WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020046-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 2, 2011
• Sequence Number: 46
• Publication Date: October 24, 1975
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
Weekly Summary
Secret
No. 0043/75
October 24, 1975
Copy N!
1399
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CONTENTS (Octob r.'?l, /975)
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SPAIN: FACING THE TRANSITION
The outlook for General Franco's survival
from th-, severe heart attack suffered earlier this
week remains guarded because of the danger of
another attack that is likely to be fatal. Even if the
82-year-old leader should linger on, he will lack
the stamina and ability to fulfill his duties.
If Franco clings to office and refuses to
transfer his powers to Juan Carlos, pressures will
mount for the government to invoke the .con-
stitutional provisions declaring the chief of state
incapacitated and invest Juan Carlos with these
powers. These procedures require recognition of
the chief of state's incapacitation by a two-thirds
majority of the cabinet, of "he advisory Council of
the Realm, and of the legislature. Prince Juan
Carlos would then be sworn in as king within
eight days. If Franco dies or agrees to a transfer,
the Prince would automatically succeed and be
sworn in, also within eight days.
to preserve order.
The overriding factor in the transition will be
the wish to preserve the image of national unity
by following the precise terms for the succession
devised by Franco. It is unlikely that any impor-
tant political sector will question efforts to
preserve this image of n,itional unity. In the event
terrorists and disaffected cLrnents try to prevent
an orderly transfer of power, the government,
backed by the Civil Guard, is exc.ected to be able
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WEEKLY SUMMARY Oct 24, 75
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USSR-FRANCE: A CHILLY '!SIT
The Soviet-French ";perial relationship"
looked a litre frayed around the edges at the end
of French President Giscard's four-day visit last
week. There apparently was less than met the eye
to the mid-visit changes in Giscard's schedule, but
the two countries are obviously having to strain
hard to find new areas of substantive agreement.
The principal documents signed by G,;card
and party chief Brezhnev were a brief formal
communique and a friendship declar_'tioi,. The
declaration speaks of the reed to deepen bilateral
consuilations, but does not formally change the
1970 protocol on consultations. It stresses the im-
portance of summit meetings and agrees to hold
them on a "periodic basis," which may be a step
toward formalizing the annual summt conclaves.
,;ie French endorsed the Soviet proposal to
convene a world disarmament conference,
probably because they regarded this as the least
painful way to appear responsive to Soviet
pressure on disarmament matters. The declara-
tion makes no explicit mention of the European
force reduction talks, which the French have
refused to join.
The declaration refers in glowing terms to the
European security conference, with both sides
pledging to implement fully all the provisions of
Party chief 11rezhnev greets President Giscard in Moscow
its final act. Another phrase, however, suggests
t`iat the implementation will he achieved through
"bilateral agreements and understandings," an
apparent nod toward the Soviet view that the
agreements made in Helsinki concerning im-
proved East-West contacts are not automatically
self-implementing.
The French made some progress, on
East-West contacts. The Soviets agreed to issue
multiple exit-entry visas for journalists alor,g the
lines of the US-Soviet accord, and also
agreed-unenthusiastically according to the
French--to consider convening a working group
to discuss improved working conditions for jour-
nalists.
Bilateral agreements were signed on
cooperation in civil aviation, tourism, and energy.
Most of these had been negotiated beforehand
and were intended mainly to ensure some tangi-
ble results from the talks. Sizable trade
agreements iere also signed, and Giscard said
that the possibility of increasing French oil im-
ports from the Soviet Union was discussed, but no
agreements were reached.
V'r-it would have been a routine visit at-
tracted considerable attention on the second day
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SECRET
when the Soviets abruptly postponed for two days
Giscard's talks with Brezhnev and the related
ministerial meetings. Some mystery still surrounds
this decision. The two leaders had differed over
the propriety of ideoiogical detente the night
before, and it is possible Brezhnev decided a
show of diplomatic pique was appropriate.
It is also possible that E rezhnev's health was a
factor. Over the past year Brezhnev's physical
stamina has waned. He can and does work quite
hard in spurts, but he apparently can no longer
sustain a heavy schedule over a long period. In
the ten days before Giscard's visit, Brezhnev met
with Portuguese President Costa Gomes, par-
ticipated actively in the three-day visit to Moscow
of East German party chief Flonecker, and con-
ferred with Syrian leader Asad. It is possible that
EUROPE COMMUNIST PARTY CONFERENCE
Delegations from 27 communist and
workers parties that met in East Berlin, on Oc-
tobc-r y and 10 apparently made some progress
toward holding a European conference of
communist parties. The Soviets evidently
decided that just getting the conference held
was more important than holding out for a
strongly worded and binding final conference
document. As a result, they apparently made
some concessions. A number of problems must
still be overcome before the formal conference
can be held, but the outlook for its convening
late this year or early next year has improved.
