TRENDS IN COMMUNIST MEDIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000200160028-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 35
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 19, 1999
• Sequence Number: 28
• Publication Date: December 24, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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FBI~i FOREIGN BROADCAST
INFORMATION SERVICE
Trends in Communist Media
+~ieniia~
24 DECEMBER 1975
(VOL. XXVI, NO. 51)
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This report is based exclusively on foreign media
materials and is published by FBIS without coordination
with other U.S. Government components.
NATIONAL SECURITY INFOF,MATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
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Automatically duelusified
six months from date of issue.
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 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
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CONTENTS
ANGOLA
Moscow Reacts Cautiously to U.S. Criticism of Soviet Actions. . .
1
CUBAN PARTY CONGRESS
Castro Touts MPLA, Demands U.S. Apology for "Murder" Plots. . . .
3
PARIS ECONOMIC CONFERENCE
USSR Decries "Socialist" Absence at "North-South" Talks . . . . .
6
PACIFIC DOCTRINE
USSR Sees U.S. Plan To Shore Up Aaian Presence, PRC Support . . .
9
USSR-JAPAN
Moscow Hits Japan Military "Buildup," Ties With United States . .
10
EAST-WEST RELATIONS
USSR Five-Year Plan Foresees Expanded Foreign Economic Ties . . .
12
MIDDLE EAST
USSR Note Hits U.S. Stand on PLO, Agrees to Talks on Geneva . . .
14
VIETNAM
DRV Releases American Bodies; Pham Van Dong Sees Congressmen. . .
17
Speech on Anniversaries Notes Plan To Merge Front Groups. . . . .
1,
CAMBODIA-LAOS
Lao Delegation Receives Warm Welcome During Phnom Penh Visit. . .
19
PRC-TAIWAN
Peking Releases More Ex-KN',' Officials, Permits Taiwan Return. . .
21
COMMUNIST RELATIONS
French, British CP's Question Soviet Treatment of Dissidents. . .
22
USSR
Debate Grows on Issue of Central Vs. Regional Planning. . . . . .
24
(Continued)
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CONTENTS (.CONTIr'u.D)
Chinese Leadership; Reappearance of AgiL:prop Official;
Moscow on OPEC Incident; European CP Co.' -ference Preparations. .
. 27
Moscow, P
eking Broadcast Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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24 DECEMBER 1975
ANGOLA
MOSCOW REACTS CAUTIOUSLY TO U.S. CRITICISM OF SOVIET ACTIONS
Moscow media thus far have reacted circumspectly to high-level U.S.
criticism of the Soviet role in the Angolan civil war and continue
to reflect reluctance to publicly acknowledge the nature and extent
of Soviet military involvement in the conflict. However, Soviet
news reports on President Ford's 19 December statement acknowledged
for the first time that he has criticized Soviet policy toward
Angola. In recent weeks, Moscow propaganda had directly attacked
UN Ambassador Moynihan for his statements censuring Soviet involve-
ment in Angola, but had avoided reporting similar criticism at a
higher level by Secretary of State Kissinger.* As of this writing
Moscow media had not yet been heard to acknowledge Secretary
Kissinger's 23 December press conference, in which he reiterated
the Administration's intention to counter Soviet intervention in
Angola.
Soviet caution was apparent in its careful media handling of
President Ford's 19 December statement deploring the U.S. Senate
decision to cut additional funds for Angola and his press confer-
ence remarks on the 20th, in which he warned that the involvement
of the Soviet Union in Angola with weapons and Cuban troops was
harmful to detente and destroyed any opportunity for improved
U.S.-Cuban relations. President Ford's 19 December statement was
noted by Moscow radio on the 20th and in a TASS report in PRAVDA
on the following day, but the Soviet accounts did not acknowledge
his specific references to Soviet introduction into Angola of
Cuba troops and massive amounts of military equipment. While
observing generally that the President's statement contained
"remarks unfriendly to the Soviet Union and its policy toward
Angola," PRAVDA carefully avoided explicit criticism of the
President. It noted instead that "certain political circles in
the United States" would like to "hide their support for armed
intervention in the People's Republic of Angola (PRA) by deliberat-
iag on the so-called threat of Soviet intervention and so forth."
A 21 December TASS English dispatch from Washington on the
President's press conference the previous day made no mention of
his remarks on the Soviet Union, merely reporting that he had
"admitted" the United States was "undertaking secret actions in
* For a discussion of earlier Moscow comment on Angola, see the
TRENDS of 17 December 1975, pages 1-2.
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Angola." The President's comments on Cuban involvement were
reflected, however, in the 23 December TASS English account of
Fidel Castro's speech on the 22d to the closing session of the
Cuban party congress. `PASS reported that Castro "dwelt on a
recent statement by President Gerald Ford to the effect that
Cuban aid to the Angolan people closed the prospect of improving
relations between Cuba and the United States," and it said that
Castro responded that Cuba would "never renounce solidarity with
the Angolan people and will continue rendering support to their
struggle." TASS did not report Castro's admission that Cuban aid
to "progressive and revolutionary movements in Africa" has
included weapons, men, and military instructors.
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CUBAN PARTY CONGRESS
CASTRO TOUTS MPLA, DEMANDS U.S. APOLOGY FOR "MURDER" PLOTS
In speeches winding up the first congress of the Cuban Communist
Party (PCC), Prime Minister and PCC First Secretary Fidel Castro
scored President Ford's warning that Cuban involvement in Angola
"destroys any chance" for improved bilateral relations, and he
vowed to continue "to help by all possible means, and with all
possible means, the heroic people of Angola." Rejecting U.S.
warnings on Cuba's support for Puerto Rican independence as
well, he said that "we will never abandon our brother Puerto
Ricans, even if there are a hundred years without relations with
the United States." And Castro demanded, in turn, that the
President apologize for the "unscrupulous, dirty, obscene manner
in which that state has devoted its time to planning the murder of
Cuban revolutionary leaders." The Prime Minister's remarks
underscored earlier indications that he is holding a firm line
on foreign policy and showing no willingness to make concessions
in order to further U.S.-Cuban relations.
Castro's tough words climaxed the 17-22 December congress, attended
by 86 foreign delegations, including a Soviet contingent led by
CPSU Politburo member Mikhail Suslov. China, which had been
harshly criticized during a June 1975 conference of Latin American
communist parties in Havana, did not send any representatives. The
congress featured a "main report" which took Castro the best
part of two days to read. It focused primarily on domestic issues
but also discussed details of U.S. attempts to assassinate Cuban
leaders--a subject heretofore played down by Cuban domestic media.*
Castro touched only very briefly on Angola in his main report, but
he did explain that "the starting point" for Cuban foreign policy
was support for "national liberation of the peoples," and he
promised that Cuba would "continue to fulfill its duties toward
the world revolutionary movement."
ASSASSINATION PLOTS In his 17-18 December formal report to the
congress, Castro dealt at length with
reported CIA-backed plots to assassinate Cuban leaders, reading
extensively from the U.S. Senate committee report on the subject.
