TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170005-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 36
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 18, 1999
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: January 29, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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T`}r~nds in 'Co~mnunist Propaganda 29 Jan 75 ;hJo.4
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Confidential
TRENDS
In Communist Propaganda
Confidential
29 JANUARY 197 5
(VOL. xxv!, NO. 4)
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This propaganda nwi; psis report is based exclusively on material
carried in foreign broadcast and press media. It is published
by FBIS without coordii,ation with other U.S. Government
conipone;its.
Classified by 000073
,ubiect to General Declassification Schedule
of E.O. 11652, Automatically Declorslfled
Two Years From Date of Issue
N .tional Security Information
J,tauthorized disclosure subject to
criminal sanctions
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
29 JANUARY 1975
CONTENTS
DRV Scores Ford Press Conference, Reports of GVN Peace Plan. . . . . . 1
Paris Agreement Anniversary Marked by Hanoi and Its Allies . . . . . . 4
DRV Party Journal Indicates Central Committee Plenum Held. . . . . 8
New Clandestine Radio Beams Insurgents' Line to Phnom Penh . . . . . 9
CPSU Delegation Visits Lao "Liberated Zone". . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
MIDDLE EAST
USSR Hits "Dangerous" U.S. Plans to Use Military Base in Oman. . . . . 11
COMMUNIST RELATIONS
Moscow, Allies Renew Pressure for World Party Conference . . . . . . . 14
PRC INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
China Sees Keen Rivalry in U.S.-Soviet Moves on Trade, Arms. . . . . . 17
USSR
PRAVDA Article Raises Theme of Collective Leadership . . . . . . . . . 20
Collection of Kosygin Speeches Contains Some New Material. . . . . . . 23
Agriculture Ministry Grudgingly Approves Link System . . . . . . . . . 25
YUGOSLAVIA
Belgrade Philosonhy Professors Purged; Criticism Anticipated . . . . . 27
URUGUAY
USSR Welcomes Released CP Leader Arismendi, Criticizes Regime. . . . . 29
NOTE
Sinu-U. S . Relations. . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
APPENDIX
Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
29 JANUARY 1975
INDOCHINA
The anniversary of the 27 January 1973 Paris peace agreement and
President Ford's 21 January press conference remarks on Vietnam
occasion?d an outpouring of Vietnamese communist authoritative
statements and press and radio comment. Both the DRV and the
PRG denounced alleged U.S.-Saigon violations of the peace accord
and set fort;i communist terms for its implementation. At the
same time, an article in the party daily NHAN DAN under the
authoritative byline "Commentator" has offered Hanoi's first
reaction to recent speculation in the Western press on a possible
new U.S.-GVN peace initiative. Commentator derided the rumored
initiative and, like other comment, insisted that the United
States must end its assistance to the GVN and that President ihieu
,rust be removed and a new Saigon government formed.
The Vietnamese communists marked the Paris agreement anniversary
much as they did last year, with comment from Le Duc Tho, chief
negotiator on the Paris accords, a Hanoi meeting addressed by former
delegate to the Paris talks Xuan Thuy, and the release of a PRG
"White Book" on the implementation of the accord. Unlike last year,
there were no government statements on the anniversary by the DRV
and the PRG, but Hanoi did publicize a DRV Foreign Ministry
memorandum on the occasion sent to the Soviet Union, China, and
other parties to the March 1973 international accord on Vietnam and
members of the ICCS. Moscow media marked the anniversary with a
spate of low-level comment similar to that of last year; there was
less Peking attention to the anniversary than in 1974.
DRV SCORES FORD PRESS CONFERENCE, REPORTS OF GVN PEACE PLAN
RESPONSE TO FORD Hanoi's initial authoritative reaction to
PRESS CONFERENCE President Ford's press conference on the
21st came in a statement by the DRV Foreign
Ministry spokesman on the following day which denied the President's
"slanderous" accusations about North Vietnamese violations of the
peace agreement and assailed his request for increased military
assistance for Saigon and Phnom Penh. Alluding to questions asked
the President about the possibility of future U.S. military involve-
ment in Vietnam, the spokesman also accused the President of "making
equivocal statements intended to threaten military action against
the Vietnamese people." A PRG Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement
on the same day was more specific, charging that President Ford had
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"left open the possibility of using U.S. air and naval forces to
attack Vietnam," and commenting that "the U.S. deterrent policy
has proved and is proving to be obsolete."
The President was harshly criticized on the 23d in an article in
the party paper NHAN DAN by Tran Kien--a regular commentator who
has been previously identified as a member of the paper's editorial
board. Tran Kien accused the President of "lying" about events
in South Vietnam, "cooking up the story that North Vietnam had
infiltrated military personnel and weapons into the South and
violated the Paris agreement," and "completely ignoring the blatant
actions" of the United States and "its henchmen." He also
criticized President Ford for failing to mention "the obligations
and responsibilities of his country" as defined in the Paris
agreement, and for making statements which conflict with the
agreement's requirement that the United States respect the
independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of
Vietnam and end its military involvement there.
Tran Kien not only held that the President's appeal for more
assistance violated the Paris agreement, but that it was "a
betrayal of the U.S. Administration's commitments to the American
people two years ago" and a "challenge to many U.S. congressman
who are eager to end U.S. involvement in Indochina." Adopting the
usual circumspect DRV stance, he did not directly assess the
likely disposition of the President's request for an additional
$300 million in military aid, but noted that the situation in
the United States "is not what it used to be" and cited statements
by Congressional opponents to the request.
Secretary of State Kissinger's 28 January press conference remarks
defending the Administration request for increased assistance
prompted a response on the following day in a statement by the
PRG Foreign Ministry spokesman. The spokesman charged that the
Ford Administration was attempting to deceive public opinion and
pressure the Congress and maintained that any amount of U.S. aid
only aggravated the situation in South Vietnam and constituted a
violation of the peace agreement.
NHAN DAN "COMENTATOR" The Commentator article in the 24 January
ON GVN PEACE INITIATIVE NHAN DAN after brief standard criticism
of U.S. policies focused on recent Western
press speculation that a new GVN initiative might soon result in a
return to the negotiating table. Commentator specifically cited
Robert Shaplen's article in the 6 January NEW YORKER magazine,
claiming that the article was part of Washington's "'good will for
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peace' campaign." While rejecting the proposed GVN initiative
to the communists outlined by Shaplen, Commentator did not
mention his speculation that the communists might give up their
demand for Thieu's removal as a condition for negotiations if he
made a good enough offer to them. Thus, while repeating
conventional communist demands, the article. did leave open the
possibility of some flexibility in reaching a settlement.
Commentator reported that Shaplen said that Thieu would advance
an initiative offering a determination of zones of control,
the establishment of the National Council for National
Reconciliation, and the convening of a constituent assembly
to draft a constitution. Deriding the proposal as an "unrealistic
peace advertising farce," the paper charged that it offered nothing
more than what was already promised in the Paris agreement. Like
other Vietnamese communist media comment, Commentator returned to
the demands of the PRG's 8 October 1974 Government statement,
declaring that the United States must end involvement in Vietnam
and aid for. Saigon and that "Thieu and his clique" must be
toppled and a new administration established in Saigon to
implement the peace agreement.
BACKGROUND: The latest Commentator article is his third in less
than two weeks and appears to reflect a North Vietnamese decision
to resume the regular use of this vehicle on major foreign policy
issues. During the war years, NHAN DAN Commentator articles were
consistently used to set forth Hanoi's views on major U.S. policies
and Presidential pronouncements.
There is no sufficient evidence to definitely determine whether
Commentator's eclipse in the post-agreement period was the result
of the diminished position of a faction in the DRV leadership.
