WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020044-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 2, 2011
• Sequence Number: 44
• Publication Date: October 10, 1975
• Content Type: SUMMARY

 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/08: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020044-0
Secret
Weekly Summary
Secret
No. 0041175
October 10, 1975
Copy N!
1399
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The WEEKLY SUMMARY, issued every Friday morning by the
Office of Current Intelligence, reports and analyzes signifi-
cant developments of the week through noon on T"!ursday. It
frequently includes material coordinated with or prepared
by the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Srrategic
Research, the Office of Geographic and Corlograpl,ic
Research, and the Directorate of Science and Technology.
Topics requiring more comprehensive trentmont and there-
fore published separately as Special Reports are listed in
the contents.
CONTENTS (October /0, 1975)
1
USSR: Harvest Prospects Lower
25X6
4
USSR - East Germany: Treaty
25X6
4
USSR -West Germany: A Little Hel
6
Portugal: Military Dissidence
7
USSR-Portugal: Costa Games' Visit
7
Austria: Socialist Majority
8
Greece-Turkey: Reaction
9
Effects of OPEC Price Hike
MIDDLE EAST
AFRICA
10
Lebanon: Truce Shattered
10
Spanish Sahara: Moroccan Plans
13
Syria: Stiffening Posture
13
Angola: Getting Ready
14
Egypt: Student Critics
15
Bangladesh: Progress Report
16
Nigeria: Promises, Promises
WESTERN
HEMISPHERE
17
Uruguay: The Presidency
18
Argentina: Peron's Return
20
Latin America - US Relations
21
Surinam: Toward Independence
EAST ASIA
PACIFIC
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SECRET
USSR: HARVEST PROSPECTS LOWER
Widespread use of unripened grain for
forage, abandonment of low-yielding acreage,
and lower than expected lelds in the European
USSR have sharply lowered prospects for the 1975
Soviet grain crop. Production will probably be
only 155 to 165 million tons, even worse than the
poor harvest of 168.2 million tons in 1972.
Moscow over the next year will be searching
world markets for large quantities of both grain
and meat.
With the harvest nearly completed, more
than 15 million hectares of the total sown area of
131 million hectares probably will not be
harvested as mature grain. The loss of pasture and
forage crops because of drought apparently led
the Soviets to cut a large area of immature grain
for green feed or to use the area for grazing
livestock. The wide range in estimated production
of 155 to 165 million tons reflects uncertainty
about yields on this acreage.
Reduced prospects for the crop worsen the
already serious situation in both grain and meat.
Moscow has so far purchased about 20 million
tons of foreign grain. A crop of 160 million tons,
for example, would still leave the USSR more than
30 million tons below requirements for this
marketing year, ending June 30, even If the
Soviets draw from their grain stocks.
Moscow cannot find this much additional
grain in the international market and is taking
steps at home to cope with the shortfall. Official
data indicate that slaughtering of livestock has
begun, with inventories of hogs, sheep, and
poultry falling noticeably. Although this action
will yield a short-term benefit for the consumer, it
will have undesirable consequences.
? Because meat processing capacity
and storage are limited and the distribution
system is antiquated, substantial waste and
spoilage will result.
? To meet long-term plans, herds will
have to be rebuilt next year, jeopardizing
1976-77 consumption goals.
SECRET
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WEEKLY SUMMARY Oct 10, 75
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SECRET
/\rrlontin,r
Wlnsrt
;i00 /100
(,()r r l
f,00
SmIlhiun
!>00
Are.tr;rli;I
Wlrc;rI
')00
li;u ley
7!)O
C;ui ui i
Wlutirt
')00300
Iim Icy
200
Wlru,rt
700
Ru luy
700
Ullu r
TOTAL
I earl (tr,rirr;
3,050-3,300
'771un.unrds of (Olu
Moscow almost certainly will contract for
large amounts of foreign meat next year. Ample
supplies will be available from Argentina,
Australia, and the EC. Purchases of 1 million
tons-double the 1974 level-would cost the
Soviets an estimated $1 billion in foreign ex-
change and would provide a 7-percent boost to
Soviet domestic supplies.
The amount of uncommitted non-US grain
that the Soviets can still purchase for delivery by
July 1, 197E is only 3 to 3.3 million tons. This
assumes that traditional trade patterns are not
altered and current crop production forecasts
hold. The extent to which foreign exporters
oversell to the Soviets will reduce availability to
traditional customers. These customers would
seek to make up the shortfall by purchasing US
grain.
Of the total available supplies, only about
one third, or 1 million tons, is wheat and the
remainder, feed grains. The single most important
supplier is Argentina, with 1.3 to 1.4 million tons.
The Soviets and Argentines reportedly arc
negotiating a new grain purchase. Supplies
available for shipment by July 1 from other origins
are more limited.
By October 1, the Soviets had purchased
some 20 million tons of grain-10.4 million tons of
US grain and 9.85 million tons from other sources.
In future negotiations the USSR will likely find
itself competing with East European countries for
the same supplies.
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USSR - EAST GERMANY: TREATY
The 25-year friendship treaty signed by the
Soviet Union and East Germany on Tuesday is
another attempt by Moscow to legitimize the
division of Germany and to justify Soviet
hegemo;,v in Eastern Europe. It may serve as a
mode! for the future revision of corresponding
treaties with other East European states.
The new agreement replaces a 20-year accord
signed in 1964 that was to remain in effect unless a
German peace treaty was signed or Germany was
reunited. The Soviets clearly believe that the
Helsinki agreement is a surrogate for a German
peace treaty. Moreover, both the new friendship
treaty and Brezhnev's remarks preceding its
signature make plain that the European status quo
is now considered frozen and that any possibility
for German reunification, peaceful or otherwise,
is out of the question. References in the treaty to
East Germany as a "sovereign independent state"
reflect both sides' desire that East Germany's
enhanced status be internationally r ,;nized.
The treaty also includes language that asserts
the responsibility of all socialist countries to sup-
port, strengthen, and -defend "socialist gains."
This language was used to justify the Soviet-led in-
vasion of Czechoslovakia and has come to be
known as the "Brezhnev doctrine." By their selec-
tion of these words, the Soviets are telling the East
Europeans that there will be no fundamental
change in their relationship with the USSR as a
consequence of Helsinki.
The Soviets may also have been trying to
reassure the East Germans that they need not fear
the consequences of progress at the Vienna force
reduction talks. The Vienna talks were discussed
when Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko visited
Prague and East Berlin in late September, and East
Berlin's coolness to force reductions was evident
from its failure to follow Prague in specifically en-
dorsing Soviet efforts. Differences also cropped
up during Soviet Defense Minister Grechko's
talks with his East German counterpart in Moscow
immediately after the Gromyko trip. The East
German insisted that until "military detente" is
reached, the socialist community's military
strength must be increased. Recognition of East
German security needs was also stressed by party
chief Honecker and his fellow travelers in Mos-
cow, although Honecker did let slip a qualified
endorsement of the limitation, but not reduc-
tion, of military forces in Central Europe.
At the same time, the citation of the
Brezhnev doctrine and the great stress on
across-the-board cooperation in the treaty may
be intended by Brezhnev to quiet fears within the
Soviet leadership that the Helsinki agreement and
the Vienna force reduction talks will undermine
Moscow's grip on Eastern Europe. In an article in
Kommunist released on the eve of the Honecker
visit, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko clearly
stated that Moscow will raise the degree of its
cohesion with Eastern Europe to still higher levels.
