NORTH VIETNAMESE RELATIONS WITH THAILAND: EVOLUTION OF DRV POLICY SINCE THE PARIS PEACE AGREEMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000200150003-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 23, 2005
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: March 20, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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NOR TH VIE TNA MESE RELATIONS WITH THAILAND:
E VOL UTION OF DR V POLIC Y SINCE THE PARIS PEACE A GR EEMEN T
J1d
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20 MARCH 1975
No. 309
0
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FOREWORD
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In the wake of the Januar:- 1973 Paris peace accord,
North Vietnam has made clear its desire to develop
diplomatic and economic :acs throughout the world,
and Thailand has been a key target of Hanoi's efforts.
This report reviews Hanoi's policy toward Thailand
during the past two years as reflected in the media,
with focus on the period since May 1974, and most
particularly on the signs of controversy in Hanoi
and shifts in policy since November 1974.
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CONTENTS
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
i
I.
DRV Comment on Thailand, January 1973-October 1974
Revival of Criticism of Bangkok After Two-Month Hiatus . . .
1
May 1974 Response to Thai Probes on Normalized Relations . .
1
Demand for Halt to Thai-U.S. "Collusion"
Call for Thai Release of Detained Vietnamese
Focus on Relations, New DRV-Thai-Contacts, Fall l974 ? . . .
3
II.
DRV Comment on Thailand, November 1974-March 1975
Foreign Minister Trinh's Proposal for DRV-Thai Tr;lks . . . .
4
Contradictory Accounts of Conditions for Talks
Reflections in Press of Contending Positions
Initial Reaction to Thai Foreign Minister's Letter . . . . .
7
Conciliatory Trinh Letter on Thai Election Eve . . . . . . .
8
Flexible Stand on Talks, Thai-Based U.S. Forces
Trinh Response on Thai Insurgency, Cambodia, and Laos
Suggestion of DO Interest in Regional Cooperation
Time-Marking Comment Since Thai Elections . . . . . . . .
11
Appendix:
DRV Diplomatic Relations as of March 1975
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NORTH VIETNAMESE RELATIONS WITH THAILAND:
EIOLUTID4 OF DRV POLICY SINCE THE PARIS PEACE AGRE9,W,
SUMMARY
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1. In the two years since the Vietnam peace accord, there have
been periodic indications in the media of e!'forts oh both sides
to improve North Vietnam.-Thai relations. Hanoi treated Bangkok's
Thanomr Kittikhachon military administration with notable
circumspection for a brief period after the January 1973 Paris
agreement. However, harsh criticism of the regime resumed in
April in connection with Bangkok's continued cooperation with
U.S. policy in Indochina, with attacks on Thanom assailing the
movement of U.S. military commands from South Vietnam to Thailand
and the U.S. bombing of Cambodia from bases in Thailand. The
overthrow of the Thanom government in October 1973 was welcomed
by the North Vietnamese, although they adopted a wait-and-see
attitude toward the new civilian caretaker administration under
Prime Minister Sanya Thammasak.
2. Some six months after the Sanya government assumed power in
Bangkok, a major article in the North Vietnamese party paper NHAN
DAN on 12 May 1974 reacted positively to statements by Thai
Government officials that they were seeking to normalize Thai-DRV
relations. The article for the first time enunciated North
Vietnamese conditions for normalization of relations with Thailand
and was notably conciliatory in calling for an end to Thai-U.S.
"collusion" against Vietnam instead of reiterating the standard
demand for a withdrawal of U.S. forces from Thailand. NHAN DAN
also demanded that Bangkok release all the Vietnamese residents in
Thailand who had been "illegally detained." The Thai Government
in fact announced the release of some incarcerated Vietnamese aliens
in June and subsequent Hanoi comment did not cite the release of the
remainder as a precondition for normal relations.