Castro said that "these activities have no precedent in the history
* Castro's discussion of domestic issues and other matters dealt
with at the congress will be discussed in a forthcoming issue of the
TRENDS or a SPECIAL REPORT.
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of any modern state" and added that "they show the cynical, rotten
and perverse makeup of imperialism." He added, however, that
"we consider the revelation of the report a positive move by the
Senate committee" even though "much information was omitted because
of pressure from the CIA itself and from the President's office."
In his 22 December speech at a public rally--which followed
President Ford's 20 December warning on Angola--Castro again
referred to the plots, and this time had much harsher words for
the President. He dismissed as insignificant President Ford's
"cancellation of his hypothetical hopes for improvement of
relations" and focused instead on the assassination attempts
as proof of "how uncivilized they are, what barbarians they are,
and what criminals they are." Indicating that it was the
United States--not Cuba--which should make amends, Castro said
that "what Ford has to do is send apologies to the Cuban Revolutionary
Government for the dozens of crimes that were planned by the CIA
for many years against the leaders of the revolution."
ANGOLA Directly addressing publicly the question of Cuban
involvement in Angola for the first time on the closing
day of the congress, Fidel Castro said that the Cuban revolution's
early survival had depended upon outside help and that Cuba
consistently had offered similar aid--"sometimes we have sent arms,
other times we have sent men"--to other members of the "revolutionary
family." Castro claimed that "imperialists" aimed at seizing
control of Angola's oil-rich province of Cabinda or, if possible,
gaining control of all Angola, and that "in order to carry out
that plan the U.S. Government unleashed the South African troops
against Angola" and "the CIA organized the FNLA." The Prime
Minister stated flatly that "we will not just stand there" but
"will continue helping the Angolan people" against this "very
stupid" U.S. policy.
Referring specifically to the President's 20 December warning that
Cuba's support for the MPLA "destroys any opportunity" for improved
relations, Castro rhetorically asked "what does imperialism want,
for us to break with this [revolutionary] family?" He vowed that
"at this price, there will never be relations with the United States."
Castro's comments amplified the Cuban regime's recent public
justification of its Angolan involvement, an issue which earlier
had been ignored or sidestepped in public statements.* For example,
* Havana's earlier treatment of Angola is discussed in the TRENDS
of 26 November 1975, pages 14-15.
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Cuba's UN Ambassador Ricardo Alarcon, in a 10 December speech
reported by the Havana domestic service, had asserted that "Cuba
has always aided all African liberation movements, among them
the MPLA," and that "helping the legitimate Angolan government
is an obligation that Cuba has fulfilled and will continue to
fulfill."
PUERTO RICO Prime Minister Castro also ridiculed U.S. "outrage"
at Cuba's support for Puerto Rican independence,
portraying U.S. complaints about a recent Havana-sponsored
conference of solidarity with Puerto Rico as another ineffectual
"threat."* As President Dorticos had done at the solidarity
conference, Castro promised that "we will never renounce our
solidarity with Puerto Rico," and, falling back on old rhetoric,
added that "this is the new Cuba, it is a different country, and
until they get that in their heads I do not see the likelihood
of improving our relations."
* Cuban President Dorticos' comments following Secretary Kissinger's
9 September criticism of Cuban support for Puerto Rican independence
are discussed in the TRENDS of 10 September 1975, page 23.
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PARIS ECONOMIC CONFERENCE
USSR DECRIES "SOCIALIST" ABSENCE AT "NORTH-SOUTH" WAS
In comment on the 16-18 December ministerial-level Conference on
International Economic Cooperation (CIEC) in Paris, Soviet commenta-
tors have expressed Moscow's first complaints about the lack of
"socialist" representation in the Western-Third World dialog.
Despite this sudden intimation of affront that the Soviet role
has been overlooked, Moscow has still shown little enthusiasm to
become entangled in the wrangling between the industrialized and
underdeveloped countries. During the year-long discussions leading
up to the CIEC, Moscow has seemed content to stand aloof and
criticize the West for trying to dictate to the Third World, while
piously proclaiming the benefits of the USSR's economic relations
with foreign countries on the "basis of equality and mutual
interests."*
The mainstream of Soviet comment on the 21-nation CIEC has continued
to follow previous patterns in questioning the West's sincerity and
voicing support for the "economic independence" of the developing
countries. Comment has expressed skepticism that any results could
be expected from the work of the four CIEC commissions, which are to
discuss energy, raw materials, development and financial problems
during the coming year.
"SOCIALIST" ROLE It is unclear why Moscow suddenly chose to call
attention to the absence of a socialist repre-
sentation at the "North-South" dialog. While the complaints suggest
Soviet sensitivity to exclusion from a major forum, Moscow's diffi-
dent approach has stopped well short of any expression of a genuine
desire to participate. Moscow might merely be moving to cover the
bets, staking a claim should the negotiations prove fruitful but
avoiding involvement if--as Soviet commentators anticipate--they
bog down over inherent "contradictions."
The most explicit previous suggestion of Soviet interest in partici-
pating in such international conferences came in Foreign Minister
Gromyko's April 1974 speech at the UN General Assembly special
* Soviet comment on preparations for the conference is discussed in
the TRENDS of 22 October 1975, pages 6-7.
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session on raw materials. Gromyko then voiced support for the
discussion of world economic problems "within a broad circle of
states" and professed Moscow's "readiness to participate in both
bilateral and multilateral discussions." But Moscow did not follow
up Gromyko's suggestion in subsequent comment. Brezhnev, in his
9 December speech at the Polish party congress, while speaking
generally in the European context, also touched on the idea of
"international conferences." After complaining about actions by
Western "circles" contrary to the spirit of the Helsinki declaration,
he asserted the socialist otates' readiness for "concrete actions"
and went on to remark favorably--if ambiguously--on European con-
gresses and international conferences on cooperation on the environ-
ment, transportation, "energy, and so on."
The first of the complaints about socialist exclusion came on the
eve of the conference, in a foreign-language commentary by Dmitriy
Vasilyev on 15 December. Vasilyev asserted that the conference
organizers were claiming to "solve world problems" even though they
failed to invite "the forces of peace." Underscoring the "extremely
important" role of the socialist countries in world affairs, Vasilyev
concluded that no international economic or political problems could
be resolved without the "views, voice and participation" of the
socialist countries.
The most authoritative comment came from IZVESTIYA's Vikentiy
Matveyev, on Moscow radio's weekly observers roundtable program
on the 21st. Matveyev asked rhetorically how pressing economic
problems could possibly be examined in a "broad international
context" without the participation of the socialist countries.
Noting that French President Giscard d'Estaing referred in his
conference opening speech to the absence of socialist countries,
Matveyev failed to press the issue, ignoring Giscard's remark on
"considering ways that they can be informed of our work or invited
to participate." He seemed instead more interested in questioning
Western motives, asserting that "obviously" the Western countries
had "set themselves goals which did not wholly coincide with those
they proclaimed from public tribunes." Elaborating on his suspicions,
Matveyev pointed out that the Western delegations at the conference
"started dictating their claims" and "demands" to the developing
countries.
