TRENDS IN COMMUNIST MEDIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000200160020-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 37
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 19, 1999
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: November 5, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

ppiQ ed
I :T IYA.: st&
of R~I~ase 19905/26
Trends :in Communist' Med
 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RD P86TOO608ROO
FBIS
FOREIGN BROADCAST
INFORMATION SERVICE
Trends in Communist Media
arriar-
UU 111
5 NOVEMBER 197 5
CVO!. XXVI, NO. 44)
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200160020-2
 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200160020-2
This report Is based exclusively on foreign media
materials and is published by FBIS without coordination
with other U.S. Government components.
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 000073
Automatically declassified
six months from date of Issue.
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200160020-2
 Approved For Release I 999/09/26oNQ$f4f DP86T00608R 2p ;%Q020-2
5 NOVEMBER 1975
CONTENT'S
J.S. CABINET CHANGES
First Communist Media Reports Sparse, Lacking in Comment 1
U.S.-SOVIET TRADE
Moscow Mention of Grain Purchase Confined to American Audience . . . 5
Peking Sees Moscow Weakness, Guile Behind U.S. Grair. Deal . . . . . 6
USSR-VIETNAM
Le Duan Visit to Moscow Suggests Strengthened Relations . . . . . . 8
MIDDLE EAST
Moscow Evinces Concern Over Current Crisis in Lebanon . . . . . . . 11
SOVIET-FRENCH RELATIONS
Moscow Defensive in Comment on Giscard Visit 16
PRC-INDIA
Peking Restrained in Denying Chinese Crossed Indian Border . . . 18
KOREA
Pyongyang Obscures UN Votes on Conflicting Resolutions . . . . . . . 20
CAMBODIA-THAILAND
Ieng Sary Bangkok Visit Restores Diplomatic Relations . . . . . . . 24
PORTUGAL
Moscow Cites Rightist Dangers, Sees Government in Command . . . . . 26
Ceause3cu Endorses Moderate Tactics by "Democratic" Parties . . . 27
USSR
Suslov Associate Attacks Russophile in KOMMMUNIST Article . . . . . 29
NOTES
PRC Provincial Leadership; Peking on USSR-Angola . . . . . . . . . . 31
APPENDIX
Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
Cln.ld.d by (100073
AulonwiCaly dal..
.I. nth from da. of Inu..
2, 7t
Appromo v
elease 1999/09F!FOFIT!'P DP86T00608R000200160020-2
 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608RQ0QN 0
Appr
- 1 -
U. S. C*AB INET CHANGES
FIRST COMNIST MEDIA REPORTS SPARSE, LACKING IN CO'1'1ENT
Initial communist media reaction to the high-level cabinet and other
personnel changes announced by President Ford on 3 November has been
sparse and scattered to date. The Soviet media thus far have confined
themselves to selective reportorial treatment implying that the changes
mean a continuation of the U.S. detente policy. East European media
have been more forthcoming, with the East Germaas in particular stating
directly what Moscow has only implied-that the removal of Defense
Secretary Schlesinger was a step based on an Administration desire to
preserve the momentum for detente and disarmament negotiations. Peking
media have not yet acknowledged the U.S. cabinet changes. Other
communist media treatment has only begun to appear.
MOSCOW Moscow has reported briefly the high-level personnel shifts
in the U.S. Administration announced by President Ford on
3 November, but it has not yet commented on these events. There can
be little doubt, however, that Moscow will assess the shifts positively,
interpreting them as an indication that the Ford Administration intends
to continue to pursue good relations with the Soviet Union.
Moscow's initial report on the changes was a TASS English dispatch on
3 November citing U.S. press reports thaw the President was planning
cabinet changes :_nd that Defense Secretary Schlesinger and CIA Director
Colby were among those slated for replacemer.':. Another TASS English
report ou the 3d announced Vice President Rockefeller's letter to the
President asking not to be considered as a candidate for the 1976
elections. Moscow revealed the news to its domestic audience on the
4th, in a commentary by Aleksandr Druzhinin reporting selectively o'..
U.S. media comment on the President's press conference.
While avoiding any single explanation for the U.S. leadership shifts,
Druzhinin gave. prominence to interpretations that identified Schlesinger
as the key figure in the changas. The former defense secretary's
reputed disagreement with Kissinger over SALT, as well as other
unspecified disagreements over the defense budget and questions of
intelligence collection, were identified as causes of his resignation.
Druzhinin went on to imply by other citations and by his reporting
of the President's positive statements on detente and SALT that the
main issue precipitating the government shakeup was the issue of
detente.
This interpretation fits the general picture of the Washington
political scene that Moscow has been projecting in its comment for
some time. The latest issue of USA journal, for example, carried an
article by chief editor V.M..Berezhkov which interpreted Schlesinger's
=1lease 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200160020-2
u..MMM Prom doe of u..s CONFIDENTIAL
 Approved For Release 1999/O9/29 .'87AN P86TOO6O8
5.93Q-2
reported comments about the possible use by the United States of
nuclear weapons to prevent a battlefield defeat as reflecting a
"struggle about detente underway in U.S. ruling circles."
Schlesinger has been identified by Moscow as a spokesman of the
conser'rative forces within the Administration, his published remarks
on nuclear doctrine and the "Soviet threat" usually being cited as
evidence. In addition, some Soviet writers have implied that the
tornier secretary has held a deep-seated hostility toward the Soviet
Union.
EAST EUROPE Initial comment by Moscow's East European allies
and Yugoslavia on the high-?lavel personnel changes
announced by President Ford on 3 November cautiousl, approved the
shifts as a success for the Ford-Kissinger detente policies and a
defeat for ousted Secretary Schlesinger's tough defense policies and
the so-called military-industrial complex. At the same time, East
European commentators warned that the struggle bet.;:7een "realistic"
and hardline philosophies in U.S. foreign policy was far from over
and that the deeper implications of the changes would emerge only
with the passage of time. Only passing attention has been given to
the replacement of CIA Director Colby,, the event being treated as
a predictable outgrowth of the current Congressional investigations
of the Agency. There was little initial comment on the designated
new Defense and CIA chiefs, Rumsfeld and Bush. The meager comment
devoted to Vice President Rockefeller's withdrawal as Mr. Ford's
1976 running mate routinely assessed the move as strengthening the
President's support from c..nservatives in the coming election.
The East Ber$.in radio, which has carried the largest volume of comment
so far, declared in a WLshington-datelined Kaeubler dispatch on the 3d
that President Ford had to make a choice between "two diametrically
opposed poles of foreign policy planning" and dismiss Schlesinger in
order to avoid jeopardizing the signing of a SALT II agreement with
the Soviet Union. The commentary also viewed Schlesinger's replr.cement
as reflecting President Ford's desire to keep intact "Nixon's system"
of concentrating foreign policy direction in the White House.
A Prague television commentary on the 3d noted that in his appearance
on U.S. television on the 2d, the "well-known hawk" and Presidential
candidate, Senator Jackson, "was attempting to keep Schlesinger in
a post which is very important for the military-political relationship."
Curiously, and erroneously, the Prague radio claimed that President
Ford at his news conference "had confirmed that the differences of
opinion" between Kissinger and Schlesinger had caused the latter's
removal.
There were mixed views about the implications of the shakeup for
Secretary Kissinger. The Budapest radio on the 3d surmised that the
CI.i&fled by 000077
AWOm.Iic IIy d.dnaned
.1. month. Imm date of Ino..
CONFIDEI ITIAL
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86TOO608ROO0200160020-2
 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R00b b 1 102 7
- 3 -
President had taken "a swipe at Kissinger" by relieving him of his
National Security Council post,--a move that had "long been
demanded by hardliners opposed to Kissinger's method of negotiations."
And the Warsaw radio the same day speculated that alleged Congressional
distrust of Secretary Kissinger might induce the President to remove
him also in order to improve Mr. Ford's relations with Congress.
In the only substantial comment on the removal of CIA Director Colby,
the Budapest radio on the 3d remarked that his departure would be
welcomed by those who had considered him "too talkative" before the
Congressional investigating committees. The commentary added that
Colby had, however, never been brought to account for "his real
sins"--administration of t::e Phoenix program, which had "resulted in
the murder of 40,000 Vietnamese." Belgrade's TANJUG the same day
attributed the CIA leadership change to the recent revelations about
alleged domestic spying and plots to assassinate foreign leaders, and
to intelligence "failures" in Vietnam, the Middle East, Cyprus and
Portugal. The TANJUG commentary noted approvingly that the U.S.
Government personnel changes were intended by President Ford and
Secretary Kissinger to convince the Soviet Union that they were
"resolute and sincere" about continuing a policy of detente.
Romanian broadcast media so far have only reported the U.S. changes
without comment.
