WEEKLY SUMMARY SPECIAL REPORT NEW CHALLENGES FOR SOUTH AFRICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000300020020-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 1, 2011
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: April 25, 1975
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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Secret
Weekly Summary
Special Repor
New Challenges for South Africa
Secret
April 25, 1975
No. 0017/75b
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SPECIAL REPORTS are supplements to the Current Intelli-
gence Weeklies issued by the Office of Current Intelligence.
The .ipecial Reports are published separately to permit more
comprehensive treatment of a subject. They are prepared by
the Office of Current Intelligence, the Office of Economic
Research, the Office of Strategic Research, and the Direc-
torate of Science and Technology. Special Reports are co-
ordinated as appropriate among the Directorates of CIA but,
except for the normal suht>tantive exchange with other
agencies at the working level, have not been coordinated
outside CIA unless specifically indicated.
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Since the coup in Portugal a year ago led Lisbon to decide to give up its African
colonies, the South African government has faced now problems and opportunities
in its dealings with black Africans. In an address to the South African Senate six
months ago, Prime Minister Vorster said the black African states and South Africa
had come to a crcssroads between constructive cooperation and violent conflict. He
promised financial and technical aid to any African country that would agree to
co-exist on a basis of mutual nonintervention in domestic affairs. Vorster said his
government was anxious to maintain South Africa's economic ties with Mozambique
after it became, independent, to participate in efforts to resolve the Rhodesian
problem, and to-prepare the people of Namibia (South-West Africa) for self-determi-
nation.
Three days after Vorster's speech, Zambian President Kaunda welcomed this
"voice of reason." Kaunda said the time might be ripe for constructive cooperation
since South Africa's ties with Portuguese colonialism had been dissolved. Kaunda
placed priority on resolving th.e Rhodesian problem, and proposed South Africa start
the process by withdrawing its military support for the Smith regime. Zambia, he
said, would welcome progress toward self-determination in Namibia, provided'it led
to the independence of the territory as a unified state. In recognition of the
entrenched white-controlled system in South Africa, Kaunda's 'comments about
change there were less specific.
A Quandary in Rhodesia
Lisbon, Pretoria, and Salisbury had long
shared a common interest i.. kcep,ng the bulk of
southern Africa under white rule. To the black
Africans, this was an "unholy alliance," but it had
always been more apparent than heal. Solid col-
laboration had been inhibited by mutual distrust
as well as by different approaches to their com-
mDn racizl problem. Portuguese and Rhodesian
officials fedred South African predominance in
any joint venture, while Rhodesians and South
Africans (hared a basic contempt for Portuguese
counterinsurgency capabilities.
A month after the Portuguese coup, Rh'-
desian Prime Minister Smith visited Vorster to
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discuss the effect of an early grant of independ-
ence to Mozambique. Their joint press conference
after the talks made it appear that they saw eye
to eye and that both would welcome an
independent black government in Mozambique,
provided it was stable and maintained construc-
tive relations with Rhodesia and South Africa.
Smith and Vorster drew different inferences
from such a take-over. Vorster recognized. as
Smith did not, that a black government in
Mozambique would nullify South Africa's
strategic interest in maintaining white control of
Rhodesia. Smith's break with Britain in 1965 had
posed diplomatic problems for Pretoria; the
South Africans, for example, never officially
recognized the breakaway regime: They did
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provide discreet economic, financial, and military
support to Smith because a white-ruled Rhodesia
was regarded as a buffer against black insurgents
who might operate against South Africa from
Zambia or Tanzania. A black government in
Mozambique would, however, permit such in-
surgents to outflank Rhodesia.
Both Smith and Vorster understand that a
hostile government in Mozambique may block
Rhodesian or South African trade that now flows
through Mozambican ports. Vorster perceives that
Rhodesia is much more vulnerable to these
dangers than South Africa. Loss of access to
Mozambique's seaports would be a crippling blow
for the Smith regime, but merely a temporary
setback to the South Africans. The bulk of Rho-
desia's overseas trade flows through Beira and
Lourenco Marques, and rerouting through South
,African ports would be prohibitively expensive.
Lourenco Marques, however, handles only one
fourth of South Africa's overseas trade, mostly
from the Transvaal mining and industrial area. A
new South African port is scheduled to open in
1976 that will further reduce the present impor-
tance of Lourenco Marques to South Africa.
