TRENDS IN COMMUNIST MEDIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000200160009-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 45
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 19, 1999
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: August 20, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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FBIS
FOREIGN BROADCAST
INFORMATION SERVICE
Trends in Communist Media
20 AUGUST 1975
(VOL. XXVI, NO. 33)
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This report is based exclusively on foreign media
materials and is publishes; by FBIS without coordination
with other US. Government components.
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Classified by 000073
Automatically declassified
six months from data of Issue,
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20 AUGUST 1.975
CONTENTS
USSR Seeks to Minimize Import of New Kissinger Mission.
PORTUGAL
? PRAVDA Observer Criticizes Western Meddling, Urges Leftist Unity. 4
PRAVDA Warns Against Dangers of Compromising With Socialists. . . 7
West European CP's React to PRAVDA, Cite Independence . . . . . . 30
Cambodians Visit PRC, DPRK on Way To Escort Sihanouk Home . . . . 12
Peking Gives Restrained Welcome to Hanoi Economic Delegation. . . 15
Peking Portrays U.S. Ties to Japan, Hits Soviet Threat. . . . . . 17
DPRK Foreign Ministry Elaborates on Government UN Statement . . . 20
DPRK Anniversary Comment Reflects Cool Relations With USSR. . . . 21
LAOS
Daily Party Newspaper Presages Greater Visibility for Lao CP. . . 24
VIETNAM
Hanoi.'s Top Leaders Turn Out for Security Forces Anniversary. . . 27
BANGLADESH
Peking, Moscow Report Coup But Avoid Official Comme?at . . . . . . 29
CHINA
Industrial Factionalism 'Carget of Unity, Production Campaign . . 30
USSR
Conflict Evident Over Ukrainian Ministry of State Farms . . . . 2
NOTES
Prague Protest on Helicopter Flights; Peking on Thai
Struggle Anniversary; Peking-South Asia 33
(continued)
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20 AUGUST 1975
C 0 N T E N. T S (coNTYNu )'
SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLE: New Solzhenitsyn Book Discusses
Political, Cultural Leaders . . . . . . . .. z . . . . . . . . . Sl
Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics . , . . . 4 . .. . . . + . . i
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CONFIDENTIAL E BIS TRENDS
20 AUGUST 1975
MIDDLE EAST
USSR SEEKS TO MINIMIZE IMPORT OF NEW KISSINGER MISSION
As with previous rounds of U.S. diplomatic efforts to facilitate
a new Sinai disengagement agreement, Moscow thus far has given
meager attention to Secretary Kissinger-'e current Middle East
mission. TASS in a one-sentence dispatch from Washington on the
18th reported that a White House spokesman had officially announced
that the Secretary "is to make a trip to the Middle East as part
of his shuttle diplomacy in the area." While scattered comment
has ccv:tinued to express standard criticism of "partial" Arab-
Israeli agreements, Moscow had been reserved on the specific sub-
ject of a new Sinai accord in the first half of August.
As it became apparent that negotiations through the United States
were intensifying and that Kissinger might undertake a new Mideast
trip to conclude an accord, Moscow began to prepare the ground by
minimizing the sigi..ficance of any new agreement. On the 13th, a
commentary carried by the "unofficial'? Radio Peace and Progress--
tl:e lowest level of Soviet media--explicitly criticized U.S.
Mideast diplomacy, American "intermediaries," and "maneuvers for
a partial settlement." Following up on the 18th, a Moscow radio
commentary in Arabic, sharply criticial of a ne:a disengagement
accord, attacked not only Israel but implicitly Egypt as well by
pointing out various alleLed disadvantages of a new accord for
Egypt, Syria and the Palestinians. The commentary also viewed
with distinct distaste the proposal for a U.S. presence in the
Sinai to man an early warning system as part of a new agreement.
other comment has cast doubt on Israeli intentions underlying any
new accord, continuing to maintain that Tel Aviv seeks to retain
possession of as much Arab land as possible and to avoid the
issue of satisfying Palestinian rights.
U.S. DIPLOMACY Criticism of the U.S. diplomatic role in
facilitating the Israeli-Egyptian talks has
been implicit in Moscow's overall treatment of a possible new
accord, but c.:)mment directly critical of the United States has
been rare--a treatment generally in line with Moscow's handling
of Secretary Kissinger's last Mideast: trip in March 1975.* One
such attack, however, came in the 13 August Radio Peace and
Progress broadcast, which remarked that a new Sinai accord was
? * See the TRENDS of 12 March 1975, pages 1-2, and 19 March 1975,
pages 5-7.