In a commentary on Moscow's domestic service on the 20th, Vladimir
Dmitriyev took a somewhat different tack, this time suggesting Soviet
interest through the device of citing unnamed "objective observers
and the democratic press in the West" to the effect that the "estab-
lishment of the new international economic order is not possible
without the socialist community'. A Georgiy Skorov article in
PRAVDA on the 21st accused the West of trying to solve--"in its own
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interests, of course"--only one issue, that of oil prices, while
"creating the appearance" of conducting an in-depth examination
of world economic problems. Skorov charged that the West hoped
to achieve this aim by shifting the discussion of these problems
from the "broad forum" of the United Nations to a conference with a
"far more limited and carefully selected group of participants."
Claiming that the contradictions evident at the Paris conference
showed the irreconcilability of Western and developing countries'
economic interests, he concluded that "only with the participation
of all interested states" could world problems be solved.
COMMENT ON CIEC Moscow uniformly portrayed the three-day Paris
meeting as contributing nothing to bridging the
gap between the Third World and the West. A 19 December PRAVDA
article by B. Orekhov and V. Sedykh typically described the West
as "patently not interested" in constructive solutions to the problems
of the developing countries. And Skorov in his 21 December PRAVDA
article echoed other commentators in asserting that the west was try-
ing to play off the backward states against the oil exporters by
blaming the latter for oil price increases and inflation.
Comment also stressed the inability of the two sides to agree on
guidelines for the four commissions. (The conference cochairmen
and commission cochairmen are to meet 26 January in an attempt to
reconcile the Western insistence or flexible guidelines and the
Third World insistence on specific agendas.) Predicting tha'- the
"difficulties are just beginning," TASS'Yevgeniy Yegoruv contended
on the 19th that the Western delegations had aroused the "legitimate
suspicions" of the developing countries regarding the work of the
commissions. Similarly, Dmitriyev's 20 December Moscow domestic
service commentary said "Paris observers" characterized the compromise
to hold the January meeting as "fragile and ambiguous" and declared
that "many complicated problems" remained to be solved.
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PACIFIC DOCTRINE
USSR SEES U.S. PLAN TO SHORE UP ASIAN PRESENCE, PRC SUPPORT
Soviet media have been strongly critical of the new U.S. "Pacific
Doctrine" announced by President Ford In a 7 December speech in
Honolulu, with press comment alleging that the United States was
seeking through the new doctrine to reverse the decline of its
military presence in Asia.
Betraying sensitivity to the President's exclusion of the Soviet
Union from his list of countries considered important for guaranteeing
security in the Pacific area, Moscow commentators have complained
that the new doctrine attempts to set some Asian countries against
others, and that a realistic plan for a stable peace in the area
should incorporate all states, as does the Soviet-backed proposal
for an Asian collective security system. Soviet media have
asserted that Peking supports the U.S. Pacific Doctrine and
implied that Sino-U.S. discussions on the matter may have
occurred during the President's early December visit to the Chinese
capital. (Monitored Peking media are not known to have even
mentioned the Pacific Doctrine thus far.)
The most significant commentary so far, by IZVESTIYA observer
Vladimir Osipov on the 16th, noted the "choice of potential
parties" to the U.S. plan and concluded that Washington was
apparentl;' attempting to "reanimate military-political blocs and
rejuvenate its military presence in Asia." Osipov suggested a system
of collective security incorporating all states in the area as an
alternative. PRAVDA's Vladimir Larin said the same day that
the rebirth of a policy tailored to the interests of only a
"narrow group of countries" was contrary to the "main trends of
international development."
Osipov linked the Pacific Doctrine and President Ford's China visit,
claiming unambiguous if tacit approval of it by Peking. In this
connection he cited White House preq' ;secretary Nessen's comment
to journalists in Peking that they would be "making a mistake" to
concentrate solely on Sino-U.S. disagreement over detente, since
"there are many other factors in relations between the United States
and Chini." Radio Moscow broadcasts to China and the rest of Asia
have stressed Sino-U.S. agreement on at least the spirit of the
Pacific Doctrine: one coimnentary said it was "not just coincidence"
that the doctrine was proposed just after the President's visit to
Peking. Soviet commentary on the Sino-U.S. summit had emphasized
Sino-U.S. accord on the need for a continued U.S. military presence
in Asia as well as their disagreement on detente.
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USSR-JAPAN
MOSCOW HITS JAPAN MILITARY "BUILDUP," TIES WITH UNITED STATES
Soviet media treatment of Japan on the eve of USSR Foreign Minister.
Gromyko's Japan visit scheduled to begin 9 January has continued a
consistently hard line, including Moscow's standard portrayal of
Japan as a potential threat to Asian peace, evidently with a view
to discouraging Japanese hopes of any Soviet concessions on disputed
issues. Recent comment was highlighted by a 17 December RED STAR
article harshly critical of Japan's Self-Defense Forces(SDF), and
a 21 December radio commentary beamed to Japan, also critical of
the SDF, which argued that the Pacific Doctrine presented by
President Ford in ionolulu on 7 December was a thinly veiled
attempt by thre United States to reinforce its position in Asia
by strengthening its military ties with Japan.
The RED STAR article went beyond standard Soviet criticism of
increases in Japanese military spending by specifically charging
that "militarist circles" in Japan were attempting to intercere
in Soviet-Japanese relations, which RED STAR characterized as
"developing positively on the whole." The article claimed the
SDF were being educated in the ideas of "revenge" and "anti-
Sovietism," and charged that the Japanese military was being
prepared for the possibility of "military aztion against the
armies of socialist states in close interaction with U.S. troops."
Citing a trend toward "glorification" of the campaigns and
traditions of the Imperial Army and the rehaifiliLation of "war
criminals," the article suggested that the growth of the SDF was
connected to an ideological revival of Japan's "militaristic past,"
In line with Moscow's inflexible stand on the issue for the past
few years, RED STAR also accused Japanese "military propaganda" of
conducting a "revanchist campaign" for the return of the northern
territories--islands off Hokkaido claimed by Japan but held by
the Soviet Union since the end of World War. I1.
The 21 December Moscow radio commentary to Japan, lumping
together "opponents of detente" and proponents of strengthening
the SDF, charged that these supporting an SDF buildup were
"importing" the Pacific Doctrine, which it labeled an attempt by the
United States to "revive" its "military-political bloc" with
Japan's help. The commentary claimed that recent comments by
Japan's Defense Agency head indicated that the government had.
charged its views on the possibility of sending Self-Defense
Forces overseas, notably to Korea.
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Earlier, a report by an IZVESTIYA commentator broadcast by
Moscow radio on 19 December charged that the flight of U.S.
11-52's to Okinawa in November--described by U.S. spokesmen as
a typhoon evacuation flight--had been a "preliminary notice of
the announcement of the Pacific Doctrine," and claimed that by
urging Japan to help finance projects in South Korea, including
the modernization of the South Korean army, the United States was
creating a "Tokyo-Seoul channel" which it intended to use for
its "selfish purposes" within the framework of the Pacific Doctrine.
