TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170010-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 18, 1999
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: February 26, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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TENDS IN N' co IST pOPA:GANb:A
b FE6...1.975 - 01 .=of 01`
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Confidentia
FBIS
TRENDS
In Communist Propaganda
STATSPEC
Confidential
26 FEBRUARY 197 5
(VOL. XXV I , NO. 8)
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This propaganda analysis report is based excltsively on material
carried in foreign broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.S. Government
components.
Classified by 000073
Subject to GsnsraI D.classification Schedule
of E.O. 11652, Automatically D.:louifisd
Two Years From Dare of Issue
National Security Information
Unauthorirsd disclosure subject to
criminal sanctions
CONFIDENTIAL
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26 FEBRUARY 1975
CONTENTS
SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS
Moscow Hits Chinese Congress's Foreign Policy Pronouncements . .
1
ENERGY
East Europeans Report Price Increases for Imported Soviet Oil
4
MBFR
Moscow, Allies Publicize Warsaw Pact Troop Freeze Proposal . . .
7
PORTUGAL
PRAVDA Editorial Article Advises Leftists to Maintain Unity . .
8
INDOCHINA
DRV, PRG Foreign Ministries Protest U.S, Airlifts to Cambodia .
11
DRV Party History Contains Atypical Harvest Statistics . , . . .
11
CHINA
Ideological Campaign Stresses Discipline and Production . . . .
12
NOTES
Chou Receives Sihanouk; European CP Conference Preparations;
Yugoslav Dissident Organ; Soviet Anti-Chilean Comment . . . . .
15
Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
i
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I FBI`??S 'I'RENI)S
26 FEBRUARY 1.975
SING - SOVIET R ELATIONS
MOSCOW HITS CHINESE CONGRESS'S FOREIGN POLICY PFi;)NOUNCEP1ENTS
An authoritative Soviet response to PRC foreign policy pronouncements
at the Fourte National People's Congress (NPC) in January has come
in a 22 February PRAVDA editorial article whicl rejected Chou En-tai's
proposal in his NPC report that the USSR "do something" to solve
'h bit" of the border problem and accused Pekin,; of fomenting global
unrest. Earlier, on 5 February a PRAVDA artl.4:?1R carrying similar
authority under the byline "I. Aleksandrov" hnd focused on Chinese
internal developments in discussing the new F'Z.C constitution.*
Linking the "Maoist leadership" with the mos: "aggressive" imperialist
forces who oppose the "dominant" trend toward relaxation of inter-
national tension, PRAVDA criticized virtually all PRC foreign
policies. It denounced the PRC concept of "Three Worlds," attacked
the Chinese position on the inevitability of war, and condemned alleged
PRC border provocations against neighboring states. The article
also pointed up China's different approach to relations with the
United States and with the JSSR, especially as shot-m in China's
support for a U.S. presence in Asia, and in Chou En-lai's relatively
positive assessment of Sino-U.S. relations in contrast to his bleak
outlook for Sino-Soviet ties.
SINO-SOVIET BORDER In Moscow's first authoritative response to
Chou's NPC challenge to the Soviets to meet
Chinese demands on the frontier, PRAVDA bluntly held Peking
responsible for blocking normalization of relations through "the
repetition of deliberately unacceptable preliminary conditions."
Showing no sign of willingness to "do something," PRAVDA countered
by tellipb the PRC leaders that if "they had serious intentions" in
proclaiming at the 14PC a desire for normal state relations, they
"should finally take really constructive steps in this direction."
The article quoted Brezhnev's November speech in Mongolia as an
expression of the Soviet position--that the USSR claims no Chinese
territory, has no preliminary conditions for normalization of
* The article is discussed in FBIS TRENDS, 12 February 1975,
pages 13-14.
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relations, and is willing to .ign a treaty of nonaggression and
nonuse of .force.* While accusing China of "border provocations"
against neighborin; socialist states, the article did not
specifically recall Sino-Soviet border clashes.
