MIDDLE EAST AFRICA BRIEF 132-75.4

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010034-2
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
20
Document Creation Date: 
December 19, 2016
Document Release Date: 
June 14, 2005
Sequence Number: 
34
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
August 25, 1975
Content Type: 
CABLE
File: 
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PDF icon CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010034-2.pdf528.83 KB
Body: 
Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R00 Secret Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010034-2 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010034-2 JORDAN-SYRIA: JORDAN AND SYRIA HAVE TAKEN FURTHER STEPS TO INCREASE COOPERATION IN A NUMBER OF FIELDS.Y IN A COMMUNIQUE CAPPING KING HUSAYN'S FIVE-DAY VISIT TO SYRIA, THE TWO COUNTRIES ANNOUNCED THE FORMATION OF A "SUPREME SYRIAN-JORDANIAN COMMAND COUNCIL" COMPOSED OF HUSAYN AND SYRIAN PRESIDENT ASAD. THE COUNCIL IS SUPPOSED TO MEET AT LEAST ONCE EVERY THREE MONTHS TO ALT ON RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE FORME.C AT THE TIME OF ASAD'S VISIT TO JORDAN LAST MONTH.Y THE COMMUNIQUE AVOIDED ANY MENTION OF A JOINT MILITA?Y COMMAND, AND ITS SPECIFIC LABELING OF THE NEW COUNCIL AS "POLITICAL" SEEMS DESIGNED TO RELIEVE ISRAELI AND US APPREHENSION THAT JORDAN AND SYRIA HAVE ESTABLISHED A MILITARY CO'1MAND. THE COMMAND COUNCIL WILL, H0'JEVER, REVIEItI PLANS FOR "COORDINA i':ION AND INTEGRATION" BETWEEN THE TUO AR01=D FOR;CL:S? , THE PREROGATIVES OF THE CO[IMANt) COUNCIL APPEAI' TO EE SUFFICIE~JTLY BROAD TO PERMIT HUSAYN TO KEEP HIS ::JOPT.%ONS OP::iJ DATE: ORIG: UNIT: EXT: Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010034-2 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010034-2 AND MOVE TOWARD CLOSER MILITARY COOPERATION AT' HIS OWN P3ACE. ALTHOUGH THE KING SEES BENEFITS IN CLOSER COOPERATION WITH SYRIA, HE WILL BE CAREFUL NOT TO ALIENATE THE JORDANIAN ARMY1, HIS MAJOR POWER BASE. FOR ITS PART, THE ARMY REMAINS ~KEP T ICAL OF SYRIAN MOTIVES, F- A RING THAT ASAD WILL PREVAIL ON THE KING TO ALLOW THE FE 4DAYEEN TO RE-ESTABLISH A PRESENCE IN JORDAN. THE PRO FORMA TREATMENT OF PALESTINIAN ASPIRATIONS IN THE COMMUNIQUE MAY REASSURE: Ti4E ARTY FOR THE TIME BEING. i,' THE COMMUNIQUE LISTS SEVERAL OTHER AREAS IN WHICH THE TWO GOVERNMENTS ARE TO JORK TOGETHER. IN ADDITION TO PLANNING FOR A "UNIFIED FOREIGN POLICY," PARTICULARLY 11TH RESPECT TO ARAB ISSUES, THE COMMAND COUNCIL WILL DISCUSS CO>t3ORDINATION OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT PLANS, THE FORMATION OF JOINT ECONOMIC COMPAIES, UNIFICATION OF MARKETS, AND ESTABLISHMENT - ?R I OF A II1ITCTr T ~Ilc+~n ti. e+ POLICY. Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010034-2 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010034-2 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010034-2 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010034-2 FOREIGN MINIS",'ERS OF NONALIGNED MEET TODAY: THE LIMA CONFERENCE OF NONE'"LIGNED STATES THAT BEGINS AUGUST 25, 1975 WILL SHOW HOW THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES WEIGH PROSPECTS FOR COMPROMISE 1,1ITH THE DEVELOPED WORLD. THE MEETING WILL PROVIDE A PREVIEW OF RADICAL STRZNGTH ON ISSUES THAT WILL COME BEFORE THE UN BEGINNING SEPTEMBER 27 1975.Y THE DELEGATIONS LIKELY TO TAKE THE LEAD AT LIMA HAVE HELD THEIR CARDS CLOSELY. THE MORE PASSIVE DELEGATIONS, WHICH ANTICIPATE THAT ALGERIA AND ITS ALLIES WILL DOMINATE THE CONFERENCE AGAIN, ARE ALREADY TELLING WES'T'ERN GOVERN- MENTS THEY WILL NOT BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE OUTCOME.Y THE AGENDA DEC.ONSTRATES DIVERSE INTERESTS. IT CALLS FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF NEW MEMBERS; A REVIEW OF THE INTER- NATIONAL SITUATION, INCLUDING THE MIDDLE EAST, SOUTH AFRICA, LATIN AMERICA, AND INDOCHINA; THE ADOPTION OF .a STRATEGY FOR MUTUAL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ASSISTAININCE AMONG THE NONALIGNED; A POST-MORTEM ON THE EFFECT OF DECISIONS TAKEN DATE: ORIG: UNIT: EXT: Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010034-2 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010034-2 SEEM KEEN FOR C3ATTLE.Y ON ECONOMIC ISSUES, MANY, ANXIOUS TO SEE WHAT PROPOSALS THE INDUSTRIALIZED NATIONS WILL BRING TO THE SPECIAL UN SESSION ON DEVELOPMENT, WOULD PREFER NOT TO ANTAGONIZE COUNTRIES THAT MIGHT BE WILLING TO ASSIST THEM. BUT THEY, TOO, SEEM RESIGNED TO POLLOW THE ALGERIAN LEAD, LVEN IF IT TAKES THEM FURTHER ALONG THE PATH TOWARD CONTENTION.Y ALGERIA PLAYS ON THE DISTRUST THAT THE NONALIGNED FEEL FOR THE INDUSTRIALIZED STATES. THE POOR COUNTRIES SUSPECT THE RICH ARE PLAYING FOR TIME AND HAVE NO REAL INTENTION OF MAKING GENEROUS OFFERS.Y THE ECONOMIC ISSUES MAY NOT BE SO EASY FOR THE ALGERIANS NOW THAT CUBA HAS COMPLAINED THAT ARABS ARE AS NIGGARDLY AS -THE WEST.Y THE IS CONCERN AMONG SOME DELEGATIONS THAT THE RADICALS MAY PULL OUT ALL THE STOPS AT LIMA:Y DATE: ORIG: UNIT: EXT: Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010034-2 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010034-2 -?HAVING LOST MOMENTUM ON THE DRIVE TO EXPEL ISRAEL FROM THE UN, SYRIA AND LIKE-MINDED STATES MAY MAKE A GREATER EFFORT TO OTRAM PLE EGYPT'S AND THE AFRICANS' CASE AGAINST EXPULSION. ISRAEL WILL BE A HIGHLY DIVISIVE ISSUE THAT COULD BREAK DOWN THE APPEARANCE OF UNITY THAT THE NONALIGNED HAVE TRIED TO MAINTAIi.Y -FOLLOWING THE POSTPONEMENT OF THE PUERTO RICAN "LIBERATION" ISSUE BY THE DECOLONIZATION COMMITTEE OF THE UN, CUBA MAY PRESS HARDER FOR SUPPORT ON THIS ISSUE AT LIMA. DESPITE THE LIKELIHOOD THAT HAVANA WILL WANT TO MAKE A FRIENDLY GESTURE FOLLOWING WASHINGTON'S PARTIAL EASING OF SANCTIONS AGAINST CUBA, HAVANA WILL BE TEMPTED TO KEEP THE PUERTO RICAN PROPAGANDA ISSUE ALIVE.' EVEN THOUGH MANY AMONG THE NONALIGNED PRIVATELY AGREE THAT RADICALS IN THE GROUP ARE PUSHING THE DEVELOPED-UNDER- DEVELOPED SPLIT TOO FAR, THEY WILL BE INHIBITED BY THE STRONG PRESSURE FOR UNITY. MANY WOULD BE PLEASED TO SEE LESS STRIDENT POSITIONS IF THE RADICALS WOULD JUST BACK OFF A DATE : ORIG: UNIT: EXT: Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010034-2 25X 1 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010034-2 XT LITTLE, BUT MOST SEEM PREPARED TO GO ALONG. Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : Cl? Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010034-2 1. PORTUGAL: ON SUNDAY NIGHT PORTUGUESE PRESIDENT COSTA COM DISAVOWED TWO PRESIDENTIAL COMMUNIQUES ISSUED EARLIER THAT DAY THAT HAD .. -';aa IT .. ~P~~E,1R., ,-I i E 'a 'AS? S.,CKIP~G A CON 'fi~J:1TI0r.i ._ _ 1. i~., OF PRIME MINISTER VASCO GORICALVES. BOTH COMMLINIIUES 'JERE RELEASED BY THE FIFTH DIVISION OF THE ARMED FORCES GENERAL STAFF, T!-IE COMMUNIST-DOMINATED PROPAGANDA AND INFORMATION SE'"-VICE:..' THE COMMUNIQUES COULD HAVE BEEN ISSUED LJITHHJOU'f THE PRESIDENT'S AUTHORIZATION IN A DELIBERATE ATTEMPT BY THE COMMUNISTS TO MISLEAD THE PU JLIC ABOUT DECISIONS REACHED EAnL T'ER AT A MEETING OF THE THREE-MAN MILITARY DIRECTORATE AND KEY MILITARY FIGURES AND TO PROVIDE MOMENTUM TO A LAST-PI I CSH EFFORT TO SCUTTLE THE PLANS OF THE ANTI-COMMUNIST ANTUNES CROUP AND SAVE GONCALVES.Y ON THE OTHER HAIND, THERE WERE PRESS REPORTS DURING THIZ, UEEKES1ND THAT THE ANTI-GONCALVE S FORCES !:!:::SINE SPLIT SY A DISAGREEMENT-, AND WE CANNOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY THAT