Although) Ithe draft
of the conference document presented in East
Berlin was more acceptable than its
predecessors, the East Germans were
nevertheless instructed to produce yet another
draft incorporating the comments and
criticisms made at the East Berlin mneeting. A
sub-working group will meet in East Berlin
sometime next month -o discuss the latest ver-
sion before referring it to an editorial commis-
he felt the need to slow his pace last week it vipw
of his busy schedule between now and the tarty
congress next February.
Nevertheless, newsmen who saw Brezhnev
on the closing day of the talks said he was looking
well. Despite the cold, he accompanied the
French President to the airport for his departure
and seemed animated and in good spirits.
By the end of the visit, both Soviet and
French officials seemed anxious to put to rest the
rumors of serious substar. ve or health problems.
Brezhnev brushed off his absence, saying it was
due to a cold. The impression remained,
nevertheless, that the Giscard-Brezhnev
relationship has not yet achieved the amicability
that existed between Brezhnev and Pom-
pidou.
Among the problems still to be resolved
are how to describe the relationship between
the communist and Western socialist parties,
and how to sell Moscow's interpretation of the
rlel-,;nki summit document. Independent-
minded parties such as the Italians, Romanians
and Yugoslavs still differ with the Soviets over
these points.
New Times, a Soviet foreign affairs weekly,
said the recent Berlin meeting was an "impor-
tant" step forward, but stopped short e`
predicting that a European Communist ce,.i-
ference is a certainty. By conveying a positive
impression of the conference preparations, the
journal is showing how the separate parties in-
tend to exploit its outcome. If a bland noncon-
troversial final document is eventually signed
by the European Communist parties, each wi',I
be able to cite those portions that accord best
with its own positions and to portray the con-
ference outcome as a victory for its own prin-
WEEKLY SUMMARY Oct 24, 75
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ROMANIA: MERCHANT FLEET EXPANSION
The Romanians are expanding their
merchant fleet so it can carry a greater share of
their growing foreign trade. It now carries about
30 percent of the country's seaborne foreign
trade. Since 1971, the fleet has newly doubled in
tonnage, adding about 500,000 dead-weight tons,
a major portion coming from Romania's own
shipyards.
D6mestic yards have supplied nearly 200,000
deadweight tons to the fleet since 1971, nearly all
of which are general cargo ships and bulk carriers.
Domestically produced tonnage represents nearly
40 percent of all acquisitions and 75 percent of dry
cargo additions to the fleet since 1971.
Over one half of Romania's domestic ship
production goes to other countries. Fostered by a
guaranteed Soviet market for its surplus products,
these yards export dry cargo vessels (o the Soviet
Union, bulk coal carriers to India, and semi-con-
tainer ships to Norway.
The current five-year plan began with a fleet
of 53 ships, totaling 595,000 deadweight tons. Ac-
quisitions during the first three years were
modest, totaling only 112,009 tons. The additions
of three Japanese-built tankers totaling nearly
260,000 tons and substantial other tonnage
brought acquisitions in 1974 to 373,000 tons. Total
additions for 1975 should go over 130,000 tons if
two bulk ore carriers are delivered.
At the end of 1970, general-purpose dry
cargo ships and tankers each accounted for about
one third of the fleet. The purchase of the
Japanese-built tankers brought the tanker inven-
tory to nearly 40 percent of the fleet by mid-1975.
Despite the acquisition of bulk carriers totaling
125,000 tons since 1971, their share of total fleet
tonnage dropped to 32 percent by mid-year. The
fleet's portion of dry cargo tonnage also fell
slightly to 28 percent during this period.
The 1976-1980 plan calls for an ocean-going
flee( of nearly 200 ships totaling 3.2 million
deadweight tons, an increase of i.8 million tons
over 1975. Tankers and bulk carriers will account
for much of the expanded tonnage. Planned
growth will allow Romanian ships to carry over 70
percent of its seaborne foreign trade by
198". 25X1
NATO-GREECE: TALKS TO BEGIN
On the eve of negotiations to restore Greece
to full partnership in the alliance, the outlook is
for protracted talks with chances for success
heavily influenced by whatever progress is made
in the Cyprus negotiations.