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EAST-WEST RELATIONS
USSR FIVE-YEAR PLAN FORESEES EXPANDED FOREIGN ECONOMIC TIES
The draft guidelines for the USSR's 1976-80 five-year plan indicate
that; Soviet leaders still consider valid the premises of the land-
mark April 1973 CPSU Central. Committee plenum decision to expand
greatly the role of foreign trade in the Soviet economy.* The
guidelines, published in the Moscow papers on 3.4 December, acknowledged
that such expansion would require improvements in the qualicy and
competitiveness of Soviet goods produced for export, and they
revealed that possible organizational changes to facilitate foreign
trade are still under discussion. Decisions made at the April and
December 1913 plenums had brought forth a .,blic campaign by Soviet
leaders and prominent economic officials justifying efforts to expand
economic and scientific interchange with the West that lasted into
early 1974. Since that time, however, little has been heard from
Moscow on the subject, and major structural changes to facilitate
trade have yet to be announced.
The Central Committee guidelines revealed that steps were planned to
achieve a "broader participation by the Soviet Union in the inter-
national division of labor," including a further expansion of trade
and scientific-technical cooperation with advanced Western economies,
"taking into account the present relaxation of international
tensions." The guidelines acknowledged that Moscow hoped to
utilize foreign economic ties in the solution of internal economic
tasks and in "accelerating scientific-technical progress." They
spoke specifically of possible measures to improve the "planning,
management and organization" of foreign trade, including an increased
role to be played by "branch ministries and departments."
From the April 1973 plenum until early 1974, prominent Soviet
economists such as N.N. Inozemtsev, director of the Institute of
the World Economy and International Relations, and Oleg Bogomolov,
head of the Institute of Economics of the World Socialist System, wrote
major articles for the Soviet press which advocated greater Soviet
participation in the "international division of labor" and frankly
acknowledged what the Soviet economy stood to gain. They argued that
the increasingly global nature of economic and social problems made it
impossible fo-- any one country to solve them on its own. Some economists
spoke of the need to increase the direct role of relevant ministries and
industrial associations in foreign trade, thus arguing implicitly for
* Internal debates on Soviet policy in this area are discussed in the
FBIS SPECIAL REPORT, "Pressures for Change in Soviet Foreign Economic
Policy," 5 April 1.974.
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24 DECEMBER 1975
a diminution of the virtual monopga.y enjoyed by the Ministry of
Foreign Trade. Brezhnev, though more cautious than the institute
spokesmen, lent support for the campaign in speeches through the
summer of 1973 as in a West German television address in May
rejecting the concept of autarky, and during his June visit to
the United States when he acknowledged bureaucratic resistance
to needed changes.
Other spokesmen, including CPSU Secretary Konstantin Katushev ::t1d
Central Committee section chief Sergey Trapeznikov, countered At
tire time with warnings of the political and ideological dangers
inherent in expanded interchange with the West. By the summer of
1974 public discussion of possible internal changes to facilitate
foreign economic ties had virtually disappeared, though a general
emphasis on expanded trade remained.
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MIDDLE EAST
USSR NOTE HITS U,S. STAND ON PLO, AGREES TO TALKS ON GENEVA
Moscow, in an official not(. to the U.S. Government on 18 December
and in related media comment, has continued to urge resumption of
the Geneva Mideast confer''ice, at the same time holding that U.S.
opposition to participat:L1U by the Palestine Liberation organization
makes resumption of the conference "impossible." The note Is
the latest in the Soviet ??U.S. exchange on the Geneva talks,
initiated by Moscow in rf 9 November note which called for resumption
of the Geneva conferenc'. with PLO participation "from the very
beginning," and followed by a U.S. note of 1 December which suggested
a preparatory meeting of the originri. Geneva participants and
expressed readiness to hold bilateral consultations with the Soviet
Union. The current Soviet note confirmed Moscow's rejection.--
clearly implied in a speech I?./ Gromyko on 2 December--of the U.S.
idea of a preparatory meeting; but it indicated Soviet agreement
with what it called "the U.S. proposal to hold bilateral consulta-
tions on matters connected with the resumption of the Geneva
conference."
At the same time, Moscow is continuing to play up endorsements of
PLO participation at Geneva in a continuing series of discussions
with Arab states and Palestinians. Thus, TASS on the 23d reported
that Gromyko received a Jordanian delegation for talks in which
both sides "stressed the necessity" of resuming the Geneva talks,
with the presence of PLO representatives "from the very beginning."
And a Moscow Arabic-language report on the 12-19 December USSR
visit by a delegation of the Popular Democratic Front for the
Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP), headed by its secretary general,
Nayef llawatimah, said the delegation noted the "great importance"
of the 9 Noveuiuer Soviet note to the United States calling for
resumption of the Geneva conference with PLO participation.
PLO ROLE The 18 December Soviet note, continuing to press for
AT GENEVA Geneva talks with PLO participation, dismissed the
U.S. argument that no decision on Palestinian
participation was taken at ttie original conference in December 1973.
"Naturally," the Soviet note said, "this cannot be a reason against
solution of this question now." Moscow claimed that the U.S.
position on the PLO "makes it, in fact, impossible to convene the
Geneva conference." And it asserted that Washington's stand
contradicted the proclaimed U.S. approval for reconvening the
Geneva conference.
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24 DECEMBER 1975
The note in effect argued that the PLO's "broad international
recognition" justified its participation at Geneva and maintained
that the Soviet position offered "the most effective method tot
the cardinal solution" of the Mideast problem on the basis of
"appropriate" UN decisions. Moscow offered no comment on the
view expressed in the U.S. note that Security Council Resolutions
242 and 3.38 should serve as the basis for negotiations and that it
would be inappropriate to introduce other resolutions "not
accepted by all parties." Soviet commentators have tended to
avoid offering any views on periodic Arab suggestions to alter--
or replace--Resolution 242 so as to obtain a reference to
Palestinian rights.
The Soviet note also brushed aside the U.S. suggestion that, "as
a practical way of proceeding," a preparatory meeting of the
original participants could discuss "agenda, procedures, and the
matter of participation in a subsequent full conference."
Offering the same objection that Cromyko had made on the 2(1 at a
dinner honoring the visiting Kuwaiti foreign minister, the note
said the U.S. proposal to hold "some sort of preparatory conference,"
again without PLO participation, indicated an intention to avoid
convening the Geneva talks.
U.S.-SOVIET Despite its objections to the U.S. stand on the
CONSULTATIONS PLO, the Soviet note conveyed Moscow's concur-
rence with the U.S. proposal to hold bilateral
talks with the USSR "on matters connected with the resumption"
of the Geneva conference. The U.S. note had in fact contained
two references to the possibility of bilateral consultations:
one had indicated U.S. readiness to discuss with the USSR "how
best to prepare the agenda and procedures for a reconvened
conference and to deal with the question of participation in
the conference"; the other reference had stated U.S. readiness,
in the context of proposing a preparatory conference, to consult
with the USSR "in advance of such a preparatory conference."