If the new treaty with East Germany is intended as
a vehicle for re;:-hing this goal, invitations to the
Czechoslovaks. pales, and other East Europeans to
sign similar accords may be in the of-
USSR - WEST GERMANY: A LITTLE HELP
If one wants to be the West German
chancellor, he has to show people that he can
deal with the Russians. That essentially was what
Helmut Kohl, leader of the opposition Christian
Democratic Union, was up to during his recent
trip to the Soviet Union. By most acc unts from
West Germany, Kohl seems to have acnieved his
purpose-with a little help, probably inadvertent,
from the Soviets.
In the middle of the trip, Pravda published an
article severely criticizing Christian Social Union
leader Franz Josef Strauss, who was then being
feted in China. Kohl demonstrated his displeasure
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over the attack on his nominal political ally by
canceling his appointments for the following day,
but did not scuttle the trip. This earned him a
good press back home.
The Soviets claimed to be nonplussed by
Kohl's reaction, but it is not beyond them to have
intentionally run the article to test Kohl's mettle.
At the same time, they wanted to express their an-
tipathy to Strauss' political views. Indeed, Premier
Kosygin told Kohl that he agreed with the an-
ti-Strauss article 100 percent and would have
worded it even more strongly.
Kohl and other CDU members who accom-
panied him described his conversation with
Kosygin as frank, open, and constructive. Kohl
and Kosygin discussed Berlin and East-West Ger-
man relations, CSCE, MBFR, bilateral trade and
economic cooperation, family reunification, and
ethnic German emigration from the Soviet Union.
Kohl had not expected any breakthroughs, and
none was achieved. Indeed, the day after Kohl
left, Pravda published an article reiterating
customary Soviet opposition to West German ties
with West Berlin, and the Soviets are likely to re-
main cool to the pros ect of a change of govern-
ment in Bonn. 25X1
25X6
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PORTUGAL: MILITARY DISSIDENCE
The survival of Prime Minister Azevedo's
government, formed only three weeks ago, will
depend on whether the nation's leaders can curb
growing dissidence in the military rank and file.
Rebellious leftist units do not appear ready to give
in easily, and Azevedo may not receive enough
support from other government leaders to force
the necessary confrontation.
Military unrest has been centered in the ur-
ban areas of Lisbon and Porto, where the in-
fluence of the far left is strongest although by no
means dominant. In Porto, radical left-wing
soldiers took over a heavy artillery regiment early
this week in retaliation for the disbandment of
their unit last weekend by the chief of the
northern military region. 'The unit was broken up
after enlisted men voted to resist the transfer of
several leftist soldiers.
Units in the northern region are considered
to be generally conservative. The situation in the
Lisbon region, however, is more serious; govern-
ment officials fear that leftist troops could take
over the capital if they wished because there are
not enough loyal troops to prevent it.
Leftist activity in Lisbon has been spearhead-
ed by a radical light artillery regiment which
placed armed guards around its barracks-alle-
gedly to protect itself from a government move
to "annihilate" it. The unit commander, known to
have ties to the extreme left, has accused the
Socialists of trying to set up a rightist gov-
ernment.
The radical soldiers have banded together
nationally in such pressure groups as "Soldiers
United Will Win" and "Revolutionary Action of
25X1 Army Enlisted Men."
these groups are controlled by former prime
minister Goncalves and his pro-Communist
followers who hope to bring down the Azevedo
government through civil disorders. The military
have received solid support from various
far left s fringe groups who probably have donned
uniforms to give the impression of greater military
support in demonstrations.
The Communists kept a low profile during
the occupation late last month of radio and televi-
sion stations that was ordered by Azevedo in an
attempt to limit leftist influence in the media. At
that time, Azevedo's willingness to take decisive
action forced the Communists to either stand by
silently or risk breaking with the government. The
Communists now probably feel that the govern-
ment is losing strength, and party leaders are try-
ing to mend broken fences with the far left.
The Communists, therefore, are letting the
extreme left take the lead in challenging the
government, but the party is also clearly con-
sidering withdrawing all support from the present
government. In a statement last week, the party
said that order will return to the armed forces
only when all "reactionaries" are removed from
command positions. The Communists have also
contributed to current military unrest by joining
the protests of the light artillery regiment in
Lisbon and throwing their support behind the
steelworkers during their strike last Monday.
Azevedo's efforts to restore discipline in the
armed forces appear to be hampered because of
the President's lack of support. President Costa
Gomes-on his return from Moscow on October
5-appealed to the military to follow their com-
manders and not political leaders. He has not
backed up his rhetoric with any action, however,
and may privately be counseling Azevedo to
avoid a confrontation.
The rebellious soldiers will not back down
easily, and only a firm crackdown on dissident
elements-including the detention of key radical
leaders-appears likely to prevent the downfall of
the government. The extreme leftists have
learned over the past year and a half that if they
hold fast, their opponents will eventually back
down in order to avoid a conflict. The Com-
munists, who tend to side with whoever appears
strongest hope to benefit from the extremists'
strategy. Azevedo will need to show equal deter-
mination if he is to overcome this challenge to the
government's authority.
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USSR-PORTUGAL: COSTA GOMES' VISIT
Moscow treated the four-day visit of Por-
tuguese President Costa Gomes as a major event
and thereby demonstrated its desire to cultivate
ties with the Lisbon government. The Soviets'
ceremonious reception of Costa Gomes in-
evitably conveyed a degree of approval of the
Portuguese government, despite recent setbacks
for the Portuguese Communists; and it was this
aspect, rather than any tangible accomplishment,
that imparted some importance to the trip.
. Costa Gomes met for two hours with General
Secretary Brezhnev and with several other Soviet
leaders, including President Podgorny, Foreign
Minister Gromyko, Defense Minister Grechko,
and Foreign Trade Minister Patolichev. The results
of the visit, primarily political, were reflected in a
joint communique and in a separate declaration
signed on October 3.
The declaration attaches "special impor-
tance" to the principles of national self-deter-
mination and noninterference in the internal af-
fairs of sovereign states, reflecting Soviet criticism
of Western "meddling" in Portugal. The declara-
tion, however, specifically notes that its provisions
do not affect existing international obligations,
presumably including Portugal's NATO com-
mitments.
Both parties pledged to hold regular con-
sultations to develop Soviet-Portuguese relations
on political, economic, scientific, and cultural
matters. A reported agreement on long-term
economic cooperation may be the culmination of
year-long negotiations for Soviet economic
assistance to Portugal, but it appears unlikely that
Moscow has pledged substantial aid for any
specific projects. The Soviets evidently promised
to buy modest amounts of agricultural products
from the Portuguese. Poland-where Costa
Comes had visited before going on to the Soviet
Union-may give some work to the under-used
Portuguese shipyards.
tend to stabilize the relationship by creating for-
mal institutions and procedures much like those
the Soviets now have with other Western nations.
The Soviets probably think that this kind of evolu-
tion will give them entree into Lisbon without
aggravating concern in the West over Soviet ad-
vances in Western Europe.
AUSTRIA: SOCIALIST MAJORITY
The Socialists in Sunday's election polled
just over 50 percent and won 93 seats in the
183-seat Austrian .lower house. The main
challenger, the'Austrian People's Party, got 80
seats and the small Liberal: Party took 10 seats.
The breakdown is exactly the same as in the old
parliament:
The Socialists and the People's Party,
however, can claim a victory of sorts because
the redistricting of several seats prior to the
election had been expected to favor the tiny
Liberal Party. The Liberals' failure to register,
marked gains, in fact, constitutes a major set-
back for them. It is also at least a psychological
blow to the People's Party, which had hoped to
break Socialist dominance of the government.