Athens' decision last summer to withdraw
from the military side of NATO, made after
Turkey's invasion of Cyprus, has never been fully
implemented. Greece now occupies a position
within the alliance somewhere between its
original commitment and the French example of
total military withdrawal. This may prove difficult
to alter because a modified Greek commitment is
generally suited to the present requirements of
Greek policy.
Surrounded by unfriendly neighbors and
lacking adequate means for its own defense,
Athens retains an interest in maintaining ties to
the alliance. Yet the present arrangement of
limited membership is acceptable to the Greek
public, which continues to hold the alliance
responsible for failing to prevent the Turkish ac-
tion against Cyprus. In order to free attention and
resources for the I urkish problem, Greece as
sought to convene a Balkan Conference that
would encourage good relations with its com-
munist neighbors. To guard against diploma-tic
and political isolation from its European alhec,
Athens has pledged fealty to Eurooc and
vigorously pressed its application for EC
membership. These efforts to buttress Greek in-
dependence nevertheless do not adequately
satisfy Greece's security requirements.
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The negotiations with NATO will focus on
two related issues: the renewal of regional com-
mand ties with Turkey and the restoration of
Greek forces to NATO command.
Prospects for restoration of Turkish corr.-
munications and overflight rights on the southern
flank appear good. There are strong iilitary
reasons for ending Turkey's strate'iic isolation,
and the allies are determined to bring pressure to
bear on Greece to satisfy NATO requirements as
well as Turkish needs. Athens has recently in-
dicated willingness to discuss these points.
Furthermore, Greek Prime Minister Caramanlis is
prepared to argue that such concessions do not
compromise a qualified Greek commitment to
NATO because this type of regional cooperation
satisfies Greece's own defense needs in the event
of an East-West conflict.
Restoring Greek forces to NATO command is
likely to prove more difficult. A substantial im-
provement in Greek-Turkish relations would be
necessary before this could take place.
Greece indicated recently that it is prepared
to soften earlier reservations regarding the com-
mitment of its forces to NATO cc-.mand, which
again suggests a new willingness to reconsider its
present position it tiie alliance. Evidence of a
Greek desire to retain substantial control over its
forces was also clear, however, in the failure of
the Greeks to clarify the precise terms of the new
Greek relationship.
Turkey has argued that unless and until
Greece agrees to submit its troops to the authority
of NATO's integrated command, Athens will not
have met the minimal political and military re-
quirements of an ally. The alliance itself is in
agreement on this point and is sensitive at the
moment to the need to emphasize allied political
unity. Accordingly, it will allow the negotiations
to go forward at a leisurely pace out of a prudent
respect for the political barrier- 'o Greek-Turkish
cooperation. The allies will continue to
emphasize that financial assistance and the con-
tinued commitment of tactical nuclear weapons
to Greece's defense depend upon an unqualified
Greek commitment.
Progress on the Cyprus question is clearly
critical to progress in the NATO talks. Yet Prime
Minister Caramanlis' assurances that a satisfactory
settlement of this question will enable Greece to
resume full military participation in the alliance is
probably exaggerated. Other problems, such as
the dispute over Turkey's rights in the Aegean,
are likely to continue to aggravate Greek-Turkish
relations. Under these conditions, Greece is likely
to seek to retain for a while the benefits of securi-
ty at seduced cost. In the long run, however,
Greece needs the alliance, and a return to
something resembling the original Greek com-
mitment seems likely, provided there is progress
in the Cyprus negotiations and some negotiating 25X1
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EGYPT-US: SADAT VISIT
President Sadat will arrive in Washington next
week in search of both a symbolic and a tangible
affirmation of a friendship that is now more vital
than ever to Egypt and to his own position within
Egypt. Sadat's leadership of the Arab world is
hanging in the balance as a result of the second
Sinai disengagement agreement. Even his position
at home, although apparently secure at present, is
vulnerable over the longer term.
He will use his trip to demonstrate to Egyp-
tians and to other Arabs the symbolic importance
of his success in winning the good will of the US
after years of estrangement. ro give substance to
the symbol, he will seek expressions of that
friendship in the form of economic and military
aid. He needs this aid to compensate for his grow-
ing isolation in the Arab world and, more impor-
tantly, to reassure his domestic constituents that
his foreign policy has not bankrupted Egypt.
