WESTERN HEMISPHERE BRIEF 150-75.4

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010052-2
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
20
Document Creation Date: 
December 12, 2016
Document Release Date: 
February 21, 2001
Sequence Number: 
52
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
September 26, 1975
Content Type: 
CABLE
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PDF icon CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010052-2.pdf776.01 KB
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;: Approved Far Release 2009108Y11(. CIA-RDP86T00608 OU300010052 2 ` Dv Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R0003000100524- ~ -(7 Secret No Foreign Dissem Secret Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010052-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010052-2 SECRET MO FOREIGN DISSEf9 ? WESTERN MENISPHERE BRIEP 350-75?V Z.//BOLIVI:At BOLIVIA'S PRESIDENT NOGO BANZCR IS STEPPING UP THE DIPLOMATIC PRESSURE ON CHILE IN HOPES OF REGAINING HIS COUNTRY'S ACCESS TO THE SEA, LOST NEARLY A CENTURY .AGO.//M //BOLIVIA HAS REPORTEDLY PROPOSED THAT IT BE GIVEN SOVEREIGNTY OVER AN 6 8-f4ILE CORRIDOR THROUGH CHILEAN TERPirOF'.'r CLOSE TO THE PERUVIAN BORDER- LA PAZ WOULD CONTINUE TO USE THE CHILEAN PORT OF ARICA UNTIL IT CAN BUILD A PORT OF ITS OWN. AS COMPENSATION FOR THE TERRITORY, RANZER IS SAID TO HAVE OFFERED TO PROVIDE CHILE WITH OIL, GAS, AND AGRICULTUPAL PRODUCTS.//M //DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN CHILE AND BOLIVIA LICRE P'E- ESTABLISHED EARLY THIS YEAR APTER A 33-YEAR BREAK, AND BANZER HAS BEEN P'?ESSING CHILE TO NE60TIATE OM THIS SUBJECT. ACCORDING TO A RECENT REPORT. BANZCR 11AY TAKE HIS COUNTRY'S CASE TO THE UN GENERAL ASSE11BLY IF AN AGREEMENT IS NOT REACHED BY THE END OF NEXT WEEK//Y I/CHILE WILL NOT CEDE ANY TERRITORY TO BOLIVIA, BUT 17 APPARENTLY DOES WANT SOME SORT OP A RESOLUTION SOON, PRESIDENT PINOCIIET COULD ? BEGIN BY LEASING TO BOLIVIA THE RAILROAD AND OIL PIPELINE TH{AT RUN Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010052-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010052-2 SECRET NO PORCXG'4 3;TSSCM BETWEEN BOLIVIA AND T14E PORT Of ARICA; TNI:. WOULD PROBABLY NOT PRODUCE flAJOR OPPOSITION FRO11 CHILEAN NATIONALISTS OR FROM Nt IGMk30RI- G PERU- LATER, NE HIGHT EVEN CONSIDER A LONG-TERM LEASE OF A STRIP OF TERRITORY. //'? //THE l'I29 TREATY BE7;JEEN PERU AND CHILL THAT SETTLED THE WAR OF THE PACIFIC {18791-18821;, PROHIBITS EITHER COUNTKY FROM CEDING AMY Of THE TERRITORY THAT CHANGED HANDS DURING THE WAR UITHOt1T THE APPROVAL Of ! E OTHER- PERU LOULD PROBABLY NOT AGREE TO THE CESSION OF FORMER PERUVIAN TERRITORY TO BOLIVIA- NEITHER THE CHILEAN NOR THE PERUVIAN PRESIDENT, HGNEVER, WANTS TO UNDERCUT 6ANZER' S INITIATIVE, SINCE BOTH VIEW IT la THEE INTEREST TO KEEP ;!I'll IN POSER. {SECRET SdG FOREIQd DISSEMWY 2?