The majority won by the Socialists clearly
shows that the electorate retains confidence In
Chancellor Kreisky's moderate policies, which
it views as the best guarantee of political stabili-
tv and economic well-being.
immediately following the election Kreisky
~1;t he would not form a coalition with
either ` :pposition party, -nor would he make
any changes in his cabinet before next year.
.;,,The "new'? government,wiil:be sworn in-later,
While the visit to the USSR and related
agreements create the potential for a further ex-
pansion of Soviet-Portuguese relations, they also
this month and parliarftent; is'ex ected to con-
vene on November 4. ' ;25X1
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GREECE-TURKEY: REACTION
Greeks and Turks have reacted in a fairly sub-
dued way to the partial lifting last week of the
eight-month embargo of US arms to Turkey.
Turkish Prime Minister Demirel may now feel
freer to deal with the Greeks on a Cyprus
settlement-especially if his party holds its own in
senatorial elections this Sunday.
Greek and Cypriot officials expressed regret
over the resumption of arms shipments, but
acknowledged that supporters of the move
believe it will facilitate progress toward a Cyprus
agreement. Greek-and perhaps some
Cypriot-government officials also may be com-
ing around to believing that the US action may in-
crease international pressure on Ankara to move
toward a solution of the Cyprus problem or, at
least, reveal Turkish inflexibility.
The press in both Athens and Nicosia was
critical of the move, but no significant anti-US
demonstrations took place. Tight security
measures were in force in Nicosia. Riot police set
up barbed wire barricades around the US em-
bassy in Nicosia in anticipation of violence, and
government officials reportedly threatened to ex-
pel students who participated in any
demonstrations.
Turkish Foreign Minister Caglayangil
characterized the lifting of the embargo as a
positive development but ruled out any im-
mediate change in the status of the deactivated
US installations. Such action will apparently hinge
on the as yet unscheduled negotiations for a new
US-Turkish defense cooperation agreement.
Ankara undoubtedly still hopes that the em-
bargo will be entirely lifted. Meanwhile, General
Staff Chief Saricar has expressed the military's
pleasure over even the partial move. The Demirel
government's cautious reactioi is probably a tac-
tic intended to avoid overplaying its hand prior to
negotiations with Washington.
With an eye to the partial senatorial elections,
Demirel was no doubt also wary of appearing to
"kowtow to the Americans," although he
probably hopes that even the partial relaxation of
the embargo will be viewed as a foreign policy
success. Opposition leader Ecevit, speaking at a
campaign rally, was extremely critical of the US
action, especially the US congressional provision
for joint consultation on opium poppy controls.
Turkey's senate election campaign so far has
produced little in the way of a meaningful
national debate on vital issues. The
politicians-apparently fearing that firm com-
mitments on such issues will only lose them
votes-have resorted to mudslinging, overblown
rhetoric and occasional violence to overcome
traditional popular apathy toward interim elec-
tions.
The absence of debate contrasts sharply with
the importance leading politicians attach to the
elections. Although the vote will have no direct
bearing on control of the all-important National
Assembly, it could give a psychological lift to the
winners as they approach the parliamentary elec-
tions which appear increasingly likely next year.
The US embassy in Ankara believes that both
Demirel's Justice Party and Ecevit's Republican
People's Party will improve on their performance
over the 1973 parliamentary elections, when
Ecevit's party won a small plurality. If such gains
for Turkey's two largest parties materialize, it will
be at the expense of the smaller parties, some of
which are on the verge of extinction.
Demirel has been under attack not only from
Ecevit but also fi.jm his coalition partner, National
Salvation Party leader Erbakan. The latter's recent
failure to cooperate within the government, and
his largely anti-Demirel campaign-designed to
project an independent identity for his Muslim
fundamentalists-will, according to the embassy,
probably attract about the same percentage of the
vote as the party won in 1973.
Demirel's party is risking an inordinately high
proportion of the seats at stake next Sunday-31
of 54; consequently, the outcome-as projected
by the US embassy-would be of primary benefit
to Ecevit. His party need only duplicate ii 1973
performance to win 25 of the seats; these were
last contested almost 10 years ago when the
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relative strength of the principal parties was much
different.
If Demirel's party equals or betters its 1973
performance, his hand in the coalition govern-
ment will be strengthened, and chances for
movement toward a Cyprus settlement would
thereby improve. If his party should falter, his
ability to promote a settlement will be further
OPEC PRICE HIKE
The 10-percent price increase decreed by the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
will considerably boost the payments deficits of
several major foreign industrialized countries. To
all of the major industrialized countries, the price
increase is one more obstacle to economic
recovery, although the direct impact on
economic growth and inflation will not be great.
An abnormally cold winter, of course, would
trigger higher oil imports and magnify the effects
of the price hike.
A Moderate Recovery
The latest increase in the cost of oil should
not prevent the six major foreign industrialized
countries as a group-France, West Germany, Ita-
ly, the UK, Canada, and Japan-from staging a
moderate recovery in real economic growth in
1976. The real gross national product of the six is
expected to increase at an annual rate of 3 per-
cent in the first half of next year. The higher oil
prices will drain more than $5 billion in purchas-
ing power annually from the six, equivalent to .3
percent of their expected gross national product
for 1976.
With a price increase of about 10 percent in
the wind for months, Tokyo, Paris, and Rome
have had time to factor it into their expansionary
programs. London has also taken it into account,
as did Bonn when deciding to retreat from
stimulative policies for next year. Canada is large-
ly self-sufficient in oil, so Ottawa's policies and
Canadian real growth will not be much affected
by the price change. The price increase will add
about .5 percent to overall wholesale prices in
coming months. Japan, Italy, and West Germany
will feel the hike most because of their greater
dependence on imported petroleum.
Oil import costs for the six had already been
rising because of the appreciation of the US
dollar, the currency in which oil prices are
quoted. This has added about .2 percent to overall
wholesale prices since June. The OPEC members
agreed in principle three months ago to switch to
pricing in special drawing rights; subsequent
strengthening of the dollar has influenced them
to put off any such action until December.
The price hike will raise the oil import bill of
the six by less than $1 billion in the second half of
1975. It will affect only about one third of the oil
imported in the period because of late implemen-
tation and the time lag on deliveries.
In the first half of next year, the price increase
will raise oil bills by $2.5 to $3 billion. The impact
will contribute substantially to current-account
deficits in France, the UK, and Italy. In Japan, it
will mean the difference between black ink and
red. In Canada, it will add slightly to an already
sizable current-account deficit. The rise in oil
costs is not likely to cause importers to cut back
the volume of purchases appreciably.
Impact on Developing Countries
The price hike, while causing some dif-
ficulties, will not seriously affect the developing
countries that are net oil importers. Their oil im-
port bill next year is expected to be $15.7 billion
instead of $14.5 billion. Three of the more ad-
vanced countries-Brazil, South Korea, and In-
dia-will absorb 40 percent of the total increase.
The impact on inflation in developing coun-
tries will be slight; domestic factors have much
more influence on price trends than the price of
imports. Exceptions will be some of the more in-
dustrialized states with few trade barriers, like
Hong Kong, where the oil-induced price rise will
about equal the inflationary impact in the
developed countries. 25X1
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LEBANON: TRUCE SHATTERED
The truce arranged through Syrian mediation
last month collapsed this week when major
fighting between Christian militiamen and
Muslim and leftist elements flared again in Beirut
and in northern Lebanon. The latest outbreak in-
creases the possibility that the major fedayeen
groups, which so far have not taken part in the
fighting despite their sympathy for the Muslims,
may be drawn in.