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F TRENDS
20 AUGUST 1975
"quite possible" in view of Secretary Kissinger's previous remarks
that he would not otherwise undertake a new Mideast mission. The
Peace and Progress commentary recalled remarks by Syrian President
al-Asad that an interim Sinai agreement prior to a Geneva confer-
ence and not linked to the Golan and West Bank situations "could
only hamper peace efforts." The commentary asserted that such a
view was confirmed by the failure of previous attempts "secretly
made" to solve the Arab-Israeli problem, adding that "nor has the
step-by-step policy produced any substantial developments--yet the
maneuvers for a partial settlement continue, as we can see." The
broadcast also noted that Israel had requested U.S. aid in build-
ing a new defense line in the Sinai, and charged that such a plan
"confirms that the American intermediaries want, by means of the
disengagement betweeen Egyptian and Israeli forces, to create
greater possibilities for maneuver by Israeli diplomacy."
CRITICISM While Moscow has been emphasizing the ultimate price
OF EGYPT to be exacted by Israel in return for a small terri-
torial withdrawal in the Sinai, it has at the same
time implicitly questioned Cairo's wisdom in cooperating with U.S.
diplomacy and allowing itself to fall into the "snare" of sepa;:ate
agreements. A Moscow radio commentary in Arabic on the 18th, 1" or
exa;aple, employed scarcely Veiled sarcasm even as it conceded
that Secretory Kissinger's new round of shuttle diplomacy might
result in Egypt's recovery of the Mitla and Jiddi passes and the
Abu Rudays oilfields. The commentary observed that neither the
Arabs themselves nor "their loyal friends" object to "the libera-
tion of even an inch of Arab territory"--a favorite expression of
Egyptian President as-Sadat's. But it went on to remark that many
Arabs "and their friends" were troubled about the price to be paid
for this "not very extensive withdrawal." Citing the views of
unidentified Arab papers, the commentary maintained that Israel's
policies gave ample cause for skepticism that a new accord would
help, rather than hinder, resolution of the basic is;;ues---complete
Israeli withdrawal fro;.z Arab territories and assuranccA of
Palestinian rights. The commentary repeated the oft-expressed
Soviet allegation that Israeli strategists sought a new Sinai
accord "to isolate Egypt from the joint Arab front," and added
that Israel wanted a "buffer zone" along the new disengagement
line which could "greatly hinder any counteraction by Egypt" in
a new Arab-Israeli war.
The 13 August Peace and Progress commentary was more forthright in
its criticism of Egypt, asserting that Israel, "with the support
of U.S. diplomacy," was attempting to dupe the Arab states--
"starting with Egypt"--into making "significant political
concessions which have been described as amounting to a degrading
capitulation." The commentary asserted that "all the patriotic
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forces in the Arab world," in implied contrast to Egypt, were
criticizing both the notion of separate accords and the objectives
underlying them. Referring to the Damascus ATH-THAWRAH, but also
closely paraphrasing part of a Yu. Glukhov PRAVDA article on the
12th, the ccmmentary cited as objects of the Arab criticism an
alleged U.S. refusal to exert effective pressure on Israel for a
genuine Mideast settlement, along with a simultaneous U.S. supply
to Israel of weapons and "every possible economic and financial
assistance."
U.S. PRESENCE As another example of the price Egypt could pay
IN SINAI for a new disengagement accord, the Moscow
Arabic-language broadcast on the 18th referred
to reports that "a foreign presence" might be allowed on Arab
territory and, specifically, that "American technicians" might
man the "so-called werning system" near the Sinai passes to
monitor compliance with a new agreement. The broadcast saw such
an arrangement as complicating the issue of Israeli occupation
of Arab territory, since the proposal would inject "the question
of a relationship with foreign machinery--in this instance
American--that has no connection :.iith the United Nations and
its emergency forces." The broadcast charged that "this machinery
will only be linked with the forces of the aggressor and will
serve his aims."
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PORTUGAL
PRAVDA OBSERVER CRITICIZES WESTERN MEDDLING, URGES LEFTIST UNITY
Moscow has elevated the level of its comment on Portugal with a
19 August PRAVDA Observer article, only the second time since the
April 1974 coup that Portuguese events have received authoritative
treatment in PRAVDA. A PRAVDA editorial article last February,
ostensibly marking the forthcoming first anniversary of the coup,
had seemed timed to coincide with preparations for the April
constituent elections.*
The present Observer article reflects Soviet concern over the
deteriorating situation of the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP),
as well as uncertainty as to the eventual resolution of what
Moscow commentators have been calling "the most serious and
complex crisis." The Observer article and other current comment
seem calculated to keep Moscow's options open. Observer
attacked both domestic reaction and Western "interference," but
did not repeat recent charges that alleged Western intervention
was incompatible with CSCE obligations. Observer's remark--
highlighted in the TASS summary of the article--that the Soviet
people "firmly defend the principle of noninterference in the
domestic affairs of other countries" was perhaps an indirect
response to Secretary Kissinger's 14 August Birmingham address
in which he warned the Soviet Union against interference in
Portugal.
