TRENDS IN COMMUNIST MEDIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000200160004-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 19, 1999
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: July 16, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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FBIS
FOREIGN BROADCAST
INFORMATION SERVICE
Trends in Communist Media
16 JULY 1975
(VOL. XXVI, NO. 28)
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This report Is based exclusively an foreign media
materials and Is published by FBIS without coordination
with other U.S. Government components.
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unsuthorltsd Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
ClaselNed by 000073
Automatic.Iryt declassified
six months from dole of Issue.
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CONFIDENTIAL FBIS TRENDS
16 JULY 1975
CONTENTS
U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS
PRAVDA "Observer" Raps Schlesinger "First Use" Remarks. . . . . 1
MIDDLE EAST
USSR Noncommittal on Arab Pressure for Israel UN Ouster . . . 3
SOMALI BASE ISSUE
USSR Claims Base Charges Prompted by U.S. Indian Ocean Plans. . 5
PORTUGAL
Moscow, PCP Hack MFA, Assail Socialist Withdrawal From Cabinet. 8
KOREA
DPRK Marks Anniversaries of Treaties With PRC, USSR . . . . . . 10
SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS
PRC Continues To Push Asian "Antihegemriny Front" Against USSR . 11
Peking Notes Planned Europe Summit, Warns of Soviet Threat. . . 13
VIETNAM
Strategy of Communist Offensive Reflected in Giap-Dung Article. 15
COMMUNIST RELATIONS
USSR Silent on Ponomarev Role in "Directive" to Western CP's. . 38
NOTES
European CP Conference Preparations; Romanian Bid for
Nonalined Status; DPRK on North-South Contacts;
Chinese Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLE: Reorganization of Soviet Agricultural
Administration Underway . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Si
Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
ct..dn.d y ONO?$
Auloffim(cativaedewood
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Approve
11,S.-SOVIET RELATIONS
PRAVDA "OBSERVER" RAPS SCHLESINGER "FIRST USE" REMARK',
A 12 July article by PRAVDA's Observer (Obozrevatel) has added an
authoritative ring to recent Soviet media criticism of Defense
Secretary Schlesinger's statements concerning circumstances in
which the United States could be the first to use ijciear weapons.*
Observer placed Schlesinger's statements in the context of the
arguments of those in Washington who feel that potwatial
adversaries should be put on notice that the commuo.ist victories
in In.ioc,iina would not affect U.S. readiness to uw.e military force
if need be. His criticism of the Secretary was r. a,w;companied by
expressions of satisfaction with the general state of U.S.-Soviet
relations and detente, and by reaffirmations of Moscow's interest
in pursuing bilateral discussions of sensitive strategic issues.
Observer complained that Schlesinger's statements about the
possibility of "selective strikes against the Soviet union" and
of using nuclear weapons even in "minor crises" were in sharp
contradiction to the official U.S. policy of improving bilateral
relations and to the 1973 U.S.-Soviet Agreement on Prevention of
Nuclear War. Moscow's real concern seemed apparent in Observer's
linkage of Schlesinger's recent statements with what he termed
"the turbulent debate inside America about the way U.S. foreign
policy should be restructured following the 'agonizing withdrawal'
from Southeast Asia." He concluded that Schlesinger represented
those "influential. forces" in Washington who thought the best
response to such setbacks was to "show force" around the world, and
particularly in Europe, in order to underscore U.S. resolve. Other
commentaries since early May have made even more explicit Moscow's
concern that the communist victories in Indochina might negatively
affect Washington's interest in detente. Soviet leaders, including
Brezhnev and Kosygin, expressed their concern about Washington's
foreign policy course in speeches during the election campaign for
republican supreme soviets in June.
Observer leavened his criticism of the Secretary's "bellicose
statements" with general approval for the recent course of
U.S.-Soviet relations and the "constructive dialog" at SALT in
* U.S. policy last draw a response from PRAVDA's "Observer" in a
February 1974 article which criticized the U.S.-UK agreement
providing for expansion of U.S. military fhcilities on the Indian
Ocean inland of Diego Garcia. For earlier Moscow treatment of the
Schlesinger statements, see the TRENDS of 9 July 1975, pages 1-2.
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particular. He reaffirmed Moscow's belief that the limitation of
strategic arms is the "central problem" in U.S.-Soviet relations
and thus an area where progress is particularly important. He
went on to attach "great significance" to Brezhnev's forthcoming
visit to the United States, although he did not directly link
this to conclusion of a SALT agreement.
Secretary Schlesinger and his predecessors at the Pentagon have
always represented something of an exception to Moscow's general--
but not rigidly adhered to--polity in recent years of eschewing
direct criticism of top Administration officials. Schlesinger's
1974 remarks on retargeting U.S. strategic weapons and the need to
plan for possib1.e limited nuclear exchanges with the USSR have
previously evoked criticism from Soviet analysts of strategic
affairs along quite similar lines.
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FBIS TRENDS
16 JULY 1975
MIDDLE EAST
USSR NONCOMMITTAL ON ARAB PRESSURE FOR ISRAEL UN OUSTER
Moscow has thus far barely alluded to the move afoot in Arab
diplomatic circles to raise the issue of sanctions against Israel,
including suspension of UN membership, for failure to comply with
UN resolutions calling for withdrawal of Israeli forces from Arab
territories. Nor has Moscow reported Secretary Kissinger's
Milwaukee speech on the 14th in which he implied that Israel's
ouster from the United Nations could prompt the United States
"to depart the scene." Such a call for efforts to deprive Israel
of UN membership was adopted by the 40-nation sixth conference
of Islamic foreign ministers at a 12-15 July meeting in Jidda; a
similar move is expected during the Lima conference of nonalined
countries In August; and Egyptian Foreign Minister Fahmi on 15 July
said the September session of the UN General Assembly "must decide
whether Israel shall remain a member of the United Nations."
