EASTERN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000200110023-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 95
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 22, 1999
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: July 3, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
Confidential
No Foreitin Dlsaem
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 STATSPEC
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NO FOHI?ICN UISSEM
I~ORIiI (;N 131ZOADCAS'1' TNI~ORMA'I'TON Sl?RVTCE
I~~rcign Prc:;s lligest : - - 0024/75 - - 3 ,1u1 75
TransT.ations from M:iiitacrwcsen (42)
l'ON'1'liN'I'S
Army Gen flof.Emann Criticizes i`J~'.'I'0 1
NA'1'0 Alliance Seen Suffering from US-European
Itiva'_ry ll
Details Provided on Developing Officer
Characteristics 24
Mass Participatiofi i.n ' Signal GDP. 25' Detailed 34 '~
Greater Emphasis to be Placed on Field Training 43
Physical F~tncss Programs for Over-40 Army
Members DiGcussed 53
'Maximum Acceptable Concentration' Values
Explained ~ 61
Use of Roads Seen as Vital Factor in Military
Operations 70
Vice-Admiral Ehm Calls for Greater Effort by
People's Navy 75
Deficiencies Cited in Political Training in
People's Navy 82
CONFiDENT1AL
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ARMY GLiN IfOF}~M/1NN CRI'L'IC I L}S NA'I'0
East L'erlin MILITAIiRWISIiN in German Jan 75 pp 3 - 13
[Editorial by tinny Gen 1}. Ilof#mann, r~~ember of the politburo of the
SF:D Central Committee and GDR Minister for National Defense]
A Good Initial Position for the 1974/75 Training Year
/Text/ The 1974/75 training year has started well in all the sectors of
the National People's Army and the border troops. In the midst of our
working population the army members are preparing themselves with new
initiatives in ,the struggle for a high degree of combat power and combt:~t
readiness for the celebration of the 30th anniversary of the liberatio~~.l
from fascism and the 20th anniversary of the Warsaw Fact. The goals
that u-e have set for ourselves are high, the foundations on which we
build on are solid.
What characterizes the efforts and the results of the 1973/74 training
year that we need continue and enlarge? Characteris*.ic were the efforts
for higher results in troop leadership, in education and training; their
objective, critical and progress-oriented spirit. Characteristic wcis
the struggle for the direct troop relevance of our idFOlogical work; the
intensive efforts to strengthen the authority of the party organizations
and their closeness to the masses. Characteristic was the effort to
strengthen our comradeship-in-arms, particularly with the Soviet Army,
snd to increase the combat power and combat readiness of our formations
and troop units in accordance with alliance obligations.
The work of all of us has paid offl Over the past year--and this is one
of the most valuable results--the political consciousness o= the great
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mat:v of our army membcr.s, their perf.orm:uue w.i..J.in};ness and their.
ol~er.:-t Lonnl. readiness h:rve increased. Al. 1. the activities of. the ~~ol.l.-
rica.l and miJitnr.y Jeader.shap, of trai.n.ln}; :uul education, have ].ed with
more efl~:ctiveness to a marked ncr.ease :Ln the combat readiness of the
troops and r~taf:fs of a1.1. the services and the border troops.
We have t;:ade progress because sae could always count on the dili.gcnce
and inifl.t-tive of our so.idiers, our NCO's and junior lieutenants,
on the energy ;tad high performanne of our officers, generals and admirals,
anri on the act-i.vi.t:y of our ci?~i11an employees, because all. the members
of the NVA and the border troops ~ef-t Ito stone unturned to strengthen
the defensive capability of socialism.
We have made progress because our party and its Centra]. Conunittee, the
Council of Ministers of ~-he GliR ,aid the national. defense council have
have always paid close attention to our National People's Army and the
border troops and have cons~.stent].y worked to develop our entire social-
ist national defense.
We have made progress because the working class, the collective farn;ers
and the socialist inteJ_ligentsia, togethF~r with our entire worki.n6 popu-
lation, have created good conditions for the military protection of
socialism. Thus we enjoy a good starting position to successfully re-
solve tlia tasks of the current training year.
In which political and, in particular, politi.caJ.-military environment
will we have to"fulfill these tasks?
