WESTERN HEMISPHERE BRIEF 181-75.4

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010083-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 15, 2005
• Sequence Number: 83
• Publication Date: November 24, 1975
• Content Type: CABLE

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ARGENTI1A: PRESIDENT MARIA ESTELA PERON HAS . TAROUCH SCVERAL
CONCILIATORY 6CSTURES, TEI1PORARILY RODUCED THE PRESSURE FOR riER
OUSSTER?5'
THE PRESIDENT MET `9IT'4 HER CABINET LAST l1CEK IN AN AIR OF
CONCILIATION AND A'JNOUNCE?` PLANS TO MOVE THE GENERAL ELECTION
ISCOEDULCD FOR MARC-; '1177 TO OCTOBER OR NOVEMBER 1976. AT T?iE SAIhE
TIME, SHE EXPRESSED FULL CONFIDENCE IN Hlt MINISTERS AND SINGLED
OUT INTERIOR MINISTER R013LEDO FOR SPECIAL PRAISE ?Y
THE MEETING FOLLOWED A PERIOD OF HIT;4DRA.:AL DURING 6dIIC:1 PEI29c1
REFUSED TO SEE THE CABINET AND APPEARED TO "uE ACCEPTINIG ONLY T,tt.
COUNSEL OF AER PRIVATE SECRETARY AND LOPE Z REGA PROTEGE, JJLIO
GONZALEZ. GONZALEZ HAD BEEN SEEKING TO ENHANCE HIS POWER RV LAVING
ROI3LEDO FIRED, A HOVE THAT WOULD HAVE EXHAUSTFI) T14E PATIENCE OF
MILITARY AND CIVILIAN GROUPS IN OPPOSITION TO PERON. RO2LEDO IS TsIE
ONE MAN IN 'VIICH ALL FACTIONS STILL HAVE SOME COInFIDE ICE ? BY ACr-
NOULEDGING ROULEDO + PERON HAS INDICATED HER WILLINGNESS TO RELY ON
THE MORE ACCEPTAULE GROUPS IH HER LATE HUS9AND' S POLITICAL MOVEMENT-
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SHE HAS SO FAR RESISTED DEMANDS TO FIRE GO?JZALEZ, 11OUEVER, SUGGESTI:,'G
T'4AT HER SHIFT TO ROOLEDO MAY BE TACTICAL AND SUBJECT TO FUTURE
POLITICAL MAC*s4INATIONS-Y
FOR HIS PART, THE INTERIOR MINISTER HAS PtJEBLICLY ASSURED PER)N'S
CRITICS TfIA'.T HER HEALTH IS SOUND APED THAT A !MEDICAL EXAMINATIOid 11S,
NOT E CQUIRED TO DETERMINE HER FITNESS TO REMAIN IN OFFICE. PRIVATELY,
RODLEDO HAS PROMISED TO CONTROL PERON AND CREATE A^tHHO;J#ST AID
EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT, 9UT HIS ABILITY TO DELIVER ON SUCH A :-ROMISt_ IS
DOUBTFUL. INDEED, T!4E PRESIDENT HAS ALREADY TAKEN STEPS TO 13LOCK A
CONGRESO-IONAL INVESTIGATION OF HIGH-LEVEL CORRUPTION THAT COULD U' LL
INCRIMINATE H#R.V
ALTHO:3GH PERON'S OIOVES HAVE PRODUCED A NEW SENSE OF HARMONY,
T,lIS WILL PROBABLY BE TRANSITORY- UNLESS REAL POWER IS GRADUALLY
SHIFTED TO TOBLEDO AND OTHER RESPECTABLE PEROINISTS, THE VIr33CUUM THAT
HAS EXISTED IN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH SINCE JULY WILL CONTINUE. THE
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MILITARY, MEANWHILE, CONTINUES TO WATCH DEVELOPMENTS, AND ITS
rr'i
ASHORENCE OF PERON IS BECOMING INCREASINGLY EVID1-NT.
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1?//JAPAN: PRIME MINISTER MIKI RETURNED FROM LAST WEEKEND'S
ECONOMIC SUMMIT CONFERENCE AFFIRMING THAT HE WILL NOT CALL A
GENERAL ELECTION "FOR THE TIME BEING," A MOVE THAT SIGNALS A
CONTINUED TRUCE--HOWEVER SHAKY--BETWEEN MIKI AND HIS CONSERVATIVE
PARTY RIVALS.//Y
//MIKI HOPED THE PUBLICITY SURROUNDING HIS INTERNATIONAL
ROLE WOULD BOOST HIS SAGGING DOMESTIC POPULARITY AND PERHAPS
ENABLE HIM TO CALL AN ELECTION THIS YEAR. MIKI ASSUMED THE PRIME
MINISTRY AS A COMPROMISE CHOICE AFTER A DEADLOCK LAST DECEMBER
BETWEEN MORE POWERFUL CONTENDERS NEARLY SPLIT THE RULING LIBERIAL
DEMOCRATIC PARTY' HE NEEDS AN ELECTION TO GIVE HIM A POPULAR
MANDATE AND IMPROVE HIS POWER POSITION IN THE PARTY.//Y
//THE CRITICAL DECISION ON THE TIMING OF AN ELECTION RESTS
WITH THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY LEADERS, HOWEVER, AND THEY REMAIN
OPPOSED TO AN EARLY ELECTION THAT COULD EXTEND MIKI'S STAY
.IN OFFICE FOR SOME TIME. THE PRIME MINISTER NEEDS THEIR SUPPORT
..IN THE CURRENT DIET SESSION AND MAY WELL HAVE AGREED TO SIDETRACK
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ELECTION AMBITIONS TO GET IT. MIKI MUST GAIN PASSAGE OF THREE
CF:JCIAL REVENUE BILLS BEFORE THE SESSION CLOSES NEXT MONTH. HE
ALSO FACES A LABOR UNION - GOVERNMENT CONFRONTATION OVER THE
CONTENTIOUS ISSUE OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' RIGHT TO STRIKE.//Y
//NEITHER DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER FUKUDA NOR FINANCE MINISTER
