TRENDS IN COMMUNIST MEDIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000200160014-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 19, 1999
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: September 24, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

inCommQ. nistMedia 24 Sep 75- ~ ~ N~. 38
 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200160014-9
FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST
INFORMATION SERVICE
Trends in Communist Media
24 SEPTEMBER 1975
(VOL. XXVI, NO. 38)
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200160014-9
 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200160014-9
This report Is based exclusively on foreign media
materials and Is published by FBIS without coordination
with other U.S. Government components.
NATIONAL. SECURITY INFORMATIJN
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 000073
Automatically declassified
six months from dale of issue.
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200160014-9
 Approved For Release 1999/09/22NQ&-ApP86T00608R000200160014-9
FBIS TRENDS
24 SEPTEMBER 1975
CONTENTS
MIDDLE EAST
Gromyko Urges Geneva Talks, USSR Cautious on Kissinger Ideas. .
1
THREATS TO FORD
Soviet Media Link Assassination Attempts to U.S, Social Ills .
5
COMMUNIST RELATIONS
Brezhnev Endorses Theorist of Hardline Revolutionary Tactics. .
6
EAST-WEST RELATIONS
Moscow: NATO Autumn Maneuvers Contrary to Spirit of Helsinki .
7
PORTUGAL
Moscow Reserves Judgment on Sixth Provisional Government. . . .
9
PRC-VIETNAM RELATIONS
Peking Welcomes Le Duan Amid Signs of Continued Differences . .
12
PRC-DPRK RELATIONS
Pyongyang Reports Chang's Anti-Soviet Remarks in North Korea. .
15
PRC-TAIWAN
Peking Releases Nationalist Agents, Permits Return to Taiwan. .
17
VIETNAM
PRG Orders Old Saigon Currency Replaced by New. . . . . . . . .
19
NOTES
European CP Conference Preparations; Peking on Spy Satellites;
Gromyko on New Weapons Ban; PRC Provincial Leadership . . . . .
22
Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
i
Ap , ~ elease 1999/09Q DDk DP86T00608R000200160014-9
 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200160014-9
CONFIDENTIAL FDIS TRENDS
24 SEPTEMBER 1975
- 1 -
MIDDLE EAST
GROMYK0 URGES GENEVA TALKS. USSR CAUTIOUS ON KISSINGER IDEAS
Soviet criticism of the Sinai accord has continued to be limited
and, for the most part, indirect. Moscow has offered no suggesti1Jts
of its own on procedures to continue the search for a Mideast
settlement other than Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko's renewed
advocacy, in his 23 September address at the UN General Assembly,
of resumption of the Geneva peace conference. And TASS briefly
reported Secretary Kissinger's 22 September UNGA address in such
a fashion as to suggest that he too was supporting a renewal of
the Geneva talks. Moscow has thus far not acknowledged Kissinger's
idea of an "informal multilateral meeting" to assess the Mideast.
situation. Moscow media have currently been focusing on the isaue of
prospective military aid to Israel, in a spate of comment apparently
prompted by the publication in U.S. newspapers of "secret" U.S.-
Israeli documents, as well as the concurrent visit to Washington
of Israeli Defense Minister Peres. The comment has professed to
see a contradiction between Israel's consent to the new Sinai
accord and its simultaneous attempt to acquire more soplAti.sticated
U.S. weaponry.
KISSINGER ADDRESS In the only account thus far of Secrecary
Kissinger's address, a TASS dispatch on the 22d
reported him as having "spoken for resuming the Geneva conference on
the Middle East" and as saying that the United States and the Soviet
Union "bear special responsibility as cochairmen of that conference."
The Secretary actually said that the United States "intends to
consult over the coming weeks with all concerned regarding the
reopening of the Geneva conference."* The TASS dispatch made no
mention of Kissinger's new suggestion that "we are prepared also
to explore possibilities for perhaps a more informal multilateral
meeting to assess conditions and to discuss the future." Nor did
TASS mention the third possible approach, the Secretary's affirma-
tion that the United States was prepared to "make a serious effort
to encourage" Israeli-Syrian negotiations.
TASS misrepresented Kissinger in reporting that he "admitted" that
a step-by-step policy could not lead to a final Mideast settlement,
and passed over the first part of that sentence: "While we have
? * Soviet comment dealing with the recently published U.S.-Israeli
understandingo has apparently passed over in silence the memorandum
of agreement relating to the Geneva conference.
Appro eAf'ax. ,.~tle se 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200160014-9
I of. ,,.~?^. ~ ..~. ?"-'" CONFIDENTIAL
 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000Mi&0014s9
had important differences wit:t the Soviet Union, our two countries
have held parallel views that the situation in the Middle East
poses grave dangers and that partial steps must be part of and
contribute to progress toward a comprehensive settlement."
While the TASS dispatch did not include Kissinger's remark that
discussions had bei,an with the Soviet Union with a view to
"weighing possible diplomatic approaches," TASS earlier had
briefly reported Foreign Minister Gromyko's meetings with President
Ford on the 18th and.with Secretary Kissinger on the 19th and 21st.
Typically, the TASS accounts mentioned only the broad topics of
discussion, noting for instance that the Ford-Gromyko talks were
on U.S.-USSR relations, including strategic arms limitation, and
on "certain international problems of mutual interest"; the reports
did specify that the Middle East was a tops" in the Kissinger-
Cromyko talks. Soviet media generally tend to be uncommunicative
on substance of such meetings; the Libyan media have offered
an explanation for. Moscow's usual reticence, suggesting that Moscow
did not wantGromyko's meetings to be construed by foreign audiences,
especially Arab, as implying Soviet endorsement of U.S. Mideast
diplomacy and the recent Sinai accord.*
GROMYKO ADDRESS According to short TASS accounts of Gromyko's
UNGA address, he reiterated Moscow's established
three-point stand on the Mideast, calling for full Israeli withdrawal
from occupied Arab territories, the insuring of Palestinian rights--
including their right "to establish their own state"--and guaranteeing
the right of all Mi('ea.t countries to independent development. Gromyko
made no specific mention of the new Sinai accurJ, judging from the
TASS summaries, but in an implicit reference said that "no palliative
measures and camouflage" can obviate the need to satisfy these basic
problems.
* Tripoli's ARAB REVOLUTION NEWS AGENCY claimed on the 21st that
Kosygin told the Libyan delegation to the 12th AAPSO meeting in
Moscow that the Gromyko-Kissinger meetings "did not mean that the
Soviet Union had endorsed American surrender solutions in the Arab
region." Soviet references to Kosygin's 19 September meeting with
the Libyan delegation, in a TASS item on the 19th and in an Arabic-
language broadcast on the 21st, merely reiterated that the USSR has
long advocated the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from Arab
territories and the assurance of Palestinian rights as essential
elements of a comprehensive Mideast settlement.