Detente--the Principal Tendency in International Relations
"We live in a time," said comrade Brezhnev at the occasion of the ceremony
celeb..atirg the 25th anniversary of the GDR. "iu which the basic condi-
tions for a fundamental reformation of international relations are
present, in the first instance here in l;urope."1
These fundamental changes in the world political arena and in international
relations are the lawful result of the global peace initiatives, prin-
cipally on the part of the Soviet Union, which characterized our collec-
tive peace and security pol-.cy also in the past year. The decisive
foundation which allows these successes to flourish has b?en and con-
tinues to remain the steadily increasing strength and radiation capability
of the socialist system in the political, economic, military and in-
tellectual-cultural areas. It is this strength that guarantees that
detente has today become the main tendency in international relations.
It encourages and strengthens those working masses who are still living
in the imperialist sphere of influence in their anti-imperialist struggle.
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Thanks to t:he m:Lght of the Soviet Union arA;i the growing international
influence of our socialist community of states, the way towards good
neighborly relations and mutually beneficial cooperat~!on among states
of differing social order is being prepared day by da;~. Preliminary
successes can already be seen in the limitatie~- of the armaments race
in p~,.tial sectors, and the genuine prospect to commence the limitation
of arms has begun to appear. Not least of all the growing strength acid
activity of the Soviet Union and its allies is witue~ased by such facts
as the checking of the military conflicts in the Near East and on Cyprus.
In both cases it has been the constructive foreign policy of the Soviet
Union, that i.s true to its princ{plea and has as its objective the safe-
guarding of the sovereignty of peoples, which has contributed in de-
cisive measure to the start of political negotiations.
Successes in the anti-imperialist v,truggl.e can be registered also on
other fronts. In Portugal, the fascist dictatorship has collapsed.
And although the forces of reaction are trying everything to inhibit
the all-lance between the progressive parties and .-he movement of the
armed forces in order to prevent the transition of the former Portug~ ~se
colonies to the path of national independence, i_ts machinations have
not been successful to date. In Greece too, whose working people have
for years been under the whip of the fascist mili.tar}~, r_he reactionary
groupings have had to retreat.
The successes of the Soviet Union, of the other Uccialist states, of
the anti-imperialist liberation movement and of the international workers'
movement, these are the one, the dominant, the progress-?oriented side
of the global happening. On the other hand, the opponents of socialism,
of peace and democracy also left nothing undone in the .last year to delay
the process of international detente and the growth of the progressive
forces that is connected with it.
The fascist junta in Chile not only is reinforcing its systematic opnres-
si,~n of the working people and of all democrats in the {.:iterior of the
country, it also is playing a decisive role in the encirclement of Peru
by U.S. imperialism and the Latin American oligarc'~~+.es which are also
directed against other progressive coui-tries anc: m~~, aments in South
America. The imperialist leadership group in Israel is also maintair!~ng
its a!;gressive and hegemonistic policy against the Arab peoples.
NATO is Planting Charges Against Detente
The leading circles of the imperialist camp are maintaining as before
their policy of strength, of the arms race, of threats and blackmail
based on military force. Thus Kissinger, the Secretary of Sta~':e of the
United States, declared 20 August 1974 in Miami i.n an address to war
veterans associations of the ''nited States, that the United States will
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have to remain "a super.i.or military power" because the mi.li.tary might
of the country is the foundation of its dlplomntic strength. It is
necessary therefore to bring its "mili.tary strength into harmo*-y with
its foreign pol.i.cy ob~ectlves." The United States therefore world never
accept "she strategic superiority o1' another p^wer." In pointing to the
fact tt-at the United States has at present about one third of its con-
ventional forces deployed abroad, Kissinl;er stateu candidly that these
troop contingents "are not serving abroad dust to do the foreigners a
favor.''
Even ~.hou~h the internal contradictions within the NATO Pact are coming
to the fore stronger than ever--f.or instance the fourth Middle Eastern
War and the military altercations between Greece and Turkey in connec-
tion with Cyprus--the impet-ialists have thus far always succeeded to
bridge the contrasts between the member states on the basis of their
common class interests, to strengthen the alliance particularly be-
tween the U.S. and ttie Western European NATO states and to expand the
political and military action capability of the military bloc. Not-
withstanding all the rivalries over armament profits among the imperi-
alist ~oncernss NATO has also succeeded in attaining a relatively high
degree of arms ~;:ooperation and to advance the integration of the Western
European %?ommunications systems and of their logistical systems. All
these efforts aim in the final .nalysis at a separate Western European
military alliance under the iVATU roof which will also 'nave control over
the British and French nuclear arms and their delivery systems.
