TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170004-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 18, 1999
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: January 22, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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Confidential
I~FBiS
TRENDS
In Communist Propaganda
Confidential
22 JANUARY 1975
(VOL. XXVI, N0. 3)
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'I'bis propuRandi~ nnnlysis report ix based rrxclusively on nwteriul
curried in forei(grr broadcast uncl press media. It is published
by IBIS without coordinatirn with other U.S. Covcrnmer,:
components.
Classified by 00007
Subject tc. General Declesslfication Schedule
of @,O. 11652, Automatically Declassified
Two Yean From Oate of Issue
National Security Information
Unauthori-ed disclosure sub(sct to
crtmina) sanctions
7
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL FDIS TRENDS
22 JANUARY 1975
CONTENTS
i(oscow Jua~ifies Trade Rupture, Ptinimizes Effect on Detente.
1
East Europe Echoes Soviet Themes on Trade-Detente issue.
CHINA
3
PRC Congress Normalizes State Apparatus. Elects Officials
5
Chou En-lai Notes Danger of War But Sees No Threat to PRC
11
rtIDDLE EAST
Ptoscow Assails Allon Visits U.S.-Israeli "Pressure" on Arabs
15
CYPRUS
USSR Cites Greek Protests Against Turkish Refugee Evacuation
18
INDOCIi INA
DRV, PRG Level Criticism at U.S. Observance of Paris Agreement
19
PRG Cr,uncil of Plinisters Communique Reveals Biannual Meeting
21
Moscow Defe~ids Communist Attacks on GVN, Scores U.S. Aid
21
Sihanouk, Penn Neuth Announce Formal Transfer of RGNU Posts.
23
CiJBA
Castro Expresses Solidarity With Latins, Pr~3is2s Cuban CP.
25
idOTES
Mao-Strauss Meeting; Albanian Unrest in Yugoslavia;
PRAVDA on CSCE Resumption.
APPEND I~
27
;Ioscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics.
i
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C0NFIDEN'1'.IAL l.~BIS 'T'RENDS
'l2 ,JANUARY 1975
l _.
U,S,-SOVIET RELATIONS
MOSCOW JUS1"IFIES TRADE RUPTURES MINIMIZES EFFECT ON DETENTE
Moscow, in extensive comment: over the past week, has sought to just' :fy
its renunciation of the 1972 trade: agreement with the United Statec3
as an appropriate response to the U.S. trade. legislation. At the
same time,Sovlet media have denl.ed tl?~at the action Implies any
cha.zge in the Soviet commitment to detente. 't'hree themes have
dominated this comment: (1) the contention that the blame for the.
episode rests with tl~e opponents of detente in tl~e LI.S. Congress,
and that the Soviet act_;on was a justl.fiable response to an
intolerable affront to national dignity; (2) a denial that the
action implies a Soviet retreat from the goals of detente; and ~;3) an
implied warning tl~iat a U.S. fai].ur.e to revise tl~ie trade legislation
will result is a sh~.ft of Soviet trade to such U.S, competitors
as West Germany, Great Britain, France, and Japan.
TRADE CONDITIONS The basis of the Soviet Union's self-justifying
propaganda is the contention that the conditions
that would have been imposed by the U.S. trade legislation amounted
to an interference in soviet internal affairs. The charac*_erizations
of the conditions clearly imply that the complaints are directed
at the provisions affecting Jewish emigration; specific refer?Ences
to tYie credit limitations have been few. Alelcsandr Bovin, ii.i an
article in IZVESTIYA on 19 January, which appears to have been a
keynote piece in this propaganda, described the conditions pis
"economically discriminating," "politically Impermissible," and
"insulting." The U.S. Congressional action was the more indefensible,
other commentators have asserted, in that the Sovie;: Union gave
repeated warnings that it would not accept such conditions, and
these warnings were reinforced by the U.S. Administration.
Vitaliy Kobysh, in a New Yorlc-datelined TASS dispatch in IZVESTIYA
on 18 January, observed sarcastically in this regard that only the
American people were surprised by the Soviet action. "The papers
kept telling their readers that the Russians would agree to any
concessions." Commentators have also quoted extensively from U.S.
public figures to support their contention that the Soviet action
was justified. President Furd, Secretary Kissinger, and two members
of the U.S.-Soviet Tradt and Economic Council, John Connor and
David KFUdall, have been cited as having expressed varying degress
of crir_icism of the U.S. Congressio~.al action.
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TBI5 TRENDS
22 JANUARY 1975
DETENTE Moscow has sought to limit the impact of its action by
insisting that the overal], conditions favoring detente
still prevail and that its own policy remains committed to the
encouragement of mutually beneficial relations with the United
States. Nevertheless, it i~as introduced a tentative note into its
assurances on this score by stressing the activities of detente
opponents in the West, and by noting that future progress depends
on the degree of cooperation shown by the United States, Bovin,
for example, noted that the U.S. Congressional action poses again
the question of the "19.mits of confidence," of the "minimum of
mutual understanding" without Wlilcll progress is impossible.