CI..r ed by 000073
*.LmNI.Nry..Un.RIN
u n
I "M & 1.. del. of
Approved For Release I 999/09726 : tI -RDP86T00608R000200160014-9
 Approved For Release 1999/09/2&4qW-?RP86T00608R1QIS9014-9
24 SEPTEMBER 1975
Saying that the "main problems" still awaited a solution, Gromyko
characterized the Geneva conference as an "appropriate mechanism"
for examining them, and revived the call for resumption of the
conference with the participation of "all, we emphasize, all"
sides concerned, including Palestine Liberation Organization
representatives. While routine comment just prior to the initialing
of the new Sinai accord on 1. September had called it "beneficial"
to resume the Geneva conference, Moscow since then had said virtually
nothing about reviving the talks in Geneva.
U.S. ARMS Moscow's current attention to the matter of further
TO ISRAEL U.S. arms deliveries to Israel appears to have been
sparked by the 16-17 September publication in the
Washipgton POST and New York TIMES of "secret" U.S.-Israeli under-
standings involving U.S. assurances to Israel on defense, energy,
and economic requirements. Some such comment would normally have
appeared in any case in connection with Israeli Defense Minister
Peres' Washington talks, since Moscow generally portrays Israeli
ministerial visits to Washington as portending increaoed military
and financial assistance.* In the present instance, Peres' visit
has been used as a peg for discussion of "some of the details of
these secret documents," with some commentators--as in the weekly
Moscow radio observers roundtable program on the 21st--in effect
questioning the worth of what was called the Egyptian-Israeli
"provisional peace treaty" when it was being followed by plars for
new U.S. weapons deliveries to Israel and new U.S. military airlifts
in the event of a new war.
Moscow comment has been especially critical of suggestions that
the United States would be responsive to Israeli requests for
advanced weapons, seizing in particular on Washington POST and New
York TIMES articles to portray the U.S. press as denouncing the
potentially "destabilizing" effect on the Arab-Israeli military
balance should the United States supply such weapons as the F-16
aircraft and medium-range ground-to-ground Pershing missiles. TASS
and Moscow radio commentators OrAlov and Korn-vev both noted on
the 19th that the Pershing was designed for nuclear warheads, both
indicating that Israel could fit its own nuclear warheads to the
missiles. And TASS Deputy Director General Scrgey Losev, in a
broadcast to North American audiences the same day, noted with
reference to a Washington POST article on the Pershing's capabilities
* Moscow comment on Prime Minister Rabin's September 1974 visit, for
instance, focused on U.S. agreement to satisfy Israeli demands for more
arms supplies, and comment on Foreign Minister Allon's January 1975
talks in Washington viewed the visit as the latest in a long line of
Israeli requests for more assistance. See the TRENDS of 18 September
1974, pages 4-5, a:.d 22 January 1975, pages 15-17.
CI8601I0/ b u0D073
Appi 1.
.W~..3 - lease 1999/09/2WNFMP-WDP86T00608R000200160014-9
 CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
Approved For Release 1999/09/26: CIA-RDP86T00608R0092>0'60 'I4.7`
that it could hit targets throughout Egypt and Jordan, most of
Syria, and "vast areas" of Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Losev warned
that "in the face of such a threat, the Arab countries will be
ccmpelled to take appropriate steps to neutralize it," with the
implication that they might seek to obtain weapons with comparable
capabilities.
Moscow's Arabic-language service has not broadcast the commentaries
dealing with the Pershing missile question, but broadcasts in Arabic
on the 17th did report a PRAVDA article that day by Kuznetsov on
Peres' Washington visit to discuss Israel's financial and military
"demands." Kuznetsov claimed that the arms aid was Tel Aviv's
"price" for its consent to return "a few dozen square kilometers"
of Arab land, and cited U.S. press reports that the United States
was promising to supply the "latest types of armaments," with
schedules for deliveries worked out "for a number of years to come."
U.S. SINAI In other comment Moscow has indicated its continued
PRESENCE displeasure over the proposed U.S. presence at early-
warning stations in the Sinai. A Moscow radio
Arabic commentary on the 17th, for example, insinuated that the
envisioned U.S. activity would be only thinly disguised electronic
intelligence collection, of immense benefit to Israel but harmful
to Arab interests. Describing the long-time collaboration between
U.S. and Israeli intelligence purportedly revealed by "recent"
congressional hearings, the commentary asserted that U.S. intelligence
on Arab military capabilities had been indispensable to Israel in
the past two Arab-Israeli wars. The broadcast clearly implied that
such U.S.-Israeli cooperation had received a new boost with the
recent Sinai accord.*
* Such criticism is almost certainly directed against Egypt for
its role in the disengagement agreement, as well as against Israel
and the United States. President as-Sadat defended himself against
such charges in a 15 September speech before Arab Socialist Union
and trade union leaders in Cairo.
Classified by 000017
A.1.T.IIc 1Iy d..Iq.II1.d
61 ~1M 0M. d446 of 1.... C FD
Approved or a ease 1999/09/26 - PI
86T00608R000200160014-9
 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200160014-9
CONFIDENTIAL FB I S TRENDS
24 SEPTEMBER 1975
THREATS TO FORD
SOVIET MEDIA LINK ASSASSINATION ATTEMPTS TO U.S. SOCIAL ILLS
Soviet media have drawn on standard descriptions of U.S. society
and politics in commenting on the two recent attempts on the life
of President Ford. Both episodes have been linked to the increasing
prevalence of violent crime in the United States and the easy
availability of firearms to the would-be assassin.
Brief reports in PRAVDA and RED STAR on the earlier 5 September
assassination attempt were largely factual, though both referred
to a U.S. "cult of violence" behind the incident. Other less
prominent papers, as well as some radio commentaries, went on at
greater length about the "pistol politics" said to have become
a regular part of U.S. election campaigns. A Moscow radio
observer on 23 September, commenting on the 22 September assassina-
tion attempt, noted that "tens of millions of firearms of all types"
are owned by private citizens in the United States and cited the
widespread opinion that "a law should be passed immediately
limiting the spread" of such weapons.
In general, Soviet commentators have avoided attaching any political
significance to the two attempts. However, regular radio and
television observer Valentin Zorin recalled for his North American
radio audience on 13 September the "slander campaign" that had
preceded the 1963 assassination of President John F. Kennedy.
Zorin wondered whether a similar "propaganda campaign" in the past
few weeks against President Ford's detente policy and his participa-
tion in the CSCE finale in Helsinki was not somehow connected with
this 5 September attempt. An IZVESTIYA commentator also implicated
the U.S. press in a 13 September article, claiming that such acts
could be abetted by the tendency of the press to "savor the details
of criminal acts."