WAR AND PEACE According to PRAVDA, Peking's current line is
designed to "undermine the cause of peace and to
kindle enmity and hatred among the peoples," and it accused
China's leaders of trying to foment international tension in order
to make China a leading power. Recalling that at the WPC Chou
had stated the goal of bringing China "into the first rank of
the countries of the world" by the end of the century, the
article accused China of basing its planned rise to power on
the misfortune of other peoples." PRAVIA quoted alleged ;1ao
remarks in the late 1950's that: a nuclear war "will not be so bad,"
and noted that "Peking is once again buzzing with speeches about
the fatal inevitability of a new world war" and suggesting that
such a development would be favorable. The article said Chou's
NPC statement that "there is no relaxation in the world" was
contrary to fact, and it noted that neither Chou nor the PRC
constitution "mention the need to uphold the cause of peace"
included it the previous constitution.
WORLD ALINEMENT PRAVDA linked China's war orientation with its
current theoretical. divisinn of nations into
"Three Worlds," with the two superpowers compcslng the First World,
other developed countries the Second World, and the developing
countries the Third World. The article portrayed the superpower
thesis as being aimed primarily against the Soviet Union in an
effort to break up the socialist community and incite other peoples
against the USSR. While accusing the Chinese of seeking to push
the United States and the Soviet Union into a tli~rmonucl.ear war,
the article noted that Chou's report presented "completely differently"
the prospects of developing PRC-USSR and PRC-U.S. relations. It
noted Chou's statement that relations with the .United States have
"improved to some extent," and contrasted that with his statement
about "controversies 'on fundamental questions' with the USSR."
" Brezhnev's speech had rejected China's 1974 October Revolution
Faniversary message, in which China first publicly raised the claim
that a "mutual understanding" at the September 1969 border talks
had provided for mutual nonaggression and nonuse of force as part
of a preliminary package accord to be reached before starting overall
border negotiations. Brezhnev's speech is discussed in FBIS TRENDS,
27 November 1974, page 5.
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CONFIDENTIAL FiI.S 'PREN{)S
26 FEBRUARY 1.975
The article ignored Chou's standard statement that "fundamental
differences" exist between China and the United States, but
made a token effort to dispel the implication of Sino--U.S.
collaboration against the Soviet Union by remarking that the
"constructive shift" in Soviet-U.S. relations has caused "bit-
terness" in Peking.
PRAVDA seemed to show some concern over Peking's success in
attracting elements of the Second and Third Worlds. It noted
that China was "flattering the young developing states" L,y
calling itself a member of the Third World and warned that such
tactics see:: only to "use the developing states as a tool" in
implementing China's great-power designs. It saw in the Chinese
maneuverings a desire to weaken these countries and divert them
from the path of strengthening their political and economic
independence. The article linked alleged internal disruption
of developing countries by China with its alleged appeals for
"preservation of the U.S. military presence" in Asia, seeing
the Chinese as "nurturing hopes of winning control of raw materials
and sales markets in Asia and Africa from the imperialist monopolies
in the future, but not feeling strong enough to achieve th:Ls yet."
According to PRAVI)A, the Chinese are now seeking to preserve the status
quo in developing countries until their strength increases. The
article saw Chinese opposition to an Asian collective security pact
as proof of their dreams of hegemony and territorial acquisitions.
PRAVDA presented Peking's relations with the Second World as an
attimpt to ally with "reactionary militarist-revanchist Eorces"
in opposition to world socialism. In standard terms, the article
accused the Chinese of trying to sabotage peace efforts in FA:ope
by asserting that the Soviet Union is "making a feint to the East
and will strike its blo'-r in the West."It recalled recent visits
to the PRC by conservative European leaders, and admonished
Chinese leaders that the "aggressive imperialist circles" have
their own goal of fom.nting military confrontation between China
and the socialist community. The article noted "Peking's desire
to complicate Soviet-Japanese relations," but it did not
specifically refer to current Sino-Japanes-_- and Soviet-Japanese
treaty negotiations.
