TRENDS IN COMMUNIST MEDIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000200160010-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 19, 1999
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: August 27, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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FOREIGN BROADCAST
INFORMATION SERVICE
Trends in Communist Media
r ^
27 AUGUST 1975
(VOL. XXVI, NO. 34)
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This report is based exclusively on foreign media
materials and is published by FBIS without coordination
with other US. Government components.
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 000073
Automatically declsssiflsu
six months from date of Issue.
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CONTENTS
MIDDLE EAST
USSR Reserved on Kissinger Tour, Critical of "Partial Steps". .
1
PORTUGAL
Moscow Questions Western Intentions in Light of CSCE. . . . . .
5
Italian Communists Shift Position, Attack Socialist Soares. . .
9
U.S.-CUBAN RELATIONS
Havana, Moscow Welcome Partial Lifting of U.S. Trade Embargo. .
11
SINO--SOVIET RELATIONS
KOM11UNIST Sees Consolidation of Anti-Soviet Course in China . .
14
EAST-WEST RELATIONS
Prague Issues Protest to FRG on Helicopter Flights. .
. . . . .
16
CAMBODIA
Sihanouk Leaves North Korea for PRC With RGNU Delegation. . .
18
BANGLADESH
PRAVDA 'Observer' Urges Dacca Loyalty to Mujib Policies . . . .
20
USSR.
Masherov Promotes Innovations in Economic Management . . . . . .
22
Collective Leadership Discussed in Republic Journals. . . . . .
25
NOTES
Korean Front Anniversary; Romania on Nonalined Conference. . .
27
APPENDI:C
Aosr.aw, Peking Broadcast Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
i
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MIDDLE EAST
USSR RESERVED ON KISSINGER TOUR, CRITICAL OF "PARTIAL STEPS"
Moscow has treated the current. Kissinger diplomatic shuttle to
work out a new Israeli-Egyptian Sinai accord in much the same
fashion as the previous round in March.* The Secretary's activities
have been reported only briefly and sporadically, as in item.,:. on
Moscow radio's Arabic-language service on the 21st and 22d noting
his arrival in Israel to begin his Mideast tour "to continue dis-
cussions on a partial settlement" and reporting his trip to '2gypt
the next day. Indirect criticism has been clearly conveyed through
occasional swipes at the value of "partial" agreements which, as
before, are portrayed as benefiting Israel and delaying settlement
of the main issues--withdrawal from all occupied Arab terrt.t.ories
and assurance of Palestinian rights. Unlike the comment In March,
however, Moscow has not called for resumption of the Geneva con-
ference as an alternative to inadequate "partial measures."
Soviet comment has also sought to imply that U.S. diplomacy is at
variance with Arab interests by si:ressing reports that Washington
will. supply Israel with vast amounts of military and economic aid
after a new Sinai accord. Explicit criticism of the anticipated
Sinai agreement and of U.S. diplomacy has been confined to the
low "unofficial" level of Moscow's Radio Peace and Progress, a
vehicle used on occasion to convey a more strident tone than
appears in Moscow radio's regular language services. Radio Peace
and Progress comment has been critical to the point of describing
the prospective Sinai accord as "capitulatory" and advocating Arab
economic pressure against Israel and the United Staters to counter
alleged diplomatic prescure tactics.
KISSINGER In sparse direct references to Secretary Kissinger,
MISSION Moscow has reported his travels briefly and occasionalY.y
cited some of his remarks on prospects for the nego-
tiations. The point of the selective citations has apparently been
to play down the significance of a new Sinai interim agreement by
contrasting it to the remaining problems involved in, achieving an
overall Mideast settlement. PRAVDA's international review by
T. Kolesnichenko on the 24th, for example, claimed that some Western
commentators had predicted the Secretary's current mission would
"bring peace and tranquillity" to the Middle East, but that
Kissinger himself disputed this assessment. Kolesnichenko recalled
* Soviet treatment of the March round is discussed in the TRENDS
of 12 March 1975, pages 1-2, and 19 March 1975, pages 5-7.
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that the Secretary said prior to his departure for the Middle
East that "of course, it is not a matter of a peace agreement;
it is a question of an intermediate step on the way to establish-
ing peace between Egypt and Israel--if this attempt is indeed
crowned with success." In a similar vein, TASS on the 26th, re-
porting from Alexandria on Kissinger's press conference there,
noted only that he said he hoped a new agreement would be reached
but that if it was not signed soon he would go t,., New York for
a special session of the UN General Assembly, returning to the
Middle East later. TASS then selectively reported remarks by an
Egyptian spokesman, and--under Algiers, Washington and Paris
datelines--foreign press comment designed to minimize the prospec-
tive Sinai agreement. It was variously assessed as "purely a
military document to defuse the explosive situation," "inciting
a split in the Arab world," "says nothing about Syria or Jordan"
or the Palestine Liberation Organization and Jerusalem, and
"includes only secondary political considerations."
U.S.-ISRAELI TIES While Moscow has again displayed a measure
of reticence about Secretary Kissinger's
mission, it has portrayed the United States to Arab audiences as
a constant ally of Israel, implying that U.S. diplomacy is sharply
biased against Arab interests. Comment has focused in particular
on reports of American readiness to extend Israel some 2.8 billion
dollars in economic and military aid, as in an Arabic-language
broadcast on the 22d which, in reporting Kissinger's arrival in
Egypt, pointedly cited his remark in Israel the previous day that
Israel could continue to rely on American friendship. Similarly,
Moscow's Arabic-language service and Radio Peace a'nd Progress in
broadcasts on the 21st singled out a statement by Y. Navon, chairman
of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee in Israel's Knesset,
that the United States had promised Israel over two billion dollars
in financial aid, as well as future supplies of oil and weapons.
TASS on the 23d attributed to the Boston GLOBE a report that the
United States had agreed to deliver "large consignments of the
latest armaments," including several hundred jet fighters, a
hundred Lance missiles, and a thousand laser-guided bombs.
Radio Peace and Progress on the 22d linked Israel's anticipated
acquisition of new U.S. military aid with the prospects of a new
Sinai accord, indicating that Tel Aviv, with Washington's support,
would be able to pressure Egypt into signing a new agreement dis-
advantageous to Arab and Palestinian interests. It quoted Palestine
Liberation Organization chairman Yasir 'Arafat to the effect that
since the October 1973 war Israel had increased its armed forces
from 80,000 to 120,000 and that Israeli "infantry, navy and air
force had been doubled." It went on to cite TIME magazine on the
large amounts of military aid the United States was expected to
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27 AUGUST 1975
give Israel soon. According to "observers," the broadcast said,
"the new military operations being planned by Israel will facilitate
the conclusion of a separate agreement being negotiated between the
aggressor and Egypt on Sinai."