Black Insurgency
Mozambican support for insurgency, a
remote contingency for Pretoria, is a present
danger for Salisbury. The Rhodesian guerrillas
who have been active in northeastern Rhodesia
since late 1972 infiltrated through Mozambique
from bases in Zambia and Tanzania. The Front
for the Liberation of Mozambique has held out
hopes to the Rhodesian insurgents that, after
Mozambique becomes independent, they may
extend their infiltration routes along Rhodesia's
entire eastern border with Mozambique. Smith's
security forces, dependent on a limited pool of
white reservists, could not expand sufficiently to
cope with a major increase in guerrilla operations.
Last June, the prospect of early independ-
eisce for Mozambigje apparently encouraged the
leaders of the African National Council, the
largest black political organization in Rhodesia, to
reject Smith's proposals for a constitutional
settlement. Smith hed offered to broaden the
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franchise gradually for Rhodesian blacks, who
outnumber whites 20 to 1, but in a way that
would have kept them from gaining a majority in
Parliament for at least 40 years.
Smith countered with an election in which
his party won all 50 of the parliamentary seats
allocated to whites. Black candidates who sup-
ported the council's rej'ction of the Smith
proposals won 7 of the 8 seats allocated to the
some 7,000 blacks who are allowed to vote.
Zambian President Kaunda is a man with a
strong preference for peaceful rather than violent
change, and a Rhodesian settlement has become
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for him a matter of increasing urgency. Zambia
has not been able to offset the economic cost of
its boycott of the Smith regime since Salisbury's
break with Britain'. Even the Tan-Zam railroad,
when it is completed next year, will not fully
compensate for the stoppage of Zambian ship-
ments over Rhodesian rail lines to Indian Ocean
ports in Mozambique; port congestion in Tan-
zania will still delay Zambian shipments.
The mutual interest of South Africa and
Zambia in a Rhodesian settlement brought
Vorster and Kaunda together last October to seek
a way to end guerrilla warfare and copen settle-
ment negotiations. From then on, the mediation
effort has grown to involve Tanzanian President
Nyerere, President Khama of Butswana, and
Samora Machel, head of the Front for the Libera-
tion of Mozambique.
Since November, Kaunda, Nyerere, Khama,
and Machel have met repeatedly with the rival
Rhodesian nationalist groups, while Vorster has
kept in close touch with Kaunda and Smith. The
combination cf sustained pressures-Vorster on
Smith, and the four black mediators on the Rho-
desian nationalists-has brought progress toward a
negoiiated settlement:
? In December three Rhodesian insurgent
groups merged with the non-insurgent African
National Council.
? A few days later Smith and the leaders
of the enlarged council agreed to a truce.
Implications for Pretoria
While V o rster has pushecr -and pushed
hard-for Smith to come to terms with Rhodesia's
backs on early majority rule, he has no intention
of allowing majority rule in South Africa. Most
South Africans, ;ncluding Vorster, concede that
racial discrimination exists in their country, but
they have also convinced themselves that
anartheid, when perfected, will eliminate the
most galling aspects of discrimination.
In the South African view, the Rhodesian
situation is quite different from theirs; when the
white Rhodesians rejected the South African
courae-apartheid-many years ago, they made a
multiracial society inevitable. The South Africans
believe that Salisbury must, as a result, either
move toward majority rule at a pace that satisfies
Rhodesian blacks or face a dangerous insurgency
supported more actively than before by neighbor-
ing black African governments.
The Smith government, in an effort to mak.
sure that South Africa does r of desert white
Rhodesia, has maintained conl acts with right
wingers in Vorster's Nationalist Party who share
Salisbury's views. Nevertheless, ,he efforts of the
right wingers to bring `: orster to view the cause of
Rhodesian whites as identica,' with that of South
African whites have been unsuccessful.
? In early February, Smith began meeting
with the council leaders to try to arrange for
the constitutional conference that was called
for in the truce agreement.
In order to force both sides to observe the
cease-fire, the black African mediators have scaled
down their support for the Rhodesian insurgents,
and Vorster has cut back his support for Smith's
counterinsurgency teams. The black mediators
told Rhodesian insurgent leaders, who wanted to
retain control of their individual guerrilla forces,
that all future aid would go to a newly unified
command structure.