His eight articles in the past two years, including the current
ones, have generally continued to focus on significant issues and
to have a tone of authority not found in other Hanoi media comment.
It is notable, for example, that the first two post-agreement
Commentator articles--on 7 April and 8 December 1973--dealt with
U.S. policies and shortly preceded the resumption of consultations
between Secretary Kissinger and Le Due Tho. Two other Commentator
articles appeared in June 1974, and he has twice written on
Thailand--on 5 December 1974 and 14 January 1975--since Hanoi's
new initiative toward Bangkok in DRV Foreign Minister Nguyen buy
Trinh's 27 November letter to the Thai Foreign Minister. The last
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previous Commentator article, on 16 January, criticized U.S.
policies toward Vietnam reflected in statements by Administration
officials and the State Department's 11 January note to
signatories of the international accord on Vietnam.*
PARIS AGREEMENT ANNIVERSARY MARKED BY HANOI AND ITS ALLIES
DRV MEMORANDUM The 27 January DRV Foreign ministry memorandum
on the Paris agreement anniversary, publicized
on the 29th, went to great lengths to demonstrate that the
communists have been forthcoming in seeking a Vietnam solution,
but it still returned to the conventional communist demands.
Focusing its criticism on the United States, the memorandum
charged that "systematic violation and sabotage" of the agreement
by the United States was he "salient feature" of the Vietnam
situation, and that U.S. "military involvement and interference
in the internal affairs of South Vietnam, as well as of other
countries in Indochina, are the main danger threatening peace and
security of the nations in the area."
Documenting its denial of U.S. charges that the communists have
turned from the path of negotiations, the memorandum cited DRV
consultations leading to the 13 June 1973 joint communique with
the United States and other parties and the PRG's alleged coopera-
tion in forums with the GVN, adding the unusual claim that:
"Throughout the past two years, the path of contacts ana talks
has remained wide open, but the U.S. Government has done nothing
but to sabotage the Paris agreement with increasing impudence."
According to the memorandum, communists attacks in South Vietnam
are not only meant to "punish" GVN "acts of war" but also to
"compel the other side" to implement the agreement.
The memorandum outlined the basic communist demands for a settle-
ment with North Vietnam, as well as in the South. In the South,
it asserted, there must be a complete end to U.S. involvement and
a withdrawal of U.S. "military personnel," along with the over-
throw of "Nguyen Van Thieu and his group," and the establishment
of a new administration in Saigon which will implement the Paris
agreement and negotiate a settlement with the PR,G. According to
* Previous articles by the NI-IAN DAN Commentator are discussed in
the TRENDS of 22 January 1975, pages 19-20; 15 January 1975, pages
13-14; 26 June 1974, pages 12-14; 12 June 1974, pages 16-18;
12 December 1973, pages 9-10; and 11 April 1973, pages 5-7.
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the memorandum, the DRV demands that the United States end
encroachments on North Vietnamese sovereignty and territory,
"fulfill its obligations" regarding DRV reconstruction, and
implement Article 20 of the Paris agreement on Laos and Cambodia.
HANOI MEETING The 27 January Hanoi meeting on the agreement
anniversary heard an opening speech by
Politburo member and Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh, the
highest level official in attendance, and a main address by
Secretariat member Xuan Thuy, former delegate to the peace talks
in Paris who had similarly addressed the anniversary meeting in
1974. Reaffirming the communists' evaluation of the Paris
agreement as a "great victory," Xuan Thuy reasoned that there
is no reason for them to violate it and undermine their own
success. In addition to listing the usual charges of alleged
violations by the United States and tL GVN, Xuan Thuy assailed
them for "threatening that if counterattacks are made a big war
will break out." He pledged that "we are ready to resist any
war of aggression, be it small or big, wherever it may come from.
We are not frightened by threats." Xuan Thuy offered the United
States a choice of two courses, indicating that if it wishes to
avoid the route of war it should implement the Paris agreement in
line with the PRG's 8 October statement and that it should stop
reconnaissance over North Vietnam and fulfill its "obligation" to
contribute to DRV reconstruction.
LE DUC THO REMARKS Hanoi radio on 26 January broadcast a
summary of a television talk that day by
Politburo member Le Duc Tho, his first statement on the Vietnam
situation since an interview in the French Communist Party organ
L'HUMANITE on 19 December, which VNA carried. The talk was similar
to a television interview Tho gave last year on the occasion of the
anniversary, but it reflected the exacerbation of Hanoi's
relationship with the United States in the intervening period.
Thus, unlike last year, Tho did not choose to specify that North
Vietnam's goodwill had been demonstrated by his two meetings with
Kissinger seeking to insure the implementation of the peace
agreement; and he did not repeat the suggestion that U.S. actions
could lead to the establishment of normal relations between the
United States and North Vietnam.
Hanoi for the most part has avoided raising the questions of
improving U.S.-DRV relations since a spate of media attention to
it at the time of the 1974 anniversary of the Paris agreement;
but Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh, in his 24 December report
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to the DRV National Assembly, did reiterate the theme that "a
strict implementation of the Paris agreement by the United States
will create conditions for establishing a new, equal, and mutually
beneficial relationship" between the United States and the DRV.
Le Duc Tho also commented on the second anniversary of the Paris
agreement in an interview in the Japanese Communist Party organ
AKAHATA, publicized by Hanoi on 27 January. In the he
repeated standard demands for U.S. implementation of ace
accord, but added a somber assessment of the situatic... According
to Tho, the experience of the past two years has led to the
conclusion that:
. . the United States and Thieu have never honored
their commitments, that they signed the agreement--an
agreement which they were forced to sign because of
their defeats--only to discard it afterwards. So,
the only way to make them honor the commitments they
have made and do what they have undertaken to do is to
struggle on with resolution and thwart all their
schemes.
MOSCOW, PEKING COMMENT Soviet media attention to the second
anniversary of the Paris agreement
generally followed the pattern set last year, with signed articles
in PRAVDA, IZVESTIYA, and RED STAR and radio commentaries praising
Vietnamese communist achievements and advocating a strict and full
implementation of the accords. The RED STAR article by Colonel A.
Leontyev was most critical of the U.S. role in Vietnam, scoring the
attitude of the "Pentagon" and U.S. Ambassador Martin and citing
Defense Secretary Schlesinger's 14 January press conference statements
on the possibility of Congressional sanction for U.S. military action
in response to a North Vietnamese offensive. The article commented
on the Secretary's remarks: "It is hard to say for whom these threats
are intended. It is clear, however, that they can only complicate
the situation in Vietnam." The PRAVDA article was much more
circumspect, noting U.S. yid for Thieu but carefully avoiding any
reference to the United States in describing the PRG's proposals
as calling for the withdrawal of "foreign troops" frcLn South Vietnam
and "other practical measures" to implement the peace agreement.
(Moscow media are not known to have mentioned President Ford's remarks
on Vietnam in his 21 January press conference. TASS did promptly
report the President's 28 January message to Congress requesting
additional military assistance for Indochina.)
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Peking marked the second anniversary of the Paris accords with
an NCNA correspondent's report on 28 January, maintaining a
lower profile on the occasion than last year when there was a
PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial. The correspondent's report reiterated
Vietnamese communist charges that the Thieu clique has system-
atically violated the Paris agreements with the support of the
"U.S. government" and that future acts of sabotage of the
agreements would continue to meet defensive counterattack from
the army and people in the liberated arras.
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CONJ IDLNTIAL
29 JANUARY 1975
- 8 -
DRV PARTY JOURNAL INDICATES CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM HELD
The editorial in the January issue of the DRV party journal HOC
TAP has indicated that the 23d plenum of the Central Committee
of the Vietnam Workers Party (VWP) has been held. Information
as to when it was convened or what was discussed was not
disclosed in the 25 January radio excerpts of the editorial,
and monitored DRV media have not made any further mention of it.