3. Late in September 1974 a new channel of Thai-DRV communications
was opened when Hanoi for the first time granted a visa for a Thai
journalist to visit North Vietnam. However, Hanoi maintained public
silence on this new development until it took issue with Bangkok's
reporting of the journalist's interviews with DRV spokesmen. Thus,
Hanoi's first acknowledgment of the visit came on 18 October, when
it objected to Bangkok accounts of the journalist's reports that
North Vietnam wanted to establish cultural relations. VNA quoted
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an interview with a DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman who said that
it was unrealistic co talk about improving relations on the
governmental level because of Baagkok'o "hcstile policy'' toward
Indochina.
4. In early December Hanoi revealed that it had for the first
time proposed negotiations aimed at improving Thai-North Vietnamese
relations. However, there were stiff preconditions to the talks in
proposed in a letter dated 27 November from DRV Foreign Minister
Nguyen Duy Trinh to his Thai counterpart in the Sanya government.
The letter flatly demanded the withdrawal of U.S. military forces
prior to talks with Thailand, a stance which was considerably
less flexible than that in the May NHAN DAN article which had more
vaguely called for an end to U.S.-Thal "collasioa" against Vietnam
as a precondition for "normalization" of relations.
5. Seven weeks after the early December Hanoi release of its
November proposal, the DRV publicized another statement suggesting
the likelihood that Trinh had favcred a less intransigent position
on the preconditions for talks, but that dissension among DRV leaders
regarding rapprochement with Thialand had resulted in the foreign
minister's being overruled on the language of the November letter
sent in his name. Thus, on 21 January this year Hanoi belatedly
released Trinh's foreign policy report, which he had delijered to the
DRV National Assembly on 24 December, in which he quoted passages
from the November letter to the Thai foreign minister which were
strikingly different from the version of the letter as released by
Hanoi on 3 December: Trinh quoted the letter as saying that talks
could take place if U.S. forces in Thailand were "forbidden from
being used against neighboring countries," not that U.S. forces must
be withdrawn.
6. On 30 January, nine days after Trinh's National Assembly speech
was released, there was additional evidence that the pendulum has
swung further in a moderate direction: Hanoi released another Trinh
letter dated 25 January, in response to a 30 December letter from
his Thai counterpart; which spelled out a position even more flexible
than that outlined in Trinh's National Assembly report. Trinh did
not cite actions regarding the U.S. ~.:roops as necessary preconditions
for Thai-DRV negotiations, but rather included Br.ngkok's "prevention"
of these force,; being used against Indochina in a list of principles
for relations.
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7. The Trinh letter indirectly responded to the Thai Foreign
Minister's expression of concern about Vietnamese support for
subversion and insurrection in Thailand, endorsing the principle
of noninterference in each other's internal affairs. The
letter seemed calculated to give the impression that Hanoi was
open to broader regional cooperation, endorsing--as Trinh had
in his National Assembly report--the concept of a Southeast
Asian "zone of peace" which has been promoted by members of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), including
Thailand.
8. The 25 January Trinh letter was dated only the day before the
Thai elections and seemed calculated to place Hanoi's most
flexible position on the record when. Bangkok was forming a new
government. Since the election low-level Hanoi comment has
continued to press Bangkok on the issue of U.S. military forces
in Thailand. However, it appears that Hanoi will await concrete
moves by the new Thai Government regarding the presence of the
forces and their relationship to the Indochina conflict before
releasing an autaorita.tive North Vietnamese appraisal of the
government's policies and DRV-Thai relations.
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NORTH VIETNAMESE RELATIONS WITH THAILAND:
EVOLUTION OF DRV POLICY SINCE THE PARIS PEACE AGREEMENT
1. DRV COMMENT ON THAILAND, JANUARY 1973-OCTOBER 1974
REVIVAL OF CRITICISM OF BANGKOK AFTER TWO-MONTH HIATUS
Since the January 1973 Paris peace agreement, there have been
repeated shifts in the treatment of Thailand in Hanoi media.
