hand in drafting and approving the document. Whatever the reason
for Mao's absence, his health remains reasonably good, and he remains all active
political force.
The congress endorsed and codified the moderate policies of'recent years. The
new list of government leaders is headed by Premier Chou En-lai and composed
predominantly of order-minded civilian bureaucrats. The policy statements approved
by the congress stress moderation and continuity, and the constitution embodies the
essentials of current pragmatic economic policies.
The leaders of the ultraleftist forces, Mao's wife Chiang Ching and Yao
Wen-yuan, did not gain government posts. Indeed, with the exc' ptions of the new
minister of culture and the lowest ranking vice premier, it is difficult to identify any
doctrinaire leftists in the State Council. The constitution and the reports adopted by
the congress do, however, include some language and provisions that apparently are
a sop to leftist ideals.
The revised government structure has fewer ministries, which should improve
centralized control. The post of state chairman has been abolished as part of an
effort to increase party control over the government. Chow's report on the work of
government also underscores the prerogatives of central management and gives
special emphasis to comprehensive economic planning.
In all, the congress appears to have set the stage for a period in which stress will
be placed on pragmatic economic development goals rather than ideological debates
or open political struggle. The age and poor health of several of the top party and
government leaders, however, creates uncertainty as to the durability of the current
leadership arrangements. As each of China's aging leaders passes from the scene,
some readjustment of the distribution of political power will result. This process
could eventually affect the pragmatic basis of economic modernization policies.
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PREMIER
AGE
*Chou En-lai
76
VICE PREMIERS
*Teng Hsiao-ping
70
Rehabilitated civilian, runs
government on day-to-day basis.
*Chang Chun-chiao
6J
Shanghai party leader, acts as
party secretary general.
*Li Hsien-nien
70
Veteran administrator, former
finance minister.
*Chen Hsi-lien
62
Peking Military Region commander.
*Chi Teng-kuei
40s
Elevated from Honan Province during
Cultural Revolution; first Political
Commissar, Peking Military Region.
*Hua Kuo-feng
Late 50s
Hunan party leader elevated to Peking
in 1971. An agricultural expert, now
minister of public security.
*Chen Yung-kuei
Mid-50s
Leader of national agricultural model
Tachai Production Brigade.
*Wu Kuei-hsien
About 46
Helps represent youth and women on
Politburo. Actual power unknown.
Wang Chen
66
Former chief of Railway Corps and
land reclamation minister.
Yu Chiu-li
Veteran economic planner, heads State
Planning Commission.
Ku Mu
Probably in 60s
Veteran administrator, heads State
Capital Construction Commission.
Sun Chien
*Politburo member
iv
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MINISTRY'
NAME
DATE NAMED
REMARKS
Foreign Affairs
Chiao Kuan-hua
Nov 1974
Civilian veteran
National Defense
Yeh Chien-ying
Jan 1975
Military veteran
State Planning Commission
Yu Chiu-li
Oct 1972
Civilian veteran
Capital Construction Commission
Ku Mu
June 1973
Civilian veteran
Public Security
Hua Kuo-feng
Jan 1975
Civilian veteran
Foreign Trade
Li Chiang
Oct 1973
Civilian veteran
Economic Relations
with Foreign Countries
Fang I
April 1970
Civilian veteran
Agriculture and Forestry
Sha Feng
Nov 1970
Former soldier
Metallurgy
Chen Hsiao-kun
Nov 1971
Former soldier
1st Machine Building
Liu Shui-ching
March 1971
Former soldier
2nd Machine Building
Liu Hsi-yao
Jan 1975
Civilian veteran
3rd Machine Building
Li Chi-tai
Jan 1975
Former soldier
4th Machine Building
Wang Cheng
May 1963; first
Former soldier
re-identification
since Cultural
Revolution:
Jan 1975
5th Machine Building
Li Cheng-fang
Jan 1975
Former soldier
6th Machine Building
Pien Chiang
Jan 1975
Civilian veteran
7th Machine Building
Wang Yang
Jan 1975
Civilian veteran
Coal
Hsu Chin-chiang
Jan 1975
Civilian veteran
Petroleum and Chemical
Kang Shih-en
Jan 1975
Civilian veteran
Water Conservancy and Power
Chien Cheng-ying
Jan 1975
Civilian veteran
Light Industry
Chien Chih-kuang