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EAST EUROPEANS REPORT PRICE INCREASES FOR IMPORTED SOVIET OIL
Moscow's CEMA partners waited a month before acknowledging in scattered
public comment that a late January CEPIA agreement means East
European countries will pF.y higher prices for petroleum imported from
the USSR for 1975 and the 1976-1980 period. Thus far, of Moscow's
allies, only Hungarian, East German, and Polish commentators are
known to have discussed the impact of the oil price increase, in
articles and talks publicized on 22 and 23 February. The only Soviet
comment on the new CEMA oil prices available thus far came in a
23 February Rodionov talk on Moscow radio that denounced alleged
efforts in a New York TIMES article to set oil-producing and oll-
importing socialist countries against one another. Rodionov
pointed out that the TRIES article had admitted that the 1975
prices for Soviet oil sold to East European countries were below
worldmarket prices. The initial East European comments do not
deal with Western allegations of friction and differences within
CEMA on the oil price issue, but emphasize that CE?iA members still
will obtain oil at prices far below those paid by Western importing
countries.
The Soviet oil price increases now beginning to be discussed were
foreshadowed in the communique on the 21-23 January CE^!A Executive
Committee meeting in Moscow. The communique had not, however,
specifically acknowledged that Soviet oil prices would go up, but
noted vaguely that to insure "favorable conditions" for future goods
exchanges within CET1A, the committee had "approved recommendations
concerning contractual prices to be applied in trade" among the
CE:IA member states during the next 5-year period. The new pricing
mechanism also provides for annual price revisions, allowing Moscow
to avoid getting locked in again to a long-term oil price unfavorable
to the USSR.
East European commentators, like Moscow, stressed that the planned
CEMA price increases for oil and other raw materials would still
result in a price level "considerably" below current world market
prices. Thus, Budapest's NEPSZABADSAG on the 23d pointed out that
under the new price schedule for 1975, a ton of crude oil imported
by Hungary from the USSR would cost 37 rubles (about $50) compared
with a price of $110 per ton on "the capitalist world market." The
current exchange rate is $1.34 per ruble, NEPSZABA')SAG added that
tiie world market price for pig iron was much higher than the price
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for Soviet pig iron, in a ratio of two and one-half to one. The
1975 price increases for Hungarian imports from the USSR, it noted
is this connection, would increase 52 percent for "energy" and
other raw materials, compared to only 3.3 percent for machines and
equipment. On the subject of the CEi1A pricing mechanism for the
next 5-year pF.riod, 1976-80, the article reported that the previous
system of fixed prices for an entire 5-year period would be
replaced by one whereby prices would be established each year on
the basis of "the main market prices" in trade between the CEFIA
countries (luring the preceding five years. The system as described
thus permits annual increases for Soviet oil, but with accompanying
safeguards to keep these prices well below the world market level.
An East Berlin radio talk by Gerstner on the 23d pointed out that
CEMA countries had "always" taken into account the world market
prices of principal products, but that the prime reason for the
CEi1A price increases lay within the socialist countries themselves.
Thus the Gerstner commentary attributed higher Soviet oil prices
to the cost of developing new petroleum sources in Siberia. The
Rodionov talk the same day had mentioned only in general terms
that the East European people were "well aware" of the USSR's efforts
to exploit "Siberian natural resources." Gerstner envisaged prices
for Soviet oil during the next few years reaching a level half as
high as those on the capitalist market. Anticipating a negative
reaction, the commentator added that "this is the situation, dear
listeners, which has objectively emerged for us and to which we
must adapt."
In more generalized but candid comment, the Warsaw weekly POLITYKA
of 22 February observed that CEHA's previous system of setting
prices, a "stop price" system, had ceased working at the end of
1973, when steep rises in world market prices for oil "began to
hamper the growth of cooperation and integration." This, it said
was the reason for the present conversion to a "progressive price"
system for the coming 5-year period. In 1975, POLITYKA said, CEHA
prices would still be well below world prices, "but the difference
will no longer be so glaring."
ROMANIA, AL3ANIA A Ceausescu speech on foreign trade on 14
February in Bucharest was used by the Romanian
leader for what appeared to be a new expression of independence from
11oscow. Ceausescu noted that while "some" raw materials were imported
from the USSR and other socialist countries, Romania imported oil
"exclusively" from nonsocialist countries at world market prices. This,
he added, resulted in a negative trade balance with nonsocialist
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countries and a trade surplus with socialist states, each
amounting to about $200 million. He called for measures to
correct both imbalances.