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A Challenge on Namibia
The loosening of Portugal's grip on the reins
in Angola has serious implications for Pretoria's
ability to deal with any unrest that might develop
in Namibia (South-West Africa).
Dissident Ovambo tribesmen, who inhabit
northern Namibia adjacent to the Angolan
border, found that Portuguese security forces in
Angola, after the coup in Lisbon, were no longer
apprehending refugees and handing them over to
South African police. By mid-1974, an Ovambo
exodus to Angola was under way, and a large
number of the refugees moved on to Zambia,
where some 3,000 now live in refugee camps.
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Some of the Namibian refugees in Zambia
are said to have joined the insurgent South-West
African People's Organization, which has main-
tained a headquarters in Zambia since its para-
military structure in Namibia was destroyed by
Pretoria in 1966. The membership of the organ-
ization is limited almost exclusively to the
Ovambo tribe, the largest of 11 non-white groups
in Namibia. Although militarily ineffectual, the
group challenges Pretoria's control of the ter-
ritory, advocating independence for Namibia as a
unified state. It is the only Namibian political
group to have gained support from the Organiza-
tion of African Unity and several UN bodies.
In August 1973, agents of the South-West
Africa People's Organization initiated an effective
boycott of Ovamboland's first popular election to
select a legislative council. Only 3 percent of the
eligible voters turned out. Despite this warning,
the South African government continued to back
the territory's traditional tribal leaders and to
suppress the dissident organization. Last Septem-
ber, however, the branch of South Africa's ruling
National Party in the territory announced that it
would eventually hold multiracial talks on the
future of the territory and called on all non-white
ethnic groups to choose spokesmen for the Talks.
Keeping a Promise
Subsequently, Pretoria announced that a
new election would be held in January 1975 for
the Ovamboland legislative council, and that the
People's Organization would be permitted to par-
ticipate. The new election seems to be intended as
a first step toward selecting genuinely representa-
tive Ovambo spokesmen for multiracial talks.
Vorster apparently had decided to move toward
eventual self-determination for the whole of
Namibia, as he promised UN Secretary General
Waldheim in early 1973.
Vorster's concept of self-determination does
not, however, anticipate the independence of
Namibia as a unified state, despite successive UN
resolutions to this effect. Vorster's preparations
for self-determination still resemble, in fact, the
National Party's blueprint for the separate devel-
opment of the- major tribal groups within bu..th
Africa itself. He has implied that Naiwula might
become independent as ci federation of separate
homelands for each ethnic group. Under such a
scheme, the white residents would have direct
control of the southern part of Namibia, where
the territory's most valuable mineral resources are
situated, and possibly retain indirect control of
the whole federation.
Because the Ovambos make up roughly half
of the territory's non-white population, the
smaller tribes, who already fear Ovambo domina-
tion, might be induced to support the whites
against the Ovambos. In the event that the
Ovambos choose to stay out of a federation, the
90,000 white residents of the territory would be
the largest of the remaining ethnic groups. Fur-
thermore, an independent Ovambo state may be
regarded in Pretoria as a useful buffer between
the federation and a possibly unfriendly, inde-
pendent Angola.
Zambian President Kaunda, who clearly
shares Vorster's desire for political solutions in-
stead of violent conflict, has long feared South
African military reprisals for Zambian support of
guerrilla strikes into Rhodesia or Namibia.
Kaunda is, for example, convinced of Pretoria's
complicity in laying the land mines that have
occasionally exploded in Zambian territory
adjacent to Namibia and Rhodesia.
It is unlikely that Kaunda or the other
Africans who have been involved in the
Rhodesian mediation efforts would explicitly
disavow the UN call for independence of Namibia
as a unified state or the OAU policy of supporting
the liberation struggle of the South-West African
People's Organization. Vorster might at least
succeed, however, in dissuading the black leaders
from stepping up suppcrt for Namibian insur-
gents. He might argue that the Rhodesian truce is
a valid precedent for Namibia, because it was
accepted by both sides before agreement on con-
stitutional terms was reached.
Divide and Conquer
Vorster's senate speech last October suggests
that he will attempt to turn any discussions from
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political issues to the mutual advantages of eco-
nomic cooperation, highlighting the economic
and technical aid that South Africa is prepared to
extend to black Africa.