//OAS. THE OAS PERMANENT COUNCIL HAS RECONVENED ANXIOUS TO NURTURE THE CURRENT FLEXIBILITY IT DISCERNS IN US PROPOSALS TO TIE UNi THE RESUI1PTION Of THE CANAL NEGOTIATIONS. AND THE LIFTING OF THE SANCTIONS k.GAINST CUBA. THE DELEGATES ARE TRYING TO CLEAR THE OAS REFORtf BACK:, OG, MO'v"%YATED BY A DESIRE TO BUILD ON RECENT SUCCESS IN AMENDIIA THE RIO TREATY. BY T'iE RENEWED COMMITMENT TO THE OAS ON Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010052-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010052-2 4 SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEN THE PART OF CRITICAL 60VERNMENTS LIKE MEXICO, AND BY THE ANTICIPATION OF UNSCHEDULED WORK AHEAD. THEY SEE AN ARRAY OF PROBLEMS THREATENING THE CURRENT SPIRIT OF GOOD WILL: THE TRADE REFORM ACT' DISCRIMINATORY PROVISIONS; THE POSSIBILITY JF A GUATEMALAN MILITARY RESPONSE TO INDEPENDENCE MOVES BY BELIZE; THE FRAGILITY OF THE CANAL TALKS AND BORDER TENSIONS IN THE ANDES AND IN CENTRAL lMERICA.//M //PERU IS PRESSING FOR A SEPARATE INTER-AMERICAN TREATY THAT WOULD PROVIDE FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST "ECONOMIC AGGRESSION" AND HAS PROPOSED AMENDING THE OAS CHARTER T1 INCLUDE THE GOAL OF "COLLECTIVE ECONOMIC SECURITY." THIS AND OTHER ISSUES THAT DIVIDE THE LATINS AND THE US SEEM BOUND TO RENEW INTER-AMEkICAN FRICTIONS.//M (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEil}//Y E-2 IMPDET.rI DO/DDD SD 25X1A SEPTEMBER 26, 1975 OCI/V3D 1027 25xj A Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010052-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010052-2 ALIGN FIRST LETTER IN T' fi BOX. OUTGO!~NG MESSAGE SIGNAL C IIN'-.'. Fl US^ ONLY AO^ COI ?.lP TOO TTU M10 OCI SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM .1 + T a a o o INOuM DISSEM BY: O NO INOfX 0 AITUnN TO PER EAST ASIA BRIE'-* 150-75.Y 1. CHIN/,,., THE HEALTH OF PREMIER CHOU Eli-?LAI HAS APPARENTLY TAKEN A TURN FOR THE WORSE. THIS MAY BE TEMPORARY, BUT REPETITION OF THE CONDITION CAN BE EXPECTED YN THE FUTURE.Y CHOU FAILED TO MEET NORTH VIETNAMESE PARTY CHIEF LE DUAN AND FORMER BRITISH PRIME MINISTER HEATH DURING THEIR VISITS TO CHINA THIS MONTH. BOTH VISITORS MET CHAIRMAN MAO F.ND WOULD NORMALLY HAVE TALKED WITH CHOU. HEATH WAS INFORMED THAT THE PREMIER WANTED TO MEET HIM `BUT WAS PREVENTED FROM DOING SO BY HIS DOCTORS.Y THE CHINESE PRESS IS NOT KEEPING THE PREMIER'S FRAGILE HEALTH A SECRET FROM THE POPULACE. IT PUBLISHED THE REMARKS OF CAMBODIAN DEPI17Y PRIME MINISTER KHIEU SAMPHAN LAST MONTH THAT CHOU WAS "NOT IN THE BEST OF HEALTH." {CONFIDENTIAL}Y 2. KOREA: NORTH KOREA HAS REACTED NEGATIVELY TO THE RECENT US - SOUTH KOREAN PROPOSAL FOR A CONFERENCE AIMED AT EASING TENSIONS IN KOREA.Y A FOREIGN MINISTRY STATEMENT YESTERDAY WAS MILD IN TONE BY NORTH KOREAN STANDE,RDS, BUT IT CONTAINED A POINT-BY-POINT REJECTION DATE: ORIG: UNIT: EXT: Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010052-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010052-2 ~f -- ALIGN FIRST LETTER IN THIS BOX. OUTGOING MESSAGE TYPE THE WORD "ALIGN" TO REGISTER HERE --- GIGNAL CINTYR WISE ONLY AOE col ACe TOO TPA MRO Oct OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 SECRET NO FOREIGN DIS5EM a e e a e e 'PAGE 3 0 INOEX DISSEM BY: 0 NO INDEX 0 RETURN TO PER `J IF FILES # OF THE US - SOUTH KOREAN RECOMMEt`,:,ATIONS. PYONGYANG SAID: --THE KOREAN ARMISTICE AGREEMENT CANNOT BE