ARAB COUNTER- Some Soviet comment has suggested that the Arabs
ACTIONS counter the alleged U.S.-Israeli diplomatic
offensive with pressure of their own. The most
notable example was a Radio Peace and Progress broadcast in Arabic
on the 22d, which referred approvingly to the notion of increased
Arab economic pressure against "Israel and its protectors." The
broadcast cited an undated call by Iraq's Saddam Husayn for a new
Arab oil embargo to be imposed against the United States and its
allies to force Israel to withdraw from occupied Arab territories.
The commentary also predicted, as did a Moscow radio broadcast in
Arabic on the 25th, that the ministerial conference of nonalined
countries, which convened in Lima on the 25th, would urge economic
pressure "on Israel and the foreign powers supporting it."
In stressing the: conflict between Arab and Israeli interests, Moscow
has sought to capitalize on the closer cooperation between Jordan
and Syria, reflected by President al-Asad's 10-12 June visit to
Jordan and King Husayn's 18-22 August visit to Syria. Radio Peace
and Progress on the 21st, for example, remarked on the realization
by Amman and Damascus that their eastern front against Israel must
be strengthened "at a time when imperialism and Zionism are
intensifying their attempts to impose capitulatory solutions" on
the Arabs. The commentary maintained that unless a "firm line"
was pursued, a large part of Arab territory would remain under
Israeli occupation--a danger it attributed chiefly to "U.S. and
Israeli attitudes during the new round of U.S. shuttle diplomacy
in the Middle East." The broadcast cited a report in Israel's
HA'ARETZ that ,after a new Sinai accord, a "U.S.-Israeli 40-point
document will be secretly signed" obliging the United Stat.-s not
to try to obtain Israeli withdrawal from any Jordanian territory
and not to try for more than "minor adjustments" to present dis-
engagement lines on the Golan Heights. Radio Peace and Progress
claimed that such plans on the part of the United States and Israel
had "naturally" compelled Jordan and Syria "to raise their fighting
capacity adequately to repulse possible Israeli attacks and liberate
the occupied territories." TASS on the 22d, reporting the joint
communique issued at the end of King Husayn's visit to Syria, noted
that the two countries had agreed to formation of a "Supreme Command
Council" composed of Husayn and al-Asad which would coordinate the
two countries' "foreign policy activities and those in the economic
and military spheres, and the taking of joint measures to protect
national security."
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CRITICISM OF Moscow has continued to impugn Israel's sincerity
ISRAEL in the current talks with Egypt and to accuse it
of militaristic policies. PRAVDA's international
review column on the 24th, for instance, charged Tel Aviv with
engaging in various "maneuvers" to disregard UN resolutions on
the Arab-Israeli conflict and continuing to count on a military
solution to the conflict "while professing peace."EasRAcDAsalalso
claimed that Israel sought "to prolong
as a whole by separate agreements"--implying criticism of U.S. and
Egyptian diplomacy, as well, for being parties to such agreements.
Moscow has dismissed internal Israeli dissent and demonstrations
against a new Sinai accord ar "hypocrisy" and a deliberate ruse to
create the impression that Israel is making serious concessions.
A Moscow Arabic-language broadcast on the 21st, for example,
denouncing demonstrations against the "expected agreement," maintained
that Israel was not making any concessions because any land it
might relinquish belonged to the Arabs anyway. The broadcast added
that Israel, moreover, would soon obtain large amounts of U.S. aid
and that a new agreement would allow Israel "to postpone for some
time the solution of larger and more difficult issues." It cited
the 18 August CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR to stress that Israel's
withdrawal "by a few more kilometers in Sinai is a limited
objective when compared to more important issues such as withdrawal
from the Colan Heights, the rights of the dispersed Palestinians
to have a homeland, and the future of Jerusalem." It was in this
context, the commentary said, that Israeli demonstrations against
"so-called concessions on the Sinai agreement" should be viewed
in order to realize what was behind "the facade of hypocritical
noises."
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PORTUGAL
MOSCOW QUESTIONS WESTERN INTENTIONS IN LIGHT OF CSCE
While Moscow has ignored President Ford's and Secretary Kissinger's
recent public admonitions to the USSR aga_nst interference in
Portugal, it has in the past few days lodged countercharges
against Western intervention in Lisbon's affairs. Although the
19 August PRAVDA Observer article on Portugal did not mention
the Helsinki document in the context of Western interference in
Portugal, some comment has again made this connection, complaining
that "some people in the West" are trying to portray the Soviet
Union as violating the CSCE principle of nonintervention, when in
fact "it is the other way around."
Following Observer's call for solidarity with the Portuguese
"political forces" struggling against reaction, Moscow has rounded
up expressions of support from various countries. Rut; other than
a statement by the Soviet trade unions, Moscow has not as yet
begun publicizing declarations of support by Soviet "public"
organizations, factory workers and private individuals, in the
style of previous solidarity campaigns. PRAVDA on the 24th did
assert that the socialist countries and communist and workers
parties were "acting in support" of the Portuguese revolution, a
more cautious pledge than IZVESTIYA's 16 July statement that
Portugal could count on the socialist countries' "active economic
and political cooperation."
On the Portuguese domestic scene, Soviet commentators have continued
to criticize the leadership of the Socialist Party while presenting
the Goncalves government as settling in and working constructively
for Portugal's "progressive" development. Reportage has reflected
the fluctuating political situation, acknowledging divisions within
the Armed Forces Movement (MFA) and "passivity and connivance" on
the part of some army authorities, while portraying the working
people as reacting "enthusiastically" to progressive developments,
such as the recent formation of a leftwing front of eight
organizations including the Portuguese Communist Party.
APPLICATION OF Moscow's renewed attacks on alleged Western
CSCE PRINCIPLES interference in Portuguese affairs would seem
to be in response to President Ford's
19 August remarks in his Minneapolis speech. The President said
that detente does not mean a license to fish in troubled waters,
and that Portugal is one of the situations "we are carefully
watching" for indications of Moscow's attitude toward detente and
cooperation in European security. Soviet accounts of the speech,
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by TASS and in the central press, relegated the remarks on Portugal
to a final one.-sentence paragraph noting only that the President
had described the Portuguese situation "as a process of 'a clash
between ideologies) which 'must b'e'giveii the opportunity to find
a solution in an atmosphere free of outside pressure."'*
PRAVDA's Kolesnichenko replied in the paper's international
review-on the:24th?and?.in a broadcast for North American listeners
the next day, rejecting the notion that the'Soviet Union was
violating the CSCE principle'of nonintervention by its attitude
on Portugal. In the internat?ional'review, he noted assertions by
"some people in the West" that events in Portugal were the first
test of the CSCE nonintervention principle'with respect to
"different concoctions on 'plans' of the Soviet Union and other
socialist states" toward Portugal. Everything is "the other way
around," he said: "If" the principle is being tested in Portugal,
"thl.s is.by no means the Soviet Union's fault," but a result of
the designs of "international reaction and imperialism."