Both Bovin and oilier commentators, however, have insisted that the
Soviet commitment to detente remains unqualified. Anatoliy Krasikov,
in a TASS "International Revieeu" on 16 January ridiculing Western
speculation about a "sensational change" in Soviet foreign policy,
asserted that "no change has taken place. and none could take
place." The Soviet Union is still committed to detente, he said,
and is still committed to making it "irreversible." Aleksandr
Dr?uzhinin, in a Moscow domestic service broadcast on 20 January,
affirmed that the cancellation of the trade agreement carried no
broader implications, even in the sphere of trade itself. "The
Soviet Union is ready to cooperate with the United States in all
spheres," he said, providing only that it be on the basis of
equality.
OTHER PARTNERS A recurrent theme in Moscow's comment has been
the implied warning that a failure of the United
States to remove the restrictive conditions in its trade legislation
would result in a shifting of Soviet trade to U.S. competitors in
Europe and .Japan. This point was driven home by an article in the
London daily THE EVl;NIP1G HEWS on 15 January contributed by Victor
Louis, the reported agent for many of Moscow's more sensitive
foreign policy maneuvers. Louis, purportedly reporting opinion held
in Dioscow,wrote that anything the Soviet Union was going to get
from the United States could be obtained elsewhere. Noting that
Japan, France, and West Germany already were doing good business
with the USSR, including "the supply of America equipment produced
under license in their own countries," Louis a ,rted that it was
pointed cut in Moscow that Britain could suppl? ie USSR with
sophisticated equipment. Referring to the upcu,. ~g visit of
British Prime Minister Wilson to Moscow, Louis said it would be
possible to negotiate increased British trade with the USSR. He
added that Soviet trade organizations would have time "t~ reassess
the situation and draw up a list of orders that would have gone to
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS '!'RENDS
22 JANUARY 1975
the United States" which, lie observed, could set off a "trade
boom" with Britain. 1-linting access to high Soviet officials,
Louie claimed that "it was stressed" to him that the USSR's
"technical dependence on Amer:Lca has been 'greatly overestimated'
in the United States." This very point that West Europe should
now take advantage or the "propitious moment" to play its card and
intensify its economic cooperation with the Soviet Union has been
the thrust of much of- the Soviet comment on the cancellation of
the U.S. trade agreement, including the TZVESTIYA article by
A. Bovin.
EAST EUROPE ECHOES SOVIET THEMES ON TRADE-DETENTE ISSUE
Moscow's orthodox East European allies and Yugoslavia, in the
wake of Secretary Kissinger's 14 January press conference,
have defended with varying degrees of vigor Moscow's renunciation
of the 1972 U.S.-Soviet trade agreement. At the same time, there is
a tendency, particularly on the part of Budapest and Belgrade, to
downplay the seriousness of the impasse and to keep the door open
for possible reinstatement of the agreement on mutually acceptable
terms. There has been no comment so far from Poland--which, with
Yugoslavia, already enjoys most-favored-nation-treatment in trade
with the United states--or from Romania.
Emphasizing tl-at it was not the USSR which was hardening its stance
or acting contrary to the spirit of detente, a Raabe commentary in
the East Berlin domestic service on the 17th declared that Congress had
violated the Soviet-U.S. summit agreements by attempting to interfere
in the USSR's internal affairs. He cited the TASS commentary by
Krasilcov on the 16th which had pointed out that the Soviet side would
never consider posing preconditions regarding U.S, internal affairs.
Raabe stressed teat it was in America's own national and commercial
interest to have a workable trade agreement with the Soviet Union,
citing Jolin Connor, head of the Moscow office of the U.S.-USSR Trade
and Economic Council for the view that "the final word" on the trade
issue had not yet been spoken in the United States.
Similarly, an authoritative Dolezal article in the Prague party daily
RUDE PRAVO on the 16th took a hard line in denouncing "unacceptable"
features of the U.S. trade bill while predicting at the samr. rime that
"realism" would ultimately prevail in U.S, trade policy toward t;te USS R
and other socialist countries. The article mentioned only in passing
the "special discriminatory amendment" in the U.S. trade bill which made
implementation of the 5 July 1974 Prague-Washington agreement on return
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CONFIllEN'I'IAL FB15 '1'12ENDS
22 JANUARX 1975
of Czechoslovak gold conditional upon Prague's payment of 100 cents
on the dollar to settle U.S, citizens' property claims against
Czechoslovakia. The same issue of. itUUE PRAVO a:Lso reported tl;e
foreign committees of the two chambers of the Federal Assembly
as merely "regretting" the terms of tl~e amendment affecting
Czechoslovakia.