OHIRA--MIKI'S TWO LEADING CHALLENGERS--IS NOW SURE OF HIS ABILITY
TO PREVAIL IN A HEAD-ON CONGRONTATION, AND BOTH ARE CONCERNED
THAT A SHOWDOWN COULD BRING THE PARTY CLOSE TO AN OPEN BREAK.//Y
//DESPITE THE TRUCE, A NUMBER OF PARTYE LEADERS ARE
EXPLORING THE POSSIBILITY OF SELECTING ANOTHER INTERIM PRIME
MINISTER, PENDING PARTY ELECTIONS TO CHOOSE A MORE PERMANENT
LEADER--A MOVE THAT COULD GAIN MOMENTUM IF MIKI FALTERS IN
THE NEXT DIET SESSION THAT BEGINS IN JANUARY. FOR HIS PART,
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MIKI MAY CALCULATE NOW THAT THE PROSPECTS FOR REVIVING HIS OWN
A CRITICAL STAGE. HARUN HAS REFUSED TO ACCEPT POLITICAL EXILE
=MINISTER RAZAK AND SELANGOR CHIEF MINISTER HARUN IS REACHING
2. MALAYSIA: THE POLITICAL CONFRONTATION BETWEEN PRIME
ELECTION AMBITIONS WILL BE BETTER IN3 THE SPRING.
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AS MALAYSIA'S PERMANENT UN REPRESENTATIVE, AND HE COULD USE HIS
CONTACTS WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT TO CHALLENGE RAZAK'S OWN POSITION.4
ALTHOUGH A RESORT TO FORCE BY HARUN AND HIS SUPPORTERS CANNOT
BE RULED OUT, IT SEEMS MORE LIKELY THAT THE PRESENT CONFRONTATION
WILL BE RESOLVED POLITICALLY WITHIN THE COUNCILS OF THE RULING
UNITED MALAYS NATIONAL ORGANIZATION. HARUN, THANKS TO THE
WIDESPREAD SUPPORT. FROM THE PARTY'S RANK AND FILE AND HIS LEADER-
SHIP OF THE PARTY'S INFLUENTIAL YOUTH ORGANIZATION, IS IN A
STRONG POSITION. RAZAK, IN FACT, MAY HAVE TO ABANDON HIS EFFORTS
TO SEND HARUN INTO POLITICAL EXILE IF HE IS TO MAINTAIN HIS OWN
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1. LEBANON: LEBANON'S THREE-WEEK-OLD CEASE-FIRE COLLAPSED OVER
THE WEEKEND. THE LARGE CHRISTIAN AND MUSLIM MILITIAS AGAIN BECAME
INVOLVED IN THE FIGHTING, AND SUSTAINED CLASHES TOOK PLACE IN
THE BEIRUT SUBURBS AND THE CITY CENTER. FIGHTING WAS ALSO
REPORTED IN THE NORTHERN PORT OF TRIPOLI AND IN THE EASTERN TOWN OF
BALABAKK?Y
THE RESUMPTION OF HEAVY FIGHTING HAS DEMORALIZED THE
COUNTRY'S POLITICIANS, WHO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THEY HAVE RUN OUT
OF IDEAS FOR NEGOTIATING PEACE. PRIME MINISTER KARA1I--LilHO HAS
A REPUTATION FOR REMAINING CALM AND OPTIMISTIC AT ALL TIMES--STATED
ON FRIDAY THAT "LEBANON IS ON THE VERGE OF COLLAPSE." THIS
STATEMENT APPARENTLY WAS DESIGNED TO SHOCK THE COUNTRY'S WARRING
FACTIONS INTO STOPPING THE FIGHTING. LIKE KARAMI'S CALL FOR A
TRUCE ON SATURDAY, HOWEVER, IT HAD LITTLE EFFECT?Y
PRESIDENT FRANJIYAH HAD SCHEDULED A MAJOR ADDRESS
FOR LEBANON'S NATIONAL DAY ON SATURDAY, BUT CANCELED IT AT
THE LAST MINUTE- THIS ONLY UNDERSCORED THE PRESIDENTS LOSS
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OF P:LITICAL INITIATIVE AND HIS INABILITY TO DEAL EFFECTIVELY
WITH THE COUNTRY'S OVERWHELMING PROBLEMS. FRANJIYAH'S TALKS
WITH KARAMI, TO REACH SPECIFIC PROPOSALS FOR POLITICAL AND
ECO!~-..7C REFORMS, HAVE NOT YET BEGUN. THE INCREASED FIGHTING
MAKES I? UNLIKELY THAT THE TWO WILL FIND COMMON GROUND ON
ANY'"?9TANT ISSUE-Y
T= NATIONAL DIALOGUE COMMITTEE, WHICH IS EVENLY DIVIDED
BETWEEld CHRISTIANS AND MUSLIMS AND INCLUDES ALMOST ALL OF THE
COUNTRY'S LEADING POLITICIANS, APPARENTLY WILL MEET ON MONDAY
DESPISE THE INCREASE IN FIGHTING- ALTHOUGH UNLIKELY TO ACCOMPLISH
ANYTHING, THE SESSION WILL BE IMPORTANT AS AN INDICATOR OF
WHETHER THE COUNTRY'S PRINCIPAL POLITICAL GROUPS REMAIN INTERESTE;
IN NEGOTIATING A SETTLEMENT- SOME OF THE LEFTISTS AND RIGHT-WING
CHRI7TI,'NS ON THE COMMITTEE ARE CONVINCED THAT COMPROMISE IS
IMPOSSIBLE, AND HAVE TALKED OF WITHDRAWING FROM THE GROUP. SEVERAI
HAVE BOYCOTTED PAST MEETINGS-Y
A STATEMENT ON SATURDAY IN THE NEWSPAPER OF THE RIGHT-WING
PHALd';GES PARTY REVEALED THE DEPTH OF CHRISTIAN PESSIMISM AND
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INDIRECTLY THREATENED THAT THE PARTY MIGHT MOVE TOWARD PARTITION
AS A SOLUTION TO LEBANON'S PROBLEMS. THE STATEMENT ANNOUNCED THAT
THE PHALANGISTS ARE FORMING COMMITTEES OF PARTY MEMBERS TO
ASSUME ALL CIVIL FUNCTIONS, IF NECESSARY, TO ELIMINATE THE
SOCIAL CHAOS AND GOVERNMENT IMPOTENCE THAT HAVE RESULTED FROM
THE LEFT'S "WAR OF ATTRITION."