Immediately following the Paris agreement a hiatus in the propa-
ganda invective aimed at the Thai Government appeared to reflect
Hanoi's willingness to moderate its traditionally hostile attitude
toward the Thanom Kittikhachon military regime. Thus, where Hanoi
media before the Vietnam peace agreement assailed Thanom personally
as a "vile U.S. lackey," for a few weeks following the signing of
the Vietnam accord--when Hanoi was still assessing postwar U.S.
intentions--the media instead used such neutral terms as
"Kittikhachon, Thailand's leader" and "Thai authorities" in refer-
ring to the Bangkok government.
Harsher Hanoi. criticism of Bangkok reemerged only when Thailand's
major role in the U.S. commitment in Southeast Asia was made clear
by such developments as the transfer of U.S. military command head-
quarters from South Vietnam to Thailand and the continuing bombing
of Cambodia by Thai-based U.S. planes. By April 1973 Hanoi comment
resumed diatribes against the "reactionary Thai ruling clique" arid
again attacked the Bangkok leaders by name. Hanoi media applauded
the overthrow of the Thanom government in October 1973, but the
North Vietnamese appeared to adopt a wait-and-see attitude toward
the new civilian caretaker administration under Prime Minister
Sanya Thammasak.
MAY 1974 RESPONSE TO THAI PROBES ON NORMALIZED RELATIONS
Hanoi's attitude toward the Sanya government was spelled out in a
12 May 1974 article in the party paper NHAN DAN which referred to
unspecified statements by members of the Sanya administration that
they were seeking to normalize relations with the DRV but that
their efforts had not received a response. The article, attributed
to "Observer," criticized Sanya's government for failing to match
its actions to its professions of goodwill, but it affirmed the
Vietnamese people's desire for friendly relations with Thailand,
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for the first time offering Hanoi's conditions for improving
relations. Significantly, the Observer article stopped short of
Hanoi's usual demand for the total withdrawal of U.S. military
forces from Thailand. Instead it asserted that Bangkok must
"stop its collusion" with Washington against the Vietnamese,
cease its alleged slanders against Hanoi's intentions toward
Thailand, and release Vietnamese residents in Thailand who have
been "illegally detained."
DEMAND FOR HALT TO With its demand for an end to Thai
THAI-U.S. "COLLUSION" cooperation with the United States
against Vietnam, Observer seemed to
signal that Hanoi was willing to improve its relations with
Bangkok even while U.S. military forces were in Thailand, as long
as those forces were restricted from being used in Vietnam. Later
authoritative North Vietnamese statements did reiterate Hanoi's
call for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Thailand; but, like
the Observer article, they focused on Bangkok's obligation to see
that its territory was not used for actions against Indochina.
Thus, for example, an 18 May 1974 DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's
statement on the withdrawal of another increment of U.S. military
personnel and aircraft asserted that: "The United States must
immediately and completely withdraw its military forces from, and
dismantle all its military bases in, Thailand." But regarding
Bangkok's role, it said cnly that it "must not put the Thai
territory at the disposal of U.S. imperialists in their aggression
and intervention against Laos and the countries of Indochina."*
CALL FOR THAI RELEASE Observer's demand for the release of
OF DETAINED VIETNAMESE Vietnamese residents receded as a major
issue in subsequent months. Hanoi may
have been sufficiently satisfied by the June 1974 Thai Government
announceuu,at of the release of 107 incarcerated Vietnamese aliens,
although the move was criticized in a 27 June DRV Foreign Ministry
spokesman's statement which demanded the release of other Vietnamese
still being detained and an end to "repression" of Vietnamese
residents in Thailand. The question of the Vietnamese in Thailand
was not pressed in later authoritative DRV statements on the ques-
tion of relations between the two countries.
* Hanoi had not issued official statements in response to earlier
phases of the withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Thailand. The
initial U.S.-Thai agreement in August 1973 to pull out 3,550 of the
approximately 45,000 military personnel and the subsequent March
1974 agreement on withdrawals for that year both prompted only NHAN
DAN commentaries stressing the need for a total U.S. withdrawal.