Moscow's only reference to the issue has come in a Moscow domestic
service commentary by N. Yefremov on the 12th which, in reporting
the arrival of Israel's new UN representative in New York, noted
that his predecessor's farewell remarks had charged that the UN
was increasingly "under Arab domination" and had indicated that
Israel might have to resign. Characterizing these remarks as a
"diplomatic counterattack," Yefremov remarked, without explanation,
that "as is known, Israel is threatened with expulsion from the
UN." He added that this was "insisted on" by the "coordinating
committee of 75 African, Asian, and Latin American countries"--
an apparent reference to the Havana conference of nonalined countries
held 17-22 March 1975. Yefremov summed the issue up as a "very
sorry business."
BACKGROUND Moscow has maintained a low profile on the issue
of sanctions _igair.st Israel since late 1973. Since
then the few favorable Soviet references to sanctions were
indirect, replaying various Arab or international organization
resolutions. TASS on 23 April 1974, for example, reported a World
Peace Council message to the UN Security Council calling for
"immediate and effective sanctions against Israel" to normalize
the Mideast situation.
Between the June 1967 and October 1973 wars, however, Moscow had
frequently voiced support for economic and political sanctions
against Israel, as provided for under Article 41 of the UN Charter,
to compel Israel's compliance with UN resolutions--chiefly Security
Council Resolution 242 of 22 November 1967, calling in part for with-
drawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the
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June war, but also those resolutions in 1968-1969 calling for
cessation of Israeli military attacks against Arab and Palestinian
targets in reprisal for terrorist activities. Such advocacy of
sanctions against Israel was normally pegged to UNGA or Security
Council deliberations on the Mideast situation, rather than
presented as a Soviet initiative. To explain why sanctions were
not implemented, Soviet comment pointed out from time to time
that U.S. opposition in the Security Council had persistently
prevented their adoption.
Moscow's position on sanctions extended at times to calls for
Israel's expulsion from the United Nations. A June 1971 INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS article by E. Dmitriyev and V. Ladeikin, for example,
stated that Israel's refusal to promote a Mideast settlement
would justify political and economic sanctions; and it recalled
that Article 6 of the UN Charter provides that a member which has
persistently violated the Charter principles may be expelled.
Other references to Israel's expulsion were made in a May
1972
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS article by V. Aleksarrlrov and in
a 4
December
1972 PRAVDA article by D. Yevgenyev. Additionally, a
14
April
1973 statement by Soviet UN representative Y. Malik,
that
the
USSR would support "effective sanctions against Israel. to
the
extent of dismissing it from UN membership," was widely reported
by TASS, Moscow radio, and the central press.
Soviet references to sanctions have also at times included
suggestions that, as provided for in Article 42 of the L-N Charter,
a UN-sponsored use of force could insure Israel's compliance with
UN resolutions. An M. Kremnov NEW TIMES article on 1 January 1969
and a 10 September 1969 Moscow foreign-language broadcast, for example,
recalled that "use of force" was allowable under the UN Charter
to compel such compliance. And, in the fullest Soviet discussion
of sanctions against Israel, an I. Blishechenko NEW TIMES article
of 10 December 1971 invoked various precedents in international
law--including the statutes of the Nuremberg Tribunal--to cite
appropriate sanctions for "political- material and moral responsibility,"
as distinguished under international ,aw and applicable to Israel
as an "aggressor state." Included in the examples was "dispatch
of a UN force to the Middle East to restore peace."
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SOMALI BASE ISSUE
USSR CLAIMS BASE CHARGES PROMPTED BY U.S. INDIAN OCEAN PLANS
Moscow for over a month has been issuing a steady flow of routine-
level comment and reportage designed to counter U.S. charges that
the Soviet Union is developing a new naval and air facility in
Somalia. The current spate of comment was prompted by Secretary
of Defense Schlesinger's testimony on 10 June before the Senate
Armed Services Committee defending the Administration's plan to
expand naval facilities on Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. The
Secretary told the committee that the "significant expansion" of
Soviet facilities at Berbera showed the USSR's serious intent to
establish a naval presence in the Indian Ocean. In the pattern
of past treatment of assertions of Soviet bases in the Indian
Ocean area, Moscow has again sought to portray such charges as
U.S. justification of its own plans to develop facilities in the
area.*
The greater volume of Moscow comment than on past charges would
seem to result from the continued widespread publicity about the
Soviet installations--including the release of U.S. reconnaissance
photographs, and the Somali Government's invitation to foreign
newsmen and U.S. Congressional delegations to inspect the site.
Moscow has refrained from issuing any formal denial, although :Lt
had done so on two occasions during the 1960's. (In November 1968
TASS said'it "had been instructed to categorically refute"
Western press allegations about the creation of a Soviet naval
base at Mers-el-Kebir and a network of Soviet rocket installations
in Algeria. At a somewhat higher level, in October 1966 an
unidentified Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman, as reported by
TASS, "denied" a London DAILY MIRROR story that the USSR intended
to set up a naval base in Egypt.)