TALKS WITH PDFLP Moscow apparently gave no publicity to the
recent USSR visit by a PDFLP delegation
other than a report, broadcast in Arabic on the 19th, on the
conclusion of the visit. Soviet media have only infrequently publi-
cized Soviet contacts with the PDFLP, one of the three main
"moderate"groups in the PLO (together with Yasir 'Arafat's Fatah
and the Syrian-backed as-Sa'iqah, led by Zuhayr Muhsin). PDFLP
leader Hawatimah, head of the recent delegation, apparently
also led a "military-political delegation" to Moscow in November
1974, actor,?ing to Beirut's AN-NAHAR on 5 November last year.
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Moscow briefly acknowledged that visit in an Arabic broadcast a
week later, noting that it had beer. under Afro-Asian People's
Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) sponsorship. Additionally, the
Lebanese Communist Party organ AN-NIDA' reported on 20 March 1975
that a Hawatimah-led delegation held talks last spring with a touring
AAPSO delegation led by the Soviet deputy chairman of AAPSO,
V. Kudryavtsev. In a 15 April IZVESTIYA article on the
Palestinians, Kudryavtsev described lHwatimah as "a politically
experienced and erudite figure" with whom he had "very useful
talks, profound in content."
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24 DECEM.3ER 1975
V I E T N A M
DRV RELEASES AMERICAN BODIES; PHAM VAN DONG SEES CONGRESSMEN
The DRV's release of the remains of three American pilots on 21 December
has occasioned a reaffirmation by DRV Premier Pham Van Dong of Hanoi's
longstanding demands for implementation of the Article 21 provision
of the Paris agreement calling for U.S. aid in the postwar reconstruc-
tion of Vietnam. The Premier voiced the now standard DRV condition for
normalizing relations with the United States at a meeting with the
House delegation from the Committee on Missing Persons in Southeast
Asia,following their attendance at the Hanoi repatriation ceremony.
In the VNA report of the meeting with the Premier, Pham Van Dong
assured the delegation that "responsible DRV organs" would continue
searching for information on American personnel still missing, but at
the same time he repeated Hanoi's demand for U.S. aid. According to
the VNA account, the U.S. Congressional delegation "also saw the U.S.
responsibility . . . and obligation" to heal the wounds of war in
Vietnam. A much briefer Hanoi radio version of the repatriation
ceremony and the Pham Van Dong meeting did not, however, cite the
delegation's agreement in this regard.
The names and vital statistics of the formerly missing American pilots
involved were originally publicized in a 22 April 1975 VNA report,
which noted that the same information had been sent earlier that month
to Senator Kennedy as a further response to a letter he had written
to DRV Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh. Trinh's initial answer to
Kennedy--dated 21 January but not released by VNA until 16 March--
contained the disclosure that the DRV was taking positive action in
finding missing Americans and noted that "DRV services" responsible
for such a task were in existence.*
SPEECH ON ANNIVERSARIES NOTES PLAN TO MERGE FRONT GROUPS
Hanoi has marked its three major December anniversaries with standard
propaganda, including reports on a 20 December meeting jointly marking
the 31st anniversary of the army, the 29th anniversary of "national
resistance," and the 15th anniversary of the founding of the National
Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSV). The intention in
the future to merge the South's NFLSV with North Vietnam's comparable
* For a discussion of Nguyen Duy Trinh's reply to Senator Kennedy's
letter, see the TRENDS of,11 June 1975, pages 6-8.
1
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front organization, the Vietnam Fatherland Front (VFF), was
revealed in a speech at the Hanoi meeting, but available media
reports of the Saigon celebration of the NFLSV anniversary on the
19th took no note of the planned merger, and were concerned
mainly with eulogizing the NFLSV's past achievements.
The announcement of the prospective NFLSV-VFF union came in a
speech by Nguyen Van Tien, head of the PRG Special Representation
in Hanoi, who followed Vietnam Workers Party (VWP) Politburo
member and Chief of Staff Van Tien Dung to the podium at the
Hanoi celebration. According to Nguyen Van Tien, the NFLSV is
now making every effort to fulfill the "last task" in its
political program--"the peaceful reunification of the fatherland."
Once this is accomplished, Tien declared, "the NFLSV will be
happy and proud to merge with the VFF so there will be a strong
and firm national united front."
The 20 December Hanoi meeting marking the anniversaries wac
essentially a low-keyed affair, with VWP Politburo members hoang
Van Hoan and Van Tien Dung the highest-ranking members of the DRV
hierarchy present. Although the usual keynote speaker, Defense
Minister Vo Nguyen Giap, was away attending the Cuban party
congress, past practice suggests that a greater turnout of
Politburo members would have been expected. The 1974 Hanoi
meeting observing the 30th anniversary of the army was attended
by the top Politburo members, including Le Duan, Truong Chinh,
Pham Van Dong, and Vo Nguyen Ciap--who keynoted the festivities.
The 1973 joint celebration in Hanoi of the army anniversary and
Resistance Day was marked by the presence of Truong Chinh, Pham
Van Dong, and Van Tien Dung. The highest-ranking member of the
DRV leadership to attend the 1973 and 1974 Hanoi celebrations
of the NFLSV anniversary was Hoang Van Roan.*
The southern celebration of the NFLSV anniversary in Saigon
commanded a full turnout of the top southern leadership, including
VWP Politburo member and COSVN Secretary Pham Hung, NFLSV Chairman
Nguyen Huu Tho, and PRG President Huynh Tan Phat. The 20 December
Saigon radio report--the longest version available--of the main
speech delivered at the Saigon meeting by Nguyen Huu Tho indicates
that he broke no new ground and hewed to the standard rhetorical
line in his discussion of the spring victory and the need to
socialize the South.
-~ The anniversary celebrations for 1973 and 1974 are discussed
in the TRENDS of 28 December 1973, pages 14-17, and 24 December
1974, pages 10-12, respectively.
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C APIBOD I A- LAOS
LAO DELEGATION RECEIVES WARM WELCOME DURING PHNOM PENH VISIT
The Cambodian and Lao media have given cordial and extensive
attention to the 15-18 December official visit to Phnom Penli by
a Lao party-government deitgation led by LPDR Premier and
Minister of Foreign Affairs Phoun Sipaseut. The visit was the
first such high-level exchange between the two countries since a
Cambodian delegation, headed by RCNU Deputy Prime Minister Khieu
Samphan, visited Laos in June 1974.*
The Lao delegation was greeted on its arrival on 15 December
by RGNU deputy prime ministers Khieu Samphan, Ieng Sary, and
Son Sen. On the same day it had talks which Phnom Penh radio
said were replete with "profound sentiments of great friendship,
militant unity, and revolutionary brotherhood" and which included
"all members of the Cambodian cabinet present in Phnom Penh."
