WESTERN HEMISPHERE BRIEF 131-75.4

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010033-3
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
24
Document Creation Date: 
December 19, 2016
Document Release Date: 
June 14, 2005
Sequence Number: 
33
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
August 22, 1975
Content Type: 
CABLE
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PDF icon CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010033-3.pdf747.17 KB
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25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000 Secret Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010033-3 X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010033-3 Z- BOLIVIA-- IiU BANZER HAS BEEN PRESIDEN7 OF BOLIVIA FOR FOUR YEARS, A 'JOTABLE ACHIEVE.-SE T IN ONE OF THE MOST POLITICALLY TURBULENT COUNTRIES IN LATIN AMERICA. THIS LONG TENURE IS THE MORE REMARKABLE BECAUSE AA!ZER IS (JOT PZRSO3ALLY POPULAR AND HAS LOST MOST Of THE CIVILIAN POLITICAL SUPPORT HE STARTED UITH.'1 4!E HAS PROVED ADEPY AT THWARTING ATTEMPTS TO OVERTHROW HIM AND SKILLFUL IN COLTIVATING THE MILITARY HIGH COMMAND. FURTHERMORE, THE COUNTRY'S ECONOMIC POSITION HAS IMPROVED DURING HIS TENURE, LARGELY BECAUSE Of THE DEVELOPMENT OF OIL AND NAUTRAL GAS RESOURCES AND THE RISE IN WORLD PETROLEUM PRICES.Y VITH POLITICAL ACTIVITY ALMOST NONEXISTENT AND NO IMPORTANT PRESSURE GROUPS LEANING ON HIM, BAWZER HAS RECENTLY BEEN STRESSING BROAD ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS. IH MOTH FIELDS HE HAS SOUGHT TO BUILD UP PUBLIC CONFIDENCE BY MAKING PROMISES ACID OPTIMISTIC PRONOUNCEMENTS. TO DATE THERE HAVE BEEN FEV REAL RESULTS. THE ECONOMY HAS BENEFITED FROM FOUR YEARS OF RELATIVE TRANOUILLITY AND ADMINISTRATIVE CONTINUITY- DET!ITE THESE FACTORS AND AN Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010033-3 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010033-3 ABUNDAI"CE Of NATURAL RESOURCES, BOLIVIA REMAINS THE POOREST COUNTRY IN SOUTH AMERICA?Y IT HAS BEEN UNABLE TO EXPLOIT ITS II I1E 4SE HYDROELECTRIC POTENTIAL AND IRON ORE DEPOSITS OR TO 1AKE FULL USE Of ITS PETR_ ='.EUN AND NATURAL GAS SUPPLIES. THE FAI:J8E IS TRACEABLE TO THE COUNTRY'S LACK OF SKI-.LED MANPOWER, RUGGED TERRAIN. A,'aD INEPT AND CORRUPT GOVERNNENTS?Y A MAJOR FOREIGN POLICY 60AL HAS BEEN TO RE6IAN THE SEACOAST BOLIVIA LOST IN THE 14TH CENTURY WAR PITH CHILE. BANI#R TOOK A SHORT STEP TOWARD THIS GOAL WHEN HE RECENTLY REOPENED RELATIONS %ITH SANTIAGO AFTER A 13-YEAR HIATUS. STILL, BANZER'S CHANCES OF REGAINING BOLIVIA'S SEACOAST ARE REMOTE?Y HE KNOVS THAT THE MOST BOLIVIA CAN HOPE POR IS BETTER ACCESS TO CHILEAN PORTS, AND, AFTER WHIPPING UP NATIONALISTIC SENTIMENT FOR A "RETURN TO THE SEA," HE NOW SAYS BOLIVIA NHHOUL D BE ABLE "00 OBTAIN A RESOLUTION" Of ITS LANDLOKCD STATUS BY 1960. THIS DISTANT DATE DOES NOT SIT WELL KITH ULTRA-NATIONALISTS IN THE ARMED FORCES.Y AT PRESENT BAMZER APPEARS ECURE? MOST Of HIS ENEMIES