THE PRINCIPAL. PHALANGIST LEADERS STILL DO NOT SEEK PAR TITION11
.HOWEVER. THEY NEVERTHELESS ?ECOGNIZE THAT ANY HINT OF MOVEMENT
IN THAT DIRECTION WOULD ALARM LEBANESE MUSLIMS AND LEFTISTS, AND
THE SYRIANS. THIS HEIGHTENED CONCERN, THE PHALANGISTS CALCULATE,
MAY INDUCE THESE OPPONENTS TO MAKE CONCESSIONS IN NEGOTIATIONS.
2. SYRIA-ISRAEL: TEL AVIV IS LIKELY TO INTERPRET THE FEDAYED
ATTACK ON AN ISRAELI SETTLEMENT THURSDAY AS PART OF AN EFFORT BY
SYRIA TO INCREASE TENSION AS THE EXPIRATION DATE-NOVEMBER 30-OF T UN FORCES' MANDATE APPROACHES. THE ATTACKERS, WHO SAID THEY WERE F
A SYRIAN-BASED UNJT OF TASIR ARAFAT'S FATAH, GOT BACK TO SYRAIA AF
KILLING THREE ISRAELIS AND WOUNDING ANOTHER.Y
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THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT WILL 2E UNDER STRONG DOMESTIC PRESSURE
SO STRIKE BACK
THE ISRAELIS NEVERTHELESS WILL TIGHTEN SECURITY MEASURES ON T
GOLAN A%D INITIATE MORE AGRESSIVE PATROLLING OF THE DISENGAGEMENT
LINE. SUCH ACTIVITIES INCREASE THE RISK OF CLASHES WITH SYRIAN TRO
ALONG T-iE MARROW UN BUFFER ZONE.Y
OFFICIAL ISRAELI REACTION TO THE TERRORIST INCIDENT HAS FOCUS
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ON FEDAYEEN, RATHER THAN SYRIAN, INVOLVEMENT. A FOREIGN MINISTRY
SPOKESMAN EMPHAZIED THAT THE-ATTACK AGAIN DEMONSTRATED THAT THE
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FEDAYEEN, INCLUDING ARAFAT'S FOLLObc_RS, ARE TERRORISTS WHO HAVE NO
PLACE IN THE FRAMEUORK OF CIVILIZED NATIONS.
3. SPANISH SAHARA: MOROCCO AND MAURITANIA HAVE APPOINTED
ASSISTANT GOVERNORS TO WORK UNDER THE SPANISH GOVERNOR GENERAL IN
SPANISH SAHARA, AS PROVIDED FOR BY THE RECENT TRILATERAL AGREEMEN T.'Y
ON SATURDAY, KING HASSAN NAMED HIS ROYAL CABINET DIRECTOR,
AHIED BENSOUDA, TO BE MOROCCO'S REPRESENTATIVE IN THE PROVISIONAL
ADMINISTRATION THAT WILL GOVERN THE TERRITORY UNTIL SPAIN WITHDRAWS
NEXT FEBRUARY. BENSOUDA IS ONE OF HASSAN'S MOST TRUSTED ADVISERS;
HIS APPOINTMENT UNDERSCORES THE IMPORTANCE THE KING ATTACHES TO
MOROCCO'S ROLE IN THE NEU JOINT ADMINISTRATION.Y
BENSOUDA, WHO WILL ARRIVE IN THE TERRITORIAL CAPITAL OF EL
AAIUN ON MONDAY WILL PROBABLY ASSUME MORE RESPONSIBILITY THAN HIS
MAURITANIAN COUNTERPART, ABDALLAHI OULD CHEIKH, WHOSE MOST RECENT
POSITION WAS MINISTER OF PUBLIC SERVICE AND LABOR. MAURITANIA
WILL PRESUMABLY CONTINUE TO FOLLOW THE MOROCCAN LEAD ON THE
DACE:
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TERRITORY.
