TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170006-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 18, 1999
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: February 5, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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TRENDS
In Communist Propaganda
confidential
5 FEBRUARY 1975
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'I'liis propa}Canila analysis report is based exclusively un urrtcrial
carried in foreign bruaclrlst ;acct press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordination with other U.ti, (;uvernment
components.
Classified by 000073
Subject to Gerte~al Declassification Schedule
of E.O. 11652, Automatically Declossified
Two Yoars From Date of Issuo
National Security Information
Unauthorized disclosure subject ro
criminal sanctions
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5 FEB12UA12Y 1975
CONTENTS
USSR, Syria Set Geneva Deadline, Egypt Fails to Endorse.
1
USSR-Rgypt Statement, Ambiguous on Brezhnev-Sadat "Fxchange".
3
Gromyko Refers to Palestinian "State," Meets PLO L'e.ader.
6
USSR-PORTUGAL
Moscow Cites Lisbon Denial That USSR Sought Port Facilities
8
VIETNAM
DRV First Secretary Le Duan Speaks on 45th Party Anniversary
9
Peking Ignores DRV Diplomatic Relations Anniversary.
12
MEXICO
Moscow, Havana Blame "Rightists" for CP Member`s Death
14
NOTES
U.S.-Soviet Relations; Moscow on Portuguese Developments
16
Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics. ~ .
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CONFIDEN'PIAL FBIS 'i'RENllS
5 FEBRUARY 1975
G ROMP KO f?9 I DEAST V I S I T
Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko's current visits to Damascus artd
Cairo clearly seem to reflect Moscow's continuing cor-r,ern to
assure thac the United States does not play the sole dtplomar:rc
role in efforts toward an Arab-Israeli settlement. Tt -!s noY:~t-
worthy that Gromyko's trip to Cairo was r-ot announced by TAS;.~
until 26 January (the Damascus visit was announced on the 29';h),
after Israeli Foreign Minister A_lon's l7 January announceme:~t
in Washington that Secretary Kissinger would be poying anot!:er
visit to the area. This follows the pattern last year, whc~~i.
Gromyko made visits to Cairo and Damascus in late February~rarly
March and to Damascus twice in May during the Secretary's rli.sengage-
ment talks in the area.~ti The omission of Baghdad--the third capital
on Brezhnev's postponed Mideast tour--from Gromyko's itinf:ra2.y
further underscores the fact that the visit was connecter.4 with
the Arab-Israeli iss~ie.
Gromyko's Damascus visit was notable for the first speciricat:ion--
frota either Moscow or Damascus--of a deadline for the resumption of
the Geneva conference no later than the end of February or beginning
of March. Cairo failed to support this deadline, the point Soviet-
Egyptian statement calling only for "immediate resumption" of the
talks. Egypt did renew its March 1974 endorsement of Soviet partici-
pation in all aspects and stages of a Mideast settlement including
in "~11 working committees" of the Geneva conference,
Gromyko'S Cairo talks apparently did not resolve bilateral issues;
the point statement ambiguously noted the importance of an unspecified
"exchange of views" between as-Sadat and Brezhnev on "most important
aspects" of bilatera?. relations. While Cairo media reported President
as-Sadat and Gromyko as saying that Brezhnev's Mideast trip would be
rescheduled, no confirmation of this has been received from Soviet
media thus far.
USSR, SYRIA SET GENEVA DEADLINE, EGYPT FAILS TO ENDORSE
Moscow has been pressing in recent weeks for a return to the Geneva
conference, at the same time sniping at U.S. diplomatic efforts to
bring about new "phased agreements" between Israel and Arab states.
* Gromyko visited Damascus last year on a split tr::p on 27 Febr.uary-
1 March and 5-7 March, interrupted by talks in Cairo 1-5 March, while
Secretary Kissinger was also in the region. He paid two more visits
to Damascus in May, also meeting Secretary Kissinger in Cyprus on
7 May and in Damascus on 25 May.
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CONFIllIsN'1'IAL IBIS TRL'NI)S
5 FEBRUARY 1975
Now, in tl~e 3 February Soviet-Syrian statement on Gromyko's
Damascus talks, both sides have gone on record for the first
time in setting a time frame for reconvening the Geneva conference,
urging that it be resumed "immediately, in any case not later than
February-begirming of March," For its part, Damascus had
previously joined with Moscow in a 27 September 1974 statement--
issued after a two-day visit by 1'r.esident al-Asad to Moscow while
en roue to North Korea--stressing the "necessity of resuming the
Geneva Mideast peace conference at the earliest date." An earlier
series of joint Soviet-Syrian conununiques, issued during Gromyko's
three visits to Damascus last spring, had omitted any mention of
tli'~' Geneva conference, reflecting Syria's reluctance at that time
to commit itself to attendance at the conference.