At the beginning of November 1974, American Secretary of Defense
Schlesinger visited r_he FRG. In the course of his visit he emphasized
the importance of that country as a "bastion of NATO." The FRG should
become more conscious of its decisive role in view cf the political
situation in Europe. FRG Defense Minister Leber, for his part, assured
the visitor that the FRG would maintain its position in the alliance. The
cooperation with the United States never functioned as well as now.
Latest results cf this "well-functioning cooperation" are already in
evidence! Thus the FI;G is increasing the number of brigades in its army
from 33 to 36 and is improving the combat strength of five additional
brigades through mechanization in particular through the allocation of
tanks. The advance guard rote of Lice FRl within the NATO alliance was
honored by Schlesinger with the final confirmation that the U.S. farces
statio:-ed in the FRG were to be strengthened by tw~~ brigades, two artil-
lery battallions and one attack helicopter com~,any at a cost of the
logistical forces.2 We will thus have to count :,~ five more NATO origades
in the attack deployment of NATO on the territory of the FRG beginning
with 1975.
The NATO strategists are ratting their main emphasis on the qualitative
improvement of their forces in orde_ to make these even more effective
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and ma;,;lization-independent. In this way tl~e nuclear units of the NATO
forces have been strengthened by phasing in of the operational-tactical
"Lance" missile system and the F-4F "Phaeitom" fighter. In the case of
the ground forces the anti-tank and anti-aircraft forces are being
otrengthened and the fire power and attack capability of the units is
being reinforced. The U.S. Army for instance has started to equip its
units with the M 60 A 2 tank and i.s supplying the FAG forces with the
M 60 A 1 tank as well as the continued use of. the "Leopard" tanks and
the "harder" self-propelled guns. New combat vehicles are also coming
into use among the British and the Belgian ground forces.
The NATO air forces are improving their combat possibilities through
snore modern weapons and equipment, by means of rockets and bombs of
high accuracy and target effect as well as with devices for electronic
counter measureG. Air defense was improved by changes in the z~Iert
system and command and control measures. Cooperation with the air de-
fens~ system of the land forces has been more closely coordinated,
the low?-level reconnaissance service has been expanded and the anti-
aircraft rocket forces have sndergonE technical modernization.
The naval. forces of NATO were able to mai~itain throughout the year a
high degree of operational readiness for units of its attack and security
farces white at the same time maintainir-g its reconnaissance acid ob serva-
tion missions.
ISetween 45 and 65 percent of all the naval units were constantly at sea.
The activities of the naval. forces have been extended with respect to
*_he duration, the strengt:i and the ocea, space ssed for the completion
of the combat task. The equipment with new guided missile patrol boats,
marine helicopters as well as other moder.i weapons and equipment was
continued.
Tne improvement of the NATO military potential also extenas to she
operational preparation within the territory of the idATO states and in
particular that of the ,RG. The constr-~ction of protected air bases,
fortified combat positions, of tactical air bases and depots on the
regular air bases was advanced. This is true alto regarding the in-orove-
ment of the military commun9.cation network. Along the border stri.n r~-
inforced concrete towers have been started that are intended to house
radio and radar reconnaissance installations. The traffic net has been
extended and the construction of barriers has been continued. The linking
of the military pipelines into a supply net has comr,~enced.
The facts cited here are only a pars of that which the most important
NATO states are doing for the purposes of armament, and to raise their
aggressive capabilities, and are examples of the explosive charges that
are being heaped up against detente. With good reason Comrade Honecker
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said at the beginning of the party training year: "It is this way,
that While Olle part of the bourgeoisie in the capita.l.ist countries view
peaceful coe:;i.stence as the only alternative t~ a nuclear war Ln view of
the st?-^_ngth of socialism, other circles of monopoly capltalism--particu-
larly the military-indusY_rial complex--do not want t?.o let go of the
bankrupt conceptions of the cold war. and are attempting not only to
stop the process of detente, but to reverse it. Our foreign and de-
rense policies therefore must take into consideration all the variables."3
What Does it Mean to Iriake the Detente Process Irreversible?