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FOCUS ON RELATIONS, NEW DRV-THAI CONTACTS, FALL 1974
The issue of North Vietnam's relations with Thailand came to the
fore again in late summer 1974. A 7 September DRV Foreign
Ministry spokesman's statement on the issue of the Thai-based
U.S. military forces reiterated the demand for a U.S. withdrawal
but, like the 12 May Observer article, did not link it to the
improvement of relations. Thus, the spokesman's statement
supported the "Thai people's struggle" for a U.S. military
withdrawal, but specifically called upon Bangkok only to "stop
joining the United States iii aggression against neighboring
countries" as a "basic condition for the establishment of
friendly relations among the countries in this region."
Evidence of DRV interest in establishing contacts with Thailand
emerged in late September, when Hanoi for the first time granted
a visa to a Thai journalist. While it seems likely that Hanoi
was seeking a new means to influence Bangkok to move toward
rapprochement, DRV media took limited note of the visit, comment-
ing only in reaction to Thai press reports of conciliatory state-
ments purportedly made by DRV spokesmen to the journalist. The
Hanoi comment reaffirmed North Vietnam's desire to improve rela-
tions with Bangkok but also reiterated the view that Bangkok's
cooperation with U.S. involvement in Indochina was a continuing
obstacle.
An 18 October VNA interview with a DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman
took issue with reports in Thai media tIat the visiting journalist
had been told by a DRV official that Hanoi wished to open cultural
relations. The spokesman maintained that it was "unrealistic" to
talk about improving relations on a government level because of
Bangkok's "hostile" policy toward Indochina, citing in this regard
the U.S. military forces in Thailand and past involvement of Thai
"mercenaries" in the Indochina conflict. At the same time, the
spokesman maintained a forthcoming pose, affirming that the DRV was
interested in developing contacts with the Thai "people."
A 30 October NHAN DAN commentary similarly r'sponded to Western
press accounts of the journalist's interview with NHAN DAI4's chief
editor Hoang Tung in which he positively appraised the possibility
of improved DRV-Thai relations and suggested Southeast Asian
disputes over underseas resources be discussed at a regional
meeting. The paper restated Hanoi's desire for better bilateral
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relations but cited Bangkok's policies, particularly the U.S.
military presence, as the impediment to rapprochement. It
descr:fted the Thai and other Western reports of the interview
as "doctored," but specifically corrected them only by quoting
from Hoang Tung's remarks a passage indicating that negotiations
on the problems of the region should come after the withdrawal
of "imperialists" from the area.
III DRV COMMENT ON THAILAND, NOVEMBER 1974-ARCH 1975
FOREIGN MINISTER TRINH'S PROPOSAL FOR DRV-THAI TALKS
Last December Hanoi publicized the first official North Vietnamese
initiative aimed at normalizing relations with Bangkok. On
3 December Hanoi media released a letter, signed by North
Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh, to Thai Foreign
Minister Charunphan Itsarangkun, which for the first time proposed
negotiations on the problem of improving bilateral relations.
Despite the positive suggestion of talks, the letter took a hard
line on the issue of the U.S. military forces in Thailand, demand-
ing their withdrawal before negotiations could take place. This
condition represented a considerably less flexible posture than
tha Hanoi had introduced in the 12 May NHAN DAN Observer article
which merely cited an end to U.S. Thai "collusion" against Vietnam
as a necessary precondition to improving DRV-Thai relations.