Tirana's ATA on the 25th viewed the CEI'IA price increases as
a new example of Moscow's plundering and exploitation of its
East European trading partners. The principal vehicle for such
exploitation, it stressed, was the "Friendship" oil pipeline,
which it said was constructed with the money and labor of the
East European countries for Moscow's benefit.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
26 FEBRUARY 1975
MOSCOW, ALLIES PUBLICIZE WARSAW PACT TROOP FREEZE PROPOSAL
Moscow and its Warsaw Pact allies have again broken the confiden-
tiality of the Vienna force reductions negotiations (MBFR) by
publicizing the Pact's formal proposal that the 11 direct partici-
pants in the talks issue a joint statement declaring a freeze on
the numerical strength of their armed forces in the region under
negotiation while the talks are in progress. The idea of a Pact
freeze proposal had been broached once before, in a low-level
Moscow Radio Peace and Progress commentary on 17 December. Media
silence on the issue was ended on 13 February, following the third
plenary session of the talks since their resumption on 30 January,
suggesting that the Pact had decided on a concerted publicity effort
to press the West for a satisfactory response. The proposal was
revealed by a Czechoslovak spokesman in a press conference reported
by Czechoslovak media and by 'PASS, and was promptly played up by
Soviet and other East European media.
The TASS dispatch on the 13th reporting the spokesman's press
conference remarks pointed out that the freeze proposal would not
be to the disadvantage of either side. Brezhnev the following day,
in his speech at the luncheon for visiting British Prime Minister
Wilson, made no reference to the proposal in repeating the standard
charge that the "persistent attempts of some countries to obtain
unilateral advantages" and "to outplay the other side are
unfortunately still seriously impeding the progress" of the talks.
Predictably, hoscow has not discussed the data on which any freeze
would be based, and has ignored criticism by Western spokesmen of
this aspect of the proposal. The thrust of the comment by Moscow
and its Pact allies has again been that the Pact states are
demonstrating their flexibility and sincerity through a readiness
for compromise in an effort to get the talks out of their current
impasse. Calling for NATO good will, the comment as before has
taken the Western states to task for their negative response to
this new Pact_ initiative. Three advantages of the freeze have been
pointed out in a series of Czechoslovak media interviews by Prague
chief delegate Klein, as well as by PRAVDA's I. Melnikov on the 17th
and by other commentators. The proposal, its proponents have claimed,
would be an obs:acle to the arms race in central Europe, would improve
the atmosphere surrounding the talks, and would move the negotiations
forward by taking the first step toward reductions. With regard to
the last point, comment has recalled the various successful first
steps taken in reaching other arms control agreements, such as the
nuclear nonproliferation agreement and the convention on
bacteriological weapons.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
26 FEBRUARY 1975
PORTUGAL
PRAVDA EDITORIAL ARTICLE ADVISES LEFTISTS TO MAINTAIN UNITY
Soviet media's first authoritative discussion of developments
in Portugal since the coup of last April ^ame in a 22 February
PRAVDA editorial article--carried textually by TASS and
Moscow radio in Portuguese and Spanish. The article, entitled
"The Portuguese People--Master of Its Destiny," purportedly
was pegged to the upcoming first anniversary of the coup, a
remarkably early anniversary observance. The timing of the
article would seem to reflect Soviet r.;acern over developments
as Portugal moves toward the projected 12 April constituent
assembly elections. It comes against the background of
considerable Western press speculation about the Portuguese
Communist Party (PCP) role and the party's reported influence
on leaders of the Armed Forces Movement, the uncertain outcome
of the April elections, and the reported decision of the Armed
Forces Movement to continue indefinitely to play an active role
in the government after the April and subsequent legislative
elections.
The editorial article might also be setting the stage for
justification of a poor PCP showing at the polls, by professing
to see threats tc the PCP from reactionary forces as well as
from the Portuguese Socialists. PCP leader Cunhal himself has
already publicly laid the groundwork for questioning the
results of the April elections if the communists do poorly.
Since the April coup, Soviet media have reported cautiously on
developments, frequently by replaying PCP comment and statements.