In his English-language commentary on the 25th, Kolesnichenko
remarked on controversy in the United States over the Helsinki
summit, saying that,"some observers" were ready to accuse the
Soviet Union of violating CSCE principles by their attitude toward
Portugal. Without mentioning the recent Ford and Kissinger
statements, Kolesnichenko aimed his criticism at remarks by former
defense secretary. Laird to-the effect that "there is ostensibly a
fairly considerable-Soviet influence in Portugal."' Kolesnichenko
agreed that,"unfortunately," there was interference, not from the
Soviet Union but from those "frightened" by the course of Portugal's
revolution.
.PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA observers also noted the relevance of the
CSCE document:to Portugal but.steered clear of the question of
Soviet involvement. IZVESTIYA.'s Mikhail Mikhaylov, on Moscow
radio's weekly observers roundtable on the 24th, cited Portuguese
President Costa Gomes'.speech at the Helsinki summit as calling
for application-of-the principle of nonintervention to his
country. Mikhaylov'stressed'that this principle, like all other'
provisions of.the CSCE document, "cannot be applied selectively,
though this is precisely the way those involved in the inter-
nationallycoordinated-campaign'against the democratic forces of,
Portugal would like to apply it." PRAVDA's Yuriy Kharlanov, in
an article on-the 27th reported'by?TASS, commented that "all true
* Soviet treatment of Secretary Kissinger's warning to the.USSR
vis-a-vis Portugal: iii'his 14-Augus't`Birmingham speech is discussed
in the TRENDS of 20 August- 1975, -page' 6.
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friends" of Portugal were concerned over the "open interference
and pressure" against Portugal and wondered "how all this is to
be understood following the solemn obligations" on nonintervention
assumed in Helsinki.
WESTERN "INTERFERENCE" Soviet commentators have amassed a grow-
ing list of "capitalist circles of the
West" arrayed against revolutionary Portugal. Along with such
stereotyped stalking horses as international monopolies and
"NATO's military-political machine"--accused. of plans for economic
sanctions, psychological pressure, acid "gunboat diplomacy"--Moscow
has added the EC to the list (for employing "sheer economic black-
mail" by conditioning its aid to "how Portugal conducts its
internal policy") as well as the "so-called European economic
council" in Strasbourg.
The West European social democrats have been a target at least
since their meeting in Stockholm after the Helsinki summit when,
according to PRAVDA on 10 August, they formed a committee to
support the leadership of the Portuguese Socialist Party.
Mikhaylov took up the cudgels in the roundtable program on the
24th, asserting that in Stockholm the Socialist International
politicians "virtually identified themselves with the international
reactionary plot" against the "new Portugal" disguised as friends,
albeit "false friends." And a Kononov commentary broadcast in
Italian on the 26th claimed that the Western European socialist
leaders were not confining themselves to advice and moral support
to "antigovernment forces" in Portugal; citing the CHRISTIAN
SCIENCE MONITOR, the commentary added that the socialists, particu-
larly the French and West German leaders, were also "giving
financial aid" to the Portuguese socialists. Kononov maintained
that unidentified "slanders" about Soviet interference in Portuguese
affairs were merely an effort to hide the "gross interference" by
enemies of Portugal's revolution.*
COMPARISON WITH CHILE Following up on the 19 August PRAVDA
Observer's statement that the "reactionary
sorties" in Portugal were reminiscent of what happened in Chile,
PRAVDA's Kolesnichenko has also professed to see similarities in
the two situations. And commentator Viktor Shragin, in a
? * Moscow has thus far ignored recent U.S. press reports that the
Soviet Union has transferred funds to Portugal through a Soviet-
Belgian shipping company in Antwerp; such stories are sometimes
rejected by Soviet media in rebuttals decrying "outright
fabrications" as anti-Soviet propaganda.
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foreign-language broadcast on the 26th, elevated the comparison to
"a new slogan born in the broad movement of solidarity" with
Portugal: "Portugal must not be another Chile." Shragin claimed
that "imperialists and forces of internal reaction" were using
the same methods in Portugal that they had used in Chile--financial
and economic measures amounting to "an invisible blockade," as well
as subversive and terrorist actions internally. He warned "Mario
Soares and other socialist leaders" to remember the fate of
Chilean Christian Democratic Party leader Eduardo Frei, who "raised
the banner of anticommunism" and cleared the way for the fascist
junta, thinking he would become president again but "losing all."
DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS Soviet commentators have continued to
criticize the leadership of the Socialist
Party for "playing into the hands" of counterrevolution and
reaction, but have avoided blanket condemnation of the socialists,
pointing out that not all members subscribe to the policy of "some"
of their leaders, end some have left the party. Moscow has again
replayed expressions of support for Prime Minister Goncalves,
while citinJ Portuguese Communist Party warnings of a possible
coup by reactionary forces, calls for solutions to basic problems
"starting with the problem of political power," and appeals for
unity of "patriots." Reporting the establishment by eight leftist
organizations--including the PCP--of a "provisional secretariat"
on the 25t:'a, TASS' offered no comment of its own but cited
0 SECULO for a positive comment with somewhat dubious overtones:
The agreement by the eight parties, "who succeeded in overcoming
disagreements" in order to unite, was a first step in the target
of uniting the working class and all working people. Moscow's
domestic service on the 26th carried a more approving report
from TASS' Lisbon correspondent that the Portuguese working
people had reacted "enthusiastically" to the call of the "leftwing
progressive parties" to set up a single national front. The
report cited Lisbon shipyard workers as saying that "at present"
this was the only forum for rebuffing counterrevolutionary attacks.
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27 AUGUST 1975
ITALIAN CO( 1UMISTS SHIFT POSITION, ATTACK SOCIALIST SOARES
The Italian Communist Party--a frequent critic of the hard line
pursued by Portuguese Communist Party leader Alvaro Cunhal--on
13 August came to the defense of the Portuguese communists and
at the same time launched an unprecedented attack on Portuguese
Socialist Party leader Mario Soares. This shift in the PCI's
stance--the attack on Soares in particular--would suggest the
PCI was greatly alarmed over the growing anticommunist violence
and the threat to the Portuguese left, thus the expression of
solidarity with Cunhal and the tongue-lashing for Soares for his
apparent indifference to the violence. Whatever the PCI's motive,
it is noteworthy that L'UNITA's more strident tone and expression
of sympathy for the Portuguese communists followed close on the
heels of a visit to Moscow by a high-level PCI delegation led by
foreign policy expert and theoretician Giancarlo Pajetta. The
PCI's position on Portugal was further obscured when, two days
after the attack on Soares, the PCI came out with a joint state-
ment with the Italian Socialist Party calling for the "speediest
establishment" of a "government of national unity" composed of
"democratic and antifascist forces" in Portugal.