CONTRADICTORY ACCOUNTS Developments following the 3 December
OF CONDITIONS FOR TALKS release of the Trinh letter, which
had been dated 27 November, suggested
there were sharp differences of opinion in Hanoi on how forth-
coming North Vietnam should be in its overtures to Thailand. The
most dramatic evidence did not come to light until seven weeks
later, on 21 January, when Hanoi media released the text of the
foreign policy report which Foreign Minister Trinh had delivered
to North Vietnam's National Assembly on 24 December. As would be
expected, in the course of reviewing recent Hanoi policy, Trinh
referred to the 27 November letter to his Thai counterpart. But
what was totally unexpected was that Trinh, while purportedly
quoting from his November letter, in fact drastically modified its
conditions for negotiations, linking bilateral talks only to
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the limitation of the action of U.S. forces against Thailand's
neighbors. The two contradictory versions, as carried in both
cases by VNA as well as NHAN DAN are as follows:
T&inh #e ,te't o' ?.7 NovembeJL: 24 Deeembe t Tki,nh nepoAt:
If your government truly follows The letter sent on 27 Novemt.=
a policy of peace and friendship 1974 by the DRV minister for
and gives up its policy of collu- foreign affairs to the Thai
sion with the United States, puts foreign minister stated: "If
a complete and definitive end to Thailand stops allowing the
the presence of U.S. troops and United States to use its
U.S. military bases in Thailand, military bases on Thai terri-
and really respects the funda- tory to threaten and encroach
mental national rights of the upon the sovereignty of neigh-
peoples of Vietnam and the other boring countries, the DRV
Indochinese countries, . . . then Government is prepared to enter
the Government of the DRV is into negotiations with the Thai
prepared to enter immediately Government on the normalization
into negotiations with the Thai of relations between the two
Government on the normalization countries . . . ."
of relations between the two
countries . .
The version quoted by Trinh in his report to the National Assembly
was compatible with the position outlined in the NHAN DAN article
on 12 May 1974. And a little more than a week after Hanoi had
released Trinh's foreign policy report containing this version,
Hanoi on 30 January released another Trinh letter, dated 25 January,
outlining an even more conciliatory proposal to the Thai foreign
minister.
It seems likely that the formulation in Trinh's National Assembly
report represents the position which he had wanted to take and
that other hands intervened in the language of the 27 November
letter. Trinl-i was not even in North Vietnam on that date and may
have been out of the country for almost a month prier to the
dispatch of the letter. East German media on 27 November revealed
that Trinh was in the GDR for a "health cure" and had met with
East German officials on the 26th; Hanoi media first noted his
visit to East Germany on 2 December and made no reference to his
health.* It seems likely that Trinh in fact left Hanoi some time
* It is not known when Trinh left the GDR, but the media reported
he was in Moscow from 4 through 8 December, concluding an aid agree-
ment, and that he returned to Hanoi on the 9th--six days after the
publication of the 2; November letter.
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before 2 November when he failed to appear at a banquet for a
Cambodian Front delegation which he had been hosting since its
arrival or? 28 October.
REFLECTIONS IN PRESS The comment on Thailand in Hanoi
OF CONTENDING POSITIONS media immediately after the release
of the 27 November letter also
appeared to reflect contending policy positions, with the army
paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN taking a particularly hostile position
toward Thailand. On 4 December QUAN DOI NHAN DAN published,
along with the text of Trinli's letter, a commentary deprecating
Thai Government claims that it had attempted to contact Hanoi
and was ready for talks. The army paper warned: "One cannot
believe in the goodwill of the Thai Government because of a few
statements, but must primarily examine its practical actions."
The 4 December commentary in the army paper took the position
that the "presence of the U.S. troops and the existence of the
U.S. military bases in Thailand" are "the sole obstacle to the
normalization of relations between the two peoples of Vietnam
and Thailand." Thus, unlike the Trinh letter, it only raised
the possibility of improved relations with the Thai "people,"
rather than the government. And, although its linkage of
normalization with withdrawal was consistent with the letter's
listing of withdrawal as a condition for talks, it did not
accord with the parallel passage in the letter which reflected
Trinh's basic moderation. Trinh had stated that "the only
obstacle to the normalization of relations" between the two
governments is Bangkok's "pursuance of a policy aimed at
furthering U.S. imperialist designs of aggression and inter-
vention in Indochina."
The formulation on normalization of relations in the Trinh letter,
as released on 3 December, was faithfully repeated in the party
paper NHAN DAN in a 5 December article attributed to "Commentator."
In contrast to the QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary, the article only
criticized "circles" in the Thai Government for their claims of
initiatives toward Hanoi, and it positively endorsed the views of
"a number of politicians such as former Foreign Minister Thanat
Khoman" who favored a U.S. withdrawal.