To make the process of detente irreversible requires today and in the
future a hard struggle to prevent the :Imperialist system and its most
aggressive circles from altering in its favor the balance of forces.
To make detente irreversible requires:
--ro continue along the way of the strengthening of socialism in all
sectors and with always higher effectiveness, to strengtt,~n the weight
of our collective foreign and security policies through cl.nsr and in-
tensive collaboration with the Soviet Union and the f:raternai socialist
countries;
--to block the path of the forces of L-he imperialist camp that desire
to return to the practices of the "cold war" through a constant strengthen-
ing of the collective defense strength of socialism, and to limit in-
creasingly their possibilities of embarking on military adventL~res;
--to supplement the political detente through measures of military
detente, to limit step by step the armaments race and to end it eventu-
ally completely in order_ to move on to actual disa~-:~:ament at a later
date;
--to create a system of collective security as an alternative to the
presently existing military blocs and to bring to a successful conclu-
sion the negotiations concerning );uropean security as an important step
along this way;
--to give life to the international agreements concluded to date through
the development of economic, scientific-technical and cultural cooperation,
and to regulate the relations among states of a differing social order
on the basis of principles of peaceful co-existence.
Oar efforts for a dependable militar}~ protection o.f socialism and for
the safeguarding of peace will contribute decisively to the future de-
velopment of detente. Under the conditions of the socialist peace offen-
sive and the successes of international detente the requirement for a
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high degree of combat power and combat readiness of our troops does not
diminish, it increases. 'Co maintain and to perfect it rer,,ains the c~n-
tral problem of our total activity. All eectors of military life are
subordinated to this task. Its purposes are served by troop leadership,
by our political-ideological tra.ning as well as by operational and
combat training, by logistaca.l and medical. maintenance. We have always
looked upon high combat power and combat readiness as a unity of poli-
tical-ideological, millt-:iry and military-technical factors. But the
extent to which the totality of these factors is translated into eff ec?-
tive military results depends in the last analysis always on the per-
sonal dedication of our people. The personal dedication and e.igagement
of our soldiers, our NCO's, junior lieutenants, officers and civilian
employees has tc be organized militarily at the same time that it is
motivated ideologirall_y. Only this unity allows us to realize a de-
cisive part of our military superiority over every imperialist aggressor.
But the extent to which we succeed, the extent to which the ideological
work becomes troop-effective and permeates all of military life, depends
to a large degree on the capability of our commanders and ?political
workers, on the strength and effectiveness of our basic organizations.
The Great Responsibility of Party and Politic~~l Organs
To create a clear understanding of the complicated questions of the
international class struggle and the development of the political-
mili.tary situation, that is the direct responsibility of our party and
p~titica1 organs. This task has consequences for an informative, lively
and convincing political activity and for the operational leadership of
all sectors. The commanders must be able to depend on their deputy for
political affairs as a leading party functionary as they would ?u~on
themselves. ~~There the deputies for politi.c31 affairs and all political
officers do full justice to their leadership tasks in the guidance of
tl,e political-ideological work, where they demonstrate how every com-
munist must work to direct the thinking and the action of army members
towards t'~e disciplined performance of the military tasks and thus
towards the accomplishment of the orders of the commander, they wield
at the same time the most effective influence on the strengthening of
. the authority of the party and of the individual leadership.
We must pay closer attention to the changes that have occurred in tie
thinking, feelings and conduct of our young citizens and of all our
people as we organize and guide the polit?.ical work. The draftees of
today have a generally high educational level and a nigher political
maturity, they are more self-conscious and demanding in the best sense
of the word, and they are also more critical and intolerant vis-a vis
phenomena that do not fit into their concept of socialism. While this
doubtlessly creates favorable c~ndi~ions for a more effective political
education, i*_ also forces a more careful, more differentiated and more
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var~~ed organization of this educational process. Whoever tolerates a
schematic approach or routine in the organization and leadership of
the political work, whoever approaches the tasks of today and tomorrow
w~th the methodP that were barely acceptable yesterday will be denied
success i.n his work!
Among the most significant traits of our young soldiers, NCO's, junior
lieutants and officers as the sons of our socialist GDR is that most of
them want to be challenged and can be challenged intellectually. They
seek confirmation and recognition as valid socialist personalities. They
want to be taken seriousl~~, they want to think and act independently.
