TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170022-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 18, 1999
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: May 14, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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Confidential
FBIS
TRENDS
In Communist Propaganda
Confidential
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CONFIDENTIAL
This propaganda analysis rctxtrt is based exclusively on material
carried in foreign broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government
components.
Classified by 000072
Subject to General Declauifiwtion Schedule
of E.O. 11652, Automatically Declassified
Two Tears From Date of issue
Notional Security Information
Unauthorized disclosure subject to
criminal sanctions
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
14 MAY 1975
CONTENTS
Major DRV, PRG Leaders Due To Appear at Saigon,Victory Fete . . .
1
Communists Tighten Control in Saigon, Warn "Reactionaries" . . .
2
PRG, DRV Ask Thailand, Other States To Return Planes, Ships . .
4
Phnom Penh Accuses U.S. of Slander, Sabotage; Extols Peking . . .
6
Pathet Lao Hail Resignations, Pledge Support for 1973 Accord . .
8
Moscow Winds Up Ceremonies With Brezhnev Speech, Peace Appeal . .
11
Prague, East Berlin Speeches Underscore Soviet Victory Role . . .
13
Belgrade Reveals Continued Pique Over Soviet Articles . . . . .
14
Peking Assails Brezhnev's "Hitler-Type" Fascism on V-E Day .
15
CUBA-U.S. RELATIONS
davana Media Highlight McGovern Support for Lifting Embargo . . .
17
CHINA-JAPAN
JSP Leans Toward Peking Stance in Compromise Joint Statement . .
20
CHINA-EUROPE
Peking Moves To Strengthen Ties With Western Europe . . . . . . .
22
NOTE
PRC-Taiwan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
24
APPENDIX
Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics
i
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
14 MAY 1975
INDOCHINA
MAJOR DRV, PRG LEADERS DUE TO APPEAR AT SAIGON VICTORY FETE
Media evidence suggests that in the next few days high-ranking
PRG/NFLSV leaders will at last make their first public appearance
in Saigon since its conquest and probably use the occasion for
their first authoritative speeches outlining postwar communist
policies for the South. This is suggested by announcements on
festivities to celebrate the communist takeover scheduled to
begin 15 May, and the planned first public visit to Saigon by a
high-level DRV delegation. The PRG/NFLSV leadership clearly
will have every reason, including protocol requirements, to
welcome the DRV delegation with a PRG/NFLSV leadership turnout
of comparable stature.
The DRV party-government delegation, announced by Vietnamese
communist media on 14 May as having departed for Saigon, includes
DRV President Ton Duc Thang and Vietnam Workers Party (VWP)
Politburo members Le Duc Tho, Le Thanh Nghi, and Van Tien Dung.
Hanoi radio's account of the DRV delegations departure noted
that it was seen off by VWP Politburo members Truong Chinh and
Pham Van Dong. No mention was made of VWP First Secretary
Le Duan or Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap, both of whom are
last known to have appeared at Hanoi's May Day celebrations.
The celebrations in Saigon which the North Vietnamese delegation
will attend are part of delayed victory ceremonies proclaimed
throughout Vietnam that will precede by a few days the 19 May
anniversary of Ho Chi Minh's birthday. The festivities were
announced in "decisions" by DRV and PRG authorities broadcast on
the 10th by Hanoi and the Front radios. The PRG decision was
the first authoritative public PRG pronouncement on developments
in South Vietnam since the war's end on 30 April.
The DRV and PRG decisions on the victory celebration followed a
VWP Secretariat directive of the 5th, released on the 7th, that
announced a celebration was to be held without indicating its
timing.* While the undated DRV decision was ascribed to the DRV
premier and was "in accordance with" the earlier VWP directive,
the 8 May PRG announcement was issued as a decision of the PRG
* For a discussion of the VWP directive, see the TRENDS of
7 May 1975, page 1.
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14 MAY :1,975
Council of Ministers and signed by its chairman, PRG President
Huynh Tan Phat. According to the PRG decision, the Council of
Ministers met on the 7th, but no details of the meeting's
agenda were disclosed. Since January 1972, PRG Council sessions
have followed a pattern of meeting twice a year--in winter and
summer--and have customarily been followed up with a communique
describing the proceedings.
According to the PRG decision, "a grand. ceremony" is to be held
"in all localities of South Vietnam for a period of three days,
from 15 to 17 May," during which time military and government
personnel are to be released from work. The PRG decision also
made special note that those who "previously served in . . . the
puppet Saigon army and admJ.nistration, as well as foreigners"
would be allowed to participate. At the same time it cautioned
those who might "harbor schemes or commit acts of sabotage against
the celebrations" that they would be "severely punished." The
briefer DRV decision only designated the 15th and 16th as
"official holidays" for the celebration.
CONYJNISTS TIGHTEN CONTROL IN SAIGON, WARN "REACTIONARIES"
Saigon radio has continued to report communist efforts to impose
control over the city and has broadcast accounts of "people's
revolutionary committees" being established at the precinct
level. While the overall impression conveyed by the media is
one of order and acquiesence by the citizens, there are indica-
tions that some persons are refusing to fully cooperate and in
some cases are taking advantage of what must be the initial
confusion of the sudden communist takeover.
The Saigon-Gia Dinh Municipal Military Management Committee,*
headed by Lieutenant General Tran Van Tra, has been issuing a
flurry of communiques ordering various categories of residents
to report to work, supplying detailed information on where
former Saigon military personnel and GVN officials are to
register with communist authorities and turn in weapons, and
establishing registration procedures for foreigners still in
the city. In addition, communiques have been broadcast providing
guidelines on postal and telegraphic services, currency
* For a discussion of the establishment of the committee, see
the TRENDS of 7 May 1975, pages 1-3.
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14 MAY 1975
regulations, printing and publishing prohibitions, registration
and collection of firearms and explosives, and the proper
disposition of real estate abandoned by those who have fled.
A 12 May military management committee communique prohibiting the
use of "improperly prepared" flags and insignia indicated that
"some bad elements" have been impersonating certain officials
by using flags and armbands to "commit illegal acts against
public order and security." An 11 May editorial in the new
Saigon newspaper GIAI P?TONG, entitled "Develop the People's
Collective Mastership, Resolutely Track Down and Punish Stubborn
Reactionaries," had also indicated that some have refused to,
conform with the communists' efforts at control. Following an
essentially conciliatory recapitulation of PRG policy toward
those who cooperate, the editorial launched into a severe
condemnation and warning to those "many reactionary and wicked
elements still remaining" who "in a number of areas . refuse
to report, hide weapons, and perform scattered acts opposing the
revolution . . . or setting up phony revolutionary committees."
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.14 MAY 1975
PRG,.DRVAASK THAILAND, OTHER-STATES"TO,RETURN PLANES, ';:SHIPS
Vietnamese communist media in the past-two weeks have.;issued,,a
barrage of comment calling upon Thailand, Singapore,.and other
Southeast Asian nations to return aircraft, ships, , and. cargo
taken out of South'Vietnam by refugees : fleeing. the communist
.takeover. 'The PRG stopped issuing foreign. ministry. spokesman
protests critical of Thailand. after:.6 May, perhaps because it
had reached,.an,agreement?with.Bangkok.on private.-negotiations.