The appearance of the Commentator article seemed to signal that
some Hanoi circles viewed relations with Thailand as a major
foreign policy issue, since such articles in the past have
generally been limited to commenting on Eich key questions as
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peace negotiations and important shifts in U.S. policy. This
point was underlined in January whe\. two more Commentator
articles were published on the issue of Thailand--an unusual
concentration. Prior to the 5 December article, the Commentator
byline had appeared only four times since the January 1973
Paris agreement.* Before the conclusion of the peace agreement,
Commentator articles had appeared quite regularly, often several
times a month, and it is possible that their eclipse in the
post-agreement period was the result of the dici:inished position
of some faction in the DRV leadership.
INITIAL REACTION TO THAI FOREIGN MINISTER'S LETTER
Thai Foreign Minister Charunphan responded to the 27 November
Trinh letter on 30 December, with a letter affirming Thai will-
iI'3neca to meet and discuss differences but ignoring the issue
of U.S. military forces in Thailand. He countered with clear
criticism of Hanoi's policy, saying that outside support for
insurgents and subversives in Thailand and interference by foreign
troops in Laos and Cambodia remained obstacles to improving
relations.
North Vietnam first acknowledged Foreign Minister Charunphan's
letter in a 6 January DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's interview
with a VNA correspondent. Hanoi media noted that the interview
was an "initial" comment on the letter and that it was still
"being considered." Like the 4 December QUAN DOI NHAN DAN coatmen-
tary, the spokesman's formulation on the possibility of normaliza-
tion of relations focused on the U.S. military forces as the "sole
obstacle," but he indicated that a U.S. withdrawal would clear the
way for normal relations between the two "governments," rather
than "peoples."
The assertion that the letter was "being studied and will be
answered," was also made in an unusual "urgent message" from
Foreign Minister Trinh to Charunphan on 11 January. The message,
which protested the alleged U.S. use of Thai bases to assist the
South Vietnamese Government in responding to stepped up communist
* The first two post-agreement Commentator articles--on 7 April
and 8 December 1973--dealt with U.S. policies and came shortly
before the resumption of consultations between Secretary Kissinger
and Le Duc Tho. Two other Commentator articles in June 1974
discussed statements by Secretary Kissinger and Ambassador Martin.
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attacks, seemed aimed at reassuring Bangkok of North Vietnam's
commitment to the dialog on relations, even in the face of the
escalating military situation.
CONCILIATORY TRINH LETTER ON THAI ELECTION EVE
On 30 January Hanoi media released a Trinh letter, dated 25 January,
officially responding to Charunphan's 30 December letter. Its
content was even more moderate than the version of the November
letter which Trinh quoted in his National Assembly speech. Not
only did the January letter show flexibility on the question of
U.S. forces, but it responded to Bangkok concerns about North
Vietnamese support for the Thai insurgency. Dated the day before
the 26 January Thai elections, the letter seemed calculated to
highlight Hanoi's reasonableness during a period when Thai leaders
would be forming a new government.
FLEXIBLE STAND ON TALKS, The 25 January Trinh letter for the
THAI-BASED U.S. FORCES first time stopped short of directly
linking the issue of the U.S. military
forces in Thailand to bilateral DRV-Thai negotiations; instead,
it merely indicated that the DRV would discuss normalizing relations
if Bangkok took unspecified "practical actions" to demonstrate
that it desired "friendly ...nd good-neighborly relations." The
imprecision of Trinh's new conditions seemed aimed at encouraging
Bangkok to make an effort to accommodate North Vietnamese interests.
The letter seemed to demonstrate Trinh's commitment to a policy of
requiring the restriction of the U.S. military forces from activities
in Indochina, rather than their withdrawal. Throughout the letter
his demands concerning the U.S. forces only stipulated that they
not be used against Vietnam and other Indochinese countries, and he
formalized this approach in a list of "principles" for the basis of
relations between the two countries. The second of Trixci's
principles merely places responsibility on Bangkok to insure that
the U.S. military forces are not a threat to Indochina. It read:
Not to allow any foreign country to use one's
territory as a base for direct or indirect
aggression and intervention against the other
and against other countries in the region.