Budapest media's notably voluminous comment on Secretary Kissinger's
press conference showed characteristic concern both to support
Moscow and to keep East-West channels of communication open. Thus,
while llungarian Deputy Premier liuszar declared in a Budapest radio
interview on the 16th that the U.S. trade bill "does not suit our
conceptions ei~her," a Moscow correspondent's comment carried by
Budapest radio on the 19th was predominantly optimistic:
Discounting any "permanent" damage to detente, the correspondent
saw no signs of any change in plans for Brezhnev to visit the
United States this year and sign there a nuclear arms limitation
agreement. lie added that Soviet-U.S. trade could still develop to
some extent "even in the present conditions." The same correspondent.
in a 15 January broadcast, had concluded that the fact that the
Soviet stand was made public through an announcement by Secretary
Kissinger meant that the Soviet Union "does not wish to dramatize
the situation." On the 21st, MTI featured President Ford's state-
ment at his press conference that day to the effect that he expected
detente to continue and expand despite Poscow's cancellation of the
trade agreement.
Yugoslav comment similarly combined stern denunciation of alleged
"interference" features of the U.S. trade bill with assessments
that the overall progress of detente had not suffered any decisive
setback, Uniquely, the Ljubljana DELO on the 16th foresaw ar_ the
same time possible "serious internal political consequences" in the
USSR if the trade deadlock should be construed as a failure of the
peace policy spelled out by Brezhnev at the 24th CPSU Congress.
Tirana, in an 18 .1a^.:~ary ATA commentary, attributed Moscow's
cancellation of the 1172 trade agreement to chagrin over the public
exposure of an alleged U.S.-Soviet secret deal to exchange most-
favored-nation. status for the emigration of Soviet Jews.
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22 JANUARY 1975
CHIiVA
PRC CONGRESS NORMALIZES STATE APPARATUS, ELECTS OFFICIALS
'L'he T'RC's 4th National People's Congress (NPC), held from 13-17
January, has formalized state reforms produced by the cultural
revolution and generally confirmed as state leaders men who have
had much experience in the PRC bureaucracy. The leadership of
the State Council has been greatly strengthened by the naming of
12 vice premiers, including eight active Politburo members and
alternates. The new organs make only a token bow to youthful
activists, though the new constitution reiterates the principle
of leadership by "the old, the middle-aged, and the young."
Mao appeared neither at the Congress nor at the preceding party
plenum, held from 8-10 January. While actions taken by these
sessions formally enhance Mao's power:., they seem clearly
designed to insure an orderly succession when he ceases to be
politically active. As with the revised party constitution
adopted in August 1973, all references to Mao in the new state
constitution have beet dropped other than references to Mao
Tse-tung Thought.
The action of the party plenum in promoting Teng Hsiao-ping to
party vice chairman and of the NPC in naming Chang Chun-Chian
a vice premier seers designed to insure orderly civilian succession
to Mao and Chou. While neither man is necessarily in line for
the top spot himself, the party and state power wielded by the
two clearly overshadows that held by any other leaders under Mao
and Chou except for Vice Chairman Yeh Chien-ying, who as a military
leader is not thought to be eligible for the top party post. Yeh
was named defense minister by the NPC but was not made a vice
premier, presumably to signal the limits of his state control.
Like the 10th Party Congress in August 1973, the NPC was brief
and held in secret. Following completely the recommendations
made by the party plenum, tl:P NPC unanimously adopted all resolu-
tions on 17 January. On its first day, the session Beard a
report on the work of the government by Premier Chou ~n-laj, a
report on the constitution by Chang Chun-chiao (delivered on
behalf of the party), and received copies of the draft constitution.
None of the reports or documents indicated any changes from current,
moderate policy lines. Chang's..report was closely tied to constitu-
tional provisions. Chows report hailed the victory of the cultural
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22 JAPIUAI;Y 1975
revolution as the most Important event of t:lie Pa;;t 10 years,
but concentrated on elucidating }:he close relationship between
revolu!-1on and economic production. lle referred repeatedly to
P1ao's role in formulating poltcy and noted that the "primary
task" is to deepen the anti-Lin Pi.ao and Coni'ucius novement;
however, he did not indicate that mass movements would be
revived, rather stressing the need for sturdy and cat?re labor
on a regular basis as the tools for insuring proletariar, rule.
He noted that the masses must "deal steady, accurate and Bard
blows at the handful of class enemi.es," c~~refully reiterating
that "the emphasis" must be on "accuracy" in a clear attempt
to reduce indiscriminate attacks on :Leaders.
Cllou indicated that the 1974 grain Harvest was in the neighbor-
hood of 2G0 million tons, but he did not supply any hard figures
in enumerating PRC economic achievements. Chou stated that the
economic plan would proceed on lines ordered by I~1ao prior to
the 3d NPC 10 years ago: the economy will be developed in two
stages with the first stage due for completion by ].980 and the
second stage--putting China among the front ranks of developed
countries--completed by the end of the century. Chou claimed
that the current five-year plan would be successfully completed
this year and stated that the State Council would draw up a
10-year plan, five-year plans and annual plans to promote ful-
filling Iiao's goal.
STATE LEADERSHIP P..11 members of the Politburo except for
Mao, his chief bodyguard Wang 'lung-hsing,
and Chi Teng-hues appeared at the NPC session. Chi has made
no public appearances since early December and may also be with
Itao; he was once of the eight Politburo members made vice premiers.