A Hanoi broadcast.on.14 May-quoted a LIBERATION. PRESS, AGENCY
announcement that thePRG Foreign,Ministry had-appointed
Ambassador Nguyen Minh.Phuong*.to:go to.Bangkok to "take over
the property",of the former GVN-.embassy.and "retrieve" the South
Vietnamese ships and..aircraft.
Hanoi continued, as.l.ate as..13 May to authoritatively criticize
Thailand;.but.a DRV Foreign'Ministry spokesman's protest on..that
.date against anti-Vietnamese demonstrations in'Thailand.echoed
earlier references to the possibility of normalizing relations
between the two countries. Hanoi's. posture is consistent-with
its basic policy..in the months prior to.the communist takeover. in
South Vietnam, when the DRV.seemed bent on pressuring, Bangkok--
.through a conditional offer of talks on improving relations--to
end its cooperation with U.S. policies in Indochina.** There has
been no public acknowledgment by the Vietnamese of Bangkok news
reports on 13 May that Thai Foreign Minister Chatchai Chunhawan..had
stated that a?DRV delegation. would arrive at the end.of the month to
discuss bilateral relations.
The campaign to gain-custody of the planes and ships for the PRG
began promptly on the heels of the fall of Saigon with the release
on 1 May of a PRG Foreign Ministry statement, dated 30 April,
which announced that the PRG is "now exercising its full sovereignty
in the whole of South Vic;.nam, is the only authentic and legal
representative of the Vietnamese people, and has full power to
solve the international affairs of South Vietnam." The PRG's
claim to be the only legal authority in South Vietnam was not
* Nguyen Minh Phuong served as PRG Ambassador to Cuba from.1969
to mid-1972.
** For a discussion of North Vietnamese policy-toward Thailand
since January 1973, sec-the 20 March 1975 FBIS SPECIAL REPORT
No. 309, "North Vietnamese Relations with Thailand: Evolution: of
DRV Policy Since the Paris Peace Agreement."
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14 MAY 1975
reiterated in a 2 May DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement
endorsing the 30 April PRG Foreign Ministry statement, nor in
subsequent official DRV statements; but the claim was echoed in
Hanoi press comment, including a 2 May commentary in the army
paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN. The PRG also issued a foreign ministry
statement on the 2d restating its right to property taken out of
South Vietnam.
On 3 May Vietnamese media released notes on this issue from both
the PRG and DRV foreign ministries. The PRG Foreign Ministry
note, which was sent to Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines,
and Singapore, restated the PRG claim to be the only legal South
Vietnamese representative and mildly requested that the nations
"help" in
the
transfer of the planes and ships to the PRG. The
DRV note,
sent
only to Thailand, asked that Bangkok respond
positively
to
the PRG and held out the hope that "correct" Thai
action on
the
issue would be "an important contribution to the
normalization of relations" between Thailand and the DRV and to
peace in the region. The possibility of a "quick improvement of
relations" between Bangkok and Hanoi was raised in a 4 May NHAN
DAN commentary. Setting the pattern for later comment, the
commentary contrasted statements by Thai Prime Minister Khukrit
Pramot, favoring the return of the planes to South Vietnam, with
remarks by Thai Defense Minister Praman Adireksan opposing such
a move. It observed critically that a number of persons in Thai
ruling circles want to continue a "reactionary policy."
Reports that the U.S. aircraft carrier Midway had removed some
of the South Vietnamese planes from Thailand prompted the next
official PRG comment, in a foreign ministry spokesman's statement
on 6 May which condemned the "seizure" by the "Ford Administration"
and asserted the right to claim all property which had been brought
into Thailand. A DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement on the
same day, by contrast, focused its criticism on the Bangkok
government, claiming that statements by the Thai Foreign. Ministry
had accommodated the U.S. "plot" to seize PRG property. It
reiterated that transfer of the aircraft and ships to the PRG
would "serve to benefit the friendly relations between the DRV
and Thailand." The DRV spokesman warned that the Thai Government
must be responsible for "all consequences of its actions" if it
"colludes with America and permits the latter to forcibly seize"
the PRG property.
The Vietnamese were slow in responding to Bangkok reports on the
6th that Thai Foreign Minister Chatchai Chunhawan had asked the
United States to halt the removal of weaponry and had sent a cable
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14 MAY 1975
to the PRG ;asking it to .send emissaries.to Bangkok.to .negotiate
the return of .the 'ships, aircraft, ;and weapons. A '9 .May 'NHAN
DAN-commentary-set the tone:for.the reaction. It charged that
the United States :had ,renioved.morethan n, 100 aircraft prior to
.the Thai embargo, claimed that Bangkok had colluded.in this
U.S. move, and declared that "this was a.hostile act-by,-the
Ford Administration and the Thai Government . and a.robbery
of-the South Vietnamese people's property ." The paper
scored "pro-U,.S.,authorities.. in Bangkok":as "hypocritical."
A Liberation,Radio,commentary on.the 10th-echoed NHAN DAN',s
harsh criticism of Bangkok and-demanded that the Thai Government
"clarify its attitude by taking'action,.not by issuing statements."
Another PRG radio commentary on the same day demanded that Bangkok
"pay" South Vietnam for the property which it has ''allowed.the
United States-to take away," but this demand has not been
publicly repeated at an authoritative level.
Perhaps reflecting.a movement of PRG-Thai negotiations into
private channels, the PRG has released no further foreign ministry
statements on the question of 'returning.ships and planes. Hanoi
on the.llth.releaseda.foreign ministry spokesman's statement
dated the previous day,. responding to a statement by Singapore
Prime Minister.Lee Kuan Yew on the 9th, which.pointed out that'.it
would.be in the interest of relations between Vietnam.-and
Singapore if the latter returned South Vietnamese:aircraf.t.and
ships to the PRG. Hanoi, but not the PRG, also issued a foreign
ministry-spokesman's.s.tatement on 13 May accusing "Thai
reactionaries" of "engineering" demonstrations against Vietnamese
residents in.Thailand.
PHNOM PENH ACCUSES U,S,'OF SLANDER, SABOTAGE;:EXTOLS~PEKING
Phnom Penh radio, while remaining silent thus far-on the-reported
Cambodian detention of a U.S. freighter and. other`foreign..ships
over the past week, has revealed sharp sensitivity to Western
accounts alleging that the-new regime is pursuing repressive
internal policies and maltreating foreigners.who.were.in the
capital at the:time of its surrender. A.10 May statement:by
RGNU.:Information .and -Propaganda Minister :;Hu .Nim :and .a 10 May
communique released by the Ministry of Information and'Propaganda
both attacked "dishonest propaganda" allegedly. spread' by' the
United States. In other comment Phnom Penh has extolled its
relationship with 'Peking while playing down. its.relationship with
Hanoi and.has reaffirmed its , longstanding: position onthe.accepta-
bility of unconditional: foreign aid.
