EASTERN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000200110032-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 71
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 22, 1999
• Sequence Number: 32
• Publication Date: September 12, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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FBIS
STATSPEC
FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
Confidential
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FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
Foreign Press Digest --~ 0033/75 -- 12 September 19%5
Translations from MILITAERWESEN (,43)
Army General Hoffmann Comments on Post-WW II Developments
1
Intensification of Cooperation in Warsaw Pact Praised
7
NATO Seen as Da~iger to World Peace
1~
Closer Cooperation with Soviet Farces Urged
29
NVA Officer Interviewed on Results of NVA-GSFG Cooperation
35
Details Prol~ided on Testing of Unit Proficiency
40
Connect.Lons Between Nuclear Strike, Fire, Thrust, Movement
Examined
49
Information Provided on Maintenance of Antiaircraft Rocket
Systems
55
Basic Training of Officer Candidates Outlined
62
CC*:;i IDENTIAL
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ARMY GENERAL HOFFMANN COMMENTS ON POST.-WWII DEVELOPMENTS
East )3erlin MILITAERWESEN in German Apr 75 pp 5-16
[Editorial by Arniy General H. Hoffmann, member of the SED Central
Committee and Minister for National Defense]
/Excerpt/ Cerman imperialism has ::wise involved our people in wars with
the Socialist Soviet Union. In ~ioing this it contributed during the first
attempted destruction of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1918
to its own defeat and to the outbreak of the November Revolution, and during
the second attempted destruction of socialism in 1941 to laying the basis
for its own defeat.
The great lesson to be learned from this is that friendship with the Soviet
Union is the life-giving element and guaranty of security for a free and
democratic Germany. In the wurds of Ernst Thaelmann, the relations}iip with
the Soviet Union is becoming for us the touchstone of proletarian inter-
nationalism, the key question for all turnabouts in the consciousness of
the people of our republic, and a guideline fo'. the conduct of our S?uung
generation.
This is manifested with particular clarity in the ranks of the armed
forces of our worker-peasant power. If it is a matter of record for us
today that the spirit of socialist comradeship-in??arms has become for all
regimental units of our National People's Army and of the Border Troops
an integral part of daily milit-.ry life that can no longer be left out of
consideration, then this is of incalculable value for the moral force and
military strength of our regimental and battalion units. Whoever. personally
experienced in recent weeks how our young soldiers, who of course only
know fascism and the postwar years from films, books and lectures, how
they empathized with the legendary heroism of the Soviet Army in the Great
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Patriutic~ War, haw they demonstrated by their attitude uncl behavior as
yourrL; revolutionaries today their hi};h respect and deep affection for the
SuvLet f.ri.ends, such an observer per.celved one thing very clearly: the. men
we have in our armed forces ar.e frl.ends of the Soviet iluton with their
whole heart and sou 'they are determined to fo:l.low the exampl.c set by
their Soviet comrades-in-arms who ar.e ~usC as co-mnitted to the defense ot-
the GDR as they are to the defense uE their Soviet homeland. These men
who are equipped with outstanding political maturity, w:Ith solid profes-
sional knowledge and skills, with high readiness for action and a growing
performance capacity--these men were nut born with these characteristics,
They alb were first educated and trained In our social:Lst society and in
the socialist armed forces to become upright fighter personalities--and
this was done by the party of the working class, its officials and members,
by the many unnamed communi:.ts at the workbench, in the school and within
the state apparatus.
It is the honora~le achievement of the SED and its Central Committee that
in the armed forces the concern of the commanding officers f.or ideological
work with the members of the army is at the center of all leadership and
training from the very b~~gln.ning. And it is a specially honorable achieve-
ment of our party and its central committee that class brotlrership and com-
radeship-in-arms with the Soviet 'Jnion and its glorious army leas always
Y~emained at the center of our overall political and military activity,
that it has become the pulsebeat of our life, an inexhaustible source of
strength for the potential and steadfastness of our defense and security
organs.
Development has taken a t~~rndamentally different path in the FRG, despite
the struggle, so rich in sacrifices, by communists and antifascists. If
there art forces there, evert in the ranks of the bourgeoisie, who Ire in
favor of setting up peaceful and good-neig}cborly relations with the Soviet
Union, who derive benefits From the process of international detente and
do not want to go back into the trenches of the cold-war, there are, how-
ever, in this imperialist state so many revanchist positions which have
been built up, and so many new anti-Soviet and antisocialist rules and
regulations and modes of behavior which are being continuously developed,
that political realism and a policy oriented toward the future can only
make a place for themselves with painful slowness. Precisely nowadays in
the FRG they are once again having a difficult time digesting, the results
of the Second World rN~ar. Many a Bonn politician sometimes can, then
again simply cannot get it through his head that the German imperialists
not only gambled away the old German empire, they also forfeited their
right to lead the German people, that their power now only extends as far
as the Elbe and the Werra, ar.d that all attempts to exercise a kind of
guardianship over the citiz~.ns of the GDR is tilting at windmills.
And so a Franz Joseph Strauss traveled as far as the Great Wall of China
at the beginning of 1975 to procl:.:im and to have confirmed that
2
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reun.fication llke a lnw of nature will yet prevai'1 and the NA'I'0 sphe_e
of influence will. extend Far into the Cast. Stra~.iss was received with
high honors, even by Mao Tse Tung personally, for, as n West German evalu-
ation has it, he had "everything to offer, which Chinese dream of when
they think of a useful German: sturdy anti-Moscowism."1
There was once a time when the CDUiCSU wanted "with the help of NATO to
force the Soviet Union to give up the GDR and concur in a reunification
WeQtern style," wrote an FRG journalist. But tl~e days of Dulles-Adenauer
,are gone. "If any one whosoever has in mind to revive once again thn.t
nearly mortal. hostt.:'pity against Moscow, then Germany and Europe will pay
the bill for such madness. It is impossible to repeat in 1976 whal? already
failed completely in 1960."
And as regards the speculative notion that concessions to West German re-
vanchism can be attained by t{ie exercise of Far Eastern pressure upon the
Soviet Union, the same aut~.~or concludes quite correctly: "And then there
is the major mistake in the calculations of the friends of. Chiba: that is
the assumption that the Soviets are afraid of the Chinese."2
German imperialists may feel that they are strong enough as the second
greatest power in the imperialist system to exercise pressures on other
imperialist states. They graciously accept the flattery of the US Secre-
tary of Defense when he speaks of the "hub of the alliance" caithout which
the NATO war wagons would not role. In fact, Defense Minister Leber of
the FRG, in partnership with Mr Schlesinger during the recent NATO con-
ferences, contributed decisively to the development whereby the other NATO
partners promised increased armaments efforts and proclaimed, under the
united pressure of Washington and Bonn,?their resolve to strengthen the
Atlantic Alliance.
The Bonn politicians and military men, `~owever, overestimate their might
and their influence on the other regio~is of this world, and in particular
their influence on the countries which lie eastward of the borders of their
state, if they believe that they can prescribe, or what is even more,
dictate to the GDR and the other socialist states how they should react
to the new versions of the pretension to exclusive representation. Ttifien
many a leading politician of Bonn, like Foreign Minister Genscher of the
FRG, are of a mind nit to deviate even a i~t~llimeter from revanch7st positions,
then they are biting on stone as far as we are concE:rned, and then, under
the best of circumstances, all that they will gain with neutral states or
even many a NATO ally is gentle irony.