NCNA's 18 January list of state leaders listed the vice premiers
in apparent party rank, with Teng first and Chang second, followed
by Li i-Isien-nien, who has alternated with Teng in performing Chou's
protocol duties while Chou has been in the hospital. Peking PLA
commander Chen Hsi-lien, the only active military leader among the
vice premiers, was listed next above Chi. Hua Kuo-?feng, ~vho was
also named minister of public security, was ma~'e a vice premier,
as was Chen 'Lung-kuei, the model peasant who led the Tachai
production brigade. Alternate Politburo member Wu iruei-hhien, a
former model worker from Shensi, was named China's first woman
vice premier. Non-Politburo members named as vice premiers were
two ministers, Yu Clriu-li and Ku I4u, former minister [fang Chen,
and Sun Chien, probably named as a bow to youth, who rose from
u.nlcnowr_ origins to become an alternate member of the Central Com-
mittee in 1973.
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CONFIllENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
22 JANUARY 1975
PIINISTERS: Of the 29 ministers appointed by the P1PC, over half
were already serving in their positions and three held the
identical positions prior to the cultural revolution. At least
seven were vice ministers of the same ministry or a predecessor
ministry before the cultural revolution and one Beaded anothe1~
ministry at that t:i.me. Three ministers identified since the
cultural revolution were replaced by the NPC. Une, Minister of
Sports Wang Meng, had not been identified by title since last
February, though he appeared as a -~:esponsible person of the
ministry in. September. Former Dlinister of Communications Yang
Chien, who was replaced by cultural revolution casualty Yeh Fei,
appeared as minister in December. Former Watar Conservancy and
Power Minister Chang Wen-pi was last identified in his post in
November. All had military baclcgrounds, though Yang Chien had
served in a civilian post in Kwangtung before coming to Peking,
and their departures may reflect continuing moves to reduce PLA
power in civil affairs. Not all of- the military men brought
into ministries during the cultural revolution tJere removed,
however. It is possible that they have chosen to resibn from
the PLA rather than leave their posts.
In areas which have been especially contentious since the
cultural revolution--culture and education--a Chiang Ching
supporter Yu Hui-yung was named minister of culture and an old
Chou En-lai subordinate Chou Jung-hsin was given the ministry
of education. Yu leas been on the cultural croup under the state
council and was named a deputy chief of the group, headed by
Wu Te, last year. Yu is the composer of two model operas and
has frequently praised Chiang Ching. In a speech reprinted in
RED FLAG in aay 1967, he noted Chiang's personal l~zder~hip over
culture and stated that in the model works, "Every word and sentence,
every tune and beat, is permeated with heart blood of Comrade
Chiang Ching." Chou served as secretary-;eneral of the State
Council prior to the cultural revolution and also held other party
and state posts.
Only two critical mi.nistries.are headed by Politburo members. Yeh
Chien-ying formally assumed control of the defense ministry, which
he has headed in fact since Lin's demise, and Hua Kuo-feng was
named minister of public security. Hua came up through the
bureaucracy~in Iiur_an and became the top official there in 1970. He
has spent most of his time in Peking in recent years and was elected
to the Politburo at the 10th Party Congress in 1973. Hua was
concurrently elected a vice premier by tre NPC, but Yeh was not--
apparently another sign of Peking's sensitivity about giving civil
power to military leaders.
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colvrlDLrrI~InL rBls TI~NDs
72 JANUARY 1975
NPC LZ;All);RSIiIP, LOCAL IL:PIt);SLNTn'"TVLS : Most of the NPC leadership
consists of aging, semi-retired Politburo members and former
members plus a sprinkling of minority nationality and women
representatives. NPC Chairman Chu Te and six of the vice chairman
are Politburo members or altcrnatest four of these leaders are
known to be in very poor health; two are members o:E minority
nationalities; the other is Peking chief 1.7u Te wllo is frequently
called upon to entertain foreign guests and may have been named
to the post to ease p1?otocol problems. Wu was also secretary-
general of the session, but follo~?aing the congress the NPC
Standing Committee named Cliff Peng-fee, former Chinese minister
of L-oreign affairs until last November, to the post. fix
former members of the Politburo were also made NPC vice chairman
as were other perennials, including Sure Yat-sen's widow Soong
Ching-ling, Li ru-chun's widow Tsai Chang, and Lu Hsun's brother
Chou Chien-j en. The only possible concession to the principle
~~
of old, middle-aged and young may leave been the naming of a
Shensi trade union official as a new vice chairman. Among the
members of the standing committee, youth was represented by
Chang Tieh-sheng from Liaoning, noted for "going against the
tide" on educational policy in the summer of 1973 and Lu Yu-?lan.
from I-lopeh, a young woman noted as a revolutionary rural leader.
There was some increase in the number of women named to the
standing committee, including the wife of purged Politburo
member Tao Clue, who did not himself reappear for the occasion.
Leery military region leader was elected a member of the presidium
of the NPC, as were most provincial first secretaries. Not
reported at the session were Ileilunglci.ang first secretary ldang
Chia-tao and Shansi first secretary Hsieh Chen-hua, c~ho have
apparently beets under attack in their provinces and have made no
pubJ.ic appearances since early last year other than in Pekiiib on
National Day. Tlie only other first secretary not elected to the
presidium, Tsingliai chief Liu IIsien-chuan, has been occupied with
other duties in Peking for years and may leave previously lost his
post; he made relatively few public appearances last year and
was identified only as a Central Committee member or as a PLA
official. Tsing~,ai second secretary and military district commander
Chang Chiang-lin was also not elected to the presidium.