ARE Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010033-3 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010033-3 EITHER IN EXILE OF TOO DISORGANIZED TO NOUMT A SERIOUS HOVE AGAINST HIf?Y SECURITY IS NOT ABSOLUTE IN BOLIVIA. SOIE CIVILIAN POLITICIANS HAVE BEGUN TO URGE A RETURN TO CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNSIEt4T? SOME ARMY OFFICERS, PARTICULARLY YOUNGER ONES WHO HAVE SEEN IN ON COUP PLOTTIUG IN THE PAST+ REPORTEDLY ARE UPSET BY BANZER' S REPEATED POSTPONEMENT OF A NATIONAL ELECTION OR BELIEVE THAT THE MILITARY- CONTROLLED GOVER4f1ENT SHOULD BE CODIFIED TO INCLUDE CIVILIAUS.Y TO STAVE OFF ANOTHER ROUND OF COUP ATTEMPTS. BANZER f1AY SOON ACCEPT A FEN CIVILIANS IN HIS GOVERbNMENT. EVENTUALLY., HO;.EVER. 25X1 THE CHANCES ARC GOOD THAT ONE OF HIS OFFICERS WYIO FEELS THAT IT IS HAS TURN TO BE PRESIDENT WILL f10VE A~,AINST HIM. 2. CUBA: THE CUBAN ECONOMY IS UNLIKELY TO BE SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECTED BY THE PARTIAL LIFTING Or THE US EMBARGO, ANNOUNCED Ott AUGUST 21. TO ALLOW US SUBSIDIARIES ABROAD TO TRADE WITH CU A?Y YHE$E BILL SE A SHARP JURP IN CUBAN PURCHASES FROM US SU8- SIDIARIES% f1AINLY IN WESTERN EUROPE, CANADA, ARGENTINA, AND MEXICO, BUT 110!T Of THE PURCHASES WILL BE DIVERTED FROf1 OTHER FOREIGN Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010033-3 5X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010033-3 SUPPLIERS. OVE~,:ALL CUBAN IMPORTS PROBABLY MILL RISE OULY SLIGHTLY- CUBAN IMPORT C 4."ACITY WILL RE'AIN BASICALLY DEPENDENT ON THE LEVEL OF SUGAR EXPORTS 4 TmE IMPA,,f."r ON CUBAN ECONOMIC GROWTH IS ALSO EXPECTED TO BE MARGINAL. V AE PARTS Of THE ECONOMY WILL BENEFIT PROF AN INFLUX OF US SPARE f.GAXTS, EAUIPMENT, AND ,TECHNOLOGY, BUT OVERALL GROWTH WILL STILL CXNGE ON CUBA'S ABILITY TO FINANCE INCREASED IMPORTS, ON SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION Of ECONOMIC REFORMS, AND ON INCREASED AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT; ALL Of THESE ARE ONLY MINIMALLY AFFECTED BY THE US EMBARGO-Y IN HAVANA, REACTION WAS IWIFT- ACCORDING TO A REUTERS PRESS REPORT. PRIME MINISTER CASTRO TOLD A NEWS CONFERENCE THAT THE US DECISION IS A "POSITIVE GESTURE" RECEIVED WITH SATISFACTION BY HIS GOVERNMENT- HE ADDER. HOWEVER, THAT HE CANNOT BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS WITH TIE US ON NORMALIZING RELATIONS UNTIL THE MAIN PROVISIONS OP THE TRADE EMBARGO OF 1962 ARE LIFTED- PRESUMABLY. CASTRO MEANT THOSE PROVISIONS AFFECTING BILATERAL TRADE- CASTRO SAID THIS DOES NOT RULE OUT THE CONTINUATION OF PRESENT CONTACTS WITH WASHINGTON, Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010033-3 5X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010033-3 AND HE ADDED THAT THERE CAN BE "NEGOTIATIONS ON HOW TO NEGOTIATE." CASTRO APPEARS CONFIDENT THAT HE ROES NOT HAVE TO RAKE ANY SIGNIFICANT CONCESSIONS. HE APPARENTLY BELIEVES THAT WASHINGTON IS UNDER MORE PRESSURE THAN HE IS TO MAKE THE NEXT MOVE, ALT30UGH HE IS OBVIOUSLY ANXIOUS TO MAINTAIN MOMENTUM TOWARD RECONCILIATION- Y WHILE THE INITIAL REACTION FROM HAVANA WAS FAVORABLE. SOt1 TW THE LEADERSHIP WILL VIEW THE MOVE AS PRIMARILY AN EF7ORT BY THE US TO END ITS PROBLEMS WITH GOVERNMENTS THAT HAVE URGED HASHIttGTON TO ALLOY LOCAL SUBSIDIARIES Of US COMPuaIES TO TRADE WITH CUBA. AS A CONSEQUENCE THE MOST HAVANA IS LIKELY TO DO--IF THAT--IS TO RELEASE A FEW US POLITICAL PRISONERS. 