';. ANGOLA: SOVIET PRESS C',VERAGE OF THE CIVIL WAR IN ANGOLA
REMAINS EXTREMELY HEAVY. PRAVDA, IZVESTY'A,g AND THE SOVIET NEWS
AGE?CY TASS ARE HAMMERING AWAY AT ALLEGED INTERVENTION BY SUCH
OUTS=DE FORCES AS CHINESE, SOUTH AFRICANS, ZAIRIANS, PORTUGUESE
" FASCISTS," AND "AMERICAN MERCENARIES" ON BEHALF OF THE POPULAR
MOVE"E'NT'S R':VALS.Y
MOSCOU t'AS RESERVED SOME CF ITS HEAVIEST BRICKBATS FOR THE
CHINESE. THE SOVIET PRESS RECENTLY BLASTED PEKING FOR ITS
CRITICISM OF MOSCOW'S "EXPANSION" AND "INTERFERENCE" IN
ANGOLA. REFLECTING SOVIET SENS=7IVITY TO THESE CHARGES, THE
COMME;TARIES RAILED AGAINST PEKING'S OWN MILITARY, FINANCIAL,
AND TRAINING SUPPORT FOR A TI--OV=i'ENT FORCES, AS WELL AS ITS
COLLUSION WITH "PORTUGUESE FASCISTS, SOUTH AFRICAN RACISTS,
AND INTERNATIONAL MONOPOLIES."
ANTI-SOVIET VITRIOL HAS FOR SOME TIME BEEN A STANDARD
FEATLnE OF CHINESE COMMENTARY O'J THE ANGOLAN CONFLICT. PEKING'S
EFFORT TO ':MBARRASS MOSCOW FOR ITS INVOLVEMENT WITH THE POPULAR
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MOVEMENT HAS GAINED MOMENTUM, HOWEVER, SINCE THE CHINESE LOWERED
THE VISIBILITY OF THEIR INVOLVEMENT BY WITHDRAWING CHINESE
ADVISERS FROM ZAIRIAN TRAINING PROGRAMS FOR THE NATIONAL FRONT
LATE LAST MONTH. SINCE THEN, PEOPLE'S DAILY HAS CARRIED TWO
ARTICLES LAMBASTING SOVIET MEDDLING IN ANGOLA. AND THE TRADITIONAL
INDEPENDENCE DAY EDITORIAL GAVE HEAVY PLAY TO THE
SAME THEME.Y
THE NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY HAS ALSO CARRIED SEVERAL LENGTHY
REPORTS FOCUSING ON THE SOVIET ROLE IN ANGOLA. ITS DAILY
TRANSMISSIONS HAVE BEEN SATURATED WITH REPLAYS OF ANTI-SOVIET
ARTICLE'S AND STATEMENTS FROM A NUMBER OF AFRICAN CAPITALS.
CHINESE PROPAGANDISTS HAVE HAD A FIELD DAY REHASHING THE
GENERALLY NEGATIVE AFRICAN REACTION TO MOSCOW'S RECOGNITION OF
THE POPULAR MOVEMENT IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE ORGANIZATION OF
AFRICAN UNITY'S CALL FOR NEUTRALITY IN THE ANGOLAN DISPUTE.
PEKING HAS PROMINENTLY IDENTIFIED ITSELF AS A STRONG SUPPORTER OF
THE ORGANIZATION'S POLICIES. A RECENT PEOPLE'S DAILY
EDITORIAL SAID THE OGANIZATION'S CALL FOR EXTENSION OF RECOGNITION
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TO ALL THREE ANGOLAN LIBERATION GROUPS AND FOR THE RIVAL FACTIONS
TO UNITE WAS BOTH "EXPLICIT AND CORRECT."
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1. PORTUGAL: THE LEADER OF PORTUGAL'S ANTI-COMMUNIST RULING
FACTION, MAJOR MELO ANTUNES, HAS WARNED THAT IF THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT
OF PRIME MINISTER PIPHEIRO PE AZEVEDO FALLS, THE COUNTRY WILL
BE PLUNGED INTO CIVIL WAR-Y
ANTUNES, INTERVIEWED BY A FRENCH NEWS MAGAZINE, SAID THAT
THE COMMUNIST PARTY IS PREPARING TO SEIZE POWER IF THE GOVERNMENT
FALLS AND THAT THE RESULT OF THE ENSUING STRUGGLE WOULD L3:.' A
RETURN TO FASCISM. ANTUNES SAID THAT THE COMMUNISTS ARE ENGAGED
IN A CAMPAIGN TO SUBVERT THE ARMED FORCES AND PARALYZE SHE STATE,
AND WILL WAIT UNTIL THE COUNTRY BECOMES UNGOVERNABLE TO MAKE
THEIR MOVE. GOVERNMENT PARALYSIS, HE SAID, HAS NOW REACHED AN
ADVANCED STAGE.11Y
SOCIALIST PARTY LEADER MARIO SOARES SECONDED ANTUNES' ATTACK
ON THE COMMUNISTS ON SUNDAY AT A SOCIALIST RALLY IN LISBON. HE
CALLED ON THE COMMUNISTS TO LEAVE THE GOVERNMENT AND SAID THAT
THE NON-COMMUNIST MINISTERS HAD NO INTENTION OF RESIGNING- SOARES
VOWED THAT THE SOCIALISTS WOULD TAKE UP ARMS, IF N':.;'ESSARY, TO
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DEFEND DEMOCRATIC FREEDOMS. LIKE ANTUNES, SOARES BLAMED THE
PRESENT GOVERNMENT IMPASSE ON COMMUNIST SUBVERSION OF THE MILITARY,
BUT THE SOCIALIST LEADER ALSO SEVERELY CRITICIZED PRESIDENT COSTA
GOMES FOR ALLOWING HIS ACTIONS TO BE TOO EASILY INFLUENCED BY
PRO-COMMUNIST DEMONSTRATIONS.Y
SO FAR, THE GOVERNMENT'S DEMAND THAT COSTA GOMES RESTORE
AUTHORITY IN THE MILITARY HAS HAD NO RESULT. WHEN THE GOVERNMENT'S
DEMAND WAS PUT BEFORE THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL LAST WEEK, THE
COUNCIL NOT ONLY CRITICIZED THE GOVERNMENT, BUT ALSO REVIVED A
SCHEME TO ESTABLISH DIRECT TIES BETWEEN THE MILITARY AND THE
PEOPLE, AN IDEA THAT IS ANATHEMA TO THE DEMOCRATIC PARTIES. THE
ONLY APPARENT CONCESSION MADE TO THE GOVERNMENT---THE REPLACEIENT
OF EXTREME LEFTIST GENERAL OTELO DE CARVALHO AS COMMANDER OF THE
LISbON MILITARY REGION--WAS FRUSTRATED ON SATURDAY WHEN CARVALHO'S
SUCCESSOR WITHDRELj HIS NAME FROM CONSIDERATION. THE REVOLUTIONARY
COUNCIL WILL TAKE UP THE MATTER AGAIN WHEN IT MEETS LATER ON MONDAYS'
THE GOVERNMENT MAY BE SERIOUSLY HANDICAPPED IN THE PRESENT
STRUGGLE BY A LACK OF UNITY IN ITS OWN RANKS. FURTHER EVIDENCE OF
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SUCH A PROBLEM SURFACED IN THE ANTUNES INTERVIEW, IN WHICH HE
CALLED ON THE SOCIALIST PARTY TO RID ITSELF OF RIGHT-WING ELEMENTS.