GROMYKO S'iATEMENTS Both in his Cairo arrival remarks and in his
Cairo banquet speech ran the 3d Gromyko urged
resumption of the Geneva talks at the earliest late. He called it
necess:~.ry for "all who can make a contribution" to settlement of the
problem to sit at a conference table, and, in what appeared to be
a swipe at Secretary Kissinger's negotiating efforts, he added that
"considerat?ons of sheer prestige and the more so vanity should be
brushed aside." He professed .*.o be pleased to see that "on this
question, just as on many others," tine Egyptian and Soviet views
coincide, "if we see Egypt's position corr.ectly." The MENA version
of Gromyko's statement omitted Gromyko's understanding of a
coincidence of views--the only MENA variation from the TA5S account
of the speech.
SOVIET-EGYPTIAN STATEPIENT Cairo declined to endorse the Soviet-
Syrian deadline for resumption of the
Geneva talks. The joint statement instead advocated "immediate"
resumption, in line with the calls for "early" or "earliest"
resumption in the December and October 1974 statements on Fahmi's
Moscow visits. As in the December communique, the sides expressed
the view that the Geneva conference was the most suitable forum
for discussing all aspects of a Mideast settlement. The Eg}?ptian
side reaffirmed its view on "importance and necessity" of Soviet
participation in all stages of. a Mideast settlement, including
participation in all working organs which might be set up at the
Geneva conference. An identical statement in the 5 Marcli 1974
communique on Gromyko's last visit to Egypt had been attributed to
both sides.
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5 F~BrunRx 1975
SADAT REMARKS As-Sadat has frequently expressed his acceptance
of both the Soviet call for resuming the Ceneva
talks and the U.S. "advocacy of a step-by-step solution," remaining
evasive on the date when "we will all go to Geneva." Speaking to
journalists on 4 February after leis meeting with Gromyko, he
again balanced his remarlcs. He said he was loolcing forward to
Brezhnev's visit and then, responda.ng to a question, eaid ho
welcomed Dr. Kissinger's visi~:, adding that "we maintain the
best of relations with the two big powers," and are always ready
to hold discussions with them. He said he had discussed the
Mideast problem frankly "with my friend Gromyko," and remarkad
that "the international momentum is slow and speed is a must."
iie disagreed with the term "partial steps" since, he said, it
was interpreted as if Egypt were preparing to conclude a partial
agreement with Israel, when it was "urgent" that Israel t~ithdr4~a
on all three fronts. In support of the Geneva talks, as-Sadat
recalled that "I was the first to call for convening the Geneva
conference," and added everything concerning peace would be agreed
on there.
As-Sadat has mentioned no specific date for resumption of the
Geneva *_alks, but in a 2 February meeting with Egyptian journalists
and information officials, he indicated that he regarded the
expiration of the UN Disengagement Observer Force mandate on
the Golan Front at the end of i~iay as the critical period. "Unless
the situation changes before this date," he said, the situation
might become "explosive," and he called on the United States--"the
one which can influence Israel"--to "make a quick decision in
this connection."
USSR-EGYPT S?AT6MENT AMBIGUOUS ON BRE7J-INEV-SADAT "EXCHANGE~~
The joint statement on Gromyko's 3-5 February visit to Cairo, taken
with as-Sadat's rer.~arks on matters to be discussed during Brezhnev's
"coming" visit to Cairo, seem to suggest that problems in bilateral
relations remain. Ho~;aever, the statement did not specify a meeting
between the two. It ;seemed deliberately ambiguous in saying that
as-Sadat and Gromyko, in discussing bilateral relations, "stressed
the great importance of the exchange of opinions" between Brezhnev
and as-Sadat "on the most important questions of these relations."