That evening there was a banquet for the delegation attended by
RGNU Prime Minister Penn Nouth and addressed by Ieng; Sary and
Phoun Sipaseut. Phnom Peuh reported that the delegation had
"cordial talks in an atmosphere permeated with a Lopirit of great
friendship and militant unity" with Ieng Sary on the 16th, and
had a conversation "in an extremely cheerful, cordial and warm
atmosphere" with Penn Nouth, Khieu Samphan, Ieng Sary, Son Sen,
and other- RGNU officials on the following day. A joint communique
on the visit was signed on 18 December and broadcast in full by
the Cambodian and Lao radios on the 19th.
Phnom Penh's extensive and cordial media treatment of the Laotian
visitors is comparable to that which it gave to visits by Cambodia's
own delegation, headed by Khieu Samphan and Ieng Sary, to China
and North Korea last August. Such treatment also contrasts with
Phnom Penh's cursory attention--confined to a terse 3 August com-
munique--to a visit to Cambodia by a Vietnam Workers Party delegation
headed by First Secretary Le Duan, the only other high-level foreign
leader known to have paid an official visit to Phnom Penh since its
"liberation" in April.**
* The 5-8 June 1974 visit by Khieu Samphan to the Lao "liberated
area" is discussed in the TRENDS of 3 July 1974, pages 9-10.
** The Cambodian delegation's visits to China and North Korea are
discussed in the TRENDS of 20 August, pages 12-14; Le Duan's visit
to Cambodia is discussed in the TRENDS of 6 August 1975, pages 16-17.
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JOINT COMMUNIQUE The 18 December joint communique on the visit
was notable for the warmth of the language
used to describe relations between the two sides, going beyond the
cordial language used in the press communique marking Khieu Samphan's
June 1974 visit to Laos. The present communique expressed "satis-
faction" with the talks, said to be held in an atmosphere of "mili-
tant unity and fraternal friendship," and called the visit
"completely successful." It noted that Lao-Cambodian friendship
"has never been blemished" and that both sides "unanimously
respect" each other's territorial integrity on the basis of the
present border. The communique pledged both sides to develop their
mutual relationship "in all fields" and to strengthen "the long-
standing great friendship and militant unity" between them. While
the press communique on Khicu Samphan's and Ieng Sary's 1974 visit
had described that visit as "crowned with success," it had hailed
the state of Lao-Cambodian relations with less overall enthusiasm,
describing the talks at that time as only "cordial."
Phnom Penh and Radio Vientiane accounts of the 18 December joint
communique differed slightly in their rendering of some passages,
although it is not clear whether the discrepancies were deliberate.
Thus, the Phnom Penh version maintained that both U.S. bases and
the "Lao and Cambodian traitors" in Thailand constituted a "threat
to the peace and security of Laos and Cambodia," while Vientiane
cited only the U.S. bases as such a threat. Similarly, the Lao
text demanded that "the camps of the Lao and Cambodian traitors
in Thai territory be dismantled," while the Cambodian version
maintained that "no remnants of the Lao traitors and Cambodian
traitors be allowed in Thailand." Both accounts called for the
removal of U.S. bases from Thailand and reiterated standard
expressions of willingness to "live in peace and friendship with
the Thai people."
Phnom Penh radio had not previously referred to the problem of
Cambodians living in Thailand, but the issue of foreign bases in
Thailand had been addressed in the 31 October Thai-Cambodian
communique establishing bilateral diplomatic relations, in which
both sides agreed to refrain from allowing the use of their
territory "by any third country in any form" in violation of the
five principles of peaceful coexistence.* Prior to that, Phnom
Penh had last referred to the issue of U.S. bases in Thailand in
criticizing U.S. policy over the Mayaguez incident last May.
* The Thai--Cambodian communique is discussed in the TRENDS of
5 November 1.975, pages 24-25.
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24 DECEMBER 1975
P R C - T A I W A N
PEKING RELEASES MORE EX?-KMT OFFICIALS, PERMITS TAIWAN RETURN
China's third release this year of former Nationalist officials
was disclosed on 23 December in an NCNA report that Chinese
"judicial organs" had decided to pardon 72 high-level military
and political leaders of the former Kuomintang government on the
mainland. The current move follows Peking's release in March
of almost 300 former KMT "war criminals" and its freeing in
September of 144 "agents" of the Taiwan government captured
during raids on the PRC in the 1960's.* Peking has noted in each
case that those pardonc3 were free to return to Taiwan and that
they would be provided with travel expenses, reflecting Chinese
efforts to publicize PRC support for such unofficial interchange
and to discredit Taipei's policy opposing contacts with the mainland.
As in previous announced pardons, the 23 December NCNA report noted
that those released--identified this time as "all former ::uomintang
party, government, military and special agency personnel at or above
the county or regimental level"--had made "varying degrees" of
progress in reforming themselves under the "lenient" CCP guidance.
It said that all would be given citizenship rights and assigned
jobs, while those who wished to return to Taiwan were free to do
so and would be provided with "conveniences." Like the previous
pardons, Peking's most recent release was depicted as an expression
of China's stability and unity.
BACKGROUND Following its release of former "war criminals" in
March, Peking gained considerable propaganda mileage
out of Taipei's unwillingness to accept 10 of those released who
had gone to Hong Kong seeking permission to return to their families
in Taiwan. In the wake of the September release of former Nationalist
agents, Taipei moderated its past opposition and announced that
former agents who managed to "escape" the mainland would be received
at special "reception centers" set up on some of the ;mall, Taipei-
controlled offshore islands. NCNA reported on 8 October that
60 of the released agents left Amoy harbor that day by boat for
Quemoy island, in order to return to their families on Taiwan.
Subsequent low-level PRC media comment attempted to undercut Taipei's
surprise acceptance of those released, claiming that the former
agents' reception on arrival in Quemoy amounted to their being placed
under arrest, as they were forced to disembark in single file, "their
hands over their heads," and that they were "frisked" by heavily armed
nationalist soldiers and taken away in military trucks under heavy
escort.
* The release in March is discussed in the TRENDS
of
19 March
1975,
pages 27-28, and the one in September is reviewed
24 September 1975, pages 17-18.
in
the TRENDS
of
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COMMUNIST RELATIONS
FRENCH, BRITISH CPIS QUESTION SOVIET TREATMENT OF DISSIDENTS
Longstanding tension between the CPSU and the French and British
communist parties has flared up anew over the issue of Soviet
treatment of dissidents and conditions in Soviet prison camps.
The current Soviet-French party dispute was triggered by the
showing on French television of a program on Soviet prison camps
which clearly disturbed the French communists, while the British
Communist Party's criticism of the Soviets is centered on Russian
dissident Andrey Sakharov's charges concerning political prisoners.
On the day following an 11 December French television program on
Soviet prison camps, a French Communist Party (PCF) Politburo
statement coupled its criticism of French television officials'
motives in showing the program with a declaration that if Soviet
authorities did not publicly refute the conditions portrayed in
the program, the PCF would express surprise "and most formal
reprobation." It added that "such unjustifiable conditions could
c.ily be harmful to socialism and to the fame the Soviet Union has
justifiably won" throughout the world.