TREATMENT CF CHARGES Even before Secretary Schlesinger's
testimony, TASS had reported on 6 June
that the Administration was trying to convince Congress to approve
additional appropriations for "the construction of a big military
*, Moscow's reaction last fall to Tat TASS called the "regrettable
inaccuracy" of President Ford's remark, in a 28 August news confer-
ence, about three Soviet naval operating bases in the Indian Ocean
is discussed in the TRENDS of 5 September 1974, pages 5-6. An
earlier flurry of Soviet comment on charges and countercharges of
Soviet and U.S. naval bases in the area is treated in the TRENDS
of 21 February 1974, page 19.
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base" in Diego Garcia, noting that "the world public" denounced
the Pentagon's plans for an Indian ocean base, which the countries
of the area considered a threat to their security. TASS' 10 June
account of Schlesinger's testimony said that in requesting the
Senate to speed up allocation of funds for an expansion of the
Diego Garcia base, Schlesinger "proceeded to scare the Senators
anew with the so-called Soviet menace, alleging that the Soviet
Union was intending to build up its military might" in the Indian
Ocean.
On the 9th TASS had reported a denial by the Somali embassy in
Kenya of "Western propaganda" reports that the USSR was building
a missile base in Somali territory, Moscow continued to focus on
a series of denials by Somali officials in Mogadiscio and elsewhere,
while simultaneously countering "rumors"--advanced by Egypt--about
possible Soviet bases in Libya.
The Soviet military organ RED STAR joined the fray on 20 June,
acknowledging--and ridiculing--the United States' high-altitude
reconnaissance "photographs of the territory of a sovereign state"
and remarking that "the Pentagon prefers to see what it wants from
where it wants." RED STAR maintained that photographs of "strictly
peaceful installations" such as residential areas and port
installations had been interpreted as barracks, a landing strip, and
a control center. The reason for the "latest Pentagon mirage,"
RED STAR concluded, was the Pentagon request for further funds to
enlarge the Diego Garcia naval and air base into a "really enormous
military center.."
In a commentary on 27 June tailored for American audiences, Moscow
attempted to make light of reports of the presence of Styx missiles
in Somalia. Commentator Pozner, in an English-language broadcast,
noted that the Pentagon had "officially admitted" that "the missiles
photographed in Somalia and made an issue of by Defense Secretary
Schlesinger were of the so-called Styx type, introduced around 1959."
Pozner tried to convey the implication that these were Somali
weapons, adding that the Styx missiles "serve as standard armament
for patrol boats of about a dozen navies around the world." And he
attempted to discredit the photographic evidence, remarking that he
wouldn't be surprised to learn the photographs were not even taken
in Somalia, and wondering if "thy esteemed secretary of defense
planted a couple of obsolete missiles in his own back yard and
had them photographed by the air force."
With the visits of American and other foreign correspondents to
Somalia in early July, IZVESTIYA on the 3d maintained that the
newsmen had not discovered anything "remotely resembling the
'discovery' of the Pentagon purveyors of false information." The
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"hullabaloo," IZVESTIYA insisted, stemmed from Pentagon efforts
to strengthen its argument for additional budget allocations.
In reporting the correspondents' tours, TASS again focused
primarily on denials by Somali officials, citing President
Mohammad Siad Barre as declaring that Somalia does not allow
foreign powers to establish bases and the Soviet Union never made
such a request to the Somali Government.
A Moscow domestic service report on 9 July cited Barre as saying
in a Washington POST interview that Somali was willing to let
ships from all friendly states make business calls at the port
of Berbera, and "if Americans come as friends, Somalia is ready
to accord this service to American ships as well and to let them
refuel and carry out repairs in the port."
Moscow has hedged on the touchy question of the findings of a
U.S. delegation led by Senator Bartlett in early July. A
Gerasimov commentary broadcast in Polish on 9 July contended that
U.S. and Lebanese journalists had found no trace of any foreign
bases in Berbera and "Bartlett did not dare say that a Soviet
military base existed in Berbera, either." Gerasimov made an
elaborate effort to convey the idea that the Bartlett mission
found Somali, not Soviet, installations. He claimed that
Bartlett was not interested in the problem of a foreign base, but
rather in "the local defense capabilities" of Somalia, and that
the senator counted the "Somali" naval buildings in Berbera. In
reporting Bartlett's remarks on his return, Gerasimov was half
accurate and half deliberately ambiguous. Thus, Bartlett said
that his inspection "absolutely confirmed" Pentagon claims that
the Soviet Union was installing a military facility in Somalia.
In Gerasimov's version, Bartlett said his visit "confirmed the
information provided by the U.S. Defense Department about military
buildings in that region." Touching on the issue briefly in the
weekly Moscow radio observers roundtable on 13 July, IZVESTIYA's
Mikhaylov maintained that the American congressmen and the
Journalists who had "literally overrun" Somalia "failed to find
any trace" of a Soviet base.
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P0RTiiGAL
MOSCOW, PCP BACK MFA. ASSAIL SOCIALIST WITHDRAWAL FROM CABINET
Maintaining its cautious approach toward actions of Portugal's Armed
Forces Movement (MFA), Moscow has given an approving nod to the
8 July MFA document outlining the people-MFA alliance, largely
through the device of citing favorable reaction within Portugal.
The Portuguese Communist Party (PCP), intent on preserving its
image as an MFA supporter, has praised the MFA plan to establish a
network of "popular assemblies"--a move believed to spell the eventual
end of political parties--as a stzp of "extioordinary significance"
in uniting the people and the MFA. The Socialist Party (PS) has
again come in for Soviet criticism following its 11 July withdrawal
from the government over the RE:,PUBLICA affair. Both Moscow and the
PCP have played down the press freedom aspect, ro;ttinely reiterating
support for freedom of information, while claiming that the Socialists
unduly exploited the REPUBLICA issue as a "pretext." for their resignation,
which was described as the culmination of a "whole campaign" of
activities against the revolution.