CUBA Havana domestic service on 3 November promptly reported the
shakeup in the U.S. executive branch, attributing the changes
to "serious disagreements within the Administration" and, indirectly,
to Congressional criticism of the intelligence community. The report
noted that "although it praises their ominous international activities,"
the U.S. Congress disapproved of the intelligence agencies' spying
in the United States. While Havana merely reported the "firing" of
Defense Secretary Schlesinger and CIA Director Colby, the broadcast
emphasized Secretary Kissinger's removal from his post as national
security adviser, noting that "from that position, Kissinger controlled
all subversive activities" carried out by the CIA, NSA and armed forces.
VIETNAM Initial comment on the U.S. leadership changes in North
and South Vietnamese communist media has for the most
part comprised replays of Western news accounts. Focusing mainly
on the change in Secretary of State Kissinger's role, the Vietnamese
broadcasts have devoted comparatively little attention to the dismissals
of Defense Secretary Schlesinger and CIA Director Colby and to Vice
President Rockafeller's decision not to run in 1976. While not
directly attacking Kissinger, a 3 November Hanoi radio broadcast
pointedly cited speculation that President Ford's moves were meant
to curtail Kissinger's power. And, in an apparent attempt to discredit
Kissinger's management of the National Security Council (NSC), the same
I Cln.ill.d by 000073
Aolomalc.lly d.cI...III?d
^.^?nlh.I,cmd.l.at ??.?. CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200160020-2
 CONFIDENTIAL F'BIS TRENDS
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608RI)0O2
02120-2
Hanoi radio account incorrectly cited a NEWSWEEK magazine report of
the 2d as declaring that the NSC had come under increasing criticism
resulting from its mishandling of the situations in Vietnam, Cyprus,
and the Middle East and from the recently revealed CIA activities.
Later broadcasts--which have included NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN
commentaries of the 5th--have dismissed the changes as political
maneuverings which will have little effect on U.S. policies.
Cl.ulll.s by 000077
AuIOMIICAlly d.CI.YIII.d
.I. MnIM fro .1. el l
App lease 1999/09/ yIK'bP86T00608R000200160020-2
 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 :cdYfU9k' 5 86TOO6O8ROO
9935
- 5 -
U,S,-SOVIET TRADE
MOSCOW MENTION OF GRAIN PURCHASE CONFINED TO AMERICAN AUDIENCE
A 3 November Moscow broadcast in English to North America carries
the only known Soviet mention to date of the longterm U.S.-Soviet
agreement on purchases of U.S. grain which was signed on 20 October.
Moscow media intended for the Soviet audiefce not only have ignored
the agreement but have completely avoided any mention of the subject
of grain imports. The broadcast reference came in a commentary on
recent developments in Soviet-American trade by Yevgeniy Shershnev,
deputy director of the USA Institute and a specialist in foreign
trade. He argued that the recently signed agreement on "annual
Soviet purchases of U.S. wheat and corn over a five-year period"
would benefit both the United States and the USSR. He declared that
it would guarantee American farmers a market, stabilize employment
for transport workers, and help the United States with its economic
problems by ensuring a billion dollars export income every year.
In acknowledging that the agreement "is also profitable to the
Soviet Union," Shershnev alluded to crop failures only in the most
general way, evading the admission that current Soviet crop failures
were a key factor in prompting the agreement. Thus he said that the
deal would not only help overcome the "adverse effects that unfavorable
climatic conditions have on crops in certain years," but, more
importantly, it would permit considerable savings through directly
importing grain to the Soviet Far East rather than expensively
shipping it by rail from European Russia. In this manner, Shershnev
said, longterm import agreements with the United States "or other
specific countries" provide broad prospects for "a mutually
advantageous international division of labor."
While decrying the failure to implement the 1972 U.S.-Soviet trade
agreement because the United States "has not fulfilled its commitments,"
Shershnev professed optimism concerning future Soviet-American
economic ties and concluded that "in the final analysis commonsense
will prevail and obstacles which today still hamper these ties from
developing will be eliminated."
Shershnev had authored a substantial article on U.S.-Soviet trade in the
27 September issue of RURAL LIFE. In it he favorably reviewed recent
U.S.-Soviet trade agreements and discussed Soviet imports of such
items as U.S. equipment and consumer goods. Although he stressed the
advantages for both countries of "longterm agreements on stable
exchanges of some types of agricultural products," he nowhere mentioned
Soviet imports of grain, nor did he give any indication that a longterm
agreement on this subject was being contemplated at the time.
Cln.lll.d by 000073
Aotom.llc.Ity d.cI...III.d
.I. month. hom d.t. of I.....
Approved or a ease 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86TOO608ROO0200160020-2
 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
Approved For Release 1999/09/26: CIA-RDP86T00608RO02UN69OW52
PEKING SEES MOSCOW WEAKNESS, GUILE BEHIND U.S. GRAIN DEAL
Peking has broken its silence on the U.S.-Soviet five-year grain
pact and oil purchase agreement with a spate of comment predictably
gloating over Moscow's agricultural shortcomings and the implica-
tions for Brezhnev's position, but warning that the Soviets may
exploit such deals to their own strategic advantage. China's
reaction came in signed articles in PEOPLE'S DAILY on 31 October
and 2 November and an NCNA commentary on the 31st. Peking radio
broadcast the comment widely to foreign, including Russian, audiences.
Prominent PEOPLE'S DAILY commentator Jen Ku-ping asserted on
2 November that the Soviet agreement to purchase U.S. grain had
underlined the "bankruptcy" of the agricultural policy of the
"Khrushchev-Brezhnev clique," claiming that Moscow's agricultural
failures stem from the Soviet "restoration of capitalism" and
Moscow's allegedly distorted economic development policies that
give first priority to "wild armaments expansion and war prepara-
tions." Jen played up Moscow's official silence on the U.S. deal
as an indication of the Brezhnev regime's wariness about the
internal implications of admitting agricultural failures.
In the same vein, NCNA on the 31st devoted the bulk of its anti-
Soviet diatribe to mocking the Soviet need to purchase grain as
evidence of Brezhnev's "important personal contribution" to Soviet
agriculture. It noted that in this case Brezhnev has "kept mum,"
despite his usual practice of "lauding to the skies" even minor
U.S.-Soviet agreements, because the Soviet leader was aware that
Khrushchev's downfall had been prompted by his own agricultural
"mess."
Jen Ku-ping depicted the United States as using the grain deal as
"a mans of influencing the Soviet revisionists, thereby keeping
the momentum of the latter's rivalry with it within bounds." But
he and the PEOPLE'S DAILY commentary on the 31st intimated that
Moscow might turn the deal to its own economic and strategic
advantage. Thus, Jen Ku-ping observed that Moscow was using its
current crop failure as "a convenient smokescreen" for building
up a "strategic reserve of grain" that would put Moscow in a better
position in any future conflict with the West.
PEOPLE'S DAILY on the 31st warned that while the USSR has shown its
economic w,iakness and dependence on Western grain and leans, "the
Soviet revisionists are also cunning and crafty." Specifically
recalling the 1972 "great grain robbery," when it said the USSR
"fattened" itself on U.S. grain purchased with "American government
subsidies," the article declared that the current Soviet purchases
and search for Western credits had ulterior motives. It accused
CI...Ih.. by 000073
1lutom.tIL.+1; d.CIO.I,.d
.1. months Iron . d.t. of Ism.
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200160020-2
 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000201-275
Moscow of using Western economic loans to woo countries such as
Turkey away from the NATO orbit with the lure of Soviet economic
assistance. It also claimed that Moscow was,employing grain
purchases to stave off Soviet domestic hunger while continuing
rapid militarization of the Soviet economy, thereby enhancing
Moscow's "military threat" to the West.
BACKGROUND NCNA reports on Soviet purchases of U.S. grain
earlier this year included 18 September and
9 October dispatches on the course of the U.S.-Soviet negotiations
in Moscow for a long-term grain contract. The reports had been
confined largely to criticism of the Soviet agricultural "failure"
and denunciations of Moscow's alleged efforts to gain economic
profit at the West's expense. NCNA had depicted the Ford Adminis-
tration as using the Soviet agricultural difficulties "to press"
the USSR to agree to a long-term contract so as to sell off
surplus U.S. grain while avoiding the "serious disruptions" and
a "politically disastrous rise in domestic food prices" caused
by past Soviet purchases.
CInI fIid by 000073
1lmonuucIIIy 11,11625 fled
_.tj" J'?. d ?"" CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200160020-2
 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
Approved For Release 1999/09/26: CIA-RDP86T00608R060do 01 -
- 8 -
USSR - VIETNAM
LE DUAN VISIT TO MOSCOW SUGGESTS STRENGTHENED RELATIONS
An improvement in Soviet-Vietnam relations in both tone and substance
is suggested in the publicity surrounding the 27-31 October visit to
the USSR by Vietnam Workers Party (VWP) First Secretary Le Duan. The
visit was marked by unusually warm Soviet praise for the Vietnamese,
and was capped by a joint declaration which broke new ground in
putting Hanoi on record as supporting Moscow's policies of detente.