PRESERVED, AS THE US URGES, BUT MUST BE REPLACED BY A US - NORTH KOREAN PEACE TREATY-Y --SOUTH KOREA, NOT A SIGNATORY TO THE ARMISTICE, CANNOT BE MADE A PARTY TO ANY NEW ARMISTICE ARRANGEMENTS.Y --RECIPROCAL RECOGNITION-OF NORTH KOREA BY THE US AND OF SOUTH KOREA BY PYONGYANG'S ALLIES-AND DUAL UN MEIMBERSHIP FOR THE TWO KOREAS ARE UNACCEPTABLE BECAUSE THEY WOULD PERPETUATE THE DIVISION OF THE COUNTRY?Y THE NORTH KOREANS REFUSED TO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THE U5 - SOUTH KOREAN PROPOSAL CONTAINS A MAJC.c NEW ELEMENT-THE CALL FOR A CONFERENCE ON KOREA, TO BE ATTENDED INITIALLY BY THE PARTIES DIRECTLY CONCERNED WITH THE ARMISTICE {THE US, NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA, AND CHINA}. THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT PYONGYANG IS OPPOSED TO SUCH A CONFERENCE NOW. THE NORTH KOREANS MAY LELL HAVE AVOIDED A CATEGORICAL REJECTION OF THE PROPOSAL IN ORDER TO MINIMIZE CHARGES THAT IT IS UNWILLING TO ENGAGE IN DIALOGUE, A CONSIDERATION DATE: ORIG: UNIT: EXT: Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010052-2 qefe& 2 ApprQed oorG 00'170 / 1' C.`I -RDP86 OP608RO00 -a U-0 0 swNAL CENTUM USI ONLY A07 COI ACP TOO TP MNO Oct OMF 0 a 0 0 0 0 0 SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM 4 r.uAO. N.LNUNCN NUM.I A INOax DISSEM BY: 0 NO INO.x 0 PINTUANTO 'PER 0 1- 011L.. }{ OF SOME IMPORTANCE NOW AS THE VOTE AT THE UN ON COMPETING KOREAN RESOLUTIONS NEARS. THE NORTH KOREANS ARE PROBABLY CONCERNED THAT THE US INITIATIVE COULD BENEFIT THE US AND SOUTH KOREA TACTICALLY IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY.'' THE CHINESE HAVE NOT YET COMMENTED ON THE US - SOUTH KOREAN PROPOSAL. A HIGH-LEVEL CHINESE DELEGATION LED BY POLITBURO MEMBER CHANG CHUN-CHIAO ARRIVED IN PYONGYANG ON SUNDAY AND THE PROPOSAL, AS WELL AS STRATEGY FOR THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEBATE ON THE KOREA QUESTION, IS UNDOUBTEDLY UNDER DISCUSSION. NEITHER SIDE HAS RELEASED ANY DETAILS ON THE TALKS.Y IN COMING TO GRIPS WITH THE NEW PROPOSAL, THE CHINESE WILL HAVE TO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THEIR DEVELOPING TIES WITH THE US AND THEIR KEEN INTEREST IN AVOIDING INCREASED TENSIONS ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA. AT A WELCOMING BANQUET SUNDAY NIGHT, HOWEVER, CHANG REITERATED STANDARD EXPRESSIONS OF CHINESE SUPPORT FOR PYONGYANG, SUGGESTING THAT WHEN PEKING'S RESPONSE IS VOICED-PERHAPS IN FOREIGN MINISTER CHIAO KUAN-HUA'S SCHEDULED SPEECH AT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY-IT WILL FIRMLY SUPPORT PYONGYANG'S POSITION. DATE: ORIG: UNIT: EXT: N a a ? CLA33I,ICATIONApproved FRgFFOg Wa4q?HTHAIpTRE'ISSI11'N'GT $ WgAc9Elt9052E2 2 IMPDET CL BY: Appro9vedTol` RIM 20&19?? - f--RDP86fir' SIGNAL CUNTln US% ONLY AGE Col ACP TOO ?n? uno oCI ouF a a a a a a a SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM NO IND6M RETURN TO PER LIKE PYONGYANG, PEKING'S RESPONSE WILL PROBABLY BE AIMED PRIMARILY AT BLUNTING ANY POSSIBLE TACTICAL BENEFITS SEOUL MIGHT GAIN AT THE UN FROM THE US PROPOSAL?Y THERE HAS BEEN NO SOVIET REACTION TO THE KOREAN PROPOSAL. {CONFIDENTIAL} E-2 IMPDET.rI SDO DDODO DATE: ORIG: UNIT: EXT: 25X1A SEPTEMBER 26, 19?5 OCI/FLO 1945 4 7 s ? NULIA?INO OFFIC[11 ~pa~ (~ ~~~R /COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTN[MICATING OFFICER CLA..IFICATIOPApproved FREFRODITCYTQN26A [Pt ttuVbTgA&pp 0 AgA9~g052e 2 IMPDET Appronv T99JI 20'01%5?1499 RDP86T SIGNAL CENTEf USE ONLf ASP C9 ACP TOO TPY MOO DCI OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 ? 