HE SAID THAT IN RECENT MONTHS THE COUNTRY HAD BEEN SLIDING TO THE
RIGHT, EVIDENTLY IMPLYING THAT HIS SOCIALIST GOVERNMENT PARTNERS
HAD BEEN RESPONSIBLE?Y
TO ADD TO ITS PROBLEMS, THE GOVERNMENT WILL FACE TODAY A
TWO-HOUR WORK STOPPAGE, DURING WHICH COMMUNIST-LED WORKERS WILL
AGAIN CALL FOR THE GOVERNMENTI'S RESIGNATION AND REPLACEMENT BY
A REGIME OF THE MORE EXTREME LEFT.
2. CEMA: INFORMED SOURCES IN MOSCOW AND BUCHAREST ARE UN-
CERTAIN WHEN THE CEMA SUMMIT WILL BE HELD, ALTHOUGH
MOST ARE GUESSING IT WILL BE SOME TIME AFTER MID-
DECEMBER?Y
LEADERS OF THE CEMA COUNTRIES ARE FACING A
CROWDED SCHEDULE OVER THE NEXT FEW WZEKS? BULGARIAN
LEADER ZHIVKOV IS SLATED TO VISIT WEST GERMANY NO-
VEMBER 24-28. CEAUSESCU IS TRAVELING IN THE MIDDLE
EAST NOVEMBER 24-DECEMBER I., CZECHOSLOVAK PARTY
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CHIEF HUSAK WILL GO TO MOSCOW BEFORE THE END OF NO-
VEMBER. THE SOVIETS HAVE SCHEDULED IMPORTANT CEN-
TRAL COMMITTEE AND SUPREME SOVIET MEETINGS FOR DE-
CEMBER 1 AND 2, RESPECTIVELY. IN RECENT YEARS THE
SUPREME SOVIET SESSION HAS LASTED 3 DAYS. THAT
LEAVES OPEii ONLY THE WEEKEND OF DECEMBER 5-7 BEFORE
THE POLISH PARTY CONGRESS -tOPENING DECEMBER 81- OR
SOME TIME LATER IN DECEMBER, BEFORE OR AFTER THE
CUBAN PARTY CONGRESS?Y
IF THE CEMA SUMMIT IS TO BE NOTHING MORE THAN
A SYMBOLIC CATHEPING, THE TIMING IS NOT ALL THAT IM-
PORTANT, BUT MOSCOW APPARENTLY DOES WANT THE SUMMIT
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TO MAKE SOME IMPORTANT DECISIONS.
"PARTICULARLY IM-
PORTANT" DECISIONS ON COOPERATION IN RAW MATERIAL
.EXPLOITATION AND AGRICULTURAL PRODU'TION. THE MORE
COMPREHENSIVE THESE PROPOSALS ARE, THE MORE TROUBLE
THE SOVIETS WILL HAVE IN BALANCING NATIONAL ECONOMIC
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.INTERESTS. THE SUMMIT WILL ALSO DISCUSS THE TROUBLE-
SOME ISSUES OF CEMA-EC RELATIONS AND POSSIBLE INSTI-
TUTIONAL CHANGES WITHIN CEMA.Y
THE ROMANIANS, WHO HAVE PUBLICLY DISSENTED ON
THE CEMA--EC ISSUE AND ARE WARY OF INSTITUTIONAL
CHANGES,, HAVE ENGAGED IN PROCEDURAL AND OTHER DELAY-
ING TACTICS. BUCHAREST PROBABLY WANTS TO CLEAR UP
BILATERAL ECONOMIC ISSUES WITH THE SOVIETS BEFORE ANY
COMA SUMMIT. THE ROMANIANS MAY ALSO CALCULATE THAT
A DELAYED SUMMIT WILL GIVE ANY OTHER EAST EUROPEANS
UHO MAY OBJECT TO ELEMENTS OF SOVIET ECONOMIC CO-
OPERATION PROPOSALS TIME TO FIRM UP THEIR OWN NA-
TIONAL ECONOMIC PLANS AND NEGOTIATING POSITION BEFORE
3. EUROPEAN COMMUNIST CONFERENCE: THE EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES
HAVE POSTPONED UNTIL JANUARY SETTING A DATE FOR THE ALREADY MUCH-
DELAYED EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTY CONFERENCE.Y
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BERLIN THIS WEEK, HAD BEEN EXPECTED TO COMPLETE WORK
ON THE CONTROVERSIAL DOCUMENT TO BE ISSUED AT THE
CONCLUSION OF THE CONFERENCE. CONTINUING DIFFER-
ENCES BETUEEN MOSCOW AND THE INDEPENDENT-MINDED
YUGOSLAV, ITALIAN, ROMANIAN, AND SPANISH PARTIES
APPARENTLY PREVENTED THIS AND LED, IN TURN, TO THE
FAILURE TO SET A DATE?Y
IN THE WAKE OF THYPOSTPONEMENT, CONFERENCE
PREPARATIONS IN EAST BERLIN WILL REVERT TO LOWER-
LEVEL EDITORIAL EFFORTS TO HARMONIZE THE VARIOUS
PARTIES' POSITIONS ? Y
WEDNESDAY'S POSTPONEMENT VIRTUALLY EXCLUDES THE
POSSIBILITY OF HOLDING A EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTY
CONFERENCE BEFORE THE SOVIET PARTY CONGRESS IN
FEBRUARY. THE SOVIETS HAD MADE A NUMBER OF CONCES-
SIONS IN AN APPARENT EFFORT TO HOLD THE CONFERENCE
BEFORE THEIR CONGRESS-Y
THE SETBACK WILL BE EVEN MORE EMBARRASSING TO
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MOSCO'! BECAUSE THE SOVIETS ALSO FAILED AT THE LAST
MINUTE TO HAVE A CEMA SUMMIT MEETING HELD THIS WEEK.