Sadat's chief purpose in signing the interim
accord with Israel last month was to obtain a
respite from preparations for war so he could
devote total attention to revitalizing Egypt's badly
neglected economy. He will look to the US for
financial and technical assistance in overcoming
the many obstacles that confront this endeavor,
ranging from the immediate problems of an
enormous balance-of-payments deficit to the
longer range problems posed by bureaucratic in-
ertia and Egypt's inability to plan adequately for
ec - jmic development. Sadat will probably seek
a multi-year commitment for economic support,
US government assistance in attracting private US
investment in Egypt, and technical assistance in
orienting Egypt's socialist economy toward
greater liberalization.
Sadat will also ask the US for arms. The fact
that the US delivers arms to Israel does not in itself
bother Sadat; he recognizes this relationship as a
necessary inrredient in Washington's ability to
press Israel for diplomatic concessions. The fact,
on the other hand, that the US does not deliver
arms to Egypt as well does bother Sadat. To him, it
is a symbol of virtually the only thing still wrong in
the US-Egyptian-Israeli triangle: that the US still
putts Egypt in a second-class status and still regards
Israel's interests as more deserving of attention.
Sadat needs US arms, moreover, as a support
for his own domestic position. He has long been
subject to criticism from the Egyptian military es-
tablishment for so estranging the Soviets that
Egypt's source of arms and spare parts has been
endangered. The fact that he has succes',ully
used the concomitant improvement in relations
with the US to regain Egyptian territory-and has
at least begun the process of obtaining arms from
the West-has eased the criticism. Unless he ob-
tains US arms, however, he may come under
heavy criticism from the military for seeming to
condone US efforts to reinforce Israel's military
superiority while allowing Egypt to lapse still
deeper into a position of military in-
feriority. 25X1
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WEEKLY SUMMARY
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SPANISH SAHARA MOROCCAN MARCH
King Hassan accelerated preparations this
week for a mass march into Spanish Sahara by
350,000 unarmed Moroccans; the first groups may
reach the border early next week. Despite
Hassan's protestations that the march will be
peaceful,clashes could occur with Spanish forces
or with armed elements of indigenous Saharan
political groups that want independence for the
region. Both Spain and Algeria are clearly unhap-
py over the King's latest gambit in his effort to
annex the disputed territory.
The first contingent left by bus, truck, and
train on October 21 from Ksar es Souk in the Atlas
Mountains for Tarfaya. More than 500,000 Moroc-
cans reportedly volunteered to participate;
Moroccan authorities are said to have selected
only those physically fit to endure the trek. Most
of the volunteers seem unconcerned about the
hardships they will face, accepting on blind faith
that the monumental logistic problems will be
overcome.
By staging a civilian march, King Hassan
hopes to avoid a direct confrontation with
superior Spanish military forces. He has given
notice, however, that Morocco will fight in any
en-ounter with non-Spanish forces, presumably
meaning any Saharans and possibly Algerians who
might try to oppose the marchers.
Hassan apparently hopes to head off a debate
on the Spanish Sahara issue in the UN General
Assembly this year. Rabat's cause was seriously
weakened by the opinion issued last week by the
International Court of justice, which in effect en-
dorsed self-determination for the territory, and
the King probably fears that any General
Assembly debate would culminate in a new and
stronger resolution in favor of self-determination.
Morocco and Mauritania claim historic
sovereignty over Spanish Sahara and insist that
Madrid should turn the territory over to them on
the basis of the principle of territorial integrity.
The planned march is clearly intended to over-
come Spain's reluctance to settle the issue
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through direct negotiations with Rabat and
Nouakchott.
Contacts between Madrid and Rabat this
week have made some Spanish officials optimistic
that an agreement can be reached that would at
25X1
least reduce the tension surround'
ne th march
The King
restated in a speech or. Uctober 23 his intention
to proceed as planned.
Meanwhile, Spain petitioned the UN S'curity
Council to enjoin Morocco from staging the
march on grounds that it jeopardizes peace and
ignores the rights of the Saharans to self-deter-
mination. On October 22, the Council approved a
resolution requesting all parties to exercise
restraint and begin a dialogue. The resolution also
authorized Secretary General Waldheim to begin
immediate consultations to resolve the dispute. It
avoided, however, any direct mertion of Moroc-
co's planned mass march.