The editorial dealt mainly with economic tasks for 1975 and
only in passing alluded to the plenum, when urging implementa-
tion of the "resolutions of the 21st, 22d, and 23d VWP Central
Committee plenums," in connection with the upcoming celebrations
of the 45th anniversary of the party, 85th anniversary of Ho
Chi Minh's birth, and the 30th anniversary of the DRV, Failure
of the editorial to provide further mention of the resolution of
the 23d plenum in the context of its economic discussions--in
contrast to its several citations of the 22d plenum resolution
as authority for carrying out current economic tasks--suggests
that economic issues were not significant at the 23d plenum.
Likewise, publicized accounts of the fifth session of the Fourth
National Assembly, which was convened at the end of December and
which dealt extensively with economic matters, also failed to
mention the new plenum, although the resolution of the 22d plenum
received the usual frequent attention.
The editorial's citing of the rarely mentioned 21st plenum is also
notable. DRV media have rarely referred to the 21st plenum, and
then usually as a passing reference in discussions of military
affairs. Linking it in the editorial with the first public
mention of the 23d plenum may indicate that both forums dealt
with matters 3f similar interest. DRV propaganda has been
reticent to account for party plenums before. During the war
years, the media made no mention of the 13th through the 18th
plenums, presumably held between August 1965 and early 1971.
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NEW CLANDESTINE RADIO BEAMS INSURGENTS' LINT '10 PHNOM PENH
The Cambodian insurgents have stepped up their propaganda effort
with the launching of a new clandestine radio calling itself the
"Voice of the National United Front of Cambodia of Phnom Penh."
The new station's programming is similar to that of the other insur-
gent radio, the "Voice of the National United Front of Cambodia
(NUFC):' and the news agency AKI. Both the radio and news agency
began transmitting in August 1970 with the announced purpose of
supplying "genuine information" about the situation in Cambodia.
Neither of these clandestine organs has mentioned the new "radio
of Phnom Penh," but the Front radio on 13 January made a
schedule change which, it now appears, was made to avoid over-
lapping of broadcasts with the new radio.
The new clandestine radio, which carries three half-hour programs
daily, was first monitored by FBIS on 24 January. However, since
no prior announcement was heard, it is not known when it first
went on the air. It should be noted that the day before, on the
23d, an AFP item datelined Phnom Penh referred to a "secret"
antigovernment transmitter in Cambodia.
To date the broadcast content of the new radio is consistent with
the past clandestine transmiss_r.ons. But no doubt the insurgents
launched the new effort with the assumption that there would be
greater psychological impact from a radio purporting to speak
for the citizens of the Cambodian capital. The broadcast heard
on 24 January carried an appeal by insurgent leader Khieu
Samphan (dated the 22d), and appeals from the other chief
insurgent leaders inside Cambodia, Hou Youn and Hu Nim, on the
25th and 28th, respectively. The new radio has rebroadcast all
these appeals and also has carried battle reports that are
identical to reports carried by the news agency AKI.
The Khieu Samphan appeal has been repeated by AKI, but the Voice
of the NUFC has not rebroadcast any of them. All three appeals
are similar to a series issued by Khieu Samphan last October in
anticipation of the dry season offensive. They conform to other
authoritative Front statements about the current dry season
offensive calling for intensified insurgent attacks but avoiding
predictions of the imminent collapse of Phnom Penh defenses. The
appeals have routinely reaffirmed uncompromising opposition to
negotiations with Lon Nol, and have called for the complete overthrow
of the Phnom Penh administration. Khieu Samphan warned foreign
residents of Phnom Penh, including the diplomatic community, to
evacuate the city, declaring that the Front would not bear
responsibility for any injury sustained should foreigners choose
to stay.
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CPSU DELEGATION VISITS LAO "LIBERATED ZONE"
An 8-12 January "friendship" visit to Viengsay by a CPSU delega-
tion led by Central Committee member Aleksey Shibayev marked
the first high-level Soviet visit to the territory controlled
by the Lao Patriotic Front. Shibayev's delegation was hosted
by LPF Economic and Production Department Deputy Head and
Central Committee member Maysouk Saisompheng, who also
represented the LPF side at the joint talks held on the 9th.
The Soviet delegation met with LPF Standing Committee members
Nouhak Phoumsavan, Nhiavu Lobliayao, and Phoun Sipraiseuth, but
Pathet Lao accounts of the visit did not mention whether
Shibayev also met with LPF Central Committee Vice Chairman
Kayson Phomvihan, who has met with comparable delegations in
the past.
In a 10 January speech at a Viengsay welcoming rally, Maysouk
thanked the Soviet delegation for the support and assistance
extended by the Soviet Union during the Lao national liberation
struggle, using formulations similar in tone and warmth to
those expressed during the last visit to the liberated zone by
a party delegation from one of Moscow's allies, the 2."-28 March
1974 visit by a SED Central Committee group led by Johatines
Chemnitzer. Shibayev, in reply, assessed the situation in Laos
and noted that the national liberation struggle was not over,
but "con'.inues in a new form." In what may have been an allusion
to the strains between the Luang Prabang and Viengsay-based LPF
leaders over policy issues in the National Political Council of
Coalition led by LPF Chairman Scuphanouvong, Shibayev urged
them to "heighten your vigilance and maintain unity within the
patriotic forces" in order to foil the "schemes" of the
imperialists and reactionaries.
As was the case with the March 1974 visit by the SED delegation,
the Pathet Lao accounts of the talks held between the two sides
did not reveal whether post-war aid was discussed, and Shibayev's
remarks ccntained only general expressions of support. The joint
Soviet-Lao communique, signed on the 12th and broadcast by Radio
Pathet Lao on the 13th, included standard references to Soviet-Lao
friendship and solidarity and the customary homage to the
Vientiane agreement and -::h! NPCC's 18-point program. Soviet media
are not known to have reported the delegation's visit.
Shibayev's delegation departed on the 12th f;'r brief stopovers in
Luang Prabang and Vientiane. In Luang Prabang Shibayev had a
"cordial" chat with NPCC President Souphanouvorg, met with LPF
Central Committee General Secretary Vongvichit, and had an audience
with PGNU Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma.
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MIDDLE EAST
USSR HITS 'fDANGEROUS " U,S, PLANS TO USE MILITARY BASE IN OMAN
Soviet media have been prompt to denounce recently disclosed U.S.
plans to acquire aircraft landing rights on the British base of
al-Masirah, an island owned by Oman and located off its north-
eastern coast. Soviet comment in general has depicted Washington's
request as part of a broad U.S. strategy to expand its military
presence in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf region and exert
military and psychological pressures on individual Arab states.
Contesting statements by U.S. spokesmen that no military operations
would be undertaken from al-Masirah, Moscow has stressed the
military capabilities of the base and has charged it will form part
of a vast #trategic system of U.S. military strongholds from the
Middle East to Southeast Asia. A. the same time, Moscow has again
denied recurrent Western press reports that the Soviet Union has
itself acquired military base rights from South Yemen, Iraq, and
Somalia.