Zorin, too, was critical of the press, in claiming that "American
newspapers were in too much of a hurry when they wrote that Lynette
Fromme was acting on her own in Sacramento." Soviet media have long
been receptive to "conspiracy theories" with regard to earlier U.S.
political assassinations. They have been quick to report
expressions of similar sentiments in the United States, including
Senator Schweiker's recent call for Congress to open a new investiga-
tion of President Kennedy's assassination, as well as accusations
that the FBI and the CIA could have been involved in some fashion.
CIWIFN., 0000/3
u1.W icN1f ..CI.NIIIN
App v d II""` elease I 999/09M tDO PARDP86T00608R000200160014-9
 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : IMIM ?r1975
0
Approve
COMMUNIST RELATIONS
BREZHNEV ENDORSES THEORIST OF HARDLINE REVOLUTIONARY TACTICS
Brezhnev's interview on 17 September with Konstantin Zarodov,
controversial theorist of hardline revolutionary tactics, raises
far-reaching questions concerning the continuity of Soviet policy
and even Brezhnev's status.
Zarodov, editor of PROBLEMS OF PEACE AND SOCIALISM, the Prague-based
theoretical journal of international communism, gained wide
attention by an article in PRAVDA on 6 August which implicitly
challenged the "unity of action" tactics which most West European
communist parties, as well as the Soviet party, have publicly
proclaimed in recent years.
Brezhnev, by identifying himself with Zarodov, has in effect also
identified himself with a militant interpretation of communist
tactics which is sure to complicate Soviet efforts to convoke a
conference of European communist parties and may damage the
credibility of the Soviet Union's detente policy. These obvious
liabilities of Brezhnev's action suggest the possibility that
he may have been acting out of need--such as the need to preempt
the position of a potential challenger--rather than deliberate
choice.
The Soviet media handled the interview in a way calculated to
draw maximum attention to Brezhnev's identification with the
controversial editor. PRAVDA carried an account of the interview
on the front page on 18 September--a highly unusual placement given
the nature of the event. The headline, "A Conversation with Comrade
L.I. Brezhnev," seemed clearly calculated to catch the eye. Moscow
radio carried accounts of the interview on its domestic service
on the 17th and on a wide variety of foreign beams on the 17th
and 18th. Monitcred broadcasts included most European languages
although, surprisingly, none in Portuguese.
Idawz'bt 1ba
?e 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200160014-9
 Approved For Release 1 999/09/2fioN I'd P86T00608RM2ftM0014-9
24 SEPTEMBER 1975
EAST-WEST RELATIONS
MOSCOW: NATO AUTUMN MANEUVERS CONTRARY TO SPIRIT OF HELSINKI
Current NATO strategy and this autumn's military maneuvers in
West Europe have been the subject of considerable Soviet comment
over the past few weeks. While criticism of the annual fall exercises
is customary, this year's expanded series of national and multinational
maneuvers and staff exercises, coming after this summer's conclusion
of the European security conference in Helsinki, has apparently
prompted Moscow to more than double the volume of comment and
reportage devoted to last year's maneuvers.*
Commentators have uniformly questioned NATO adherence to the spirit
of the CSCE accord. Thus Moscow has persistently asked why it was
necessary to undertake such large-scale exercises at a time when,
following the successful conclusion of the CSCE summit, the peoples
and states of Europe were looking forward to a future of growing
security, peace and progress. Comment has made the standard
assertions that NATO feels threatened and weakened by the deterioration
of its "southern flank." Therefore, the alliance, according to
Moscow, has undertaken "massive" maneuvers in an effort to demonstrate
solidarity and strength, while at the same time endeavoring to
undermine peace and progress in Europe by stirring up mistrust and
fear.
A Yuriy Kharlanov article in PRAVDA on 15 September provided Moscow's
only acknowledgment, in all the comment on the autumn exercises, that
the NATO countries had adhered to the prior-notification provision
of the Helsinki accord. But Kharlanov went on to assert that living
up to the letter of the document was not enough: "Some people,"
he said, "are trying to prove in the Western press that the current
NATO maneuvers are in full accordance with the decisions adopted
in Helsinki, Since these exercises were announced in advance, they
maintain, this means that one of the points of the final act is
being fulfilled. Yet an understanding was reached in Helsinki to
be guided not only by the letter but also by the spirit of the
conference. The present NATO campaign has nothing in common with
the spirit."
Similarly, IZVESTIYA on 23 September described this year's "intensified
military preparations" as being clearly contrary to the "spirit of the
times." The Soviet military newspaper RED STAR asserted on 21 September
* Moscow has not publicized any major multinational exercises of the
Warsaw Pact since the five-country maneuvers held in Czechoslovakia in
the fall of 1972.
CI~QIU W 0000fl
Appr > 8r'l lease 1999/09/2&N P86TOO608R000200160014-9
 Approved For Release 1999/09/26: e9XF-W1 9I6T00608R000W01'8t 0dA-9
24 SEPTEMBER 1975
that such an "unprecedented series" of military maneuvers could only
arouse "legitimate alarm" and reflect a desire to "block" and
"hinder" the processes of easing tension in Europe. Earlier, RED
STAR on 30 August, having noted that this year's maneuvers coincided
"for the first time" with operations in the North Sea of nuclear-
powered ships of the U.S. Navy, called the coming maneuvers an
"unprecedented demonstration of the NATO machinery."
Appro' +' i "' ase 1999/09/26CCQ86T00608R000200160014-9
 Approved For Release 1999/09/2tQ40t61P86TOO608RDeO2O tE6IDJ14-9
24 SEPTEMBER 1975
PORTUGAL
MOSCOW RESERVES JUDGMENT ON SIXTH PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
Moscow has taken a "wait-and-see" attitude toward Portugal's
sixth provisional government, formed by Premier Azevedo on
19 September, cautiously saying that "only the future will show"
whether the new government will follow the path of revolution,
the "only guarantee" of success in its mission. In the light of
the Portuguese Communist Party's considerably reduced role in the
new government, Moscow has put the best face on the situation,
praising the PCP for "putting the interests of the revolution above
party interests" in agreeing to join the government, while at the
same time warning that solutions to the country's problems were
"inconceivable" without PCP participation.
Foreign Minister Gremyko, in his 23 September UNGA address, became
the first Soviet leader to speak out on the Portuguese situation
ard, in effect, to respond to admonitions in August by President
Ford and Secretary Kissinger against Soviet interference in
Portugal. -According to TASS' summary of his speech, Gromyko
deplored "frank attempts from outside" to force the Portuguese
people to abandon their chosen path, but he did not identify the
authors of such attempts. He called for calm to allow Portugal to
tackle its complex political and economic problems, and said it
was the Soviet position that "no one should be allowed to trample
underfoot" the Portuguese people's right to decide their destiny
without outside interference.