OBSERVER ON Despite the criticism of the Socialist Party (PS)
DOMESTIC EVENTS leadership and the call for "support" of the
PCP, Observer's chief message appeared to be the
article's concluding appeal for leftist and military unity. Under-
lining this point, TASS quoted this final sentence as the lead in its
summary of the Observer article. The Soviet people,, Observer declared,
"regard with profound sympathy the Portuguese democrats' desire to
insure the unity of actions of the MFA (Armed Forces Movement), the
:ommunists, the socialists, and all leftwing progressive forces who
advocate the strengtheiing of the antifascist democratic regime in
the country and are defending the Portuguese people's revolutionary
gains." Thus, Moscow on its own account reaffirmed in almost identical
language a position taken jointly by the CPSU and the Italian Communist
Party in an 8 August communique--apparently the first time Moscow
had mentioned unity since Portugal's government crisis began developing
late this spring. The February PRAVDA editorial article had advised
* The 22 February PRAVDA editorial article is discussed in the TRENDS
of 26 February 1975, pages 8--10.
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"all progressive forces" to maintain unity, but this idea was
pursued only sporadically in subsequent comment.
Observer appeared to be making a careful effort to place Moscow on
record with support for any of the "progressive forces" which
might come out on top in the current power struggle. Thus, the
article said that "no true friend" of the Portuguese people could
"remain indifferent Lo reaction's intrigues." Observer then went
on to stress the importance of "mass solidarity" with the "political
forces" in Portugal struggling against reaction, subordinating
to this a less emphatic call for "support" specifically for the
Portuguese communists. (The Observer article did not repeat the
pledge in a 16 July IZVESTIYA article by Kamynin that Portugal
could "count on active economic and political cooperation with
the socialist countries.")
In the same cautious vein, Observer portrayed the Socialist
Party (PS) leadership as responsible for tha present situation,
but at the same time contrived, along the lines of other recent
comment, to suggest that whatever its true intentions, the party's
actions were being exploited by "reactionary forces." "Like it
or not," Observer said, the PS leaders were rallying "all the
reactionary forces in Portugal, including those who have recently
tormented communists, socialists, and other democrats and
patriots " Like other commentators, Observer did not identify
the "reactionary forces" but described the perpetrators of
disturbances and "pogroms" against the PCP as terrorist detach-
ments, hooligar elements, unruly thugs and hired terrorists.
Holding up the Chilean example--as had a Moscow radio foreign-
language commentary on the 15th--Observer noted that the present
attacks by reactionaries "remind us of the things that happened
just before the fascist coup in Chile."
The Observer article's critical, yet measured, handling of
Portuguese moderates had been foreshadowed in the 17 August
Moscow radio observers roundtable, in which Moscow radio political
o'i;server Dunayev recalled the "leading role" played in the
revolution by former foreign minister Melo Antunes and wondered
how a man like Antunes--whose "motives and sincerity" were not in
question--had now "permitted his name and popularity to be used
by the enemies of the revolution." Dunayev saw PS leader Mario
Soares--welcomed "triumphantly" in Lisbon after the 1974 coup--as
a "similar although somewhat different case," and speculated
whether PS "excuses" for withdrawal from the'government, like
Soares' "personal conflict" with Prime Mi?I;ister Goncalves, did
not "hide something more substantial."
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TREATMENT OF Soviet sensitivity to Secretary Kissinger's
KISSINGER ADDRESS warning to the USSR vis-a-vis Portugal in
his 14 August Birmingham address was
demonstrated in Moscow's hand?ing of the speech. Not until the
16th did TASS selectively report the speech, in a New York-datelined
dispatch which :elegated his remarks on Portugal to a brief final
paragraph. A version carried by RED STAR and Moscow radio further
compressed TASS' paragraph on Portugal, while PRAVDA omitted this
paragraph entirely, along with two other deletions.
The TASS report, of course, made no mention of Secretary Kissinger's
remark that the United States has "never accepted that the Soviet
Union is free to relax tensions selectively," and his specific
caution that the Soviet Union "should not assume that it has the
option, either directly or indirectly, to influence events contrary
to the right of the Portuguese people to determine their own
future." TASS' editorialized account said he declared U.S.
sympathy with "the 'moderate elements,' which, as is well known,
oppose the policy of the Revolutionary Council." TASS said
Kissinger "admitted at the same time that 'the events in Portugal.
are the result of the development of Portuguese history itself."'
The Secretary did say that events in Portugal have their origin
in the dynamics of Portuguese history; but he went on to add that
80 percent of the Portuguese people had declared their desire
for a democratic system, and "the attempt by an antidemocratic
and doctrinaire minority to thwart this desire is meeting
inevitable and growing resistance-"
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INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM
PRAVDA WARNS AGAINST DANGERS OF COMPROMISING WITH SOCIALISTS
In a str4!,.ing reassertion of Soviet hardline revolutionary doctrine,
PROBLEMS OF PEACE AND SOCIALISM Chief Editor K.I. Zarodov warned
in a 6 August PRAVDA article that communist parties must maintain
"hegemony" in bourgeois democratic revolutions in the West and be
willing to suppress resistance by force if necessary. Ostensibly
commemorating a 1905 essay by Lenin, Zarodov was clearly aiming
at present-day "opportunists," "moderates," and "conciliators"
within the communist movement who, according to him, were willing
to compromise communist revolucionary goals for the sake of-pre-
serving tactical alliances with socialist parties. Although? there
was no reference to Portugal in the text, the article will no
doubt be read in the West and in the communist movement generally
as an endorsement for a policy of forceful measures to preserve the
communist position in Portugal. Whether it should also be read
as a broader change of line by Moscow, implying a repudiation of
its carefully cultivated policy of encouraging alliances with
socialist parties, remains to be seen. At this point, there is
much evidence to suggest a less dramatic interpretation.