MFA DOCUMENT TASS dispatches on 9 and 10 July favorably reported
the MFA's "new key policy document" on mass organizations.
With customary caution, however, TASS largely confined itself to quoting
the PCP and noting that "the Portuguese press and. many progressive
organizations" had expressed their approval of the MFA's decisive
action "at a time when reactionary forces try to brake the revolution."
Further emphasizing the widespread approval for the idea of popular
assemblies, a 16 July PRAVDA article reported by TASS noted that
recent pro-government demonstrations were "eloquent evidence" that
the people backed the MFA program, which "confirms the progressive
course chosan by the Movement." In a "note" published in the party
organ AVANTE on 10 July, the PCP Central Committee--which long has
urged the creation of Cuban-style mass organizations--lauded the MFA
announcement as further recognition that the alliance between the
people and the Movement was the "binominal driving force" of the
revolutionary process. Noting that the MFA decision came at a time
when "reactionary and conservative forces are waging an intensive
campaign" against the revolution, the PCP note said that the MFA
decision had "extraordinary significance" for the consolidation of
the revolution's gains.
SOCIALIST TASS on the 11th promptly reported the Socialist
RESIGNATION Party's announcement that day of its decision to
withdraw from the government following the 10 July
publication of a workers' edition of the party paper REPUBLICA.
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TASS dismissed the REPUBLICA issue as a "pretext" for the Socialists'
latest "attempt to aggravate the political situation."* TASS reported
that "observers" in Portugal said that the PS action actually was
based on opposition to the plan for popular assemblies, a plan which
has "wide approval of the entire democratic public and trade unions."
Suggesting PS isolation from the people, PRAVDA on 16 July insisted
that Mario Soares and other Socialist Party leaders were "at variance
with the will of the Portuguese masses" and must bear a heavy
responsibility for "aggravating diffinulties" rather than rallying
to the support of democracy and social progress during "this hard
period of the Portuguese revolution." More outspoken in its criticism,
a Moscow radio Portuguese-language commentary on 11 July labeled the
Socialist withdrawal "nothing but sabotage aimed at undermining the
revolutionary transformation in the country" and asserted that PS
actions were "just further moves by local and foreign reactionaries,
who are trying to frustrate Portugal's advance along the path of
socialist democracy."
A PCP "note" of 11 July, reported by Lisbon radio, also glossed over
the REPUBLICA issue as only a "pretext" for the PS decision, which
was said to be the culmination of the Socialist Party leaders' domestic
and international activity aimed at the "division of the MFA and the
setting up of a new coalition government of rightwing forces." Against
the background of the government's precarious position following
the withdrawal of the major party, the PCP insisted that a rightwing
government would never, be acceptable to the Portuguese people and
that, should the present coalition "become unworkable," the only
alternative would be "another government which will pursue the policy
of democracy toward socialism already mapped out." Appealing to the
PS rank and file, the PCP urged "Socialist militants" to note that their
leaders' resignation was a "venture against the revolutionary process"
which "gravely endangers the Portuguese revolution and their own party."
As for the PCP's own role, the note denounced "slanders" accusing
the Communist Party of seeking to take power and reiterated the PCP's
"intransigent" support for a democratic Portugal in which "freedom
of the press and freedom for political parties" would flourish.
* REPUBLICA's fate has been hanging fire since 18 May, when communist-
dominated workers refused to print the paper. The government's failure
to enforce a Press Council verdict restoring the paper to its socialist
owners, and the subsequent decision to "intervene" the paper and permit
its publication by a. new worker-controlled management board, represented
a major setback for the Socialist Party. The REPUBLICA issue is discussed
in the TRENDS of 29 May 1975, pages 10-12, and of 2 July 1975, pages
24-26.
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KOREA
DPRK MARKS ANNIVERSARIES OF TREATIES WITH PRC; USSR
PEKING Breaking with standard, past practice, DPRK media marking
the anniversary of the 11 July 1961 DPRK-PRC treaty of
friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance failed to characterize
the treaty as defending "security interests" of the two countries.
Pyongyang's downplaying of the treaty's security aspects places
DPRK comment on the anniversary more in line with the tone of
Chinese media treatment of the event for the past several years.
This year both Chinese and Korean banquet speakers characterized
the treaty as a symbol of the enduring nature of PRC-DPRK friendship,
while eschewing references to the military nature of the alliance.
Both Peking and Pyongyang marked the anniversary with routine
banquets and press comment.
Unlike last year, the issue of U.S. troops in South Korea was not
raised by Chinese speakers at the anniversary banquet in either
capital. Banquet speeches by the Chinese last year touched on the
issue of the U.S. troop presence in South Korea.* This year the
PRC ambassador in Pyongyang simply denounced the "U.S. imperialists"
for "criminal obstruction" of Korean reunification, a charge not
specifically made last year. PRC Vice Premier Chen Hsi-lien,
speaking at the Peking banquet, gave Chinese support to the Korean
struggle against "foreign intervention" and he predicted the
inevitable -P-llurc of "U.S. imperialism . . . no matter what schemes
they plot to create 'two Koreas."'
MOSCOW Reflecting the cool state of Soviet-DPRK relations, both
Soviet and North Korean treatment of the 14th anniversary
of the 6 July DPRK-USSR treaty of friendship, cooperation, and mutual
assistance was even more muted than last year's subdued treatment.