The statement thus left it unclear whether such an exchange had
already occurred or was still pending. Soviet media thus far have
not mentioned, much less conf firmed, than. Brezhnev's Middle East
visit is to be rescheduled; statements by as-Sadat and Gromyko to
the effect were reported by Cairo media.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBI5 TRENllS
5 FEBP.L'A1;Y 1975
lioscow has provided virtually nothing_in the way oL- upbeat
coverage of Gromyko's Cairo visit, the first in almost a year,
other than Y.o note that in the final. Fahmi-Gromyko talks on the
4th the foreign ministers expressed "complete satisfaction"
with the "exchange of views" on bilateral relations and lcey
issues of the Piideast situation. T~:SS' brief report on Gromylco's
four-hour meeting with as-Sadat on the 4tlt said the conversation
took place in a "businessl.ilce and friendly" atmosphere--the
same characterization used in the joint statement--and the two
"thoroughly discussed the state" of bilateral relations. In
contrast, TASS' 2 February account of Gromylco's "warm and
friendly" conversation with Syrian President al-Asad had said
they expressed "satisfaction" with the progress of Soviet-Syrian
relations. TASS said Gromyko and as-Sadat "exchanged opinions"
on the complex and tense Mideast situation; in Damascus, Gromyko
and al-Asad gave "much consideration" to this issue, and al_-Asad
expressed appreciation for the role of the USSR "which renders
all-round assistance" to the Arabs.
SADAT, GROMYKO REMARKS TASS gave no indication that as-Sadat
ON BREZHNEV VISIT and Gromyko had met with journalists
after their talk; Cairo radio and ;iENA
reports cited as-Sadat as telling reporters that political, economic
and military subjects had been surveyed and "I believe tae are
starting a ne~?~ page" in Soviet-Egyptian relations on a "realistic"
basis. Foreshadowing the phrase in the joint statement on a
summit-level exchange of opinions, as-Sadat said that di~cu~sion
of "certain topics" had been completed "after reaching an under-
standing and a decision" on them and "other topics" would be
discussed "during Brezhnev's coming visit to Cairo." Gror..yko
affirmed, according to the P4ENA account, that Brezhnev's visit
"would take place shortly," but said the date would be set later.
Asked whether Brezhnev's Cairo visit would precede or follow hip
visit to the United ~tates, Gromyko said that had not been decided:
"Brezhnev's visit to the United States is scheduled, and its date
will be fixed later."
The Cairo radio report cited Gromyko as calling the talks "extremely
useful and constructive." He also mentioned discussion of bilateral
cooperation "particularly in the political and economic spheres, and
military cooperation between the two countries"--seemingly relegating
the military aspect to second place. The joint statement on the visit,
as reported by Moscow's domestic service on the 5th, did not specify
military subjects in noting that questions concerning further
development of relations in the "political, trade, economic, and other
fields" were discussed.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENllS
i FEBRUARY 1975
FAHMI-GROMYKO TALKS Prior to Gromylco's meeting with as-Sadat,
remarks by Gromylco and Foreign Minister
Fahmi had indicated that their talks had not ironed out Sovi.et-
Egyptian differences. PI~NA reported Gromyko as saying, at the
end of the first session of talics on the 3d, that they were held
in a "constructive" atmosphere (TABS described them as "warm
and :Friendly") and dealt with "one topic--a review of certain
problems" in Soviet-Egyptian relations, with attention centered
on the 1`lideast situation "within this framework." Gr~~mylco added
that one meeting was not- enough to deal in depth with "practical
matters concerning what steps can be taken or discussed."
In his banquet speech on the 3d Gromyxo in effect acknowledged
Soviet-Egyptian differences, observing that "any setbacks,
blemishes in our relations" pleased those who from the beginning
did not want friendly Soviet-Egyptian relations to develop. He
asserted that the two countries "must be guided by their own
interests," which he termed inseparable from the broader interests
of the struggle for toor.ld peace.
In reporting Foreign ??inister Fahmi's banquet speech, TABS
pointedly deleted his reference to Arab military strength, citing
him as saying that the Axab countries had to "strengthen their
forces in all fields''---Fahmi here added "and particularly to
double their defensive capacity"--to be able to deter aggression.
TABS did report Fahmi as saying that Egypt wanted the USSR to
have an effective role in supporting the Arab cause, but omitted
his statement that in talics in Moscow, including the 26 llecember
meeting with Brezhnev, "I was careful tv underline this point."
Nor did TASS include Fahmi's statement that as-Sadat, in defining
the basis of Egyptian policy, had said that Cairo was "quite
prepared to establish the best relations with the Soviet Union."