Heavy fighting erupted in Beirut on the night
of October 7 after five days of relative calm. The
next day fighting also broke out again in the
Tripoli-Zagharta area where the army has been
trying to maintain a buffer zone between the op-
posing forces. Lebanese authorities announced
on October 8 that all sides had agreed to yet
another cease fire, but rocket, machine-gun, and
mortar exchanges as well as small arms firing con-
tinued.
Once again the government has turned to
Syria for aid in restoring internal peace. Prime
Minister Karami conferred with Syrian President
Asad in Damascus on October 9, probably appeal-
ing to the Syrian. leader to attempt a new
mediatory effort. Syrian Foreign Minister Khad-
dam, who spent over a week in Lebanon last
month, may be asked to return to Beirut.
As the trouble drags on, Christian
President Franjiyah's prospects for remaining in
office until the end of his term next year are
becoming increasingly uncertain. Last week
Christian leader Raymond Edde and Muslim
leader Saeb Salam, members of a centrist bloc in
the Lebanese parliament, threatened to resign
fron :he 20-member national reconciliation com-
mittee in what appeared to be an effort to force
Franjiyah's resignation. They have not yet follow-
ed through on the threat, but the pressure on the
President to leave office is expected to increase.
Most Muslims would like to see Franjiyah replac-
ed at least by a Christian who is less identified
with the right-wing Phalanges Party. Many
Christians now believe that the removal of the
President is necessary to pave the way for a com-
promise that would grant the Muslims a greater
share of political power.
Prospects for any early solution to Lebanon's
basic problems are very poor. Most Lebanese ara
inclined to blame external forces for their coun-
try's troubles rather than to see them as stemming
from years of failure to address pressing social,
economic, and -political problems. The national
reconciliation committee met again on October 9
after a five-day break for the Muslim holiday con-
cluding Ramadan, but the new fighting forced the
committee to focus its attention on security
problems rather than the root causes of the tur-
moil.
The renewed violence abruptly halted the
trend toward renewed economic activity in the
capital that had set in during the lull. Banks were
again closed and all but a few shopkeepers shut
their doors. The cost of the intercommunal
fighting thus far this year to the Lebanese
econom is estimated to exceed $2.25
billion. 25X1
SPANISH SAHARA: MOROCCAN PLANS
King Hassan reiterated this week that he will
wait for an advisory opinion by the international
Court of justice before resorting to force in
Spanish Sahara. Morocco has taken unusual and
apparently related military measures, however,
that suggest King Hassan may be planning in-
tervention in Spanish Sahara.
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I SECRET
King Hassan Is also devoting more attention
to his armed forces to build up their morale and
confidence.
j25X1
Initially Hassan may limit military action to
forays against Spanish border posts, but with the
Spanish military still in the Sahara serious fighting
could develop. He has also demanded the return
of the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla in
northern Morocco, and they may becu,.e in-
volved as well. There is also potential for drawing
Algeria into the conflict. Mauritania, the other in-
terested party, probably will avoid any military in-
volvement.
Morocco may be trying to exploit what it
perceives as a moment of Spanish weakness in the
wake of widespread international criticism of
Madrid's campaign against terrorism. Hassan may
provoke a direct confrontation with Spanish
Spain
Madrid
CEUT
Canary Islands
o
c7 D
LeidAnlun.
Spanish
Sahara
aoudir
eroeco
Algeria
forces in an attempt to generate into national
pressure for mediation that he hopes would lead
to a Spanish withdrawal and Moroccan acquisi-
tion of at least part of Spanish Sahara. Most
Moroccans have supported Hassan on Spanish
Sahara, but if this gamble fails he would be
vulnerable to another coup attempt by the
military.
Hassan reiterated his intention last August to
acquire Spanish Sahara by the end of the year,
with force if necessary. Although he promised
then to await an advisor; opinion from the Inter-
national Court of justice on Moroccan-Maurita-
nian claims to the territory, he may have conclud-
ed that he has little time left to exercise his
military option. The court's decision may be am-
biguous or unfavorable to Morocco, and the
report of a fact-finding mission of the UN Com-
mittee on Decolonization is expected to favor in-
dependence for the territory. The Moroccans also
fear that collusion between Spain and Algeria
could generate irreversible momentum in sup-
port of independence.
Madrid has taken limited precautionary
measures to increase its capabilities to fend off a
Moroccan incursion into the Spanish Sahara.
Spain increased slightly the number of its air-
borne forces in the Sahara in mid-September and
has dispatched six F-5 tactical fighters and
reportedly some naval forces to the Canary
Islands.
inc u ding the maximum use of combined
air, artillery, armor, and infantry.
Most evidence suggests that the Spanish
military views the reported crisis with some skep-
ticism, although by Wednesday there were in-
dications the military was be inning to take the
situation more seriously .
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Although Madrid does not want to remain in
Spanish Sahara or fight a colonial war, Spanish
troops in the Sahara would resist a forcible evic-
tion. At the same time Madrid would appeal to
the UN to restore peace and ask Washington for
its support. Initially an armed conflict with
Morocco would unite most Spaniards and
provide a diversion from internal problems.
Prolonged fighting, however, would create
another divisive issue in Madrid. The military
would eventually disagree over the merits of
SECRET
fighting for a territory the government has already
decided to give up,
Algeria continues to support independence
for Spanish Sahara and Is backing the POLISARIO
Front, a pro-independence Saharan group.
Algiers has never advanced a territorial claim and
would probably stop short of direct military in-
ter-ention in the ev(-:nt of Moroccan aggression.
The Algerians would, however, create as many
problems for Morocco as possible. They could
support a sustained insurgency effort in the
Sahara, mount an intensive diplomatic effort to
denounce Morocco, renew support to Moroccan
dissidents, and move more troops to Morocco's
THE BALANCE OF FORCES
Morocco has kept approximately one
fourth of its more than 55,000-man army in
southern Morocco since mid-1974. We es-
timate that most of the 12,000 to 15,000 Moroc-
can personnel in the southern zone are tactical
infantry troops with some armor, artillery, and
air defense forces in support. Although the
army has established a command-and-support
structure In the south, the Moroccans would
nonetheless face considerable obstacles in
launching and sustaining a major offensive
against either Spanish or Algerian forces.
Spain,
muster enough force t c, defeat a Moroccan in-
vasion of Spanish Sahara. Madrid already has
some 16,000 army and air force personnel in
the Sahara, with 20,000 more located nearby in
the Canary islands. The Spanish have 51
medium tanks and 35 armored cars for im-
mediate armored support.
Spanish forces are better equipped and
trained than the Moroccan army. Madrid has
immediately available more than 60 subsonic
fighter-bombers and trainers, which can carry
limited armaments, plus two squadrons of F-5
tactical fighter-bombers and four squadrons of
Mirage III and F-4C interceptors from the air
defense command in reserve.
Moroccan air power is limited to some 20
F-5s and an';ther 20 or so Fouga Magister jet
trainers, R;.bat could only muster about half of
these for combat missions because of
maintenance problems and a shortage of
qualified aircraft crews.
Algeria's ground forces are about the same
size as Morocco's, but are better trained and
equipped. Algiers has the smallest number of
troops in the immediate area of potential con-
flict-only some 4,000 to 6,000 troops in
southwestern Algeria. The Algerian air force,
consisting of some 200 Soviet-built light
bombers, fighter-bonibers, and interceptors,
could be brought to bear quickly and could
well play a decisive role in support of Algeria's
SECRET
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SYRIA: STIFFENING POSTURE
The Syrians continued to lash out publicly at
Egypt and the Sinai accord this week. President
A,,ad took the lead in a televised address marking
the anniversary of the 1973 war. Asad also stated
bluntly that Syria would not engage in talks look-
ing toward another Syrian-Israeli accord unless
concurrent n,.,;ntiations are held with the
Palestine Liberation Organization.