CONSTITUTIONAL Although the new constitution conta=.ns no direct
CHANGES reference to "Chairman i~iao," it formalizes his
control over the military by placing the office
of the chairman of the CCP in command of the armed Forces, a power
which the previot~.s constitution, adopted in 1954, had given to the
now abolished post of head of state. By focusing on the institutional
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22 JANUGftY 1975
role of the office of the chairman of: the pa;:~y, rather than on
Iiao himself, the constitution appears aimed at providing the
frame;vorlc necessary for a smooth organi.zationaJ transition whin
I1ao eventually leaves the political scene.
'1'he new constitution drops all of the personal references to
Iiao which were contained in the 1970 draft constitution, a
document presumably bearing the imprint of Lin Piao, who has
been charged with building a cult of personality around 1-tao
in order to advance his own standing within tl~~e party and army.
Placing more stress on the ptt. ty's role in guiding state affairs,
the new constitution omits the draft's reference to I1ao as "head
of the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat" as well as
the draft's characterization of Iiao as L-l~e "supreme commander"
of the PLA. The constitution also fails to include the draft's
statement that it is one of the duties of PRC citizens tc "support
Chairman I~lao," substituting instead the need to "support the
leadership of the CCP." The conetitution~iiowever, officiaJ.ly
enshrines Iiao's Thought, noting that the party is tiie core of
leadership of the whole Chinese people and that ""?Tarxism-L~eninism-
Ilao Tse-tung Tlwught is the theoretical basis guiding the thinking
of our nation."
llISSENT: Aside from the low-keyed treatment given to 'tao personally,
the only other major difference in tine new constitution compared
with the 1970 ciraft version is a passage noting that citizens have
the right to lodge written or oral complaints to organs of state at
any level regarding "transgressions of law or neglect of duty on
the part of any person working in an organ of. state" and that no
one will be allowed to "Binder or obstruct the making of such com-
plaints or retaliate." The righr_ to file complaints without fear
of retaliation with hither level authorities was written into
the party constitution at the 10th party congress in August 1973
and a similar statement was also included in the list of rights
given PRC citizens in the 1954 constitution. Like the 1970 draft
version, the new constitution contains 30 articles compared with
the 106 articles of the 1954 constitution.
NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS: The section in the 1954 constitution
devoted to the office of the chief of state has been eliminated
in the new constitution. The former duties of Liu Shao-cliff, the
P1tC's las*_ chief of staE.e, remain within the NPC and presumably
will be exercised by Cliu 'I'e as IQPC chairman. By making the
chairman of the party the commander of the armed fences and by
eliminating the office of head of state, a post. Liu Shao-chi
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CONL~ 1a IsN'1'.I:AI. I:~'131.5 'I'IZI.NUS
lZ ,1l1Nl1Al;Y :L975
allegedly used as a ;-evil power center L-o the party, tl~e new
constitution atrenl;thcns the party's conL-ro.l ove~~ the government
rind wealcent; N1.'C powers. The NI?C may now, Cor exnrnnle, remove
llie prem:Ler only "on the propo~3a1 of. the C:entr.a]. Committee
of the CCI'." 'L'he PII?C also lppears to have .Lost its former power
to declare war and there is no mention of the Natl.ona]. i)efense
(;Ol1I1C:L.L, a mi1Lt-ary adv:Lsory group whi.cll had previously reported
to the NPC. NPC members ::r.e also no 1.on},er immune from arrest
and li;~ve lost the power to grant ann:esty,
The 1JPC does, however., retain its power to "appr.ove" the state
budget and it :ts sti:~l character9.zec1 as the supreme state
organ; although the new constitution carefully notes that thc~ NPC
functions under the "leadership of- the CCP." The length of
cF:f~ce for each A'PC leas boon increased from four to five years
which "may be extended under special circumstances." NPC sessions
are to be held each year, but may be "advanced or postponed" if
necessary. Under the 1954 constitution, Llie Pltl: vas described
as a multiparty "people's democratic" state witl- power belonginb
to the people as represented by the IVPC" and loci; assemblies.
Under the new constitution the PRC has officially advanced to
L-he stage of "a socialist state of the dictatorship of the
proletariat" with the working class exercising leadership over
the state "l-lirouhh its vanguard, the CCP."
ECUNOhIIC PROVISIONS: The constitution does not call for any
radical change in thn r'cono;nic policies which leave been in force
for the past several years. '~'he production r,am remains the basir_
accounting unit within L-he commune, and the farming of small plot:
for personal needs as well as a ].imiL-ed amount of 'iouseliold side-
line production will be continued. S:Lnce the PRC is now a "socialist
state," the new constitution has dropped the 1954 guaL~ntees of
handicraft rights and the right of. inheritance. Tlie new constitution
also recognizes only two kinds of ownership, socialist ownership
by the whole people and socialist collective o~,mership by the
working people. The 1954 constitution had granted the right of
ownership by individual working people and capitalist ownership.