As in 1974, there were no reports of a rally in Moscow, and this year
neither Soviet nor DPRK media reported that the usual reception had
been held by the North Korean ambassador--an event both had reported
last year. KCNA did not carry any DPRK press comment on the anniver-
sary this year, and only brit?ly noted the Soviet ambassador's J July
banquet in Pyongyang for the anniversary, without reporting any
speeches.
* As reported by KCNA, at the Pyongyang banquet the Chinese charge
demanded that U.S. troops "quit South Korea at once." NCNA, however,
had not reported this demand. For further details, see the TRENDS
of 17 July 1974, pages 16-17.
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SING - SOVIET R ELATIONS
PRC CONTINUES TO PUSH ASIAN "ANTIHEGEMONY FRONT" AGAIF' T USSR
Recent warnings in Peking media against Soviet expansionist
intentions in Southeast Asia have contained a new element: NCNA
has picked up Bangkok comment on the 1 July establishment of
Sino-Thai diplomatic relations stressing the importance of an
Asian "anti-hegemony movement" to "frustrate all schemes of the
hegemonists." This goes beyond earlier reports in Peking media
which said merely that the establishment of relations between the
PRC and Southeast Asian countries would strengthen the unity and
cooperation among the Third World.
Peking's current reportage is unusually explicit in portraying
Chinese efforts to include "anti-hegemony" clauses in recent
communiques with states throughout the Asia-Pacific region as an
effective means to counter alleged Soviet ambitions to dominate
the area under the cover of the Soviet-fostered "Asian collective
security system." It also conforms with recent shrill Chinese
warnings of Soviet attempts to expand its influence in the area
following the U.S. withdrawal from Indochina,* and it indicates
China's intention to use the anti-hegemony issue to fuel its
attempt to establish a pro--Peking East Asian diplomatic order in
opposition to the USSR.
Recent NC14A reports of Thai comment focused on the antihegemony
clause as "the most important thing" contained in the 1 July
joint communique. NCNA on the 4th quoted a Thai editotia].
applauding the Sino-Thai joint statement because it had "further
strengthened" "the antihegemony front." After duly warning
against "intensified Soviet expansion in Southeast Asia," NCNA
cited the Thai editorial's observation that "the surest guarantee
for security and peace in Southeast Asia" is to "reinforce the
antihegemony movement" in the area.
Peking reports of Thai comment on 9 and 10 July depicted the.
Sino-Thai communique, as well as Peking's proposed inclusion of
tht antihegemony clause in its planned peace treaty with Japan,
as an effective rebuff to Soviet attempts to meddle in Asian
affairs and use the Soviet Asian collective security proposal to
dominate the continent. The articles warned that Asians must
* For example, see the discussion of Chinese warnings against the
USSR during the Thai Prime Minister's recent visit to China in the
TRENDS of 2 July 1975, pages 13-14.
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be more wary of Soviet intentions in the wake of the U.S. pullback
from the area, and they portrayed Peking's establishment of
relations with Thailand as "beneficial to the security and peace
in the region" because this had caused the USSR, "seeking hegemony
everywhere," to become "greatly panic-stricken."
BACKGROUND ON Peking thus far has included the ant:Lhegemony
"ANT !HEGEMONY" clause in joint cominuniques signed \7tth the
United States, Japan, Malaysia, the Ptitlippines
and Thailand, and it is attempting to include the clause in its
proposed peace treaty with Japan. The clause states that the
countries are opposed "to any attempt by any country or group of
countries to establish hegemony or create spheres of influence in
any par. of the world." Moscow has publicly warned that Peking
is using the clause to establish anti-Soviet feeling in Asia.
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PEKING NOTES PLANNED EUROPE SUMMIT, WARNS OF SOVIET THREAT
While acknowledging that recent East-West agreements apparently
will produce the summit-level European Security Conference (CSCE)
long sought by Moscow, current Peking comment stresses that this
in no way reduces the Soviet threat to Europe. Chinese media
at the same time have muffled past criticism of the U.S. role
in the CSCE negotiations, which Peking has long opposed. Peking
media have denounced the planned summit as an "illusive deception"
fostered by Moscow, have strongly supported the efforts of small
and medium-sized countries to protect their interests against
Soviet ambitions at the con arence, and have stridently warned
that Moscow's mouthings about "detente" have not reduced the
Soviet threat to Europe.
Current Peking comment treating the CSCE issue recalls earlier
practice in warning the small and medium-sized European states that
the CSCE was contrary to their best interests, while supporting
th=ir demands upon the major powers. But recent comment has
dropped previously customary charges against the United States,
while focusing on Moscow as the main danger to Europe. For example,
a signed article in the 12 July PEOPLE'S DAILY by prominent foreign
affairs commentator Mei Ou warned that Moscow wanted to use the
European summit to consolidate its East European "empire" and make
it a base for further expansion in West Europe at the expense of
U.S. interests. Avoiding reference to the U.S. military presence
in Europe and to NATO, the article denounced Moscow for increasing
its forces in Europe, improving its weapons, and launching frequ,.:nt
military exercises there. Underlining Peking's carefully differentiated
approach to the two superpowers, the article repeatedly used the term
"Soviet revisionism," while consistently referring to the "United
States" without any pejorative epithet.