Notwithstanding this, clear indications not to believe in any fuodn
the b:csi:; of this accord. and to d~welop planned and nil.-round cooperation
on the has Is of soc ta1..Lst t.nternat Luua.l. t:;m. The magnitude of` the tasks,
their increasing complrxi.ty on the one hand, and on the oth.:r, file still
ext:.int, h.Lstor.icuily condLtioned differences i.n .level o.f development, as
we1L as other national anti geographical peculiarities, pose ever higher
demands on the act o~c of every individual fraternal party. l.t depends
above al.l on the ability of: the Marxist-heninist Prir.ty to carry out a
policy which is appropriate to the objective requirements for building
socialism and 1'.or. meeting the international situation, how great progress
in socialist development will be in each country Ind in our community, or,
how succc~ssfull.y n:_~tional and international interests aye brought into
accord,
Almost a1:1 fraternal p~rtLes, like our own party, are facing upcoming
congresses. 'Che congresses will draw the balance as to what successes
were achieved in bsi.lding the advanced socialist ?^ciety, and lay down
the tasks which next must follow. A further visible upswing in social
life can be seen in all countries of the socialist community. 'i'he USSR
hzs made a further important step forward in the creation of the material-
tect~nic:il I~as.ts of communism or_ the basis of the decisions of the 24th
CPSU Confress. With this its role as the principal force of socialism
has become even more conspicuous.
In the other member states of the War:;aw Pact the tasks of the advanced
socialist society are being accomplished successfully, or being taken in
hand. This means that a number of fraternal countries find themselves
in approximately the same stage of develop~~ent. Three or four years ago,
a new importune stage of development was introduced in our community with
the congresses of the fraternal parties. It was characterized by growing
j~~int arYiyi.tir--~.~ an inCr?~S!ng numt'F_'r of idnntir~l nr cirnils~r hagl;c~
which our parties, states and peoples have to accomplish.
1. It is :i matter here, first of all, of the principal task assibned, which
by i.ts very nature is the same in alt our fraternal countries. Beyond this,
it is :; matter of accomplishing such important tasks as:
--raising; the leading ro.1e of the working class and its Marxist-Leninist
party.'
--intensification of the economy and raising ita effectiveness;
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- -sol.ut on of the energy and r.aw m;iterir~l.s problems;
--fu.Lftll.ment o~ the socaa:Lpolitical. program, in which housing construct Mn
taker a partic~ilarly Lmportant place;
--the further perfection of socLali.st democracy.
2. All party congresses agree in according extraordinary lmpor.t.nce to
socialist economic integration. A11 fraternal parties are agreed that a
necessary and timely step is speeding up the fulfillment of the compre-
hensive program.
3. The peace program adopted at the 24th CPSU Congress became a joint
action program for all fraternal countries united in the Warsaw Pact. On
this basis it became possible, as mentioned 'More, to bring about impor-
tant changes in the international situation.
deepening Cooperation
The increasingly col:.ecrive nature in setting tasks and going about their
solut~.on is creating `.avorable preconditions fot? raising the eff ective-
ness of the exchange of experience. It is opening up new po~.ential for
intensifying cooperation, and it iG wideni.ng the basis for still closer
integration of our community of sccialist states ranged around their prin-
cipal power, the Soviet Union. At the same time it has also been estab-
lished that deepening cooperatio:: bet-~.eeen the fraternal socialist countries
in the various areas of activity is increas~~ngly proving to be a decisive
Factor in the progress being made by every single country in building up
socialism. The communique of the April 1974 session of the Political
Advisory Committee ici Warsaw reads: "The participants in the meeting
emphasized with satisfaction the further development of universal coopera-
tion among the fraternal states, which is speeding the growth of economic
potential, strengthening the defens?~ capability of the participating coun-
tries of the Warsaw '?act, and contributing to raising the level of living
of the peoples and also to the development of culture and science."6
On the hRRIR of tha fi_nnin~g ~f tha Pnlitiral Adyignry ('.nmmittna3 and algid
on those of the Crimea meeti:.ti of the First Secretaries of Secretaries-
Ceneral of our fraternal parties, it has ~~een possi'le, especially in the
years since the 24th CPSU Congress, to strengthen significantly relations
among the states of our community, and to develop these. Especially the
close cooperation among our fraternal parties became in ever stronger
measure a c:riving force in the relations among our states in all other
areas of activity.
Negotiations between party and government delegations, and also work meetings
of the first secretaries of our fraternal parties serve for the exchange- of
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[n!:ormatluu and c~xper.t_euce cchuut building up socialism in our countries,
Cor operritlunnl. coo r.c.lJ.n~-tL~~n of foreign policy acliv.tty, and f`or aJ,rcci.nl;
upon ju1.nC t_:c~3ks In tlu: development of r.eLat.Lons. Just in :1974 cll.one,
within Che ('rumewcrk of the Warsaw fact, the .1ea;dershap of the GDR party
rout state had otl.'lctu' mecti.ngs with ~- p;irty and government dc~legati.on
from thc~ [1SSR, which was lc~d by t-he secretary-general of thc~ CPSU Central
Conun.i.ttee, L. [. lirezhnc~v, and also wi.tli the aeadang persona] it ies of the
Pol.Ish ['ec;~lc~'s Republ..ic, the CSSR, and the Bulgarian 1'eop:le's Republic.
'Cho bi- an.. nuilt.Ll.ateral meetanl;s among tlic secretaries of tl;e central
c?nnunLttccs of our fraternal. parties ar.e also gaining in import~.ince.
Uur. in.t; these consu:Ltati.ons the main .li~e~ of cooperation in certain ~creas
are laic) down. Espeeial.y important for pol.i~ical-ideologic?.al and oc-
ganlz~.iCiona.l. cooperation of our parties and states were the meetings of
the central Comm ttec secretaries for ideology or for foreign policy of
December. 1973 and also of the secretaries for party work problems held in
,January 1974. The results of L-hese consultations created the. hasis for.
close cooperation and coordination in political.-ideological. education work
of the Fraternal parties and also in the ideological confrontations with
class opponents.
Precisely in the present stage of building up socialism and of internat~on al
development, in view of the reinforced influence of socia:Lism in the world
arena, and of the growing necessity Eor a confrontation with bourgeois
ideolot;y, joint ana:Lysis of new phenomena and developmental l:~rocesses,
the exchange of experience about forms, methods and content of ideological
work and also the operational coordination of concrete joint steps are in-
creasing in importance. There is developing according to plan and with
increasing eFf.ectiveness tLe exchange of delegations and the exchange of
experience ,among our Marxist-Leninist parties. The SED was i.ndeecl able to
study valuable experiences of the fraternal parties, especially those
of the CPSU, and make this useful. for the building of socialism in the
GDR. Simultaneously the Lraternal. parties studied and took advantage of
SED experiences.
Far advanced and clearly profiled are cooperation and joint approaches of
our. parties and states to matters of military and security policy. The
unified command is performing outstanding work for the defense of so-
cialist achievements. It is in charge of the training of the troop con-
tingents placed in its command.
Since the J~*~uary 1956 meeting of the Po L'tical Advisory Committee in
Prague, contingents of the NVA also belong '-o the united armed forces of
the Warsaw Pact. The unified command regularly carries out staff command
exercises and troop maneuvers on the territories of the allied states. In
the course of these the collaboration of the united armed forces with
national troop contingents and staffs is also testCU. The armed forces
of the allied states have been found to be at the required level of combat
readiness.