SOVIET-EGYPTIAN TREATY Perhaps in an implicit rejoinder to
recent remarks by President as-Sadat
about the 1971 Soviet-Egyptian treaty, Gromyko mentioned the
treaty both in his arrival remarks, ~.s reported by PRAVDA on
the 14th, and in his Cairo banquet speech, when he termed it
of "special significance" since the "high level" of Soviet-
Egyptian relations depended on it. TASS' report on the
as-Sadat/Gromylco meeting also noted that the sides had resolved
to "widen and deepen" their bilateral relatiions on the basis
of the treaty. A reference to the treaty in this same context
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CONFIllENTIAL FBIS TRL'LJDS
5 FEBRUARY 1975
also appeared in the point statement- on the visit as carried
by Cairo media. While I?ioscow versions of the statement available
thus far made no mention of the treaty, it presumably will appear
in the text when published i.n PRAWA, fudging by similar Soviet
media treatment of the same passage in the "announcement" on
Fahmi's meeting with Brezhnev last October.
In recent irit~rviews, as-Sadat has suggested some doubts about
the effectiveness of the treaty. He was reported as saying in
a 12 January ROSE AL-YUSUF interview that he expelled the Soviet
experts in 1972 because the USSR had not L-ulfilled its obligation
under Article 8 of the treaty, which refers to strengthening
Egypt's "defense capacity." iJhen he was asked in his 20 January
LE I~10NDE interview if he would denounce the treaty if Moscow
did not deliver requested arms, as-Sadat said he "cannot rule
out such a possibility, but it is very difficult to take a
decision which would run counter to Egypt's interests and those
of the Arab eTOrld generally." He would have to "reflect a
great deal before taking such a decisive step," he said, adding
that no other power was in a position to replace the USSR :in
this sphere but that "nevertheless, my patience has limits."
Asked again, in a French TV interview reported by I?fENA on
27 January, whether he had lost the "strategic reserve" represented
by the treaty, as-Sadat replied that this had not happened "yet,"
and said the treaty was "still effective and absolutely no change
occurred in this regard."
GROMYKO REFERS TO PALESTINIAN ~~STATE," MEETS PLO LEADEF~
Previous Soviet leadership usage of various formulations acknow-
ledging Soviet support for some forn- of Palestinian "statehood"
(gosudarstvennost') since September 1974 suggests that little
special importance should be attached to Gromyko's reference to
a Palestinian "state" (gosudarstvo) in his dinner speech at
Damascus, reported by PRAVDA on the 3d. Gromyko made the first
known reference by a top Soviet official to "state" in affirming
Moscow's support of legitimate Palestinian rights, "in keeping
with their national aspirations right up ~o the establishment of
a state of their own." However, Podgornyy, in an 8 September 1974
speech, had made the first Soviet elite reference to some form of
Palestinian "statehood," and Moscow since then has used, inter-
changeably, a variety of formulations that reveal no particular
pattern.
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5 FEI3RUARY 1975
Tt seems doubtf:u.1 Moscow assigns much significance to or draws
any distinction among the various formulations, having once gone
on record in support of some sort of Palestinian entity. Brezhnev
followed up Pod~ornyy by stating in an 11 October speech that i t
was necessary to satisfy the 1'alestini ans' right to their own
"national home" (ochag). Since then, Soviet comment has used
statehood and national home, separately or together, and has
also used such expressions as "nationa 1 entity" and "national
authority," while some TASS English reports have cited Egyptian
officials and Palestinian leaders on the question of a Palestinian
"state."
As an exampla of Moscow's inconsistency or this matter, TASS'
4 February report on Gromylco's Cairo dinner speech cited him
as referring to the Palestinians' right to statehood; a Pioscow
Arabic-language report on the same speech said Gromyko had
expressed Soviet support for the Palestinians' right to establish
their "national authority" (as-sultah al-wataniyah). Still
another variation appeared in the Soviet-Egyptian s~atement,
which referred to Palestinian national rights including their
right to self-determination and "their own national home."
Curiously, the Soviet-Syrian statement made no mention of any
Palestinian entity, merely advocating assurance of Palestinian
"national rights."
GROMYKO-'ARAFP,T MEETING Gromyko again met with Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO)
chairman 'Arafat ~~hile in llamascu~, as he had during his trips
to the area last year. A Moscow domes tic service report on the
"warm and friendly" talk on 2 February said particular attention
was devoted to the problem of safeguarding the Palestinians'
legitimate national rights and their rights to self-determination
and statehood. The report indicated that one topic of discussion
was the question of PLO participation in the Geneva peace
conference, Gromyko calling for attendance of "a PLO representative"
with "the full rights of a delegation." No mention was made of
'Arafat's position. The final statements on Gromyko's visits
in both pamascus and Cairo called for PLO representation at
Geneva. Suggestive of PLO footdragging on this issue, an P.rabic -
language commentary broadcast by Moscow on the 4th asserted tha t
"Geneva alone will provide the PLO the opportunity to participate
in efforts to achieve a Mideast settlement," warning that Israe 1
"aims to exclude the PLO" from these efforts.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRT;NAS
5 FEBRUAI?Y 1975
USSR-PORTUGAL
MOSCOW CITES LISBON DENIAL THAT USSR SOUGHT PORT FACILITIES
Moscow media have reported the Portuguese Foreign Ministry's denial
that the USSR had asked Portugal to provide port facilities for the
Soviet fishing fleet. But the wording of the Ivloscow media report:;
and differences between Moscow Radio and TASS accou^ts hsve left
some confusion as to whether the issue in contention is the use
of port facilities or a more permanent establishment of "bases"
for the Soviet fishing fleet.