Moscow's annoyance over the PCF statement was registered in an
Alekseyev commentary reported by TASS late on the 18th and pub-
lished in PRAVDA the next day. The commentary, entitled "Gross
Fabrication," followed up its criticism of the French television
program with the remark that "it is even more surprising that some
persons who have always given a due rebuff to anti-Sovietism and
anticommunism were taken in" by the program and thus wittingly or
unwittingly promoted the spreading of the alleged provocation. The
PCF kept the controversy alive with a direct response to the
Alekseyev commentary in an article in L'HUMANITE on the 20th which
asserted that, while the PCF has always fought anti-Sovietism, it
could not condone the survival of "Stalinist" conditions in Soviet
prison camps, adding that the French party considers socialism to
be inseparable from "ever-increasing freedom for all members of
society."
Perhaps encouraged by the PCF's outspoken stance, the British
Communist Party daily MORNING STAR on the 23d similarly coupled
a criticism of Soviet dissident Sakharov's latest book with a
demand that the Soviet Governmer_: give "an authoritative answer"
to Sakharov's charge that there are 2,000-10,000 political prisoners
in Soy*iet prison camps, in addition to "even more" suffering for
their religious beliefs. The paper cited the British Communist
Party program document, "The British Road to Socialism," for the
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24 DECEMBER 1975
assertion that suppression of political expression and religious
freedom is intolerable, harms socialism, and helps its enemies.
While the tso Western parties' independent proclivities had been
relatively muted in the years following their expressed disapproval
of the 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia, these parties
during the past year have figured prominently in the controversy
surrounding the preparation of a document for the proposed European
communist party confe-.ence. The French party (PCF) on 17 November
joined the Italian Communist Party in issuing an apparently
gratuitous joint statement underscoring the principle of autonomy
of communist parties and rejecting "all" interference.*
* See the TRENDS of 26 November 1975, pages 3-4.
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24 ULC:I.MBgR 1.975
USSR
DEBATE GROWS ON ISSUE OF CENTRAL VS. REGIONAL PLANNING
11
There has been recent evidence in the Soviet media of a rising
debate between advocates of strong central ministries and their
opponents, who favor greater authority at the regional level.
Some of the evidence suggests the possibility that in the current
round--unlike the last public debate on this issue In 1972-73--
the regionalists may now be on the offensive and presenting a
growing challenge to the centraliuts, with the regionalists perhaps
inferring that they have support from Brezhnev, whose recent pub-
lished statements touching on the question appeared sympathetic
to the Idea of greater latitude for regional planners. Such a
challenge also would be consistent with the continutug decline in
support for the 1965 Soviet economic reform, a reform that had been
accompanied by the restoration of a system of strong central
ministries. The current round in this debate was touched off
by an article in the October issue of KOMMUNIST by Ukrainian
planning official A. Yemelyanov, who argued for increased authority
for republic planning organizations at the expense of central
branch ministries.*
The debate centers on the so-called "branch principle" of planning--
in this context, meaning the strong all-union ministries for
individual branches of industry that were reestablished in
September 1965 with the abolition of the regional administrative
bodies (Khrushchev's sovnarkhozes). While this restoration of
ministries corrected the "localism" Inherent in the sovnarkhoz
system, according to many complaints it has also allowed central
ministries to ignore local interests. This trend appeared to
reach a peak in 1972-73, when some central officials, who already
were: frequently ignoring or overriding regional officials' rights,
proposed totally eliminating the regional planners from the
planning process.
Local planners reacted sharply to the centralizers' campaign and
have increased complaints about the neglect of territorial planning
under the present branch planning system, citing as examples the
construction of new plants by central ministries without the
approval of local a?sthorities, and without considering or providing
for the impact on local housing, schools, labor resources and
* For details on the Yemelyanov article, see the TRENDS of
19 November 1975, pages 20-22.
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24 DECEMBER 1975
environment. Thu local planners are advancing their cause under
the bcn.ner of "complex territorial planning" to overcome narrow
"departmental" planning inherent in the branch system. As indi-
cated by RSFSR Gosplan Deputy Chairman N. Zenchenko in the June
1975 PLANNED ECONOMY, some local officials arc directly urging
creation of new planning organs for local economic regions.
RECENT ARTICLES The public debate, directly revived by Ukrainian
plenningofficial Yemelyanov's October KOMMUNIST
article arguing for a reversal of the present system by giving
regional planners preference over branch planners, has been followed
by other, if less polemical, articles on the subject.
The November issue of Gosplan's organ PLANNED ECONOMY carried four
articles on territorial planning. In one, air Armenian, R. Badalyan,
complained that the republics' complex plans are presently compiled
only after ministry plans already have been confirmed and that
hence the republic plans were simply a projection of ministry
figures. To restore republican authority, he called for simultan-
eous preparation of ministry and republic plans. (The Yemelyanov
article had gone further, urging that republic plans be actually
prepared first and ministry plans then based on them.)
V. Meleshchenko, director of the RSFSR Gosplan's planning institute
for the Northwest region, wrote in PLANNED ECONOMY about Leningrad's
complex regional plan--the USSR's first such plan. He explained
that work on it had begun in 1972, after Brezhnev had publicly
endorsed the idea in December 1971, and that despite difficulties
caused by lack of progress on the new national five-year plan it
had been completed and approved by the USSR Gosplan in May 1974.
This same issue of PLANNED ECONOMY also carried a review of a 1975
book on territorial planning by V.F. Pavlenko, who urged strengthen-
ing of republic planning authority. One of the reviewers was
V. Kistanov, who had ignited the 1972-73 public debate by proposing
that republic borders be changed to facilitate economic planning.
Centralizer Kistanov was critical, but he conceded that Pavlenko
was not as extreme as some in trying to substitute "regional
economics" (which he explained as the "economics of individual
regions") for the economic approach to geography (placing economic
efficiency above regional boundaries). Kistanov noted that "the
concept of 'regional economics"' has become "quite widespread"
recently.
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- 26
This issue of PLANNED ECONOMY also reported on a conference con-
cerning territorial and branch administration which heard various
proposals on how to improve consideration of territorial. interests
and change the present branch-dominated system.
On the other hand, the branch principle was defended by A.I.
Gladyshevskiy in the November-December issue oi. the Academy of
Sciences' ECONOMIC SERIES (No. 6). Citing Cosplan Chairman
Baybakov's warning in the March 1974 PLANNED ECONOMY that the
complex approach to planning should not be set against: ':he branch
principle, he argued that despite the growth of complex planning
and the "possibility of creating new organizational forms" of
complex planning, the branch principle would retain its importance.
He approved of the present situation wherein, he explained, complex
plans are compiled only after branch plans and can at most only
bring about some amendments to branch plans, and he declared "the
task is not to abolish or alter the branch principle" but to improve
coordination of branch plans.