7 a e ? ~ a ? ~ i INOtx DISSEM 8Y: 0 NO INDtx 0 RETURN To PER EUROPEAN ' BRIEF ,7,50-75IY 1. PORTUGAL: SEVERAL THOUSAND PORTUGUESE MILITARY ENLISTED PERSONNEL LED AN ANTI-GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATION IN LISBON LAST NIGHT, 'OPENLY' CHALLENGING' A' PLEDGE BY THE NEW' GOVERNMENT TO RESTORE PUBLIC ORDER AND ENFORCE MILITARY DISCIPLINES' AFTER THE' DEMONSTRATION ENDED, THE 'PAR'TICIPANTS;-REINFORCED BY THOUSANDS OF LEFTIST CIVILIANS, WENT TO A MILITARY PRISON IN TOE SUBURBS. Of. LISBON. AND -DEMANDED THE RELEASE? .OF. TWO OF THEIR.- COMRADES. WHO. HAD BEEN ARRESTED, EARLIER. AN,. UNCONFIRMED., PRESS REPORT SAID THE TWO PRISONERS WERE SUBSEQUENTLY FREED, BUT'THAT 'IT'HAD NOT BEEN DETERMINED 'WHO-,AUTHORIZED THEIR RELEASES' THE-MILITARY POLICE FIGURED IN ANOTHER DISTURBANCE IN LISBON' ON WEDNESDAY, WHEN THEY CLASHED WITH HUNDREDS OF JOBLESS ANGOLAN REFUGEES. BECAUSE OF THEIR WELL-PUBL.iCIZED LEFTIST LEANINGS AND THEIR REFUSAL TO EMBARK FOR ANGOLA, THE MILITARY POLICE ARE SPECIAL TARGETS FOR THE WRATH OF THE RETURNEES.Y ACCORDING TO LOCAL OBSERVERS, ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF FABIAO MET WITH MILITARY REGION COMMANDERS AND OTHER KEY OFFICERS ON DATE: ORIG: UNIT: EXT: R! ASINO OFFICt O ROI 1 Gg P I 3 VTHE AUTHENTICATING OPFIClR pprovet~ For Release 2001/~ 11 14A l r~~g~ i~ IRsOr ~ tQ~~~r40~2 cI.ASSIrICATION REPRODUCTION BYO H R IAA U I 2 IMPDET CL EW: ApproveO LbTGQ&UG001RQIS IDP86TOO R000 Q T Z 9 SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY Ao9 col ACP TOO TPE moo OCI OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM ui INOUx DISSEM BY: 0 No 11,10.x 0 ".TURN To PER 0 IF PILI. ?I} WEDNESDAY TO DISCUSS DETERIORATING?DISCIPLINE.?THF SUB'JECT^ REPORTEDLY WAS ALSO TAKEN UP THURSDAY IN A MEETING OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL, WHICH CONTINUED LATE INTO THE NIGHT.Y BEFORE IT CAN HOPE TO DISCIPLINE THE ENLISTED PERSONNEL, THE COUNCIL, IT SEEMS, WILL HAVE TO PLACE SOME RESTRAINTS UPON TWO OF ITS OWN MEMBERS, ADMIRAL ROSA COUTINHO AND GENERAL CARVALHO, BOTH LEADERS OF THE EXTREME LEFT NATIONALIST FACTION. UPON THEIR RETURN THURSDAY FROM SWEDEN AT THE HEAD OF AN OFFICIAL DELEGATION, THE- .TWO OFFICERS MADE STATE?M?ENTS, WHICH. CAN ONLY...PRQVIDE ENCOURAGEMENT .TO THOSE ELEMENTS THAT HAVE DECIDED TO-DEFY THE GOVERNMENT AND TEST ITS METTLE.Y ROSH COUTINHO DESCRIBED BOTH LAST NIGHT'S DEMONSTRATION AND THE COMMUNIST-BACKED STEELWORKERS! STRIKE ON WEDNESDAY, WHICH WAS AN OPEN CHALLENGE TO THE NEW ANTI-COMMUNIST LABOR MINISTER, AS "JUSTIFIED WARNINGS." NOT TO BE OUTDONE, THE OUTSPOKEN CARVALHO SAID HE WAS NOT WORRIED THAT ARMS HAD BEEN HANDED OVER BY ONE OF HIS OWN SECURITY OFFICERS TO LEFTIST FORCES. HE WOULD BE WORRIED, CARVALHO SAID, IF THE WEAPONS IN QUESTION HAD GONE TO THE RIGHTISTS, DATE: ORIG: UNIT: EXT: Aplproaed l or Release 2001/08/21 ?qSI P'861'00608R000300010052-2vTNlNTICATINO OFFICER CLASSIFICATION REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2 C App(WC'0()j$We /SM(e-RDPB? T SIGNAL CGNTIIT US! ONLY AGE COI ACP TOO TP? moo OCI OMF 0 0. 