I~ioscow Radio on 2 February briefly reported the Portuguese Foreign
Ministry's denial that the USSR had asked permission for its
fishing fleet "to call at Portuguese ports." Coming two days after
initial Western press agency reports of such a Soviet request, the
terse, two-sentence Moscow Radio item avoided any attribution to
the Soviet government while noting that the Portuguese Foreign
Ministry had described the reports as "totally unfounded."
Moscow Radio's account of the Portuguese Foreign Ministry denial
was carried in several of :its African and European broadcasts at
midday and on the evening of the 2d. TASS did not carry the
Portuguese denial until the 4th, when its English service trans-
mitted essentially the same report, although the TASS account
stated that "allegations" by the Western news agencies suggested
the USSR was asking for "bases" for its fishing boats.
Moscow refrained from commenting directly on Western press
s pe;.ulation concerning the alleged Soviet request until the 4th,
when TASS com'nentator V. Goncharov ridiculed the New York TIMES
:~isbon correspondent for reaching the "wise" conclusion that
there exists a "Soviet threat" to the NATO states. While citing
the Portuguese Foreign Ministry's denial that t'he USSR had requested
"bases for its fishing vessels," Goncharov pointed out that it was
normal practice for Soviet fishing boats to use "the services of
many foreign ports" to replenish fresh water and food supplies and
sometimes make repairs." Arguing that this is a "generally
accepted practice of long st~.nding," Goncharov maintained that
it has "never occurred to anyone to make a sensation out cif this."
Iie concluded that in light of the Fortuguese denial, the "provocative
campaign" by the "American" media has "failed miserably."
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S FEBRUARY 1975
VIETP~Af~I
DRV FIRST' SECRETARY LE DUAN SPEAKS ON 45TH PARTY ANNIVERSARY
The 45th anniversary of the Vietnam Workers Party (VWP) on 3 February
was marked in standard fashion by a Hanoi meeting at which First
Secretary Le Duan delivered the main address. The first secretary's
address was most notable for its detailed recounting of the
importance of political struggle in the Vietnamese revolution. In
outlining conditions for a settlement in South. Vietnam, he called
for a new Saigon regime, but stopped short of recent PRG and
authoritative Hanoi pronouncements demanding the overthrow of
President Thieu. In discussing party tasks for the coming year,
the first secretary maintained Hanoi's silence on the party's long-
delayed fourth party congress, suggesting that North Vietnam is
stj.ll not prepared to set a date for the national party gath~?ring,~'
The party anniversary is the first of the DRV's long-heralded
"three major anniversaries" to be celebrated in 1975, and will be
followed by the 85th anniversary of Ho Chi M~.nh's birth, on 19 May,
~Znd the 30th anniversary of the founding of the DRV, on 2 September.
F.s in the case of previous quinquennial anniversaries, the party
landmark was observed with emulation campaigns, editorial comment,
and the publication of a revised party history. Le Duan had also
addressed the 40th anniversary meeting in 1970, and 10 days later
North Vietnamese media publicized a major article by the first
secretary marking the anniversary, describing the work as a "very
important and very basic documen~."
The traditional Hanoi meeting prompted the turnout of the entire
North Vietnamese Politburo, with the usual exception of Pham Hung
who has not been reported by the media to ha~~e been in North Vietnam
since 1967. The Politburo similarly appeared in full force at the
1970 anniversary meeting, except for Le Duc Tho ?~aho was in Paris fo r
a French Communist Party congress. Politburo member Truong Chinh
gave the brief opening and dosing remarks at this year's meeting--
a task assumed five years ago by DRV President Ton Duc Thang, who,
this year, was merely listed in the presidium of the meeting.
* The Third VWP congress in September 1960 was preceded by more
than a year of reports of provincial preparations and other
publicity.