A stiffening of Damascus' f ublic position on
the Sinai accord has become inc reasingly evident
over the past few weeks, but r:iis is the first time
Asad has insisted publicly on a direct link
between Syrian-Israeli negotiations and the
f ilestinian problem.
By now insisting in public on some kind of
linkage, Asad may not be ruling out the possibility
of a strictly military disengagement agreement.
But he apparently did intend t, indicate as
forcefully as he could that Syria is not prepared to
make the kind of political concessions Egypt did
unless Israel or the US is also ready to offer a
political quid pro quo by extending recognition
to the PI0 as a legitimate party to the peace
negotiations.
By taking this tack, Asad appears to have
restricted his room for maneuver, but the Syrians
are already so Pessimistic about the prospects of
obtaining anything substantial from the Israelis
that they probably believe they have nothing to
lose by assuming an uncompromising public
posture. Syrian chief of staff Shihabi indicated
privately last week that he questioned whether
produce results.
there was any point in Syria seeking negotiations
because, he said, there was no give In the Israeli
Oosition an(] the US had already expended what
leverage it had over Israel by paying such a high
price in aid for the Sinai agreement.
The Asad regime may now be trying to put
pressure on the US and Egypt to demonstrate that
they have not abandoned their efforts to work for
peace in the rest of the area. In the meantime, the
Syrians are unlikely to slacken their criticism of
the Sinai agreement or of the US and Sadat.
At the same time, Damascus is likely to try to
create as much confusion and uncertainty as it
can about Syrian intentions as the time nears to
renew the mandate of the UN forces on the Golan
Heights on November 30. Asad's remarks last
month to Newsweek about the possibility of Syria
resuming hostilities and the recent movement of
Syrian armored units back toward the Golan
Heights may have been intended to plant seeds of
doubt about Syrian military intentions. For the
time being, Asad probably sees no better alter-
native than to see whether these pressure tactics
ANGOLA: GETTING READY
After a brief standdown to build up their
supplies, Angola's three warring liberation groups
seem to be about to begin a fresh round of
fighting. The Portuguese high commissioner in
Luanda is still trying to find a po'itical accom-
modation that will spare Portugil h, ving to
transfer sovereignty on November 11 to the
Soviet-backed Popular Movement for the Libera-
tion of Angola alone.
In the north, the National Front for the
Liberation of Angola has begun to probe outlying
defense perimeters established by the Popular
Movement following the Front's recapture last
month of Caxito, some 40 miles northeast of
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I tranrla. Purlttguesr? nttlit,uy offs( ials believe the
I runt is preparing t major offensive with the ob-
jective of surrounding the ( apical city in the hope
that a siege will indtrc e the Popular Movernertt to
accept the I ront as a partner in a post-
independence government.
Central Angola may soon be( onw the s( ent?
of heavy fighting. force,. of the Popular Move-
ment are moving toward Nova I.isho,i, the head-
quarters of the National Union for the dotal
Independence of Angola. Clashes between the
two groups apparently have taken plate west of
the city, although neither side has made signifi-
cant gains.
I leretofore, both groups have refrained from
military operations in Nova Lisboa in order not to
impede the evacuation of refugees from the city.
The evacuation effort there ended on October 4.
It will continue in Luanda and several small ports
along the central and southern coast. Officials in
I.kbon estimate that 140,000 whites have been
removed from the territory since the program got
under way in early August; another 140,000
refugees are still waiting.
Last ~-."('kerid the Popular Movc- nivrit stated
publicly ag tin that it regards itself as the only
legi'rmate reprecrntative of the Angolan people
and that it has no intention of negotiating with
the other liberation groups. At a rally in Luanda,
Movement president Agostinho Neto said his
organization ;ritends to assume sovereignty on
Novembe; I.
In a desperate attempt to cut some ground
out from under the Popular Movement, the Por-
tuguese high commissioner on the same day an-
nounced that he was r"-establishing the former
transitional government. Ile then appointed as
co-premiers the same three senior represen-
tatives of thr? "-_.~'ion groups that had formerly
served in the defunct transitional government.
The high commissioner's gesture was
meaningless, inasmuch as the repre.enratives of
the National Front and National Union do not
reside in Luanda and the Popular Movement,
25X1 which is the real power in the city, will not allow
EGYPT: STUDENT CRITICS
Students at a (giro university used the of c a-
slon of a "N.rsirist I fought ( onferenc e," tinter) to
( oint isle with the anniversary of Nasir's death on
September 111, to level broad ( ritit isnt at the Sarl.rt
regime and to t,rll for a return to Nasirism. In the
midst of the c onferertr e, some students staged
the first puhlir protest in I gyps against the second
Sinai disengagement agreement. (;overnrnent of-
fit ials ?rre ( our ended that student tlist ontent will
her once more Irouhlesome when the s( pool year
.rpens next week and that the emotional lplwal of
Nasirism could he used to fuel further ( ritir sin
of
the government.
the student conference was riot primarily
concerned with the disengag(vnent agreement,
and the demonstrations against it were oe.ly .1 sill(-
show. The students' target was broader: They
spent several days attic king government polio ies
,tc ross the hoard and larnenting Igypt's turn away
from Nasirismi. To exploit this theme, till,
organizers arranged for three of Nasir'5 ( hildren
to attend and for his son-in-law to deliver a
speech. Other speakers warned against the
uleged dangers of the Bove; nrnent's efforts to
liberalize the economy and thus to overturn
Nasir's socialism, and they der ried corruption and
the rise of "nouveau riche capitalis:s." I gypt's
sole political party was denounced for its
rightward "reaction try" drift.
The governrnerit has suppressed virtually all
news of :he c onfrrene in order riot to fuel
further protests, and security fortes air alert to
the possibility of, and probably capable of h ?n-
Wing, disturhan( es that might act ornpany the
opening of the universities Nonetheless, the
students and leftist politic tans in( holed to
manipulate them base a real p(,'(?e'ial for c ausing
trouble.
There ue legitimate t(onomic griesances
that tefIists will probably att ?mpt to exploit, par-
tit ularly if the government c(,x?s not move q,nc kls
I( (tsr the respire brought by the diser,,'ag( merit
to bring tangible economic benefits to the pro-
ple. Moreover, leftists could use the amorphous
concept of N.rsirism to undermine the still
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widrsprratl support within Igyps for the ills
rriK,igrnir?nt agrrrrnrnt.
Hr( ,tun, the, dis? Iig.igr tornl has Itullrrl Ihr
underpinnings front Ihr pusiti,III of Arab
leadership Ihat Nasir built up for I gyl it, Sadat is
now more, vulrtrr,thlr' to rrnc)tional I Ih,ugrc that
in. is destroying file- Iryat y Irft by Nasir Su( h
( harKrs t mild have. .111 itnpa( I rVI'rt on Ihosr who
do not oppose, the, disrng.tgrmrnt agri'villvnt hilt
Who) (mild be, rttatlr to I)rlirvr ilia) things had
sot-how born brttr?r under Nasir.
I indoul)trdly in an effort to Iomrrtl din( ()(I.