0 0 0 0 0 SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM 0 608R0003 00 0052-2 T 7 ? ? BUT THAT NOW THEY WERE "IN GOOD HANDS." {SECRET}Y 0 ..D.X DISSEM BY: 0 NO IND.X 0 RETURN TO PER 0 SP FIL.? # 2. ITALY: ITALY'S CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS AND SOCIALISTS HAVE EACH HELD PARTY LEADERSHIP MEETINGS RECENTLY TO GRAPPLE WITH POLITICAL. PROBLEMS BROUGHT ON BY THE COMMUNISTS' STRONG SHOWING IN THE' NATIONWIDE LOCAL ELECTIONS LA'ST' JUNE. THE TWO PARTIES' DIFFERING VIEWS ON HOW TO DEAL WITH THE COMMUNISTS REMAIN A MAJOR ..OBSTACLE TO.-.RENEWAL- OF : THE- COOPERATION BETWEEN THEM THAT HAS ? BEEN. . THE BASIS FOR MOST ITALIAN' GOVERNMENTS ,SINCE. 1963.4' BOTH PARTIES SAID THEY STILL SEE PRIME MINISTER MORO'S FRAGILE GOVERNMENT-IN WHICH ONLY THE CHRISTIAN" DEMOCRATS AND THE REPUBLICANS HOLD"CAB?INET POSTS-AS THE ONLY VIABLE POS%IBILITY UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES. THE SOCIALISTS, HOWEVER, SEEMED TO CONDITION THEIR CONTINUED SUPPORT ON THE GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSIVENESS TO ORGANIZED LABORS DEMANDS IN MAJOR CONTRACT TALKS THAT GET UNDER WAY THIS WEEK-4' AT THEIR GATHERING, THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS TOOK A STEP TOWARD THE SOCIALISTS BUT DID NOT GO FAR ENOUGH TO BRIDGE THE GAP ON THE COMMUNIST ISSUE. IN A COMPROMISE REFLECTING THE SHARP DIVISIONS DATE: ORIG: UNIT: EXT: R.L4Ap1prav" For Release 2001/08/29R6IIC. FW86TOO608R000300010062TICATING OFFICER CLA55IFICATION REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET -`I Qv. ApprQ1i GQJI 2 FOfi&A6IE-RDP86? 00030 O'_1 O~ 7 1 6 SIGNAL CiNTRR U513 ONLY AGE COI ACP TOO TrE CARD OCI 01W 0 G G 0 0 a 0 MESSAGE REFERENCE NUM.ER G INDEX DISSEM BY: G NO INDEX 0 RETURN TO PER BETWEEN THE PARTY''S? LEFT AND RIGHT WINGS, THE CHRISTIAN DE10CRATS VOTED TO MAINTAIN THEIR OPPOSITION TO THE COMMUNISTS BUT TO OPEN A ".COMPETITIVE DIALOGUE" WITH. THEM-PRQ..VIDE?D SUCH ? AN?.EX.CHANGE DOES NOT BLUR THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN MAJORITY AND OPPOSITION.Y PARTY LEADER ZACCAGNINI AND PRIME MINISTER MOR,O ARE.THE. MAJOR ADVOCATES OF THE "DIALOGUE" PROPOSAL, BUT THEY FACE AN UPHILL FIGHT IN TRYING TO MAKE THIS VAGUE FORMULATION SPECIFIC ENOUGH TO SATISFY THE-SOCIALISTS AND STILL?OBTAIN AGREEMENT WITHIN THEIR OWN PARTY. CONSERVATIVE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS HIWE WARNED THAT DIALOGUE WITH THE COMMUNISTS, IS A LOSING PROPOSITION UNLESS THEIR PARTY FIRST DEVELOPS'ITS OWN CLEAR- LINE ON MAJOR POLICY -QUE-STIONS-Y THE SOCIALIST MEETING, MEANWHILE, UNDERLINED THE GROWING FEAR AMONG PARTY LEADERS THAT THEIR POST-ELECTION MANEUVERS HAVE HURT THE PARTY BY IDENTIFYING IT TOO CLOSELY WITH THE BETTER ORGANIZED AND STRONGER COMMUNISTS?Y