Vorster probably has no illusion that the UN
will come around to approving his version of
self-determination by May 30, 1975, the latest
deadline set by the Security Council for South
Africa to relinquish control of Namibia. More
likely, Vorster has decided to gamble that lifting
some of the hitherto tight restraint's on political
expression in Namibia will foster tribalism instead
of nationalism. If a program leading to autonomy
or independence for each ethnic group actually
mollifies Namibians who resent white rule,
Vorster can well withstand international criticism.
If such is Vorster's game, he may have been
encouraged by the outcome of the second
popular election in Ovamboland last January. Al-
though the South-West African People's Organiza-
tion again called for a boycott, 55 percent of the
120,000 eligible voters went to the polls, an
impressive gain over the 3 percent of the first
election. Although opposition candidates were
allowed to run, the traditional tribal leaders who
are responsive to Pretoria were re-elected.
Although the election results may indicate
the organization's support inside Namibia is
waning, Namibian guerrilla bands based abroad
have gained recruits from the recent exodus of
Ovambo tribesmen and may step up their incur-
sions into Ovamboland.
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A Test in Mocambique
Since the coup in Portugal, South Africa has
officially maintained that Pretoria will neither
interfere with black governments that emerge in
the two territories nor tolerate foreign meddling
in South African affairs. The "non-interference"
doctrine was put to the test last September after
Lisbon came to terms with the Front for the
Liberation of Mozambique ;and gave it the
dominant place in a transitional government.
When disgruntled whites in L.ourenco Marques
attempted to seize power, the South African for-
eign minister promptly declared Pretoria's
readiness to cooperate with the transitional gov-
ernment and warned South Africans not to join
mercenary bands that were said to be preparing to
support the white dissidents.
A large portion of Mozambique's ,-evenue is
derived from port and rail earnings on South
African trade and from the remittances of some
100,000 Mozambicans who work in South
African mines. South Africans also anticipate that
completion of the huge Cabora Bassa hydro-
electric project will strengthen their economic
leverage over an independent but impoverished
Mozambique. South Africa is the only possible
big consumer of power from the dam, but over
the short term it could also do without.
Thus far, the Mozambique nationalist leaders
seem willing to cooperate with Pretoria, but they
are likely to stop short of diplomatic ties.
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? In response to Tolbert's statement that
racial problems within South Africa must be
resolved on a basis of equality, Vorster said
that the policy of separate development was
designed to provide independence for blacks
in their own homelands and that he was
striving for a gradual removal of admitted
racial injustices.
Back in So Ath Africa, Vorster has been tell-
ing audiences that he is indeed seeking to normal-
ize relations with the other African states, but
that he has no intention of abandoning apartheid.
Vorster's Apparent Strategy
Vorster apparently assumes that black
African leaders are grasping at straws to justify
profitable dealings with South Africa, a view that
may be the thread binding his current activities
together:
? The withdrawal of South African police
from Rhodesia would fulfill Vorster's most
immediate promise to Tolbert and thereby
might sustain expectations from some
Africans that Vorster intends to follow
through with more difficult reforms in
Namibia and South Africa proper.
? An eventual grant of independence to
Namibia as a federation of autonomous home-
lands would, at least superficially, reconcile
Vorster's promises to his white constituents
and to Tolbert.
? Vorster's periodic meetings with South
Africa's black 3antustan leaders can be used
to turn aside the challenge from the OAU to
maintain a dialogue with South African
blacks, yet the concessions he has made to
them thus far have been so minor that white
South Africans have not become appre-
hensive.
? The opening of a government-sponsored
theater in Cape Town to mixed audiences in
February was prompted by Vorster as part of
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Vr ter apparently I i opes he can parlay h'
quiet collaboration with the four black leaders on
Rhodesia into an open and continuing associa-
tion. He also wants his work on a Rhodesian
settlement to smooth the:! way toward a general
normalization of relations between South Africa
and the black African states. Although Pretoria
has sought for a decade to establish diplomatic
relations with OAU meml:ers, only Malawi has an
embassy in Pretoria. Vorster's earlier attempts to
initiate dialogues with black African leaders were
rebuffed by in OAU surnmit resolution in 1971
that condemned any diplomatic contact unless
Pretoria modified its racial policies.
Since Vorster assumed a mediator role in
Rhodesia, however, he has pursued new dialogues,
approaching several Wost African leaders. In
September 1974, Vorster visited Ivory Coast to
meet with President Houphouet-Boigny and
Sengalese President Senolhor. Last February, he
made another quick trip to Liberia and met with
President Tolbert.