In El Aaiun, the Saharan General Assembly,
cimprised of indigenous tribal and religious
leaders, has condemned thz Moroccan march
and announced plans to resist the "invasion" of
their territory. The major Saharan political parties
in the territory-the Spanish-backed Saharan
National Union Party and the Algerian-backed
Polisario Front-have said they would stage a
countermarch north to the border. Both groups
probably have access to arms. Should either
become involved in clashes with the Moroccans,
the 12,000 ',15,000 Moroccan troops deployed in
southern Morocco might well iltervene. Such an
intervention could escalate and involve Spa;,ish
and Algerian forces in the area
Algeria, surprised by Morocco's move, has
begun a diplomatic and propaganda campaign in
support of self-determination for Spanish Sahara.
On October 20, the Foreign Ministry summoned
Arab, Islamic, and African ambassadors in Algiers,
presumably to stress that the Saharans' right to
self-determination must be respected, in keeping
with the Court's opinion and a recent report by a
UN fact-finding group. The Algerian Press has
labeled Morocco's policy as imperialism. On Oc-
tober 22, the government-controlled radio charg-
ed that Algerians living in Morocco are being
prevented from leaving the country and that
Rabat has suspended rail service between the two
cou ntries.
Algerian officials have indicated they would
pre'er a transition period in which Spain would
have a considerable role. This would be followed
by a referendum offerii,g a range of options from
independence to union with M.:,rocc3 and
Mauritania.
Algeria is also taking defensive precaut-ons
along its western border with Morocco. Although
Algiers will probably not initiate hostilities with
Morocco, its reinforcement of the border area
will exert pressure on King Hassan and may tie
down a large number of Moroccan troops. The
Algerians can be expected to provide arms to the
Po lisario Front and ossibly some
"volunteers." 25X1
Rabat
rrakeW . Mar 89-801A
.Oueuazate
Page 9 WEEKLY SUMMARY Oct 24, 75
Spain
F'~rtte
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LEBANON: NO SOLUTION
Intermittent and sometimes heavy fighting
between Muslim and leftist elements and their
Christian adversaries continued in Beirut this
week as efforts to find a political solution
appeared to be making no progress. The
economic damage from the long crisis is moun-
ting.
Most of the fighting was in Beirut's southern
and eastern suburbs, with particularly intense
clashes taking place between the Sunni Muslims
of the Ras an-Nabeh region and the Christians of
Ashrafiyah. Over the weekend of October 18-19,
the fighting also briefly t!-,reaened to spread to
the Ras Beirut section in the western suburbs
where many Americans live. Except for a few
minor clashes, Tripoli, in northern Lebanon, and
Zahlah, east of the capital, have remained quiet.
Kidnaping continued during the week with
both sides using mobile roadblocks as a means of
snatching members of opposing groups. On Oc-
tober 22, two USIA officials were taken from their
car by armed men at a roadblock in a largely lef-
tist-controlled southern suburb of the capital.
The Christian Phalanges Party opposes any
concessions to the country's Muslim majority. It
still insists that security be restored and the ques-
tion of "sovereignty"-a reference to the Palisti-
nian presence-be settled before constitutional
reforms are considered. Early in the week,
Phalangist leader Pierre Jumay;1l threatened to
pull his organization out of the national dialogue
committee, charging that attacks on Christian
areas of Beirut are intended to force the
Christians to make concessions. Saeb Salam, a
former prime minister and a moderate Muslim
leader, warned that if reforms were not made
soon, "the whole system will be swept away."
Lebanon's parliament reconvenec; this week,
and the question of its role in finding a solution to
the crisis will be intensively discussed over the
next few weeks. Interior Minister Shamun
believes the "recommendations" of the dialogue
committee must be endorsed by parliament as a
legally competent body. It is unlike;y, however,
that the politically impotent parliament will have
any success in resolving the conflict.
On the economic front, the fighting is rapidly
causing Beirut to lose its status as the business
center of the Middle East. Some major firms, such
as McDonnell Douglas and Bechtel Corporation,
have already pulled out. Bank of America, First
National City Bank, and General Motors have also
evacuated employees and their families.
If hostilities ceased, most of the firms would
probably return because there is no readily
available alternative to Beirut as a regional
business center. Athens is too far away, Cairo is
over-taxed and over-bureaucratized, and Am-
man, Kuwait, and other Gulf cities that would like
to replace Beirut cannot match its com-
munications network, highly trained work force,
or housing and educational facilities.
If the fighting goes on, some companies are
likely to co.isider controlling their Middle East
operations from outside the region and eventual-
ly may bypass Beirut altogether.