SINCE JUNE, THE SOCIALISTS HAVE SHARPLY INCREASED COLLABORATION WITH THE COMMUNISTS BY FORMING GOVERNMENTS WITH THEM IN MOST MAJOR ITALIAN CITIES, 5 OF THE 20 REGIONS, AND ABOUT A THIRD OF THE 94 DATE: ORIG: UNIT: EXT: ""App96VffQ For Release 2001 /08/?Z1"?'r'7- Ri 6T00608R000300010052"2"'CATING OFFICER IMIPDET Approvved Fo, Releas E20~1%~8/21 : CIA- SIGNAL CENTER USE CNLY ACE COI ACP TOO TIRE moo Dr.4 w 1 7 N ~ ? ? OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM O INOE M O No INDEX O 'RETURN TO 0 ?V FILE. PROVINCES, AND THEY HAVE REFUSED TO FORM ANOTHER NATIONAL COALITION WITH THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS WITHOUT A FORMAL PROCEDURE FOR C&NSIDERING.COMMUNIST VIEWS ON POLICY.OPTIONS?M MOST, SOCIALISTS AR,E.CONVINCED ,T.HAT THEY' .SUFFERED IN THE. LAST ELECTION .AS ..A RESULT. OF COOPERATION. -WITH THE GOVERNMENT AND BELIEVE THEY,???CANNO?T ..'COMPETE WITH -THE' COMMUIV.ISTS?? FOR.- V.OTER? SUPPORT.UNL?ESS THE COMMUNISTS' OPPOSITION STATUS IS DILUTED. EMPHASIS AT THE LEADERSHIP MEETING WAS ON ESTABLISHING AN "AUTONOMOUS" LINE OF ACTION TO SET THE SOCIALISTS APART'F.ROM'BOTH THE 'COMMUNISTSAND THE CHRISTIAN AEMOCR.ATS.-NO SMALL T.A.SK ?.Y CVMI1UNIST CHIEF. BERLINGUER IS STAYING OUT OF. THE' MUSUAO. RIPMRINC^ NUM..w SOCIALIST - CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT DISPUTE OVER HIS PARTY'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE NEXT NATIONAL GOVERNMENT. NEVERTHELESS, THE SOCIALISTS ARE CONCERNED OVER HIS INSISTENCE THAT COMMUNIST STRATEGY AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL HAS NOT CHANGED. BERLINGUER IS STILL AIMING FOR AN EVENTUAL "HISTORIC COMPROMISE' AGREEMENT WITH THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS WHICH1 IF ACCOMPLISHED, WOULD MAKE SOCIt.LIST SUPPORT SUPERFLUOUS.M DATE: ORIG: UNIT: EXT: Apprgg$oaFDge & g1 QR 41iE:1g6urR kT49@ ft@$000j00252-2 IMPBET CL BY: `A~-bi~~fl~FtST~ReI'~9T10SR1 : CIA-R SIGNAL CINTtf USE ONLY AO^ COI ACP TOJ TM MRO OCI OMF 0 0 0 0 B 0 a 1 , I ww% ! ? s ? ? 0 0 0 Ino?x ' DISSEM ?Y: NO I0-Dix RETURN TO PER 0 IF POLES ' THE COMMUNISTS ARE NOT OVERLY JUBILANT THEMSELVES, HOWEVER, AND ARE BEING CAUTIOUS IN THOSE LOCALITIES WHERE, THEY NOW HOLD-POWER FOR THE. FIRST :TIME.:.. ,THEY, FEAR THA T...PUBUC,.REACTION TO THEIR . INITIATIVES COULD SEND PROTEST VOTERS BACK. TO??THE. CHRISTIAN .DEMOCRATS OR TO'' THE FAR RIGHT IN THE NEXT' ELECTION.- {CONFIDENTIAL]- E-2 IMPDET?rI 0 ? SDO DDODO-- DATE: SEPTEMBER 26, 1975 ORIG: UNIT: OCI/FL) EXT: ;;945 R!L!AlINO O'Approved For Release 2d6c"OY 41?! TAs RDP86TOO608ROQ03OOO10052 2 2-2....... Appproved Ior'ReTease 2 170812''1:CIA-RD 310NAL CENTER U9C ONLY AGO col Acp TOO TIPS Moto Oct 1 J ? ? ? ? IND?M DISSEM 9Y: 0 NO INDCA 0 RETURN TO PER MEA BRIEF 150-?5.Y 1. RHODESIA: THE RHODESIAN AFRICAN NATIONAL COUNCIL-THE UMBRELLA ORGANIZATION FORMED BY FOUR BLACK NATIONALIST GROUPS LAST DECEMBER-IS SCHEDULED TO HOLD ITS FIRST NATIONAL CONGRESS IN SALISBURY THIS WEEKEND. THE MEETING WILL FOCUS NEW ATTENTION ON THE BITTER LEADERSHIP STRUGGLE AMONG THE NATIONALISTS THAT IS THE MOST IMMEDIATE BARRIER TO A RESUMPTION OF SETTLEMENT TALKS