The warming trend in Soviet-DRV relations raises the question of whether.
Hanoi will be able to continue its balancing act between its two giant
communist allies. Some doubt as to the state of PRC-DRV relations was
raised during Le Duan's visit to Peking at the end of September.
Chinese comment was notably restrained, and the visit ended summarily
without the usual reciprocal Vietnamese banquet and a joint communique.
On the other hand, it is possible that Le Duan will stop over in
Peking en route home. The first secretary is currently vacationing in
the Soviet Union and will go from there to Poland, continuing a tour
of East European countries that began in early October.*
SOVIET-VIETNAMESE The protocol of the Le Duan visit to Moscow
RELATIONS closely paralleled that during his previous
visit in July 1973, with General Secretary
Brezhnev acting as host and the top echelon of CPSU leaders joining
in talks and turning out for Le Duan's arrival and for a luncheon on
28 October and a Kremlin reception on the 30th. However, the warm
tone of the current Soviet reception for the VWP first secretary
surpassed that reflected in 1973, at a time when Soviet-Vietnamese
relations were still exacerbated by the impact on Soviet detente
policies of the continuing hostilities in Vietnam after the signing of
the January 1973 Paris peace agreement.
Brezhnev set the tone for Le Duan's current visit in his 28 October
banquet speech, praising the "prestige" and "consistent internationalist
policy" of the VWP and lauding Le Duan personally as an "outstanding
figure in the world communist movement." In the past, Moscow as well
as Hanoi have reserved such praise only for the late Ho Chi Minh.
The final joint declaration, signed by Brezhnev and Le Duan on
30 October, most clearly illustrates the improvement of Soviet-DRV
* Le Duan's 3-27 October East European visits are discussed in the
TRENDS of 30 October 1975, pages Sl-S3, and his 22-28 September visit
to China is discussed in the TRENDS of 1 October 1975, pages 13-15,
and 24 September 1975, pages 12-14.
Close tied by 000073
Aulomal.c.lly declassified
u. monlbs from data of .sue
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200160020-2
 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : GW'T00608R000
Abt;75
relations since 1973. The current Brezhnev-Le Duan talks were said
to have taken place in a "warm atmosphere of fraternal solidarity,
mutual understanding, and mutual respect"--a more positive description
than in 1973, when talks were said to have passed in "an atmosphere
of cordiality and comradely mutual understanding." More important,
this time the two sides were said to hold "completely identical
views on the matters brought to discussion"--a claim not made in 1973.
The key substantive difference between the two declarations was
Vietnam's current willingness to endorse' explicitly the Soviet policy
of detente. Both the 1973 and 1975 declarations c.ctained Vietnamese
approval for Soviet policies of strengthening peace ar.' security,
peaceful coexistence, and support for the popular struggles for
independence and social progress; however, the current document
goes on to affirm the final goal of making "the course of detente
irreversible." Lingering Vietnamese misgivings about detente seemed
reflected in a 1 November NHAN DAN editorial on the visit, however,
which omitted the allusion to detente from an otherwise complete
citation of the Vietnamese declaration of support for Soviet foreign
policy.
In line with the more forthcoming Vietnamese endorsement of Soviet
diplomacy, the Vietnamese section of the declaration also went further
than the 1973 document in paying tribute to Moscow's international
position. Thus, the Vietnamese side asserted that the Soviet Union
is "playing a specially important role" in the common struggle of
nations for peace, independence, democracy, and socialism. By
contrast, in 1973 the statement had merely acknowledged Soviet
activities "with other fraternal socialist countries."
The Soviet side was similarly more forthcoming this time in appraising
the stature of the VWP. While the 1973 statement had merely noted that
the Vietnamese struggle was led by the party, the 1975 declaration lauds
the "glorious" VWP for its "skillful" leadership. The current document
also contains a gratuitous reference to the VWP as a "Marxist-Leninist
party" and maintains that: "The prestige of the VWP--architect o_`.
all the victories of the Vietnamese people--has increased markedly."
In this same vein, the brief 1973 statement of satisfaction with the
"continuous fruitful development of Soviet-Vietnamese friendship and
fraternal cooperation" was expanded considerably in the current
declarr.tion and underlined with references to the "unshakeable"
character of the ties. Amplifying the suggestion in the 1973 statement
that the parties expand their ties and consultations, the current
declaration specifically provides for broadening the exchange of
experience by "arranging for contacts between leaders of the two
countries, for mutual visits by missions of party cadres, and by
Classified by 000073
Automtic.1 IV declassified
six monlfls Irom date of issue
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200160020-2?
 CONFIDENTIAL 1' :I " 1
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86TOO6081~ 91490-2
promoting contacts between party ot'gans."* It further states that
the two sides would "encourage visits of official delegations and
statesmen and appoint special envoys to regular meetings to
exchange views on matters related to relations between the two
sides as well as on international problems of mutual concern."
Also, the declaration commits Vietnam to economic, scientific, and
technical cooperation in the "framework of multilateral cooperation
of the socialist countries"--a formulation not previously agreed to
by Hanoi which could presage some Viet.aamese association with CEMA.
ECONOMIC AGREEMENTS The economic assistance package concluded by
the Vietnamese in Moscow, also signed on the
30th and described in the joint declaration, included an agreement
on Soviet assistance, including long-term loans, to Vietnam during
1976-1980, and a protocol on the coordination of the Soviet and
Vietnamese five-year plans. Specifically, the agreement provided for
assistance in examining the technical and economic aspects of the
construction of an unspecified number of "major national economic
projects," and loans on a "most-favored.-nation" basis to enable
Vietnam to promote industrialization, agriculture production, and
welfare over the next five years. Soviet and VieL:uamese media also
reported that an agreement on "goods exchange and payments" for
1976-1980 and a protocol on trade and payments for next year was
signed on 31 October.
Reports on Soviet-DRV ec.-)nomic agreements for 1974 and 1975 had
not similarly specified that Soviet assistance to Vietnam would
take the fora cf loans. During Le Duan's July 1973 visit to Moscow,
Brezhnev had announced that the Soviet Union had decided to waive
repayment for all assistance given during the previous war years.
* in accompanying communique on the visit revealed that the two
sides had confirmed an agreement--also mentioned in 1973--on an
official friendship visit to the D RV by a Soviet party-government
delegation.
Release 1999/O98ID tAERDP86TOO6O8ROOO2OO16OO2O-2
 CONFIDENTIAL VI111) 'I'IZP;NUS
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608ROO02001:600 '0-2
MIDDLE EAST
MOSCOW EVINCES CONCERN OVER CURRENT CRISIS IN LEBANON
Soviet ;acdia have given civil. strife in Lebanon over the past two
months regular reportage and comment, most of which has emphasized
concern for the heavy toll in lives and property and urged a
peacef.u.l. solution to the factional fighting. Moscow's treatment
of the recent crisis has laid the blame on "Lebanese react i ern"
while backing "progressive" forces, ,just as was done with previous
outbreaks of fighting earlier this year. In recent weeks Soviet
commentators have begun to express support for domestic reform:;
to solve the crisis, especially reform of Lebanon's political
system, which has involved power-sharing arrangements between the
Christian and Moslem communities based on a 40-year-old and now
inaccurate census favoring the Christians.
Moscow's recent comment has been consistent with Soviet reaction
to prev'i.ous outbreaks of fighting last April, May, and .June-.July.*
Thus, Moscow has denounced "Lebanese reaction" and the predominantly
Chr'_Grian "rightist forces" led by Pierre Jumayyil's Kata'ib
(Phalangist) Party for allegedly fomenting and sustaining the
conflict. Predictably, Soviet comment has supported the "progressive
and national patriotic forces"--chiefly Moslems in Kamal Junhl.att's
leftist Progressive Socialist Party, the Lebanese Communist Party,
and the Ba'th Party, with the support of Palestinian fedayeen
groups. In persistently urging a peaceful resolution to the conflict,
Moscow has commended efforts by Prime Minister Karami, "the national
dialog committee," Syrian and Palestinian mediators, and others to
negotiate an end to the fighting.
Soviet comment raising the issue of external interference in
Lebanon's problems predictably has condemned Israel for allegedly
seeking to heighten and exploit the crisis, while avoiding direct
charges of U.S. or Arab state involvement. A major. PRAVDA commentary
on 3 October warned directly that events in Lebanon had provided "no
grounds for interference ii. Lebanese affairs by other states,
particularly Israel." While making no direct claim:. of U.S.