The impact of such a shift would be disastrous
for Lebanon. Physical destruction and lost tourist
and trade earnings are already estimated at some
$3.5 bi!Iion-nearly a full year's gross national
product. A loss of earnings from financial services,
transit fees, and other commercial services would
turn Lebanon's usual trade surplus into a chronic
deficit. Two thirds of the country's gross national
product is drawn from its services, primarily bank-
Page 10 WEEKLY SUMMARY n_t
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I SECRET
SYRIA-ISRAEL: GOLAN TENSIONS
The Syrians, while continuing their
propaganda attacks on tie Sinai accord, have
taken some military measures recently that may
be aimed at raising tensio is on the Golan Height;.
again. With the mandate of the UN observer
forces up for renewal at tl.e end of next month,
Damascus probably hopes to create as much ::n ?
certainty as possible about its real intentions until
then in hopes of prodding the US and Israel on
negotiations. So far, Israel's public reaction has
been low key, but Tel Aviv is clearly watching the
situation on the Heights closely.
Both the First and Third Syrian armored
divisions-the core of Syria's armored
strength-have been returning to their regular
positions near Damascus over the past few weeks.
They were sent to the northeast last spring at the
height of tensions with Iraq. In themselves, these
moves are not alarmin ~
Late last week, about two brigades of Syrian
troops, possibly unconnected with the movement
of th,, armored units, were also spotted strung out
on the road from Homs, north of Damascus, to a
point 25 miles south of the capital.
Israeli position on the Golan Heights
Meanwhile, there were reports in Damascus
last weekend that the Syrians are planning a
limited military operation of ~?hort duration to
seize some Israeli-held territory along the dis-
engagement line. Such a plan cannot be entirely
discounted. The Syrians could calculate that the
US would restrain the Israelis in order to keep the
fighting from spreading and jeopardizing the
Sinai accord.
On the other hand, the "plan" may have
been only a story delibe rely leaked by the
Syrians to increase tensions over the next few
weeks. The Syrians could hold exercises near the
front and call up some reservists, making it almost
impossible to tell a real operation from a bluff.
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WEEKLY SUMMARY Oct 24, 75
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The objective would be to force the US to step in
quickly to defuse the situation and refocus its ef-
forts on obtaining a Syrian-Israeli accord.
In a recent interview with it Kuwaiti
newspaper, Syrian Preside it As ad casualty dis-
missed the importance of the UN mandate,
stating that Syria would extend the mandate if it
were in its interests to do so, but that the presence
of the UN observer forces would not make any
difference if Syria decided to go to war. Asad's
remarks and those of other Syrian officia,s sugggest
that no official public decision on the 'Mandate
should be expected before late November.
The Israelis, or their part, may have in-
structed their forces on the Golan to adopt a
more aggressive posture to signal Da.-iascus that
Tel Aviv is fully alert to the cos i ill
fight:.ig.
ave e i erase y initiate a number of
minor incidents in the vicinity of the disengage-
ment line during the past few weeks.
Both the Israelis and the Syrians, in fact, have
recently committed an increasing number of
minor violations in the UN buffer zone. Last
week, two Syrian shepherds were killed by the
Israelis in a disputed part of the zone, and this
week the Syrians claim to have clashed with an
Israeli patrol. Such violations and provocations
are certain to keep both sides on edge and could
lead to more serious incidents
ANGOLA: DIM PROSPECTS
With less than three weeks to go before the
scheduled date for independence-November
11-the chances of a political settlement being
arranged among Angola's warring liberar;ion
groups still appear dim. Portugal may withdraw
from the territory without formally transferring
sovereignty to anyone.
After almost two weeks of new fighting, the
Zairian-backed National Front for the Liberation
of Angola has made some progress in northern
Angola, Front forces are now within 1. miles of
Luanda, the capital, which has hen controlled
since June by the Soviet-backed Popular Move-
m,:'t for the Liberation of Angola. Front troops
apparently have met less resistance than they had
expected.
Unless the Popular Movement's resistance
stiffens, the Front could be emboldened t,-) try
fighting its way back into Luanda. Since being
driven from the city, the Front has based its
strategy on the premise that its forces could riot
militarily re-enter the capital, but that they could
maintain a siege of the city that would be suf-
ficient to pressure th,. Movement into agreeing to
a coalition government.