WITH PRIME MINISTER IAN SMITH.M THE CONGRESS IS A TACTICAL VICTORY FOR JOSHUA NKOMO, A FORMER LEADER OF ONE OF THE COUNCIL'S CONSTITUENT GROUPS, WHO NOW APPARENTLY CONTROLS A MAJORITY OF THE COUNCIL'S BRANCHES INSIDE RHODESIA. NKOMO'S EXPECTED BID FOR THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE COUNCIL MAY RUN INTO TROUBLE, HOWEVER, AND THE MEETING COULD END IN RIOTING BETWEEN HIS FOLLOWERS AND SALISBURY-BASED ADHERENTS OF EXILED NATIONALIST LEADERS WHO WANT TO SCRAP SETTLEMENT TALKS AND GET FOREIGN BACKING FOR A GUERRILLA OFFENSTVE.Y TWO WEEKS AGO BISHOP MUZOREWA, THE FIGUREHEAD CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL WHO HAS BEEN TFAVELING EXTENSIVELY OUTSIDE RHODESIA, DATE: ORIG: UNIT: EXT: - -L CI-ASSIFICATION Approv%pp~8KA9190%Gi'I kl4 ITH~'I urfh ' %1L'~'f Ml 9JJU"IU a IMPDET Approved ior'IPeleaseF60 /b$/2 :CIA-R) r? 8IONAL CENTUfl US K ONLY O AO^ COI ACP TOO TP? U O DCI OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM I 00608R >t ? ? -- 0052 2 Y ? s 0 +m0?11 DISSEM BY: 0 No INO?!I I~ II?TUNN TV PER . 0 IP PIL?S Tr EXPELLED NKOMO FOR ENGINEERING THE CALL FOR THE CONGRESS OVER MUZOREWA'S OBJECTIONS. ALTHOUGH MUZOREWA HAS ADVOCATED A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT WITH SMITH, HIS BREACH WITH NKOMO HAS SEALED HIS DEPENDENCE ON NDABANINGI SITHOLE AND OTHER MILITANT EXILES.Y SHORTLY AFTER MUZOREWA EXPELLED NKOMO, ZAMBIAN PRESIDENT KAUNDA AND THE PRESIDENTS OF TANZANIA, MOZAMBIQUE, AND BOTSWANA MET WITH THE RHODESIAN NATIONALISTS IN LUSAKA BUT FAILED TO RESOLVE ..THE SCHISM. THE..FOUR:.P.RESIDEN.TS WARNED-THAT- THEY WOULD WITHHOLD,. FURTHER SUPPORT-. UI\NTIL THE COMPETING. LEADERS'--MUZOREWA; NK.OMO -I'.' AND SITHOLE-AGREED TO WORK TOGETHER. {CONFIDENTIAL}Y 2. BANGLADESH: LOCAL OBSERVERS REPORT THAT AFTER ALMOST SIX WEEKS IN POWER, THE NEW GOVERNMENT IN BANGLADESH HAS DONE LITTLE TO DISTINGUISH ITSELF FROM THE OUSTED REGIME OF THE LATE PRESIDENT MUJIB. THE NEW LEADERS HAVE REAFFIRMED THE FOUR BASIC PRINCIPLES OF BANGLADESH'S CONSTITUTION-NATIONALISM, SECULARISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY- BUT HAVE MADE VIRTUALLY NO OTHER MAJOR POLICY ANNOUNCEMENTS.Y DOMESTICALLY, PRESIDENT MUSHTAQUE'S REGIME HAS IMPOSED SECURITY DATE: ORIG: UNIT: EXT: CLASSIPICATION Appr9 gcfD9E ST gQypAW4A - 196- kT99~9? RR2gOO0100a52-2 IMPDET CL BY: 4__ ALIGN' F Rf?9TTER I% ffgWff OUTGOING MESSAGE AO^ S? -:AL CINTIR USE ONLY COI ACP TOO TPS J O DCI EAFIERE---- 1-I I I E 7 S ~F% HANDU O INDICATO E 2 G N D I S S E 1TI.T1ME GROUP Cm 0 INo.>t DISSEM BY: 0 NO INOIM 0 SITUIN TO rER 0 v -r.u # M'.ASURES THAT APPEAR ALMOST AS AUTHORITARIAN AS THOSE OF ITS PREDECESSOR. THE COUNTRY'S ILLS HAVE. BEEN BLAMED ON IIUJIB'S ABUSES OF POWER, BUT NO SWEEPING C-?ANGES IN HIS POLICIES HAVE BEEN INSTITUTED. THE FEW ECONOMIC MOVES MADE BY THE NEW LEADERS HAVE BEEN POLITICALLY MOTIVATED, AND SOME HAVE BEEN IN LINE WITH PRE-COUP POLICIES.Y IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS-, OBSE..RVERS .SEE.. THE. IMPROVED P,ROSPECT?. FOR TIES' WITH PAKISTAN AND CHINA . AS A, REAFFIRMATION OF. MUJIB'S?? POLICY OF FRIENDSHIP WITH ALL. MUJIB HIMSELF HAD