POLICY AND IDEOLOGY in the first place, the article is an
isolated statement. The bulk of Soviet
media comment continues to express support for the coalition of
leftist parties in Portugal and for the united front policy in
general. As recently as 19 August a PRAVDA "Observer" article
reaffirmed Soviet support for the "unity of action" program in
Portugal. An "Observer" article involves a much more formal con-
mitme-at of official authority than an article signed by an individual
such as Zarodov. Moreover, official support for "unity of action"
was reaffirmed by world communist specialists Suslov and Ponomarev
in speeches last month before a Kremlin conference commemorating
the 40th anniversary of the 7th Comintern Congress, which had
ratified a policy of seeking broad antifascist united fronts in
the face of the growing threat from Hitler's Germany. Ponomarev
in partic,tlar asserted, in his speech on 4 July, that "the cause
of defending peace" occupied an even larger place in the activity
of communist parties today than it did in the 1930'x, as he pointed
to the "topicality of the conclusions and ideas" of the 1935 Congress
fur "the unity of the workers' movement and, above all, relations
between communists and social democrats."
In the second place, there is an alternative explanation which would
appear to account both for the character of Zarodov's artii-le and
the fact that it is not being seconded by other public declarations.
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The article appears to be part of an ongoing debate among Soviet
theorists over the strategy and tactics of communist parties at
Lhe current stage of the "crisis of world capitalism." The Zarodov
article itself contains many indications that it is aimed at other
theorists who have been pushing a soft line on these questions.
One of the more prominent of these, Timur Timofeyev, director of
the Institute of the International Workers' Movement of the USSR
Academy of Sciences, seems to be a particular target of Zarodov.
THE STAGES OF REVOLUTION In articles in KOMMUNIST in April 1975
and in PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY in May
1975, Timofeyev presented an extensive theoretical justification
for the policy of united action with "democratic" forces. A key
issue for. 'Timofeyev was the question of distinguishing the first,
"democratic," stage of the revolution from the second, "socialist,"
stage. In his view, only the first, "democratic" stage was called
For by the current world situation. He labeled as "'leftist'
opportunists" those who would "deny the inevitability and necessity
for a general democratic stage in the antifascist, antimonopolist
struggle." Interestingly enough, Timofeyev specified Portugal as
one of the places where such "leftists" could be found.
The same issue was addressed by Zarodov in his commentary on Lenin's
article. But unlike Timofeyev, Zarodov sought to blur the distinction
between the two stages, recalling Lenin's statement that there was
no "wall" between the democratic and socialist stages, and insisting
that the tasks of both stages could be "resolved simultaneously."
He criticized as "opportunist" the view that the "seizure of the
levers of power should be merely a final act for the proletariat
and its party."
Although the conflict between the two articles is so sharp as to
leave little doubt that the one is intended as a rebuttal of the
other, the issue probably reflects a broader debate within the
communist movement as well. Timofeyev expresses what has thus far
been the majority view--that the formation of united fronts with
socialist parties is the best way to influence the policies of
capitalist states in preferred directions and to prepare the way
for eventual socialist revolution. Zarodov expresses a dissenting
view--possibly reflecting nothing more than the perspective of
Pragun-based chief editor of a journal that is supposed to reflect
the views of a diverse group of world parties--most without the
responsibilities of exercising political power.*
Zarodov was editor of SOVIET RUSSIA in the early 1960's before
moving to PRAVDA as first deputy editor in 1.965. He moved to Prague
to assume his current position about the time of the August 1968
Warsaw Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia.
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THE BREZHNEV CONNECTION These observations do not, of course,
answer all the questions raised by
the Zarcclov article. It remuias a puzzle why PRAVDA should have
chosen to publish the article at this time, when the fortunes of
the Portuguese communist party seem to have reached their Lowest
ebb since the April elections. It cannot be entirely ruled out,
then, that some faction in the leadership might be using the current
embarrassment of the Portuguese Communist Party to challenge the
whole concept of "unity of action" as.the appropriate strategy
fcr the current stage of the world communist movement. Such a
challenge would presumably involve a rebuke to Brezhnev, who is
closely identified with the "unity of action" policy--a point
which Timofeyev strongly emphasized. Such a hypothesis is purely
speculative, however, since there is no indication that any other
leader has opposed the "unity of action" program.