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The joint defense policy, joint weapons systems and military techniques
resul.tect in a significant strengthening of the defense potential. of the
Warsaw Pact states.
Economic cooperation among the Warsaw Pact states on tide basis of the C);MA
Comprehensive Program for socialist economic integration plays a special.
role in their interrelationships. The CEMA states, especially the Soviet
Union, possess a gigantic economic potential, which constitutes the basis
for dynamic growth of their. economy and the purposeful realization of the
comprehen~.ive program. That puts them in a position of being able to ac-
complish in jig time tl:p principal task set by the party congresses. And
this, to be sure, at a poin~ in time when imperialism in all areas of 1:!fe
is being shaken by an all-embracing crisis, when prices and c:ne:mployment
figures are rising and the standard of living of the working class is
sinking.
The results which the CEMA states have achieved since the adoption of the
comprehensive program in 1971 justify the rightness of the path chosen
and, at the same time, call for systematic acceleration of the tempo of
the integration process. Success was achieved in accomplishing important
economic tasks by joint work or at least tackling their solution, something
which proved useful to every country and to our community as a whole.
In this manner comprehensive projects for the better coverage of our raw
materials and energy requirements were and are still being accomplished.
Think, in this connection, of the gas and oil pipelines, atomic power
,plants, the energy network systems or of the joint new productive capaci-
ties for iron smelting, cellulose production and other things. Specializa-
tion and cooperation among the fraternal socialist states was further
deepened. However, reserves are still to be found here. Joint activity
on their part in science and research, project planning and production
was further developed to an essential degree. Al). this goes to make up a
pleasing bc.:lance statement of joint efforts, but still does not mean that
cooperation is going forward free of problems and without difficulties.
Just the variation in the level of development of the different economi,~s,
the complexity of the problems to be solved, differences in economic
structure, in raw materials and labor force reserves, can lead to certain
problems and conflicts, whir_h, however, will be overcome by the joint ef-
forts of the fraternal parties.
The Warsaw Pact states have achieved outstanding results both in building
socialism and communism and also in the international arena thanks to their
joint activities. These successes confirm the correctness of the line
jointly laid down by the Political Advisory Committee, the foreign ministers
or the committee of the defense ministers. It was not easy to a.c:c~mplish
such results. They depended on and required great labor, full of sacri-
fices, by our peoples. We cats conclude with pride that nowhere in the
world has there been such a successfcl development as that achieved by the
socialist states united in the Warsaw Pact.
15
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Witte sutlsfacCion we cnn say as a conclusive fact that our alliance, in
this 20th year of -its existence, has proven itself and contr:tbut-ed decisl.vel.y
to strengthenin}; the unity and resolution of our fraternal coi.u~tr~es, ranee d
round the Soviet Una.on, and to improving the international atmosphere. But
imperialism still. possesses stronE; forces. The opponents of cletc~nte are
ncr.easing their. .r_ctavity. The armaments expenditures of the NA'I'0 states
were never as high, The situation calls for extreme aler.tneGS, and care-
ful observance of the actions of the imperialist Mates. Every step on
the path to detente has to be won by struggle Irom imperialism. From thl.s
there results the necessity of keeping our powder dry, of Further str.engthe n-
ing our socialist defensive alliance, and to develop a].1 aspects of i.ts
activity. ror t'nis reason strengthening our fraternal socialist states,
raising their defensive strength, comprehensive coordination of foreign
and secc.~r.ity policy and also deepening socialist economic integration are
all an important precondition for the further shifting of thc~ balance of
power in favor of socialism and for the continuation of the process of
detente.
1. L. I. Brezhnev: Operations Report of the CPSU Central Committee to
the 20t1i Par:y Congress, Moscow/Berlin, 197:1, p 20.
2. The Warsaw Pact for. Friendship, Coopera~ion and Mutual Assistance,
Berlin, 1960, p 21
3. L. I. Brezhnev: op. cit., p 8.
4. From the report of the Politburo at the 13th Session of the SED Central
Committee. Reporter: Comrade Erich Honecker. Berlin, 197!,, p 66.
5. Central Committee Report to the Eighth SED Congress. Reporter: Comrad e
Erich Honecker, Berlin, 1971, p 13.
6. NEUES DEU7'SCHLAND (B Edition), 19 Apr 74.
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:NATO SEEN AS DANGER TO WORLD PEACE
East Berlin MILITAERWESEN in German Apr 75 pp 46-54
[By Col Dr A. Charisius and Lt Col Dr T. Dobi,~s both of the GDR
Military History Institute]
/Text/ As of 1974 the North Atlantic Pact had been in existence 25 years.
The ledger balance of this Holy Alliance of our times is negative. This
Pact, aimed against the three principal revolutionary currents, has never
achieved its aggressive and r~aactionary gials. Its antisocialist line of
attack, above all, for whose sake it was e;~tablished in the first place,
at the instigation the American mon~~poly bourgoisie, in April 1949, ended
in fiasco. The political and military strategic concepts ("roll back,"
"massive retaliation," "indirect strategy," "flexible jtrategy" and others),
which were closely tied in with the build up and development of US gJ.obal
strategy, were shattered and all came to nought, as is well known, against
the dynamically developing strength of the socialist states.
Socialism has not been extinguished in Europe, but has demonstrated its
hi:;torical superiority over the imperialist states, and for~:ed NATO into
the defensive. This process, which grew stronger with the turn into the
1970's, has brought it about that the peace policy, active7.y pursued by
the community of socialist states, did prEVail, and that political detente,
not open military confrontation, has come to characterize In~ernational
relations in Europe.
liowever, to be sure, neither the aggressive nature of imrzrialism nor NATO
potential for military aggression have been weakened by this. This Pact
is still a source of danger for peace now as it has always been because it
follows an essentially antisocialist policy and military strategy along
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with a corrzsl~unding outlay for war armaments, just as it has done through-
u?it its 25--year history. 'Itao closely interrelated processes largely govern
its development along these lines at the present time.
First, the internationa~ balance of power shifted further in favor of
socialism, and of the rev~~lut:tonary workers movement and the national
liberation movement which a:?e closely tied to it.
The growth in the military might of the Soviet li'nion, and with it of the
community of socialist states, has undermined the foundation of the
imperialist "Policy of: Strengl-t?," which in various forms has characterized
the mil-.~ary policy profile of the principal NATO powers and the principles
of military strategy pursued by the Pact. The creation of further real
preconditions for peaceful coexistence among states with different social
organization has once again diminished t'-~e room for maneuver in NATO opera-
tions. The USSR also succeeded in :1974, especially in the Vladivostok
negotiations, in reaching ag,r?eements or understandings with the United
States for a definite quantitative and in the future also qualitative
limitation of the strategic arms race, which diminish the danger of a
worldwide nuclear war. Overall, the opportunities for NATO to deploy
military ~.ggressiveness were decisi~~Ply reduced by the Warsaw Pact states.