CRITICISM In its attack on Soares,L'UNITA noted that the "anti-
OF SOARES fascist forces" in Portugal were "split by violent
polemics." Therefore, the paper went on, Italian
communists cannot "pass by in silence or without firm criticism
the fact that socialist leader Mario Soares has been agitating
violently against the communists , . . while at the same time
failing to condemn the wave of fascist violence." The editorial
denounced those who "out of party sectarianism or provincial
narrowmindedness, incurable anticommunist hatred or mediocrity
of political vision" can stand by-passively "or even with ill-
conceived satisfaction" and watch or "even encourage and justify"
fascist violence. This is blindness, L'UNITA said, because if
Portuguese reaction prevails it will destroy "all democratic forces."
The editorial concluded by reiterating the PCI's "greatest possible
firmness" in condemning the acts of violence, expressed "solidarity
with the Portuguese communists" and denounced "all the attitudes
of complicity, toleration and silence" regarding the violence.
DIFFERENCES The PCI's position on Portugal has tended to be
WITH PCP much closer to the line espoused by Soares and
his socialists than that of the Portuguese com-
munists, with L'UNITA and PCI leaders frequently taking strong
exception to Cunhal's dogmatic policies and engaging in polemical
exchanges with him in the press. As recently as 29 July L'UNITA
was taking sharp issue with the Portuguese communists for their
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failure to realistically assess the Portuguese situation and
understand the views and wishes of the Portuguese people. L'UNITA
at that time recalled that the April elections provided ample proof
of the country's massive backing for democracy and demonstrated
that it was not the Communist Party that had extensive links among
the proletariat. "Our disagreement" with the Portuguese comrades,
said L'UNITA, starts with the conviction that the "democratic
factor" cannot be viewed simply as some kind of "concession" to
the moderate forces. Democracy is an "indispensable component of
the revolutionary process," the paper stressed, adding that
fundamental political freedoms must be preserved and defended, not
Just "tolerated."
The ].5 August joint PCI-PSI statement, like the L'UNITA editorial,
expressed concern for the "exacerbating" situation in Portugal,
but in general took a low-key approach and stuck to the familiar
themes espoused by the PCI over recent months--that there must be
unity of all democratic forces and guarantees of basic freedom.
When alluding to the recent physical attacks on Portuguese communists
and party premises, the statement said only that the "first and
foremost task" was to "put an end to the acts of violence."
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U. S. -CIIBAN R ELATIONS
HAVANA, MOSCOW WELCOME PARTIAL LIFTING OF U.S. TRADE EP'IBARGO
Cuban Prime Minister Fidel. Castro has welcomed the U.S. State
Department's 21 Augurit announcement of a partial lifting of the
ban on trade with Cuba as a "positive gesture" of "great satisfac-
tion" to Cubans.* Apparently interested in responding in a
positive way to the U.S. action, but still reluctant to begin
negotiations without a complete lifting of the blockade, Castro
equivocated on the significance of the State Department decision.
In press 'onference remarks reported on the 22d by Havana radio,
Castro reiterated his view that the embargo must be entirely
removed before "there is a truly healthy atmosphere in which to
discuss differences," but he added that "this is not a condition,
I would call it the essential requisite for discussion with
dignity." Later, when pressed by U.S. newsmen, Castro stated that
now "there can be negotiation on how to negotiate," seemingly
indicating for the first time that conditions for preliminary
talks had been met.**
Moscow's straightforward coverage was exemplified in a 22 August
commentary by TASS observer Anatoliy Medvedenko, who assessed
the State Department move at- indicative of "Cuba's growing
international prestige" and as evidence of U.S. domestic support
for a revised Cuba policy. Regarding Castro's press conference
remarks, Medvedenko reported the prime minister as saying that
the complete lifting of the blockade would have to precede
"genuinely effective bilateral talks."
CASTRO PRESS CONFERENCE Questioned about the State Department
action at a 22 August joint press
conference with visiting Mexican President Luis Echeverria, Castro
see-sawed between praising the action and urging further steps by
* The State Department action permits foreign subsidiaries of
U.S. firms to trade with Cuba, but does not affect the prohibition
on direct U.S. trade.
** On 7 May, Castro had urged the United States to respond to his
past overtures with a "gesture of similar importance," and he
vaguely suggested that lifting the ban on export of foodstuffs and
medicines would lead to a "reconsideration by the Cuban side of i-,
relations with the United States." Castro 's 7 May press conference
is discussed in the TRENDS of 14 Nty 1975, pages 17-19.
Approv
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27 AUGUST 1975
the United States. Referring to the U.S. roi:) at the 30 July OAS
session--which removed sanctions against relations with Cuba, and
which the State Department cited a,l the basis for its 21 August
announcement--Castro said that, at the OAS meeting, the United
States "behaved realistically and voted with most of the Latin
American countries." Tying that conference to current develrp-
ments, Castro said: "I sincerely regard these steps as positive"
but added that "nevertheless, in its essence, the economic
blockade persists," Declaring that Cuba was willing to negotiate
with the United States "with absolute seriousness, frankness and
responsibility," Castro explained that "we would not like to do
so with a dagger at our throat"--his frequent characterization
of the blockade--and insisted that "a climate of dignity, equality
and honor has to be created" if negotiations are to be conducted
in a "truly healthy atmosphere."
Asked if this meant that "the entire lifting of the blockade" was
a precondition for discussions, Castro first answered: "I
believe so," but 'gent on to say that this requirement was "not
a condition" but simply "the essential requisite for discussion
with dignity." However, when further pressed as to whether he
was excluding even preliminary discussions under present
circumstances, Castro said: "I believe there can be negotiation
on how to negotiate," quickly adding that, at any such meetings,
Cuba would "always maintain that conditions of equality must
exist to negotiate." Seewingly concerned to appear reasonable,
Castro explained:
This does not mean that we object to holding talks.
But we maintain the principle that in order to
engage in deep negotiations, it is necessary that
the economic embargo imposed against Cuba by the
United States be lifted.
Castro also avoided inflammatory rhetoric on the export of
revolution, as he has done for some time. Responding to a question,
he stated flatly that "the revolution cannot be exported," and
asserted that Cuba had "adhered strictly to the norms of inter-
national coexistence." However, he then went an to cite several
examples of the United States' "innumerable attempts to export
counterrevolution" in Cuba and elsewhere in Latin America. In
toto, his 22 August statements underscored his recent tendency to
give cautious encouragement to U.S. steps in his direction, while
continuing to flail United States foraign policy.
MOSCOW COMMENTS Moscow's reaction to the State Department
announcement has been low-key and couched in
predictable terms. In a 21 August dispatch, TASS promptly
acknowledged the announcement, noting that the step "does not mean
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any change in bilateral relations since the decision only applies
to third countries." Later reports also emphasized the limited
scope of the action and suggested the need for further steps,
again drawing on statements by American political figures who
favor a more "realistic" Cuba policy.