REVOLUTIONARY COPII~IT'i'TLF5: The revolutionary committee system,
which was set up during the cultural revolution, will form the
basis of anew system ~f local government, devolutionary committees,
which are usually headed l;y party leade.~s, are to function as the
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standing committees f:or the yet to be elected 'local people's
congresses and pis local government organs. Revolutionary
committees members cuila be "elected and subject to recall" by
the local people's congresses. The committees and their
members are also accountable to the state organ at the ne:a
1-igher level. Local people's congresses and revolutlonary
conmrittees are to Mork together to approve local economic
plans, :+afeguard the r.:i.gltts of: citizens and "maintain
revolutionary order."
JUSTICE, ]2IGHTS Or CITIZENS: The Western concept of due process
under the iaw is given short shrift in the new constitution which
places local fudges under the authority of people's congresses and
revolutionary committees. The "mass line" is to be followed in
trying cases and the previously specified right of the accused
to legal d. fence leas been ot~,it::~d in the new constitution.
PRC citizens apprently have lose the right of "equality before
the law" as guaranteed in the 1954 constitution, but leave gained
the "freedom to strike," a provision Chang Chun-?chiao specifically
noted in his report on the constitution to the NPC as having
been "proposed" by Ilao liimselt. Citizens also now enjoy freedom
to believe or not to believe in religion as well as the freedom
to "propagate atheism." All nationalities leave the freedom to
use "t:heir own spoken and written languages," but the new consti-
tution fails to reaffirm the right of mi~iorities to "develop"
their. langr.~ages and it dropped a passage from the 1954 constitution
granting minorities the right to "preserve" their Habits and
customs. Autonomous regions will, However, be allowed to
continue as organs of self-government for minority rationalities
and to "exer_ise autonomy within the limits of their authnr.ity
as prescribed by law."
CHOU EN-LAI NOTES DANGER OF WAR BUT SEES NO THREAT TO PRC
Chou En-lai's report to the NPC reflected an evolution of the
vi.e.ws lie had presented in his report at t11e 10th party congress
i.ri August 1973--iris last comprehensive discussion of foreign
affairs. His NPC report was particularly notable for its image
of a world situation markedly favorable to China. Chou did
give more credence to the possibility that contention between the
superpowers could lead to world war, but leis remarks were couched
3.n a theoretical framework and did not picture China as threatened.
He assessed Sino-U.S. relations in positive terms, but lie bluntly
characterized Sino-Soviet relations as at a standstill.
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22 JANl1AKY 1975
WORLD VIEW Chou departed in two respects from the PRC line
on world war ,.incl revolution that has been standard
1'or almost five years. ile said that the "fierce contention"
between the Un:l.tecl States and the Soviet Union "i.s bound to lead
to world war some clay," and he was equ].voenl as to whether war or
revolution was more likely, saying th;.tt "the factors for both
revolut].on and war ar..~ increasing." lly contrast, C1-ou at the
1Otlt party congress had quoted the passage in Mao 'Tse-lung's
20 May 197(1 statement that while "the danger of new world war
still exists," revolution a~inst .imperialism is the "main trend"
in tite world today. '1.'he Mao formulation has been f.reyuently
quoted in authoritative Chinese comment up Lo the present.
Reflecting his balrtnced view of war and revol.utj.on, Chou appeared
sanguine about the strength of the 7.'hird World, and he declared
that "whether war paves rise to revolution or revolution prevents
war, in either case the int-e.inational. situation will develop in a
direction favorrtble to the people ." This assertion is
similar to Lin Piuo's remark at the 9th CCP Congress in April
1969 when he cited a Ma.; quotation to the effect that either
world war wi.11 give rise ro revolution or r.evolul?lon will prevent
war.
Chov's remark on the inevitability at some future time of a
military confrontation between the two superpowers seemed aimed
primarily at disparaging the notion of possible U.S.-Soviet
relaxation of tensions under the cover of detente. At the
same time, he voiced continued support for Peking's flexible
foreign policy appru~ch under the banner of Mao's "revolutionary
line in foreign affairs," and he gave hei.gh~ened attention to
improving ties with the developed countries of the so-called
Second World. Thus, he offered Peking's highest level
endorsement for West European unity against superpower threats
and bullying;, and voiced Chinese readiness to p-omote friendly
relations with Japan on the basis of the 1p72 Sino-Japanese
statements. Chou reaffirmed China's intention never to he a
superpower, its solidarity with the Third World, and its intention
to uphold proletarian internationalism. He also promised to
enltanr_e ties with "socialise- ccuntries."
SINO-U.S. RELATIONS Chou echoed Iris assessment at the party
congress that Sino-U.S. relations "Dave
improved to some extent" over the past three years. However, he
added a phrase giving credit to the United States as well as to
~e ror recent background on this subject, see the TRENDS of
1.5~ January 1975, pages 17-18.