Second, the consequences of the qualitatively new phase in the general
crisis of capitalism are being revealed ever more sharply for NATO. On
various planes within the Pact the contradictions of imperialism are
growing deeper. The Pact, to ar- ever increasing degree is drawn in the
wake of conflicts and rivalries between imperialist centers. The antagon-
ism between the United States and capitalist Western Europe--especially
the EEC--stands out ever more clearly as the principal antagonism. For
the first time reference was openly made in the communiques of meetings
of the top NATO organs in December 1974 to the consequences of inflation,
the energy crisis acid the complicated economic situation as it affects
the further develol?,nent of the North Atlantic Pact, To this is added the
Further po~~rization of the class forces and ttie sharpened tension of the
class struggle in many NATO states,
However, all these clearly visible crisis and erosion phenomena observable
`_n NATO most recently do not cancel out the dominant long range effecl:s
of the thrust of the ant socialist alliance of imperialist states. Ruling
circles of monopoly capital and the principal powers of NATO as well as
the majority of small. Pact states also continue as before *o place all their
hopes on NATO as the basis and instrumentality of the foreign and military
policy. In view of this unchanged role of the Pact, the first secretary of
the SED Central Committee, Comrade Erich Honecker, declared in September 1974:
"Certain imperialist forces are in~.reasing their efforts to perfect NATO
as a military instrumentality and to protect it from the growing crisis
phenomena of capitalism...Thus it is revealed that the military policy of
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imperialism now as always i.s directed toward the strategic goal of destroy-
Lng socialism."1
Modified Policy of Strength
All essential. developments which are currently going on within the North
Atlantic Pact have a common denominator: adaptation of NA'10 to the changed
strategic situation of imperialism by maintn.ining or restoring of inner
stabtltty, and increased political, but first priority military eff.ecti~e-
ness of. the Pact. Two tendencies stand out here in the policy of the ruling
circles of the principal powers in the Pact. On the one hand their position
is char~icterized by a certain partial realism vis-a-vis the new power re-
lationships to the point where they are forced to understand that a genera].
nuclear war is not presently an appropriate modality for imperialist policy,
without, however, ceasing to prepare for it. On the other hand, the
adaptation is viewed by very influential circles in the principal NATO
powers as a long-term process, in the course of which imperialism ought to
achi~~e military superiority over the Warsaw Pact states. This presupposes
resolving the contradictions within their Pact, and further intensifying
the armaments race. The backbone of such an aggressively oriented ad~ust-
ment in this form is moreover the effort to attain a position of military
strength, even if in varied forms and less global but rather regional,
adjusted in each case to the concrete pattern of forces. This has been
drastically demonstrated most recently by statements of leading American
politicians above all.
Secretary of State H. Kissinger proclaimed anew in a speech on 20 August
1.974 that the United States is striving "to bring its military strength
inCJ harmony with its foreign policy goals."2 In this manner shall be
guaranteed that the goals of US imperialism will be attained both in
opposition to the principal currents of the world revolutionary movement
and also in opposition to its own partners in the alliance. Kissinger was
of the opinion that "if other nations have confidence in our goals and
give our words full credence, then America must remain an unequaled mili-
tary power." For,according to Iissinger, "the military might of America
is the foundation of our diplomatic strength."3
The unconcealed threa~ made by Kissinger 2 January 1975 against the oil-
producing Arab states is also to be understood in this sense. For he did
not exclude the direct use of US armed forces to protect the n?~aximum profits
of the multinational monopolies. The President of the United States,
G. Ford, has expressed a similar point of view. In one of his first
messages to Congress he emphasized that "The strength and manifold nature
of our armed forces, our freedom of decision to patrol international waters
which are sites of unrest--all this is essential for our security."4 This
high positional value of. military might as a basis and instrumentality for
an expansive foreign policy is the essential stimulus for the armaments
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race being carried orr globally by the United States and regionally by the
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vc?hool. of br.utherly frtendr+hlp and conrracleship for the soldiers of our
r-l.lled ;crmles. in the course of ti~etr execution the army members t;et to
know each other as they joint y solve the must variegated military problems,
.jointly obtain the skills required for combat and understand their i.nter-
natlonalast cfuti.es an performinK them. Their friendship and mutual respect
as well. as their mutual trust and understanding are reinforced.
The great combat experiences, the high state of training and the superior
moral traits of our Soviet comrades-in-arms allow NVA members to experience
the veracity of the continual challenge--"to learn from the Soviet Army
means to learn to be victorious." Not least of a1.1, the demonstration
through joint exercises of the increased defensive strength of our frater-
nally al:l.iecl states serves to mobi..lize the members of both armies for their
further and dependable military protection. Proof of this was provided by
such important maneuvers on the territory of the GDIt as "Quartett," "October
Storm," "Comradeship-in-Arms" and a multitude of joint exe~tcises with the
participation of commands and troops of all services of our armies.
Four socialist armies took part in the first joint maneuver executed in
1963 on the territory of the GDR. The maneuver had the designation "Quar.tett."
The participating forces acted for the first time according to a uniform
concept and under a single command. This took an important step on the
road towards purposeful joint military action. In the course of the further
develcpment of our alliance, ~:ormations and units of the ground forces of
the NVA took part in exerci:~es in the Peoples Republic of Poland and in
the CSSR.
The climax to date of the steadily increasing collaboration in the military
sector was provided by the "Comradeship-in-Arms" maneuver of 1971 which
brought together all of the socialist armed forces integrated in the Warsaw
Pact. Besides the superior military results obtained the participating
troops demonstrated the growing cohesion and cooperation of the socialist
armies in providing a dependable protection of the achievements of their
peoples linked by solid bonds of friendship.
These operational-tactical exercises were participated in by tactical
troops and formations as well as units and formations of the components
services and specialized troops. Such an extensive participation of the
component forces and means places high demands on commanders and staffs.
The deployment of the most varied arms, special troops and services of
the allied armies on the battlefield was a crowning achievement of military
mastery, providing visible proof that our forces are in a position to solve
combat missions jointly. The examples that left lasting impressions on
army members are legior].labur.r.ttaon
with the rttaffs of l:hc NVA land forces was guaranteed in all phases. 'Phis
fine perfornt..tncc of our. comrades-in-arms did not on y have a stimulating
effect on our arm~~ members, but :Lt provided co ganders and staffs pri-
marily with valuable suggestions for f.urt-her improvement of their command
activlty.
As is confirmed by the experiences obtained in joint exercises with the
Soviet Army, the collaboration among the commands at all levels has gained
a steada.ly increasing importance. Just as in past years the demands
placed on the extent and content of our common activity in the manifold
political and military sectors of the army have increased, so the command
tasks geared to joint action which are placed on commanders and staffs are
increasing in a lake manner. for their fulfillment the exchange of opera-
tional groups and of signal units and equipment among the cooperating
staffs and troops have proved themselves to be effective besides the col-
laborative efforts of commanders in the decisive questions of exercise
preparation and troop cooperation. I3y these means close collaboration is
guaranteed among the staffs and troops and the participating commands
obtain the required information concerning the situation and tasks of their
neighbors as well as other necessary data.
It is useful to put such forces and means under the control of the respon-
sible commander and his staff in the planning, organization and conduct of
joint exercises Generally, greater attention should be paid to the
organization and composition of the respective commands/staffs for these
training exercises.
In connection with the fulfillment of these tasks the requirement for a
command of the language of our Soviet comrades in arms asserts itself which
insures the successful activity of the members of the operational groups
of the commends as well as of the signal forces. It provides a decisive
basis for a join: leadership of troops, for the organization of coopera-
tion as well for the proper functioning of measures of combat support and
combat service support. To train our commanders and staffs continually
in this sector, requirements for the use of the Russian language are to
be placed in the various training exercises.
Time and again the high value of uniform concepts and attitudes towards the
manifold questions of military leadership asserts itself in ~he common work.