July 1970
Civilian veteran
Railways
Wan Li
Jan 1975
Civilian veteran
Communications
Yeh Fei
Jan 1975
Civilian veteran
Posts and Telecommunications
Chung Fu-hsiang
Aug 1973
Civilian veteran
Finance
Chang Ching-fu
Jan 1975
Civilian veteran
Commerce
Fan Tzu-yu
Dec 1972
Civilian veteran
Culture
Yu Hui-yung
Jan 1975
Civilian
Education
Chou Jung-hsin
Jan 1975
Civilian veteran
Public Health
Liu Hsiang-ping
July 1973
Civilian veteran
Physical Culture and Sports
Chuang Tse-tung
Jan 1975
Civilian veteran
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The State Council, which includes the premier, vice premiers, and
government ministers, is a smaller and more streamlined body than before
the Cultural Revolution. There are now 12 instead of 15 vice premiers and
29 ministries instead of'40. Furthermore, three of the current ministers head
commissions, which normally rank below ministries in the government
hierarchy. Staff offices under the State Council, which were in existence
before the Cultural Revolution to oversee the workings of several ministries,
have probably been re-established in some form, but this cannot be directly
confirmed.
Chou En-lai remains premier. There had been speculation that he might
give up the post in favor of Teng Hsiao-ping, who has been running the daily
affairs of government since Chou's hospitalization. Instead, Teng is the
top-ranking vice premier. Since the Central Committee plenum preceding the
congress named Teng a party vice chairman and a member of the Politburo's
Standing Committee, he appears to be in a strong position to succeed Chou.
The next-ranking vice premier, Chang Chun-chiao, who is in his early sixties,
is now the logical successor to Teng, who is 70.
Only one of the vice premiers is a military man, whereas there were
four prior to the Cultural Revolution. Several vice premiers have consider-
able experience in economic planning and administration. Among vice
premiers are two persons who are more likely to be symbols than powers in
their own right--Chen Yung-kuei of the national agricultural model Tachai
Production Brigade, and Wu Kuei-hsien, the first woman vice premier. The
background of one vice premier, Sun Chien, is hazy. He is a worker from
Tientsin, apparently in his mid-thirties, whose actual role may be minimal.
I-Ie appears to have leftist credentials and is the lowest ranking vice premier.
Three ministers active in recent years were replaced; all had military
backgrounds. A number of the present ministers also have had military
careers, but they are almost certainly no longer on active duty. In all, the
military did not conic off well. In contrast to past practice, the defense
minister is not a vice premier. Another military man who was a vice premier
before the congress, Nieh Jung-then, was dropped. Moreover, Li Te-sheng,
commander of the Shenyang Military Region, lost his party vice chair-
manship and Politburo Standing Committer ranking at the plenum which
preceded the congress. Li remains a full member of the Politburo.
The new minister of defense, Yeh Chien-ying, is a close ally of Chou
En-lai. Yeli apparently held this post on a de facto basis since the Lin Piao
affair in September 1971.
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Hua Kuo-feng
tion. The document specifically
economic policies:
The minister of public security is
Flua Kuo-feng. By gaining this politi-
cally sensitive post, Hua continues to
improve his stature and becomes a man
to watch. Hua first gained prominence
during the Cultural Revolution but was
brought to Peking only after the fall of
Lin Piao; he was accused in posters last
spring of "suppressing the masses." The
power of the public security force has
been expanded to include police func-
tions. The Supreme People's Procurate,
which formerly exercised police powers,
has apparently been abolished.
The new state constitution is a
simplified document of 30 articles, as
opposed to 106 in the 1954 constitu-
codifies the fundamentals of moderate
? in agriculture, the production team, the lowest of the three
organizational levels within the commune, remains the basic ac-
counting unit, as has been the case since the failure of the Great Leap
Forward.
? Private plots and individual, non-collective labor are retained.