U.S. "THREATS" Throughout its comment, Moscow has sought to fit
the issue of U.S. base rights on al-Masirah
into a larger strategic pattern of alleged U.S. attempts to
intimidate the Arab oil-producers. TASS English on the 21st, in
the first Soviet pickup of official U.S. confirmation--through a
Pentagon spokesman on the 20th--that negotiations on base rights
were under way with Britain and Omar: placed its terse report on
the issue in the context of Secretary Kissinger's recent statement,
as TASS put it, "about the possibility of using armed forces
against the Middle East oil-producing countries under certain
conditions." subsequent comment has expanded on this theme,
stressing the strategic location of al-Masirah near the Persian
Gulf oil regions and the existence of military facilities on the
base to handle modern fighter, transport, and reconnais3ance
aircraft. A Moscow radio commentary by Aleksandr Timoshkin in
Arabic on the 24th typified much of the comment in chargilg that
the al-Masirah development provided evidence that the Arab
oil-producers were being confronted by U.S. "political blackmail
and military threats." Similarly, a RED STAR article on the 26th
charged that the U.S. "dangerous plans" to acquire base rights on
al-Masirah were consistent with previous "threats" against the
Arabs.
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DHOFAR Some Soviet comment, for the most part citing
INTcRVENTION accusations from Arab media, has accused the
United States of intending to use al-Masirah to
intervene in the guerrilla war in Oman's southern province of
Dhofar. A PRAVDA article by Oleg Skalkin on the 24th, for example,
charged that a U.S. basa on al-Masirah would fulfill a "local
purpose" vis-a-vis the Arab oil-producers and play a "mcre
substantial role" by helping to fill out a U.S. "military arc"
from Taiwan, through Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, to Oman
and the entrance to the Persian Gulf. In addition, Skalkin
asserted that it "may be used for suppressing the national liberation
movement in Dhofar, with which the Sultan cannot cope acting all
by himself." Moscow's "unofficial" Radio Peace and Progress in
Arabic on the 28th cited a statement by South Yemen's foreign
mini'-try which made simi].Lt: charges, asserting that the United
States and Oman had reached agreement on the U.S. use of al-Masirah
"with the aim of suppressing the revolution in Oman," as well as
"taking over the Arabian Gulf countries' oil resources."
U.S.-OMANI Soviet media have, however, shown some confusion in
AGREEMENT assessing the precise nature of the U.S. request
concerning al-Masirah and the state of subsequent
negotiations on the issue. In its initial comment, from 20 to 23
January, Moscow primarily replayed a report in Beirut's AS-SAFIR
to the effect that tl: United States and Oman had signed a "secret
military agreement" during the Omani Sultan's 9-11 January vi;.it
to Washington. Some comment also claimed that the Omani Government
had granted the United States base rights on al-Masirah in exchange
for military weapons and "specialists" to support the war against
the Dhofar rebels--the "Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman."
While apparently reluctant to drop the AS-SAFIR story, Moscow
subsequently--following remarks cn the al-Masirah issue by the
White House press secretary on the 22d--has generally been careful
to note that negotiations are continuing and that the U.S. request
concerned aircraft landing rights rather than substantial base
rights.
A Moscow radio commentary by Dmitriy Andreyev, broadcast in English
to Great Britain on the 25th, took both tacks in noting that although
some media reports had said a U.S.-Omani agreement had been signed,
official U.S. and British statements indicated that the issue of
U.S. base rights on al-Masirah was still under discussion. Andreyev
observed that the Omani Sultan might be "waiting for Britain's
reaction" but, as in most other Soviet comment, also suggested that
a U.S.-Omani and British agreement, if not already secretly achieved,
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was prubably a foregone conclusion. However, a London-datelined
TASS report by Philip Cutler on the 28th, noting Prime Minister
Wilson and Foreign Secretary Callaghan's departure that day for
Ottawa and Washington, predicted that the United Sates and Britain
would continue to differ over approaches to meet the world energy
crisis and implied in this context that Britain's fa""orable
consideration of the J.S. request regarding al-Masirah would be
inconsistent with current British policy of "seeking agreements"
with the Arab oil-producers.
The Andreyev commentary on the 25th was also notable for its
observation that "the Americans would like to play down the issue."
Andreyev explained that U.S. spokesmen had specified that the
base rights requested were only for "occasional or emergency
landing." Some Soviet comment, such as a TASS English commentary by
Sergey Bulantsev on the 23d, has played on the word "emergency,"
implying that it could go beyond the definition of an aircraft
in difficulty and citing recent U.S. leaders' statements on the
possible use of military force against the Arab oil-producers
"in case of emergency." Similarly, a RED STAR article on the 26th
cited a Washington POST report that opinion appeared divided
over whether the al-Masirah base would be used by the United States
only under "extraordinary circumstances" or whether it had "broader
purposes."
SOVIET While denouncing alleged U.S. "imperialistic" strategy
BASES in the Persian Gulf an& Indian Ocean region, Soviet
media have refrained from suggesting how Moscow would
respond to a given contingency. Soviet comment has reacted in
typical defensive fashion, however, to renewed reports in Western
media that the Soviet Union has itself enjoyed military base rights
for some time in South Yemen, Iraq, and Somalia. A Moscow radio
commentary in Arabic on the 28th, for example, labeled the reports
"fabrications" and complained that they only compel the Arab states
named to issue formal denials of the "imperialistic propaganda."
Citing the London DAILY TELEGRAPH as a particular example, the
broadcast described the paper's "lie about Soviet bases" as an
attempt to detract Arab attention from the danger of actual
British-American bases in the Mideast. A Bulantsev TASS commentary
on the 27th also devounced the DAILY TELEGRAPH for its article
on "Russian expansiou" in the Indian Ocean and Persian (7 -If
region, accusing the paper of "scaring the readers with mythical
Soviet bases" to justify the projected "escalation of an American
military rresence" in the same region through U.S. use of the
al-Masirah base.
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- 14 -
COMMUN I ST RELATIONS
MOSCOW, ALLIES RENEW PRESSURE FOR WORLD PARTY CONFERENCE
Moscow and its orthodox East European allies have resumed their
publicly expressed support for a world conference of communist
parties after they had earlier softpedaled this issue in
apparent deference to the independently oriented parties.
Following meetings held in Warsaw and Budapest in October and
December of last year to prepare for an all-European communist
party conference--planned for East Berlin later this year--Moscow
and its allies had avoided the issue of a world party conference,
viewed with disfavor by the independent-minded Yugoslav and
Romanian parties.* At the 1974 preparatory meetings, the
Yugoslav delegate had in effect ruled out any repetition of past
history, in which the 1967 Karlovy Vary conference of European
CP's had been followed two years later by the 1969 world party
conference in Moscow. And the Romanian delegate had served
notice at Warsaw and Budapest that his party would boycott any
international conference used as a forum for censure of "absent"
communist parties. The new Soviet bloc calls for a world conference
amount to a tacit acknowledgment that differences with the inde-
pendents on this issue may be irreconcilable.
In now renewing public support for a world conference, Moscow has
reverted to the practice it had followed prior to the October
meeting in Warsaw of merely indicating agreement with and support
for what it portrays as a rising tide of proposals for a world
gathering by foreign communist parties--registered most recently
by the parties of Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria. Thus a talk by
PRAVDA political commentator Korionov, broadcast by Moscow radio
on 22 January, followed up an appeal for a rebuff to Maoism with
the observation that
many fraternal parties nowadays suggest further
collective steps aimed at a further ideopolitical
consolidation of the communist movement . . . . As
has been noted at the plenums of the CPSU Central
Committee, our party is prepared to support
appropriate constructive initiatives and, together
with other Marxist-Leninist parties, to participate
in their implementation in practice.
* The Warsaw and Budapest meetings are discussed in the TRENDS
of 23 October and 24 December 1974, respectively.
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The commentary also recalled that the 24th CPSU Congress had
come out in favor of holding further international "conferences,"
adding--with the independent parties' objections presumably in
mind--the CPSU's conviction that such world forums should focus
on "constructive" matters.