3W Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010033-3 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010033-3 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010033-3 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010033-3 i . THAILAND: THE RIOTING IN BANGKOK HAS SUBSIDED, BUT THE UNDERLYING ISSUES THAT SPARKED WEDNESDAY'S VIOLENCE REMAIN UNRESOLVED.' fHE THAI CABINET HAS AGREED TO REINSTITUTE LEGAL PROCEEDINGS AGAINST STUDENT AND FARMER ACTIVISTS ARRESTED LAST WEEK. IT WAS THE GOVE RNMENT'S DROPPING OF THE CHARGES THAT PROMPTED THE WAVE OF POLICE PROTESTS.//V IN REOPENING ITS INVESTIGATION OF CHARGES OF KIDNAP:CNG AND ARSON AGAINST THE ACTIVISTS, THE GOVERNMENT IS RISKING A NEW ROUND OF DEMONSTRATIONS BY THE STUDENT COMMUNITY. IT WAS STUDENT PROTESTS AGAINST THE ARRESTS THAT DROUGHT ABOUT THE GOVERNMENT'S CURRENT DILEMMA. KHUKRIT NEVER EXPLAINED WHY THE GOVERNMENT DROPPED THE CHARGES IN THE FIRST PLACE, WHICH GIVES HIM SOME FLE;I3ILITY IN PLACATING THOSE ON BOTH SIDES OF THE ISSUE. FOR TKAMPLE, THE CHARGES COULD AGAIN BE DROPPED IF THE GOVERNMENT DATE: ORIG: UNIT: EXT: REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITEC ` 2 rl_ 3Y: Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010033-3 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010033-3 DETERMINES THERE IS NOT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO"PROSECUTE.Y WHATEVER MEASURES THE GOVERNMENT TAKES TO MEET THE CURRENT PROBLEM, DISTRUST BETWEEN CONSERVATIVES AND LEFTISTS IS NOT LIKELY TO EASE- THE CONSERVATIVES MILL SC=E ANY MOVE BY THE KHUKRIT GOVERNMENT TO AVOID PPOSECIJ PING THE ACTIVISTS AS FURTHER EVIDENCE OF THE GOVERNMENT'S WILLINGNESS TO PLACATE DEMONSTRATORS AT THE EXPENSE OF LAW AND ORDER. LEFTISTS ARE LIKELY TO SEE REOPENING OF THE CASE AS A SHAi~P MOVE TOWARD THE NIGHT BY THE:' GOVERNMENT AND WILL MOVE QHICKLY TO OPPOSE IT?Y 25X1 CL ti;: Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010033-3 FONM 1 J~ Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010033-3 ORGANIZATION HAVE AGREED TO HOLD A COUNCIL MEETING IN NEW YORK ON SEPTEMBER 24 AT WHICH THE DISSOLUTION OF THE ORGANIZATION ?.S EXPECTED TO BE DISCUSSED. THAI FOREIGN MINISTER CHATCHAT. CHUNHA'.JAIl (JILL CHAIR T-ice CO 1~ "_i:..'!CE !.iNIDICATI)iNS ARE THE S . C WILL BE GRADUALLY PHASED OUT OVER A TWO- OR THREE-YEAR PERIOD, ALTHOUGH THERE MAY BE SOME PRESSURE TO DISSOLVE THE OR(:.`.`.IiATTON SOONER. THE MANILA TREATY UILL PROBABLY BE RETAINED AND THE NONMILITARY SEATO FUNC T IOr+; TRA`,SFERRED TO OTHER ORGANIZATION:. 