* For discussion .f Moscow's reaction to previous major civil
strife in Lebanon in May 1973, involving units of the Lebanese
army and the Palestinian fedayeen, see the TRENDS of 9 May 1973,
page 16, and 16 May, page 20. At that time, Moscow essentially
maintained an even-handed approach toward both sides and urged
a peaceful resolution to the conflict.
CI s.lb? S7 000077
Appr "'? ase 1999/09/28 oGI +IRlP86T00608R000200160020-2
 Approved For Release 1999/09/266?L4Rt-ba86T00608ROOt2GOl020-2
5 NOVEMBER 1975
involvement on its own authority, Moscow has insinuated U.S.
interference by replaying occasional Arab accusations and by
suggesting U.S. support for Israel.]. plans to capitalize on the
conflict by attacking Palestinian fedayeen-positions.
CAUSES OF Soviet analyses of the underlying causes of Lebanon's
CONFLICT crisis have stressed three major points, recently
exemplified by PRAVDA's editor for Asian and African
countries, Pavel Demchenko, in a 3 October PRAVDA article and again
on Moscow radio's 2 November roundtable program. Demchenko
listed the preconditions for a major conflict as (1) the development
of acute social and economic divisions--"a gulf formed between a
handful of parasitic rich and hundreds of thousands of deprived
paupers"; (2) the maintenance of a special political system
involving procise power-sharing arrangements between Christians and
Moslems--"the ratio has not changed since 1943 [when the arrange-
ments were established in the un,aritten "national pact" as Lebanon
prepared for national independence], although the balance between
the religious communities has, of cou.?se, changed since then" in
favor of the Moslems; and (3) the influence of some 300,000
Palestinian refugees, constantly in conflict with Israel in southern
Lebanon as well as with Lebanese "haute bourgeoisie and rightist
parties" who allegedly want to expel the Palestinian groups from
Lebanon.
A similar explanation was provided by IZVESTIYA's foreign affairs
editor, Albert Grigoryants, on the 12 October roundtable. Relying
heavily on an analysis by LE MONDE's Mideast specialist, Eric Rouleau,
Grigoryants emphasized an increase in recent years in Lebanon's
"social polarization" which has been "aggravated by religious and
ethnic stratifications." He developed the point that the Christians
were formerly in the majority and therefore "the ruling Christian
elite holds key state posts and wields great economic power," whereas
Moslems now make up "some 65 percent" of the population.
CRITICISM OF Soviet comment on recent fighting has zeroed
RIGHTISTS, ISRAEL in consistently on Lebanese "rightist forces"
and condemned them for provoking the conflict,
resisting efforts by Prime Minister Karami and others to end the
fighting, and failing to honor cease-fires. The comment has also
accused Israel of seeking to aggravate and exploit the crisis by
conspiring with the Phalangists against the Palestinians. As in past
comment, the most common Soviet charge has been that Israel wants
to destroy the Palestinian fedayeen groups and has exploited the
development of Lebanon's civil strife to intensify its air and sea
raids against Palestinian targets in Lebanon. In September, PRAVDA
on the 14th, IZVESTIYA on the 17th, and RED STAR on the 27th, all
asserted that Israel's military actions against Palestinian targets
Cl..mud er 0000>
Aulem.UC.II, declnall.d
App fI flth'l0n 1i01" lease 1999/09/2 .F@rAIR?P86T00608R000200160020-2
 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 cCIPPMM T00608R0O O16?020-2
5 NOVEMBER 1.975
had regularly increased in proportion to the fluctuating domestic
conflict in Lebanon between the Phalangists and progressives.
Additionally, some Soviet comment has charged that a conspiracy has
existed between Israel and the Phalangists against the Palestinians.
A. lengthy article by L. Medvedko in the 3 October issue of NEW
TIMES, for example, alleged that a "pincers operation" was being
waged by Israeli and Phalangist forces. Similarly, the deputy
director of Moscow's Institute of World Economy and International
Relations, Ye. Primakov, alleged on Moscow radio's 24 October
"international situation" program that the Phalangists and Israel had
arranged "two plans," one to provoke civil war and Lebanese army
intervention against the Palestinians, the other to wage a "so-
called pincers operation" to trap the Palestinian fedayeen
between invading Israeli forces and the Phalangists. An "unofficial"
Radio Peace and Progress broadcast in Arabic on 3 November repeated
Primakov's remarks, accusing Israel additionally of beginning to
prepare to intervene with military units in southern Lebanon.*
U.S. ROLE Typical of the effort by Soviet media to exploit Arab
and Palestinian accusations of U.S. involvement in the
Lebanese crisis was a TASS 30 October report citing a message to
Libyan leader al-Qadhdhafi from PLO head Yasir 'Arafat which charged
that "there is no doubt that the United States is behind the events
in Lebanon" and. that the crisis fits U.S. Mideast policy goals,"to
split the Arab revolutionary movement, to support reactionary
forces, and to strengthen its influence in the region," Additionally,
Moscow has made thinly-veiled hilts of U.S. involvement through such
expressions as "Israel and those who support her" and "Zionism and
imperialism." More recently, however, a K. Geyvandov PRAVDA dispatch
on 3 November cited the Israeli newspaper DAVAR as having lamented that
"the Western countries which formerly supported the Christian community
in Lebanon have now abandoned it" and as being displeased that the
United States considered events in Lebanon to be "an internal affair."
tOSCOW SUPPORT FOR In accord with previous Soviet comment this
PROGRESSIVES, PLO year on Lebanon, Moscow has consistently
referred favorably to Lebanese "progressive
forces," often citing their positions on issues and stressing that
they have worked for a negotiated end to the fighting. In the same
* Charges that Is:-ael was preparing to implement contingency plans
to invade and occupy southern Lebanon "up to the T.Itani river" have
appeared occasionally in Soviet comment during t:he past year. A
9 January IZVESTIYA article by L. Koryavin, for example, asserted
that "there is now a grave danger Israel may at any moment occupy a
considerable part" of southernLebanon and alleged there was a "long-
sta.lding" Israeli contingency plan for such an invasion.
CIu,IOad by 000073
Automaticity d.cl...IfI.d
.I. month. from data of l..,..
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200160020-2
 999/09/ 6 05R5ftP86T00608r ' 6R~0-2
Approved For Release I
vein, Moscow has praised major Palestinian groups in Lebanon for
their political maturity in refusing to be drawn into major
fighting and for seeking to remain outside the conflict altogether.
Ye. Primakev, for example, in remarks on Moscow radio's 24 October
"international situation" program, stressed that Israeli and
Phalangist schemes against the Palestinians had not succeeded
largely due to "the sober attitude of the Palestinians, who refuse
to interfere in the domestic affairs of Lebanon and even attempt
to reconcile" the two sides and "bring about peace." Soviet
comment has also praised the "positive" and "responsible" role
of the PLO in cooperating with Prime Minister Karami in trying
to restore order and arrange cease-fires. 2LO head Yasir 'Arafat
has been occasionally singled out and praised for his efforts
to mediate between the fighting factions.
SOLUTION TO Throughout the crisis Moscow has consistently urged
THE CRISIS a negotiated solution tc the conflict, favorably
reporting !rime Minister Karami's efforts to arrange
cease-fires, and expressing cautious optimism about a return to
domestic security and peace during each of the numerous short-lived
cease-fires. As to the specifics of reforms that might lead to a
solution, however, Moscow has largely.limited itself to generalities
that fall within the programs urged by Lebanese progressives--
evidently reflecting awareness that the predominantly Christian
"rightists" want little or no change, and the predominantly Moslem
"progressives" seek substantial reforms. Most Soviet cor.iment favoring
reforms has expressed its support by citing Lebanese sources, as in a
4 November TASS dispatch from Beirut by A. Urasov, which said that
Beirut newspapers were urging an end to the conflict and "a political
settlement on the basis of political, economic, and social reforms."
Similarly, an earlier reference to the issue of reforms was a
23 September PRAVDA dispatch by K. Geyvandov which cited Beirut's
AS-SAFIR as saying that "wide-ranging democratic reforms of a
political and socio-economic character" would provide a solution
to the conflict, noting that such reforms were being proposed by
Lebanese progressives.
Much Soviet comment has implied the need for reforms in discussion
of the Christian-Moslem population ratio. By noting that the ratio
has changed over the years in favor of the Moslems, the comment has
implied that the 1943 "national pact" should be revised. Soviet
commentators have not always been consistent with each other in
discussing the present ratio--estimates have ranged from "roughly
equal" to "a slight Moslem majority" to "65 perc.mnt are now Moslems."
Clnsifl.d by 000073
Auton..Ilc.IIY d.cl.nlfl.d
sl. month. Iron. d.1. of Inue.