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22 JANUARY 1975
the PRC, stat?ing L?hat improvement had been achieved through
";joint efforts of both sides,'' Though Chou notcxl that "there
exist fundaments]. differences between C1-ina and the United
States," he expressed confidence +~~~at bilateral relations Drill
continue to improve so long as the two countries carry out
":In earnest" the principles of the Shanghai communi~;ue.
Chows assurance stands in contrast to his def:ensJVe 1973
assessment of PRC ties with Washington, when he had gone to
great lengths to rationalize the need for "necessary compromises
between revolutionary countries and imperialist countries."
SuggestinE that at that time he was having some difficulty
;justifying Sino-U.S. detente to more rigid ideologies at home
or abroad, Chou at the party congress had cited Leninist
scripture to distinguish Peking's new policy from Soviet
collaboration with Washington. Observing that "there are
compromises and compromises," Chou had hammered leis point home
by invoking Lenin's conclusion of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty
and contrasted it with the "doings of Khrushchev and Brez`anev"
as "betrayers of Lenin."
Chou in his much shorter NPC report did not repeat his 1973
references to U.S, "defeats" in Korea and Vietnam and to the
"decline" of U.S. power over the past generation. And,
although he continued to list the United States ahead of the
Soviet Union in commenting on the ~uperl~owers, he dropped x:11
reference to "U.S. imperialism," which lead been cited frequently
in leis 1973 report. The premier gave only routine atter.t.ion to
Taiwan, reaffirming determination to "liberate" the island while
calling on "fellow countrymen" on Taiwan to join in the liberation
struggle.
SING-SOVIET REiATIONS Though his discussion of the USSR was
shorter and less polemical than his
anti-Soviet diatribe at the 1973 party congress, Chou characterized
Sino-Soviet relations as at a standstill, openly attacked Soviet
"deception" on the border issue, and challenged Moscow to meet
Chinese demands concerning the frontier. Chou accused the "Soviet
leading clique" or ha-~ing betrayed Marxism-Leninism and of having
taken a series of actions--including subversion and provoking of
armed clashes along the frontier--to worsen state relations with
China. In his first public dis~ussior~ of the Sino-Soviet border
talks since they began in October 1969, Chou repeated charges
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which were contained in the Chinese message to tl;e USSR on the
6 November October Revolution anniversary and in an article: in
the December issue of the Chinese journal HISTORICAL 5TUDIL.S.*
Chou claimed that Moscow is totally responsible for the lack of
progress because it has refused to adhere to the PRC-USSR
underst:,~nding reached during the September 1q~9 Peking meeting
between Chou and Kosygin that led to the start of the formal
border talks. He said that the understanding included an accord
on mutual non-aggression and non-use of force, as well as
agreement to withdraw forces from disputed border areas.**
Chou said that Moscow has refused to do anything about with-
drawing from disputed areas, and has even denied the existence
of disputed border areas. He accused the Russ:.ans of talking
profusely about "empty treaties" on non-use of force and non-
aggression in order to deceive Soviet and world opinion, and
advised Moscow to stop its "deceitful tricks," negotiate honestly
and. "do something" to solve "a bit" of the border problem.
* The charges in these pronouncements are discussed in the TRENDS
SUPPLEMENT of 10 January 1975 "Peking Ends Silence on Border Talks,
Assails Moscow's Stance."
i This marks the first time Chinese willingness to consider a non-use
of force and non-aggression pact with the USSR under terms of the
alleged Chou-Kosygin understanding has been reported to the Chinese
people. It had been publicized earlier by Peking in the 6 November
1974 PRi; message to the USSR, but that message was never publicized
for tl-e Chinese domestic audience.
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CUNI.~ illliNl'lAL
N~IllULE kA~~f
ll JANUARY :1.975 ~'
M'JSCUVJ ASSAILS Al_LON VISIT, U,S~-ISRAELI "PRESSURE" ON ARABS
Sovl.et COlmllellt on Tsraell foreign Minister. A].:1on's :lS-17 January
talks in Washington has disiaissecl any idea that- the discussions
might contribute to improved prospects for new Israeli-Egyptian
and/or Israeli-Jordanian negotial-ions. Rather, hl~scow typically
has viewed the All.on talks as the latest- ~a a tong series of
Israeli requests for increased financial and military assistance.
In this context, Soviet- media have denounced an alleged U.~.-Israeli
joint strategy of "comprehensive intimidation" designed to impose
disadvantageous bilateral arran;aments on individual Arab states
by exertinb a var.icty of psychological and military pressures on
them. As in other comment i.n past months, Moscow has also continu..~d
to convey resentment at being left on the diplomatic sidelines,
accusing Washington and "1'el Aviv of seeking through "partial solutions"
to postpone, if nut prevent altogether, a comprehensive Mideast
settlement at a reconvened Geneva conference.