? Citing agriculture as the economic "base" and industry the "lead-
ing factor," the constitution maintains the economic priorities that
have prevailed since the Great Leap.
Compromise is evident in several articles. The right to criticize officials
and policies through public debate and wall posters, the retention of revolu-
tionary committees as permanent government bodies, and prohibitions
against arbitrary arrest and retaliation against those who lodge complaints all
appear to be sops to the political left. Citizens also are guaranteed the
freedom to strike-a provision included at Mao's behest.
Article 15 places the armed forces, including the militia, under the
command of the party chairman rather than the now abolished head of state.
The new provision is consistent with attempts to enhance party authority
over the military.
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The constitution in general asserts party supremacy over the govern-
ment apparatus as a whole. Unlike the former constitution, the new charter
states specifically that the NPC is under the leadership of the party and
performs its duties "on the proposal" of the party Central Committee.
A number of ministries and commissions have been abolished, and their
functions apparently havt- been transferred to other ministries. Two sensitive
commissions dealing with science and technology, for example, have been
dropped, although important work in these areas is undoubtedly being
carried out in the Chinese Academy of Sciences and possibly in other
organizations the Chinese have chosen not to reveal.
In several cases, various ministries were amalgamated. The former
ministries of education and of higher education have apparently been merged
into a single ministry of Education. The choice of minister seems to reflect
Peking's intention to put education, a politically sensitive area that has often
been a hotbed of leftist political agitation, under the control of moderate
elements. Chou Jung-hsin, the new minister, has long experience in impor-
tant State Council positions and in the field of higher education. Signifi-
cantly, he was the first of the new ministers to appear publicly with Chou
En-tai, thus signaling the premier's interest in improving the spotty perfor-
mance of China's educational institutions.
Concern over economic difficulties in the past year was reflected in the
establishment of separate ministries for coal and railways. Both ministries
had been subordinated to other bodies. The coal and railway industries have
experienced major problems recently, in part because of disruptions caused
by ~:hc anti-Confucius campaign.
Chcu En-tai's Report
Premier Chou left the hospital to deliver a long report on the work of
the government. He made some verbal bows to the political left, but the
report was basically a firm statement of moderate policies, with emphasis on
discipline and the prerogatives of the central authorities. Economic priorities
were spelled out clearly and authoritatively for the first time in many years.
The order of priorities-agriculture, light industry, and heavy industry-
suggests that current policies will be largely continued and that the military's
apparent bid for a larger share of the budget has been rebuffed. The speech
also strongly endorsed the central government's role in overseeing economic
planning.
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Chou praised both Chairman Mao and the Cultural Revolution-state-
ments that could hardly be avoided. He reiterated that criticism of Lin and
Confucius was the primary task. Chou noted that the class struggle not only
would continue but would become acute at times-an apparent reference to
the leadership struggle of the past year which did not rule out future clashes.
His emphasis, however, was on unity. While stating that hard blows should
be dealt to the handful of class enemies, Chou pointedly remarked that such
criticism must be carried out with "accuracy." This appears to be a slap at
those who raised charges against various leaders last spring.
Chang Chun-chiao's Report
Shanghai party boss Chang Chun-chiao gave the report on revision of
the state constitution on behalf of the party Central Committee. This
assignment is another indication that Chang is acting as party secretary
general, although he has never been identified in that post.
Youthful p arty vice chairman
Wang Hung-wen, who had presented the
report on revision of the party constitu-
tion on behalf of the party at the Tenth
Party Congress in August 1973, did not
gain a government post. While Wang was
seated on the rostrum in the Great Hall
of the People next to Chou En-lai and
with other party vice chairmen, his pub-
lic role was limited to observing the
actions of a congress dominated by men
who were active in the Chinese revolu-
tion before he was born.
Chang Chun-chiao
Chang's speech noted that the task
of revising the constitution had taken
nearly five years. His remarks were
closely tied to the provisions of the
draft, but he did provide a hint that
there may be friction ahead. Chang
noted that while state enterprises have
the form of socialist ownership, in some
cases leadership is not in the hands of
real Marxists and the worker masses.
The implication of this phrase is not
clear, but it may mean that new politi-
cal attacks may develop as the incipient
"New Leap" economic campaign
gathers steam.