4411 in I Kypt on lire'( isrly files(, grounds, both
Bonin and Syrian I)rol)agan(fist% invoked Nasir's
rnrmory rxtr?nsively in ( omrnrntar'rs on the an-
niversary of his death. This is not um-sual for
fslos( o.v, but I)arn.ts( us has not previously taken
note of the anniversary, and the Syrians were at
loggr?rhr. 1s with Nasir during most of his
BANGLADESH: PROGRESS REPORT
1 he gos ernment is attempting 'o projr?( t an
image, of a dr( isivr. honest reMirnr with a ( tine urn
for c evil librrtirs It has t irarly plat rd limits,
howrsrr, tin how far it will No for now in lihrrah7-
Ing political controls In foreign affairs, tile new
?aders have s( orr(f sorer diplomatic su( ( rssrs in
ire ent ssrrks
I ant ssrrk Prrsidrnt tilushtarlur made further
efforts to distinguish his gos "rr)rnrnt front thr late
Mulibur Rahman's regime, whit h had be( omr
higi. ly authoritarian prior to its fall in the ( oup last
August 'slushtayue announ(rd that 1,000
political prisoners had t>c?rn relrasrd and that a
high-irsrl (ommittrr will rr%irw the (harKrs
against other political detainees, He also an-
noun(rd that the ban on political activity im-
posed after the (oup will be lifted nest August
and that grn??ral rlr( )ions will be held in February
1977
I )r?spitr tltrsr ntr asurrs, tile, govrrnrnrnl is
,tti)arentiy still r?nfor( ing its tough rn,tttial law
rrgulatinns. Nvw arrrct s have, hrrn made,' in the
e antpaign to (nrtfisr,it ' Ihr large mrntbr?r of
wralt,trts illrg,tlly I)(-!,I throughout the, country.
At c meting to ()fit( i,tl statements, sin( e. tile,
program hryan in raid-Septr?rnbi-r over 1,' (K) i,'o-
ple, have, hrrn arrrstvd, and rnariv ( mild fa( I. a
dr?,itlt '.r?ntr?ncr. The govr?rnmrnt it%o ,ipparrnt-
!y is still holding stunt' of fslujih's ( lose, assor lairs,
who wi-ty rouncir(l up after the ( null)
I hrsr? tttr?asurr?s rrfir( I till' govrrnrnrrlI's
(lilt (If II twit internal sr( urity. A post ( oup
Ir?.tdrrship dispute, in the, ()fit( rr c ores ,tppr,us to
have, e,,tsr?:i at bast trrnlni oily, but their ate,
other prohlrrns It addition to Ihr pr?tsistrnt
Ihriat of Irrrorisnt by rrtrrmist groups, the
Iegime, is c o it urne,d ahou:t reports that armrd
supporters of Muijib are crrking revenge for (hr
t oup The government probably also rrali,r?s that
unless it shows some, p-ogrrss in dealing with the
( rnirttry's r( onoini( and 4n( ial problems pubiit
disrnc hantmrnt is irtrvitabIr
this rnonth Oa(ta tonehided agrrr?mrnts
with Islarnahit and Peking !o rstahiich full
dtplnmatt( eel ttions slips that rslushta(lur
hopes will lead !o et onomi( assistant r arid
in- trade, i ollrrving the r oup, Pakistan and
r Itirt~ y~r'r ?~,,,nn !hr el, ti ? , to r('iiij~riiji'
Ihr new govr?rnmrnt ( hina~had,nrsrr rrtog-
ni,rrd the \lulib n?girnr, and progrss toward for-
mal firs firs brhvrrn Pakistan and Iangladrsh
had bogged down (isrr -Nitrjib's drrnand that
I slamah.ttj first ((( rpt entire rrf ugrrs and agrrr to
a sharing of undnidrd Pakistan's assets 'slushta-
(p)r, it is ( Iran, agreed to drop the rrsnlution of
thrsr issues as a pre,( ondititin it, a (hplomati( rr-
( hang(-
Tile- Itrngalrrs will be (arrfut not to nsr ipIav
the important r of their new relations s ith
Pakistan and ( hina in ortf,^r to a~n,d prost>kirtg a
strong rra(ti(n from India, wilt( h is alrrady ton-
( ernrd ab(?u( the orientation of the new gui ern-
ment Mlushtarlur apparently n nervous user In-
dian intentions in hlangladrsh and has made
repeated attempts to reassure India as well as the
Peto 15
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SECRET
NIGERIA: PROMISES, PROMISES
Nigrri,i'?. nrsv rniltt.try Irgirnr Lt%I wrrk un-
vr?iIrri .t five dell I)()Iili(.11 Itroyr,tnl aimr?O at
restoring ( ivali.trl ri)Ie' within (n(tr yeaI%. iht?
Itrograot I?. an ('fforl In rr?SIn,r1(1 to (I1?martdc for a
Iinu?t,tIli- fru(n It tlif If l.t11t ( IVIli,trt group" 111.11
11.tvr? hr?rrl Unhal,I)) Sin( I. (,r?nrral (,owon'%
r ()Vernot(?rtt r(?n(?Nr(I 1.1"t
%r .u on its (trunticr to
and o'r?r (4rts('f h)' 14it,
11riga(lir?r fvlult,(rnntrd, who rrllla( rd (,uwon
hr,trl of ??t,+lr' it) a ( Daft 1.1%t f oky, outlined fill-
ItrnF;rarn in a ?.l,rr( h u11 ( )( t(a)rt I tn.trkirtg Ihr
1?,Ih m fmr?,?..Ily of `:1Er?r3.trl 3ndr?I,rnOr 8((r Il :rl:
.+ %r?r;r oI 1.trg(?I (lair': fr,r Ihr (omf(1('t r,tt 8(l ?It?I,%
?h?%IV, ned to (11nnnat(? II .1 I'rrnosrr If Ow
F(itrrrvlll-tit tr rI r, II?II ( i'.111.tn rrl)rr% r? r 11.111% 1?'.
? 11, I'll(, 1'1'1,, 1 nrss frdr?r,;l (on:13t(tl3nn
r. to hr (l rtfl' ,tr,?1 (,r is '.1.tf(?% within
'Vty,a tr,t': federal clatrnt rrt.l'~ f?r (rr.ttrrf
It Is t-n( It, it what III or, it IIIIt it y has In mind f(,r
Nigrria'c old-lint' polith( inns who still aspire It)
power and whoce cut-throat I)oliti( s led to two
military (ouln in 139)0 and a civil war a year later
Noor of these polith lam has .uu1-ort trans( end
ing .1 narrow Irihal or sr(IIonal bitsr. II t I I
rrgirnr is srriou: .;bout restoring ( ivilian rule, it
may well try to rn(ourage Ihr emergence of .1
ounger aril more nationalistic gtoul3 of f)olitit al
I"JdvrS.
Although Mttliammr(1 (It-( lare(I that the
military would not stay in off it r .1 day longer than
8(r( rcsary, flit- (r-r?Srnl Iulrrc (b?arly intend to
t onltnl the pa( v and Aire( tiun of their program.
\1uh.ttIII1r41 .41141 the Iuitrrrnr MiIitaIv ( 33(Jrlt iI
have cr-vrtl noti( r? that their m.,wriding ()it( ern
I-. flit, Irrr:rfvation of Ntyr?rian unit and Stability
tihotild Nigeri.t'% deep-cralr41 trih,il and rrgiot.al
anirnncrttrS tw(o 13' ct?rioil%ly inflamed as the
Ittotfarn i% inthlrmrntrd, the rrgirnr 13rohahly
N, t)f?25X1 %%r,ul41 not hecitalr to St rap tilt new Iimetahlr and
f rr,I f; .lhrJrd .118(1 tlril,ll.1fir-1,t Ir/r .ll rlr'r ,(111% vibe l(I militar rule Indefiflifely
held ^ r .,strtor?nf will It ?r he
( Ilocrn to aflf,rncr flit' draft ( onstit(tt on
? In ()(toiler 110-11 flit, tan (111 i1.,liti(.11
a(tn(trr : I% to hr lifted and Itolitt( ,11 ft,?rlir%
will ht, all(/ss ' J to mg.wiff.