Similarly, a 13 July NCNA commentary hailed as a direct slap at
Soviet ambitions Malta's recent demand for an agreement on reducing
superpower presence in the Mediterranean Sea prior to the CSCE
summit, but made only a passing reference to such an agreement's
implications for the United States. And several recent NCNA reports
stressed the growing Soviet threat in such diverse areas of Europe
as the Daninh coast, the North Sea, Portugal and Cyprus, while
making several positive references to the United States as a necessary
strategic bulwa,-k for West European countries in resisting the USSR.
EARLIER PEKING When CSCE preparatory talks began in the fall of
COMMENT ON CSCE 1972, Chinese spokesmen had stressed that the
conference represented a thinly disguised effort
by both the United States and the USSR to settle European issues
"behind the backs" of the European people. Peking had called for
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dismantling NATO and the Warsaw Pact and the withdrawal of foreign
forces as prerequisites for European security, and it firmly
backed the interests of the small and medium-sized countries
against both superpowers.*
As the CSCE preparatory talks entered their second phase in mid-1973,
Peking's line shifted in accord with the PRC's more positive view of
U.S. forces in Europe and of NATO as keystones in Western efforts
to check Soviet expansionism. From then until now the Chinese media
have encouraged U.S. and West European determination on strategic
issues against Soviet blandishments based on detente. Most recently,
Peking applauded President Ford's statements at this May's NATO
summit meeting that the United States would carefully scrutinize
Soviet intentions at the CSCE and demand significant concessions from
the USSR. Peking has dropped past calls for dismantling NATO and
withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe, and it has muffled past support
for small and medium-sized states' calls aimed at U.S. influence.
The Chinese at the same time gleefully played up signs of East-West
impasse during the two years of talks in the second phase of the
conference, reflecting Chinese pleasure over Moscow's inability
to strike a bargain with the United States that Peking saw as detri-
mental to its own international interests.**
* For a discussion of the Chinese line at the time of the preparatory
CSCE talks see the TRENDS of 12 October 1972, pages 13-14.
**' Peking's coverage of President Ford's European trip is discussed
in the TRENDS of 4 June 1975, pages 6-7. Peking's general line on
the second phase of the CSCE is discussed in the TRENDS of 31 July
1974, p;~ a 13.
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VIETNAM
STRATEGY OF COMMUNIST OFFENSIVE REFLECTED IN GIAP-DUNG ARTICLE
The analysis of the final communist offensive to seize power in
South Vietnam, in the lengthy article jointly authored by DRV
Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap and Chief of Staff Van Tien Dung,
provides some insights into the planning and direction of the
campaign by Hanoi's military leaders.* While the last half of the
two-part article calls attention to the unprecedented strength of
the Vietnamese communist armed forces, the article never comes to
grips with questions about the future of this massive military
force--whether it will be demobilized, or how its strength might
be used to exert Vietnam's influence in Southeast Asia.
The straightforward account in the first half of the article of
events leading up to the fall of South Vietnam leaves the
impression that, while overall strategy for the final campaign
had been formulated and prepared well in advance, the timetable
of the communist offensive was predicated on the outcome of each
successive major military action, rather than on any previously
devised schedule. The redundancy of some of the material,
presented first in the opening half of the article and reviewed
again in theoretical terms in the last half, suggests the
possibility that the two authors were separately responsible for
each of the major parts, with Giap--as the leading Vietnamese
communist uilitary theoretician--drawing the general lessons set
forth in the second half of the article.
Touting the capture of South Vietnam with characteristic
extravagance as "the greatest and most glorious exploit in all the
4,000 years of our people's nation-building . . . and a fabulous
achievements of the 20th century," the article gave prime credit
for the military success to the leadership of the Vietnam Workers
Party and only secondly cited the "compatriots and combatants
throughout the country." Consistent with DRV propaganda since the
fall of Saigon, the article virtually ignored whatever role in the
campaign the NFLSV and PRG might have had as the ostensible
leaders of the South Vietnamese revolution. Only passing reference
was made to their part, in the introduction to the second half of
the article.
* The release and dissemination of the Giap-Dung article were
discussed in the TRENDS of 9 July 1975, pages 9-10.
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PLANNING, TIMING OF In treating the opening of the communist
COMMUNIST OFFENSIVE offensive in the Central Highlands, the
first part of the article was in basic
accord with an earlier assessment by Hanoi's prominent but
anonymous military commentator "Chien Thang" (Victor)* that Ban Me
Thuot, the target of the attack, constituted "a key strategic
position" and that if it fell, the other highland provincial
capitals of Pleiku and Kontum would be isolated. The Giap-Dung
article introduced an element not discussed by Chien Thang, however,
when it claimed that diversionary tactics were used by the communists
to mislead the ARVN into thinking the attack would be at Pleiku and
thereby causing them to neglect the defense of Ban Me Thuot.
According to the Giap-Dung article, the GVN evacuation of the Central
Highlands was foreseen by the communists as early as 13 March, the
day after the capture of Ban Me Thuot, although by the article's
own account ARVN troops did not begin their retreat from Pleiku and
Kontum until the 16th.
The next major move in the offensive, as recounted in the Giap-Dung
analysis, was begun "only a few days after" the conclusion of the
Central Highlands campaign when "large attacks" were mounted in
Military Region I. The preparations for these attacks had been
completed by mid-March, and on the 19th, "before even the conclusion
of the Central Highlands campaign," the decision was made to
"annihilate" the Thua Thien-Hue defense system, the article averred.
The decision to attack Danang came on 24 March, the article declared,
when it was decided that the GVN's position there would be highly
untenable after the communist capture of Hue to the North and Tam
Ky to the South. The article said that the fall of Danang "pushed
the enemy into a hopeless situation" caused by a decline in morale,
organizational chaos, loss of equipment, and "bankruptcy of strategy
and tactics."