The uniformity of concepts and views has its deep cause in the uniform
world view and socialist military doctrine. It finds its expression in
the principles that are binding on all the socialist armed forces as well
as in the coordinated demands of the various combat rules. The latter
are forming the concrete basis for common training and create uniform
criteria For the assessment of command and troop actions.
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A further reason For the effeclave collaboration can be found in the
steadily increasing quality level of our cadre. Particularly those of the
officers of the land forces of the National Peoples Army who were trained
in Soviet military acade+ies are accomplishing their leader.shtr pole in
joint exercises In the various sectors in a continually impro~~-~g measure.
They have the highest objective potentialities for a fruitful ~~operat ion
in all sectors. The knowledge and experiences of these leadership cadre
are to be transmitted in the widest possible measure to all army members,
but particularly to officers. The commanders' training, exchange of ex-
periencer, and other appropriate measures arm to be used in this endeavor
to a gre~`er extent than heretofore.
In this connection also the increased contr;.~ution made by the NVA becomes
visible based on its many years of experience in belonging to the 'nTars aw
Pact. It is a contribution towards the ~anrichment of socialist milita ry
science. This concerns mainly questions that pose themselves in tonne c-
tlon with the role and tasks of the Jand forces of the NVA within the
coalition, but it also includes prob.:~ms of general military theory si g-
nificance. This discloses an important page in the dialectic of our co-
operation which consjsts of the creative utilization of the wealth of
Soviet military experience, in the generalize.tion of new discoveries in
the field of military science and in the elaboration of generally valid
conclusions and tasks for our joint military activity.
On the basis of the experiences noted it will be necessary to solve such
tasks as follow in the near future within the framework of the main tasks
to be fulfilled in the current training year by the land forces:
--the further elaboration of uniform concepts pertaining to troop col-
laboration between she respective command levels of the GSFG and the NVA
land forces pertaining to the organization and conduct of joint training
measures,
--the further shortening of the times required to obtain a state of combat
readiness of components and formations of the land forces on the basis of
the excPtlent results achieved by the Soviet army and
--the execution of appropriate measures for the improvement of Russian
language knowledge.
In the 1974/75 training year as well, .*.he year of the 20th anniversary of
our socialist alliance, we wiJ.l make the exemplary achievements of our
Soviet comrades-in-arms even more consistently our standards for the
training of units, formations, components and staff of the land forces.
This will take place in joint training measures. The fulfillment of the
increased tasks set by the command instructions from higher headquarters
for the further raising of the combat power and combat readiness of the
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NVA requires in the+ future as we11, a steadily closer anti deeper collabora-
tion in all. military sectors with the "regiment next door."
1. Y. Yacubovski: Soyuz vo imya miry i besapasnosti narodov. In:
KRASNAYA ZVGZDA Moscow, 13 May 73.
2. A. A. Gretchko: "Vooruzhonniye Sily Sovetskogo Gosudarstva" (Armed
tortes of the Soviet State") Moscow, 1974, p 331.
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NVA OFFICER INTERVIEwTED ON RESULTS OF NVA-GSFG COOPERATION
East Berlin MILITAERWf:SEN in German Apr 75 pp 105A-108A
[Interview with Col S. Braeunig, commander of a unit]
/Text/ /Question/ Comrade Colonel, your unit has been working closely
for years with a Soviet Army snit. How are these fraternal relations
reflected in the everyday life of soldiers?
/Answer/ In the past years a multitude of forms and methods of collabora-
tion have deg:eloped between our regiment and a unit of the Soviet Army.
Year to year we worked even more closely, hand in hand. The collaboration,
which became more planned and purposeful throughout the years, also in-
creased in scope and today is felt in every company and in every platoon.
Particularly close contacts and many-sided cooperation exists between
similar units of both formations; almost all the soldiers in these units
know each other. In this way the solid fraternal relation with the Soviet
Army has become a daily and direct personal experience for the members of
our regiment. The mutual acquaintance of the soldiers of both formations
starts with the d.ay they are sworn in. Soviet comrades participate in the
ceremony in our regiment; and it is always a reward and a deep experience
for soldiers of our regiment to attend the solemn swearing-in of their
comrades-in-arms.
The participation of Soviet soldiers in the first political training of
our newly-called-up recruits has become a fine tradition. Similarly,
soldiers of our regiment attend the first political schooling of their
comrades-in-arms. In this way they gain at the same time an insight into
the military everyday routine of the "regiment next door." This strengthens
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the f.ecLings of sol.idar.ity and the tl.es between Chem. Our younK yold.iers
are always impressed by the: high sense of deity of the Soviet soldiers.
'Phis lilt;h :sense of duty is always demonstrated most visibly during measures
of ~jolnt training--a very effective form of collaboration among the units
of both our formations which we i.~tend to stren?;then and to extend on the
basis of the experiences made to date.
Both units are working together closely in the field of culture and sports.
For instance there have been choral contests and for sports competitions
members of the partner unit ara always invited and included in the
champion~ehip bouts.
Joint sports competitions are also the rule in the case of the numerous
friendship .~aeets at company level. The events organized with the partici-
pation of the children of tine professional soldiers in both units also
find a large echo. For the past few years for example, the Thaelmann and
the Lenin Pioneers of the 5th to tha. 8th grade are celebrating their
commemorative days jointly.
The many-sided close: collaboration wil-h the Soviet comrades, beginning
with headquarters and extending down into the companies, the platoons and
the squads, has a highly positive effect on the internationalist training
of the members of our regiment and promotes among them the desire to prove
themselves with quality performance as reliable allies in the fulfillment
of their political and military tasks.
Certainly the close relations de>>eloped with the Soviet allies during
their period of military servic.~ had something to do with the fact that
33 comrades amo*.ig the former members of our regiment who ?aere transferred
to the reserve have volunteered for the construction of the Orenburg
natural gas pipeline.
/Question/ How are you prepari;lg in your unit together with the Soviet
allies, the commemoration of the 30th anniversary ~f the victory of the
Soviet Army over Hitler fascism and of the liberation of the German
people, as well as the 20th anniversary of tre foundation of the Warsaw
Pact?
/Answer/ We are using the point preparation of the `_30th anniversary
celebration of the victory of the Soviet Army over Hitlerite fascism and
of the liberation of the German people to deepen the realization among
the members of the regiment that all the changes in the international
balance of power over the past 30 years are based on this decisive victory
for the progress of mankind, that the foundation of our socialist state
was also made possible by the sacrifices and ~_he victory of the Soviet
people and that our inviolable alliance with the Soviet Union and the other
fraternal socialist countries, the solid anchoring of the GDR in the
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socialist community of states, is a guarantee for the further successful
development of our fatherland.
It can already been seen that the preparation of the two anniversari e s
is accompanied~~GyLDIERtINITIATIVEa75 WUnitedoWitheOureAlliesthCombat aReady
competition:
and Strong!"
And of course tY-e preparation of such jointly-celebrated anniversaries
contributes to a still more effective organization of our good collabora-
tion with our partner unit. The commands of both unite haveeoglesd and a
series of measures to mark these two great holidays of our p p
armies. First of all we plan to organize a joint cultural program which
we will present before the members of our units and also to the pub 1 ic.
A sports celebration of the alliance is planned. Friendship meets w~.ll
take place at the company level. Wall newspapers are being exchanged.