PARTIAL AGREEMENTS Soviet comment on the Allon. visit has
continued to expound on t-ht dangers to Arab
unity posed by ill-intentionc~i proposals for "interim" solutions,
indicating that Egypt was the primary--and perhaps receptiv~a--target
of such approaches. I'LVL'STIYA's Koryavin, in a Beirut dispatch
on the 14th, pointed out that Arab press coverage of A11on's visit
emphasized the danger to the pan-Arab c~~tuse presented by "a so-called
'stage-by-stage' or 'interim settlement."' And a Moscow domestic
servic^_ commentary on the 17th, dismissing as "publicity fuss"
various Western media reports of new Israeli negotiating flexibility,
cited file Syrian AL-BA'Tll as charging that Tel Aviv's po?icy aimed
at creating "the appearance of movement toward peace" by means of
partial withdrawal, a plan the paper assessed as "unacceptable in
principle."
PRAVDA's i~tternational review on the 19th, reported that day by
Moscow radio's Arabic service, noted "comers swirling around" that
Allows visit might be followed soon by a U.S. announcement along
the lines that "Israel has agreed to withdraw a few kilometers
further from the Sinai and Jordan River in exchange for political
concesr,ions from Cairo and Amman." PRAVDA deno~inced this idea for
its om~~.ssion of Syrian and Palestinian interests and f.or its aim of
dividing t-he Arab confrontation states by offering them "individual
deals." A hiayevskiy article in PRAVDA on tl~e 18th, along the same
lines, charged that *_he United #tates was striving to "neutralize"
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22 JANUARY 1975
Egypt by offering it certain concessions from Israel and isolating
it from united acr_ion witl- Syria and ether. Arab countries.
SADAT INTERVIEW Moscow's handling of a recent interview by
President as-Sadat served to reinforce Soviet
criticism of the "U.S.-Israeli step-by-step approach," citing the
president as rejecting unilateral agreements, but p7.aying down his
indication of- willingness to consider a new set of negotiations
on Sinai. I;1tAVDA's Cairo correspondent Glukhov, in a dispatch
in the paper on the 18th, asserted that as-Sadat had "reiterated
that Egypt rejects a unilateral agreement. with Israel on the Sinai
peninsula" and that Cairo insists on such a withdrawal taking place
in the next three months "accompanied by simultaneous withdrawal
from occupied Syrian and Jordanian territories." liowever, in the
interview, published In the 16 January Beirut AN-NAIlAI2, as-Sadat
was quoted as saying that although the next withdrawal must be on
all three fronts within three months, "Egypt considers it tre~ison
to refuse, for any reason, any occupied Arab land which the enemy
returns to us."
While seemingly disinclined to acknowledge this statement, Glukhov
did cite an 18 January Cairo AL-AHRAM editorial which, he said,
"explained the Egyptian position." Glukhov reported AL-AHRAM as
saying that Egypt did not reject the principle of a phased solution
or "any opportunity for getting back the Arab territories." liowever,
according to Glukhov, the editorial declared that Cairo "categorically
opposes a partial or. separate settlement with just one of the Arab
states" and firnily asserted that Egypt "will not tolerate maneuvers
that undermine the main objective."
KISSINGCR VISIT, 1`Ioscow has given bare,;t acknowledgment of the
FORD STATEMENTS possibility of anew Kissinger visit to the
rli.ddle East. A TASS dispatch on the 18th,
reporting the conclusion of Allon's Washington talks, noted that
the Israeli foreign minister had said that Secretary Kissinger
"accepted 'in principle' an invitation to visit Israel after he
manages to coordinate a new 'interim' agreement with ~:gypt."
TASS added that Allon had emphasized that there had beEn no U.S.
pressure "whatsoever with the aim of persuading Israel into
starting earnest negotiations or taking some def;.nite attitude"
on them.
Reporting President Ford's interview j.n the 20 January issue of
TIP~E magazine, a TASS English dispatch on ~'~e 13th noted that in
answering a question on the t`lideast situation and the U.~. and
Soviet roles, the President responded t?:at the USSR wants "to refer
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CONFIDENTIAL FIIIS TRENDS
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these matters to the consideration" of the Geneva conference (the
President actually said the USSR "wants t o throw all of these issues
into Geneva"). TASS quoted the President as saying that "we do
not rule out Geneva at a point, but we feel that in the interim
before we go to Geneva we ought to try and malts some other additional
progress on a step-by-step basis."
A TASS English report on President Ford's 21 January press conference
cited hits as saying that the danger of war in the area was "very
serious" and in order to avoid that "we are maximizing our diplomatic
efforts." TASS summarized part of the President's remarks on U.S.
arms deliveries to Mideast countries, observing that he "upheld the
pc~'.icy of intensifying deliveries of U.S. armament to the Middle
)vast," primarily to Israel, "justifying" that by the need to maintain
the internal security of the various countries as well as to
"maintain military equilibrium."*
* TASS on the 21st reported a New York TIMES item on the Allon aid
discussions, highlighting the reportedly three-fold increase in the
military-economic aid request ar.d noting that the new two-billion-dollar
total had been exceeded only once before in the history of U.S.-Israeli
relations.
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CONI'IlllsPJ'I'IAL 1~BI5 '1'ItLNllS
22 JANUARY 1975
CYPRUS
USSR CITES GREED PROTESTS AGAINST TURI