The recording of support for world conferences in Korionov's
22 January talk takes on added significance in view of the same
commentator's silence on this issue in his article, also dealing
with communist unity, in PRAVDA of 26 December--five days after
the end of the Budapest preparatory meeting.
The still low-keyed character of Moscow's renewed public support
for a world party conference is also indicated in Soviet media's
selective reporting of the endorsements of such a gathering
during the 20-24 January visit by Czechoslovak party leader
Husak to Bulgaria. While the 23 January friendship rally speeches
by both Husak and Zhivkov and the final communique issued the
next day all included such endorsements, Soviet reports of the
visit mentioned only the one by Husak: PRAVDA on the 24th noted
that the Czechoslovak leader "spoke in favor of convening an
international conference of communist and workers parties to assess
new phenomena and trends in the world." Soviet media also cited
attacks on the Chinese leaders in Husak's speech and the final
communique. Zhivkov had uncharacteristically refrained from
attacking Peking in his speech at the Sofia rally.
Just prior to the Korionov broadcast and Husak's visit to Bulgaria,,
Soviet media had completely ignored a 17 January speech by CPCZ
Presidium member and secretary Bilak which included a call for the
start of preparations for a net world party conference. Moscow's
failure to report the speech in Presov by the prominent Czechoslovak
party figure is the more noteworthy in view of the fact that the
occasion was the 30th anniversary of the Red Army's liberation of
this major East Slovak city, and thus the start of the liberation
of Czechoslovakia which culminated on 9 May 1945.
Most recently, TASS reports of Ponomarev's speech at a Soviet Army
ideological conference in Moscow on the 28th indicate that the CPSU
Politburo candidate and secretary registered generalized support
for interparty meetings, in addition to an explicit endorsement
of the projected European CP conference. The inclusion of strong
attacks on Lne Chinese in both the Ponomarev speech and the
22 January Korionov talk does nothing to dispel the fears of the
independent parties that Noscow intends to raise the China issue
at the European CP conference as well as at a world party conclave.
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NORDEN ARTICLE ON CHINA That Moscow will insist that China be an
issue at the all-European CP conference
was again reflected in a strong anti-Chinese diatribe by one of the
3DR's leading ideologues, Politburo member Albert Norden, in the last
issue of Moscow's KOMMUNIST for 1974. Norden's article, signed to
press on 17 December on the eve of the Budapest meeting, was reprinted
reprinted virtually in toto in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND on 8 January.
Appropriately entitled "How Maoism Is Struggling Against Peace
in Europe," it was clearly a well-timed lecture to all European
parties on the dangers of "Maoist" policies for the communist
movement in Europe and detente in general. That the article was
written by a leading SED spokesman and then reprinted in the
East German daily after the Budapest meeting adds to its importance,
as the East Germans, hosts for the upcoming conclave, were mandated
by the other parties in December to chair the editorial commission
which is to draw up documents to be presented at the conference.
The Soviet and East European media hare not yet confirmed if there
will be another formal meeting berore this summer's conference
as rumored in the Western press. But Budapest's prominent
commentator Ferenc Varnai, responding to a question on Budapest
television on the 15th, said that another meeting will be held
at the end of January or the beginning of February, without
noting whether it will be a meeting of the editorial commission
or another formal preparatory session.
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- 17 -
PRC INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
CHINA SEES KEEN RIVALRY IN U,S,-SOVIET MOVES ON TRADE, ARMS
Peking has recently publicized the breakdown of the U.S.-Soviet
trade agreement and warnings from high-ranking U.S. officials over
Soviet weapons development as evidence for its thesis that super-
power rivalry is increasing, a thesis reaffirmed and strengthened
by the 4;-h NPC this month.* The Chinese comment has portrayed the
United States in neutral terms--as a great power which is firmly
determined to preserve its interests vis-a-vis its major interna-
tional. adversary--but it has lambasted alleged Soviet double-
deal'::g over the trade deal and over arms limitation agreements
with the United States. It has given particular attention to
statements by President Ford and Secretaries Kissinger and
Schlesinger concerning U.S. resolve to protect U.S. interests
and to maintain a firm strategic balance against Moscow. Peking
has sharply criticized Moscow's "sell out" of Arab interests over
Soviet Jewish emigration and has portrayed thR Soviet Union as
attempting to use arms limitation discussions with the United
States as a cover for growing Soviet weapons development.
TRADE ACCORD Peking's first report that the 1972 U.S.-Soviet
trade accord would not be brought into force--a
16 January NCNA report on Secretary Kissinger's 14 January press
conference announcing the breakdown--took pains to portray the
incident as resulting from a U.S. initiative. NCNA quoted Kissinger
as saying that "the U.S. President has decided that the U.S.-USSR
trade agreement signed in October 1972 cannot be brought into force"
and that the President had decided not to give he Soviet Uninn
most.-favored-natitn status. NCNA acknowledged that the U.S. action
was prompted by the Soviet refusal to accept U.S. Congressional
restrictions, but downplayed any suggestion that the USSR was
acting out of principle. It recalled previous Soviet "deals" over
emigration of Soviet Jews and noted that the Congressional loan
ceiling of 300 million dollars was an important factor behind Moscow's
acti.r. NCNA tried to give an impression of heightened U.S.-Soviet
tensions as a result of the breakdown, carefully replaying Secretary
Kissinger's press conference warning of U.S. resolve to resist any
Soviet pressure while avoiding reference to the Secretary's
accompanying statement on Washington's continuing commitment to
detente with the USSR.
* For a discussion of NPC foreign policy, see the TRENDS of
22 January 1975, pages 11-14.
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A 14 January NCNA report--released prior to Kissinger's press
conference--offered Peking's most comprehensive rebuke in recent
years of Soviet attempts to reach a trade agreement with the
United States. NCNA portrayed Moscow as anxious to obtain
U.S. goods and technology and as willing to engage in "behind-
the-scenes deals" in order to achieve favorable trade terms.
It pointed particularly to Brezhnev's personal role in fostering
Soviet agreement to increase Jewish emigration in order to gain
most-favored-nation status, and it charged that recent Soviet
media criticism of the 1974 U.S. trade act was designed to
cover Soviet embarassment at being shown to be "a trader in
human beings" and a betrayer of the Arab people's cause. Peking
has subsequently continued to tie Brezhnev closely to the Soviet
agreement on Jewish emigration. A 22 January NCNA report quoted
claims by U.S. Senator Jackson on 18 January that Secretary
Kissinger had told the Senate Finance Committee that Brezhnev
had agreed to accept the Jewish emigration ammendment to the
U.S. trade act when he met with President Ford in Vladivostok
last November.
ARMS RACE On 18 January NCNA reported Secretary Schlesinger's
14 January press conference statements that the
United States had confirmed evidence of Soviet deployment of the
SS-18 missile; that there was some indication that Moscow had
begun deploying the SS-19--a missile, NCNA noted, that Schlesinger
said had an "inherent" MIRV capability; and that these steps were
a "potential source" of "strategic imbalance" between the nuclear
superpowers. It also cited Schlesinger's warning that Washington
may be forced to take countermeasures that would maintain the
overall balance in the strategic area.. NCNA carefully noted
that the Soviet deployments were taking place only two months
after Brezhnev had agreed with President Ford on the framework
for nuclear arms limitation, and at the very time that Moscow
had agreed with Washington to announce the scheduled resumption
of the SALT talks in Geneva on 31 January.
On 23 January NCNA reported Schlesinger's 22 January speech at
the Economic Club of New York, highlighting his use of a CIA
projection which NCNA said showed that the Soviet Union is out-
spending the United States in overall defense by 20 percent and
that Moscow spends 60 percent more than the United States on
strategic nuclear arms. NCNA included Schlesinger's darning that
a continuation of this trend implies an upsetting of the U.S.-Soviet
military equilibrium and his admonition that Washington under the
circumstances has "no satisfactory alternative but to continue to
maintain the forces necessary to sustain a worldwide military balance."