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14 MAY 1975
Speaking on behalf of the RGNU, Hu Nim ridiculed alleged U.S.
pretensions to humanitarianism when, he said, the United States
actually was "the bloodiest supermurderer . . . in the history
of mankind." Hu Nim charged that the United States has
engaged in propaganda efforts against the new regime and has
"planted traitorous forces" to continue "subversive and sabotage
activities." Hu Nim warned that his regime would not allow
"U.S. imperialism, its allies, or its hirelings" to continue
their "anti-Cambodian activities" with impunity. The 10 May
Ministry of Information and Propaganda communique similarly
accorded primary responsibility for unfavorable Western press
reports to the United States, accusing the U.S. "propaganda
apparatus" of trying to "distort the truth" of Cambodia's efforts
to deal with foreigners who remained in Phnom Penh despite the
Front's repeated warnings that they evacuate. Neither the
statement by Hu Nim nor the communique specifically referred to
President Ford's remarks on Cambodia at his 6 May press conference,
and they both avoided referring by name to the Ford Administration,
in line with Phnom Penh's practice since the Front victory.
A 10 May commentary on foreign reaction to the Front's victory
hailed Peking's relationship with Phnom Penh as "a radiant model"
of international relations "based on sincere support and mutual
respect." The commentary warmly noted the PRC leaders' message
of 18 April to the Front leaders and other signs of Chinese
friendship. It gave only perfunctory attention to Phnom Penh's
relationship with Hanoi, mentioning assistance by Vietnam only
in conjunction with support rendered.by Laos and the DPRK and
identifying the three nations as the "other close comrades-in-arms
of the Cambodian people in Asia." Phnom Penh commentaries have
continued to affirm that Cambodia is willing to accept aid from
foreign countries so long as it is unconditional, accords with
the regime's policy of self-reliance, and is not a subterfuge for
subversion or interference--a stand set forth at the Front's
second national congress in February and at the special national
congress held on 25-27 April.
DOMESTIC AFFAIRS Phnom Penh radio continues to provide little
concrete detail on the regime's efforts
toward political consolidation and economic reconstruction. There
has been no acknowledgment of the deportation of Cambodia's urban
populace to the countryside nor any report on the fate of former
GKR leaders Long Boret and Sirik Matak, but radio commentaries
have indirectly touched upon these. questions. A 12 May Phnom Penh
radio commentary announced that the regime was carrying out the
second congress' "political stand of solidarity" with former GKR
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14 MAY,1975
officials and military personnel. The commentary noted that,
except for the seven "supertraitors" condemned by the February
national congress, all connected with the former administration
are currently "vigorously cooperating to build anew Cambodia."
A 10 May radio commentary stated that "anybody going the wrong
way by mistake or by past habit will be given a gradual moral
and political reeducation by the people unt:;,l he or she is
totally reformed and purified," adding that "zonly those who
continue to sabotage our nation" will be punished in the future.
Phnom Penh broadcasts since the special national congress have
also highlighted the regime's attempt to restore communication
and transportation facilities, efforts apparently being undertaken
primarily under the direction of the army. Separate broadcasts
have reported work on several of Cambodia's major highways and rail
lines, on Pochentong airport outside of Phnom Penh, and at the
major port of Sihanoukville.
PATHET LAO HAIL RESIGNATIONS, PLEDGE SUPPORT FOR 1973 ACCORD
Pathet Lao broadcasts have welcomed the 9 May resignation of five
leading "rightists" members of the coalition Provisional Government
of National Union (PGNU), but have given no indication that the
Lao Patriotic Front (LPF) has altered its policy of participating
in the governing of Laos under terms of the 1973 Vientiane peace
agreement. The tone and content of the comment suggest the LPF
is concerned with maintaining its image as a strict adherent to
the Vientiane accord in order to avoid giving the impression they
are seizing control of the government. Initial Pathet Lao
reaction to the resignations, in an 11 May radio commentary, was
restrained, depicted the resignations as the result of mass
pressure exerted by the Lao people, and charged the former
officials with attempting to subvert the PGNU and its counterpart,
the National Political Council of Coalition (NPCC). The commentary
.noted that despite the "schemes" of the rightists, the PGNU and
the NPCC would "continue to run the affairs of state." Subsequent
Pathet Lao radio announcements reported the replacement of
Defense Minister Sisouk na Champassak by General Khamouane Boupha,
a member of the Pathet Lao-alined Patriotic Neutralist Forces.
The radio quoted Premier Souvanna Phouma to the effect that all
members of the armed forces should obey the new defense minister
and urged the population to maintain unity and public order.
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14 MAY 1975
The resignations of Defense Minister Sisouk, Finance Minister
Ngon Sananikon, and several other officials were preceded by
several weeks of strong Pathet Lao radio criticism of the
rightist leaders, particularly of Sisouk and Meo,General Vang
Pao, who were personally singled out for condemnation for their
alleged initiation of recent attacks on LPF-controlled areas.
Such personal attacks on Sisouk and other rightist officials
have occurred periodically since the formation of the PGNU a
year ago. The most recent denunciations began on 22 April, two
days after an LPF Central Committee spokesman issued a state-
ment condemning the "reactionary clique" for launching attacks
in the Sala Phoukoun area, and three days after Hanoi had
issued a DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement which
"strongly refuted".Sisouk's "fabrications" concerning North
Vietnamese troops in Laos. In addition to commentaries attacking
the rightists, the Pathet Lao radio carried reports of demonstra-
tions in Vientiane in late April and early May by the
"21 Organizations," a coalition of front groups who demanded
that the PGNU force the rightists to comply strictly with the
Vientiane accord.
While criticizing Sisouk and Vang Pao, the Pathet Lao has
suggested that the LPF has acted with restraint in the face of
constant provocation by the rightists, at the same time warning
that its patience was wearing thin. Thus, a 6 May commentary
stated that the patriotic forces were capable of wiping out
Vang Pao's forces but that "this is not our primary goal . . .
because we want to preserve the spirit of national concord
called for in the peace accords." The commentary closed with a
threat to "duly punish or wipe them out" if the situation
became more intolerable. A later commentary directed at Sisouk,
on 8 May, suggested that Pathet Lao patience had been exhausted,
asking rhetorically if the "people" should sit idly by in the
face of repeated rightist provocations, and answering its own
query in the negative. Citing Pathet Lao willingness to employ
its "legitimate right to self-defense" as a "solemn warning,"
the commentary pointedly suggested that Sisouk follow the example
of Lon Nol and Thieu and leave the country with his family.
MOSCOW, PEKING, Moscow, Peking, and Hanoi have all reported
HANOI TREATMENT on recent developments in Laos, relying
primarily for their information on Pathet
Lao sources, although differing in the level of attention they
have devoted to the situation. Moscow, in a 12 May TASS report
citing the Pathet Lao news agency (KPL), reported Vientiane was
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calm in the wake of the resignations; and an unattributed
12 May Moscow domestic service commentary noted that the
developments in Laos were aimed at eliminating the "last
obstacles" to the full implementation of the Vientiane agreement.