? fig ( )( t(,hrr 1'071i ct.tr anti (t?Or?r. I
ii K,ii.tti, ~? ?'ir'.t'.,i.l h,ii ((.r%t' t/r'-!'fl flrt(1 ?(7
that l,os%rr c .+n I,r I,aIt fr?rrrI I to the rlr: 3rd
gosrt nn,rnt
'vtuhallntrd dud not addrr%% the question (if
the (1,3113( 1i1a11rrn of 'r3I(rria?c ra-irnlrtrc 3,3(15 311 a
rtr%% t n111an rc?knnr That nnu'Sul . along will the
()CA four-sear timr'ahlr and ac r ornp.3rling Cot.
trm(nn of the nine tray has on Iull(tt(,31 a(trs,trrc
for ,3t I, r1 '1.,-?r stow ', ears. rtl doubt ha% rrin-
for( rd 38)( c(.rf,U( 1Srr+ ()1 fof,nrr fH)Ittr( 1.331% and
thru followers th.tt Ihr It (I(Ii rs AIII honor its
I,3tctt Itrnrn(sr to return it) ihr barracks
Mohammed il%o gasr no hint aht,ut the shape of
future 11()hh(aI institutions or ihr, role Ihr military
en'.iuon% for itself under a ( ivtlra.t government
ILLEGIB
PnQ" 16
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Prrtidcnt ltoardahrriy
URUGUAY: THE PRESIDENCY
1)esWtr frequent (lashes with military leaders
over who makes policy, President flordahrrry has
managed -o riirrc tsr a large measure of control
over major drervons His performance is disprll-
tng fears that he would he rr%trictrd to a
c rrrmonial role by the h+ ,h command's dre Ivan
in June 1971 to atxalnrn traditional politics in
I'ruguay It now seems certain that national rlrc-
tions will not he held as scheduled in November
1976, and llhrdaberry will probably continue in
office beyond the eat?tr?tion of his currert term
in March 1977.
Since the military (1st became directly in-
solyed in running if e ge%-rnment. Bordaberry s
position has often appeared tenuous, Some
arrtrt?d forces officers `till want III(, military to
assume full control, but are hampered by their
own I,)( k of unity aril limited expertise in several
< roc ial areas of government operation;.
In it-( ent months Ilordaherry has become more
willing to c onfront the milhary high command on
key issues, p.:rtic ularly agriculture and economic
polity. llec,'use C ontprornices ,'ave allowed
c ivillan technocrats to retain ?tuthority in
ec ononric planning, flordaherry has received
c on?Jdrrable public praise. This acclaim has
engendered a new public confidence in llor-
daherry and given hint greater maneuverability
Not only does he insist on directing c?c onomic
policy, but he has also taken some significant
foreign policy initiatives. In recent months fior-
d, berry has met with the ( hirf executives of
Ilolivia, Paraguay, llra,il, and Chile for the pur-
post' of fostering improved economic and
political ties among the anti-Communist coun-
tries of the southern cone. Through these
meeting;, and their resulting bilateral
agrerrnc?nts, the Ilrtikuayan President hopes that
the region's economic infrastructure will he sub-
stantially upgraded and that the countries in-
volved will join together to countrrac t what he
views as an international Marxist-inspired
propaganda c ampaign against there
^s hra T?.puL grit and .rn:r of indc'pc'ndeni i?
have inc rraced, 11ordaherry has rndic atecl that the
scheduled 1976 presidential election must be
(arts elect to avoid returning to the "old politics."
but h a mor? scould satisfy most of the military
high t ommand her ause it would legitimize their
continued der; t role it, the government
This emerging system runs counter to
t'tuguas's tradition of denuar ratic participation,
hint her ause of recent politic ;I violrnc e and
or-4 uoomic stagnation, must Uruguayans seem to
be ssilung to go along with things as they are The
'.jounce and political turrncu) in neighboring
Amgcntina undoubtedly are added incCriticcc.
recent cursrv showed that the vast majority of
Uruguayans srrw rc onomic growth and domestic
tranqu.iitc as greater pr .arthrs than a return to
politycal normalcy
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ARGENTINA: PERON'S RETURN
The relative political lull during President
Maria Lstela I'eron'% absence from the capital has
given way to growing controversy centering on
her {)rospe(liv(' return, scheduled for next week.
While Peron herself has lost effective power and
is unlikely to gain it back, the question of who will
assume it permanently is of vital concern to all
significalll political sectors.
Presidential spokesmen have said that Peron
is well and plans to return to Buenos Aires on Oc-
tober 17 to address a mass rally marking Juan
Peron's rise to power. Some observers fear the
possibility of violence if dissident
Peronists-including the terrorist Mon-
toneros-should seek to disrupt the event.
the eventual disposition of effective power
will affec I most directly the current governing
team led by Acting President Luder, Interior
Minister Robledo, and Economy Minister Cafiero.
These three have managed to restore a measure
of confidence in the government's ability to func-
tion and carry out day-to-day administrative tasks.
All three realize that unless there is a satisfactory
solution to the political problem of Peron's status,
their ability to continue fu.ictioning will diminish
steadily.
Their concern is complicated by the fact that
all three are potential contenders in the presiden-
tial ,?Iection, scheduled for 1977, For this reason,
each has his own preferred solution to the
problem. Luder, for example, who is c`i;ef among
those who favor Peron's continued absence,
hopes to continue exercising presidential authori-
ty and build a case for his cventual election to a
full term. Rob. do, on the other hand, is said to
favor restoring Peron to the presidency, at least as
a figurehead, and thus removing Luder from the
scene. Cafiero, who so far has deftly avoided be-
ing identified with either side, would nonetheless
benefit from Luder's departure; he would this
have one less man to contend with.
T h c military, whose unity and
behind-the-scene influence on politics have in-
creased greatly in recent months, are eyeing the
situation with concern. Anxious to prolong the
relative effectiveness of the Luder team-par-
ticularly its efforts to centralize the anti-terrorist
stnir-le-the high command is dismayed at the
res, ng debate over Peron's role. Most of Its
amen, .?rs probabl favor her continued absence,
but would accept her return in a ceremonial role.
Though the officers still favor it constitutional
solution, they are more likely than before to in-
tervene o{)enly should political struggles once
again paralyze the government.
Top labor leaders also have an important
stake in the resolution of the President's status.
Peronist union chief Lorenzo Miguel is chief
among those favoring her retention in the
presidency. He has been challenged, however, by
another leading unionist, Buenos Aires province
governor Calabro, who is increasingly considered
a presidential contender. Calabro, who has tested
the political waters by calling openly for Peron's
ouster, has contributed to a major split within
tabor.
There is consideraHe sentiment within the
main political parties either for the President's in-
definite absence, or her definitive departure.
Indeed, the action of her own party some months
ago in choosing Lt Ier as Senate president, thus
placing him next in Inc .of succ^ssion, constituted
an early and important expression of antagonism
to her. The chief opposition party, the Radical
Civic Union, has prop')sed advancing the date of
the presidential election by some six months. The
Radicals clearly hope to capitalize on popular dis-
gust with the Peron administration and feel that
unless el,!c;ions are held soon the chance! of a
military coup will increase.
Much will depend on Peron herself. She
appears determined, at least for the moment, to
retain some role. Both Robledo and Luder visited
the President this week, the former probably urg-
ing her to accept a ceremonial role and the latter
recommending a longer rest. If she feels com-
.)elled to assert herself to comply with a sense
of duty, her attitude could go a long way toward
provoking the military.