In central Angola, forces of the Popular
Movement and of the National Urion for the
Total Independence of Angola have fought to a
standstill. The Pop,ilar Movement wants to cap-
ture Nova Lisboa, the headquarters of ,he
National Union, and the National Union wants to
recapture the port of Lobitz, which has been held
by the Popular Movement since August.
The reconciliation committee recently sent to
Angola by the Organization of African Unity
returned to Kampala on October 21 after conferr-
ing with the three liberation groups
!..;sbon is stilt trying to put together some sort
of coalition to take over on November 11. Earlier
this week, a high-ranking Portuguese cabinet
minister arrived in Angola to talk with liberation
group representatives. Barring a eke-over of the
government in Lisbon between now and in-
dependence by radicals who would recognize the
Popular Movement, Lisbon may unilaterally
transfer sovereignty to all three groL, s in the
name of the "Angolan people," leaving the final
solution to a r~militar struggle amon the libera-
tion groups. 25X1
SECRET
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`MEEKLY SUMMARY Oct 24, 75
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CANADA: TRUDEAU CHALLENGED
the (.rn.rdi.rn postal and sorters union has
quickly challenged the Inuieau governnrent's
new econnrni( prr)y,ram by shutting down post
offices in virtually .ill major cities. the r!niorr is
demanding salary ins reasrs far in excess of those
allowed under the control program. the
postal
workers' ac lion is aimed directly at the main goals
of the control plan which are to (heck excessive
wage iC1(reases and to refurbish Prince Minister
I rudeau's image is a "take-charge" leader.
the union, demanding .1 51-perc('nt increase
over a 12-m )nth I,eriod, rejected the recorrrnien-
(lations of a i offici.cl arbitrator for a .3f1-percent
wage increase' over a i0-month period. 1 he
governnrene was willing to grant the .3I1-percent
raise ev,?n though it exceeded the c ontrol
program's guidelines. A provision in the new
prchrarn grants exceptions for such raises to
workers whose jobs are closely related to those of
another group which recently has gained a more
favorable settler ivnt. Canada's other major postal
union, the letter carriers, received a _3f3-percent
v` age hike in A,rril.
The large wage settlements this year have
been it major factor contributing to Canada's in-
flation, WHO, is running at a rate higher than that
of most major industrial countries. The com-
petitiveness of Canadian goods ( n world markets
has been affected, and the nation's trade deficit
has grown rc.pidly.
Canadian labor leaders were quick to
recognize that Trudeau's economic program was
aimed chiefly at controlling wages. In addition to
the postal workers, several other unions have
threatened to ignore wage controls or to
challenge their constitutionality n the courts. The
Trudeau administration had hoped the first case
to come before its new Anti-Inflation Review
Board would deal with a rollback of prices in
order to convince labor of Ottawa's good faith.
The postal strike appears to have upset this
strategy.
lrudeau has staked his political future on a
hold program of ec onornic controls to c heck in-
flation and cannot afford to ha( k down. Members
of his own Liberal Party have threa;,'ned to call for
a special leadership convention at a party con-
ference nest month-a move,.ome observers felt
might have the support of 20 to 25 percent of the
conference delegates. Trudeau hoped to avoid
this h ow to his prestige as party leader by an-
nouncing the new economic program.
The postal workers ma" eventually com-
promise on a wage settlement along the lines of
the government offer. In the meantime, however,
Trudeau's political skills will be severely tested as
he seeks the necessary nationwide support for his
program and hip own leadership. A portent of
trouble ahead was 'ie defeat last week of
Trudeau's hang-picked candidate, Com-
munications Minister Juneau, who lost a by-elec-
tion in a working class Monti --I constituency that
had been held by Trudeau's Liberal Party for over
Page 13
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I Ili, I atir, Amer if an I ( ononlf( SyStem, ,1 new
S( helve for 4`( ollOIlli( irlt(Kl,ltioII .(dung I atln
.,ld (arihl)ean governments, was established .11 ,l
ministe. ial meeting in I'ananl,l on O ioher 17. I he
f)ro(ess That led finally to its forril,ll ( (ration
generated heightened sensitivity among ill(,
governrtn?nts to each other's politi(,ll -u?eds ,IS
well IS S( ).' new fo;nlulas for r('gi()na! coopera-
11011.
I I(?,l(lcluarl(?rti of SI I A will he C,uac.is, its
Se( rel,lry general IS a for met fin.ui (` minister of
I cua(Ior, and its starting adrniniStrative budget of
$400,000 will derive from a carefully contrived
dues-paying SySlem based on ,lhilit? to pay. tit I A
was shaped IS ,i fairly loose federation with
nunlem long-range goals, minirn,il strut tor(', and
sonic' con( rote plans for joint enterprise.