Peking gave extensive replay to'news reports from Laos on the
resignations and Sisouk's replacement with Khamouane Boupha,
repeating without elaboration or comment several Radio Pathet
Lao commentaries highly critical of the former government
officials. Hanoi's VNA English-language transmission have not
yet reported the resignations, but did carry reports on earlier
developments in Laos, including a 12 May item citing KPL reorts
that Sisouk and others were planning a "reactionary coup."
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14 MA? 1975
V-E DAY
MOSCOW WINDS UP CEREMONIES WITH BREZHNEV SPEECH. PEACE APPEAL
Moscow's extraordinary three-month campaign to celebrate the 30th
anniversary of V-E Day wound up rather anticlimatically, with a
bland, relatively brief speech by Brezhnev and an equally bland
peace appeal signed by the three top Soviet governing bodies. In
contrast with the generally militant and even jingoistic rhetoric
that has characterized much of the campaign, these documents were
mild in tone and clearly intended to accent the peaceful aspects
of the Soviet Union's international posture. On some of the
peripheral political questions raised by the campaign--such as
its implications for Brezhnev's political status--the evidence
remains ambiguous. The brevity of Brezhnev's speech--under an
hour--seems to be a minus for him, but the award of marshal's
stars signifying his promotion to the rank of General of the
Army is clearly a plus.
BREZHNEV'S IMAGE MIXED The brevity of Brezhnev's speech meant
that he did not dominate the press
coverage of the event as he did 10 years ago on the occasion of
the 20th anniversary in 1965. On that occasion his speech was
not only lengthy, extending from the first to the fourth page of
PRAVDA, but it bristled with passages of great political interest.
That was the speech which signaled the post-Khrushchev partial
rehabilitation of Stalin; it was harshly critical of U.S. policy
in Vietnam; it contained one of the rare acknowledgments by a
Soviet leader of the domestic social impact of defense expenditures
(in a statement declaring that the Soviet people understood the
need foe such expenditures.) By contrast, this year's speech was
largely a panegyric to wartime heroism and, aside from it's
expression of hope that the end of the war in Indochina would
bolster U.S.-Soviet detente, carried little of political substance.
Furthermore, this year Brezhnev shared the first four pages of
PRAVDA with a half-dozen other speakers, none of political rank.
While the briefness of his remarks may have been due to health
reasons, the effect was still to diminish the public impact of his
speech.
The announcement on 9 May of the award of marshal's stars to
Brezhnev confirms the accuracy of Grechko's reference in his
18 April speech to Brezhnev as a "general of the army". Nevertheless,
the absence of an official announcement of Brezhnev's.promotion,
plus the failure thus far of speakers other than Grechko to refer
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to him by his new rank, auggents that the promotion may have
been pushed through against opposition. Some support for thin
suggestion in provided by name curious changes made last year in
Soviet procedurenfor appointing Generals of the Army.
According to the 6 November GAZETTE OF THE USSR 8UP1EME SOVIET,
it wan decreed on 1 November that the rank of General of the
Army would henceforth be conferred by the Supreme Soviet
Presidium, rather than by the Council of tiinstern, an provided
for in the law of 12 October 1967. Thin meant that authority
to confer the rank wan removed from Konygin'n jurisdiction and
put in the hands of Podgornyy. It in notable that only the
rank of General of the Army--the presumptive next rank for
Brezhnev--wag affected by the change in procedure. In a second
decree issued the same day, the Supreme Soviet Presidium provided
that the "marshal's star" could henceforth be awarded to Generals
of the Army. Podgornyy signed both decrees.
"141LITARY COOPERATION" A recheck of the historical evidence
also thrown some new light on the
significance of a curious phrase which began to crop up in
Soviet statements on the war anniversary several weeks ago.* In
his speech on 18 April &larshal Grechko had observed that the
wartime alliance confirmed the possibility of effective "political
and military cooperation" between states with different social
systems. Since Grechko permed to be implying that the wartime
experience might serve as a model for the future, hie une of the
phrase raised questions concerning his intentions. However, when
other Soviet speakers began to use the same phrase, it became
apparent that the words were being drawn from a common sources.
This source, the evidence shows, was tho original CPSU decree of
9 February calling for the start of the anniversary campaign. The
context indicates that it was used in a historical sense and
was intends: simply to describe the actual nature of the wartime
alliance relationship.
* For a brief discussion of use of this phrase see the TRENDS
of 7 May 1975, pages 22-23.
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Cbt4P 11 IM A1, 114 1.9 11#11Utf9
1r? MAY 1915
P'RAWE, WT BERLIN SPEWC (R flW SOVICT Vt
Speeches t:y Ikonecker and Ilusak were the featured events of the
JOth V-C bay anniversary cerer~ontes in goat fettt.n and Prague,
both on I Hay. In addition to V-1 bay, the festivities ccao=
rated the Jbth liberation anniversaries of the OR (8 clay) and
Csechosiovakta (9 clay). The highest-tanking soviet teptegentatives
at V-ly bay observances in Kastetn Curope Were CPSU Politbuto
taember Kulako', who attended the GOA sere nies, and Politburo
m ether Kirilenko, who performed the corresponding honors in
Czechoslovakia. Oreghnev had attended the 25th annivetsarty
festivities in Prague in 1910. According to tieRtetn Waits reports,
plans for a repeat visit this year veto canceled because of the
renewed tensions surrounding bubcek and the juestton of vhethet
further Measures taay be taken against ht#a.
In their speeches, Ilonecker and Husak. paid the conventional
deference to the Soviet Union's tole in defeating Ilitler, barely
mentioning the tole of the other "tbets of the "anti-Ilitlet
coalition." Ilusak's silence on the V.s. war tale #tav have been
more a work of restraint than of disdain, hcrttevet, since the
Ciechoslovak press had been caffying harsh anti- .eti.can att.icles
in the buildup for the anniversary cerelonies. breihoev was
singled out for praise several tithes, particularly by Kirilenko
in his speech in Prague. Ile reminded his audience that btethnev
had "participated directly In the fighting for the liberation of
your country."
'1ICCK AFFAIR The bubcek controversy was reflected in veiled
tang in the speeches of Ilusak and Etrilenko.
Thus, in an obvious reference to Dubcek,'uhcsrn he had accused of
"treason" to his 16 April speech, Ituxak Nose slsokc of "individu ls"
who, in contrast to the Majority, "lost their enthusiaso, or even
eovaitted treason" in the cuaplicatcd difficulties experienced
by the CPCZ in the past and present. Kirilenko, In t+raiaing tlusak,
portrayedthe CPCZ leader as exerplifying "Caechoslovak reality,"
In contrast to "all degenerate politicians who would like to
wear" the country's outstanding ach1evcents. $Soviet approval
of the current anti-Dubcek campaign has heretofore been registered
only indirectly In favorable Soviet reportage of lluxak'u 16 April.
speech and of public support for the attacks on the purged leader.
In the wake of the Prague festivities, a CTK report en the 12th
denounced "fabricated reports" In Austrian, t+'eat Gcrt n, and
French media about recent arrests of 1968 liberals in Czdchoslovakla.