BREZHNEV, PODGORNYY, From the record, it would appear that all
KOSYGIN STANDS three top Soviet leaders--Brezhnev, Podgornyy
and Kosygin--oppose any, shift of power to
regional organs. In the wake of the 1972-73 public debate, Brezhnev
at the December 1973 Central Committee plenum declared that "we will
continue to uphold the branch principle of administration," and only
days later, Podgornyy in a 26 December 1973 speech denied that there
would be "any kind of radical reorganization of the present system
of administration" since "the branch rinciple has stood the test
of time." As for Kosygin, he was closely associated with and
actually announced the original restoration of the branch principle
at the September 1965 plenum.
Nevertheless, Brezhnev in his December 1.973 speech balanced his
endorsement of the branch principle with a statement that "it
should be improved, territorial aspects should be more fully con-
sidered, and more attention given to interbranch questions." His
December 1973 statements, only recently made public with the
issuance of Brezhnev's collected economic speeches in mid-1975,
may encourage decentralizers to press their causes. Moreover,
there are good reasons to suspect that Brezhnev would favor some
shift of power to territorial organs, since this would increase the
party apparat's influence over economic decisions and thereby reduce
Kosygin's power, and it would also enhance Brezhnev's popularity
among regional politicians. Furthermore, as evidenced by the
Meleshchenko article, Brezhnev is credited with sponsoring Leningrad's
"complex plan for economic and social development"--the most-
publicized example of complex territorial planning.
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NOTES
CHINESE LEAffERSHIP: Recent PRC media reports have shed some light
on the current status of several Chinese leaders. NCNA's 21 December
report on the Peking funeral for Politburo member. Kang Sheng, who
passed away on the 16th due to a prolonged illness, revealed that
Vice Chairman Wang 1-lung-wen has retained his number three ranking
in the central party hierarchy after an unexplained stay of at least
five months in his old Shanghai bailiwick. Wang headed the list
of all active Peking-based Politburo members turning out for the
funeral. The report on Kang's funeral also listed Chou Jung-hsin,
the minister of education, as attending the ceremony. Chou,
reportedly under poster attack for his outspoken criticism of
cultural revolutionary educational reforms, was listed without a
title along with several other "leading members of departments"
under the central committee. In PRC provinces, a 19 December
Chengtu report on a mobilization rally on rural work identified
former Kwangtung party leader Chao Tzu-yang as Szechwan's new
party chief. Chao had disappeared from public view last October,
-,!hen Politburo member Wei Kuo-ching was transferred from his
post as party chief in Kwangsi to become the top party man in
Kwangtung. The transfers appear to be part of a larger plan
designed to fight provincialism and to strengthen central party
control. A new rehabilitee was revealed in a 20 December NCNA
report, on an Albanian military delegation visiting in Nanking,
which indicated that Wang En-mao has reappeared and been given the
post of deputy political commissar of the Nanking Military Region.
Wang, the top party and military leader in Sinkiang for many years
prior to the cultural revolution, had not appeared publicly since
1969.
REAPPEARANCE OF AGITPROP OFFICIAL: Agitprop first deputy head
G.L. Smirnov, whose name disappeared from the press several months
ago, was mentioned again in the 19 December PRAVDA, where he was
identified as deputy head of a Central Committee section while
addressing a Higher Party School course. This would indicate that
he has not been removed as acting Agitprop chief, as was suggested
in a 5 December TRENDS Supplement article, but had apparently
just dropped out of sight for an unusually long time. Prior to
this PRAVDA report, Smirnov's last reported activity in the press
came at the end of June--nearly six months ago. Since becoming
Agitprop deputy head in late 1969, he had never gone unmentioned in
the press for more than two or three months, and his name had
usually appeared at least once a month. While apparently still
holding his post, Smirnov's continued leadership of Agitprop these
past months seems questionable, as other deputy heads have been
conducting conferences at which Smirnov normally would have been
expected to preside.
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MOSCOW ON OPEC INCIDENT: Criticizing the 21-23 December terrorist
incident in which OPEC oil ministers were kidnapped from the
organization's Vienna headquarters, Moscow media were quick to
stress that the Palestine Liberation Organization was not
involved. Soviet comment insinuated at the same time that anti-
OPEC "circles behind the terrorists" included the United States
and international oil monopolies. The criticism is in line with
Moscow's longstanding opposition to international terrorism. Moscow
has also been sensitive to publicity about pro-Palestinian inter-
national terrorist acts that might. implicate the PLO and discredit
it as a politically responsible organization. As with past
terrorist acts, Soviet media this time have mainly replayed
Palestinian and Arab comment to dissociate the PLO from the
episode and cast suspicion on the United States. For example,
Moscow domestic and Arabic broadcasts on the 22d cited in particular
a statement by the PLO political department head, Faruq al-Qaddumi,
describing the attack as part of a broader "imperialist and Zionist"
operation to destroy OPEC. Similarly, TASS on the 23d publicized
a PLO statement released in Vienna alleging that the attack
was "backed by the United States and Israel" to discredit the
PLO prior to the UN Security Council debate :);i the Mideast question
in January. Additionally, a commentary in Arabic by A. Zlatorunskiy
on the 22d strongly suggested U.S. involvement, stressing an
"increasing resentment of OPEC by imperialist circles and
international monopolies" in past months and recalling in this regard
"threats of military invasion" against Arab OPEC member states.
EUROPEAN CP CONFERENCE PREPARATIONS: The apparent disarray
surrounding preparations for the projected all-European conference
of communist parties was demonstrated by the holding of an
unscheduled--and evidently inconclusive--meeting in East Berlin
on 16-19 December of the editorial commission charged with working
out a final conference document. A cryptic East Berlin radio
report on the 19th said only that the editorial commission had
ended a four-day meeting and had "agreed to continue the work" on
the conference document "at the beginning of next January." There
had been no mention of a scheduled December meeting in the
communique issued at the end of the 17-19 November editorial
commission session in the GDR capital. That communique had said
that the commission would meet "next" in January to consider a
revised document and discuss a date for the final conference. TASS
on the 16th, however, portrayed the December meeting as having been
convened in accordance with an "agreement reached at the November
meeting" of the editorial commission. Progressively lower-ranking
Soviet delegates have attended the last three preparatory sessions:
An October "working group" meeting was attended by CPSU Politburo
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24 DECEMBER 1975
Approvo
Candidate and Secretary Ponomarev, the November editorial
commission meeting by CPSU Secretary Katushev, and the latent
editorial commission by V.V. Zagladin, member of the CPSU Central
Auditing Commission and first deputy chief of the CI'S11 Central
Commit tee's International Department.
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- i -
Air PEND I X
MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 15 - 21 DECEMBER 1975
Moscow (24)6 items)
Peking (917 items)
CPSU Central Committee
(6%)
15%
UNGA 30th Session
(5%)
5%
1976-1980 Draft
USSR
(5%)
4%
Economic Plan
PRC Satel..ite Launched
(--)
4%
First Cuban CP Congress
(2%)
12%
Kang Sheng Death
(--)
3%
China
(3%)
5%
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" Is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
In other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
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