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WEST EUROPEAN CP'S REACT TO PRAVDA, CITE INDEPENDENCE
Major. W'st European communist party leaders have reacted gingerly
to the Zarod.:Yv PRAVDA article, apparently recognizing that It puts
at issue boch their credibility as national leaders and the
viability of the alliances they have been developing in recent
years with moderate socialist parties. But the "directive" tone
of the article compelled the West European communi3ts to
reemphasize that their policy "is not made in Moscow," as French
party leader Georges Marcnais put it in his 8 August press
conference, according to L'JIUMANITE on the 9th.
Marclais' reassertion of independence from Moscow echoed his
remarks in late June when he responded to the much-publicized,
so-cal.l.ed "Ponomarev directive" to West European communist parties
which was printed in LE QUOTIDIEN DE PARIS on behalf of the
beleaguered Portuguese Socialist pape': REPUBLICA. On that
occasion Marchais said "once again the independence of our party
has been called into question," and "we will react strongly
each time the charge is made against us."
Marchais attempted to minimize the importance of the Zarodov
article by noting its commemorative nature. But he r_,)rietheless
went on to take issue with Zarodov about the need for a dominant:
communist party role in leftist coalitions when he emphasized
that the PCF's strategy was "founded on the alliance of the left"
and "it: is completely out of the question that we should change
our strategy." Marchais also further emphasized that the
PCF's "attitude toward democracy and personal and collective
freedoms . . . is well known." This attitude, he said, "does not
stem from an existing model or models."
The Italian Communist Party's initial reaction--a short article
in they 9 August L'UNITA--also tended to softpedal the polemical
intent of Zarodov's views. L'UNITA acknowledged that some of
Za..odov's views seemed "partly correct," but took issue with his
attempt to reduce Lenin's thought to a "single concept, limited
to a few questions i-nd to short formulas."
L'UNITA took a more forceful position on 12 August when it stated
that "the presumption cf dictating rigid and general rules is
unfounded," not only because "monolithism has been over for some
time in political practice and in relations between communist
parties" but because of the "variety of today's situations and
problems." The 12 August L'UNITA article also disputed Zarodov's
"doctrinaire" view of the "relationship between democracy and
socialism," apparently an allusion to his reference to the
"Leninist conclusion" that "there is no 'wall' between the democratic
and socialist stages of revolution in the new era."
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British Communist Party press spokesman George Matthews said on
13 August that his party's policy was "independently decided by
our party and by no other" and "the time has long since passed
when communist parties subscribed to a single political center."
According to the London MORNING STAR on 14 August, Matthews went
on to suggest that this was also the position of the CPSU and
therefore "we have no reason to believe that PRAVDA intended that
this anniversary review of Lenin's book should be considered as
a 'directive' to other parties."
Given the historical nature of the article, said Matthews,
Zarodov had paid too little attention to the changes that have
taken place since 1905. Zarodov, according to Matthews, failed
to take into consideration the many different conditions that
exist for the advance of socialism, and he dealt with tactics
applicable to Russia at the time in which Lenin wrote "as if
they werr: universally applicable today." Like his fellow West
European communists, the British pasty spokesman stressed that
the transition to socialism must be achie,ed by "democratic
political struggle" and that unity of socialists and communists
was "ind!.spensable" if rightwing ideas and influence were to be
defeated,
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PRC FOREIGN RELATIONS
CAMBODIANS VISIT PRC, DPRK ON WAY TO ESCORT SIHANOUK HOME
The first official Cambodian delegation to leave Phnom Penh since
the 17 April victory visited China from 15-19 August, where it
was joined by RGNU Prime Minister Penn Nouth before proceeding
to Korea to escort Prince Sihanouk hack to Cambodia. During the
Chinese portion of the trip, the delegation was led by RGNU
Deputy Prime Ministers Kliieu Samphan and Ieng Sary. Sihanouk has
participated in delegation activities in Korea, and he gave a
banquet for DPRK President Kim Il-song on 20 August at which
Kim announced that Sihanouk would return to Cambodia with the
delegation.
KHIEU SAMPHAN IN CHINA Chinese and Cambodian testimonials to
their close mutual solidarity and
friendship during the Khieu Samphan delegation's visit were
similar to those expressed during the extraordinary treatment
accorded Khieu Samphan during his April-May 1974 visit to China.
There was, however, no repetition of last year's meeting with
Mao, perhaps because of the absence of Sihanouk, who led the
delegation at last year's ,.eeting. The effusive Chinese and
Cambodian media treatment of the ?7isit stands ir, Vivid contrast
to cursory Cambodian-Vietnamese coverage of the recent visit to
Cambodia, acknowledged early 'in August, of a DRV delegation led
by VWP First Secretary Le Duan, and it serves to underscore
recent s.'.gns of Cambodia's differentiated relationships with its
two most important communist allies.*
Though the visit to China of the Cambodian delegation overlapped
with that of a high-level DRV aid delegation led by Vice Premier
Le Thanh Nghi, there was no report of any meeting between the
Cambodians and Vietnamese.** By contrast, when Le Thanh Nghi
traveled to China on a similar aid mission last August, he was
reported meeting separately with Cambodian "head of state" Prince
Sihanouk and with RGNU Prime Minister Penn Nouth. This year the
Cambodians also did not follow their practice in 1974 of stopping
first in. Hanoi before visiting China, but traveled directly from
Phnom Penh to China.