The sole aim of such reports, CTK charged, was to "disrupt the
dignified atmosphere" of the 30th anniversary celebration.
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Gv #''MUTIAL #'tils t#t# i lJs
14 "AY 19tS
-4 $'Y (usmA#xg-i 1~itsak I#t Ptagi and Cillakoit it,
haat Iteti lh
hctth tt+ehtiofted the all*IP'1topeah c tftist
patty cishtetohce planned tot this *eat' Ittepataticttts tot WtiO-h
har~e apparently ehcouhteted setlovs difficulties, ttile the
cohtetehce teas hot 0- htiohed in the speech by ikle_cket-thief i~f
the SO4 ,hich Is sched~tle~f to host the
coftclarea= ltlak.oYt q
speech, folio .iho, #1o'heckeftq, ttoteal that "It Is #ktlih Meta
the confetehce of Futopean c vnists is #seing prepared,"
adding that t? topean crnmgfhigts ate ttov+ as 10 I-aats tt00, In
the *ahgeatd of the fight tot peace.
In Ptagle, 1?1#sak declate-4 that his patty A-as patt.icipatihO' In
ptepatatieta tot a tntopaan te"lothigt Patty ctetteteftce stall
gii$+pvttihq `"the initiative rot co"Ve#tits +wot)to#tfetettce?-
+'his fet lati!9it a.icc#us ss.+tptisitygly pto-vocotitve, aiftce it appears
to challe#tge the 'Neoslav declatatieh that the tCT vinsla #wt
attend a t-ito Aft C#' Cvhfeteftca '#itth is re are d as a ptel e
to a iwotld patty ci,hfeteh(e.
TutoslaT cr t-h~ctit saf t ?lo 2hss 3 t't ahhi eteaty 06 $'_ a 1 g
lh:litated cc"nti#sa3Fd official 101- wee o>+vet tc-'teiit atticlep bx tc;-;,
S'ryvlet :PPi i itar1 1.4a4ets Which fal le~l, In tl7e a+if'ea of Tufoalaw
lea4ets4 to give 4ue cte-dit to Tito's a_tivi tot t!.e litetatie-h of
Yaiosia~vla. 1 tee #itae"c aieoihi, tha issue talsad hx
the articles i-nvohp?d t c-t,1T histotical at.tttts*tY but tl?e +ruttc tt
d i# ate_4 W47,L . Tnrgealav at+.alcc7te-t pt-efeece4 tr, sari i#t tl?a
.t aDiet art is.' 3e.s ah a~t tpt to iust i fx -11Triet 1tttietfete0te ist
Iuoalax affairs. 3h1se, In tesprdiy. to tlye articles, Ub's
T9F,Pglaac$ have st.tesaed that Tire *elaula to-talhg sift i#rAe #t c'y-t
4111-4 xet_f-t'sllaht te.-tMtty.
'':ate thin' of Pelt=tellante Vaa attegae4 ih Vltt"ally .all tt ]ta
c te#tt and lea?;ets' c~ePrl es tha x.7t a ti~cers.atl. etblact
party leader vlag.al ic., fm- exan?f le, #sote4 that "we ssnvgt co +stafst ll
keep to f+i#d the fact that, aft in the "Qt* ;a3 Viii #.al.e a
gift to og of attythiftl; . . . ." Pvthapg the t3trc'nigrAt Clam to
Pelt-rolia;ice vas ptomlded by a lheli ra-de radio report ci#s the '? X47
Patti ersar-T parade tfch repeatedly statej that .a f'ayotlty of the
veal-s ss rmo display ate d.erelope-.d by tutc*talams its tutoalatt tactatrleg.
the report did not ack>stieletl a that a ttv!tstontial 4tuft6er of the
Pophittticat+ d a .ilitary ap tt+s t dig-play, actor-ditie to uestem
0111tary obs:wrver#, r trv*m "16iktosa, stlthou,olt it d!d ftot+E ararhiA"s
t: ttributl to the + evel+ ptt"t tf th Orr Oran (IIthter pl rae,
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C011PI0T1i tAL Mg I R rn
14 HAY 1915
tfr the highest=leoel C&Wkkefit 45th the a#%fiivetsRty+ a stRtenebt by
Yiti .issrrecl by 10,tiIr3 mri the Sth# the 'Pugsslav 1rts~et vebeni,efit.ly
rieieMe4 the PRttisa#is; vatti !we tetotri. ttkNr leeglfrg that
the 'C.e'viet 1:'ffirr irR4 iotf*e the htrrnt of ttre Vat tot
r:.ettlafiyy,
iTitc hevo-ttheless Rsgette4 that "Ve . i$hetate,4 art c+,frtt*
e-rtselves," elthr-40,r his, temai#iistefrses weta_ bvi"sla ifitely4e4
to tehvt the S?1;-a'iet 0111taty lestdets' vetsiefr of the lih:etatio#f
of t"?,Osistvls 4 71too'R ctiticia of KM1s fi. vsr_4 :,te 1nnrtc-4 t rafr
t t t i t is i avO ha e4 irts.ae ifv sf 2 Apit i l e pee h. vii $ c?h W.,e jtw,,t e.
the e:sttiet TrY Qlav teln-uttsi ?i[etts, ?'? st xet4 his s st st
ctiticin,u vac; 41tecte4 at tteatst=r 4i0r,ttic rs of hilt t3 tathet
t%-ail at 'scrvy
I" an Rrpetet:'t etk,tt tfq srssgafe Y e-eglRv
sE+wr v'Fart*rti itsav ifi
the tetef- gn t teat ' r.6~-at~ar~~tR t+9 t-.4y
blic.~,rrr~# twos $~s^'Qts~v$' t'riie $f9 theta P#e~?:;~ ~$e#s.?i
ts.e 'trr. rT4$svg IitO ifi fi,etatif4 t trtrttiT~ tieha tai the defeat
e? itlyt tsry "fxati }ai li etaIki" at~i~o, sre Qixvia arcs
sin'$isrti aka . tz: $ # .at Q~t?r lists ss y' 1$t art n ~:.?e#
~,a2nr# *;, leaet of tt:ee:iet .a~ele3i$e trr t?~ita a cele=
tt,
xtte `c- toPt$I toile"' it,
##.~ $~$ a t :a x#t$c~ g ac Kati
Rs his "`t:ytari *--4 cvutAL,S
Despite there itkrMsq t "r4 t4 tet: iliat$~?~ i? t .# _ c^ tia~waeg to
c Tte~s ifti~6e*!atia^, Bret !+ t $t teE;st4s as a~m ;st$te att tticrx it%
LR$ kc c tt$ps. -fs 2 "K.s?~ a_#t i
~rrn t~e'n t # z .~5$t ccE#tit t t i? .e .# :tc r:y + tc
te'*it$f a to t-fl+1$:c'h 4i?e#Ysi Attictes tam q - r r - et trI tat ,
i ci i g e !r t;ta~h ~s tepette4; r i$c! 4 ifr t0}e ~.ech sl vaC
t3,cd*te?idat ir-yttwal tPITA I'4: . 5vf '_t aissv ,c, .4,i~$`E ta?Rt a"?