THE TUO EVENTS ARE NOT DIRECTLY RELATED, BUT THE
CONSECUTIVE POSTPONEMENTS CONVEY AN IMPRESSION OF
DISARRAY IN THE COMMUNIST CAMP.
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4. USSR-CZECHOSLOVAKIA: NO REASON HAS BEEN GIVEN FOR THE VISIT TO
MOSCOU BY CZECHOSLOVAK PRESIDENT AND PARTY CHIEF HUSAK
LATER THIS MONTH, BUT THE SIGNING IN OCTOBER OF A
NEW EAST GERMAN - SOVIET FRIENDSHIP TREATY DIJRING
PARTY LEADER HONECKER'S VISIT HAS LED TO SPECULATION
THAT HUSAK MIGHT SIGN A NEW CZECHOSLOVAK-SOVIET
TREATY.Y
UNLIKE THE CASE OF EAST GERMANY, WHERE THE
PREVIOUS FRIENDSHIP TREATY HAD CLEARLY BECOME OUT-
DATED, THERE APPEARS TO BE NO COMPELLING REASON FOR
A REVISION OF THE 1970 TREATY BETUEEN PRAGUE AND
MOSCOW. THE "_ATEST EAST GERMAN DOCUMENT INCORPO-
RATES THE "BREZHNEV DOCTRINE," EXPANDS THE PROVISION
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OF MUTUAL ASSISTANCE BEYOND EUROPE, AND ABANDONS
SUPPORT FOR THE REUNIFICATION OF GERM,.NY. THE
CZECHOSLOVAK TREATY ALREADY CONTAINS THE FIRST TWO
ELEMENTS AND THE LAST DOES NOT APPLY.Y
INDEED, THE TWO DOCUMENTS ARE VERY SIMILAR',
THE CZECHOSLOVAK TREATY MAY EVEN HAVE BEEN USED
AS A MODEL. FOR THE EAST GERMAN - SOVIET ACCORD.
NEiLI ELEMENTS IN THE EAST GERMAN TREATY INCLUDE
SPECIFIC REFERENCES TO CLOSER COOPERATION AND CO-
ORDINATION IN THE POLITICAL, MILITARY, ECONOMIC,
AND IDEOLOGICAL FIELDS, BUT THESE THEMES, ALREADY
FAMILIAR IN THE SPPECHES OF CZECHOSLOVAK LEADERS
ARE NOT SUFFICIENT IN THEMSELVES TO WARRANT RE-
WRITING THE 1970 TREATY TO INCLUDE THEM.Y
STATEMENTS ON FURTHER COOPERATION AND PLEDGES
TO DEFEND DETENTE AND THE RESULTS OF THE CSCE
COULD EASILY BE CONTAINED IN A JOINT PROTOCOL,
SHOULD BREZHNEV FEEL THE NEED FOR AN EASY FOREIGN
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POLICY SUCCESS BEFORE THE COMING SOVIET PARTY
CONGRESS. THIS WOULD ACCOMPLISH MOSCOW'S AIM
WITHOUT THE EMBARRASSMENT OF HUSAK THAT A REVISION
OF THE FRIENDSHIP TREATY WOULD ENTAIL. THE CZECHO-
SLOVAK LEADER WOULD PROBABLY NOT UANT TO FOCUS
ATTENTION ON THE 1970 DOCUMENT, UHICH IS THE FIRST
EMBODIMENT OF THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW- Y
ON THE SURFACE, THERE ARE NO PRESSING BILATERAL
PROBLEMS THAT REQUIRE RESOLUTION AT THE SUMMIT, BUT
HUSAK MAY SEEK TO WORK OUT UNRESOLVED DETAILS OF
TRADE ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES BEFORE
THEIR RESPECTIVE FIVE YEAR PLANS ARE ANNOUNCED AT
THE END OF THE YEAR. HE MAY ALSO REPORT ON THE
STATUS OF HIS PARTY AS PREPARATIONS BEGIN FOR ITS
APRIL PARTY CONGRESS, AND TRY TO GET A READING FROM
BREZHNEV ON HOW THINGS STAND IN THE SOVIET PARTY.Y
WHATEVER THE AGENDA, THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT
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^ IP FILES it
THE HUSAK VISIT WILL PROVIDE AN OCCASION TO CELEBRATE
THE UNITY AND COHESION OF THE SOCIALIST CAMP, A
QUALITY MUCH IN NEED OF ADVERTISING IN THE WAKE OF
THE ABRUPT POSTPONEMENTS AND DELAYS IN MOVING TO-
WARD A CEMA SUMMIT AND CONVENING THE EUROPEAN COMMU-
NIST CONFERENCE. THE EXAMPLE SO OSTENTATIOUSLY
SET BY THE EAST GERMANS AND CZECHOSLOVAKS MAY ALSO
BE USED BY MOSCOW TO PERSUADE OTHERS IN THE CAMP
TO FALL INTO LINE.