Apparently about the same time the communists made up their minds
to attack Danang, they were making the decision to launch an all-out
attack on Saigon. This was supported by the article's assertion
that "toward the end of mid-March, . . . we had already determined
the ensuing direction of development, namely, toward Saigon-Gia Dinh."
The ultimate decision, however, was not made until a few days later,
specifically in the "middle of late March," when the fall of Hue was
imminent and it was decided "officially," according to the article,
to launch the Ho Chi Minh campaign for the capture of Saigon.
The article's description of the timing of the communist decision
to press for a total military victory coincides closely with some
rather abrupt changes discerned in Vietnamese communist propaganda
* See the TRENDS of 7 May 1975, pages 3-5 for a discussion of the
Chien 'Chang article.
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16 JULY 1975
last spring. Toward the end of March and in early April, Hanoi
and PRG media stopped promoting the possibility of a negotiated
settlement with a government replacing Thieu, a proposition that
had received strong backing until then.* The Giap-Dung article
underlined the communists' rejection of a compromise solution after
this time when it criticized alleged U.S. and GVN efforts to
"delay" the offensive, not only through military means but on the
basis of undefined "cun:,jng political and diplomatic tricks" that
would "limit the complete victory" of the communist forces.
COMMENT ON U.S. Despite the earlier withdrawal of U.S. military
ROLE, POSITION forces from South Vietnam, the likelihood of
renewed U.S. participation in the fighting
was actively considered by the communist strategists and apparently
rejected as not posing a decisive threat--judging by the article's
attention to this subject. In the discussion in part one of the
military situation following the collapse of military regions I
and II, the author baldly contended that the United States was
essentially "powerless" to do anything, "no matter how they might
intervene." The argument made in the second half of the article
also took the tack that renewed U.S. participation was unlikely-=
not because of U.S. impotence but because the United States
recognized that the GVN could not be saved and that intervention
would "only lead to even more ignominious defeat." Irrespective
of the professed confidence that the U.S. would not reenter the
war, the second part of the article acknowledged that preparations
were made "to deal with such an eventuality," but failed to specify
what they were.
Predictably, the article argued that the impact of the victory on
the United States is farreaching. It claimed that this was the
United State's "greatest military and political defeat," "a U.S.
Waterloo" that will have "incalculable consequences for many years
to come." The article said that the trust of U.S. allies had been
"severely shaken" by the U.S. "defeat" and that this was causing
"greater contradictions in the imperialist system" and accelerating
its collapse.
* The last known Hanoi media mention of the possibility of talks
was contained in a 21 March NHAN DAN editorial; for the PRG;, the
last authoritative indication of a willingness to talk was presented
by NFLSV Chairman Nguyen Huu Tho in an AFP interview of 2 April that
was transmitted by Front media on the 7th. The apparent change in
the communist position on negotiations is discussed in the TRENDS
of 16 April 1975, pages 8-9.
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COMMUNIST RELATIONS
USSR SILENT ON PONOMAREV ROLE IN "DIRECTIVE" TO WESTERN CP'S
Moscow has predictably ignored French press reports claiming that
alleged "Kremlin instructions" to West European communist parties
on how to seize power were in fact based on a year-old article by
CPSU Secretary Ponomarev, published in some editions of the
June 1974 PROBLEMS OF PEACE AND SOCIALISM, the international
communist journal. The "instructions, as reported last month in
a "special edition" in Paris of the suspended Portuguese Socialist
Party paper REPUBLICA, had prompted a flurry of Soviet reaction,
including a 28 June TASS "refutation" calling the alleged
instructions "nothing but a fabrication."*
The June 1974 Ponomarev article, keyed to the fifth anniversary of
the 1969 Moscow conference of communist parties, advocated on the
basis of Chilean developments that Western CP's seeking to
consolidate their revolutions should seize control of the news
media and the army and form a new state apparatus. Ponomarev
himself, speaking this month at a 4 July Kremlin meeting on the
40th anniversary of the Seventh Comintern Congress, touched only
indirectly on the REPUBLICA affair in citing unspecified "worn-out
fabrications and lies" as examples of the anticommunism and
anti-Sovietism of "certain social democratic leaders, especially in
connection with events in Portugal." He went on to declare that,
while supporting the policy of alliance between communists and
social democrats, the CPSU "strives resolutely to halt" such
anti-Soviet actions by social democrats.
The French Communist Party (PCF) has demonstrated particular
sensitivity to the REPUBLICA charge, which appeared as an
insert in the 23 June newspaper LE QUOTIDIEN DE PARIS. PCF
Secretary General Marchais, in a press conference reported in
L'HUMANITE on 27 June, had denounced REPUBLICA's "Soviet directive"
as a fake but went on to discuss the 1974 Ponomarev article,
in which, he said, "a CPSU leader expressed a few personal
reflections" following the Chilean coup. He insisted that "none"
of the quotations used by REPUBLICA had actually appeared in
Ponomarev's article. Indicating the implications of REPUBLICA's
"Dorgery" for the PCF, he said that had the French party "not
forcefully reacted against it, the publication of such a document
c o u l d have led to complications in r-lations between our party
and the French Socialist Party and helped to keep alive the
attacks against our alliance."
* See the TRENDS of 2 July 1975, page 27.