Along these lines, a commentary by TASS observer Anatoliy
Medvedenko, broadcast by Moscow's domestic service on the 22d,
noted that the State Department move was both a tribute to Cuba's
"growing international prestige" and "an indication of the current
trend in the United States toward a revision of l,ts relations
with Cuba." Medvedenko remarked that the limited nature of the
action demonstrated that "influential forces in the United States"
still opposed normal relations. The TASS commentator indicated
that such a position must change, because, as Fidel Castro had
noted, "a full lifting of the embargo is necessary for a start
of genuinely effective bilateral talks."
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SING - SOVIET R ELATIONS
KONTWJNIST SEES CONSOLIDATION OF ANTI-SOVIET COURSE IN CHINA
An editorial in the most recent issue of KOMMUNIST concludes that
"Maoism" has reached a new stage in China, characterized by the
institutionalization of Pekipg's anti-Soviet course. According
to summary reviews issued by TASS, the editorial asserts that
this development will make more difficult China's return to
socialism and to improved relations with the USSR.* The editorial
is Moscow's most authoritative statement on China since its assess-
ment of the results of the January 1975 National People's Congress
(NPC) in a PRAVDA editorial article last February.**
The editorial repeats a series of now-familiar charges concerning
China's hostility toward the USSR and the socialist community, its
opposition to detente, its desire for rapprochement with the most
reactionary elements in the West, and its alleged interest in
fomenting conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union.
But in asserting that China's anti-Soviet course is now formalized
and consolidated in the new state constitution adopted by the National
Peoples Congress in January 1975, Moscow seems to be acknowledging
implicitly that the possibilities for a significant improvement
in Sino-Soviet relations are more remote than ever. The timing
of this most recent assessment of the dispute also suggests that
Moscow does not expect any foreseeable leadership changes in
king to materially affect China's
policy--a view consistent with
its long-standing position that the struggle between "leftist" and
"moderate" factions, associated with Chiang Ching and Chou :n-lai
respectively, has r" direct bearing on relations with the USSR.
The new stage in China, according to KOMMUNIST, involves a switch
from political and ideological confrontation with the socialist
community to "interstate hostility on all fronts." Available
summaries of the article have not mentioned the Sino-Soviet border
problem or implied that Moscow perceives any increase in the
immediate military threat from China. Indeed, a 16 August article
in SOVIET RUSSIA by G. Apalin making similar charges went on to
* Based on past experience regarding the intervals between the
publication of TASS reviews and the actual issuance of the journals,
it may be several weeks before the latest issue, No. 12, is avail-
able for inspection.
** Moscow's assessment of the NPC is discussed in the TRENDS of
26 February 1975, pp. 1-3.
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note that, while Peking is interested in conflict among its opponents,
"it is at the same time doing all it can to have these conflicts
break out as far as possible from Chinese borders."
The article warns that a neutral or conciliatory attitude on the
part of other communist parties toward Peking's policies would only
serve the "antisocialist purposes of the Chinese leadership." The
impression that this warning was aimed at independent-minded parties,
such as the Romanian party, was strengthened by the appearance of an
article in the CDR party organ NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, summarized by TASS
on 25 August, which echoed KOMMUNIST's changes about the new stage
in Chinese policy. This criticism of neutralism suggests that
Moscow is in no mood to compromise with those communist parties
in East and West Europe that are reluctant to participate in the
European and world party conferences unless there is advance agree-
ment that the China problem will be soft-pedaled.
There is some evidence to suggest that Moscow's renewed harshness
toward China may be accompanied by a peace offensive in the West
aimed at taking advantage of the favorable momentum created by the
CSCE. PRAVDA's Yuri; Zhukov recently wrote of a new "worldwide
campaign for disarmament" and a "second Stockholm movement," a
reference to a Soviet propaganda campaign of 25 years ago which,
according to Zhukov, "prevented the use of nuclear arms in Korea
and rallied the people in the struggle to prevent a new world war."
Apalin stressed the linkage between the two aspects of Soviet policy
in his SOVIET RUSSIA article, asserting that "the struggle against
Maoism is inextricably linked with the struggle against imperialism
and against the threat of a new world war."
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EAST-WEST RELATIONS
PRAGUE ISSUES PROTEST TO FRG ON HELICOPTER FLIGHTS
The Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry has formally charged West Germany
with responsibility for the 15 and 17 August helicopter flights
which airlifted East German refugees to West Germany. The foreign
ministry note, issued on 20 August and broadcast by Prague on
21 August, formalized an earlier verbal protest, which was conveyed
to the FRG charge d'affaires in Prague on 19 August and which
presumably was the unattributed protest aired by Prague radio the
same day.*
The foreign ministry protest to Bonn is the first such Czechoslovak
action taken in regard to West Germany since diplomatic relations
were established on 11 December 1973. The Czechoslovak Foreign
Ministry had handled an earlier comparable incident--the hijacking
of a Czechoslovak plane to the FRG in May 1972--through the U.S.
Embassy in Prague, which was representing the FRG at that time.
The Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry has routinely issued annual
statements protesting the holding of "revanchist" meetings of
Sudetan Germans in the FRG.
The protest note'said the recent helicopter flights "amount to a
g:?oss violation of international law, for which the FRG Government
is responsible" and were "contrary to the spirit" of the European
security conference final document. The note demanded that the
FRG Government take appropriate action to punish the offenders and
prevent a repetition of the incidents and added that the CSSR
Foreign Ministry reserved the right to claim compensation for
damage caused by the exchange of gunfire during the helicopter's
departure on the 17th.
The protest note stopped short of alleging an active FRG role in
the helicopter incidents, claiming only that they had been
"prepared and organized in advance." However, a Czechoslovak
Interior Ministry spokesman, as reported by CTK on the 21st, as
well as subsequent Prague comment, declared that the incidents
had been "prepared by the military and security bodies of the
Federal Republic of Germany."
The 20 August note identified the helicopter pilot as "former
American Air Force pilot Meeker," but did not mention the fact that
the refugees flown out were from East Germany. However, a Prague
radio commentary on the 20th described the escapees as "a number
* The Prague radio 19 August protest is discussed in the TRENDS of
20 August 1975, page 33.
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of citizens of a third state" and, in referring to Meeker.'s
"records at the CIA center in Langley," implied that he was an
agent of the CIA.
NOTE TO AUSTRIA The Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry conveyed on
the 25th a milder note to the Austrian
ambassador expressing Prague's "deep concern" that Austrian
authorities had not prevented the helicopter from entering
Czechoslovakia via Austrian airspace. The note, which was carried
in part by CTK on the 25th, followed a 21-22 August session of the
Austrian-Czechoslovak border commission, which had been requested
by Prague to discuss the helicopter incidents. Citing the Austrian
side's expressions of "regret" over the incidents and assurances
that it would seek to prevent similar incidents in the future, the
foreign ministry asserted that it expects Vienna to "consistently
fulfill" its pledges.