They also do not accept a finished political world view, they want to
elaborate one for ~hemselves. They are susceptible to substantive
information and convincing arguments. Therefore one of the decisive
conclusions as regards ideological work in all its forms--for political
training and social sciences education, for up-to-date political :infor-
mation as well as for the daily agitation ~aorlc according to military
requirements--must be: more relevance, more vividness anal genuine dis-
cussion, at the same time more theoretical thoroughness and pedagogic-
methodological mastery, more, and more systematic, study of the classi-
cists of Marxism-Leninism, of the party decisions and of the latest
contributions of Soviet military science.
Points of )Jmphasis in the Political-Ideological Work
Our entire political-ideological work in the coming months is under the
influence of. the two historic anniversaries of May 1975. In the light
of the three past decades, on the basis of historical facts and our own
experiences we need to emphasize the historic achievement of the Soviet
Union and i.ts armed forces in a convincing; manner, we need to demonstrate
it as an act that next to the October Revolution has had the greatest
influence on world history. We have to explain clearly to our army
members that the Warsaw :'act represents a coalition of a completely new
and socialist character whose socialist basis is a guarantee of its peace-
sustaining function and which has for the past two decades consistently
realized the Leninist demand for a c~~llective defense of socialism.
The conscious application of the unity of history and policy--as it also
finds its expression in the creation and growth of the Warsaw Pact--makes
i~ easier to understand the mission of the socialist arme3 forces;
demonstrates to our arm_~ members and civilian employees their high de-
gree of personal responsibility for the dependable military protection
of socialism and for the safeguarding of peace; and sharpens their per-
spective for future tasks. What are the main points of emphasis on which
we should concentrate ourselves in this connection?
First of all it is important to explain convincingly the w.;rldwide offen-
sive of Socialism, the historic achievements in the development of.
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sociallsm/communism as a unity and the successful balance sheet of the
GDR that ~s connected with it. By this we mean the permanently high
growth rate of industrial production which is a characteristic trait of
socialist society and the related steady improvefient in the material
affluence of people, the better-nent of working and living conditions and
the stability of the economic and social situation of tl~e working masses.
We mean here the completely new way of .life represented by socialism.
'" Second, we direct ourselves to the training for socialist internationalism
and patriotism, to the providing of convincing evidence concerning the
decisive role of tr. Soviet Union. and of the socialist community of
states in the world process of revolution, we orient ourselves to the
steady strengthening of the alliance with the Soviet army and the other
fraternal socialist armies. Pegardless of which tasks we have to solve
and which problems have to be mzstered in the struggle for high combat
readiness--always and forever we are led by our guiding star of socialist
internationalism. We must strengthen the conviction that a socialist
patriot is always a consistent and dependable internationalist. For us
as army members this means the strengthening and broadening of t_he
alliance relations between the National People's Army and the Soviet
Army in all its multiple forms.
Third, we have to explain thoroughly the roi.e of the socialist military
power in the struggle for peace and security, against the opposition of
the reactionary and aggressive forces of imperialism. A high state of
combat readiness of our forces presupposes clarity concerning the dia-
lectic of the struggle for international detente and the military
strengthening of socialism.
Fourth, we direct our efforts in realization of the decisie:ns of the
Eighth SED Party Congress and the Ninth Delegates Conference of the
party organizations of the NVA and the border troops towards lice un-
masking of the class enemy and his hostile policies, particularly his
military intentions.
Effective ideological activity and truly socialist troop leadership also
means daily concern with the question of socialist relations among the
army members. These consciously-formed relations reflect the character
of our armed forces, they are a decisive nurturing ground for the combat
morale, the will to perform, the discipline and whole gamut of training
results. Socialist relations are and remain an essential objective
necessity in the solution of military tasks in the attainment of high
combat power and combat readiness.