AZEVEDO GOVERNMENT Prior to the formation of the government--
in which the PCP is represented by only one
communist minister--Moscow had displayed concern over the PCP's
declining influence and indicated willingness to accept the
government arrangement only as a necessary evil to avoid the threat
of reaction. Oa the 17th, PRAVDA correspondents Yermakov and Kotov
had rejected extreme leftist criticism of the PCP's participation
in the cabinet by noting that the forthcoming government was "the
sole possible--under the present conditions--solution to the
crisis." Similarly, ZA RUBEZHOM said on 18 September that "it is
the realization that a real danger of overt action by reaction
exists in the country which is forcing attempts to achieve a
compromise." ZA RUBEZHOM added that PCP leader Alvaro Cunhal
had warned, that "if it proves necessary, we will start a struggle
with different means and victory will be the revolution's all the
same."
App , " jm~ ?"f,, t lease 1999/09/g8 6 Fi6 cep~N7~dCRpP86T00608R000200160014-9
 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 ? I--tYP86TOO6O8RO
Yermakov and Kotov gave a lukewarm welcome to the new government
in PRAVDA on the 20th, observing that "it seems that the
rrotracted government crisis has been resolved," largely due to
the PCP's "sense of high responsibility for the fate of the
revolution's achievements" and to the "renewed dialog between the
communist and socialist parties." The correspondents noted with
approval that the government's plan "envisages measures to
consolidate the revolution's basic achievements and speaks of
Portugal's socialist path." But they warned that stability and
success "can be insured only if the government's effo ".s coincide
with the aspirations of the working masses."
A TASS report in PRAVDA on the 21st praised the PCP for "putting
the interests of the Portuguese revolution above party interests"
in supporting Azevedo's efforts, but indicated unhappiness over
the PCP's lot, reporting that the party considered that the
composition of the government "far from corresponds to the
influence held in the country" by the various political forces.
In another caveat, TASS warned that "any government can succeed
only to the extent that it accords with the interests of the
revolutionary process." Further underscoring Moscow's wait-and-see
attitude, a 22 September Kotov dispatch in PRAVDA, as reported by
TASS, added that the sixth government's platform "reflects
contradictory tendencies" and that "only the future will show which
of them takeis the upper hand." Kotov added that "the masses are
now on the ;Hove" and that commentators "stress that the government
will find it impossible to ignore this new weighty factor."
Commentators on Moscow radio's weekly observers' roundtable on the
21SL, summing up the stages in the "antifascist democratic
revolution" represented by the five previous provisional governments,
described the sixth as a compromise including representatives of
"various tendencies" within the military as well as "socialist
and communist ministers" and Popular Democratic Party representa-
tives. Without further analysis of the makeup of the cabinet,
IZVESTIYA's MatvLyev and Moscow radio's Dunayev analyzed the past
failures to implement "truly good measures" aimed at satisfying
the aspirations of the peasantry, particularly in the north, in
effect calling on the new government to follow the line established by
the cabinets of ousted Prime Minster Concalves.
LITERARY GAZETTE While recent Soviet comn;,=nt on the Socialist
ON PS, PDP Party has tended to be moderate--on the 18th,
PRAVDA, for example, slecifically noted
Cunhal's recognition of the need for a PS role in the government--
a 17 September LITERARY GAZETTE article by radio commentator Igor
Cl..dll.d by 000073
Aulom.llc.lly decln.l0.d
.Is month. from ..te of Ique,
Approved For Release 1999/09/5~NFiW P86TOO6O8ROOO2OO160014-9
 Approved For Release 1 999/09/26c;oQ - ,J '86T00608R000200160014-9
FillS TRENDS
24 SEPTEMBER 1975
resunenko revived earlier criticism of the PS.* resunenko
observed that Portugal's current problems "have been caused by the
sharp turn to the right" of the PS and PPD leadership. And, while some
Soviet observers had been almost appreciative of Soares' remarks
in a L'EUROPEO interview on the threat of a rightwing coup,
rr:bunenko noted only that "Soares was forced to admit" that such
a danger existed. Reserving the worst words for the socialist-
allied People's Democratic Party, Fesunenko said that the PPD
"actually refused to cooperate with the communists" and clairid
that the PPD, "in alliance with openly counterrevolutionary groups;'
had "instigated the escalation of violence, terror and pogroms
which befell the local PCP committees this summer."
* LITERARY GAZETTE's earlier attacks against the Socialist Party
and PS leii'er Mario Soares are discussed in the TRENDS of 2 July
1975, page 25 and of 6 August 1975, page 23.
Ap ~~~'~ :1' elease 1999/0%JAjbPj 4 DP86T00608R000200160014-9
 Approved For Release 1999/09/9rQTDP86T00608A00Ap,01,?0014-9
214 :1, I;I''I'I1:1`1111':It 197',
?- 12 ?-
PRC - V I ET ''IM RL.LAT 1 ONS
PEKING WELCOMES LE DUMI MID SIGNS OF CONTINUED DIPFERLNCES
While prennnt:ltig an :ipItc':trnncv of cordial, correct Sinn-Vit?tnamc?t;c
H1)1 Icl trlty, Chinese Ivi idI ing of the current. vlt;i It t;; PekIll y, by a
VLetnantene party-guvetnmont: delegation Ied by VWI' FII'll t Sc'rr?ito ry
Le Duan hail been not.1 ccab1y Ict;1; eI'I'tit;Ive titan Ii hill bees for
he Duan's I;tst visit at; head of an offlclat dclegat.Ion In .June 1973.
The current visit: began on 22 September. I'ekirig comment moder:rtecl
previous expretnt;Iona of tin Ely and fricndi;hIp and hilt; given more
attention to at;nc:t;i;mentn of the world nituatton potent Ia11.Y t;ffent;ly
to Vietnamese nennltiviilet; than it had durlnf, the 1973 t;tay. Such
Peking trectiment t;crvet+ to under) Inez recent tiigns of coolli' ;i; In
relc.tlont3 with Hanot since ibe I;;ttcr't; "I ibcrat ion" of South
Vietnam last spr.Inp,.* Vietnamese treatment, by contras;t, hat; thus
far reiterated tentImuninlt; to Sino-Vietnamese friendship oiled in
1973, althot'gh IlanoI iiir.cdIa have deleted Chinese commenI at. odds
with V.etnamet;c position-, in the course of report inf; on the vit;It.
The current delegation, which Includes one other Vic-ttiarnese politburo'
member, PRV Vice Premier Le Thanh Nghf., is .lower-ranklnf, than that
led by he Dunn In 1.973, which included DRV Premier Phan Van Dung at;
well as Le Thanh Nghl. The present delegation's several 1)RV economic
and planning offic?.Lals suggest It has come to conclude an crononlic
assistance agreement, as did the last Le Duan tie legation in 1973.