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CONFII)LN'1'lAL F]ilS 'i'RI:Nll5
5 FLI3RUARY 1975
LE UUAN SPEECH Keeping to the general outline of his anniversary
speech ir. 1970, Le lluan devoted the greater part
of 1-is remarks to summarizing the "revolutionary" achievements in
Vietnam since the inception of the party in .1930. In this context,
he dwelt upon the tactics of political struggle and the historical
lessons to be drawn from their use in the 1945 August Revolution,
While Le Duan did nit directly link these tactics of the past to the
present-day situation in the South, his implication is clear that
they would be. equally effective now and should be used g9ven tY~e
proper opportunity. Le Duan noted that the VW1' had always employed
violence to obtain its revolutionary goals, but pointed out that
this did not imply that only armed struggle was invo)ved.
According to Le Duan, the party "from the outset attached paramount
importance to political struggles, to building a 'mass
political army' of the revolution ." Terming the August
Revolution "a general insurrection ingeniously combining political
struggle with armed struggle," he argued that its development in
Hanoi, llue, aiad Saigon was the consequence, n:~t only of armed
struggle in the countryside, but the result of hav~.ng thrown "all
of the political and armed forces into do-or-die at*_acks on the
nerve centers of the enemy trl the cities and t~~~~ns." i~ithout
utilizing these tactics, Le Duan claimed that a "unique opportunity"
would have been lost.
It is unclear whether Le Duan's historical discussion reflects his
current views on strategy in South Vietnam, but it is notable that
an historical passage in his 1970 party anniversary speech see?._a,
in retrospect, to have been related to his views on the strategy
to be pursued then, In the 1970 speech he gave unusual attention
to the party's "flexible" tactics in dealing w?.th Nationalist
Chinese and French forces in 1946--involving temporary "reconcilia-
tion" with first one and then tlic other to gain time to prepare for
the resistance war. His historical allusion then--three years
before the Paris peace agreement--could well have reflected his
s?ipport for Hanoi's policy of seeking an agreement short of the
final communist goals, in order to remove U..ri. forces and gain a
respite in the struggle in South Vietnam.
Le Duan's discussion of the situation in `'mouth Vietnam, in his
current speech, did not include the strident demands that have
become standard since the 8 October 1974 PRG statement. The 1:'RG
statement--focusing on. the reec? to overthrow Thieu "and his gazlg"
before there can be negotiations for d settlement--has been recalled
in recent authoritative DRV comment, including that ~n til:' anniversary
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CON1~ iULN'1'IAL 1~IlIS 'I'RLNll.3
5 I~LIIRUAI~Y 1975
of the Marta peace agreement. While nt one point lauding the
Souci'~ Vietnamese urban struggle to overthrow the "clique of
laclcnvs," Le Duan's remarks on a settlement seemed ~.o be
couched in deliberately moderate tones when he said:
A ::omplete end to TJ. S. involvement and inter-
ference, and the formation in Saigoi: of a
new administration standing for peace and
nat:Lonal ccnicord and scrupulously applying
the PariA agreement, consttrute at present
important conditions for reaching a settle-
menL? of the South Vietnam issue.
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CONI?IDLN'PIAL Fll'LS TRENDS
5 FLI3RUARY 1975
PEIti The fact that NCNA did not carry Chiao Kuan-hug's message is not:
unusual. Peking over the past year has given such PRC leader's
messages limited publicity, us ual_.y restricting coverage to broad-
casts beamed to a particular country.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
5 FEBRUARY 1975
of the establishment of PRC relations with other close socialist
allies the DPRK and Romania. Last October NINA similarly
reported celebrations that month cn the 25th anniversaries of
PRC-DPRK relations and of PRC-Romanian relations. NCNA reported
receptions hosted by the DPRK and the Romanian ambaESadora in
Peking, and by Chinese ambassadors in the respective capitals and
it highlighted remarks testifying to close unity and friendly
relations.
PEKING ON VWP The Central Committee message and the PEOPLE'S
ANNIVERSARY DAILY editorial on the 3 February VWP anniver-
sary reaffirmed the usual testimonials to
Sine-Vietnamese solidarity. Sine-Vietnamese friendship was sai:
to be based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian
in L-ernationalism and able to stand any teat; the founding role of
Ho Chi Minh and Mao Tse-tung in establishing Sino-Vietnamese
ties was duly noted; and Peking promised continued resolute support
for their allies' struggle.