* The Cambodian delegation's 1974 visit to China is discussed in
the TRENDS of 10 April 1974, pages 11-15; 24 April 1974, pages 19-
20; and 30 May 1.974, pages 10-12. Le Duan's recent visit to
Cambodia is discussed in the TRENDS of 6 August 1975, pages 16-1.8.
** For a discussion of Le Thanh Nghi's visit to China, see the
following article in this TRENDS.
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The Khieu Samphan delegation's visit was highlighted by a meeting
with Premier Chou En-lai on 16 August. Vice Premier Teng
Ilsiao-ping headed the Chinese side at other meetings with the
delegation, including their arrival on 15 August and their
departure on the 19th. Teng feted the delegation at a banquet
on the 15th at which both he and Khieu Samphan spoke and held
talks with the delegation, together with Hua Kuo-feng, on the
15th and 16th. Khieu Samphan and Teng I-Isiao-ping signed an
economic and technical cooperation agreement at an 18 August
Peking ceremony also attended by Hua and Li Hsien-nien. Khieu
Samphan hosted a farewell banquet on the 18th. RGNU Prime
Minister Penn Nouth was present at all of the delegation's
activities except for the bilateral talks; Phnom Penh reported on
16 August that he had flown to Peking from Pyongyang especially
to meet the delegation. On 19 August NCNA released a joint
communique dated the 18th.
SINO-CAMBODIAN AGREEMENTS The 18 August joint communique
employed essentially the same
expressions of warmth and solidarity between the two countries
that were in last year's communique, hailing the growth and
progress of the "great revolutionary friendship and militant
unity" between them, though again failing to note a complete
unanimity of views. Both communiques similarly hailed the
conclusion of the respective aid agreements as "another vivid
manifestation of the friendship and unity" between the countries,
and in both commur?nues the Cambodian delegation acknowledged
Chinese assistance to the Cambodian liberation struggle in the
past. Both communiques also assessed similarly the importance of
the respective visits, the current communique stating that Khieu
Samphan's visit this year had made "an important contribution to
strengthening the great revolutionary friendship and militant
unity" between the two peoples and to "further developing the
friendly relations and cooperation" between the two nations.
Going slightly beyond last year's effusive language, the present
communique recorded that the current delegation had been accorded
a "grand and enthusiastic welcome and an extremely cordial and
friendly reception"; last year the communique had noted "a warm
welcome and ;rand and cordial reception" for the delegation.
Bilateral talks were described in the current communique as
proceeding in a "very cordial and warm atmosphere" and both
sides "expressed great satisfaction with the results"; last
year's communique did not characterize the atmosphere of the talks
between the two sides. This year's communique repeated last year's
condemnation by both countries of international maneuvers of the
"superpowers," and Cambodia reinforced its anti-Soviet credentials
by lauding China as a "steel bulwark" of the "socialist movement."
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NCNA's i8 August report of the agremeent on economic and technical
cooperation signed by Teng Hsiao-ping and Khieu Samphan on the 18th
did not provide details on the intended cooperation, but Khieu
Samphan in referring to the accord on the 18th thanked the
Chinese for their "unconditional and gratis aid." The aid
agreement concluded last year and signed by Chou En-tai and Khieu
Samphan had called for "gratis provision of military equipment
and supplies" to the inaurgent Front for "1974."
DELEGAT;ON IN KOREA Under the leadership of both Penn Nouth
and Khieu Samphan, the Cambodian delegation
departed Peking on 19 August for Pyongyang, where it was greeted on
arrival by DPRK Vice President Kim Tong-kyu. Accompanied by
Prince Sihanouk, the delegation was received by Kim Il-song on
the 19th and was feted at a welcoming banquet hosted by Kim
Tong-kyu and attended by Kim I1-song. Vice Premier Ieng Sary
did not accompany the delegation to Korea, but according to NCNA
on .19 August departed Peking that day for Lima as head of
Cambodia's delegation to the ministerial conference of nonalined
nations.
Sihanouk gave a banquet for Kim Il-song on 20 August, at which
Kim formally noted that Sihanouk would return to Cambodia.
Kim referred to the Penn Nouth-Khieu Samphan delegation as having
come to visit Korea "in order to accompany Samdech Norodom
Sihanouk home."
PHNOM PENH COVERAGE Phnom Penh radio's coverage of the
delegation's visit to Peking has thus
far followed the past practice of Front media in reporting the
delegation's activities in detail and carrying texts of speeches
and of the final communique, in striking contrast to its terse
coverage of the recent visit to Phnom Penh by VWP First Secretary
Le Duan, which was noted only by a brief communique on 3 August.