The Vietnamese visitors include Vice M[nintc?r of Foreign Trade l.y
Ban, who has been in Peking since mid-August, when he accompanied
a DRV delegation led by he Thanh Nghi to initiate talks on Sino-
Vietnamese economic cooperation in Peking.**
Chinese hospitality protocol for the Vi.etnamew thus far has followed
closely the pattern employed in the 1973 visit. The guests were
greeted on arrival by five CCI' Politburo members led by Vice Premier
Tengllsiao-plng, -.,re welcomed at a 22 September reception attended
by nine CCI' Politburo members, and were feted at a banquet that
evening hosted by Teng Ilsiao-pint; and addressed by Teng and Le Duan.
* The 4-11 June visit by Le Duan as head of a VWP and DRV government
delegation was discussed in the TRENDS of 31 May 1973, pages 1--4;
6 June 1973, pages 1-3; and 13 June 1973, pages 1-7. For discussion
of recent signs of Sino-Vietnamese coolness, see the TRENDS of
20 August 1975, pages 17-19, and of 4 September 1975, pages 17-18.
** That delegation's visit is discussed in the TRENDS of 20 August
1975, pages 17-19.
Appr `~d;~r ease I 999/09/2
@o1aP86T00608 8000200160014-9
 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 ~OYAWDP86T00608RO99~rQgligp,914-9
2/4 10: 'l'I'.MII1I( 1915
On the 23d Le Durin and Le llinnh Nghl "penud tnikn with Tonp and
Li Ilnien-nlen and nine met Cambodian Deputy Prime Mininter long
Spry, who hart been in Peking a I nee the 111th. llie V1 ot.nnmene
delegation won received by Milo on the 24th.
CIIINLSL CO'?'1LNI l;xpronaiono of Sino-Victttntrtene fr1t'ndnh1p and
no11(Irtrl ty in ;enp,'-t 22 September bnnq(iot ripoech
were Iean eIoboroto than those In the npooc'h by PI(C I'remlor Chou
E'n-.Inl. welcoming Le burin in 19I.. when the Vietnam Military conflict
Continued denpl to the Parln agreement. Mille Chou had charncterl yotI
the two notions an "(-lone comrnden-In-armn and brothers" who "nhared
weal and woo" rind had gone through "thick and thin" together, Tonp,
now called the PI(C acid Vietnam "fraternal nodal lnt neighborn"
sharing a "longt.tandlug traditional IrIcndnhilt."
Clint;
In hin had noted that a "profound revolutionary friendnhip,"hnuritured
personally by Mao Tue-tong and lit) Chi Mlnh and balled on the
principles of Marxirirn-Lotilttir(m and proletarian Intorn,t.ionalinm,
had been forged between the two natlonti nrd that the "great friend-
ohip and m111tant unity" between them had been "furtht'r enhanred
and consolidated." Chou had pledged that Chinn would continue to
perform itta intornatlonallnt duty to resolutely support Vietnam's
"Just struggle." Thin Lime Tong merely noted that the Chinese
people have "always.; treatsured their revolutionary friendship"
with Vietnam, that the preservation and development of their
friendship on the bail]-i of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian inter-
nr.tionalfsm was In keeping with the "common desire" and "fundamental
interests" of the two peoples, tin,! that the Chinese people would
"spare no effort" to do no.
The PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial greeting Le Duan's latest arrival
similarly dropped most of the expressions of friendship that had
been recited in the editorial greeting his 1973 visit. It pledged
only that the Chinese "will, ar always, actively contribute their
share" to strengthening Sino-Vietnamese friendship. Atmospherics in
the NCNA reports on the delegation's arrival and its reception by the
Chinese leadership were also moderated. While the Sino-Vietnamese
talks in 1973 had been orened in a "warm atmosphere overflowing with
revolutionary friendship and militant unity," talks this time were
characterized simply as "fraternal, cordial, and friendly."
Like other I'1(C spokesmen before Vietnamese audiences in recent weeks,*
Teng on the 22d stressed, without specifically mentioning the United
* Vice Premier Li lisien-mien, at a 13 August .1915 welcoming banquet
speech for Le Thanh Nghi, and Vice Premier Chen !isi-lien, in a
3 September speech at the Thai Nguyen steel compl(.x near Hanoi during
the 1975 DRV National Day celebrations, had similarly admonished Viet-
namese audiences on the dangers from superpower hegemonism for peace
in the world today.
App"'"" " ' elease 1999/09/5 FGtAARDP86T00608R000200160014-9
 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200160014-9
CONFIDENTIAL I'M!; TRENDS
214 l;li1'Tra,1111:R 191'i
l;1 t1!ti and the l;ovlet tinIotr, tlt:tt Life hcf!enutninn; oI the nupe.r'powerti"
wtiti the primary etiunc of world tcnrtton today. He warned hln
IInLenvrt; iIIat. the nupcr?powvrt+ were nublcctinp Life 'Third World to
"ngf;rctinlon, ttubv(!rtilon, Ifit ('r1('rencV, control, and plunder," and
pledged tint China would "tilrutd ;mnwerv(ngly" ilL the tilde of the
Third World count, left :u; Hill "main force" of rcr+lrstnnce to
l.mperlal it;nt, colon fit I and hry,cmonlnm. DurInp, Le Dunn'n 1973
vlr;lt by cuntrn;;t, Chou En-Iai did not comnumt. on the world
?IitutlLlon, dI:scuntillif, only the "compIiLely new r;Itttation" in
Indocliina In the wakw of the Park pvnc?.c? af;rremcnt ts.
ViLTPUV4I:Sl: Ti i.Aii ! NT Le. Doall'n 22 September ball(lttet npecc?Ii
or VISIT crhoc'd hit; previorI tcnLimattfalr+ to Sirto-
Victn;InIt ;e nolf(!arlLy and apprcci;ILIoIl
for 1'RC aid in the wilt-, employed in Ill,, 1973 vitf.t. The p;IrLy
lender lauded Lhe "ntl1 i t;mt root idarity" bctwccr- the Vlctttamcne
peopl and tat I,Lose people, "our close Fr icndt ," and he prn i t;cd
Lhc ;'gre;It. support and multiform :I:;n I rcane('" y, (ven by the I'RC
".In a :pft It of proletar1a11
fntcrnationa.l it;tn."