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Necessary U.S. military preparedness was also the focal point
in NCNA's brief 17 January discussion of the foreign affairs
section of President Ford's 15 January State of the Union
message. It highlighted the President's resolve to keep the
United States militarily strong in order to sustain a position
of world leadership and to maintain commitments abroad. It
concluded that the President's statements meant that the
United States will engage in "still fiercer worldwide conten-
tion" with the Soviet Union.
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U S S R
PRAVDA ARTICLE RAISES THEME OF COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP
The raising of the theme of collective leadership by P. A. Rodionov
in an article in the 21 January PRAVDA revives a symbolic instrument of
opposition to one-man leadership in the Soviet Union at a time when
Brezhnev's authority has become the subject of world-vide speculation.
Its symbolic sensitivity in this respect is heightened by the fact
that lodionov, first deputy director of the Institute of. Marxism-
91 Leninism, has a well-established reputation as a champion of collec-
tive leadership and as an earlier Brezhnev antagonist. In recent
months, references to collective leadership have been both rare
and brief and have usually been accompanied by statements asserting
Brezlinev'c predominance.
The symbolic implications of the Rodionov article, however, are
diminished by the fact that it is relatively bland in language and,
unlike many of his earlier articles, contains no formulations that
are claarly directed against Brezhnev. Determining the significance
of the article is made more difficult by the fact that the press
continues to heap praise on Brezhnev, calling him head of the
Politburo, and identifying him as the primary initiator and executor
of national policy.
Although Rodionov's PRAVDA article, entitled "Leninist Style of
Party Work," discussed several subjects, including the scientific
approu.2h to decisionmaking, businesslike leadership, a party
approach to economic administration, and checking on plan fulfill-
ment, the theme of collectivity was not treated cursorily but
rather was the subject of several paragraphs. Rodionov declared
that "the strength of party leadership is in its collectivity,"
which prevents "subjective decisions," facilitates carefully worked
out policies, and insures unity. Nevertheless, Rodionov also
cited the need for "individual responsibility and individual
direction"--a concept usually invoked as a warning against the
diffusion of responsibility inherent in excessive ,ollectivity
Furthermore, the statements in the PRAVDA article were nowhere
near as pointed as Rodionov's formulations usually are.
During the late 1960's, Rodionov was the most prolific writer
on collectivity and stressed the rights of the collective as
against the primacy of the leader, an implicitly anti-Brezhnev bias.
In an October 1966 QUESTIONS OF CPSU HISTORY article he cited
Lenin's example in submitting to the will of the collective and
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in rebuking anyone who suggested that Lenin could speak in the
name of the Central Committee or party. In a December 1967
ICOMMUNIST article on intraparty democracy, he declared that
no leader has enough experience and knowledge to substitute for
the collective. In a 2 August 1969 PRAVDA article on collegial-
ity in party committees and bureaus, he assailed first secretaries
who infringe on the rights of the collective and who think
collectivity means having the other bureau members approve
everything he says. In an April 1970 QUESTIONS OF CPSU HISTORY
article on collectivity, he stressed Lenin's example in not
forcing his opinions on the. collective.
Apparently as a consequence of his anti-Brezhnev stance, in
early 1971 Rodionov was demoted from second secretary of Georgia
to the academic post of first deputy director of the Institute
of Marxism-Leninism. And at the 1971 CPSU Congress he was
dropped from candidate membership in the Central Committee.
Thereafter, he authored only occasional, innocuous articles. But
in February 1974 his writings reappeared in book form under the
title "Collectivity Is a High Principle of Party Leadership."
Rodionov's book asserted that "Lenin saw collectivity as the most
reliable means to prevent the rising of a cult of personality
and invariably stressed that the authority of the party and its
collective leadership organs is immeasurably higher and more
important than the authority of an individual leader, no matter
what merits he possesses." He said that Lenin "called on
members of party collegiums to decisively and unitedly act against
the slightest attempt by individuals to usurp power or to escape
the influence of the collective." Noting that Lenin "permitted
no praise or exalting of his person or actions either at meetings
or congresses or in the press," Rodionov refuted the allegations
of foes that "a tendency to individual leadership is inherent to
communist parties."
RECENT REFERENCES Rodionov's book clearly did not reflect the
TO COLLECTIVITY current prevailing line, as the press has
increasingly ignored collectivity and
stressed Brezhnev's personal dominance. Moreover, the brief
mentions of collectivity in recent months have usually been
thoroughly diluted by simultaneous statements setting Brezhnev
above the collective. For instance, on 24 June 1974 Podgornyy,
while presenting an Order of Lenin to Andropov, referred to "our
collective leadership headed by General Secretary L. I. Brezhnev."
A 15 August 1974 IZVESTIYA editorial cited collectivity, but
only in the context of stressing the importance of "combining
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29 JANUARY 1975
collective leadership with personal responsibility." At the
2 November 1974 Kirgiz anniversary ceremony, Kirgiz First
Secretary Usubaliyev, according to the local paper, declared
that the work of the Politburo "is characterized by collectivity
of leadership," but he also repeatedly called Brezhnev head of
the Politburo and he conferred on Kosygin the title of "a very
close comrade-in-arms" of Brezhnev. Kazakh First Secretary
Kunayev in a 20 November Kazakhstan speech cited collectivity,
but also referred to the Politburo headed by Brezhnev. KOMMUNIST
chief editor V. G. Afanasyev in a November 1974 article in his
journal cited Lenin on the need for a "necessary minimum of
collegiality," while leaving the final decision to "one leader--
a comrade known for his firmness, decisiveness, boldness. ability
to handle practical matters, and enjoying the most confi:ience."
Perhaps the height of incongruity was achieved by Kirile.iko,
who in a speech at a Bucharest factory in November 1974, while
attending the Romanian party congress, said that the Politburo
"headed by" Brezhnev "shows constant concern about the strict
observance of Leninist norms of party and state life and the
principle of collective leadership."
There have been only a handful of references which have not been
accompanied by this stress on Brezhnev's primary role. On 16 October
1974, while receiving an award from Bulgarian First Secretary
Zhivkov, Suslov referred to himself as "a member of the collective
leadership of the CPSU." In his articles on the anniversary of
the October 1964 plenum in the 15 October 1974 RURAL LIFE and
an October 1974 PARTY LIFE, V. Stepano, declared that the -lc.num
had restored collectivity. Rodionov also mentioned collectivity
in an October 1974 POLITICAL SELF-EDUCATION article.
Unlike the current Rodionov article, most recent theoretical
articles--such as the PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA editorials on the
anniversary of the October 1964 plenum--have ignored collectivity
and focused on Brezhnev. The formulation Politburo "headed by"
Brezhnev continues to appear very frequently in the central. press--
on 14 days in the three weeks ending 25 January--and Brezhnev
continues to be obsequiously treated in speeches and at meetings.
the most recent examples being a 10 January Komsomol plenum and a
15 January trade union council plenum. Other leaders continue to
pay obeisance to Brezhnev. Thus, Moscow First Secretary and
Politburo member Grishin, visiting Poland in mid-January, brought
personal greetings from Brezhnev and referred to Brezhnev and
Gierek as the "leae'.ers" (rukovoditeli) of their parties and
countries, while Podgornyy on 24 January again referred to Brezhnev
as head of the Politburo.