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CONFIDENTIAL FIIIS TRENDS
5 FL']iRUARY 1975
MEXICO
1~10SCGW, HAVANA Bl~4ME "RIrHTISTS" FOR CP MEI~ER ~S DEATH
Soviet and Cuban media have protested the death--announced on
5 January--of long-time Mexican Communist Party (PCM) member
llilarl.o Moreno while in Mexican police custody and the incarcer-
ation of other PCM members. Moscow and llavana have shown caution
in treating the Mexican incident and have followed the lead of
the PCM in blaming Moreno's death on "rightist forces" said
to have infiltrated the police, rather than on the government
of President Luis Echeverria, whom Fidel Castro recently
described as the "Mexican president who has been most friendly
with Cuba" since the success of Castro's revolu *_ion in 1959.
The Soviet and Cuban reactions in the Mexican case contrast
sharply with their wholesale condemnation of the Guatemalan
Government following the recent death of Guatemalan Communist
Party chief Humberto Alvarado.*
TREATMENT OF lluring the early years after Castro came to
ADMINISTRATION power, relations between Cuba and Mexico,
the only OAS member which never broke diplomatic
ties with the Castro regime, often were formall y correct rather
than o~arm. However, conununist media characterizations of Mexico
have become more flattering since the 1970 inauguration of Luis
Echeverria, whose Third World-style politics and dialogue with
leftists iu his counl-ry have won a considerable measure of
approval from Moscow and llavana. The PCM, a Moscow-line party,
also backs the president's foreign policy, although still
occasionally chastising him for an "antipopular" approach in
maintaining tight control over domestic politics.
In the past few months Echeverria's "firm" posture toward the
United States has been given special attention, PRAVDA noting
on 23 October 1974 that his border meeting with President Ford
demonstrated the iviexican president's determination to "uphold
an independent line." Mexico's increasingly critical attitude
toward the Chilean regime also was praised, and on ::7 November,
Cuban comr,Rentator David Nunez Segura touted Mexico's rupture
of relations with Chile as "an important contribution to moral
uprightness." Mexican support for the lifting of OAS sanctions
* For a discussion of the response to Alvaradu's death, see the
TRENDS of 31 December 1974, pages 23-24.
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENllS
S FEBRUARY 7.975
against Cuba won further accolades from communist officialdom,
and, on 10 Jaz-uary during a visit to Cuba by a Mexica:z delegation
led by Mrs. Echeverria, Castro told reporters that Lcheverria
was Mexico's "most progressive chief of stat~.e" since 1940 and
"the moat friendly toward Cuba "
PCM A potential test of these close relations was
EVENTS by L-he arrest of PCM activists Hilario Moreno andJided
Eusebio Martinez on 29 December last year and the
subsequent announcement by the Mexican police that Moreno had
committed suicide in his cell and that the PGM was implicated
in a plot to subvert central American governments. Further
complicating matters was the later arrest of at leaPh one PCM
leader and oilier leftists in connection with a series of bombings
which leave been 'variously attributed to guerrilla groups and
to rightwing elements in league with the CIA.
In an 18 January PRAVDA article--Moscow's only public response
to the recent events--writer K. Kurin views the incidents as
a "campaign of provocat9on" by reactionaries and imperialists
seeming to "goad the official authorities to anticommunist
aci.ions." Izi phraseology typical of Moscow's treatment of
left--of-center Latin governments, the writer asserted that
Mexico's "secret police" had used the "absurd pretext" of a
suppose-3 plot to strike against the PCM and the "constructive
foreign policy of President Luis Echeverria." Kurin played down
the death of Moreno--noting only that the police had "alleged"
suicide--possibly because the Mexican government had already
appointed "an observer of the presidency" to monitor the
continuing investigation of the death.
P:sNSA LATINA reports, like PRAVDA, have avoided direct criticism
of tl~e Nierican government and have viewed the events as a
"provocatory campaign" of "anticommunist slander" that has
been denounced by the country's leaders. Thus, on 17 January
the Cuban agency reported that Mexico's ruling Institutional
Revolutionary Party had "backed the PCM demand" tha*_ the
police end their "persecution" of communists. Going a step
further than Moscow, Havana quoted Mexican sources who associated
the CIA with the "persecution," noting on the 23d that the
Mexican socialist party had described recent events as "an
escalation started by the CIA to drive the country into a situation
of violence."