An he had :Iotic Ili 1973, however, Le Du:ur a l r;o underscored Viet namcne
dlffcrencen with Chinn )n the .Itit ern at IonaI titLuation. Ili, stressed
the intport.fncc of solidarity among the "sochil itst rountrlcr;" and the,
intern:t Iona l comment l,:t tncwement, car;tlf;aL lnf; the United St.Kett ;Bone
as the "i-inf,icadc'r" of intern?It.lonol imperialism, and prafslnf; ;Iid
to Vietnam from "other fratcrn;ll socialist countries" ;In well ;l Lh;It
from Lhc f'RC--but. without :specifying thanks to the "So.'iet. people"
as he had done in his 1973 speech. VNA's 23 September report of
the 22 September bniruc't :11,;o reflected Victn;nne;;c difference.-; with
China on t;en:;ItIvc Sino-Soviet issuers by pointedly omitiInf; that
part of T'nf; II?;Lao-i,inf;' address which dealt with conc'emnlnf; the
"superpower.-:" for their international rivalry.
PRE-VISIT CCX41ENT Iwmedlatcly prior to Le Duan's arrival,
ON DISPUTED 1' I/'lfr, Peking media took paints to underline an
intransigent Chinese position on island;;
claimed by h?th Vietnam and China In the South China Sea. A
Peking radio report by the station's correspondent, broadcast to
Taiwan on 19 September and to Vietnam on 20 and 21 September, reaffirmed
China's claims to the disputed islands and recalled--for the first
time in Chinese media in several months--the PRC victory over Saigon
forces in the Paracel (Hsisha) Islands In January 1974. Focusing
on Chinese accomplishments on the Parsed Islands, the report noted
the development of modern industrial, transport and fish-processing
facilities there, adding that one of the islands had become "a basd'
with "various modern facilities for fishery, shipping industry and
national defense in the South China sea." This report is not known
to have been carried in other Chinese media.
App ' , ~, lease 1999/09/26 coNFIO A-RDP86T00608R000200160014-9
 Approved For Release 1999/09/26?61iREk'0086TOO608R0 - 'ObH1 14-9
Zvi PTEMHI:f 1975
- 15
PRC - DARK R ELATIONS
PYONGYANG REPORTS CHANGIS ANTI-SOVIET REMARKS IN NORTH KOREA
On 24 September KCNA replayed attacks on "superpowers" and
"I-cyemonism" made by visiting CCP Politburo member Chang Chun-chino
at a 23 September rally in Nampo, the first time such anti-Soviet
remarks have been replayed by I'yongynt.g. The KCNA version was
even more complete than the NCNA report on the speech. In the pant
the North Korean media have carefully refrained from replaying any
overtly anti-Soviet references in Chinese statements; the most
recent 11 lust rat Ion of thin occurred on 21 September, when DIRK
medIn dropped a Chang reference to "modern revinIonium" in a speech
at n banquet welcoming him to Pyongyang.*
The 24 September replay of anti-Soviet references does not neem to
iodlcnte. that, North Koren has become willing to burn ideological
bridges with the Soviet Union, however, an Pyongyang displayed
caution in replaying only those anti-Soviet remarks made outside
the capital, and Korean speakers themselves continue to refrain
from making anti-Soviet remarks. In addition, KCNA reported the
presence of Soviet officials at a wreath-laying ceremony on
22 September while NCNA failed to do so, in line with the pattern
followed when then CCP Vice Chairman Li Te-sheng made a National
Day trip to North Xorca In September 1973.
Chang is in the DI'R} as held of a party delegation which arrived
in Pyongyang on 21 September, the first high-level Chinese group
to visit the DPRK other than on a major anniversary since Chou
En-lai's trip to Pyongyang in April 1970. There has been no
indication the PRC delegation has any special substantive aim,
and thus far the visit seems mainly to have fostered an image of
Asian communist unity--which may, in fact, be its intended purpose.
NCNA reported the delegation was on a "friendly visit" at the
invitation of the Korean Workers Party, while KCNA has called the
visit a "goodwill mission" of "great significance in further
strengthening Korean-Chinese friendship" and for attaining the
"common goal." The delegation was received by Kim II-song on the
* Over the past two years, Pyongyang has alluded to but never publicly
embraced Peking's current scheme of "t!::ee worlds," which lumps the
united States and the USSR together. DPRK media have widely discussed
the "Third World" and referred in passing to a "Second World," but
have never mentioned the "First World" of the "superpowers."
M. Aw14. Ir... uN Nlr.
Appr elease 1999/0992BF1DVPMDP86T00608R000200160014-9
 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : ? i4t- i .6T00608R00Q,;QA11~9p1~;! -9
24 1;1a''I'I;1i111:i( 197 i
26th, but there have been no roportn of any forma] tnikn. 'I'Irurt 1,111 -
till' do I egoI Lnil's sir I lv i t. sort have I nc l udocl the banquet: III I'yosgyangr
vlt;ltn to Kim's birthp.lar.e and varloun monuments;, and the mrtatt
rally on (lit, 23d in Nampo,
Speaking it the hanquet oil the 21nt, Cluing (:hue-chino c lone I y
followrcl tite public pnnltlon on Koren that. Peking cspouned during
Kim I1-song's vlttit to Ch1n:1 in April.* Chang supported Kite's;
thrrr prlnriples and five-point program tt; the Correct path for
Konen rrunl ficat toil, condemned the tinited Stn tea and the l'ak
regitne fur nt tempt. Itig, to perpetuate the division of Koren, and
ofirrrd Chine tie nuppnrI for the Korean den;nnd for "complete
withdrawal of U.S. troupe" from South Koren.
111 111u ;speech at tlw banquet, KWI' Political Committee member Y:;r,l;
Ilyong-t;up al~;o strongly emphnnlzed Korean-Chine tie unity, noting;
tint It was based on "complete equality and independence." Yang
paid 140:;01 attention to the Korean question, not,tnp only that it
won the Korean people's "supreme national task" to force the
withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea and achieve the
Independent and peaceful reunification of the country, and tint
both North and South Korean people would defeat the "two Korean
plot" and atruggle to Implement Kim's three principles and five-
point policy.
* Peking's views on Korean issues as reflected in the April visit
are discussed in the TRENDS of 23 April 1975, pages 19-23, and of
30 April, pages 8-9.
Appr
ease I 999/09/26x1 Lbt1 6iP86T00608 R000200160014-9
 Approved For Release 1999/09/26c 1ACRW86TOO608ROII'OE00*60014-9
24 SEt'TI.MISI:k 1975
PRC-TA I WAN
PEKING RELEASES NATIONALIST AGENTS, PERMITS RETURN TO TAIWAN
Peking on 22 September announced the release of .144 agents of the
Taipei government captured during sabotage raids against the PRC
in the early 1960's. The NCNA account of the release noted that
those pardoned would be permitted to return to Taiwan and would
be provided with travel expenses.
This latest Peking initiative follows Taiwan's earlier rejection of
10 Nationalist "war criminals" whom Peking hal pardoned in March
and given permission to go to Taiwar.. Peking knt considerable
propaganda play when the Chiang government refused to allow those
former Kuomintang army officers into Taiwan. The current release
seems designed to gain Peking further favorable publicity for its
efforts to foster people-to-people interchanges with Taiwan
against the wishes of the Taiwan government.