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5. YUGOSLAVIA: DUSAN ALIMPIC, PARTY BOSS OF THE SERBIAN PROV-
INCE OF VOJVODINA, IS EVIDENTLY IN HOT WATER, AND
THE FIRST PERSONNEL SHAKE-UP FOR THE TITO REGIME IN
YEARS COULD RESULT.Y
ALIMPIC, A FORMER SECRET POLICE OFFICIAL AND
A HARD-LINE ORTHODOX COMMUNIST, CAME TO POWER DURING
A PURGE OF LIBERALS IN DECEMBER 1972. HE NOW AP-
PEARS TO BE IN TROUBLE FOR THE VERY TRAITS THAT
FIRST BROUGHT HIM TO PARTY PROMINENCE. ALIMPIC'S
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REPUTATION AS A DOGMATIC DISCIPLINARIAN AND HIS
RECORD OF SUPPRESSIVE TACTICS STRONGLY SUGGEST THAT
HE SYMPATHIZES WITH THE "FIRM HAND" PROGRAM ADVOCATED
BY THE YUGOSLAV NEO-STALINISTS. THERE ARE, IN FACT,
RUMORS THAT HE IS A COMINFORMIST-Y
ALTHOUGH THE RUMORS ARE PROBABLY UNFOUNDED,
ALIMPIC'S STEWARDSHIP IN VOJVODINA IS DEFINITELY
BEING CRITICIZED. FOR AT LEAST THE PAST YEAR, STANE
DOLANC--TITO'S NUMBER-TWO IN THE PARTY--HAS MADE
AN UNUSUAL NUMBER OF VISITS TO THE OUTLYING TOWNS
OF THE PROVINCE IN AN APPARENT EFFORT TO SURVEY
THE PEOPLE'S MOOD. TITO HIMSELF GRILLED PROVINCIAL
LEADERS--MINUS ALIMPIC--ON THE LOCAL STATE OF AF-
FAIRS IN EARLY NOVEMBER. HE WAS CLEARLY NOT
SATISFIED.Y
FOR THE PAST SIX WEEKS ALIMPIC HAS BEEN OUT
OF THE LIMELIGHT, AND IT IS HIS SUBORDINATES WHO
HAVE BEEN MAKING THE MANDATORY NOISES AGAINST COM-
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INFORMISTS. DURING A BRIEF TITO VISIT TO THE
VOJVODINA LAST WEEK, ALIMPIC'S NAME WAS PROMINENTLY
ABSENT FROM THE LIST OF LOCAL OFFICIALS WHO WELCOMED
HIM.''
ON TUESDAY, ONE OF AL11 PTc'5 SUBORDINATL~; --THE
CHIEF OF THE NOVI SAD PARTY ORGANIZATION--MADE THE
PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT THAT NINE COMINFORMISTS ARE UNDER
ARREST. THE NINE, '?_i;10 ALLEGEDLY "WERE INSPIRED AND
ENCOURAGED FROM ABROAD," COULD, WHEN TRIED, PROVIDE
AN OPPORTUNITY FOR ALIMPIC'S POLITICAL ENEMIES TO
CRITICIZE -IIM OPENLY FOR HIS LAXITY IN CHECKING
HARD-LINERS.
6. USSR: THE AU ARD OF A NOBEL PEACE PRIZE TO ANDREY SAK-
HAROV APPEARS TO BE GENERATING A DEGREE OF COHESIVE
ACTIVISM AMONG MEMBERS OF THE SOVIET DISSIDENT COMMU-
NITY THAT MAY GIVE THE REGIME PAUSE, AT LEAST OVER
THE SHORT TERM. IN THE LONGER TERM, HOWEVER, THE
.1 DISSIDENTS' PROSPECTS REMAIN GRIMY
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SUPPORT FOR SAKHAROV AMONG THE DISSIDENTS GAINED
MOMENTUM UITH THE RELEASE TO THE WESTERN PRESS ON
NOVEMBER 19 OF A STATEMENT REPORTEDLY SIGNED BY 77
JEWISH ACTIVISTS PRAISING SAKHAROV'S CONTRIBUTION TO
PEACE. THE DOCUMENT IS THE THIRD PUBLIC DECLARATION
OF SUPPORT FOR SAKHAROV AND HIS PRINCIPLES THAT HAS
APPEARED IN AS MANY WEEKS. THE FIRST, SIGNED ONLY
BY A HANDFUL OF THE MOST PROMINENT NAMES, W/,S MADE
PUBLIC ON OCTOBER 30, EVIDENTLY IN RESPONSE MEMBERS
OF THE ACADEMY OF SCIENCES CONDEMNING SAKHAROV AND
THE NOBEL COMMITTEE. Y
LAST WEEK- 37 DISSIDENTS OF DIFFERING PHILO-
SOPHICAL STRIPES JOINED IN ISSUING A STATEMENT CON-
DEMNING THE REGIME'S REFUSAL TO PERMIT SAKHAROV TO
TRAVEL TO OSLO NEXT MONTH FOR THE AWARD CEREMONY. THE
DISSIDENTS PLEDGED SUPPORT FOR SAKHAROV AND CHARGED
THAT THE REGIi1E'S ACTION IS PROOF OF ITS "FEAR IN THE
FACE OF THE UNWAVERING MOVEMENT OF CIVIL THOUGHT AND
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THE FIRST TWO DECLARATIONS, BOTH OF WHICH MAY