11t;t $ $ & 1 att $c lest 14 Uat It hsrr#^,?laria'sis~?E
vaq s#itef-C- ft$r..,t t T?a $c Sts tt by me `'taglHa c+t$tets $ et4al
to e*s,as$2e tae 'set tf*le.
t'Eking, toMch ha-4 fxxt ii.9tk,e-J t;vv %'-t biay af; %urfta-sfty last yeat or
t last i #*ts+i:al itt 1?+ . tc sat tat, -4 t'r$s boor*,% th
atiaixetgaty 4rith a ? .ay t3A1LY c4itetiat ia'y 'v+ i4? i
hats;r> t traticet,t,s~~ is~ts,+age the `#lnt~@rt?h?m-ttlsr
tvO,F--#*4e ?:igrae" hot svhx-east, the $..ict v$ tPtp $9t tbq V,,t
a0a1.ct Rider 4-,.4 F-4tabt$Qtr11sA a jitta!t?!tshi i of "41tier-ty
d4st $g,.."
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Ctliltrt#Ait"114t" 11#19 Uoibl
14 MY 191$
The P t't.f `S tiAtt afitotial attac!ke(l l4ascev rot atte#tstitt?
to "oegAte"" the tole played by stall" ift the tint, chatgifig that
this telitese$iteJ the "jttossest 1Pgtilt"' to tha Soviet people
att~f eons atr itt=din e~lsed ello#t to tft,illfty ttfe `"seciatiat
s~ste estr3et tha diet"totship of the Sowi.et ptoletatiat at that
tide,>? Pof#ttf.fig to t4,ttett! S iet #tedia titaise tot tfte hftevv,
tscf esr, sf a IIG chgtactctftif,O. the ut+itc;f 5tatet
ac '"'f tteagU."flby "i e#sabje sA1~ shalt fratl~r s~t$eea~'" to
11?G5 SkJ:v., A ai tftgt4,G4 ft ithy etO-f%- q f^,t' xafi-eac rice
~trti!$cte .xS~a~.dB~,~ ter :.~ s
.':. ~, e;,ri. ?asa~4i~T~At~ '!'~att ~'+^4tErD
Ist the -iaiat, td, aim f.t~tMslr,tk et3~e itt f?effx.:
f_ 7"?' tea ~v :;',~`f. t '' idsf C, R. t f'C C'k3~'#+t Al}S' 1-tQF terkqt .,v^ n=f the *4
tcrettfe?s,fc arc#t. att~taE.i fr?? tzfr,cce dLde.aifc tcx
cfflcf'ts at t.ht ttfh1fz(,Pt1P; lw$-et rt k lr s.
1.4 vcx 1 1A,
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 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP+86T00608ROO02*~00170022-9
C'09 tjt41AI. P1115 1 ODA
11, HAY 191
- 11 a.
CUBA - U, So RE LAT I OHS
11WMA ltbtA HtC - .f1` KtOVE l 'F T FOR utrTtl0G CJ
Cabs," t edia coverage of the a=8 Hwy visit to Cuba by li.S.
5e". Capotge licC ,vet" sons *vch to e*te"sive 00d ptr p? tha"
that Attotded the last cccpatable visitc,ts==Se"atots Javits and
bell, i ,o visited Cuba in Septe'tSet l / =-sti Asti" that 11ava"a
ttaso baa ai"te ce ifide"ce i" dealit,g *4th such tl.S. visitors and
e*pioititvo pitch occasions to publictt!e Its viests cit the obstacles
to teestabiishittg Cu# a"=t?rs. tela?in"s.* the ifava"a o+e4ta gave
apecial attetitlei to the se"atot's ctiticlpo of the S. trade
e0ba#gct it%d to 111del Casttd`s state r-t,l.s favotitig a "ot alizatiot,
Of telatir,tvs. eivie? iYq:clla lit,ked the lcct rvetn ttip to the 8 a'r
rspet,itgg of the OAS ce*etal Asseobly it, ' ashi"gtoil, oeti"g that
th OAS's chief ?eplr_ ivo},lsl be "the tc_n- val of 41ectit4tiatot7
sat::cti s against Cu;na." 1?Fk.itle ttkefla, sahlch bad ig"oted
ce+i-Pletel; tha 11A visit by Set,atots iavits at-,, Pell at,d
t=. tit,ally pay little attet,tiei, to i e,bat, ailaits, Ph this e'ccasiet1
effetc4 a single tep!,tt ell the ?crovet" Vioit, 1It)t11 #, It to
atv a*nPttc-4 easlne of tha U.S. ttaf,d !.,nycett V4101, UC'bA cited
!!,t -evetn a? say ink, -has e-MV sFtVe4 ? s*.al;e cmba 11-Its + epeiheeiit
p3 j.n;ta tba S?3oiet t"`% ilt~
31'x' ,G'''I k3 `+ astto, i" a pterq
ca*t~fe#F#~#e avith 4'. .
~~r3. s~ 1 St:~.C~ e~cwreiTc ~f t (tiYa ~#?3'io-s ~ {c -Pto tee lLtte+,
tk
rea?7 4; ` m fee l.s 4?s +l L. a!$ Fi
pia?=aa tdi i ,x #oxt its tela
t ie'!s vitl, t '+e X?Mtc4 rta?ea" ba,t
teitctate, ta-c' ! ~!^i t=Ei te* t.RCitle?, t ?t the (7 r embratgo
g1"114 t6 1 if te'1 f itst t'=_caase ? ' ,a e,l4 ?got '""gigot late '.,#1. ct
;f a.r~;#r. aa.ars.c*~e1 # i tcwi:n sG crttal je ;;t1gfeq ,ts.44e ty the
1'tiited tat o, 'zr!!a c s34i?~ #twc taoiti t i *? S #i y ~~ttt
~lit~lem&ats at t? "r~its4 `tatirst+a, ~C:zett agQ~t?c 'that C, ?t
ha4 m3;'c ~n,cstc -'s ?,l:a"ria"' e~ett~,tca 1"tl+ t#, Er*n :eta?iot, e;,
?':a s .x3ac :i g. #e ,lc , and z,a11p fet a -. ?Ecctute aS
slliitat itl .ttat?ce,` =. % as liftille t1he ,,411 et, a*.ott of
fe~rn_r?staffs a~,.1 iig i 1^as te+ c v,!-?A. at+~ th' a rsic,it*t a 4itc t
? ???atcmrctst -v v'! at tQae "t,43e: tAt;a tr1Cht Cai! i ? tct .tt~, C;astt
c,aiA a +1 that a wattial 1ifil"g of t1*e c= t=batgce srP.uld lsad to
a "tcCd'`aaliEtati b5t the CO"at, 14e of its telatlett:s ulth the
Vol(" t.gatca.
46 t#ba* :v*4 ts~ralc_t?Sia tefatc e,f the ~a!vita=#?ell 'a+is#t it
d1RC+,QSC.d l.ti tb.e $lr. of frictt laara 1=11.