W`%ile Prague has given heavy publicity to the incidents, Moscow has
limited its coverage to brief TASS reports on the Czechoslovak
diplomatic actions vis-a-vis West Germany, and a broadcast to
Austria citing Prague's request to convene the Austrian-Czechoslovak
border commission.
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CAMBODIA
SIHANOUK LEAVES NORTH KOREA FOR PRC WITH RGNU DELEGATION
Prince Norodom Sihanouk has ended his three-month stay in North
Korea and returned to Peking in the company of an RGNU-NUFC
delegation led by RGNU Prime Minister Penn Nouth and Deputy Prime
Minister Khieu Samphan. The visit of the Cambodian delegation in
North Korea provided the occasion for Sihanouk's first meeting
with Khieu Samphan since the Front victory in April, but communist
propaganda has given no clear indication about the prospects for
Sihanouk's return to Cambodia or his future relationship with the
Cambodian-based leadership.
The only indication thus far that Sihanouk may return to Cambodia
with the RGNU delegation, apparently including Penn Nouth, was
contained in Kim I1-song's 20 August banquet speech. As reported
by KCNA on the 20th, Kim noted that the delegation had cc.me "to
accompany Samdech Norodom Sihanouk home." While Sihanouk has not
acknowledged that he is returning to Phnom Penh, he has been
quoted twice by KCNA--in his 20 August banquet speech and in a
23 August message of gratitude to Kim--as stating that he intends
to lead an "important national delegation" back to Pyongyang for
the 30th anniversary of the founding of the Korean Workers Party
on 10 October. Although both Phnom Penh radio and NCNA have
closely followed the activities of the delegation in the DPRK,
neither reported either Kim's reference to Sihanouk's return
"home" or the prince's statement that he would be returning to
North Korea in October.
The enthusiastic reception given the Cambodian delegation during
its 19-22 August visit in Pyongyang, follrwing a warm reception
in Peking, closely p&ralleled the attention accorded a visit to
the DPRK last year of a Cambodian delegatiop led by Khieu Samphan.*
On 19 August the RGNU-NUFC delegation was greeted on arrival by
DPRK Vice President Kim Tong-kyu, had a "cordial and friendly"
talk with Kim I1-song in the presence of Sihanouk, and was feted
at a banquet hosted by Kim Tong-kyu, addressed by Kim and Penn
Nouth, and attended by Kim Il-song and Sihanouk. Sihanouk did
not participate in bilateral talks between Kim Tong-kyu and Penn
Nouth and Khieu Samphan on the 20th, but he hosted a banquet that
* The visit of the Cambodian delegation to Peking is discussed in
the TRENDS of 20 August 1975, pages 12-14. The visit of the
Cambodian delegation to Pyongyang on 5-8 April 1974 is discussed
in the TRENDS of 10 April 1974, pages 11-15.
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evening for Kim Il-song at which both he and Kim spoke. Khieu
Samphan addressed a DPRK Ministry of the People's Armed 1!'orces
meeting hosted by Yi Yong-mu, director of the General Political
Bureau of the KPA, on 21 August. Sihanouk and the delegation
were given a high-level send-off from Pyongyang on the 22d, and
KCNA released a lengthy 22 August joint communique on the 23d.
The Cambodian leaders were greeted on arrival at the train station
in Peking on the 23d by PRC Vice Premiers Teng Hsiao-ping and
Li Hsien-:lien, in an otherwise low-key reception.
The 22 August Cambodia-DPRK communique employed virtually the same
expressions of warmth and Khmer-Korean solidarity that were used
in the 8 April 1974 joint communique capping Khieu Samphan's visit
last year. Thus both communiques includel similar expressions of
gratitude for mutual aid in past struggles and assurances of
support and solidarity in the future. Each communique evaluated
the significance of the visits by the respective delegations in
similar terms, the present communique stating that the current
visit has "greatly contributed to further consolidating and
developing the militant friendship and unity and cooperative
relationships" between the two peoples. Simi.r to last year's
communique, the current communique noted that bilateral talks
proceeded in "an atmosphere of militant friendship and mutual
trust" and that there was "a complete unanimity of views on all
the problems discussed." The invitation extended by the Cambodian
delegation for a reciprocal DPRK delegation to visit Cambodia,
included in the communique last year, was dropped in the current
communique. The present communique expressed support for the
admission of the DPRK to the movement of nonalined nations, as
both Sihanouk and Penn Nouth had done earlier in their banquet
speeches.
Phnom Penh radio covered the visit of the delegation to Pyongyang
in somewhat less detail and depth than it reported on the
delegation's earlier visit to Peking. While the radio had carried
the full text of both Khieu Samphan's 15 August banquet speech and
of the 18 August Sino-Khmer joint communique, it carried only
excerpts of Penn Nouth's and Sihanouk's banquet speeches and of
the 22 August Khmer-Korean joint communique, and did not cite any
of Khieu Samphan's remarks in reporting his 21 August DPRK Defense
Ministry meeting speech. The radio also reported many of the
delegation's activities in Pyongyang only in passing, in contrast
with its fuller accounts of the delegation's activities in China.
The radio did,, however, include all due expressions of warmth and
cordiality.
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75
BANGLADESH
PRAVDA 'OBSERVER' URGES DACCA LOYALTY TO MUJIB POLICIES
Moscow's first authoritative reaction to the 15 August coup in
Bangladesh, contained in a 22 August PRAVDA "Observer" article,
reflected both vexation over the death of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman
and skepticism concerning assurances by the new president that
Bangladesh's foreign policy orientation would remain unchanged.*
PRAVDA Observer articles have traditionally been regarded as
representing official Soviet views; they rank below the editorial-
article level in importance but above the level of routine signed
articles. The last article under the Observer byline? in the
19 August PRAVDA, dealt with the current situation in Portugal.
Eulogizing the former president for his contribution to the national
liberation movement, Observer stated that the "slaughter" of Mujib
and his family had evoked "legitimate indignation" throughout the
world and that the "Soviet people share the feelings of grief"
over his "tragic death."
In discussing Bangladesh's foreign policy, Observer acknowledged
that newly installed President Ahmad had proclaimed an "unchanged
foreign policy line" and "loyalty to treaties and agreements pre-
viously concluded with other states." The article noted, however,
that "political observers in different countries" were questioning
whether "forces having a hostile attitude," such as "imperialism,
Maoism and internal reaction," would "exert an influence on the
country's future development." Hailing the "positive trends" of
Bangladesh's recent foreign policy, Observer recounted that Soviet-
Bangladesh relations had "progressed significantly" and were an
"important factor in peace in the region." The article concluded
that Bangladesh's "friends" hoped it would "remain loyal to the
fundamental trends of its foreign policy" and continue to cooperate
"with its neighbors and other countries" in the interests of world
peace.