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010033-3 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010033-3 1. ISRAEL-SYRIA: THE ISRAELI PRESS IS SPECULATING ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT TEL AVIV MAY MAKE LIMITED CONCESSIONS TO DAMASCUS ON THE GOLAN HEIGHTS ISSUE IF ANOTHER INTERIM AGREENE NT WITH EGYPT IS CONCLUDED. PRESS COMMENTATORS SUGGEST THAT THE ISRAELI GESTURE WOULD BE INTENDED TO MEET US DESIRES TO HAVE SOMETHING FOR PRESIDENT ASAD TO GO WITH AN ISRAELI-EGYPTIAN ACCORD.V THE PRESS GIVES NO INDICATION, HOWEVER, THAT THE GOVERNMENT IS PREPARED TO ALTER ITS BASIC NEGOTIATING POSITION THAT NO MAJOR ISRAELI PULLBACK IS POSSIBLE ON THE GOLAN IN THE Anna OF A FINAL PEACE TREATY WITH SYRIA.V THE COLUMNISTS INDICATE THAT TEL AVIV HAS IN MIND ONLY "COSMETIC" CHANGES ON THE GOLAN, EITHER AS A UNILATERAL GESTURE IN CONNECTION WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION O" A NF 9 SINAI AG3EEt1ENT OR :'.S THE RESULT OF NFGO T IA 7IO''JS UI T H ;:,YRIA. THE CHANGES QOUQ TAKE THE FORM OF SOME MINOR ADJUSTMENTS TN THE PRESENT DI ZEN 16Er NT L.'. AE, FOR I.NS T ANCE, TO EIIAHLE THE SYRIANS TO REPOPULATE MORE EASILY SO!1E DATE: ORIG: UNIT: EXT: Approved For Release. 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010033-3 r~!:Nl:1IT i .^, baoDnni:,^?in?. ,v (1TIHIR Tl..\V T.1c l ,SUING OFHIC?_ !S Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010033-3 OF THE VILLAGES IN THE AREA.Y RECENT STATEMENTS BY DEFENSE MINISTER PERES THAT THE GOV.R?JMENT IS READY TO RENEW NEGOTIATIONS WITH SYRIA FOR AN INTERIM AGi';E MEN f PROVIDED THIS DID NOT LEAD TO THE R :MOV,1L OF A Sll'J'I_F 1.)'=!.JTSH SETTLEMENT ON THE GOLAN, SUPPORT THIS VIEW. SOME OF THE- SE-i'TI-L"PIENTS ARE VERY CLOSE TO THE DISENGAGEMENT LINE.Y PERES' CONDITION HOLDS OUT LITTLE HOPE THAT NEGOTIATIONS FOR AN INTERIM AGREEMENT WOULD BE SUCCESSFUL- PRIME MINISTER RABINJ, FOR THIS VERY REASON, IS KNOWN TO FAVOR NEGOTIATIONS ONLY FOR A FINAL PEACE TREATY.Y THE INCREASED PRESS ATTENTION NOW GIVEN THE. GO)-AN T SIJE IN ISRAEL SUGGESTS, HOWEVER, THAT THE ISRAELIS ARE BECOMING NO;-\1E AWARE THAT SYRIAN DEMANDS MUST SOi1EHOW BE CONSIDERED IN Y 'HE PRESENT NEGOTIATING PROCESS. MANY ISRAELIS WILL, IN FACT, SUSPECT THAT P:RES' STATEMENTS AND THE GRO:IJING MEDIA COVERAGE ARE PART OF A C04' Ei'~IP1r ;JT CAMPAIGN TO PREPARE THE PUBLIC FOR AN EARLY I:ESUMPTION OF T;iLKS DN X1 THIS ISSUE. 2. INDIA: A MEMBER OF PRIME MINISTER GANDHI'S LEGAL D`F!:NSE DATE: OPIG: UNIT: EXT: Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010033-3 rtiLEY5-s,110f'-.NN c,o oIt r-c Uh'?LiH`J All: '?f?t:nllNl. i;1!fl Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010033-3 STAFF SAYS HER GOVERNMENT IS FORMULATING PLANS TO I EDU(E SIGNIFICANTLY THE POWERS OF THE JUDICIARY. THE POWER OF JUDICIIAL 1;EVI~_W REPOR'T'EDLY WILL BE FURTHER CURTAILED, AND ADMINISTRATIVE COURTS ON THE F'ENCii MODEL EST .48L ISHr D TO HANIDLE ECONOMIC AND C. CONSTITUTE THE BULK