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LATIN AMERICA - US RELATIONS
Latin American governments, especially
those of the more advanced countries, in various
ways are revealing the tentative nature of their
recent moratorium on criticizing the US.
Latin response to the improved negotiating
climate at the UN and in other arenas of the rich-
poor debate reflects both relief at the break in
tension and deep skepticism of Washington's in-
tent to follow through on proposals and prin-
ciples it has enunciated. Most Latin Americans
agree that Washington's presentations at the UN
this fall have opened the way to negotiation. But
while they wish to exploit fully any "give" in the
US position, they seem to regard new frictions as
inevitable.
Official and media commentary reflects Latin
doubt about Washington's "political will" to
make any real sacrifices in the process of assisting
the have-not and developing nations. Reactions
have varied in detail, but certain common themes
reflect the Latins' reluctance to move out on a
limb of optimism. They remain chagrined over
their experience two years ago when they
overenthusiastically greeted the offer of a new
dialogue within the hemisphere and then had to
wait in line while Washington dealt with more
pressing concerns elsewhere. Gains in their
dealings with the US will have to be tangible
before they begin to accept new US offers as
sincere.
Brazil's Foreign Minister Azeredo da Silveira,
who made some proposals of his own at the UN,
returned to Brasilia criticizing the US proposals as
"cosmetic" and suggesting that the US still fails to
comprehend the seriousness of the world's
economic disequilibrium. He also offered some
"advice" to the US in its relationship with Africa,
warning Washington against recreating there the
frustration and bitterness felt in Latin America
because of unfulfilled US promises.
Silveira appears to distrust the offer of a
renewed producer-consumer dialogue, claiming
that the problem is not raw materials but the
protection of all products of the developing
countries, whether primary or manufactured
goods. He complains that the US and other
developed countries have the wherewithal to
protect themselves both as producers and con-
sumers and that the existing framework serves
only the wealthy nations. Trade, he says, is the
centerpiece for meaningful negotiations, and
new rules must demand legal, not merely moral,
obligations toward the poor and aspirant coun-
tries. The Brazilians continue to feel stung by what
they regard as protectionist US attitudes in trade
matters. Brazil feels, for example, that its shoe in-
dustry, now that it has become competitive with
the US, has been "punished" by US trade
regulations.
Venezuelan officials have cited US proposals
as positive but expressed suspicion about certain
"contradictions" and annoyance with US criticism
of oil producers. The Venezuelans object to the
number of new organizations envisioned to im-
plement proposals, suspecting that they are ad-
vanced as a delaying tactic. They resent
Washington's insistence that codes of conduct of
transnational companies must be met by stan-
dards of behavior for the governments hosting
such enterprises. They question the principle of
expanding raw material resources in the lesser
developed countries, pointing to the conflict with
their own conservationist efforts. The
Venezuelans speak openly of their doubt that the
US has the determination to come to grips with
the many difficult issues involved in adjusting the
world economy.
Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay
have in varying ways expressed Latin America's
concern that this region, more advanced than
most of the "Third World," can be the loser in the
current international focus on the need to help
the poorest countries. Slowly but deliberately,
they are formulating the needs of "middle-in-
come" nations. Uruguay has recommended, for
example, the establishment of special standards
for loans and fund ng to medium- and high-in-
come nations.
While the Latin Americans will probably be
more inclined than some other regional groups to
go along with and even assist US initiatives that
they see as positive, they will look closely at every
detail that might affect them
adversely. F -1 25X1
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SURINAM: TOWARD INDEPENDENCE
With Surinam's independence still scheduled
for November 25, pre +arations have been
delayed for over a month by a deadlocked parlia-
ment, and neither the government nor the op-
position seems ready to make concessions.
The Progressive Reform Party, Surinam's ma-
jor opposition group, has been on the defensive
since its surprise electoral defeat in November
1973. It represents the urge East Indian communi-
ty, which fears that under the present leadership
Surinam is becoming dominated by the creoles
(blacks). Faced with losing Dutch protection
following independence, the East Indians have
become even more apprehensive.
The balance of power' has shifted in recent
weeks, however, following the defection of three
non-creoles from the predominantly black ruling
coalition. The three have joined with the
Progre?;ve Reform Party's 17 legislators to give
the opposition a majority in the 39-member
Staten (parliament).
Jagernath Lachmon, the leader of the opposi-
tion, now is heading a delegation in the
Netherlands, where the Dutch Parliament is
attempting to resolve a few remaining bilateral
issues before Surinam becomes independent. He
Haiti
Panama
Surinam
i tPenmariba
r\ *(Fr. Guiana
will use his party's new position of strength to try
to secure Dutch support for a Surinamese con-
stitution that would protect the rights of the East
Indians.
Recent efforts aimed at working out a com-
promise have failed because of intransigence on
both sides. A prominent member of the
Progressive Reform Party has encouraged
Lachmon to be more conciliatory and to consider
joining a new governing coalition, but his en-
treaties have been rejected and he has since been
forced to go along with Lachmon's hard-line
posture. The Staten chairman, who is a respected
member of the ruling coalition, also has un-
successfully tried to get the opposition to agree to
a compromise political formula. The government,
however, has not openly demonstrated a
willingness to compromise.
It is still possible that a settlement can be
reached that would allow a peaceful transition to
independence, but prospects have diminished
over the past month, and it appears increasingly
unlikely that the present schedule can actually be
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PHILIPPINES: HEADS COULD ROLL.
When President Marcos decided to celebrate
the third anniversary of martial law with a
dramatic purge of civilian and military
bureaucracies, he hoped the shakeup would rein-
vigorate his New Society programs. The manner
in which he carried it out has created con-
sideraLie uncertainty among his subordinates and
has led to intense political lobbying that may ul-
timately cause more problems than he an-
ticipated.
Some of those allegedly fired for corruption
or malfeasance in office were apparently the vic-
tims of high-level political infighting and not real-
ly wrongdoe,?s. Others, who were justly named,
may ultimately get the decision reversed because
the-, have protectors in important positions in the
palace circle. This has caused a general air of con-
fusion and a case of nerves within the govern-
ment as jittery functionaries try to figure out
where they stand with the President and his con-
fidants.
In addition to the wide-ranging civilian purge
already under way, Marcos also plans to weed out
some military officers. He is expected to an-
nounce soon a dismissal list that will include not
only malefactors, but also those who should have
retired long ago.
Several motives may havt been behind Mar-
cos' original action. Although he is under no
strong domestic pressure to move against corrup-
tion, he is sensitive to criticism both at home and
abroad that the New Society differs little from
previous regimes in either its actions or its cast of
characters. Marcos may also have seen a chance
to increase his personal authority over the c 'lian
and military bureaucracies and to reminu his
close associates that their positions depend on
him personally.
Despite the accompanying ballyhoo, the final
outcome of the great housecleaning may be
largely cosmetic. Some of the big fish who are
removed may well remain powers behind the
scene, suffering only the loss of their titles, and
others will probably receive lucrative sinecures.
Marcos will have to move soon to counteract
the image that his purge is creating of an in-
discriminate and unplanned shakeup. The -d-
parent ineptness is already leading to criticisn of
the President's leadership. Moreover? Marcos 'ill
want to reassure his followers, particularly in t e
military, that their vital interests will not b
threatened by his reforms. He depends on the
military to remain in power, and if thf: present up-
roar creates serious doubts in their minds about
his continued willingness to repay their to alt it
could over time erode his ower base.
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