The 22 September NCNA report disclosed that "Chinese judicial
organs" had decided to release "all the 95 armed special agents
and 49 crew members . . . of the Chiang Kai-shek clique in custody,"
marking the "completioc of the disposal of all the cases of the
U.S.-Chiang armed agents and crew niembers" who were captured between
1962 and 1965. NCNA noted that some of the captured personnel had
been released earlier "in four batches" since July 1963. It said
that the newly released agents had been granted citizenship rights
and jobs and would be allowed to return to Taiwan if they wished.
The report also noted that two Japanese and two South Koreans
captured on the boats carrying agents were also released. NCNA
repeatedly called the saboteurs "U.S.-Chiang agents," but it did
not elaborate on the role the United States played in the 1960
raids.
MARCH AMNESTY Peking announced last March the release of almost
300 former KMT "war criminals" and subsequently
gave considerable propaganda support to 10 of those released who
traveled to Hong Kong in April to petition Taipei authorities for
permission to return to their families on Taiwan.* In early
September NCNA and Peking radio reported that three of the group
had returned in frustration to the mainland, two had gone to the
United States, and four remained in Hong Kong. NCNA earlier had
reported the suicide in early June, caused by the "Chiang clique's
* Peking's 18 March announcement and subsequent propaganda on the
issue are discussed in the TRENDS of 19 March 1975, paLis 27-28, and
of 30 April 1975, page 13.
Ap
elease 1999/09/I26rw1OiAyRPP86T00608R000200160014-9
 CONFIDENTIAL IBIS TRENDS
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86TOO608ROOQ2O t6Qp0: -X1.9y5
hcnrtlenunean," of one member of the group in Hong Kong. Speaker"
at meetings sponsored by the CCP United Front Work Department in
Canton and Peking to welcome the three returnees expressed hope
that eventually they would be able to return to the iulnnd and
nhnrply denounced Premier Chiang Ching-kuo and other Taiwan
offlcialn for their 'perverted" stand.
Appro H& ase 1999/09/2Cto&I QF86T00608R000200160014-9
 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 caES+"tR86T00608R0Qq?.Qq.J?x14-9
24 SEPTEMBER 1975
VIETNAM
PRG ORDERS OLD SAIGON CURRENCY REPLACED BY NEW
A major exchange of former GVN currency for new "National Bank of
Vietnam" banknotes at n rate of 500 old piasters for one new unit
wan reported to have been carried out on 22 September throughout
South Vietnam. According to r series of communiques released that
clay, the exchange was necessary for both economic reasons and to
halt "espionage" activities and disruption of the market and the
people's livelihood. The various announcements from the PRC, bank
authorities, and the Saigon Military Management Committee explain-
ing procedures and rules for Lite exchange include several indirect
acknowledgments of resistance and difficulties the PRG has faced
since its 30 April takeover in the South.
Elimination of the old GVN currency, use of which had been permitted
since the takeover, appears to he a major step in the campaign,
announced in a 10 September. PRG statement, to "eliminate" certain
categories of big businessmen and institute new forms of economic
organization.* Announcements to date provide no evidence of the
new currency's relationship to the existing DRV currency, or on
any fixed currency exchange rate between the North and South or
with foreign currencies.
The 21 September PRG communique ordering the exchange--first
monitored from Saigon radio on the 22d, the day of the exchange--
justified the step on grounds that "an independent and sovereign
currency" that served the people's interests was needed to replace
the old GVN money, which it said had been a "brazen tool for
exploitation" and had become "dependent and seriously devalued by
serious inflation." The communique added that the PRG had
decided to take "economic and financial measures"--not spelled out
furthest--aimed at building "an independent and sovereign economy
of the revolutionary administration," overcoming inflation "left
behind by the enemy," and preventing continued use of old GVN
banknotes "to undermine the economy," to carry out "acts of
espionage to disrupt security and order" and to "upset the market
and the people's livelihood."
The exchange rate for old currency into the new, 500 "Saigon
administration" piasters for every new banknote unit, was
announced in a 21 September communique of the National Bank of
Vietnam, also first monitored on the 22d. The communique pointed
* See the TRENDS of 17 September 1975, pages 16-17, for a discussion
of the 10 September PRG statement and the new campaign.
CIS"" b, 00001]
Ap elease 1999/09
F1p, DP86T00608R000200160014-9
GUN TFAt
 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : .9IMT00608R000'20101 014-9
24 :l:PTI;Nftl;R 1.975
out that only old hitnknoten lti denominc-Llout; of 1,000, 50(), 200,
and 100 planters (dong;)* would he exchanged, with the nlnrt.l.ler
denotnf.nalfonn ~'tempor'artl.y'' coltt1.rttuing In tine as "nnutl.1 chanpc."
The connurticluc, npecIlied rentr.fctionn on amounL'; that could he
exchanged for hourtchoidit-?-I tmltcd to 100,00() old p.l.ru;tern,
individual-ii till to 15,000, and larger amount'; for bun.I.nensen up to
500,000 planter;i. All nntountn move the fntlto were to be
depot;Ited In hank nav.Ingu or other accounin, from which withclrawn.l.t;
could be made ''gradis;Iiy" for nnut.l.l deponltort; and based on need
for buninenvcr;.
Evidence that In S;t.1gott, at lean L, authorities greatly under.estintaLed
the scope and complexity of the exchange program wain provided by
revised announcemcn Lt; on the Saigon exchange hour. s and travel
rentric-Lions. The Initial announcement by the Saigon Military
Management Committee called for the exchange to be completed
between 0600 and 1.100 Sa f.gon time on the 22d, and nn;tounced that
workers would he authorired absence from work until 1.100, a period
during which vehicular travel. and trading restrictiorn were put
into force. But a second announcement some 11 bourn later announced
that because of the "practical situation," the Saigon currency
exchange committee had ext.e:;led the deadline by 12 hours, to 2300
on the 22d. Another indication of the problems facing, the
authorities effecting the exchange came in a 24 September communique
issued by the National Bank of Vietnam, warning people to be on the
lookout for bogus currency bearing the inscription "NFLSV Central
Committee." The bank communique cautioned people not to confuse
them with the genuine new ones and to report any information they
might have about the circulation of the bogus bills.
The importance of the currency exchange in the PRGls new canpaign against
the "comprador bourgeoisie" and disruptive elements was reflected
in initial commentaries on the Saigon radio and in an article in
the 23 September Saigon GIAI PHONG newspaper. Repeating the key
Justifications of the. 21 September PRG communique, the article
stressed that tltc~ "comprador bourgeoisie" had continued,since the
South was "liberated,"to "speculate in" and hoard goods, increase
prices, and "disrupt the market" with prices increasing "every
passing day," thus undermining '.he economy and causing "political
disturbances." The article urged vigilance against "slanderous
arguments and acts of sabotage" by the "enemy and his lackeys"
to maintain security and order during the currency exchange period.