I he emergence of SF! A as a forum for prac-
Iical business and technical exchange among
members is largely the result of the resistance by a
bloc of nations to the visionary and ideologically
inclined motivations of its original promoters. The
oo-ton o1 sl I A wa?, Itr'.t adv,ull rd ovel I ye,lr ,Il;O
by nlexu u) I'r4'?J1f1?Ilt I I hr?vrrri,l, 114(414? a?, a
thel(,(4( ,II huortsii than 1 ( (III s41I ' i' I Ora
Vrnl'~uel,t'. I',4??,itl(?nt ( ,III()', Amitr??. I'r?1l'i, I
plop(4n1?nt (If I .lt111 orlity, a( tively supported Ih)'
t ( 4 11 ( e 1 ) I I he I II g Ily 11.111( )11 .111 %1 11 F.( )%'('I I In if 'I W,
w4?14?,Itlr,Il tell I() the fit opnsell (u1,,Inii,tl,) ! f,y it-.
ex( I11%inn (If 11 if I I) I)III 1111 IU?,I(If I (4I ( ul).I, ,ln(I IIy
till' r?xl)(?( Lofton III finan11.tl %trpp1u fl(;Ill wr?.(Ilhy
V4 n( iu( L1 Itr.tiil ,Ind st'ver,tl ()III(,( I (IUntrie?,
flit:Ilyd I111(?rest III 1h(? 5,tk4? Ut 1'Itll) Unity hilt
%V( It( ex( ee, It nf;Iy If 'I of 1.1111 1O If 't Ihr,n?,l'I vr?, h(?
tr,lllilrti ill yr?t lilt lhr'r I mitt( lvrrvi.ll Ihir(!-'\')1Id
.1%,.(1( 1,11If III Who )%(' 1IfIn( 11)al full IIf III Inil,bt he Io
1,111 al;ain?.t till' I iti.
Il.tlher I! an rolling with the 1)()liti(.11 Iid that
had often swa'pt thl'nl into una1111IMus positions
and re?.olunnns with whi( It they felt 11114 ornfor-
1,1h1e, the govern111ent5 of Braid, t Iruguay, Argen-
1111,1 and others industriorlsly parti( ip.'te(l in the
negotiations p1eparatury to SI IA's foundling.
I hey insistId on rules to prevent "! dec warns
from het ultliFig 111 )1l atory, Ill demanded
spec iti( gOals IOI the it garIIIat i()n, ant I the'
offered 5,01( )it% Grafts Uf charter language and
development prollosais. the (andid (-x( Imrige of
views ( re,ted an atmosphere of cooperation and
positive thinking, u) that the I,uge majority of the
members have come to view SFLA as a
business-like ass()( iation for formulating regional
str,uegy, setting up multinational corporations,
funding regional transportation and on)mUnica-
tion systems, and other practical ventures.
The experience is likely to attract the interest
of tile' less assertive 141)vern?ients in playing a
more active role in regional ,ltfairs. For the lighter
weight pretenders to regional leadership, the ex-
pcrienc e may prompt ,c:mv sober thoughts about
the wisdom of int,odut ing ( onfrontatiorml ISSUes
into regional bodies in view of the sharp political
different'. produced by the Lcheverria-Loper in-
itiative ar(I the unlooked for concern expressed
by some countries over the appearance of in-
stitotion.-,lited antagonism toward the
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BOLIVIA-CHILE-PERU
I),??.IIIIf IIit- Iof Iy rhr?Ioril ent.InaIIIIF ItoIIIIIIf,
ntecUng III I irn.t l.,st we,.k of the nnhtary Ivadr?r?.
of IIrrllvl.r, ( hilt-, and I'eru, the nnnl ontnlitt.II
joint ( urltnIOni(1ue c Ica, ly Indio .111??. Lu k (if agree
rnr?nl on Iwo ii,I?.rc issue-. involving the flit(',' An
dean nations it uui,Cl amts Iirnit.Ition and Bolt
vi.ul .(c I es% In Ih,? %1,.1
R,?L,'c?II I.rlk?, were held in I t I'.r, I,ist August
and in Santiago in ,.lily ',eptl?nlht?r, ,1 follow-up
-nrt?ting on .11111% limitation is %( he