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COLLECTION OF KOSYGIN SPEECHES CONTAINS SOME NEW MATERIAL
The contents of the recently issued collection of Kosygin speeches
and articles fails to answer the question of why the Soviet
premier has been honored by this unusual publication. Apart
from Brezhnev, heretofore only Suslov has been so honored and
his collection was clearly pegged to his 70th birthday. Kosygin's
by contrast, was issued some six months after his 70th birthday
and there is no other protocolary consideration that would explain
the publication. The book contains some previously unpublished
speeches by the Soviet premier, but omits many of his more import-
ant public ones. Among the newly revealed speeches is a remarkably
frank 1964 address to the Central Committee Institute of Social
Sciences--an organization rarely :mentioned--which argued for more
trade with the West.
A possible clue to the timing of the book may be afforded by the
publication data. The book was set in print on 23 July 1974 and
signed to the press on 20 August, a schedule which would suggest
that the decision to compile the book must have been taken some-
time in the spring of 1974. This was a period when Kosygin's
influence was apparently strong in the leadership, since two
important decisions promoting policies which he had long advocated
were issued at that time. The first was the 22 April Council of
Ministers decree extending the 1965 "direct ties" experiment
throughout light industry, and the second was the extension of
the new planning system adopted by the Moscow Motor Transport
Administration in 1965 to other motor transport organizations.*
The book was issued in 200,000 copies--roughly similar to the
handling of collections of Brezhnev speeches, most of which have
appeared in 200-300,000 copies. Just as various Brezhnev
assistants were credited with preparing the collections of his
speeches, the Kosygin publications identified his assistants
A. G. Karpov and B. T. Batsanov as "responsible for issuing."
SECRET SPEECH Less than half of Kosygin's significant speeches
since becoming premier were selected for this
collection. Among those omitted were an 18 July 1965 Riga speech,
in which he attacked anti-Semitism; his 1966, 1967, 1970 and 1971
Supreme Soviet election speeches; his 14 February 1968 Minsk speech
urging use of computers and foreign technology; and his 13 November
1973 Minsk speech admitting that Soviet fuel reserves were tight.
e See the TRENDS of 17 July 1974, pages 21-23.
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On the other hand, the collection includes a secret 3 July 1964
speech to the Institute of Social Sciences, which presen'.ed
this select audience of foreign affairs specialists with a
remarkably frank discussion of Soviet trade relations with the
West. Kosygin's advocacy of developing foreign economic ties
was stronger in this private speech than in his public state-
ments during this period. He explained in detail the great
opportunities for the USSR to sell oil and gas to increasingly
energy-short West Europe and also the great value in developing
foreign trade and scientific-techrological exchange with all
countries, especially the United States. Citing observation;
that he had made during foreign visits, he argued that even small
countries have something to offer to the Soviet Union. At the
same time, he bitterly complained that big capitalist countries
still underestimate the Soviet economy and have little interest
in trade. Observing that the United States is the only country
which is not developing economic relations with the Soviet Union,
he said this resulted from ignorance. To document this claim he
quoted the then Secretary of State Rusk as asking him what the
USSR could trade except vodka and caviar?
LAUDATORY REVIEWS IN The Kosygin book was reviewed in an unsigned
IZVESTIYA, KOt 1UNIST PRAVDA article on 20 October and an IZVESTIYA
article on 24 October, as well as in
KOMtIUNIST in October, PARTY LIFE in December, and the January
PLANNED ECONOMY. The reviews in IZVESTIYA and KOMPNUNIST were most
enthusiastic about Kosygin's views. Writing in IZVESTIYA Academician
A. Yefimov was unusually laudatory. The reviewer declared that
Kosygin treated various spheres of activity of the party and state
"convincingly and brilliantly." And he 'referred to the premier's
"many years" of experience in state and economic leadership and his
"profound and economic erudition." Yefimov, as deputy Lcademic
secretary of the Academy of Sciences' economic division and as
director of Gosplan's economic institute since 1955, has clearly
had Erequent contact with Kosygin.
The unsigned KOMHUNIST review lauded Kosygin's 1965 economic reform
and backed his longtime drive for more trade with the West with the
statement that "attempts at self-isolation by any state and disregard
of the achievements of science and culture of other countries lead
to failures in the.economy, impoverishment of spiritual life, and
loss of a feeling of reality in politics." The PLANNED ECONOMY review
praised the 1965 reform and Kosygin's "big contribution" to planning,
administration, and the use of economic levers.
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CONFIDENTI:A1, FBIS 'I'RI;NUS
29 JANUAIRY 1975
AGRICULTURE MINISTRY GRUDGINGLY APPROVES LINK SYSTEM
AfLe r long years of sharp prodding, the Agriculture Ministry
has finally produced a guarded and grudging endorsement of the
mechanized link form of farm labor organization. Although the
ministry has been studying the link system for several years
and, according to a 10 June 1973 PRAVDA article, was supposed
to have issued recommendations as early as 1971, ministry
officials have dragged their feet and still in late 1974
appeared to be encouraging sniping at links.'
The ministry's decision is revealed in the January ECONOMICS OF
AGRICULTURE account of a recent meeting of the ministry's collegium
to discuss the work of agricultural organs in Krym and Dnepropetrovsk
oblasts on improving forms of labor organization. According to
the agricultural journal, the collegium approved an e::pository letter
prepared by the Agriculture Ministry's administration for labor
organization, norms and wages and ordered it sent to lower organs.
The letter declared that study has shown complex mechanized links
using pay based on final results with wage advances to be an "effective
form of labor organization," ad it cited their numerous advantages.
However, the letter appeared not to take the form of as instruction
but rather looked more like a detailed study of experiences with
the mechanized link system.
The journal's account of the collegium was written by V. Zhurikov,
chief of the Agriculture Ministry administration which prepared the
letter and himself a past foe of links. The 10 June 1973 PRAVDA
article had accused him by name of delayinr the recommendations on
links and subsequently, in response to the PRAVDA attack, a deputy
minister promised that the recommendations would be completed and
issued shortly. In his present account, Zhurikov mentions that
these recommendations were in fact prepared in 1973 but he fails to
explain what was done with them. They were not publicized, and
Zhurikov subsequently repeated his reservations on links in a
December 1973 ECONOMICS OF AGRICULTURE article.
Although Zhurikov's account of the zollegium meeting is fairly long,
it makes no mention of Agriculture sinister Polyanskiy's presence,
suggesting once again Polyanskiv's unwillingness to associate
himself with the link system. Further qualifying the ministry's
endorsement is the evident distaste for links so apparent in the
letter. Thus instead of selecting the oblasts and farms receiving
* See the TRENDS of 20 November 1974, pages 22-23.
CONFIDENTIAL
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~ONFT.DENTIAI, IISIS TRENDS
29 JANUARY 1975
national attention for their link experience, the ministry picked
out two oblasts in the Ukraine--where enthusiasm for these kinds
of links has been lower than in other areas.* Apparently Polyanskiy
did not wish to raise as examples the links in Volgograd, Krasnodar:
and elsewhere touted by his longtime foes.
In addition, the Ukrainian links singled out by the ministry may
be larger than the more-advertised links, reflecting ministry
dislike for the small-unit character of most links. Nikolayev
Obkom Secretary V. Vednikov wrote in the 24 March 1974 RURAL LIFE
that his oblast had first copied Krasnodar farmer Pervitskiy's
mechanized links, but found them too small and switched to Krym
experience, creating big mechanized links.
Further, while ::rym agricultural officials are criticized by the
ministry decision for not encouraging links, Dnepropetrovsk is
criticized for forcing the creation of too many links. The
ministry's endorsement also included the warning that conditions
throughout the Soviet Union vary and no one form of organization
can be recommended for ill farms. This is alL objection often
raised by Zhurikov an.: other link fees in the past. Hence, the
letter of information also endorsed specialized links, various
kinds of brigades and mechanized units and specifically urged
that mechanized brigades be encouraged too. On the other hand, the
"unregulated" type mechanized link--where work assignments are
not handed out--is not endorsed by name.