The tasks for the 1974/75 training year have been placed before us. To
order them for the separate services, for the border troops, their
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l'or.matCons un:Ltrz rend inetal:Liti.onn is one rcl.de of the equ:ztion, lint Co
volvc~ them ~rtt:h [he :LeadJ.ng etrcugth of the party orl;:cnizatl.o~zs wLth the
darih of Chc I~r.ec German Youth, with the wealth of idena rind 'che crc~ativc
f.:orcc of al.:L the aimy members rmd ci.v:il.ian c~mp.l.oyces In tli~~ dally mLal-
tur.y life, that i.s the other side. Much wi. 1. depend on how :i1.1. vuper-
vi.sors, al.l party functionaries, al.l tr~nin:S.ng of f:i.cera :Ln the NVA and
the border truopr. wii.l r;ucceed to make the polit:cal. hll;t~ points of the
new training gent--the 30th annivcrsar.y of tine la.brrat ton .."tom far;c:Lsm
and the 20th anniversary of the Warsaw Pact--a di_k;nif:Led occasion of
exemplary and creative performance of. mi.Litary duties. "Sold[er
Initiative 75--i1nited With The A1.lies--Strong, and Combat-Ready!"--this
i.~i the motto that describes ou, military thinking and acting :Ln the
1974/75 training year. As soldiers of soci.ala.sm we are gauging our
internationalist attitude primarily according, to the: state of our. combat'
readiness and on our ability to carry out combat and vecuri.ty missions
together with the Soviet Army and the other al.l.ied armies.
Among the most important concerns and tasks ~~f socialist competition in
the 1974/75 training year are the following:
--to diffuse rind absorb the Marxist-Leninist world view in an atmosphere
of st'_mulating learning and comradely assistance;
--to develop the military and military-technical knowledge, the special-
ist capabilities and skills of army members in a goal-oriented manner,
in particular to direct initiatives towards the exemplary .are and
maintenance and the most effective e~zployment of. weapons and equipment;
---to further strengti_~: '-he military esprit de corps, to in:;ure in
particular that the training standards are met b~? each army member in
quality fashion and to integrate the new soldiers rapidly and in a
comradely manner into the existing collectives;
--to strengthen military order and discipline and to promote socialist
relations in the collectives.
In socialist competition too, suc~:ess does not arrive by itself. but it
must be organized. This competition must be used even more skillfully
as a leud~rship technique. But this again is only possible if we suc-
ceed in i~rin~;ing every collective and every single cor.~rade into the
discussion concerning the objectives of the competition, to promote
r-ew initiatives, to develop political motives in a goal-oriented manner
and to creatA the necessary material and organizational conditions be-
sides the '_deal bases for the accomplishment by everyone of his duties
in an hc~.rorable manner.
Let us taF with united and increased strengths under the tested leader-
ship of the party of the working class, those practically inexhaustible
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I~~ I I~, ~ Iti,,l?
well.uprl.n};r~ that rerrult from rl-e nc,clnLLet. chnrnctrr of our m-my--for
thr. benef .t of uur common concern ol- rtocLnlirtm and crnnmunLr~ml 1,ct ura
make :- worthy contribut lon in honor c.~f the 30th nnniverr-nry of the
LLbcrntlon of our people rrnd the 'loth nnn(vcrrinry of our nociallnt
nl_1J.nncc, by not reLcxin}, in t:hc~ ntruYKle for hiKh combat: power and
cocnbnt r.endinesn in the clefenne of rroclnlinm and the nnCel,unrd.lnK of
pence!
F00'I'NO'I' i~. S
1.
NI~.UI?S Dis"UTSCIILANll (i3 edition), 7 Oct 74.
2.
PiF. WELT, linmbur.I;, 6 Nov 74.
3.
NGUL'S D1;UT~CIILAND (I3 edit:L.~n) ,
27_ Oct 74.
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NO I~OIZIiiCN I)1`~~~I~AI
NA'Z'I) AI,I,TANCI: S1iliN SIII~I~IiIZfNC I~ROn1 U~-IiIIROI'IiAN I'.IVALRY
East Rcrlin MII,I'~'AIitWkl'iP,N itl German Jan 75 Irl' "?')-37
(Ry Col I)r. A. Charisius and l,t. ('o] I)r. '1'. Ik~hia~: cif the
htil itlry I l story Institute o f the GI)R]
/Text/ When the "Declaration Conccr.ninl; At lrmti.c Kclat ions" was sii;ncd
on 26 ,Tune 1974 in the course of a summit conference of the 15 NATO
nations, most mass media in the lvropean capitali~;t countries received
it without enthusiasm. The declaration had been published durlnl; a
council meetinl?; of the treaty organization nn lc) June. The media de-
scribed thc~ declaration as a new and significant step i.n t-1ie Supposedly
highly successful 25 year history of NATO but at the same time. they
could not avoid noting the continuaticn of thc~ political c~rtsit of thc~
alliance. The FRANKFUP'I'L'It ALLGEMEINE Pa'1'UNG wrote on ?.7 June ] 974:
"The Declaration of Ottawa which the heads cf f;overnment of the North
Atlantis Treaty nations signed with such ceremony on Wednesday in Tirussels,
is not to be misinterpreted as a historic event.. .the new era s*_ill has
not commenced." On the other hand, rRG chanccl.lor 11. Schmidt noted that
the "Atlantic Declaration (is) more than a piling up of platitudes,...