In general, the steady flow of Moscow press and radio comment
has been of routine nature and unexceptional content. Soviet
leaders in their speeches have repeatedly, but briefly, praised
the coup, remarking favorably on the successful overthrow of
"fascism," democratization of the in,:ernal political situation,
and the rapid decolonization process, and cited the coup as an
example of the benefits of Moscow's policy of detente.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
26 FEBRUARY 19;15
ADVICE TO LEFTISTS The PRAVDA editorial article was notable
for its warning that "if all. the
progressive forces" in Portug-.1 did not remain united, favorable
opportunities would be creed for "revenge on the part of
reaction and fascism." The warning was primarily directed at
the Portuguese Socialists and other left-of-center parties.
But PRAVDA also seemed to be cautioning the PCP that if leftist
unity was not maintained, and if the party moved too far and
too rapidly in the present circumstances, the "democratization"
process would be endangered. Perhaps also implicitly chiding
the PCP, which reportedly has demonstrated some opposition to
the recently announced Portuguese economic development program,
PRAVDA stated firmly that the program's implementation "requires
the ccnsolidation and activization of all demc,,~ratic forces."
While not mentioning the example of the downfall of the Allende
regime in Chile, PRAVDA intimated that a similar, if unidentified,
"insructive historical experience" could be repeated in Portugal
if unity of the left was not safeguarded--a point made repeatedly
in the past year in Soviet theoretical discussions of strategy
and tactics for Western communist parties.
PRAVDA offered its advice to the leftists in observing that
it seems that many leading figures are forgetting
the instructive historical experience which
convincingly shows that the strength of democracy
is in the unity of all progressive forces, and,
conversely, wherever this unity is ruptured,
wherever action is dictated by the wish to gain
positions at the expense of communists and the
striving to remove them from active work in the
national interest, a split is made in the left
forces' ranks and favorable opportunities are
created for revenge on the part of reaction and
fascism.
PRAVDA immediately addea a disclaimer, asserting that it was "far
from making any advice and recommendations" because "each people
is the master of its destiny and each political party bears
responsibility for its own action." The article concluded by
stating that the "close alliance" between "the working masses" and
the Armed Forces Movement was the guarantee for the Portuguese
people's "democratic gains" and that the Portuguese only wanted to
be left alone, without any interference, while they decided their
affairs.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
26 FEBRUARY 1975
NATO, WEST EUROPEAN The editorial article had earlier spelled
"INTERFERENCE" out this interference in cataloging recent
"alarming" attempts by "external forces"
to influence Portugal's political life. PRAVDA identified these
external forces as a motley and "strange coalition" ranging from
"belligerent NATO circles" to "quite a number" of West European
Social Democrats. PRAVDA professed to see recent NATO naval
maneuvers off the Portuguese coast, along with statements by Dutch,
West German, and British Social Democrats, as examples of direct
interference in Portugal's internal affairs. Summing up, PRAVDA
"regrettably" concluded that enormous pressure from "outside" had
been brought to bear on the Portuguese Socialist Party "to make
it unfold an anticommunist campaign."
The article also routinely decried the efforts of "reaction" to
retrieve its lost positions and thwart the process of democratiza-
tion. It cited three such attempts: "last summer," when former
prime minister Palma Carlos attempted to "retard the nr',cess of
democratic development"; on 28 September, when "reactionary forces"
relying on former president Spinola attempted to "reverse the
country's development 'legally"'; and in late January-early
February, when "certain quarters" attempted to cause a government
crisis.
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INDOCHINA
DRV, PRG FOREIGN MINISTRIES PROTEST U,S, AIRLIFTS TO CAMBODIA
The U.S. decision, announced on 24 February, to begin an emergency
airlift of food from Saigon to encircled Phnom Penh prompted
protests on the 26th from both the PRG and the DRV in the authori-
tative form of foreign ministry statements. Presumably the
protests were issued at this high level because these new U.S.
flights are from Vietnam. Earlier, on 19 February, the DRV and
PRG had issued less authoritative foreign ministry spokesman's
statements assailing the U.S airlift of supplies from Thailand.