Subsequent routine Soviet media comment on Bangladesh has predictably
echoed the Observer article. Political commentator Druzhinin,
speaking on the 24 August edition of Moscow radio's weekly
* Initial Soviet and Chinese reports on the coup are discussed in
the TRENDS of 20 August 1975, page 29. Peking media have continued
to carry reports on developments in Bangladesh, but have not as yet
commented on the new government.
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international observers roundtable program, reiterated verbatim
the Observer article's apprehension concerning the influence of
"forces with hostile intentions" toward the national liberation
movement and the "hope" of Bangladesh's "friends" that it continue
its previous foreign policy line.
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USSR
MASHEROV PROMOTES INNOVATIONS IN ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT
P.M. Masherov, the ambitious party first secretary of Belorussia,
appears to he currently riding high as a successful and innovative
economic leader. Belorussia's industrial growth is far ahead of
the plan and Masherov has been publicizing this and attributing
it to more efficient econc,aic management introduced under his
leadership. What is more, he has recently introduced new experi-
mental systems in construction, transportation and agriculture
aimed at further increasing efficiency of management. He is one of
the few leaders to regularly stress the need to extend economic
reform and his experiments appear to conform to the ideas of
Premier Kosygin (as well as his onetime patron, First Deputy
Premier Mazurov). Masherov's construction experiment was recently
endorsed by the USSR Council of Ministers, and if the plan is
successful it could greatly enhance his prestige, since all
earlier attempts to solve the chronic problems of construction
have failed.
The construction industry is plagued by chronic failures to com-
plete construction projects, a condition partly caused by peculi-
arities in the planning system which make it relatively more
profitable for construction organizations to start new projects
than to finish existing ones. Kosygin and others have repeatedly
demanded faster completion of construction and have attempted to
facilitate this by drastic cuts in the number of projects permitted.
The Soviet Government had extended economic reform to the construc-
tion field already in 1970, after adoption of a June 1969 Central
Committee-Council of Ministers decree on improving planning and
incentives in construction.* But, as pointed out in a July 1975
OUR CONTEMPORARY article by A.N. Chekalin, even though half of all
construction organizations now work with the new system, "it has
still produced little noticeable effect"--partly because of
restrictions hampering implementation of the reform. Chekalin,
deputy editor of STROITELNAYA GAZETA's department of economy, added
that in 1974 the main construction ministries--construction, indus-
trial construction, construction of heavy industrial enterprises,
and rural construction--all failed to fulfill their plans.
Last year the Belorussians came up with a new system, which Chekalin
declared "opens a new page in the development of the economic reform."
* See the FBIS SURVEY of 31 July 1969, pages 10-12.
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The system revises planning procedure and makes payment depend
on final completion of a project, rather than on completion of
various stages of construction or on calendar periods. The number
of planning indicators is to be reduced and the builders are to
have more rights to adjust their work schedules and manipulate their
own resources. Starting in January 1976 construction organizations
will work on the basis of credit from banks: if they fall behind
schedule in completing a project, they are penalized by having
to pay high interest rates; if they complete the project ahead of
schedule they receive a considerable incentive reward.
Chekalin described how Belorussian Industrial Construction Minister
N.T. Arkhipets successfully proposed this systemtas an experiment
at a meeting in the CPSU Central Committee's construction section
at the end of September 1974 and how an interdepartmental commission
(headed by Gosstroy First Deputy Chairman M.G. Chentemirov) was
created, whic'i carried the proposal "through hell and high water"
past Gosplan and the various other ministries until it was approved.
The system, basically one of economic self-sufficiency, conforms
well to Kosygin's ideas, and in May 1975'a USSR Council of Ministers
decree (announced in the 5 June IZVESTIYA) approved the proposal
to adopt the system for the Belorussian industrial construction
ministry. On 20 May the Belorussian Council of Ministers adopted
a decree on improving planning and economic methoda, and on 10 June
Masherov visited the republic industrial construction ministry's
computer center and stressed the importance of the new system. At
the 4 July Belorussian Central Committee plenum, Masherov described
the new system in detail and again stressed its importance.
At the same July plenum, an extensive reorganization of agricultural
administration was unveiled, aimed at improving efficiency by
increasfad specialization in interfarm organizations.* These two
new experiments come on top of a recent economic reform experiment
in Belotussia's vehicle transport ministry, which was lauded by
Masherov is his 30 May 1974 election speech and his 4 July 1975
plenum speech. Masherov has also vigorously pushed economic reform
by creating 100 production associations in industry and transferring
23 plants to the Shchekino system of raising labor productivity and
reducing the work force (as indicated in Masherov's May 1974 and
July 1975 speeches). He has also int'?oduced and promoted other
agricultural innovations, such as the "shop" (tsekh) system,
* This system is described in the Supplementary Article "Reorgani-
zation of Soviet Agricultural Administration Underway" in the TRENDS
of 16 July 1975, page S 6.
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which puts specialists in direct command of production, and a
system of concentrating aural construction in local construction
departments.*
In contrast to the generally lackluster Soviet economic performance,
Belorussia has been achieving remarkable growth. At the July 1975
plenum Masherov could boal3t that by increasing efficiency Belorussia
had increased industrial production by 63 percent during the present
five year plan instead of the planned 53-56 percent, had raised
labor productivity by 42 percent instead of the planned 38 percent,
and had produced over one billion rubles' worth of consumer goods
above the plan. He bragged that Minsk had already completed its
five year plan goals in June 1975 and was greatly exceeding the
planned growth of labor productivity. Demographer Viktor
Perevedentsev in the 30 April 1975 LITERARY GAZETTE declared that
during the first three years of the five year plan industrial
production in Minsk grew 34 percent--far faster than any other city
of one million population. He also noted that Minsk is growing in
population far faster than any other major city and said that
"specialists are even talking about a special "Minsk phenomenon."'
In the light of such economic success, it is hardly surprising
that last Tear's Central Committee rebuke to Belorussia for
inadequate ideological work appears to have had little visible
e..rect on the republic leaders.** There have been no shakeups
as a result of the decree.
* Both these experiments are descried in the TRENDS of 1 June
1972, pages 39-40.
** For background on the Central Committee decree on Belorussia,
see the TRENDS of 9 October 1974, pages 25-26.
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COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP DISCUSSED IN REPUBLIC JOURNALS
For the first time this year full-acale articles on "collective
leadership" have been published in the Soviet press. The August
issues of the Ukrainian and Estonian party journals carry articles
on the subject written by P.A. Rodionov, author of one of the last
notable comments on the subject in PRAVDA early this year. A prolific
publicist on the issue and a long-time defender of "collective
leadership," Rodionov has tailored his articles this time to the
political leanings of the respective republic party bosses. In
KOMMUNIST UKRAINY, the organ of Brezhnev's protege, Shcherbitskiy,
Rodionov stresses the importance of combining collective leadership
with strong personal leadership; in KOMMUNIST ESTONII, organ of
Estonian ''first Secretary Kebin, a regional leader who appears to
be distant from Brezhnev, Rodionov stresses the predominance of
the collective over any individual leader. The articles were clearly
written with each individual republic in mind, since after discus-
sing general principles they both deal with party activities
peculiar to the respective republics.