Thus, Phnom Penh radio reported on 15 August the delegation's
departure from Phnom Penh's Pochentong airport, and noted its
arrival in Peking with a 16 August report.
On 17 August Phnom Penh radio carried the full text of Khieu
Samphan's 15 August banquet speech--the first time since Cambodia's
"liberation" that the radio has carried the full text of a RGNU
leader's speech--and reported Teng Hsiao-ping's speech at some
length in its "weekly international news feature." On the 17th
the radio also carried an editorial hailing Chinese support for
Sihanouk and the Front since its inception, specifically singling
out the efforts of Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai, and acknowledging
anew that the PRC has "continued to provide unconditional support"
since the liberation. The radio reported the signing of the aid
agreement, the departure of the delegation for Pyongyang, and the
departure of Ieng Sary's delegation to Lima, all on 20 August.
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20 AUGUST 1975
PEKING GIVES RESTRAINED WELCOME TO HANOI ECONOMIC DELEGATION
Peking media treatment of the 12-17 August visit by a ARV economic
delegation led by Vice Premier Le Thanh Nghi has provided new
evidence of coolness in Sino-Vietnamese relations by omitting
almost entirely the customary cordial descriptions of visit atmos-
pherics applied to similar visits by Le Thanh Nghi in July, August,
and October last year.* The delegation was greeted on arrival on
the 12th and feted at a welcoming banquet on the 13th by PRC Vice
Premier Li Hsien-nien, '.rho had welcomed Le Thanh Nghi on his
visits last year. The delegation also met PRC Premier Chou En-lai
in the hospital; last year's delegation did not meet Chou on its
first visit, but had a meeting with him after signing an economic
and military aid protocol on 26 October. Hanoi's VNA on the 18th
announced that the delegation had gone on to the Soviet Union on
the 17th; DRV Vice Minister of Foreign Trade Ly Ban has remained
in Peking, presumably to continue negotiations as he did last year.
Characterizations of atmospherics were notably lacking throughout
the delegation's visit this year as compared with its initial
visit in July last year. While NCNA had reported that Li Hsien-nien
had "warmly greeted" the delegation on arrival in July last year,
NCNA reported that Li only "greeted" the delegation on 12 August
this year. Initial talks between Le Thanh Nghi and Li last year
had proceeded in a "very cordial and friendly atmosphere" according
to NCNA, but this year initial talks between the two leaders were
not characterized by NCNA. In NCNA's report on the 13 August
banquet and speeches, Li did not express confidence that Sino-Viet-
namese relations would "be consolidated and constantly develop on
the basis of proletarian internationalism," as he had in his
5 July banquet speech last year. While Le Thanh Nghi was "warmly"
sent off on his 7 July departure by Li Hsien-nien last year, NCNA
did not characterize his sendoff this year.
By contrast, Hanoi media continue to describe the tone and atmosphere
of Le Thanh Nghi's meetings with PRC leaders in terms similar to
those applied to his visits to the PRC last year. Thus, a 14 August
VNA report had stated that "an atmosphere of militant solidarity and
great friendship completely pervaded" the ]. August banquet.
* The successive visits of the DRV delegation last year were dis-
cussed in the TRENDS of 10 July 1974, page 19; 14 August 1974, pages
18-19; and 31 October 1974, pages 15-17.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
20 AUGUST 1975
Last year, Peking reports showed sensitivity about Chinese aid to
Vietnam; the pattern continued in NCNA's report of this year's
13 August banquet speeches by Li Hsien-nien and Le Thanh Nghi,
which deleted several references to Chinese backing that were
included in Hanoi's 14 August VNA report of the baaquet and speeches.
The only references to such backing retained by NCNA in summarizing
Li's speech dealt with Chinese sympathy and support for Vietnam
in the past and his pledge of continuing Chinese support for the
"Just struggles" of the Vietname,fc people. While NCNA did record
Le Thanh Nghi's remark that China has always supported Vietnam out
of "bounden internationalist duty," NCNA delet::d Nghi's mention of
current talks on economic aid to Vietnam, his recognition that
Chinese aid had constituted an "important factor" in the communist
vi(:tory in Vietnam, and his expectation that "an increase" in PRC
aid would be of "great importance" and have a "-,reat effect" on
Vietnamese reconstruction. NCNA's coverage of the banquet speeches
by Li and Le Thanh Ng:ii during Ngh;'s successive visits last year
had cimilarly omitted most references in Peking's own name to aid
the Vietnam.
NCNA's report of the banquet speeches deleted all but two references
to the United States, both made by Le Thanh Nghi. While reporting
Li's assessment of the "great international significance and
historic importance" of the Vietnamese victory, NCNA omitted Li's
elaboration--reported by Hanoi--on the future importance of the
victory to other liberation struggles. Hanoi predictably omitted
Li's assessment of the current international situation with its
references to "hegemonism" related to the Sino-Soviet polemic
exchange.