Although both trips were secret, the South
African press made reference to the meetings with
H ouphouet-Boigny and Senghor two months
afterward; Vorster and Tolbert publicized their
meeting within a week.
Vorster Explains
According to Tolbert, Vorster asked for the
visit in order to give his views on the problems
that stood in the way of black African leaders
who might accept his offer of a dia;ugue. During
their talks:
? Vorster promised that the South African
police in Rhodesia would be withdrawn as
soon as guerrilla terrorism ceased, noting that
he favored a compromise settlement.
? Vorster accepted Tolbert's stipulations
that the whole of Namibia should be inde-
pendent and that Pretoria should set forth a
definite program and target date for inde-
pendence.
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his reported plans to desegregate some public
facilities without dismantling the basic struc-
ture of apartheid.
The aftermath of Vorster's rn- ;g with the
Liberian President may mak? ;iim revise his
strategy. Although Vorster's r xplanations of his
policies convinced Tolbert teat he should consult
with other OAU members in order to determine
their views, the OAU foreign ministers criticized
the meeting when they met in Addis Ababa last
February. Some also criticized Kaunda, Nverere,
and Khama for working with Vorster to bring
about a Rhodesian settlement outside the frame-
work of the OAU.
The debate at Addis Ababa led to a resolu-
tion calling for an extraordinary foreign ministers'
meeting in April in Dar es Salaam to discuss a
-nordinated reaction toward Vorster's detente
policy. This meeting, held last week, concluded
with a r;eclaration that approves negotiations with
South Africa designed to bring about majority
rule in Rhodesia and independence for Namibia.
The latest declaration went on, however, to
call upon member states to help southern African
nationalists prepare for intensified guerrilla war-
fare if their goals cannot be attained through
negotiations. It also calls for a tightening of the
boycott against South Africa until it ends
apartheid.
The declaration is a significant gain for the
black African leaders who have cooperated with
Vorster in pushing the Rhodesian nationalists and
Prime Minister Smith toward a negotiated con-
stitutional settlement. Nevertheless, Nyerere had
to formulate the new boycott measures in order
to counteract calls for a repudiation of efforts to
mediate the Rhodesian conflict.
A Rhodesian settlement that provides for a
peaceful transfer of power t^ the black majority
might pave the way for constructive relations
between South Africa and a few moderate black
African states. /orster's dramatic turnabout-
from militarily backing a white supremacist
regime in Rhodesia to helping arrange its
demise-will make it p! jchclogically easier for
black African leaders to meet him openly and
discuss sensitive issues. It is unlikely, however,
that Vorster's contributions toward a Rhodesian
settlement will yield international tolerance for
his concept of separate development in Namibia
or in South Africa proper.
The OAU would probably condemn a
member state if it tried to open diplomatic rela-
tions with Pretoria in return for economic assist-
ance. Nevertheless, an end of UN sanctions
against Rhodesia would open the way for
economic integration throughout southern Africa.
Vorster went ahead with his initial meetings
with the three West African presidents before he
was sure a Rhodesian settlement could be con-
cluded. His domestic political situation hardly
required diplomatic triumphs, and his party has a
comfortable majority in parliament. Possibly,
Vorster hoped that his meetings with the leaders
of other OAU states would reduce pressures on
the presidents of Zambia, Tanzania, and
Botswana while they were involved with him
concerning the Rhodesian problem. Possibly, also,
Vorster assumed that a satisfactory Rhodesian
settlement would be in sight by the time his
meetings surfaced in the press. Such a favorable
outcome still seemed likely in early February
when Vorster visited Liberia.
Recent events in Rhodesia, however, show
that Smith will not easily go along with Vorster's
plans, and the Rhodesian situation remains at an
impasse. Vorster apparently had hoped the
meager concessions that Smith had made to
Rhodesian nationalists at his behest would soften
the OAU boycott of South Africa. The declara-
tion issued by the African foreign ministers at Dar
es Salaam proved otherwise.
Of all the players in the Rhodesian game,
Vorster seems to have the highest stakes on the
table. He has depicted a Rhodesian settlement as
the first step toward a solution of Pretoria's
Namibia problem and toward full acceptance of
South Africa by the black states of Africa. Unless
settlement negotiations are salvaged soon, Vor-
ster's further goals may fade from si ht. I
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