A tradition circle in our regiment is researching the hero4.c deeds of
members of our partner ;snit in the Great Patriotic War, In this connection,
our FDJ members are working closely with the Komsomol organization. An-
other circle is looking into the development of the fraternal relations
between the two units from their very beginning; a chronicle of these
comradely relations is being created within the regiment. The impressions
gained 'by soldier's in their collaboration with their Sovie*_ comrades-in-
arms are being written down. These notes are being used by both sides
for their political work.
During the last FDJ meeting of the regiment, the youth objective "We are
Studying RussMan" initiativeseinithisddirectionehavetalreadyubeent d eveloped
the alli:>.s. y
in th.: units.
The joint preparation of the two anniversaries thus includes manif old
measures. It is our aim to involve all members of the regiment actively
in one or another way in these preparations.
/Question/ You mentioned joint training as a very eff ective form of co-
operation. What position does this activity occupy.
/Answer/ Years ago we started our collaboration with joint sports and
cultural events. For some time now we are paying more attention t o joint
combat training. This is an expression of the qualitative development of
our mutual relations because '.t is precisely in joint combat training that
? the goal of our alliance, the rel'..able protection of socialism is expressed
most visibly. Although we arE~. ~~:'.y at the beginning as concerns joint
combat training and many re.~ewes remain to be utilized, the activity has
' in some ways already become a tradition. Similar type units of both
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for.tnat Lonr~ have be~~t~ mceti.ng for n conH(dcrnble period already on the balls
of mutual agree-nent Co wulertake Joint combat tr.r in:.nK. Measures of tur.Cicn1.,
Eirlnl? dr.lvLnK rind protective defense trnlninf; have already taken place.
'Phe agreement stipulrttes the sub.Jects in which :joint traaninp, will. be under-
taken !n the course of the six month traininE, cycle.
Perf.ornt~tnce comparisons for instance in firing practice as well as in per-
formance norm training have been particularly valuable. The meetinhs and
exchanges of experience among the commanders, staff officers, political
workers ~?nd also young officers and training instructors of both units
have also proved to be highly useful. I would like to emphasize this with
two examples only:
The relationship between time spent and the results obtained in maintcanance
of equipment was not satisfactory in our regiment. An exchange of. experi-
ences which we conducted on this problem with our friends he:Lped us a lot.
We also had the task of accomplishing a trcop training exerca.se during a
period of. very inclement weather. As a preparatory measure for this
exercise we conducted an experience exchange with the Soviet comrades.
Our company commanders received a whole series of tips during this meeting
which helped them in the successful accomplishment of the training exercise.
I want to take this occasion also to point to the positive influence ~ol:ich
Joint training exercises on the performance attitudes of the participating
army members. In these Joint events every c,ne seeks snore than normally
to give his utmost which i.s reflected by the gaining results. Our mutual
efforts aim at the further deepening and expansion of cooperation in the
comb%it training sector.
Question/ A many-sided close collaboration requires an efficient organi-
zation and leadership. Which experiences were you able to gather in this
connection?
/Answer/ First of. all I want to emphasize that our Soviet comrades display
a great readiness for cooperation. This mutual readiness and openness
provides a good foundation for the development of our mutual relations.
Many questions that come up in the course of our cooperation are solved
without complications and unb;.reaucratlcally directly between commander and
commander or between functionary and functionary.
There is also always a strong push "from below" on the part of the military
~ollectivec, the basic party and FDJ organizations to expand and strengthen
relations and cooperation in different sectors of our military life. This
strong interest in the strengthening of relations is an expression of the
fact that the close cooperation with our Soviet friends has become a need
for our comrades anti collectives at all levels. Tnis too makes its
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orgrinizatLon rend ic~aderf{hip a l.ot ea~3ler. 'L'he coll.ectlveH themselvc~y
oriKlnatc many goad su};l;eKttons, Ldcr~s and Lnitiat-Luca.
Of course despita all. thl.s the pr.oces~; of c~:~llahoratic~n cannot be left t~~
itself. An appropriate planning and orl;anizaL-ion is required. We have
conciudect an agreement with the Soviet comrades which include: a statement
of the joint measures that w? 1~Ztend to undertrikc. 'I'bis agreement is
always concluded for a six m~nll: ,raining cycle. This 1-as proved effective.
This tlme frame is easily manageable for us. The measures can he coordi-
nated within the regiment both as concerns timing and content. 1'he agree-
ment is always discussed at the beginning of each six month training cycle
during a "Day of the Functionary" with all the functionat'ies of the units
in order to inform them of all the points to be stressed and all the co-
opPeative measures to be undertaken in the course of the six month training
cycle.
In the life of the troops there are also always events that cannot be anti-
cipated precisely for each half year or predicted for a precise day. We
therefore follow the procedure which has proved effective to go over the
agreement--our joint plan for cooperation--together with our Soviet com-
rades on a monthly Uasis.
The planning and purposeful direction of the cooperation between our units
goes beyond the points specified in the plan and extends to uther levels
and sectors. Thus the chairmen of the innovator collectives for example
coordinate their plans among themselves. The cooperation with the Soviet
comrades leas become an integral part of our total command activity.
Of course there are problems in the realization of the planned projects;
things don't always go as smoothly as anticip~.ted. The realization of
our projects depends substantially on the. help and support given by our
superiors.
/Question/ What are the plans for the future expansion of the fraternal
relations w~.th our allies?
/Answer/ First of all it is important to translate the agreement that has
been concluded, into action in a purposeful manner, because it is based on
prior experience and has as its goal the further sl-rengthening of our
collaboration. It provides for concrete steps for a still closer coopera-
tion in matters of combat training. The questions of combat training will
continue to occupy the center of attention. We have made progress in this
respect from one six month training cycle to another and will continue on
this road. During the past few years new and more effective forms of
collaboration nave been found and tested--there are lots of reserves that
can be brought to bear on this issue. Our comrade7_y alliance relations
have deepened from year to year, they are a matter of the heart and of the
daily life of our soldiers and this will continue in the future.
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DETAILS PROVIDED ON TESTING OF UNIT PROFICIENCY
East Berlin MILITAERWESEN in Gel-mat: Arr 75 pF 109A-115A
[By Lt Col A Preuhs]
/Excerpt/ The regular evaluation of. the status of training attained by
units in all training subjects is an integral part of combat training.
The monitoring of the proficiency of the motorized infantry and tank units
i.n the course of their six month training cycle is therefore a part of
the leadership process of commanders. These evaluations are required as
a part of the training cycle completion exams for each company/battery
and for all motorized infantry and tank platoons after the completion of
platoon training.
By means of the prof:'~iency evaluations, the platoons are included for the
first time in the periodic evaluations, such as inspections, final exams,
etc. The commanders of troop units are thus in a position to assess the
state of training of all motorized infantry and tank platoons in the f.9.rst
half of each six month train{.ng cycle and to draw the appropriate con-
clusions. They are thus placed in possession ~f the data required for
their subsequent command decisions.
The Aim cf the Proficiency Evaluation
~~ first the knowledge, c?:ipabilitjes and skills of the platoon and squad
leaders are evaluated.