SOUGHT, ALBEIT UNSUCCESSFULLY, TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN AND CHINA TO BALANCE THE INFLUENCE IN BANGLADESH :!F INDIA AND THE SOVIET UNION. THE NEW GOVERNMENT DOES NOT WANT ITS TIES TO ISLAMABAD AND PEKING TO CROW TO THE EXTENT THAT THEY SOUR BANGLADESH'S GOOD RELATIONS WITH INDIA AND THE SOVIET UNION, AND IT HAS MADE EFFORTS TO REASSURE THESE COUNTRIES .Y THE GOVERNMENT'S SLOW PACE MAY BE A RESULT OF ITS PREOCCUPATION WITH POLITICAL CONCERNS, SUCH AF SORTING OUT LEADERSHIP ROLES AMONG CIVILIAN AND MILITARY FIGURES IN THE DATE: ORIG: UNIT: EXT: Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010052-2 , Approved For Release 2001/08/21: CIA-RDP86..IVIT006081~~Q03Q0(~~,QQ; 111 .. I 1 .\V I\ I R 1 RL'~'~''I I I I I '_ OUTGOING MESSAGE SIGNAL CINTIR US^ ONLY AOI CO. ACP TOO TM MRO OCI SECRET NO FO:EIGN DISSEM CONF: a s S 3 ? ? MESSAGE RU/lR/NC^ NUM?ua O (NOUN 0 NO INONX 0 RETURN TO PER ? 0 IP PILES 1t ' HIERARCHY 'AND PROTECTING ITSELF AGAINST SECURITY THREATS. THE POST-COUP LEADERSHIP STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE MAJORS WHO LED THE COUP AND-SOME SENIOR OFFICERS HAS SUBSIDED, BUT THE YOUNGER OFFICERS HAVE STILL NO.T RETURNED TO. THEIR UNITS. THEY ARE ADVISING MUSHTAQUE AND IN ONE CASE ARE REPORTED TO HAVE OVERRIDDEN HIS DECISION. MUSHTAQUE IS AWARE OF HIS UNCERTAIN POSITION WITH THE MILITARY AND IS PAYING CAREFUL ATTENTION TO THEIR (ONCERNS.M INTERNAL SECURITY SEEMS-TO BE THE. GOVERNMENT'S' BIGGEST' CONCERN. IN ADDITION TO IMPOSING TOUGH MARTIAL LAW REGULATIONS, THE GOVERNMENT HAS ROUNDED UP SOME ASSOCIATES OF MUJIB, SUSPENDED POLITICAL ACTIVITY, LAUNCHED A NATIONWIDE CAMPAIGN TO CONFISCATE ILLEGALLY HELD ARMS, AND ABSORBED INTO THE ARMY THE RAKKHI BAHINI, A PARAMILITARY GROUP SET UP BY MUJIB AND BELIEVED LOYAL TO HIM. THE GOVERNMENT'S FEARS MAY HAVE BEEN COMPOUNDED BY PERSISTENT RUMORS THAT SOME OF MUJIB'S SUPPORTERS ARE SEEKING REVENGE FOR THE COUP.Y MOST BENGALEES ACCEPT THAT THE DATE : ORIG: UNIT: EXT: Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R0003QO010052-2 Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010052-2 Yr -ALIGN FIRST LETTER IN THIS BOX. TYPE THE WORD "ALIGN" TO REGISTER HERE III CUTGOING MESSAGE SIGNAL CINTIA USI ONLY AQI COI ACP TOO TPI MIIO DCI OMF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 6 SECRETNO FOREIGN DISSEM 1 . 7 I I / 0 INDIX DISSEM BY: 0 No INDIA 0 II ITVNN TO PER O IF PILII 1f GOVERNMENT MUST-SET ITS HOUSE IN ORDER. THEY APPEAR WILLING TO ACQUIESCE IN THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF RIGHTS AND POLITICAL ?ACTIVIT?Y' FOR THE TIME BEING--.V LIE BELIEVE DISENCHANTMENT IS INEVITABLE BEFORE LONG. ANY GOVERNMENT-WOULD FIND IT TIFFICULT 10 CONSOLIDATE ITS CONTROL OVER POLITICALLY AND ECONOMICALLY TROUBLED BANGLADESH. THE MUSHTAQUE REGIME, WITH ITS INTERNAL DIVISIONS AND LITTLE OF THE MASSIVE POPULAR APPEAL ENJOYED .'BY MUJIB*IN 'HIS EARLY. DAYS, 'WILL HAVE AN ESPECIALLY 'DIFF'ICULT 'TIME ? tCONFIDENTtALY 25X1A' DATE: SEPTEMBER 26, 1975 ORIG: UNIT: EXT: 1945 Approved For Release 2001/08/21 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010052-2 SDO DDODO