* The Ukraine has preferred specialized links--for beets, corn,
sunflowers and other special crops--rather than the more controver-
sial general field links.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBiS TRENDS
29 JANUARY 1.975
YUGOSLAVIA
BELGRADE PHILOSOPHY PROFESSORS PURGED; CRITICISM ANTICIPATED
Belgrade has demonstrated its intention to crack down on internal
dissent by ousting eight nonconformist philosophy professors at
Belgrade University. Tito and the communist party had endured
their criticisms since 1968 and had tried to have then purged a
year ago. The 28 January dismissals, approved by the Serbian
Assembly and reported by TANJUG, were not unexpected, having been
preceded by the passage of a new law specially designed to enable
the government to remove the professors, the initiation of a
bitter press campaign against them and the 24 January resignation
of the philosophy faculty's dean, who had supported the professors.*
Media comment on the dismissals has been particularly defensive;
VECERNJE NOVOSTI, according to TANJUG on the 28th, for example,
conceded that the assembly action was "extraordinary and specific,
but necessary."
The assembly's decision accused the Marxist professors of using
their academic positions and a facade of false theoretical state-
ments about communism fcr staging "political opposition" against
the regime, including advocacy of a multi-party system and the
"aim of violent change." In an apparent effort to discredit the
professors' charges of Stalinism against the party leadership,
the assembly accused them of using Stalinist methods themselves
to oust professors loyal to the regime. The assembly also discounted
strong intellectual and student support for the professors in
portraying them as an "isolated group" and not part of "any new
left wing." The professors' opposition to the regime had come
into prominence during the 1968 student revolts, and when the
party threatened to oust them a year ago, the university's 800
philosophy students vowed to strike and shut down part of the
university.
Officials also revealed apprehension that intellectuals in the
West will portray the purge as an attack on academic freedom in
Yugoslavia--as had happened last year. Accusations from "some
foreign countries" that the government was guilty of "persecution"
and "gross meddling" in university affairs were turned aside as
"quite ill-intentioned and very tendentious." Officials also
maintained that academic freedom is stronger in Yugoslavia than it
For background, see the TRENDS of 15 January 1975, pages 26-27.
CONFIDENTIAL
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29 JANUARY 1975
is "in the states from which such words of blame emanate."
Earlier media comment had referred specifically to the United
States as well as to several West European states. As a possible
son to critics, TANJUG noted that the professors will receive
financial compensation.
The regime's sensitivity to criticism of its suppression of
dissent is heightened by the fact that prominent writer Mihajlo
Mihajlov was to have gone on trial 27 January on charges of
hostile activity and spreading hostile propaganda. Mihajlov,
whose case has not been publicized in the Yugoslav media, was
arrested last October after writing articles critical of the
Soviet Union which appeared in U.S. and Russian emigre
publications. Western intellectuals and Milovan Djilas have
protested his arrest.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
29 JANUARY 1975
URUGUAY
USSR WELCOMES RELEASED CP LEADER ARISMENDI. CRITICIZES REGIME
Soviet media have given considerable attention to Rodney Arismendi,
First Secretary of the Urugur;.yan Communist Party (PCU,, since
his release from prison in MuLltevidco and arrival in Moscow on
6 January. Moscow, which has denounced as authoritarian the
regime established in Uruguay in June, 1973, has highlighted
Arismendi's criticisms of the regime and his effusive praise
of the PCU, the Soviet Union, and the "powerful movement of
solidarity" which forced the government to "retreat and release"
him.
TREATMENT Although condemnation of Uruguay has not been as
OF REGIME frequent and severe as that regularly meted out to
the Chilean regime, the major actions of President
Juan Bordaberry's military-dominated government have been regular
targets of Soviet criticism. PRAVDA, in deploring the November 1973
ban placed on the PCU, asserted on 5 December 1973 that "the
Black Hundreds have never succeeded" in crushing communist deter-
mination and predicted that Uruguay's communists would "fight
until victory" was achieved over the "rightist forces." The May
1974 arrest of Arismendi, long-time leader of the pro-Soviet
PCU, was denounced by the PCU--in a statement replayed by TASS
on 14 May--as an attempt to "decapitate the resistance movement,"
and a Moscow-sponsored solidarity movement was organized on
behalf of Arismendi and other imprisoned leftists. Moscow's
annoyance at Montevideo's stand against Cuba at the Quito OAS
conference last November may have promoted the flurry of comment
about that time. For example, ZA RUBEZHOM on 24 November berated
the Uruguayan regime as a "lackey and diehard champion" of the
"most reactionary U.S. circles."
PRAISE OF Giving a warm welcome to Arismeni, Moscow has
ARISMENDI honored him with the award of the Order of the
October Revolution and publicized his state:^:nts
in. a press conference and television interviews. Presenting the
award in a ceremony on 24 January, President Pudgornyy declared
that Arismendi's "whole life and activity" had been a "wonderful
example" of service to Uruguay and to "proletarian internationalism."
Soviet media have taken the occasion of Arismendi's arrival to
underline the theme of inevitable success of liberation movements
in Latin America. Hailing Arismendi's arrival, PRAVDA said on the
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29 JANUARY 1975
12th that his release proved that authoritarian forces were
involved in a "futile attempt" to reverse the liberation of
Latin America and expressed continued faith in the "mighty
campaign" of solidarity through which the socialist community
aided the liberation movements.
Arismendi's public statements in Moscow have emphasized the
"vanguard" role of the PCU and the Soviet Union. Speaking at
a press conference reported by TASS on the 16th, he said that
the PCU "was and still is" the "vanguard of the antidictatorial
struggle" against reactionary forces within Uruguay and he also
noted the "tremendous positive impact" of Soviet policies on
"the struggle of the Latin American peoples for their liberation."
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
29 JANUARY 1975
NOTE
SINO-U.S. RELATIONS: NCNA on 27 January revealed President
Ford's letter of congratulations to Chou En-tai on his recent
reappointment as premie? The press agency noted that the
President said he looked forward to meeting with Chou later
this year and that he expressed hope that "through common
efforts" the two sides could overcome their "fundamental
differences," "advance the cause of normalizing Sino-U.S.
relations, and thus fulfill the joint commitment expressed
in the Shanghai communique of 1972". The report represents
the first time Peking has reported a formal U.S. Presidential
message to a Chinese leader since the thaw in relations in
1971, and it marks Peking's most positive replay of President
Ford's remarks on U.S.-China relations to date. Peking had
heretofore limited its coverage of President's Ford's discussions
of Sino-U.S. relations to a few references 'to his generalized
support for the principles of the Shanghai communique.
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FBIS TRENDS
29 JANUARY 1975
- i -
APPENDIX
MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 20 - 26 JANUARY 1975
Moscow (2465 items)
Peki
(783
ng
items)
China
(5%)
9%
Fourth National
(23%)
57%
[Fourth National
(--)
3%]
People's Congress
People's Congress
U
[Foreign Greetings
(--)
4%]
.S. Trade Law
F
(--)
4%
Angola Independence
(--)
4%
oreign Ministry Pro-
test to U.S. over UN
Shooting Incident
(--)
3%
Nordic "Marxist-Len-
inist" Parties Con-
ference
St
kh
l
(--)
2%
CEMA Executive Commit- (--) 3%
tee Meeting, Moscow
,
oc
o
m
Indochina
(4%)
2%
Lenin Death Anniver-
sary
(--)
3%
These statistics are based on the -~?oicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
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