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200160020-2
 CONFIDENTIAL T''BIS TRENDS
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R00OM 'Hb2 '2
CIns10.d by 000073
Aulom.Oc.lly d.clnsl0.d
sl. months from duo of luu..
Moscow has infrequently advocated the need for Lebanese domestic
reforms in original comment. Thus, a 25 October SOVETSKAYA
ROSSIYA article by V. Nikolayev, entitled "Lebanon's Difficult
Days," concluded that "the time has come to think seriously about
,he problems facing the country and to try to approach from
constructive positions the resolution, above all, of tasks of
socio-political reorganization."
While expressing support for domestic reforms, Moscow has opposed
rumored plans for the partition of Lebanon along religious
community or other lir. s. Much of the opposition, as typified
in remarks by-'P. Demchenko on the 2 November roundtable program,
has been expressed as support for the Lebanese progressives' call
for "preservation of the country as a united state." Additionally,
some comment, as in a 25 October IZVESTIYA article by L. Koryavin,
has attributed the notion of partition to "certain circles which
are kindling the internal contradictions in Lebanon" and to
"enemies of the Arab nation" who desire "to weaken resistance to
imperialist intrigues."
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200160020-2
 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
Approved For Release 1999/09/26: CIA-RDP86T00608R O21Qf1:6aQa-2
SOVIET-FRENCH RELATIONS
MOSCOW DEFENSIVE IN CONr1ENT ON DISCARD VISIT
While Soviet comment has routinely stressed the importance and
success of French President Giscard d'Estaing's 14-18 October
visit to the Soviet Union, it has nonetheless provided evidence
to support Western press speculation that Soviet behavior during
the visit was cool. Not only has there been no party-government
statement endorsing the results of the visit--a feature of all
previous French-Soviet summits--but a major PRAVDA editorial
article on 26 October has assessed the visit in lukewarm terms
while going out of its way to stress the Soviet Union's unfailing
commitment to Marxism-Leninism, at best an inappropriate reassu.:ance
given the nature of the occasion. Moreover, the editorial article
format--the -nosc authoritative form of editorial statement--suggests
that Moscow regards the issue as unusually sensitive, since all
previous French-Soviet summits have rated straight editorials only.
IDEOLOGY AND DETENTE In its defense of ideology, PRAVDA asserted
that the Soviet Union, despite its purr-uit
of peaceful coexistence with France and the other capitalist cotn-
tries, "invariably and inviolably maintains position; of Marxism-
Leninism and proletarian solidarity with the workers and liberation
movements of the peoples." A similar statement was made by Brea::hnev
at the 14 October Sinner speech welcoming Giscard. The French
President had suggested a few minutes earlier that detente should
be extended to the field of ideological rivalry, but Brezhnev
replied that "relaxation of international tension by no means
eliminates the struggle of ideas."
Moscow also seemed to go out of its way to curry favor with the
French communists by reporting in PRAVDA during the French
President's visit a French Communist Party communique which was
critical of Giscard's domestic and foreign policies. The communique
also criticized the Giscard government for allegedly trying to
get Moscow to put pressure on the PCF to modify its policy.
In the same vein, the PRAVDA editorial article quoted L'HUMANITE
as criticizing the French Government for giving only verbal support
to Soviet proposals or. prohibiting the development of new types
of nuclear weapons and preventing the spread of nuclear weapons.
L'HUMANITE had rebuked the French Government for not making any
positive moves in this direction "without further delay." PRAVDA
appeared to be expressing Moscow's concern and annoyance over
reports that France might station some of its tactical Pluton
nuclear missiles in West Germany.
CteuIfI.d by 000073
Automatically declass' tied
IIx month* from date of Is....
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200160020-2
 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : FAW1W51 6TOO6O8ROOO2G1M 6.0.0M2
5 NOVEMBER 1975
CI.Wned by 00007
.ulo.rlIC.II d.elaan.d
CI. eq.11411 from date it Inue.
BILATERAL RELi.TIONS Soviet irritation with Giscard over what
the Kremlin sees as France's declining
independence and indications of renewed interest in NATO also
surfaced during the visit. In his 14 October speech Brezhnev
reminded Giscard that "the strength of France's po!icy lies in
its independence" and "an independent France" can make a sub-
stantial contribution to the strengthening of international peace.
Referring to the two counries' mutually expressed interest in the
"materialization of detente," the editorial article cautioned that
it could not be forgotten that NATO is continuing to accumulate
weapons "despite and in defiance of detente."
Insufficient progress in trade and economic cooperation between
the two countries was alluded to on a number of occasions by the
Soviet media and PRAVDA conveyed Moscow's disappointment with
France in this regard. It said that even though trade and economic
relations are developing "favorably on the whole" there is still
"much unused potential" in this sphere.
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86TOO608ROO0200160020-2
 CO FI E T FBIS TRENDS
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : GI-96b86T00608RQ;0A >EiOQR0s2
P R C - I N D I A
PEKING RESTRAINED IN DENYING CHINESE CROSSED INDIAN BORDER
A 3 November PRC Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement used
relatively restrained language in denying charges made in a 1 November
statement by the Indian Foreign Ministry spokesman, who claimed that
Chinese troops had violated Indian territory in a 20 October clash
which killed four Indian soldiers. The Chinese statement avoided the
harsh invective against the Indian government and its China policy
that have characterized Chinese statements on the border since the
1962 Sino-Indian war. China did not comment on the border incident
until after the Indian statement made it public.
According to the Chinese statement, Indian soldiers crossed into
Chinese territory on 20 October despite repeated warnings from
"Chinese civilian checkpost personnel" and opened fire on the Chinese
side, causing the latter to "fire back in self-defense." The statement
said that the incident took place at the Tulung.Pass (located cn the
eastern Sino-Indian border near Bhutan), as the Indian troops crossed
"the line of actual control of November 7, 1959"--a phrase used by
Peking in the past to refer to the so-called McMahon line which
delineates the eastern part of the Sino-Indian frontier.
Peking's statement noted that a Chinese protest on the incident had
been delivered to the Indian Embassy in Peking on 22 October, that the
Indian Embassy had agreed on the 25th to accept China's offer of the
22d to collect the bodies of the four dead soldiers, and that an Indian
representative at Tulung had accepted the bodies and captured Indian
weapons and ammunition from the Chinese side on the 2F,th and had
signed "a receipt."
BACKGROUND Though accusing the Indian side of spreadiu,; "slander"
about the clash, the Chinese statement was far milder
than China's last official protest over an armed border clash, in 1967.
At that time a series of Chinese Foreign Ministry statements in
September and October had scathingly labeled the Indians "aggressors,"
denounced the "reactionary Indian government" for its alleged hypocrisy
in calling for a peaceful border settlement and normalization of
relations with China, and accused New Delhi of working closely with the
United States and the USSR to foster anti-China opinion in the world.
In contrast to Peking's usual stress in the past on China's military
preparedness in the face of further Indian "provocations," this
current statement concluded by giving unusual emphasis to Peking's
repeated measures to maintain the border status quo, avoid armed
conflict, and "preserve peace" pending a final settlement of the
frontier issue.
Cl.s.lfl.d by 000073
Autom.llc.lly d.cln.llm.d
.I, month, from d.le of I..u..
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200160020-2
 CONFID
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP8N0608R0004 q
?975
MOSCOW TREATMENT Since 1 November TASS has favorably replayed
reports of the Indian protest. On 3 November
TASS carried Indian press comment condemning the Chinese action as
an affront to India's expressed desire for normal Sino-Chinese
relations and as the latest evidence of "the great power, hegemonistic
policy of the Chinese leaders" in South Asia. A 3 November Moscow
radio commentary in English to South Asia--the first monitored
Soviet comment on the border clash--similarly blasted the Chinese
response as "another important link" in Peking's "chain of anti-
Indian actions," which Moscow said included interference in the
Kashmir and Sikkim issues and support for subversion and insurrection
in northeastern India.
CIIUIfI.d by 000073
flbm I ells AabWfl.d
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200160020-2
 CONFIDENTIAL. FBIS TRENDS
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608Rb fff0b -2
- 20 -
K 0 R E A
PYONGYANG OBSCURES UN VOTES ON CONFLICTING RESOLUTIONS
The North Korean media have obscured the fact that on 29 October
the UN General Assembly's First Committee, in an unprecedented
move, adopted two opposing draft resolutions on the Korean
question, both of which will now be referred to the UN General
Assembly. Pyongyang acknowledged only the passage of the pro-
Pyongyang draft, by a 51-38 vote, which it described as an
"overwhelming majority" and a "great victory" for the DPRK.
Pyongyang has failed to acknowledge that the U.S.-sponsored draft
also passed the First Committee, by a 59-51 vote, and that the
General Assembly now must deal with the conflicting draft
resolutions. By contrast, both Peking and Moscow media have
acknowledged that the two resolutions will now be considered by
the UNGA.