The Thai side must not allow the United States
to use Thai territory against the peoples of
Vietnam and the other Indochinese countries.
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Th-i demand that The United States remove its military forces from
Thailand was raised authoritatively two days after-the release of
the Trinh letter, in a 1 February NI:AN DAN Commentator article.
But the article did not stipulate that the presence of the forces
would rule out normalization of relations. It also quoted Trinh's
principles calling for Bangkok to restrain the use of the forces
against Indochina and to establish better relations with the DRV.
TRINH RESPONSE ON THAI The first of the 25 January
INSURGENCY, CAMBODIA AND LAOS letter's three principles responded
to Thai complaints voiced in
Foreign Minister ('.Larunphan's 30 December letter, about "direct
or indirect" support for insurgent and subversive activites in
Thailand. The principle called for:
Respect for the fundamental national rights and the
right to self-determination of each people. Non-
aggression and noninterference in each others'
internal affairs. Nonparticipation--either directly
or indirectly--in any act that may harm each others'
independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial
integrity.
Previous Bangkok protests about DRV interference in Thailand had
prompted Hanoi charges that Bangkok was engaging in slander and
attempting to justify policies of repression. While the 12 May
1974 NHAN DAN Observer article-had affirmed Vietnamese commitment
to noninterference in other countries' internal affairs, it also
demanded the cessation of "all slanders against the DRV."
Trinh's third, and final, principle merely endorsed the "establish-
ment of friendly and good-neighborly relations between the two
countries," and "economic and cultural exchanges on the basis of
equality and mutual benefit." Trinh did not respond to another
main point raised in the 30 December letter from Foreign Minister
Charunphan. In addition to complaining about outside support for
Thai insurgents and subversives, Charunphan's letter had cited the
problem of the continued presence of "foreign"--i.e. North
Vietnamese--troops in Laos and-Cambodia. The 25 January Trinh
letter alluded to the issue by stating that the Thai foreign
minister's remarks on the struggle in Laos and Cambodia were not
in conformity to "the facts of-history." Trinh also reiterated
North Vietnam's intention to support the Lao people and government
in the implementation of the Vientiane agreement and the "Cambodian
people's struggle against U.S. aggression."
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SUGGESTION OF DRV INTEREST Trinh's 25 January letter also gave
IN REGIONAL COOPERATION some evidence that Hanoi was study-
ing the broader question of its
relations with the entire region of Southeast Asia. He seemed to
adapt his remarks to the sensitivities of the members of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), including,
Thailand, when he held that a DRV-Thai rapprochement would be
beneficial to the cause of peace and friendship in Southeast Asia,
and would "contribute to the creation of a zone of peace composed
of independent states in this region." The concept of the establish-
ment of a "zone of peace" in Southeast Asia is most closely identified
with ASEAN and Trinh's reference to it seems calculated. The foreign
minister had made a similar reference to the zone of peace concept
in his 24 December National Assembly report, but he had not earlier
used the formulation, for example, in a detailed article on North
Vietnamese foreign poli;.y in the January 1974 issue of the party
journal HOC TAP.
Infrequent direct Hanoi media comment on ASEAN has been consistently
critical, despite efforts by the organization to encourage better
relations with North Vietnam. Thus, for example, an invitation
from ASEAN for the DRV to send observers to its 7-9 May 1974
ministerial meeting in Jakarta was turned down by a DRV Foreign
Ministry official who, according to VNA, cited the participation of
some ASEAN nations in the Vietnam war, the presence of U.S. military
forces in Thailand and the Philippines, and the failure of the members
to recognize the PRG and Sihanouk's government.*
While NHAN DAN editor Hoang Tung's remarks in October 1974 to the
visiting Thai journalist favoring regional cooperation may have
signaled a more positive Hanoi attitude, they were not publicized
by DRV media. Judging by accounts of the editor's statements
published in the Thai pape: THE NATION on 23 and 24 October, he had
not only talked at some lelgth about the possibility of a regional
meeting on undersea reso: ces, but had also strongly endorsed coopera-
tion in general. Thus, Hoang Tung had reportedly stated:
The situation in Southeast Asia is changing. The
inclination to independence and neutrality of the
Southeast Asian countries is inevitable and inarrest-
able. Now there is a very good chance for our peoples
and for our nations to gain independence and establish
good relations with each other.