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Chou on Foreign Policy
Chou En-tai's report on the work of the government, which contains
almost all NPC pronouncements on foreign affairs, reaffirms in clear teruls
established Chinese foreign policy lines and themes. Like his speech to the
Tenth Party Congress in August 1973-Chou's last comprehensive statement
of Chinese foreign policy-his report to the NPC artfully constructs a
practical and ideological foundation for a relatively pragmatic policy. The
report indicates that China's foreign policy has changed very little since the
Tenth Congress.
Chou used the formulation "Mao's revolutionary line in foreign affairs"
to characterize Peking's policy. This formulation refers specifically to
China's rapprochement with the US, to which Chou gave a positive assess-
ment. I-Ie said Lhat "owing to joint efforts of both sides... relations have
improved to some extent," despite continued existence of "fundamental
differences." The premier had also used the formulation "improved to some
extent" during the Tenth Congress, indicating that, in Peking's view, Sino-US
relations have remained at least on track during the intervening 17 months.
His acknowledgement that efforts
by the US as well as China have contri-
buted to improved relations appears in
particular to be a positive element. At
the 1973 congress, Chou did not use
this formulation, which is seldom em-
ployed by Chinese spokesmen. Peking
has used the terns "fundamental differ-
ences" in Most authoritative statements
relating to Sino-US relations since
Chou's speech at the Nixon banquet in
February 1972.
The premier said in his report that
Sino-US relations will continue to im-
prove as long as the principles of the
Shanghai communique are carried out
"in earnest." This first use of "in ear-
nest" in an authoritative Chinese state-
ment seems to imply that Peking ex-
pects closer attention to the terms in
the cor:nmunique for normalized rela-
tions. Chou, however, seemed to mini-
mize Taiwan as a serious source of irrita-
tion. lie mentioned Taiwan separately
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from the US and only briefly, using a standard formulation which is shorter
and less vigorous than the language in his report to the Tenth Party Congress.
In contrast to the party congress speech, Chou did not other the NPC
any justification for China's US policy. In 1973, Chou had implicitly argued
that Peking's opening to Washington was a "necessary compromise" between
ideologically disparate countries-like the Brest-Litovsk treaty engineered by
Lenin with Germany in 1918. Chou had also claimed in 1973 that the US was
strategically on the decline--by implication, less threatening toChina than the
USSR, whose policies were expansionist. The absence of any rationale at the
NPC suggests that the present course in Sino-US relations may now be under
less criticism within China.
Chou came down hard on the USSR and, as he had 17 months before,
held out only the barest hope for amelioration in Sino-Soviet relations.
Chou's treatment of the USSR was briefer than in 1973, and rather than
castigate individual Soviet leaders and policies, as he did then, he emphasized
outstanding substantive issues in state relations. Chou gave his remarks on
this issue a veneer of' flexibility, but he did not indicate that Peking had
altered its terms for reconciliation. He added that Moscow, far from helping
to ease the way toward more normal state relations, had taken steps to
worsen the situation-including promoting subversion against China and
provoking skirmishing along the frontier. As in 1973, the premier virtually
closed the door to reconciliation on the party level.
The premier clearly implied that, of the external dangers to Chinese
security, Peking remains primarily concerned about the threat posed by the
USSR. lie hinted strongly, however, that China believes a Soviet attack is
less likely now than at the time of the Tenth Party Congress. In his 1973
report, Chou had specifically warned that China should remain particularly
vigilant against a surprise Soviet attack, adding that China would "certainly"
counterattack. Such admonitions were absent from Chou's report to the
NPC and, although his formulations leave no doubt that Chou had Moscow
in mind, he did not explicitly name the USSR as China's greatest external
threat.
Chow's report in 1973 contained the first authoritative Chinese claim
that the Soviet threat was focused on Europe and that Europe had become
the main arena for "super power contention." His remarks to the NPC on
US-Soviet contention, while not as lengthy as his 1973 treatment of the
subject, depicted competition between the US and the USSR as having
reached new levels of intensity, thereby making a world war more likely and
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imminent than at the time of, the Tenth Party Congress. Chou's handling of
the war theme was the most authoritative treatment of a subject which has
been standard fare in Chinese propaganda for months. In private, however,
Chinese officials remain much less serious about the likelihood of war,
Suggesting that this line May have greater implications for Chinese domestic
rather than foreign policy.