North Korean media hzve sought to make it appear that the
Assembly actually had already adopted the pro-Pyongyang draft,
and have called on the United States to implement that resolution--
which calls for dissolution of the TTN Command, withdrawal from
South Korea of foreign troops under the UN flag, and conclusion
of a peace treaty between the "real parties"* to the Korean
armistice agreement.
DPRK GOVERNMENT DPRK comment on the UN debate thus far
STATEMENT ISSUED suggests that Pyongyang considers the Fist
C'.im'ittee passage of the pro-DPRK draft an
important propaganda victory no matter what the General Assembly
might finally do. A 31 October DPRK Government statement hailing
the vote called it a "telling blow" at the United States and a
"turning point" in the history of the United Nations, representing
a breakdown of the U.S. "hand-raising machine" which in the past
had passed "illegal" resolutions on the Korean question. Asserting
that this is the first time the United Nations 1.tad adopted a
"fair resolution" on the Korean issue, the government statement
argued that Washington was under an "coligation" to implement that
Pyongyang-backed resolution because the basis for the U.S. troop
presence in South Korea--UN sanction--has now been undercut. A
31 October NODONG SINMUN editorial on the First Committee's vote
made a similar case.
* In a 17 August 1975 DPRK Foreign Ministry memorand;:.m; Pyongyang
specified that "real parties" means the DPRK and the United States.
That memorandum is discussed in the TRENDS of 20 August 1975,
pages 20-21
L
C1 slfl.d by 000013
AW .uUc.ur ARI.OIIISE
,. month. hom da. of b.u..
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200160020-2
 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
Approved For Release 1999/09/26: CIA-RDP86T00608R0002 2 Y
OTHER COMMENT Pyongyang has claimed over the past year that,
Washington's protests notwithstanding, U.S.
troops are in South Korea under UN auspices and not, as the United
States claims, under the terms of the 1953 U.S.-ROK defense treaty.
Pyongyang contends that passage of the resolution calling for
withdrawal of foreign troops under the UN flag has removed any
alleged legal basis for the presence of U.S. troops in the South.
The 31 October government statement made no reference to the U.S.
claim linking U.S. troops in South Korea to the defense treaty,
but the NODONG SINMUN editorial stated, in standard Pyongyang
terms, that the United States could not justify its troops'
presence with "such rubbish" as the defense treaty, which had
been "cooked up illegally."
Glossing over the passage of the U.S.-sponsored draft resolution,
the government statement claimed that the success of the Pyongyang-
backed draft had rendered the U.S. proposal "meaningless and
useless." The NODONG SINMUN editorial went even further, claiming
not only that the current U.S. draft has been "buried" as a "piece
of scrap paper," but also that all the United Nations' past
"illegal" resolutions justifying the U.S. troop presence in
South Korea are now "null and void."
The only known North Korean acknowledgement--carried by the Peking
media--that the U.S.-sponsored draft resolution on Korea had also
been passed by the First Committee, in a UN speech on the 29th
by DPRK delegate Yi Chong-mok which called that adoption "unjusti-
fiable" and claimed that the Korean delegation would never recognize
it, was excised from the 1 November Pyongyang KCNA version of Yi's
speech. This passage was, however, reported by Peking's NCNA in
a 30 October dispatch.
Neither the government statement nor the available KCNA summary
of the NODONG SINMUN editorial included detailed objections to th=
U.S. resolution that Pyongyang had previously set forth in an
11 August government statement and 17 August foreign ministry
memorandum.* The summarized editorial noted only that the U.S.
draft would create "obstacles" to settlement of the Korean question,
declaring that because the pro-Pyongyang draft had been passed, the
United States "must accept the unanimous demand of the majority
of the world's countries" and implement the DPRK resolution.
* The 11 August government statement is discussed in the TRENDS
of 13 August 1975, pages 1-2.
CI.Wn.d by 000073
*ulolAnuny d.cl...ln.d
.Im ngidll, from do" OI I..u..
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200160020-2
 CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86TOO608RO
397?
PEKING HANDLING As last year, Peking issued an authoritative
OF UN RESOLUTIONS PEOPLE'S DAILY Con.entator's article oa
2 November following the First Committee's
vote. Commentator endorsed the 31 Octoh-r DPRK Government statement
and claimed that implementation of the pro-Pyongyang draft would
improve the situation on the Korean peninsula. However, Commentator
did not suggest that the United States was now actually obligated
to implement the resolution. Less harsh in its portrayal of the
U.S. presence in Korea than a 21 October speech by PRC UN delegate
Huang Hua, the Commentator article did not renew charges that the
U.S. presence was a threat to the North's security or that U.S.
troops had carried out "armed provocations" against the DPRK. It
did charge that the "long stay" of U.S. "aggressor troopd'in the
South was the basic cause of tension in Korea, and that the UN
Command is a "U.S. tool of aggression."
Arguing against the U.S. draft resolution, Commentator called the
U.S. proposal for "alternative arrangements" to the UN Command
an "obstacle" and said that the U.S. draft would "deepen the
division" and "sharpen tension" in Korea. Commentator did not
repeat the claim--included in Huang Hua's 21 October speech and
PRC Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua's 26 September address to the
General Assembly--that the U.S. draft was "absolutely unacceptable."
A 31 October NCNA report on the UN Korean debate claimed that
before it took place, the United States amended its draft resolution
"for fear that its cloven hoof would be revealed" and that it
"played tricks" in order to have its draft adopted. Describing
the debate as "hotter" than at the previous two General Assembly
sessions, NCNA noted that the U.S. draft was adopted after "pains-
taking efforts." NCNA also added to Peking's polemics against
the Soviet Union's stand on the Korean question, charging that the
Soviet UN representative had attempted to justify and provide "cover"
for U.S. "aggression" against Korea. NCNA reiterated its recent
charges that Moscow's altered rendering of the DPRK slogan for
"independent and peaceful" reunification as "peaceful and
democratic" reunification showed Moscow's perfidy. It claimed
that the Seoul government also backs "democratic" but not "inde-
pendent" reunification, and that,thus the Soviet representative
saw "eye-to-eye" with the "puppet clique."
MOSCOW TREATMENT Moscow has noted the results of the UN voting
OF KOREAN ISSUE in several TASS reports and commented
authoritatively on it in a 5 November PRAVDA
article devoted to the October Revolution anniversary, so far
available only in an abreviated TASS version. A Moscow radio
broadcast to Korea on the 4th claimed that as a result of the vote
in the First Committee the United States had "lost its token right
CIM.ltl.d Ay 000070
Aulo.rlly.lly d.cI.H10.d
.I. mourn, from d.t..f Ino..
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200160020-2
 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R0005269'M6~01~"
- 23 -
to station troops in South Korea under the guise of the UN flag."
The commentary also contained Moscow's first c'irect response to
recent Peking attacks on the Soviet stand ou:;orea, charging that
the PRC UN representative had attempted to "obsLure" the Soviet
position, and that such an attempt by Peking "only serves the
purpose of dividing the ranks of people who expect to Gee the
peaceful unification of Korea."
Moscow's last substantial media comment on the UN Korean debate
was a 24 October IZVESTIYA commentary. IZVESTIYA noted that
withdrawal of foreign troops from South Korea and cessation of
military confrontation on the peninsula would accord with the
interests of the peoples of "both Korean states." The commentary
went on to cite Soviet UN delegate Malik's remarks that adoption
of the pro-DPRK, Soviet-cosponsored resolution by the General
Assembly would promote "normalization" of the situation in Korea
and create favorable conditions for reunification, but offered
no other support for the resolution. IZVESTIYA offered support
for the DPRK's "big, constructive program," which it described
as a propusal for a confederation of the "two states," and the
setting up of the North-South Coordination Committee that has
"embarked on a dialog in which points of contacts are being sought."
This upbeat assessment of the North-South dialog contrasts with
Pyongyang's current line, which is that the dialog is on the
"brink of runture" due to the Pak regime's "sabotage." IZVESTIYA
did not mention the U.S. draft resolution on Korea.
CIM.IO.d by 000073
AulumMlc.lly d.cl.gl0.d
W. month from date of 156U.
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200160020-2
 CONFIDENTIAL FIT I.S 'I'II,-,NU;;
Approved For Release 1999/09/26: CIA-RDP86T00608ROO2O0:6.GVM-2
-24-
CAMBODIA-THAILAND
IENG SARY BANGKOK VISIT RESTORES DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS
The 28 October-1 November visit to Thailand by Cambodian Deputy
Prime Minister Ieng Sary has been capped by the announcement that
diplomatic relations have been restored. The announcement came In
the 31 October communique on the visit--th_ first to a noncommunist
Southeast Asian country by a leader of tny_ new Cambodian regime.