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14 HAY 1975
Citing Other factors Witch augured well for better relations.
Castro ""Honed the resignation of President Ilixon and the
end of the Vietnam war -often a feature in Cuban denunciations
of U.S. "Imperialist" policy. He added that the visitn of
Senators Jnvits, Pell and HcGovetn were also "appreciated,"
and be praised I4ctsovern as a a-an whose opposition to the war
in Vietnam had deoonstrated that tie was a "loyal defender of
peace." In geptembet' 1914 Castrt, had not mentioned the visit
then by Senators Javtts and Pell in delivering a harshly anti-
V.5. anniversary speech.
Queried, as usual, about alleged CIA ploto against him, Castro
teplied--as he has in the past--that the "plots" had been
'"knit ed for a long tine'in Cuba. "Doaens of plots" had been
discoveted, he rlat*ed, some of theta involving the use of
weapons "fton the Guantanatso naval bane."
stC~I s#'i'i:tC Cantro's re#?atks about relations with his Latin
p,["i.llm neighbors vere conciliatory, in line with the
regime's indications of a desire to Improve
C`.iha's status vin-a-vis other nations in the he- inphere. Castro
said that "ye are ready to abide by international nortls and
respect all countries that te.spect us," and, although he
expressed his hope that the Chilean people would "rid thetaelven
of the fascist yoke," he added that "this is a matter to be
decided by the Chileans thet selves." As if dismissing the
idea that such wild tetarks could be tied to the current session
of the GA, several of whose tr rbetq have stated a willingness to
lift sanctions against Cuba it the Cuban gaverneaant i ould
,s uatatatee nti-intetfetFtsc:e in other countries, Castro said that
the OAS had "piayed a very sad role" and that "the best decision
it way ft4kq is to dissolve itt3eif."
tM ' I IA cri MN SA tteat:hent of Senator fcr.overn's
''COWL44i, *at ?cfa?ks on the V.S. trade embargo against Cuba
app-a_ared to set the pattern fora similar
?''-oscov handling. The Cuban agency had reported On 8 `say that
'ci~ove?n had "agreed with the Cuban Prime iiinister" on the latter's
svggeatIen that the U.S. should lift its ban an the ritport of
lo&ndstuf f s and is dic itie to Cuba as a step which would "pave the
way for i*p toned relatiot?A" between Cuba and the United Stater#.
TVA54 tepetted on 10 ltay that 'kCovern had "called for lifting the
vttbargo the Voiced :Mate ; imposed on trade with Cuba." As MoB cov
coMent had dine in the case of the Javitn-Pell visit in SeptDeber
1974. its tta_atas nt of the nk(o ern visit 91tto linked It with
the idea of gtoving ptuspetts for improved U.S.-Cuban relations.
OMMIMMIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL FDIS TRENDS
14 MAY 1975
For example, Moscow radio's "International Diary" program
commentator Yevgeniy Kachanov noted on 7 May that McGovern's
visit wan "directly linked by foreign observers" to nn
"increasing trend among Washington political circles" favoring
a review of relations. In further tying the visit to an overall
upgrading of Cuba's status, Kachanov observed that the trip
came on the eve of an OAS mooting whose "chief topic" would
be the sanctions "imposed on the OAS countries 11 years ago
by the United States." Kachanov, Couching lightly on the
failure of last year's OAS foreign ministers' meeting to
lift the sanctions because of voting rules requring a two-
thirds majority, noted simply that "it is not beyond possibility"
that now voting procedures being discussed "will correspond
to the real state of affairs" and allow for a removal of the
minority-supported sanctions.
In the only available Soviet reaction to Castro's press conference,
TASS on 10 May focused on his remarks about the blockade and U.S.-
Cuban relations, noting Castro's statement that a "sufficiently
wide" opening in the embargo would lead to a "reassessment by
the Cuban side of relations with the U.S.A." TASS also reported
that Castro had "expressed hope that the Chilean people will
throw down the yoke of fascism," but made no mention of his other
statements on hemispheric relations.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
14 MAY 1975
CHINA-JAPAN
JSP LEANS TCVARD PEKING STANCE IN COMPROMISE JOINT STATEMENT
A 12 May joint statement signed by the Japan Socialist Party (JSP)
delegation that visited Peking 5-12 May brings the JSP into public
agreement with the Chinese on the question of opposition to
"hegemonism of the two superpowers," meaning the United States
and the Soviet Union. Previously, the JSP had tried to steer a
middle course between the Soviet Union and China. Increasing
Chinese satisfaction as the visit progressed was evident in
NCNA coverage. While NCNA did not characterize the atmosphere at
the initial 5 May banquet for the delegation, later it described
the 11 May farewell banquet as "permeated with a warm atmosphere
of friendship." China-Japan Friendship Association President
Liao Cheng-chih credited the visit's success to the "courage
and resolution" of JSP Chairman Narita, thus identifying Narita
even more closely with the communique.
The joint statement is unabashedly a compromise document, stating
that both sides decided to seek "common 9,riunds instead of stressing
the differences between them" and thus reached agreement on "a
number of major questions." On their part the Chinese expressed
"admiration" for the JSP's struggle against the U.S.-Japanese
security treaty, a struggle Peking has virtually ignored in recent
years as it has stressed the Soviet threat.
While the JSP made a decided tilt in its position toward the
Chinese side, it did make some attempt to assert that it was not
opposing the Soviet Union, but rather certain specific actions by
the superpowers. Thrs, at the 11 May farewell banquet for the
delegation, Narita tried to rationalize the JSP's virtual capitula-
tion on the hegemony issue by stating that agreement had been
reached on opposition to the two superpowers' hegemonism by
discussing "concrete facts," implyLng that ,SSP agreement was not
aimed at countries, but at particular actions or policies. In
this connection, the joint statement criticized U.S. efforts to
"hang on" in South Korea and "further strengthen" military bases
in Japan and also attacked the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia,
its occupation of Japanese-claimed islands, and Soviet attempts
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL PBIS TRENDS
14 MAY 1975
to "peddle" an Asian collective security treaty.* In the state-
ment the JSP side also carefully noted its willingness to
"develop relations with all countries."
Both sides held that a China-Japan friendship treaty must be
concluded "at an early date," and they followed the Chinese
position in stating that the treaty must be "a step forward"
from the 1972 joint government statement establishing diplomatic
relations. Peking-propaganda has assailed efforts to drop the
hegemony clause as a "backward step" and the communique stated.
that "no backward step is permissible."
The joint statement's recording of Chinese "admiration" for the
Japanese struggle to abrogate the Japan-U.S. security treaty and
to dismantle unspecified military bases is unusual in recent
practice, and moreover represents a dilution of China's position
as stated in November 1970, in the last previous joint statement
with a JSP delegation in Peking. On that occasion the Chinese had
not only expressed "heart-felt respect" for the struggle against
the treaty, but had also specified support for struggle against
U.S. military bases, against nuclear armament for Japan, and for
Japan's "neutrality," all of which were omitted from the current
statement. Chinese support for such measures has dropped off as
Peking propaganda has increasingly stressed the Soviet danger.