* In the original Vietnamese, the term "dong" has always been, and
continues to be, used to refer to the monetary unit in both the
North and the South. However, translators have traditionally
retained dong in speaking of Hanoi currency but have rendered the
word as "piaster" when referring to GVN currency.
t,nnn.: sr oooor.IO,,,.I i u i q ..c r..p ll.d
ID,.
Approve or RIa ease I 999/09/26" l Wb''86T00608R000200160014-9
 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 ~A{RXL186T00608R09Q&04a14-9
24 SEPTEMBER 1975
A questions and answers broadcast on the currency exchange by
Saigon radio on the 23d explained why the now r:dministration had
waited until now--nearly five months--to replaced the old Saigon
currency. It cited "many other big tasks" such as maintaining
public order and security, building and consolidating administrative
machinery at various levels, and added that issuing currency
required a "preparatory period."
App~-.d i elease I 999/09/ FIR6 DP86T00608R000200160014-9
 CONFIDENTIAL FBZS TRENIIS
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R0002Q.QJfaQQ 1% 1975
N 0 T E S
EUROPEAN CP CONFERENCE PREPARATIONS: Recent references in the Polish
and Czechoslovak press suggest that the projected all-European con-
ference of communist parties is still planned this year, despite
Western press speculation that disagreements might force a postponement
until after the 25th CPSU congress in February 1976. The Warsaw
TRYBUNA LUDU on 10 September referred to the conference as taking
place "this autumn, ,and Bratislava PRAVDA on 26 August said It
would be held "this year." High-ranking East European figures have
been less specific as to the timing. Bulgarian Premier Todorov,
in an 8 September Sofia speech, and SED Politburo member and Secretary
Axen, in a Milan L'UNITA festival speech on the 14th, indicated
that preparations for the European communist party conference were
still going on, but refrained from saying when the conference would
be held. That the preparations have been difficult was indicated by
the fact that communist media have not reported any preparatory
meetings since the one held in East Berlin on 8-10 April. Bratislava
PRAVDA called the preparations "arduous" and "not easy or simple."
The Yugoslav paper Ljubljana DELO on the 13th stressed that the most
basic disagreement during the conference preparations was between
Moscow and the independent Italian Communist.Party, which--along
with the Polish party--is one of the organizers of the planned con-
ference. Concern over the Italian party's independent attitude may
have been a factor in the SED's decision to send an exceptionally
high-ranking figure such as Axen to the L'UNITA festival in Milan.
PEKING ON SPY SATELLITES: A 22 September NCNA commentary bluntly
derided U.S.-Soviet cooperation in space, alleging that there is
evidence of an increasingly fierce superpower "spy war" in space.
The commentary claimed, for the first time in PRC media, that the USSR
has been developing satellites capable of searching out and destroying
U.S. spy satellites covering Soviet military deployments. Citing a
16 August AFP report from Bonn, NCNA alleged that a Soviet satellite
had "recently torpedoed a U.S. spy satellite in orbit," noting that
this "technological breakthrough" stemming from a three-year Soviet
testing program poses a "grave danger" to the West. The commentary
also broke new ground when it declared that the United States, in order
to counter the USSR, has stepped up test production of Weapons to
protect its satellites and is planning to put "synchronized spy
satellites" into a high orbit beyond the reach of Soviet interception.
The NCNA commentary explicitly ridiculed the July 1975 U.S.-Soviet
"space handshake," but--like other Peking media--it failed to mention
the visit to the USSR of the U.S. astronauts who were received by
Brezhnev on 22 September--the day the NCNA commentary was released.
CImiO?A by 000073
Awo..u.. ly d.oi...m?a
Sim mnths from
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : %19iMn-FRDtbT00608R000200160014-9
 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 cQNMR 86T00608RO Oor too14-9
24 SEPTEMBER 1975
GROMYKO ON NEW WEAPONS BAN: On 23 September TASS publicized a
letter from Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko to ON Secretary
General Wal%heim submitting a proposal for banning the development
and production by all states of new types of mass destruction
weapons. Gromyko spoke in support of the proposal in his UN
? General Assembly speech the same day. Such a Soviet proposal had
been expected since Brezhnev raised the matter informally in his
RSFSR Supreme Soviet election speech last June. Although Gromyko,
like Brezhnev, failed to specify any particular weapon systems,
he indicated Soviet willingness to clarify the proposal "in a
concrete discussion of this question." Gromyko also acknowledged
that it was "above all the great powers" that Moscow hoped would
ccnclude such an agreement. Perhaps anticipating Western demands
for verification procedures considered intrusive by Moscow,
the Gromyko letter said that an agreement "must not create
obstacles to the economic, scientific and technical development
of participating states."
PRC PROVINCIAL LEADERSHIP: Peking and Shenyang accounts of a
North Korean acrobatic troupe's 23 September performance 'n
Shenyang identified Tseng Shao-shan as "first secretary and
chairman of the Liaoning provincial CCP and revolutionary
committees and political commissar of the Shenyang PLA units."
Tseng was previously party second secretary in this province.
The first secretary's post has been vacant since Chen Hsi-lien was
transferred to Peking in late 1973. Chen was replaced as military
region commander by Li Te-sheng, but like other military region
commanders transferred at the time, Li was not given a provincial
party comu;ittee post. Li last appeared publicly on 1 August Army
Day in She'ayang. With Tseng's assumption of the new post, all
PRC provincial party secretary vacancies caused by the mass
transfer of military commanders have been filled, though it is
likely that other vacancies still exist in Heilungkiang and
Tsinghai.
App
lease I 999/09/23)1 JU RIDP86T00608R000200160014-9
 Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608l
APPENDIX
MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 15 - 21 SEPTEMBER 1975
Moscow (2440 items)
Peking (905 items)
China
(8%)
7%
UN (12%)
10%
AAPSO Council 12th .
Session, Moscow
(--)
7v
[UNGA 7th Spe- (12%)
cial Session
7%]
[Brezhnev Greet-
ings
(--)
2%]
[UNGA 30th (--)
Session
3%]
UNGA 30th Session
(--)
5%
Zambian Goodwill (1%)
5%
[Gromyko Arrival
(--)
3%]
Delegation in PRC
Statement
Tanzanian and (--)
3%
USSR Nm?clear Test Ban
Proposal
(5%)
21'01
Zambian Government
Delegations in PRC
Angola (--)
3%
Papua-New Guinea (--)
Independence
3%
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and internat:vnal radio services. The term "commentary" Is used
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have be a covered in prior issues;
In other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200160014-9