HAVE BEEN DRAFTED AND ORGANIZED BY WRITER ANDREY
AMALRIK, BROUGHT TOGETHER SUCH FIGURES AS REFORMIST,
MARXIST HISTORIAN ROY MEDVEDEV, SCULPTOR ERNST
NEIZVESTUY, FORMER GENERAL PETR GRIGORENKO, POET
ALEKSANDR GINZBURG, MEMBERS OF THE OFFICIAL WRITERS
UNION VLADIMIR KORNILOV AND OSIP CHERNY, AND LARISA
BOGORAZ, UIFE OF WRITER ANATOLY MARCHENKO. ALSO AMONG
THE SIGNATORIES WERE JEWISH ACTIVIST VITALY RUBIN AND
MATHEMATICIAN VLADIMIR ALBRECHT. THE LATTER IS THE
SECRETARY OF THE MOSCOW BRANCH OF THE LONDON-BASED
HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATION AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL--A
POST FORMERLY HELD BY SAKHAROV'S ASSOCIATE ANDREY
TVERDOKHLEBOV, WHO WAS ARRESTED IN APRIL AND RE-
PORTEDLY IS SCHEDULED TO FACE TRIAL SOON.Y
ALTHOUGH THE DISSIDENTS' CLAIM TO A COHESIVE
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"MOVEMENT" IS AN OVERSTATEMENT, SAKHAROV'S AWARD HAS
BECOME A FOCAL POINT FOR SOME PERSONS IN AND OUT OF
THE ESTABLISHMENT WHO UNTIL NOW HAVE NOT BEEN PRE-
PARED TO PLAY AN ACTIVE ROLE IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS
FIELD. FOR BOTH THE BIG NAMES AND THE LESSER LIGHTS,
THE REGIME'S HANDLING OF THE DILEMMA PRESENTED BY
SAKHAROV IS LESS IMPORTANT THAN ThE FACT OF THE NO-
BEL AWARD ITSELF. THEY SEE IN THE PRIZE PROOF THAT
SAKHAROV'S EFFORTS, AND BY EXTENSION THOSE OF THE
DISSIDENT COMMUNITY AS A WHOLE, HAVE BEEN RECOGNIZED
BY THE WEST IN THE MOST DRAMATIC WAY POSSIBLE. THEY
CLEARLY HOPE BY THEIR ACTIONS TO SUSTAIN AND BROADEN
THE WEST'S ATTENTION TO THEIR CAUSE.Y
THE DISSIDENTS' ACTIONS ARE A PRODUCT OF SAK-
HAROV'S CONFRONTATION UITH THE REGIME OVER BASIC
PRINCIPLES--FREEDOM OF THOUGHT AND MOVEMEN1--WHICH
ALL CAN SUPPORT. THEIR NEW-FOUND COURAGE AND SEEM-
ING UNITY, HOWEVER, DO NOT STEM FROM A COMMON ASSESS-
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MENT OF THE SITUATION AND ARE, THEREFORE, PROBABLY
FRAGILE AND TEMPORARY.Y
SOME OF THE DISSIDENTS HOPE THAT A UNITED FRONT
ON THE ISSUE OF SAKHAROV WILL INCREASE OFFICIAL CON-
CERN OVER THE SOVIET IMAGE ABROAD, ESPECIALLY NOW IN
THE POST-HELSINKI AND PRE-CPSU CONGRESS PERIOD, AND
RESULT IN AN IMPROVED DOMESTIC CLIMATE. OTHERS, MORE
NUMEROEIS, BELIEVE THEIR LONG-TERM PROSPECTS AND THOSE
FOR DEMOCRATIC CHANGE IN THE USSR ARE SO DISMAL THAT
NOTHING WILL BE LOST BY GRASPING THE OPPORTUNITY PRO-
VIDED BY SAKHAROV'S PRIZE TO RAKE THE REGIME OVER
THE COALS. JEWISH ACTIVISTS--WHILE PLEASED WITH SAK-
HAROV'S AWARD AND WILLI14G TO STAND UP FOR HIM--APPEAR
CONVINCED THAT NEITHER SUPPORT NOR LACK OF IT FOR
SAKHAROV'S CAUSE WILL HAVE ANY MEASURABLE EFFECT ON
THEIR SPECIFIC INTERESTS, MAINLY EASED EMIGRATION.
' THE MORE PESSIMISTIC MAJORITY SEE THE KREMLIN
AS WILLING TO USE SAKHAROV'S CASE TO MAKE EVEN CLEARER
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THAN BEFORE THAT THE CSCE AGREEMENTS CANNOT BE CITED
BY THE WEST TO PRESS FOR CHANGE IN SOVIET DOMESTIC
POLICY. THEY ALSO POINT TO THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP'S
RECENT RETRENCHMENT ON DOCTRINAL ISSUES AS AN INDI-
CATION NOT ONLY OF PRE-CONGRESS CLOSING Of` RANKS,
BUT ALSO A REACTION TO PERCEIVED EXPLOITATION OF HIJ-
MAN RIGHTS BY SOME IN THE WEST TO SABOTAGE DETENTE.
IN THIS ATMOSPHERE, THE DISSIDENTS SEE THEIR FUTURE
AS DARK.
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