The platoon leader must be capable of:
--making proper decisions in complicated situations;
40
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--formulating the combat mission precisely fcr the squads/crews, and,
where present, for. the reinforcinfi units, and doing the same regarding
the combat support rind combat service support tasks; organizin{; and
maintaining the cohesive action of his unit;
--demanding the consistent and timely fulfillment of the comhat mission;
--providing the correct and appropriate fire direction;
--maintaining continuous reconnaissance of the enemy and drawing the
proper conclusions from thin action for his own unit activity;
--properly employing the weapons and combat equipment of his platoon,
to make full use of his unit fire power and that of the reinforcing fire,
and,
--acting appropriately under the conditions of the employme}o~6~BrT00608R000200110032-4
--the evaluation objective is determined in a timely fashion,
--the organization of combat training takes account of the objective and
--the results of the evaluation are appropriately utilized.
To realize these demands is not only the responsibility of the major unit
commander but it is central to the command activity of the formation.
The formation does not conduct any additional proficiency evaluations.
The proficiency evaluation of the platoons therefore provides the decisive
opportunity for the formation commander to judge the state of training of
the platoons, to measure their combat value and to draw from this assess-
ment the required command conclusions.
We have to take for granted that the quality of collective achievements in
the following tactical exercises always will depend on the results attained
in individual training and in small unit training. Combined actions of
the separate arms, special troops and services presuppose that each col-
lective is in complete command of its own special tr1~le, of its own special
tasks and then in combination with other units attains a higher quality
threshold of combat value.
The Place of the Proficiency Evaluation in the Process of Combat Training
In order to evaluate the proficiency of a unit, the unit must first have
created this proficiency. This takes place in the course of unit training:
--in S:he case of squad/crew training, in the course of combat drills and
in unit combat firing or in combat drills of the crew;
--in the case of the platoon, in the course of combat drills during tactical
training and in unit combat firing;
?--in the case of the company, during combat drills, during tactical exer-
cises with or without combat firing.
In this a relatively substantial role is played by the preceding basic
military training that one third of the major unit has undergone. The
quality of the individual training forms the basis for unit training.
Each and every army member must have achieved his ow,t combat readiness
if he wants to perform successfully within his combat collective. This
is attained during basic training and in training for those specialties
which are essential for the activity of army members within their units.
Because of the importance of this individual training we would like to
consider it as belonging to the first phase of the six month training
cycle. The six month training cycle can be divided into two phases:
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~.. 'Che phrase of mil. i.t-ary busk trtil.ning, of squad and platoon training
which ends with the proficiency evaluation of platoons;
1. 'I'hc phase of tra Wing for reinforced companies and bata.lli.ons, of
tactical. exercises with or without combat f.lring, which ends with the
final. eval.uati.on Including the evaluation of. the proCici,~ncy of comp~.-nies.
Four main points of emphasis are of decisive significanr_e f.or the evalu-
ation of the combat value attained:
--the establishment of the combat readiness of the newly called-up re-
servists (which is determined without any special. examination),
--the proEic:~.ency evaluation of platoons and compa~.iies,
--the troop exercises,
--the testing of the collectivness of the platoons and companies.
'lhe evaluation of the platoons is conducted as a rule during the first six
month training cycle at the end of January to early February and in the
second six month training cycle from the end of July to the beginning of
August. By that time the necessary conditions for a substantive evalu-
ation will have been created. The specific themes and training subjects
selected depend on the substance of the evaluation decided on by the
commander. In order to fulfill the planned objectives of the evaluation
a specific sequence must be maintained in the planning process.
Figure 1 /not provided/ gives a general picture of the most important
variable and constant training measures of a si:: month training cycle.
It makes the following general provisions for the principal subject area
of "tactical training":
1. The main training measures (training complexes, tactical exercises of
the motorized infantry and armor companies) are to be planned and executed
sequentially. The subjects and training complexes that are required for
the fulfillment of the instruction objectives of the subsequent topics.
Main training measures and the preceding topics may be considered as
relatively constant.
The evaluation of the proficiency of platoons and the final exarination
are also relatively constant dimensions of the training process.
2. The tactical exercises from batallion upward are the variables of the
training process and they serve the permanent maintenance of combat readi-
ness. They can be inserted at any time during the six month training
cycle into the training process without affecting to any substantial
degree the logic of the process. These exercises include the preceding
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combat drills of the reinforced batallion and, if required, the unit com-
bat firing. They have to be preceded by such subjects and school drills as
are needed to insure the success of the tactical exercises.
Content and Form of the Evaluation
The substance of the evaluation depends on the combat training program and
other military regulations. Each commander, however, should strive to
include only the actions that are most important for the respective units
because neither time nor the existing p.3sibilities permit the complete
evaluation of all requirements. In connec~a.on with the projected objectives
the substance of the evaluation may c.onsis,` of the following teaching
questions and elements:
1. Inspection of the Unit
--general discipline and order, appearance c.if the army members;
--condition of the combat equipment and armament, of the protective means
against weapons of mass destruction and of signal equipment;
--condition of clothing and equipment;
--completeness of equipment and its proper storage;
--control questions to test soldiers' knowledge concerning the duties of
co+^'.nanders and other grades in combat, norms and employment potential of
the weaponry;
--knowledge of the general command signals ire combat;
--actions concerning and within the APC's a?nd tanks, in particular the
alert command and the seat order in the tanks;
--the bases of fire direction in the combat arm that is being evaluated.
2. Attack from movement or direct engagement with the enemy
--organization of t~:a attack;
--approach to the enemy and combat deployment or preparation for the attack
from an attack position (staging area for tanks);
--mounted or dismounted attack with combat vehicles against an enemy
strongpoint;
--continuation of the attack into rear of the enemy's defense area;
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--repe111ng of counterattacks and the subsequent final destruction of the
enemy ;
--pursuit.
3. Movement from attack to defense or movement to defense without contact
with the enemy
--organization of the defense, particularly of the fire control systP.m and
the combat engineer. preparation of the platoon strong point~ahile i~~ con-
tact or without contact with the enemy;
--command and control o~ the defense, repulse of the enemy in the attack,
maneuver of forces and means available for the destruction of the enemy
in a penetration and reorganization of the fire control system and of
the defense fortifications;
--organization of the attack.
4. March Security
--organization of march security;
--actions during march security particularly in case of contact with the
enemy ;
--organization of a break.
5. Bivouacing or Quartering
--moving into bivouac area;
--organization of bivouac security;
--organization of engineer construction activity in the bivouac area;
--actions in case of attack warnings or surprise attacks by enemy on the
ground or from the air;
--preparation of weapons and equipment for anticipated combat actions.
6. }Zeconnaissance
Combat reconnaissance troop
--organization of deployment and task organization by the troop leader;
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--preparation of the platoon for committment;
--penetration into the enemy's rear defense area;
--reconnaissance of strong points, nuclear weapons, tank and artillery
units, radioactive terrain sectors (with the non-TO:: nuclear radiation
and chemical reconnaissance group), barriers, bridges, roads, fording
points and water obstacles, as well as the reporting of target coordinates;
Raids
--organization of the raid ,tnd task organization by the platoon commander;
--preparation of the platoon for committment;
--approach to the raid objective;
--attack end withdrawal.
Ambush
--organization of the ambush and task organization by the platoon commander;
--preparation of the platoon for committment;
--attack and withdrawal.
In case special units are prepared and trained for special actions--for
instance, barrier clearing and special detachments, actions as amphibious
or airborne units, etc.--the evaluation care be given this particular
content. But it must be insured that questions pertaining to other train-
ing subjects are included in a Way that permits. their comprehensive evalu-
ation.