* North Vietnam does have diplomatic relations with two ASEAN
members--Indonesia and Malaysia. A list of nations maintaining
diplomatic relations with the DRV is attached as an appendix of this
report.
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TIME-MARKING COMMENT SINCE 1HAI ELECTIONS
Since the 26 January Thai elections Hanoi media have carried
low-level reports on political developments in Thailand, including
the failure of Prime Minister Sens Pramot to gain a vote of
confidence from the Thai National Assembly-and the subsequent
formation of the new government by Prime Minister Khukrit Pramot.
To date Hanoi has issued no authoritative comment on recent Thai
proposals to speed up the withdrawal of U.S. military forces
from Thailand--Seni's call for withdrawal in 18 months and
Khukrit's 19 March official statement endorsing a one-year dead-
line for withdrawal.
Some low-level Hanoi reports have criticized suggestions by Thai
officials that the forces could remain in Thailand for an
indefinite period or that their withdrawal should be dependent
on conditions in Southeast Asia. Prior to Khukrit's 19 March
statement, a Hanoi radio report on the 14th cited him as calling
for the immediate withdrawal of U.S. forces, to be complet.d "in
three or six months or one year." The radio said his statement
was "vague" and did not meet the "Thai people's urgent demand that
the United States immediately and unconditionally withdraw all
U.S. troops and dismantle all U.S. bases in Thailand."
While continuing to press the Thai Government-on the U.S. forces
issue in low-level comment, it appears that Hanoi will await more
concrete moves by Bangkok regarding the presence of the U.S.
forces and their relationship to the Indochina conflict before
releasing an authoritative appraisal of the new government in
Bangkok and DRV-Thai relations.
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APPENDIX
DRV DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AS OF MARCH 1975
Country
Date of Credentials
Country
Date of Credentials
Accredited to:
for Current Ambass.
Accredited to:
for Current Ambass.
Afghanistan
Albania
07/22/71
Korea, North
Laos
Algeria
Argentina
Australia
Libya
Luxembourg
Malagasy
06/21/74
Austria
11/21/73
Malaysia
Bangladesh
Belgium
Bulgaria
08/03/71
Mali Republic
Malta
Mauritania
Burma-
Mongolia
09/28/74
Burundi
Netherlands
01/11/75
Cambodia (RGNU)
Cameroon
11/19/73
New Zealand
Niger
03/11/75
Canada
Norway
11/22/73
Chile*
05/14/73
Pakistan
China (PRC)
Poland
09/20/74
Congo (Brazz.)
Romania
08/21/74
Cuba
02/22/74
Senegal
11/24/72
Czechoslovakia
Denmark
Singapore
Somalia
09/21/73
Egypt
12/01/73
Sri Lanka
05/25/74
Finland
France
10/11/74
Sudan
Sweden
11/27/74
Gambia
10/31/73
Switzerland
Germany, East
09/26/74
Syria
02/16/71
Ghana
Tanzania
03/09/73
Guinea
Hungary
Iceland
Togo
Tunisia
USSR
08/15/74
Ind ia+-
11/26/72
U.K.
Indonesia
09/15/73
Upper Volta
Iran
Iraq
05/15/71
Yemen (Arab Rep)
Yemen (PDRY)
Italy
Japan
Yugoslavia
Zambia
12/20/73
-4- Burma and India missions of the DRV are maintained at the Consulate
General level; all others are Embassy-level.
* DRV.broke diplomatic ties with Chile on 25 September 1973.
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