CONFIDENTIAL
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CpNFIllENT;[AL FB'L5 T1.i,ENllS
5 FEB1tunltY 1975
NOTES
U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS: Soviet comment in the walce of Mosco~~'s
cancellation of the 1972. U.S.-Soviet trade agreement has included
sporadic hints of retaliatj.on against the "discriminatory" U.S.
trade bill. At the same time, the cormnent has continued to stress
the desirability of U.S.-Soviet detente, and there have also been
references to Brezltnev's scheduled trip to the United States this
year. According to a 1 February Budapest radio report, PR.AVDA's
authoritative political commentator Yuriy Zhukov in a receni.
Moscow TV talk cited Brezhnev's scheduled LT .S. trip as, like the
Vladivostok summit, a significant step in consolidating detente.
And a 25 January PRAVDA report of President Ford's meeting with
a group of yo!~ng Soviet journalists included his statement that
he expected Brezhnev to visit the United States this summer.
Zhu'.cov's Moscow TV talk also reportedly included a remark that
in view of the cancellation of the trade agreement, "the Soviet
Union was not paying, among other things, the Lend-Lease debts
outstanding from World filar II." As has happened occasionally in
the past, Zhukov's talk apparently was not reported by the
Moscow radio or press. His statement on Lend-Lase had been
foreshadowed in an 18 January IZVESTIYA commentary by Bovin,
which had implied that the compromise reached ors this issue in
the 1972 trade agreement was no longer operative. Bovin had
also hinted that the present moment would be propitious for
West Europe to intensify its econpmic cooperation with the
Soviet Union, a hint that was reinfozced in NEW TIMES on the
24th and IZVESTIYA on the 28th, both of which cited American
publications for the conjecture that the U.S. trade bill would
lead the USSR to transfer its orders from *_ile United States to
other ~destern countries. Implied criticis*.i of the trade bill
by President Ford in his 21 January press conference was noted
in several commentaries that buttressed Moscow's demand for a
revision of the bill's objectionably features.
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CONFIll);NTIAL~ FBIS '.L'R)N!)S
5 F);BR.UARX 1975
MOSCOW ON PORTUGUESE DEVELOPMENTS: Moscow has continued its relatively
low-Iceyed and selective reporting of recent events in Portugal at a
time of heightening tension prior to the scheduled constituent assembly
elections. Two constant Moscow themes suggest that "reaction" has
not yet g:?.ven up in its attempts to reverse the gains of the past
nine months and that all "progressive" forces must fight to continue
their unity with the Armed Forces Movement (MTA). Moscow has reported
the increasing difficulties between the Portuguese Communist Party
(PCP) and the Socialist Party (FSP) and has cited PCP statements
on the alleged "movement to the right" by PSP leaders. But Moscow
has not acknowledged the recent strong attacks by Socialist leader
and Foreign Minister Soares linlcing the PCP to the Soviet Union.
Similarly, Soviet media have generally ignored the charges by the
PSP and ethers that the Communist Party has "conspiratorial" plans
to carry out a coup in Portugal. Instead, Moscow has reiterated
PCP leader Cunhal's urgings that the socialists and communists
cooperate and remain united with MFA in order to advance the "demo-
cratization" of Portugal. Thus, typically, TASS on 1 February
reported that the situation in Lisbon was "tranquil" following the
agreement by the PCP and PSP to cancel their planned demonstrations
at the r.?equest of the PEA and the "fiasco" of the attempt by "left
extremists and reactionaries" to cause disturbances in Lisbon. At
the same time, Moscow has issued its usual swipes at NATO for its
"concerns" over the situation in Portugal and Spain, with a TASS
summary of a 4 February PRAVDA article asserting that the current
NATO naval maneuvers reflect the concerns of the NATO "strategiF:.s"
over the outcome of the upcoming elections in Portugal a:~d the
development of the "democratic struggle in Spain."
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FBZS TRI:NUs
5 F>;BRi1ARY 1975
- i -
APPENDIY.
MOSCOW, POKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 27 JANUARY - 2 F>;BP.UARY 197 5
Moscow (2602 items)
l
Peking (847 items
China
(9%)
5%
,
Fourth National
(57 %)
7%
Gromyko in Syria
(--)
4%
People's Congress
Salyut 4 Flight
(2%)
4%
Vietnam
(1/)
?
5/
Tenth Indian CP
(--)
3%
[Paris Peace
(1%)
3%]
Congress
USSR-DRV Diplomatic
(--)
3%
Accord Second
Anniversary
Relations 25th Anni-
Angola Independence
(4 %)
4%
versary
[Chou Greetings
(--)
3%]
Vietnam Paris Peace
(--)
2%
Gambia Foreign Minister
(--)
3%
Accorc: Second Anni-
versary
Nj ie in PRC
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
cnent or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
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