The DRV Forc.'.gn Ministry statement claimed that the Saigon-Phnom
Penh airlift is transporting weapons, munitions and fuel as well
as food, and it charged that the Ford administration's a'..m is
"to help the puppet Lon Nol clique intensify the war and massacre
the Cambodian people." The PRG statement was less specific in
describing the airlift, but both it and the DRV statement e l1Ed
the U.S. action a new violation of the Paris agreement. Both
statements also sharply castigated President Thieu as well as t),.e
United States. The PRG "sternly warned" that Americans and "the
bellicose Nguyen Van Thieu clique" that the airlift was "an act
of war" against the Cambodian people and a "brazcu violation of
'Vietnam's sovereignty." The DRV statement for -.ts part charged
that the "Nguyen Van Thieu clique's" agreement to the airlift
constituted "an extremely grave. act of aggression against Cambodia."
The foreign ministry spokesmen's statements on th19th had voiced
no similar criticism of the Thai Government. Thus, the DRV spokes-
man merely called on Bangkok to "stop lending a hand to the United
States in its aggression" in Indochina.
DRV PARTY HISTORY CONTAINS ATYPICAL HARVEST STATISTICS
In a departure from years-long practice of avoiding precise figures
for its annual harvests, Hanoi has boasted of an astonishing
5.6 million metric tons in food production for 1971--the year of
floods which had been described as the worst in nearly 100 years.
The claim appears in the new lengthy history of the Vietnam
Workers Party, issued to mark the party's 45th anniversary on
3 February and broadcast by Hanoi radio in 19 installments. The
history indicated that the figure of 5.6 million tons actually
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represented an equivalent tonnage of paddy--unhush:ed, unmilled
rice--and that, of this total amount, "nearly 5 million tons" was
paddy itself, with other grains and vegetables accounting for
the remaining portion.
Earlier DRV media discussion of the 1971 crop had typically failed
to provide annual figures and had given the impression that the
crop fell considerably short because of the extremely serious
floods during the growing season for tenth-month rice. As
recently as last August First Secretary Le Duan, in his report
delivered to an agricultural conference, recalled that "in 1971
and 1973 alone, natural calamities caused the loss of more than
1.5 million tons of paddy . . . ."
In the early 1960's Hanoi media regularly publicized figures for
annual agricultural production; however, the new figure for 1971
is the first annual total known to have been released since
escalatioi of the war in 1965. During the past 10 years the media
have customarily used such generalizations as "higher than normal"
to characterize agricultural progress, and have sometimes cited
percentage increases over other, unspecified production totals for
previous years.
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CONFI1)EN7.'TAL F11IS TRENDS
26 FEBRUARY 1.975
C H I NA
IDEOLOGICAL CAMPAIGN STRESSES DISCIPLINE AND PRODUCTION
China's central and provincial press continue to give dominant
attention to the study campaign on proletarian dictatorship, a
drive reflecting Peking's need for controlled, orderly economic
development to meet the ambitious goals set by Chou En-lai in
his report to the Fourth National People's Congress in January.
The campaign was launched early in February by a PEOPLE'S DAILY
editorial citing a new Mao Tse-tung instruction.* .n example
of the concentration on this campaign was the 22 February
PEOPLE'S DAILY, which devoted three and a half pages--nearly
the entire issue--to a list of quotations from Marx, Engels,
and Lenin on the dictatorship of the proletariat. The quotations
evidently were carefully selected and compiled to stress party
discipline and the need for strong central control to insure the
transition to communist economic forms during the interim period
following the fall of capitalism. A PEOPLE'S DAILY-RED FLAG
editor's note accompanying the quotations stated that studying
the theory of proletarian dictatorship should now "draw top
attention" from everyone.
As part of the study campaign, Peking radio and NCNA Nave
carried four articles from a "special column" on the dictatorship
of the proletariat published in the February RED FLAG. On
21 February Peking broadcast excerpts of the last of these RED
FLAG articles, which confirmed authoritatively that the campaign
will be run according to central directive, not mass initiative.