Cambodian pronouncements during the visit avoided contentious issues
in 'T'hai-Cambodian relations, unlike Vietnam and Laos, which have
continued harsh criticism of Bangkok politics.*
The joint communique cited "traditional links and similarities"
between the Thai and Cambodian peoples, the two nations' "deep
sense of neightLrliness" arising from their geographical proximity,
and the "common aspirations" of the two nations to maintain peaceful
relations as he basij for normalizing relations. However, the
communique aid not state when relations would be fully normalized,
noting that an exchange of ambassadors would occur only "at a date
convenient to both countries depending on the conditions prevailing."
It included pledges to respect each other's territorial integrity,
to resolve issues retween them without resort to force, and to
prohibit "the use of its t r..:ritory by any third country in any form."
The communique also noted that "the political, economic and social
system" of each country is "solely the affair of the people of that
country" and that "external interference will not be tolerated."
The communique stated that the two sides discussed economic and trade
cooperation, but added that "the *:rins and the modality of trade"
between the two countries would be discussed at a later date. Bangkok
radio broadcasts on 1 November reported that Thai Foreign Minister
Chatchai had stated that temporary liaison offices would be established
by each side--the Thai office in Aranyaprathet, and the Cambodian
office in Poipet--to handle immigration and trade affairs until
permanent embassies are opened in Bangkok and Phnom Penh, and that
rail links between Aranyaprathet and Poipet will be reopened.
OTHER COMMUNIST Peking's NCNA on 2 November promptly reported
REACTION principal clauses of the joint communique on Ieng
Sary's visit. Hanoi reported the visit. and the
joint communique in brief reports on 30 October and 1 November, and
a 2 November Saigon domestic radio broadcast briefly noted the
* For earlier discussion of Thailand-Vietnam issues that have
obstructed efforts to restore diplomatic relations, see the TRENDS of
6 August 1975, pages 19-21, and of 13 August 1975, pages 4-6.
CI. o I .d by 000013
Aulom.hc.Ily declu.lll.d
.i. month. 1rnm dot. of I..u.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200160020-2
 CONFIDENTIAL Fill S TRENDS
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608ROPQgflWP,pgZ952
-25-
Thal-Cambodian normalization. The I'athet Lao radio reported leng
Sary's visit on the 31st. A 1 November Moscow radio commentary
on recent changes in Thai Government policies acknowledged in
passing the normalization of relations with Phnom Penh. The I'RC-based
clandestine radio of the Thai Communist Party, the Voice of the People
of Thailand, reviewed the accomplishments of. Ieng Sary's visit in a
straightforward broadcast on 3 November, praising Cambodian policies
while muting the station's usual abusive characterizations in referring
to prominent Thai government officials.
CIn.UI.d /1000013
Aut.nwicNq e.ei.auwa
.l. w.nln. teem eN. of 4w..
Approved or a ease 1999/09/26C:OFIR I86T00608R000200160020-2
 CONFIDENTIAL FfIS TRENDS
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00668W6iM01 4020-2
-26-
PORTUGAL
MOSCOW CITES RIGHTIST DANGERS. SEES GOVERNMENT IN COMMAND
Soviet coverage of Po-:tugucse developments continues to stress the
need for "unity of progressive forces" and vigilance against a
possible move by reactionaries. Generally, the Soviet reaction
to re'-urrent rumors of a planned "rightist coup" has been less
strident and vocal than last summer--some observers portraying
the Portuguese army as alert and last summer's "counterrevolutionary
drive" as halted. However, some Moscow commentators, referring
to the imminent 11 November date when Portugal is scheduled to
grant independence to her lastmajor colony, Angola, have suggested
there are right:wing plans to thwart the revolutionary process in
Portugal while at the same time preventing the transfer of power
to the Soviet-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of
Angola (MPLA), which maintains control of Luanda.
TASS correspondent Mikhail Artyushenkov or. 1 November reported the
arrest of two fugitive rightwing leaders in northern Portugal
(TASS called the two "a group of counterrevolutionaries"), tying
this event to rumors of a forthcoming coup. Artyushenkov noted
that "counterrevolutionaries are trying to coordinate their actions
in Portugal and Angola," and, in keeping with Moscow's tendency
to equate actions against the MPLA as threats against the whole of
Angola, he scored former members of Salazar's secret police who
were said to have arrived secretly in Luanda "to organize subversive
activities against the MPLA." Drawing on Portuguese sources with
similar views, TASS on 29 October implied that all Portuguese
progressives favored the MPLA and reported that Admiral Rosa Coutinho
had "demanded",that "all power in Angola be handed over to the
MPLA" on 11 November. PRAVDA on the 27th also quoted PCP'leader
Alvaro Cunhal's r'ference to the MPLA as "the genuine, legitimate
representative of the Angolan people" and cited the PCP's charge
that "imperialist forces" were attempting to prevent Portugal's
transfer of power to the MPLA.
While such Soviet coverage reflects concern about the plans of
"rightist forces" in Lisbon and Luanda, Moscow's reaction is generally
low-key and, occasionally, optimistic. Thus, a long article by
PRAVDA's Lisbon correspondent B. Kotov on 25 October stressed PCP
confidence that "revolutionary forces are taking the initiative" and
indicated that last summer's "real danger of an abrupt shift to
the right" was now on the wane. Another Kotov dispatch, published
in PRAVDA the following day, reported that the Portuguese army
was in a state of readiness because of reports of "planned sabotage
CI..Ill.d by oo00"3
A ulom.ilc.lly d.d"Slll.d
.I. -tb? __ d.t. W t... CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200160020-2
 COWFIDENTIAL FB1S TRENDS
5 NOVEMBER 1975
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 CIA-RDP86T00608R000200160020-2
-27-
by extreme rightwing groups," and that, as a result of such
measures, "the situation in the country today is absolutely
calm." Moscow's handling of the coup rumors accords with
the usually cautious treatment given the government of Prime
Minister. Azevedo, whom Moscow does not criticize directly and,
on infrequent occasions, portrays favorably. A 23 October
KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA dispatch by correspondents Khuzemi and
Artyushenkov, for example, noted that Azevedo's government had
"adopted a number of important measures" and that "the attacks
of counterrevolution have been halted."
CEAUSESCU ENDORSES MODERATE TACTICS BY "DEMOCRATIC" PARTIES
During a 28-31 October visit to Portugal, Romanian leader Ceausescu
cautioned local political forces that failure to subordinate their
differences endangers Portugal's national independence. Although
Ceausescu's criticism of traditional Western political concepts
accords with standard Soviet doctrine, his stress on the importance
of unity and independence seems to have reference to Romania as
well as Portugal.
Ceausescu's allusions to foreign interference in Portugal's domestic
affairs appeared to be directed primarily toward dangers from the
right, as in a 29 October toast to Premier Azevedo when he asserted
that "everything that is undertaken must prevent a return to the
past." Similarly, in stressing the need for political unity, he
twice raisec: :he Spector of Portugal repeating the Chilean experience.
Ceausescu combined his expressed fears of the right with unusually
frank ..riticism of Western concepts of government. Thus, in his
toast to Azevedo he disparaged Western-style democracy for allegedly
promoting economic inequalities and rejected political pluralism
as "not essential" because "you can have a single party and a very
good democracy."
Ceausescu allowed, however, that for the foreseeable future Portugal
must be represented by a broad spectrum of "progressive and democratic
forces." Thus, in his 29 October toast, he asserted that "there is
no other way for Portugal but cooperation among Communists, Socialists
and other political forces, :'.n close connection with the army" in border
to promote the unity of various forces including "that part of the
bourgeoisie which wants to serve the fatherland." This is a position
that might be disputed by militant communists, but it is one that
is shared by the more moderate.
Classified by 000073
Automelicalit, declassified
at, month. from 0.te of Ism.
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200160020-2
 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000W6*6OO28
- 28 -
His apparent effort to equate the dangers facing both Portugal
and Romania was particularly evident during a press conference
on the final day of his visit in which he asserted that it is
both "natural and necessary" that Portugal develop its relations
with the socialist countries, adding that it is also expected
that Lisbon will continue to develop its relations with the
developing and developed capitalist states. He went on to explain
that Portugal's increased ties with the socialist bloc cannot
be interpreted as "counter" or "harmful" to the other Western
countries or the United States since the "development of any
independent state" can only promote international peace and
understanding. Thus, he pointedly referred to Romania's "very
sound relations" with all western countries--including the United
States--as well as all developing and socialist countries, a
situation which he described as "not detrimental to anyone."
ClmIfl.d by 000073
A.10.0t1o.lly d.cI...If.d
SIX month. from d.1..1 I..11..