Rodionov's article in KOMMUNIST UKRAINY bore the same title as
his early 1974 book: "Collectivity--A Very High Principle of
Party Leadership." AltL'ough the article includes several of
Rodionov's usual statements on the importance of collectivity,
it omits the sharp warnings against a leader permitting himself
to be exalted or assuming one-man leadership which appaared in
his book. What is more, the article includes several paragraphs
arguing the need for a strong leader--a theme played down by
Rodionov in the past. His choice of terms calls to mind terms
used for Brezhnev in recent months, and his statements carefully
and curiously use more than one term for leader: vozhd, rukovoditel,
lider, avtoritet. Thus, he declares that "the people and party
need rukovoditeli, lidery, able to correctly express their
interests and will . . ." and "Marxism-Leninism is alien to
anarchic denial of the role of avtoritety, rukovoditeli." "Vozhdi,
rukovoditeli, armeu with Marxist-Leninist theory, experience,
political feeling, ability to see better than others the course
and prospects of movement, relying in this on the experience of
the masses, play a very important, outstandin:, role in public
development." He states that the "authority of a leader
(rukovoditel) and the cult of personality are not the same," since
the latter means "belittling the role of the masses" while the
"authority of rukovoditeli, lidery, vozhdy is based on recognition
of the deciding role of the masses. on collectivity in work, on
common interests of leaders and let and correct, deep understanding
of th
i
erests by both."
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Rodionov's article in KOMMUNIST ESTONII is entitled "Collectivity--
The Determining Feature of Leninist Style in Party Work." In it,
he stresses that Lenin strictly observed collectivity, never
forced his views on his colleagues, never decided important
questions singlehandedly, rejected exaggeration of his role and
insisted that the Central Committee's secretary can only carry
out collegial decisions of the Politburo, Orgburo or Central
Committee. Rodionov refers readers to his pro-collectivity book
(which he does not even mention in the Ukrainian article) and
does not include the paragraphs on the need for a strong leader
included in the Ukrainian article. The only bow he makes in the
direction of a strong leader is to state that criticism of the
cult of personality does not mean denying the role of leaders
and that "if leading figures, lidery, vozhdy, invested with the
trust of the masses and by their collective will set at the head
of the party or of some party organ, keep pace with the times and
place their wisdom, their knowledge and their organizational talent
at the service of the party and people--the role of such figures is
significant and important."
BACKGROUND Rodionov, as party second secretary of Georgia,
turned out numerous articles on collectivity during
the second half of the 1960's, articles with an implicitly aL,ti-
Brezhnev bias. Hence, it was not surprising that in 1971, as
Brezhnev's power-grew, Rodionov was removed from party leadership
work, dropped from Central Committee candidate membership, and
reduced to academic work at the Institute of Marxism-Leninism.
Although his articles became less frequent and more innocuous
than before, his book on collectivity, set in type August 1973
and signed to press February 1974, still reflected his antileader
bias. Rodionov appeared ty) return to prominence during the period
of Brezhnev's illness earlier this year, when PRAVDA on 21 January
carried an article by him briefly discussing collectivity. The
appearance of this sensitive theme in the press during a difficult
time or Brezhnev stirred some speculation at the time. However,
the article was rather bland in its formulations and did not
appear to be a sharp jab against Brezhnev.* While the present
KOMMUNIST ESTONII article reflects his old views, the KOMMUNIST
UKRAINY article suggests that he is now willing to occasionally
bend his principles to accomodate Brezhnev's predominant position.
* See the TRENDS of 29 January 1975, pages 20-22.
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NOTES
KOREAN FRONT ANNIVERSARY: Pyongyang marked the anniversary of the
25 August 1969 founding of the Revolutionary Party for Reunifica-
tion (RPR), the DPRK-backed party in the South, as it did last
year with a NODONG SINMUN editorial article. The only available
version of this year's editorial article, a 25 August KCNA
summary, praised the party for its success in strengthening its
ranks through adoption of Kim Il-song's ideological principles.
The editorial article claimed that on the basis of Kim's "chuche"
ideas the revolutionary ranks have been "constantly expanded and
strengthened." It noted RPR attempts to block the alleged
U.S.-backed "two Koreas plot," to achieve the country's
"independent reunification," and to establish a "national
coalition" government, and offered standard North Korean support
for the "struggle" of the South Korean people for "winning
democratic freedom" and reunifying the country. The KCNA summary
contained no mention of the "colonial rule of U.S. imperialism"
in the South, which has been mentioned in Pyongyang comment on the
anniversary in previous years and is supposedly one of the main
targets of the RPR.
ROMANIA ON NONALINED CONFERENCE: The Romanian leadership welcomed
"with satisfaction" the 25 August decision of the ministerial
conference of the nonalined countries meeting in Lima, Peru,
25-29 August to allow Romania to attend as a "guest." A 26 August
session of the RCP's Executive Political Committee, as reported by
AGERPRES that day, indicated no sign of pique that the invitation,
in effect, amounted to a rejection of Romania's bid to gain "observer"
status at the conference. According to Belgrade's TANJUG on the
25th, "guests" have no definite status within the nonalined move-
ment and are not automatically invited to future conferences. The
Executive Political Committee session portrayed the invitation as
"fresh proof" of Bucharest's increasing solidarity with the
developing countries. At the same time, it stressed Bucharest's
socialist links in declaring that Romania would continue to develop
relations of "fraternal cooperation" with all socialist countries
and in asserting that the participation of Romania and other
socialist countries at the nonalined conference demonstrates the
solidarity of socialist and Third World countries against
'imperialism, colonialism and neocolonialism."
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27 AUGUST 1975
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APPENDIX
MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 18 - 24 AUGUST 1975
Moscow (2547 items)
Peking (853 items)
University Association
(--) 7%
Cambodia
(14%)
21%
6th International Con-
[Khieu Samphan,
(11%)
14%]
ference, Moscow
[Brezhnev Greetings
(--) 4%]
Ieng Sary in PRC
[Sihanouk, Khieu
(--)
5%]
European Security
(12%) 7%
Samphan, Ieng
Conference
Portugal
(4%) 6h
Sary in DPRK
USSR
(2%)
4%
Romanian Liberation 31st
(--) 6%
Japan
(4%)
3%
Anniversary
European Security
(2%)
3%
China
(4%) 5%
Conference
These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and
Peking domestic and International radio services. The term "commentary" Is tised
to denote the lengthy item-radio talk, speech, press article or editorial. govern-
ment or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are
counted as commentaries.
Figures In parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.
Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always
discussed In the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues;
in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.
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