The article noted that Lin Piao had used the slogan "the mass
movement is naturally justified" to negate centralism and split
the party. It called for balancing centralism and democracy,
stating that freedom must be "freedom under guidance." Urging
that a balance be found between democracy and centralism, the
article warned that "without unified revolutionary discipline
and forceful but proper executiv.. orders, revolutionary order
cannot be maintained" and "the masses cannot engage in effective
production and in orderly study and living."
* The editorial and related articles are discussed in the TRENDS
Supplement "China on Need for Proletarian Dictatorship in Socialist
Stage," 14 February 1975.
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FB:CS TREI'TI)S
26 FEBRUARY 1975
PROVINCIAL RESPONSE Provincial radios have responded to the
centrally :initiated campaign with it flurry
of reports on local meetings to discuss the need for strengthening
"dictatorship" and ending various remnant capitalist practices.
Nanchang radio on 24 February broadcast an unusually comprehensive
report on a local rally of 13,000 people whic!t concluded that "it
is necessary to strike hard at the corrupt officials, embezzlers,
speculators, and leaders of criminal gangs." Kiangsi.'s first
secretary, Chiang Wei-ching, spoke at the rally, noting that
Mao's recent instruction on proletarian dictatorship "should draw
the top attention" of all party -.embers within the province.
Chiang cL?Tunissioned local party leaders to organize "small but
competent teams" to go to factories, rural villages, stores and
schools and "see to it that the party's principles and policies are
adhered to and that the task of consolidating the dictatorship
of the prolet?riat is fulfilled." Endorsing moderate methods to
overcome remaining problems, Chiang tasked the tearis with "putting
facts on the table and reasoning things out." Chiang instructed
the teams to deal "steady, accurate, and hard blows at the handful
of class enemies, with the emphasis on accuracy," to suppress
"class enemies who resist the socialist system and sabotage the
socialist economy." Spelling out the need for strengthening
party authority, Chiang called upon officials to "strengthen
security work" and "guard against trends to undermine the unity
of the party."
The relationship between the new study campaign and meeting
production goals was highlighted by several provincial reports cn
spring farming tasks. A 24 February Wuhan report on a recent
provincial conference on spring farming suggested that mass
energies generated by the campaign will eventually be turned
toward production objectives. The broadcast stressed the need
to study I'_ao's instruction on dictatorship of the proletariat
and "deal accurate blows at the sabotage activities of a small
handful of the class enemy. . . and make a success of spring
farming." The report urged local party leaders to "protect the
masses' activism" and to "seriously arrange the masses' daily life,
since spring farming is a very busy time :nd production is tense."
A 21 February Foochow report on provinica! efforts to study Mao's
recent instruction lauded a local county party committee for
resolving to carry out study plans "before spring farming begins
in the county," indicating that study meetings may be curtailed
during the busy planting period.
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CONFIDENTIAL F13IS TRENDS
26 FEBRUARY 1975
NOTES
CHOU RECEIVES SIHANOUK: On 24 February NCNA reported that PRC
Premier: Chou En-last had received Prince Norodom Sihanouk in the
hospital that evening. Sihanouk had returned on 15 February
from his annual visit to Hanoi for the 'let holiday. On Sihanouk's
Tet visits in 1971, 1.972, and 1973, Chou saw Sihanouk off at the
Peking airport and greeted him on those occasions when he
returned directly to Peking; last year Sihanouk departed from
and returned to Canton. Since Chou became ill in the late spring
of 1974 there had been no reports of meetings between the two
leaders, other than Sihanouk'-- appearance at the PRC National Day
banquet reception on 30 September 1974 hosted by Chou. The reedit
Chou-Sihanouk meeting is the first publicized private meeting
between the two since August 1971.
EUROPEAN CP CONFERENCE PREPARATIONS: A Zholkver commentary broad-
cast by Moscow on 21 February indicated that the previously
announced timetable for the planned European communist party
conference was still in effect. The commentary, which said that
the all-European CP gathering "is to take place in the first half
of this year," was pegged to a 17-19 February East; Berlin
preparatory session of a "working group" of the editorial commission.