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200160020-2
 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
5 NOVEMBER 1.975
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200160020-2
-29-
USSR
SUSLOV ASSOCIATE ATTACKS RUSSOPHILE IN KOWUNIST ARTICLE
An article in the September issue of KOMMUNIST, No. 14, assailing
well-known Russophile writer Oleg Mikhaylov for writing a 1974
book extolling pre-revolutionary traditions constitutes the most
serious attack on the Russophile movement in recent years. Its
author is the venerable ultraconp.rvative ideologist V.P. Stepanov,
who is a member of KOMMUNIST's aditorial board and has been
associated with Suslov.
The Russophile movement, which burgeoned during the 1960's,
represents a strongly conservative trend which has disturbed
orthodox communist conservatives by overstressing the traditional
nationalistic Russian values at the expense of new communist
lnternationalistic and proletarian values. The trend was censured
by Agitprop in the late 1960's, but remains strong among conser-
vative communists, making it difficult for ideologists like
Stepanov and Suslov to move against it decisively. The last
serious attack on Russophilism, made by a Suslov subordinate in
late 1972, backfired and resulted in the dismissal of the critic.
Since then, attacks have been relatively rare; hence such an
attack in the leading party journal by a prominent conservative
ideologist is all the more striking.
Mikhaylov's book, "Faithfulness," calls on the younger generation
to be faithful to the "traditions of the classics," to patriotism
and "the national pride of the Russian people," according to
Stepanov. Pointing out that national traditions included not
only progressive but also conservative and even reactionary
components, Stepanov insisted that "when we speak of the Motherland,
we alwa""s rightly stress our Soviet socialist Motherland." He
censured Mikhaylov for lauding the humanism of Tolstoy, Dostoyevskiy
and Bunin. Stepanov conceded that Russians are rightly proud of
these great writers but argued that their ideas cannot be accepted
by communists.
The 70-year old Stepanov rose under Stalin and has long been a
spokesman for hardline views. He appears to have had ties with
Suslov for many years. He became chief editor of the Central
Committee's cultural paper CULTURE AND LIFE in 1949, after
ideological supervisor Zhdanov had died and young Central Committee
Secretary Suslov had taken over supervision of ideology. He later
was deputy head of Agitprop, deputy chief editor of PF'AVDA, and
from 1962-65 chief editor of KOMMUNIST. In the latter post, he
created a stir with his 17 May 1965 PRAVDA article attacking
r Cistal led by 000073
Aulo=cslly d.dn.fh.d
sit fronUS hom dole of I..u.
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200160020-2
 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TREND;
Approved For Release 1999/09/26: CIA-RDP86T00608R0002O IN02O 25
Khrushchev's pragmatism and defending the importance of ideology.
He apparently fell into disfavor in late 1965 and was demoted
merely to membership of the board of KOMMUNIST and was not reelected
a Central Committee candidate member in 1966. Although he has
never been publicly identified as an assistant to Suslov, his tie
to Suslov was revealed when he edited the collection of Suslov
speeches published in 1972. All the collections of speeches of
Brezhnev and Kosygin published in recent years have been edited
by men publicly identified as their assistants.
The main high-level attack on Russophiles in recent years was a
late 1972 LITERARY GAZETTE article by A.N. Yakovlev, a first
deputy head of Agitprop and, thus, a subordinate of Suslov.
According to rumors circulating in Moscow at the time, the article
had been endorsed for publication by Suslov himself. Despite such
high-level backing, there reportedly was a sharp behind-the-scenes
reaction, resulting in Yakovlev's dismissal and appointment as
ambassador to Canada in early 1973.
ADDENDUM
The article on the October 1975 CPSU slogans carried in the TRENDS
of 16 October 1975, page 23, failed to note that a traditional
appeal for "further strengthening of our motherland's economic
and defense might" was dropped from its usual place in a slogan
addressed to the Soviet workers. These words had appeared in the
same slogan in each of the semi-annual lists since October 1972.
Prior to that, Soviet practice regarding the use of the formula
has varied, and there have been several periods when the appeal
was not used at all.
qu.In.d by 000073
Wofftl Nl7 d,ct...m.e
.tx month. Irom date of n...
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200160020-2
 CONFIDENTIAL F13IS TRENDS
5 NOVEMBER 1975
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 CIA-RDP86T00608R000200160020-2
- 31. -
NOTES
PRC PROVINCIAL LEADERSHIP: A 29 October Canton report on a local
meeting on learning from the model Tachai brigade in agriculture
revealed that CCP Politburo member West Kuo-ching has been transferred
from his pest as party chief in Kwargsl to become first secretary of
the Kwangtung provincial party committee and chairman of the revolutionary
committee there. Wei headed a lengthy list of Kwangtung leaders at the
meeting including Canton Military Region commander Hsu Shih-yu, and
Wei delivered the major address at the rally, stressing the need for
local party committees "to do a good job of all current work with
autumn harvesting, winter cultivation and agricultural capital
construction." Wei replaces Chao Tzu-yang, Lwangtung's party chief
prior to the cultural revolution, who was reLnstated in his old job
in 1974. Chao last apTtared in Peking on 19 October, when he and
several other provincial leaders attended the closing session of the
national conference on learning from Tachai. Chao had appeared
regularly in Kwangtung during the past several months, and there is no
evidence that he is under political attack. Wei's move to Kwangtung,
which has created a vacancy in Kwangsi, may be part of a larger transfer
plan designed to fight provincialism and strengthen central party
control. The last transfer of a provincial party boss took place in
December 1973, as part of Peking's massive rotation of all military
region commanders who were also provincial party chiefs, a device used
to strip military leaders of their civil posts and put more provincial
party committees under the direct control of civilian leaders.
PEKING ON USSR-ANGOLA: A 5 November Peking PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator
article has authoritatively lambasted recent Soviet messages on
the Angolan issue. The Tiessages have not been publicized by the
Soviet media, but according to African reports they were addressed
to Zaire officials and the head of the Organization of African Unity
(OAU). The Commentator article attacked Moscow for allegedly
planning to recognize Angolan independence under "a single libera-
tion movement." Commentator called the messages "an ominous
indication" of Moscow's "further intervention and aggression in
Angola," a "wanton slander, threat, and intimidation" against Zaire,
and a "threat" to the entire OAU. Commentator "strongly condemned"
the USSR in the name of the Chinese people, and "resolutely backed"
the OAU position, supported by Zaire, calling for unity among the
three Angolan liberation groups. Peking's last authoritative comment
on Angola, another PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article on 19 September,
had attacked Soviet interference in Angolan affairs but had not
specifically condemned the Soviet Union in tha name of the Chinese
people. Peking has attacked Soviet "interference" in the OAU
before--most recently in a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on the conclusion
of the 12th OAU summit conference--but not in reference to Angola.
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200160020-2
 CONFIDENTIAL FI3 f S TRENDS
5 NOVEMBER 1.975
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200160020-2
-32-
Like previous authoritative comment, Commentator did not specify
which Angolan group the Soviet Union supports exclusively, and
it repeated Peking's standard line that the "Angolan problem"
should be solved by Angolans themselves "through consultations"
and under the guidance of the OAU. A:Peking in Arabic broadcast
at 1630 GMT on 2 November briefly reported that "the Chinese
Government issued a statement" on 31 October calling for an end to
the fighting among the three competing Angolan liberation groups,
a halt to foreign interference, and the withdrawal of "mercenaries"
fighting there. Inexplicably, this Chinese statement is not
known to have been carried in other monitored Chinese media.
CIWIfied S1 X0)17
~W..MI..It1 AKI.uIIIad
.In MAW from U.1@ of 110n.
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200160020-2
 FBIS TRENDS
5 NOVEMBER 1975
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86TOO608ROO0200160020-2
- i -
APPENDIX
MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 27 OCTOBER - 2 NOVEMBER 1975
Moscow (2620 items)
Peking (893 items)
DRV Party-Government
Delegation in USSR
(--)
18%
FRG Chancellor Schmidt
in PRC
(--)
15%*
[Brezhnev Speech
(--)
4%]
UNGA 30th Session
(8%)
11%
Venus 9 and 10 Space
(8%)
8%
[Korea Debate
(6%)
9%]
Missions
25th Anniversary of
(8%)
3%
China
(7%)
6%
Chinese Volunteers'
Algerian Revolution
(--)
4%
Entry in Korean War
21st Anniversary
USSR
(2%)
3%
PRC Nuclear Test
(--)
3%
PRC National Coal
Conference
(--)
3%
Thesr.m, statistics are based on the volcecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" Is used
to denote the lengthy item--radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note: Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
In other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significa:'ce.
* This figure excludes brief reports on Mao Tse-tung's meeting with
Schmidt.
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86TOO608ROO0200160020-2