In the past year there have been only two monitored Chinese media
references to Japanese opposition to the security treaty, both of
them NCNA replays of Japanese reports.
* The negative current reference to the Soviet plan for an Asian
collective security system contrasts with another JSP position of
October 1974, when a JSP-CPSU communique stated that both sides
agreed that "an Asian peace and security system" could be created
"by both collective and bilateral efforts." Moscow was probably
surprised by the JSP's decision to follow the Chinese lead; Moscow
radio commentaries on 4 and 5 May had confidently predicted the
JSP would not succumb to Chinese pressure.
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CONFIDENTIAL. FBIS TRENDS
14 MAY 1975
CHINA-EUROPE
PEKING MOVES TO STRENGTHEN TIES WITH. WESTERN EUROPE
China's desire to strengthen relations with Western Europe was
sharply illustrated during the past week by Vice Premier Teng
Hsiao-ping's departure for an official visit to France and
Peking's agreement to establish formal relations with the'European
Economic Community. Teng, also.a CCP vice chairman, is the
highest-ranking Chinese leader to make an official visit to a
Western state since the cultural revolution. Peking's agreement
on relations with the EC came during a 4-11 May visit to China.
by EC Vice President Christopher Soames, the first official EC
representative to visit China.. Peking media comment on both
visits has carefully underlined Chinese interest in West European
unity as a bulwark against Soviet expansion in Europe.
TENG VISIT Teng Hsiao-ping's visit to France, which reciprocates
former French President Pompidou's September 1973
visit to China, has thus far been highlighted by discussions with
.President Giscard, who hosted a banquet for the vice premier on
13 May, and by talks with Prime Minister Chj.r'.c, who feted Teng
at a banquet the previous evening. As PRC Premier Chou.En-tai
had done during Pompidou's visit to China, Teng has stressed in his'
banquet speeches the longstanding friendly relations between China
and France, established personally by Chairman Mao and former
French President DeGaulle, has played up both sides' common
resolve to maintain national independence against superpower
interference, and has pointed to the Soviet Union--without
explicitly mentioning it--as the main threat to West European
security. Teng has shown greater deference to French sensitivity
about anti-USSR rhetoric than did Chou, however.
In his speech at the welcoming banquet on 12 May, .Teng voiced
an unusual Chinese interest in the establishment of a "relatively
favorable international environment," but he warned that even
though "the trees may prefer calm," the "wind" of superpower
rivalry will not subside. In a 13 May banquet speech Teng
reaffirmed that U.S.-Soviet contention is centered in Europe, and
he focused criticism on the USSR, warning that the-superpower
"who talks the loudest about peace and security ..is the'very.one
who flagrantly'imposes military threats on the people of the world,.
the European peoples in particular."
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14 MAY 1975
Teng's speeches have stressed a common Sino-French emphasis on
national independence and resistance to "monopolization of
world affairs by the superpowers." Praising President Giscard
D'Estaing's efforts to promote unity in West Europe, Teng explained
in his 13 May speech that China has established ties with the EC
and encouraged European unity mainly as a strategic measure, He
stated that through unity West Eurcpe would be able to safeguard
its independence, play a "more positive role in world affairs,"
and move the developing world situation in a "favorable
direction." He did.not mention the economic benefits of
Chinese ties to the EC, but noted in his 12 May speech that China
has far to go in economic and technical fields and said that
China welcomed foreign economic contacts within a general frame-
work of Chinese self-reliance.
SOAMES DELEGATION The EC delegation to Peking led by
Christopher Soames held substantive
discussions with Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua and also met
with Chou En-lai and Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien. Peking formally
revealed the establishment of official PRC-EC relations in a
10 May NCNA report reviewing the delegation's visit. The report
replayed Foreign Trade Minister Li Chiang's remarks, at an 8 May
banquet for the European guests, which presented the EC as a
framework for strategic West European unity against external
pressure and a "positive development." Thc: report also highlighted
Soames' 8 May press conference statement in Peking in which he
stated that the EC has no ties with Taiwan.
Peking's interest in promoting unity within the Common Market
as an anti-USSR bulwark was explicitly set forth earlier, in a
24 April NCNA report on the 21-24 April summit meeting of French
President Giscard and FRG President Scheel in France. The
report cited Scheel's call for common EC foreign and defense
policies--as well as economic--in order to protect against
"foreign hegemony." Peking's view that EC unity should be
directed mainly against the USSR was reflected by NCNA's replay
of Scheel's stress that a unified West Europe must "continue
the alliance with the United States," and by its pickup of a West
German newspaper comment that the summit meeting had shown that
the Franco-German commitment to West European unity would serve
to block Soviet efforts to isolate the FRG and extend Moscow's
"imperialist influence westward."
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
14 MAY 1975
NOTE
PRC-TAIWAN: A 7 May-signed article carried by Peking's Fukien
Front radio beamed -to Taiwan explicitly. linked the collapse of
the, pro-U . S . .regimes in .Indochina with the situation faced by
the Chiang government in Taiwan. Equating the former.Thieu
-regime in Saigon with the Taipei authorities,. the article said
that Thieu's failure-stemmed from his reliance on the United
~States.and opposition . to' the will of the "people," and claimed
.that Taipei wasconEinuing,a -similar policy .that would only
"shorten one's life." The.broadcast carefully noted that the
United States consistently gave "full support and backing" to
.shore up Saigon, :but .that -.its efforts were .in vain since the
popular will cannot be checked by "imperialism." 'The article
called.upon Taipei officials'to draw appropriate "lessons"
from the Vietnamese :example, "return from .the wrong road," and
work .for the "liberation" of.Taiwan. A.26.April.Peking broad-
cast..to Taiwan had noted in passing:the "lesson" of Phnom Penh
.and Saigon for Taipei authorities but without such explicit
suggestions.
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Fri18 TRENnS
14 MAY 1975
APPENDIX
MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 5 - 1.1 MAY 1975
Moscow (2273 items)
Peking (874 items)
V-E Dap 30th Anniversary
(12%)
53%
"Liberation" of South
(16%)
7%
(Brezhnev Speech
(--)
6%]
Vietnam
(Podgornyy Speech
(--)
4%]
UN Law of the Sea Confer-
(2%)
7Z
(Party/Government
(--)
4%]
ence, Geneva
Appeal
Cambodia
(10%)
6%
Vietnam
(8%)
3%
V-E Day 30th Anniversary
(--)
6%
China
(4%)
3%
Japan
(3%)
5%
Soviet-Czech Friendship
(--)
2%
(Japanese Socialist
(1%)
3%)
Treaty 5th Anniversary
Laos Delegation in USSR
2%
Delegations in PRC
Mao 7 May Directive 4th
(--)
5%
Anniversary
EEC/PRC Establishment of
(--)
2%
Relations
These statistics are based on the volcecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and International radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy Item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures In parentheses Indicate volume of comment during the preceding week,
Topics and events given major attention In terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered In prior Issues;
In other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
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