Moscow's concern to preserve an aura of democratic procedure and open
debate w.1s reflected in the fact that the 16 parties reported by TA SS
as participating in the working group session included seven independ-
ently oriented CP's--those of Romania, Yugoslavia, Britain, France,
Italy, Spain, and Sweden. TASS added that the working group meeting
was marked by "a detailed and constructive exchange of views" on the
conference documents and on the next stage of preparations.
YUGOSLAV DISSIDENT ORGAN: PRAXIS, the anti-regime journal for
Yugoslavia's disaffected Marxist intellectuals, has ceased
publication. The closing, according to TANJUG on the 20th, was
announced by a Croatian party official who stressed that the
editorial board--rather than the state--had made the decision to
shut down the 11-year-old bimonthly journal of the Croatian
Philosophy Society. He did, however, acknowledge that the editors
had been under increasing pressure to reorient their. "anarcho-
ultraleftist" perspective. PRAXIS, which had appeared only twice
during the past year, reported in its latest issue that the state
had cut off its subsidy. Western media have also reported that
pressure was applied on publishing houses not to handle the
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL IBIS TRENDS
26 FEBRUARY 1975
journal; in a speech against PRAXIS last December, Croatian party
leader Dragosavac had warned of such pressure. The announcement
on the closing reiterated longstanding regime charges that the
journal had attacked Yugoslavia's "self-managing socialism" and
had denied the basic role of the working class and the vanguard
role of the party. Tito himself revived earlier party complaints
against the journal's links with circles in the West. Speaking
at a party meeting on ideology on the 25th, he criticized foreign
ties "with some people abroad" and the "growing hue and cry" by
foreign media regarding PRAXIS, the 28 January ouster of eight
Marxist professors at Belgrade University, and the regime's
prosecution of writer Mihajlo Mihajlov, who went on trial on the
25th on charges of publishing several anti-Yugosla-, ,- articles.
Tito brushed aside such criticism as failing to recognize the
"right" of the party "to put out of action" those who stand in the
way of party policy.
SOVIET ANTI-CHILEAN COMMENT: Moscow media have publicized two
recent anti-Chilean events in continuing the steady stream of
Soviet denunciations of Chile's military government. Expressing
support for imprisoned Chilean "communists and patriots," Moscow
again assailed the Chilean Government in the course of comment and
reportage on a 12 February WFTU-sponsored "international day of
solidarity with workers and people of Chile" and an 18-21 February
meeting in Mexico City of an "international commission to investigate
the crimes of the military junta." IZVESTIYA noted on the 13th that
the 12 February demonstrations proved the "growth of solidarity
throughout the world" in support of the Chilean people who were
suffering "under the heel of the fascist junta," and added that the
"voice of the Soviet pe.iple" would continue to be heard on behalf of
"Chilean patriots." Reporting the meeting in Mexico, TASS on
22 February said that the commission had condemned the "mass murder
of helpless people" which had been "unleashed" in Chile and had
urged all governments to break diplomatic ties with the military
regime. TASS also noted that the commission had "stigmatized" the
United States for involvement in Chilean matters and had written
President Ford expressing concern about the attempts of "certain
American circles" to justify "the interference of the CIA in the
internal affairs of Chile."
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FBIS TRENDS
26 FEBRUARY 1975
- i -
APPENDIX
MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 17 - 23 FEBRUARY 1975
Moscow (2577 items)
Peking (999 items)
British Prime Minister (8%) '.5%
FRELIMO President Machel
(--)
11%
Wilson in USSR
in PRC
[Joint Statement (--) 2%]
World Tattle Tennis
(8%)
5%
Soviet Armed Forces Day (--) 9%
Games, Calcutta
[Grechko Order of (--) 3%]
USSR
(2%)
4%
the Day
Laos Peace Accord
(?-)
3%
China (4%) 7%
Upcoming V-E Day 30th (10%) 6%
Second Anniv:'rsary
Developing Countries
(--)
3%
Anniversary
Czechoslovak Foreign (--) 3%
Ministerial Conference,
Algiers
Minister Chnoupek
NCNA on U.S.-Soviet
(--)
3%
in USSR
Mideast Policies
These statistics are based on the voicecast cnm.nentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" Is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses Indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior Issues;
In other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor ^+gnificance.
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