On a related theme, Chou equivocated when he weighed the likelihood
of war or revolution, Saying the "factors" for both war and revolution "are
increasing." By contrast, in 1973 lie had quoted Mao's statement of may
1970 that revolution was the main international trend. In fact, Chou's
speech at the NPC appears to be the first authoritative Chinese statement to
modify this line, which has been quoted extensively for almost five years. It
is too early to say if the new formulation will now be standard.
Chou's remarks to the NPC on the so-called Second World-developed
countries of some stature but lacking the power of the US and USSR-re-
flected an evolution in Chinese policy since his report to the Tenth Party
Congress. At that time, the premier in vague terms had invited Second World
states to join China in a broad front aimed against the "hegemonism" of the
super powers. In his report to the NPC, however, Chou more clearly signaled
the high priority Peking places on good relations with Europe and Japan.
Chou explicitly pledged Chinese support to Second World nations who
oppose "super power control, threats, and bullying." He added that China
supports European unity and is prepared to work with Tokyo for stronger
Sino-Japanese relations.
Chow's speech dealt rather sparsely with the Third World, and his
remarks on this subject were largely pro forma, reflecting its relatively low
priority. He described the developing countries as the "main force" strug-
gling against super power hegemony, but he refrained from repeating recent
press themes which have played hard the idea of Third World economic
strength.
The premier's report reaffirmed China's relatively active trade policy,
which he did not address in his 1973 speech but which had come under sonic
fire in 1974. He made a brief bow toward the goal of self-reliance in
modernizing the economy, but he clearly supported the continued acquisi-
tion of capital equipment and technology from abroad. Indeed, the ambi-
tious economic goals he sketched for China by the end of the century could
not be reached without foreign technology. Chou said this liberal trade
policy in the past had strengthened China, enabling it to withstand Soviet
pressure and "imperialist encirclement."
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C'hina's aging leadership has now filled most of the gaps left by the
Cultural Revolution in the party, government, and military hierarchies.
Successors to Mao and ('hou have in effect been designated, although in both
cases there is some question as to their staying power. The man who ranks
behind Mao and Chou in the party, Wang Ilung-wen, is young, relatively
inexperienced, and resented by at least some older leaders. Teng I-Isiao-ping,
Chop's logical successor, is 70 and may succumb to the same enormous
pressures of running the government that eventually took its toll on Chou.
Moreover, Teng can probably never fully live down his purge in 1967.
Chang Chun-chino is next in line to Teng lisiao-ping in the government
succession, but the party succession beyond Wang Ilung-wen is cloudy. Teng
and Chang also rank high on the party side, and either could end up in the
top party job should Wang falter. Chang's increased stature is bolstered by
his recent acquisition of another post-head of the army's political commissar
system. Behind Teng and Chang conk several Politburo members whose age,
experience, and rank give them a real chance for party leadership over the
intermediate term.
On the military side, Defense Minister Yell. Chien-ying and several other
leaders of the Military Affairs Commission-the party's instrument for over-
seeing the military establishment-are
also very old. Politburo member Chen
I-Isi-lien, who commands the prestigious
Peking Military Region and is the only
vice p crnier who also is a soldier, re-
mains a prime candidate for military
leadership. However, he is almost cer-
tainly a politically contentious figure.
The Peking Military Region command is
a traditional hot seat, and Chen's future
is by no means assured.
In sum, significant progress on suc-
cession has been made, but an ironclad
succession arrangement that will stand
up has by no means been made. More-
over, a great deal of power has been
concentrated in the hands of a relatively
few leaders who hold ranking posts in
the party, army, and government. This
will probably increase central control
for now, but it could cause difficulties
over the longer run. When one of the
top leaders dies-or if one is purged-the
!'4,2 -0 regime will again be confronted with the
'reng Hsiao-ping
difficult task of tilling several important
vacancies.
-8-
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