After alI thf~ debates of the past twelve or f:if:teen monthr; such a general
declaration i~c...highly useful."1
Actually the "Atlan~ic Declaration" does mark a certain milestone in the
context of the lively public discussion in progress since the beginning
of 1973 concerni:tg the future shape of the alliance in general and of
the relations beta*een the American and the European monopoly bourgeoisie
which is evolving furthr_r, in particular. Even Western commentaries con-
firm that tt~~.s declaration was not able to eliminate the objectively
active contradictions among the impe~~alist states or governments. The
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NO l~ORI? I (.N Il I S51sM
poLltlc.cl-mLlltrcry rcpc~nkc?t' of t'he CU1J/CSU frtctaon i.n the i~ItG Ilundestng,
M. Wocr.ncr. sunmced :Lt up tli1= wr-y: "The presenC condLtl.on of Nl:'f0 l;iverc
1 itt.lc~ rc~nnon for a cclcbrntion?"7 And the T~RANKI~URTER IZl1NllSC11AiI com-
mented on t:lcas prob.lcvn on 7.0 June: 1.914 us fo.ll.ows: "'i'he worth of r;o.lemn
declarations has often pr.ovcd to be of short duratLon. The NA'1'(1 dec]n-
rntlon of Ottawa...nt bcu:t has n symboalc vletnr.lrrn
nternatl.ona.l trim.
Consc:Lentaouancs:, :[n Prec.Lnenes:~ and Ah l Li.ty to entry th lnl;s
carrying out :,er.vl.ce exact l.tucle. Lhroul;h.
instructl_ons and
commands.
N
Highly developed Eal;erness for. human hove of. officer's
sense of duty ;a[.tlr contacts. profession.
respect to sub-
ordinate clans com-
rades sad the technLcal
equipment entr?~sted
to t~is care.
--Commander characteristics are stabilized t.n varying degrees. It be-
comes apparent again and again that structures of psychical character-
~~ istics can he quite variable, depending on the objective demands made
on r:he personality involved as well as depending nn the level of de-
velopment in any particular case. It has not been our. experience that
the characteristics striven for through educational influences in an
officer trainee unit or in an officer's collcctivc will after t an undisturbed assurance of individual study and individual preparation
for pout:^al training. Despite the fact that the Political Training
Order provides clear statements in this respect, frequent infractions
occur and such complaints are aften justified. The basic organizations
sl-ould therefore make greater demands on military superiors to supply
genuine and effective assistance to the training group leaders.
This concludes our remarks on some problems cf the preparation and execu-
tion of political training as i;, is being conducted in the area of the
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I'ecplc's Navy. 'Che authors do not claim to have dealt with the problems
exhaust ly and comprehensively. All we intended to do was to provide
a few impulses and suggestions to commanders, politica'1 workers, training
group leaders, and propagandists which are intended to help them to meet
the higher requirements of the Political Training Orde1 in a better
manner.
1. K. rreuder~reich: "What is the Pedagogical and Methodological In'
str~iction Preparation? What does it want to do and what can it do?"
In: PARTEIARBEITER, Berlin, No 8, 1973, p 26.
2. H. B:uenner: "In Connection with an Evaluation of the Party Elections:
a Cont;nuation of the Purposeful. Increase of the Combat Strength of
the Party Organizations. In: PARTEIARBEITER, Berlin, No 3, 1974, p 4.
See also: Il. Knaefel: "Level and Effectiveness of Advanced Social
Science Training." In: MILITAERWES rN Berlin, No 11, 1972, pp 20-26.
W. Wund rlirh? "Increased Requirements ~n the Conduct of GWW." In:
MILITA~RWFSENBerlin, No 10, 1973, pp :1-12.
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