OF 1HE JLIDICIARY'S BUSINESS.'' THE REVISIONS ARE EXPECTED SOMETIME AFTER THE SUPREME (:OURT DECIDES ON THE VALIDITY OF THE RECENTLY ENACTED CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT THAT RETROACTIVELY PLACES A PRIME MINISTCR'S FLECTION TO PARLIAMENT OUTSIDE THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURTS. ON A1.IGUST 25, FIVE MEMBERS OF THE SUPREI'IE COURT, INCLUDING THE CHIEF JUS'TICr WILL BEGIN HEARINGS ON THE AMENDMENT- GANDHI MAINTAINS THAT THE AMENDMENT DOES NOT ALTER THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF 'I'H.:- CONSTITUTION AND THEREFORE IS VALID. IF THE COURT CONCURS, THE CASE AGAINST GANDHI FOR ELECTION VIOLATIONS IN 1971 WILL ALI1OST CERTAINLY BE VOIDED IMMEDIATELY.' ALTHOUGH FOUIR OF THE FIVE JUSTICES WHO WILL RULE. ON Tii- CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE DISPUTED AMENDMENT APPEAR TO FAV'>' (ANDHI, THE COURT IS SENSITIVE A30UT ITS INDEPENDENCE AND MAY PROI_O`1G THE D,I -E : ORIG: UNIT: EXT: Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010033-3 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010033-3 HEARINGS BEYOND THE ANTICIPATED TWO WEEKS OR EVEN RULE AG,AImST HER. IN THE EVENT OF AN ADVERSE RULING, GANDHI MAY ONCE AGAIN TURN TO PARLIAMENT, WHICH IS SUBSERVIENT TO HER, TO SECURE i HEI POSITION. SHE MIGHT-, F f):\' EXAl"'.1PLE, CONVE~;T IT INTO CONSTI1!J`I; T ASSEMBLY THAT WOULD MAKE ft JO' CHANGES IN THE G^VER-NMENTAL STF'UCTU E, INCLUDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A LESS POWERFUL JUDICIARY. GANDHI INSISTS THAT PARLIAMENT SHOULD HAVE SUPREMACY OVER THE COURTS, ARGUING THAT LEGISLATORS A MAJORI TY OF THE PEOPLE, UHILE 25X1 THE JUDICIARY SPEAKS ONLY FCF PRIVILEGED MINORITY. E-2 IMPDET. d 25X1 I Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010033-3 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010033-3 1. PORTUGAL: U112i 11111aAN APPARENT LAST-MINUTE EFFORT BY CONTENDERS IN THE PORTUGUESE POWER STRUGGLE TO LINE UP MILITARY SUPPORT HAS SET OFF A WAVE OF RUMORS IN LISBON THAT A COUP IS IMMINENT. THE POWER STRUGGLE COULD JUST AS WELL DEGENERATE INTO CLASHES BETWEEN MILITARY UNITS BACKING RIVAL IDEOLOGICAL APPROACHES-9 THERE WERE REPORTS THURSDAY NIGHT THAT A MILITARY ALERT HAS BEEN DECLARED IN COIMBRA,.HEADQUARTERS OF THE CENTRAL MILIT.?\RY REGION. SOME HIGH-RANKING MILITARY LEADERS, INCLUDING GENERAL OTELO DE CARVALHO AND ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF FABIAOi MET IN COII'IBRA THURSDAY IN WHAT COULD HAVE BEEN A STRATEGY SESSION. THE COMMUNIST PARTY, WHICH MAY HAVE GOTTEN WIND OF THESE OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MILITARY, CHAK:-ED LAST NIGHT THAT THE CHANCE OF A RIGHT-WING MILITARY COUP HAS INCREASED." ON THURSDAY, PRESIDENT COSTA GOMES REPORTEDLY MET AGAIN WITH MELO ANTUNES, LEADER OF THE ANTI-COMMUNIST FACTION IN THE MILITARY, APPARENTLY TO DISCUSS FURTHER THE ULTIMATUM ANTUNES DATE: ORIG: UNIT: EXT: Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010033-3 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010033-3 AND CARVALHO PRESENTED THE PRESIDENT FOR THE " REMOVAL OF PRIME MINISTER GONCALVES. ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS, ANTUNES TOLD COSTA GOMES THAT ANY MILITARY MOVE TO KEEP GONCALVES IN POWER COULD BE DEFEATED IN A MATTER OF HOURS. SO FAR?, COSTA GOMES HAS GIVEN NO INDICATION OF HOW HE WILL RESPOND.Y THE PRIME MINISTER VOWED AGAIN ON THURSDAY THAT HE WOULD FIGHT TO THE END TO RETAIN POWER. IN FACT, HE SEEMS TO HAVE PICKED UP SOME SUPPORT WITHIN THE ARMED FORCES. THE NAVY REPRESENTATIVE ASSEMBLY VOTEDI ITO CONTINUE BACKING ILLCLIb THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT.-IT COUPLED THIS ACTION WITH A STATEMENT OF SUPPORT FOR THE POLITICAL ACTION PLAN DRAWN UP BY OFFICERS ASSOCIATED WITH CARVALHO.Y PRIME MINISTER GONCALVES' ARDENT SUPPORTERS IN THE COMMUNIST PARTY ARE BACKING AWAY. ON TUESDAY, PORTUGUESE COMMUNIST PARTY LEADER ALVARO CUNHAL CONCEDED AT A PRESS CONFERENCE THAT THE GONCALVES GOVERNMENT DOES NOT HAVE THE NECESSARY SUPPORT AND SAID THE COMMUNISTS ARE PREPARED TO CONSIDER ALTERNATIVES.Y DATE: ORIG: UNIT: EXT: Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010033-3 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010033-3 GONCALVES' OUSTER WOULD BE THE MOST SERIOUS OF MANY FLOWS FOR THE COMMUNISTS IN RECENT WEEKS. CUNHAL SAID HE BELIEVES MILITARY OFFICERS FAVORING THE COMMUNISTS WILL NOW BE PURGED, A PROCESS THAT HAS ALREADY BEGUN, AND THAT THE ARMED FORCES MOVEMENT, WHICH THE COMMUNISTS HAVE EXPLOITED SO EFFECTIVELY, MAY NO LONGER HOLD THE BALANCE OF POLITICAL POWER. CUNHAL ADDED THAT THE ARMED FORCES COULD "QUICKLY BECOME AN INSTRUMENT OF COUNTER-REVOLUTION." HE IMPLIED THAT THEY COULD TURN THEIR GUNS AGAINST THE COMMUNISTS-Y 2. ITALY: ITALIAN GOVERNMENT AND PARTY LEADERS ARE STILL. GRAPPLING WITH THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY'S UNPRECEDENTED GAINS IN THE REGIONAL AND LOCAL ELECTIONS IN JUNE. THE MAIN CONTROVERSY CENTERS' ON THE CONTINUING TRE13ND TOWARD CLOSER {RELATIONS BETWEEN THE COMMUNISTS AND THE SOCIALIST PARTY, WHICH IS PLEDGED TO SUPPORT THE MORO GOVERNMENT IN PARLIAMENT.Y SINCE THE ELECTIONS, THE SOCIALISTS HAVE SHOWN A CLEAR PREFERENCE FOR ALLIANCE WITH THE COMMUNISTS IN THE NEW REGIONAL HATE: ORIG: UNIT: EXT: Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010033-3 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010033-3 AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS. THE SOCIALISTS, WHO GAINED MODERATELY IN THE ELECTIONS, NOW SHARE POWER WITH THE COMMUNISTS IN MOST MAJOR ITALIAN CITIES, 5 OF THE 20 REGIONS, AND NEARLY A THU> OF THE 94 PROVINCES.' SOCIALIST LEADER DE MARTINO HAS REBUTTED CRITICISM FROM THE OTHER PARTIES THAT PARTICIPATE IN OR SUPPORT THE MORO GOVERNMENT--THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS, SOCIAL DEMOCRATS, Ai'ID REPUBLICANS--B3Y MAINTAINING THAT HE IS AGAINST A SOCIALIST-COMMUNIST COALITION AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL. SUCH AN ALLIANCE WOULD NOT CONTROL A MAJORITY IN THE PRESENT PARLIAMENT, BUT THAT COULD CHANGE AFTER THE NEXT NATIONAL ELECTION, WHICH MUST BE HELD NO LATER THAN 1977.' DE MARTINO DREW ADDITIONAL FIRE FROM THE OTHER PARTIES LAST WEEK BY SIGNING A JOINT COMMUNIQUE WITH COMMUNIST CHIEF BERLINGUER ON THE SITUATION IN PROTGUAL. THE COMMUNIQUE CALLED FOR A POLITICAL AGREEMENT IN PORTUGAL BETWEEN THE "DEMOCRATIC" PARTIES-INCLUDING THE COMMUNISTS-AND THE AIRMED FORCES MOVE1ENT.Y THE FACT THAT DE MARTINO ASSOCIATED HIMSELF IN A JOINT DATE: ORIG: UNIT: EXT: Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010033-3 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010033-3 L. STATEMENT WITH BERLINGUER DREW MORE CRITICISM THAN THE DOCUMENT ITSELF. ALTHOUGH THE COMMUNISTS AND SOCIALISTS HAVE CONSULTED DISCREETLY ON POLICY MATTERS IN RECENT YEARS, THEY HAVE NOT ISSUED JOINT COMMUNIQUES SINCE THE DISSOLUTION OF THEIR COMMON "FRONT" IN 195?.Y BERLINGUER, FOR HIS PART-1 SCORED A MAJOR GAIN BY SIGNING A JOINT DOCUMENT ON A FOREIGN POLICY ISSUE WITH A PARTY THAT HAS PARTICIPATED IN MORE ITALIAN GOVERNMENTS FOR MORE THAN A DECADE. THAT WILL HELP HIM DEFLECT THE RENEWED CRITICISM HE HAS COME UNDER AS A RESULT OF HIS PARTY'S RECENT SIGNING OF A JOINT COMMUNIQUE ON PORTUGAL AWITH THE SOVIETS THAT SEEMED TO GIVE STRONGER SUPPORT TO THE PORTUGUESE COMMUNISTS THAN BERLINGUER HAS IN THEPAST. ON MANY OCCASIONS, HE HAS PUBLICLY STATED HIS DISAPPROVAL OF PORTUGUESE COMMUNIST STRATEGY.Y DE MARTINO, ON THE OTHER HAND, WILL BE ABLE TO POINT TO THE LESS-THAN-REVOLUTIONARY LANGUAGE IN THE DOCUMENT HE SIGNED WITH 3ERLINGUER TO SUPPORT HIS ARGUMENT THAT ITALY'S COMMUNISTS ARE DEVELOPING INTO A LEGITIMATE NATIONAL PARTY. THE SOCIALISTS DATE: ORIG: UNIT: EXT: Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010033-3 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010033-3 HAVE USED THIS LINE TO HELP JUSTIFY GROWING COLLABORATION WITH THE COMMUNISTS.Y THE SOCIALISTS, MEANWHILE, HAVE SPELLED OUT WHAT THEY REGARD AS A SUITABLE SUCCESSOR TO THE MORO GOVERNMENT, WHICH IS ALMOST CERTAIN TO BE REPLACED BEFORE THE END OF THE YEAR. ALTHOUGH STILL OPPOSED TO GIVING THE COMMUNISTS ANY CABINET POSITIONS, THE SOCIALISTS DESIRE AN ARRANGEMENT THAT WOULD ALLOW THE COMMUNISTS TO PARTICIPATE INDIRECTLY.Y LAST WEEK, THE SOCIALISTS POINTED TO THE REGIONAL ADMINISTRATIONS IN LOMBARDY AND CAMPANNIA AS MODELS FOR THE NEXT NATIONAL GOVERNMENT. ALTHOUGH THE COMMUNISTS ARE EXCLUDED FROM DEMOCRATS AND SOCIALISTS IN THOSE AREAS, THE TWO PARTIES HAVE AGREED TO NEGOTIATE FORMALLY WITH THE COMMUNISTS ON THE REGIONAL LEGISLATIVE 25X1 PROGRAM 3. SPAIN: THE MEETINGS GENERAL FRANCO IS HOLDING THIS WEEK WITH HIS DESIGNATED SUCCESSOR, PRINCE JUAN CARLOS, HAVE SPARKED SPECULATION THAT AN IMPORTANT POLITICAL ANNOUNCEMENT MAY BE '.MADE DATE: ORIG: UNIT: EXT: Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010033-3 REL FA91NG OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTNf.NTICAT-I. OYFICE R Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010033-3 xi FRANCO HAS GIVEN NO INDICATION THAT HE IS READY TO TURN OVER HIS POWERS TO THE PRINCE, THOUGH RUMORS OF SUCH A MOVE CROP UP PERIODICALLY. THERE IS A UIDE R;9ANGE OF OTHER POSSIBLE TOP:IC:S. FOR THE TALKS BETWEEN THE TWO, INCLUDING: --POSSIBLE CABINET CHANGES; RIGHT31ISTS REPORTEDLY HAVE BEEN PRESSING FOR THE REPLACEMENT OF PRIME MINISTER ARIAS, WHO WAS DAMAGED POLITICALLY BY FRANCO'S RECENT APPOINTMENT OF JOSE SOLIS RUTZ AS MINISTER SEC_RE.. T ARY GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL MOVEI'1EN T ? Y --COUNTERTERRORIST. MEASURES; TOUGH NEW REGULATIONS ARE PLANNED THAT ARE LIKELY TO DRAW A HOSTILE REACTION FROM SPAIN'S EUROPEAN NEIGHBORS.Y --RECENT MILITARY ARRESTS; SOME OF THOSE ARRESTED REPORTEDLY WERE UCLASSMATES OF THE PRINCE AT THE MILITARY ACADEMY. 4. USSR CSCE: THE SOVIETS HAVE ISSUED AN AU T HORITATI.'VE INTERPRETATION OF CSCE THAT, NOT SURPi'ISINGLY, R'_ASSERTS CONCEPTS THEY STRESSED IN THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS.Y DATE: ORIG: UNIT: EXT: Approved For Release 2005/06/22.: CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010033-3 REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE !S PPOhfl iiEED Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010033-3 IN A PRAVDA ARTICLE ON AUGUST 20, THE SOVTETS ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THE TEN AGREED PRINCIPLES OF INTERSTATE RELATIONS ARE EQUAL, BUT THEY PUT SPECIAL STRESS ON THE PRINCIPLE OF INVIOLABILITY OF FRONTIERS. PRAVDA DISPUTES CLAIMS THAT THE PRINCIPLE, WHICH WAS A CENTRAL SOVIET OBJECTIVE DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS, BENEFITS THE EAST MORE THAN THE WEST, ARGUING THAT IT IS VITAL FOR ALL THE NATIONS OF EUROPE.Y THE ARTICLE GIVES LOW PRIORITY TO CONFERENCE PROVISIONS CONCERNING HUMAN CONTACTS. IT SEEMS TO IMPLY THAT IMPROVEMENTS IN THESE AREAS WILL RESULT -FROM., RATHER THAN ADVANCE, DETENTE. DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS, THE SOVIETS WERE UNABLE TO GET WORDING TO THIS EFFECT INCORPORATED IN THE CONFERENCE DOCUMENT. THE ARTICLE ALSO OBSERVES THAT COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF HUMAN CONTACTS MUST BE SUBJECT TO THE "LAWS AND TRADITIONS OF EACH STATE"-ANOTHER FORMULATION THE SOVIETS TRIED, BUT FAILED, 10 HAVE INSERTED IN THE FINAL TEXT.Y A MAJOR PURPOSE OF THE ARTICLE SEEMS TO BE TO DISABUSE THE SOVIETS' DOMESTIC AUDIENCE OF ANY NOTION THAT PUBLICATION OF THE: DATE: ORIG: UNIT: EXT: Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010033-3 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000300010033-3 FULL TEXT OF THE CONFERENCE DOCUMENT IN PRAVDA AND ASSERTIONS BY BREZHNEV AND OTHERS THAT MOSCOW WOULD FULFILL ITS CONFERENCE OBLIGATIONS MEANS THAT THE CONFERENCE WILL LEAD TO MEANINGFUL. CHANGE IN THEIR DAILY LIVES. 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/06/22 : CIA-RDP86T00q