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16 JULY 1975
Marchais also acknowledged that the French edition of PROBLEMS OF
PEACE AND SOCIALISM had not carried the 1974 Ponomarev article,
remarking that it was viewed by the French party as "likely to
obscure rather than illuminate" its struggle for power. Asked
why the PCF did not publish Ponomarev's article at the time,
Marchais responded that "it is generally known" that discussions
are taking place within the international communist movement and
that "some problems remain" which require further discussion.
He added, however, that in order to demonstrate REPUBLICA's
inaccuracies, the French CP had provided reprints of Ponomarev's
article which would be available to newsmen as they left the
press conference.
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NOTES
EUROPEAN CP CONFERENCE PREPARATIONS: The Yugoslav media have
provided the only communist-source confirmation thus far that a
meeting was held in East Berlin 1-5 July by a working group
charged with drafting a final document for the planned all-European
conference of communist parties. Western reports claimed that the
Yugoslav party delegation received support in its resistance to the
Moscow-oriented draft document from delegations of the Romanian,
Spanish, Italian and French communist parties. Belgrade's
publicity for the meeting reflected a possible split in the LCY
over the Yugoslav role in the planned conference. Thus TANJUG on
the 13th reported an article in the weekly KOMUNIST denouncing a
9 July Belgrade TV program and the 10 July issues of POLITIKA,
VJESNIK, and VECERNJE NOVOSTI for "impermissibly" altering the
"official" TANJUG report of an LCY Presidium meeting on the 9th.
The official report had said with regard to the LCY delegation's
activity at the 1-5 July Berlin meeting that the Presidium
"approved its work and confirmed its stands and views, especially"
on the aims of the conference and the content of the final
document. The alteration, which deleted the phrase "approved itF.
work" in available reports in POLITIKA and VJESNIK, was said by
KOMUNIST to reflect an irresponsible attitude by some papers'
editors "that it is their right to edit and alter even official
statements in their own way."
ROMANIAN BID FOR NONALINED STATUS: President Ceausescu publicly
acknowledged on 13 July current Romanian efforts to obtain
"observer" status at conferences of the nonalined countries, such
as the nonalined foreign ministers' scheduled August meeting in
Lima, Peru, and next year's summit conference in Colombo, Sri
Lanka. Ceausescu's statement, carried by AGERPRES on the 14th,
was in response to a question at a press conference during a visit
by Austrian Chancellor Kreisky. Acknowledging that Bucharest "has
indeed shown interest" in participating in nonalined conferences,
Ceausescu emphasized that Romania was asking only for observer
status, rather than full membership, because of its position as a
member of the Warsaw Pact. Although he indicated Romanian partici-
pation in nonalined activities should take a limited form "until"
the dissolution of the two military alliances, Ceausescu also
seemed to leave open the option of seeking full membership in
noting that "in the meantime the international situation will
witness further changes and we shall judge accordingly how we
should act in relation to these changes." Nonalined charter member
Yugoslavia has thus far withheld comment on the question of granting
its neighbor observer status. On the other hand, Tito has publicly
endorsed the March decision of the nonalined countries' coordinating
bureau to grant full membership to North Korea.
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DPRK ON NORTH-SOUTH CONTACTS: A 14 July KCNA report on the contents
of a "telephone letter" to the South Korean vice chairman of the
North-South Coordination Commission (PNSCC) from the North's vice
chairman, Cho Myong-il, appears to suggest that terms for resuming
contacts between the NSCC vice chairmen are less demanding than
the stiff preconditions for a formal dialog stated in a 3 July
statement by the North's NSCC co-chairman, Kim Yong-chu. Cho said
in his message that "we will meet with the Seoul side at an early
date" if Seoul gave "assurances" that it would alter its
"perfidious attitude," stop the "'anticommunist' and 'vanquish
communism unification' rows and frantic war provocation maneuvers,"
renounce the "two-Korea's plot," and "honestly implement" the
4 July North-South joint statement. Cho omitted demands, made by
Kim in his 3 July statement on the third anniversary of the
4 July 1972 North-South joint statement, that Seoul demand the
immediate withdrawal of U.S. troops and that it withdraw measures
for "fascist repression" in the ROK as preconditions to reopening
the North-South dialog. Contacts between the NSCC vice chairmen
have been suspended since the North postponed the 11th meeting,
originally scheduled for 30 May. The last plenary meeting of the
NSCC, the third, was held in Seoul in June 1973.
CHINESE EDUCATION: Judging by recent provincial broadcasts
reporting on local enrollment work to select students for higher
education, the dictum that students should return to their
original production units to engage in labor after graduation
has been modified to permit fuller utilization of skills learned
in the classroom. The new guidelines on job allocation for
college graduates were reflected in a detailed 11 July Changsha
radio report noting that all graduates of agricultural colleges in
Hunan would return to their local communes after graduation, but
that Hunan's colleges of medicine, education and forestry would
practice "in part" the principle of "'coming from and going back
to the communes."' All other colleges in Hunan would just carry
out experimental work in sending graduates back to their communes
according to the "different needs of the rural areas." Anhwei
radio on 12 July reported that local medical students would
"partially practice the system of 'from communes, back to communes"'
and it announced that liberal arts and science departments of the
Hofei Industrial University would simply "test the system" at
selected units. A more flexible system of job allocation for
college graduates is in keeping with recent efforts to improve
the quality of Chinese education, as it would tend to encourage
qualified students to undertake training in technically demanding
but heretofore unrewarding fields, thus speeding the training of
vast numbers of "experts," particularly those in scientific fields,
which China will need to realize its goal of joining the front ranks
of the developed countries by the end of the century.
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