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PEKING PORTRAYS U.S. TIES TO JAPAN. HITS SOVIET THREAT
Consistent with the Peking media's increasingly positive treatment
of developments suggesting that the United States maintains a
strong strategic presence in Asia to guard against Soviet inroads,
Chinese media have virtually dropped criticism of U.S.-
Japan ties while increasing their attacks on Soviet intentions re-
garding Japan.* Peking's NCNA reported the 5-6 August tsiks between
President Ford and Prime Minister Milci without the usual reproaches on
U.S.-Japanese defense ties. At the same time, Chinese reports on
14 August sharply criticized Soviet military and economic pressures,
instead of criticizing U.S. military involvement in Japan as had
been customary in the past on that date, the anniversary of V-J Day,
an anniversary which Chinese media usually have not acknowledged
explicitly.
FORD-MIKI TALKS A 7 August NCNA report highlighted passages from
the U.S.-Japanese joint announcement following
President Ford's talks with Prime Minister Miki which emphasized
the importance both sides attach to the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty
and noted that "the continued maintenance of the treaty serves the
long-term interests of both countries." NCNA replayed the announce-
ment's affirmation that the United States would continue to abide
by its defense commitment to Japan, and cited without adverse comment
President Ford's statement that the United States "would continue
to play an active and positive role in that region and would continue
to uphold its treaty commitments there." By contrast, Peking's
coverage of the last official visit by a Japanese prime minister
to the United States, a 3 August 1973 report on former Prime Minister
Tanaka's talks in Washington with then President Nixon, had ignored
both sides' stress in their joint communique on the importance of
the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.
In reporting that the two leaders had discussed "a wide range" of
economic problems, NCNA avoided references to U.S.-Japanesr: friction
over trade and financial matters that in the past had been a staple
of Chinese comment. Peking even noted with apparent approval that
both leaders had "welcomed" a dialog between oil producers and
consumers. By contrast, the 3 August 1973 NCNA report on former
Prime Minister Tanaka's talks had cited alleged "contradictions"
* For background on Peking's recent line on the superpowers in
Asia, see the TRENDS of 6 August 1973, pages 13-l'.
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between the two leaders on trade and fi..ical policies, noting news
reporLa that Tanaka felt the United States and Japan were "both
partners and competitors."
The current NCNA report on the Ford-Miki talks did criticize the
passage in the joint announcement which voiced both sides' support
for the security of South Korea, but Peking's rebuke was predictably
milder than its reaction to the last U.S.-Japan summit communique
to focus on Korean security--the November 1969 joint communique
following former Japanese Prime Minister Sato's talks with former
President Nixon. That communique had prompted an outpouring of
strident Chinese comment, including a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial,
accusing "chieftain of U.S. imperialism" Nixon and "his faithful
lackey" Sato, among other things, of plotting to drive "Japanese
militarist forces" to promote "aggression and war" in Korea and
elsewhere in Asia.
V-J DAY ANNIVERSARY The Chinese media, as usual, have not
explicitly acknowledged the 14 August 30th
anniversary of the defeat of Japan in the Pacific war, but NCNA
did use the date to issue two sharply worded reports attacking
Soviet military threats and pressure against Japan. On the last
quinquennial of the date in 1970, Peking similarly had avoided
explicitly acknowledging V-J Day but had iasued a 'Lengthy NCNA
attack on the United States for its alleged military occupation
and pressure on Japan.
The current NCNA reports reiterated recent wide-ranging Chinese
cr'?icisms of Soviet policy toward Japan, claiming that Moscow was
employing "tough and soft tactics of military threat and economic
lure" to bring Japan into its sphere of influence. One report
broke new ground regarding both tactics by depicting Soviet military
bases on the Japanese-claimed "northern territories" as "a dagger
directed against Japan" and by pointing to a "new trick" regarding
alleged efforts by Moscow to get the Japanese involved in a so-called
"new plan for developing Siberia" following its failure to get
involvement in exploitation of the Tyumen oil field in Siberia.
The report stressed the Soviet military threat to Japan, stating
that Moscow only needed to move its forces "slightly" in order to
land troops on the main northern Japanese island of Hokkaido, "as
the troops of the old tsar did in the past." It added Japanese
press comment that Japan's air space from "Hokkaido to Okinawa" and
the "whole of Japan" have been "put under the shadows of Soviet
naval and air force might."
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Though the articles duly portrayed Moscow's efforts as designed
fundamentally to contend with the United States for hegemony in
Asia, NCNA carefully avoided all reference to the U.S. bases or
military presence in Japan. It even went to some pains to depict
the United States and Japan as mutually threatened by Soviet ex-
pansion. For instance, one report said that Soviet naval maneuvers
around Japan "pose a threat to the U.S. Pacific fleet and directly
to Japan's security" and also stated that Soviet bases in the
northern territories were targeted for use against the United
States as well as Japan.
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