The multitude of the teaching questions listed demonstrates that seven
training hours are not sufficient for their total coverage. It is there-
fore essential that the mos~~ important questions are selected and if
necessary different ones picked for the different platoons. However at
least three main instructional subjects and two training subjects are to
be included in the testing. Tactical training occupies a central position
in this. In principle each platoon is to be tested in offensive and
defensive combat techniques. The particular questions selected on the
ideas of the regimental commanders. It is the commanders and the unit s
that are being tested. With the assistance of the norms, unit activities
are evaluated in specially created combat scenarios, but the testing of
the commanders' performance is the main issue.
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'Ih.Ls is why the fol.lowing areas of emphasis are to be included in all
teachLng questions selected by the regimental commander:
--the work of the section and plal-oon leaders on the terrain or with the
a:Ld of the sand box;
--the capability to reduce the tasks directly into a sketch map without
first writing it in narrative;
--fire control in all phases of the engagement;
--organization of the fire control system in the defense and explanation
of the decisions taken;
--organization of unit cohesion and integrity during the engagement;
--foi.aard and rear area security before and during the engagement;
--genF~ral and appropriate security organization for engagements at night.
If the unit training terrain so allows and if the general actions are not
affected thereby, platoons are allowed to use live ammunition to solve
combat tasks in training situations. But this must not lead to the post-
ponement of the evaluation or the shifting of the troop exercise area.
Tactical training is to serve as the organizational form of the evaluation.
This form insures that the commanders can determine the degree of unit
proficiency and themselves influence the state of training. This form of
training is explained in Part 1 of the tactical training methodology.
The repetition of individual teaching points and elements is allowed only
within prescribed time limits and can be defended only if mistakes can
be eliminated in the shortest possible time and the prescribed subject
matter is fully covered. In the case of teaching questions that have to
be repea[~d the initially assigned grade remains valid.
The above contribution gives firs': of all, a general overview of the bases
for the evaluation of unit proficiency. A subsequent article will ex-
plain how the concepts prescribed here are to be realized. By means of
practical experiences gained in unit combat training all commanders are
receiving pointers as to how this important task can be fulfilled still
better in the second half of the 1974/75 training year.
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CONNECTIONS BETWEED'~NUCLEAR STRIKE, FIRE, THRUST, MOVEMENT EXAMINED
East Berlin MILITAERWESEN in German Apr 75 pp 116A-119A
[By Lt Col M. Goebel, military scientist]
/Text/ The question of the connection between nuclear strike, fire, thrust
and movement amounts to defining them as elements of armed combat. As the
revolution in military affairs brought about chan;es in the theory of
warfare, the question arose in this context whether the nuclear strike
was a new separate element or sh:.uld be seen as belonging to the element
of "fire," which would alter its quality.
Thus a very interesting debate was carried on a few years ago in the journal
MILITAERWESEN in which partly very contrary or, at least, diverse aid at
tunes one-sided points of view concerning the elements of armed combat wer e
put forth.l Publications in the Soviet military press, direct exchange of
experiences with comrades in the Soviet Army and other fraternal armies,
and our own military science research have helped gain uniform views
about this problem. In connection with that, some views i-~ad to be re-
vised because they had not stood up to military practice.
Since then we have differentiated among nuclear strike, fire, thrust and
movement as four elements of armed combat in a series of combat operations,
that is, of the operation (the battle) and the combat of the troops on
land, on water and in the air.
Nothing will change in that definition at present or in the future.2 What
will constantly change, however, is the quality of the various elements of
armed combat. Therefore we are always facing the task to determine usefu 1
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methods for the employment of forces and material, and for their operations
and combat command. That must also be supported by rational forms and
methods of combat tr.nining.
It means, for the command echelons and the troops, that they must focus
on changes in the armament, equipment and structure of their own forces
and the enemy's farces occurring at briefer periods. 'That is objectively
necessary. Our own further training thus requires that we improve what
we already know about the four elements of armed combat and find creative
application f.or it in military practice.3
A few brief remarks are offered about the various elements and the demands
they raise.
A characteristic of the current development of military affairs is the fact
that rockets for various purposes constitute the strongest nuclear weapons
in modern armies.
Their tactical and technical rPrformance parameters and design character-
istics are constantly being modified and, in part, being replaced. Tn
general, Western views underscore a simpler launch preparation, better
launching possibilities, wider range, and improved strike accuracy, wider
impact and increased mobility and maneuverability.
The effect of a nuclear weapon clearly differs from that of conventional
arms.4 These means of mass destruction therefore fundamentally affect the
laws, principles, rules, norms and methods of armed combat.
Sovie;~ military science has shown that the nuclear strike has become an
independent element in armed combat because it pcovides the possibility
to strike important and worthwhile targets within a brief span, to destroy
enemy installations, and to annihilate, or demoralize, the enemy's troop
formations. Massive strikes, above all, permit to a certain, degr.e an
almost complete destruction of parts of the enemy's order of battle,
whereby they alsa partly fulfill the tasks of fire, thrust and movement.5
This, in a sense, grants a predominant role to the nuclear strike. The
employment of nuclear weapons, among other things, depends on the scope
and strength with which conventional weapons are used in the combat and
on the tasks which the various branches, special troops and services,
coordinated with each other, have to fulfill when and where.
Victory over the enemy can never be gained by the use of only one type of
weapon, even a nuclear weapon. Fire, thrust and movement therefore remain
of vast importance, regardless of the scope and nature of the nuclear
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strikes employed. One must be aware in every situation, however, that thc:
nuclear strike neither merely "supports" and "accompanies" nor "secures"
military action.
Not only nuclear rockets, traditional weapons :i~; well, such as artillery
pieces, Lanka, antitank and air defense weapon:, helicopters and others,
are being perfected or replaced by new types chid weapons systems. As
examples for the perfecting of combat technology we may here --based on
data from the military press--refer to arti 1:l.ery and the combat heli-
copter.
Essential performance parameters of artillery ~~re: Wider employmen t
possibilities; larger range of the systems; greater effects on targets
because of improved ammunition, higher firing speed and imp roved strike
accuracy; better employment against armored vehicles in the direct line
of fire; greater mobility and less maintenance.
The combat helicopter is gaining increasing importance as an element of
fire. A highly efficient air weapon, it can attack moving targets,
especially tanks, and thereby provide more fire support to ground troops.b
Such a helicopter has a relatively large carrying capacity, can take on
various types of weapons and weapons systems, mainly antitank rockets, and
fire control equipment, strike at armored vehicles from its own territory
via large distances without being immediately hit by the enemy's air
defense, has great maneuverability, a high flying speed and along flying
range.
Thus, apart from nuclear strikes, it is also possible by the fire ~ rom
conventional weapons effectively to fight agait;st the enemy at great
depths and in various directions.
The fire not only has to prepare and support the thrust of the motorized
infantry and tanks, it also must supplement, or create the conditions
for, nuclear strikes. As there is only a limited supply of nuclear weapons
available, their use must be assessed circumspectly and be careful ~y
computed. In many cases the defense effort can also be satisfied through
artillery fire or air strii:~s. When combat operations, at least in some
stages, proceed without the use of nuclear weapons on either side, it i.s
mainly up to the artillery troops to act during this period as the main
fire power with their guns, howitzers and missile launcher units. Reliable
and accurate mortars of all calibers also play a decisive role in this
connection.
Nuclear blast and fire can, to be sure, destroy large parts of the enemy's
order of battle. Yet a combat only is completed when the enemy's territory
has also been occupied.
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'Chat alwc-y;~ requi.re