EASTERN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000200110007-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 75
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 22, 1999
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: March 18, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

~~~~~ZRN L~UR t~P ~ T~R,AN LA 1'~ ~ ON ~ ,
8 MAR: 7~ ' ~ `~
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Confidential
Nu Furcihn llisaenr
~~t~c~: ooe~/~s
iti March 1975
D
FBIS
TYanslations Fro~z 11~1ILITAE'R W~'SEN ~ -~ `~ ~
STATSPEC
FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
\ 4UIIIIIICIil1~1
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FOREIGN BROADCAST INFURMATIf)N SERVICE
Foreign Press nigest: -- 0007/75 -- 18 March 1975
Translations from Milit,aerwesen (39)
Mass Media Seen As Key To Effective Indoctrination
1
Kn~wiedge of Marxism-Leninism Necessary for NVA Officers
11
Efforts Detailed for Recruiting Professional Soldiers
17
~:.ommentary Provided on U. S. Military Bases Abroad
26
M+.tnition Supply of Battalions Discussed
36
Advantages of Joint Soviet-GDR Officer Training Des~sribed
42
Pro5lems in Radar Maintenance Cited
47
FRG 'liolations of Coastal Waters Cited
52
Figuras Provided on CEMA Merchant Fleet Activities
56
Problems Cited in Anti-Mine Equipment
65
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MASS MEDIA SEEN AS KUY TO EFFECTIVE INllOCTRINATir7N
East Berlin MILITAERWESEN in German Oct ?4 pp 3-13
[Editorial by Col H. Knetsch, historiar~J
/Text/ Etientful and busy weeks and months in preparing the 25th anniver-
sary of the GDR lie behind us. The pulse of our Workers and Farmers State
was beating in every collective. Everywhere the competition was going on
toward solving all tasks through good and very good performance and t~ us
to contribute to ensuring a constantly high comi:at readiness ar~d fign tirg
strength.
Weeks like L-hese made the basic position in the actions of the indiv iduals
as in the collectives stand out particularly clearly: Their firm al 1 lance
with the socialist state and the socialist community rallied around the
Soviet Union, their tcnshakeable confidence in and loyalty to t:he working
class and its Marxist-Leninist party, their determination to ;atr2ngthen
the military might ~.nd superiority of socialism and their will never to
leave the eneny a c narc` .
In placing, in the good conscience of d~~ty fulfilled, their soldiers'
present on the birthday table, the members of the NVA and of .*.he GDR
border troops also reflected the effectiveness of our political-ideo -
logical work. But, as always, we canr_ot stop at what has been achieved,
particularly since "anniversaries are not empty days of celebration t o
the communists and t'~e class conscious part of the proletariat, but
directions for the class struggle, guidelines for. action."1
Thus precisely we have to proceed in carrying on our political-ideological
work so as to obtain deeper insights again and lasting effects for the
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develop;nent of consciousness. For only out of the increasingly better
understanding of our class task grows the s trong motivation toward con -
scious action in all military affairs.
The decisive importance of ideological work and the understanding that
none of its sides and none of its forma mus t be slighted demand that time
and again their requirements and consequences for the leadership be worked
out in the various fields. The following discussion of the work of agi-
tation is intended to direct attention at those areas in which still
greater Efforts are needed in order to advance content structure, organi-
zation ar.r? leadership'..
Use Agitation Possibilities More Purposefully!
The Nin*.h Delegates' Conference of the SED party organizations in the NVA
and the GDR border troops determined that constantly high combat reaAiness
and a growing fighting strength ar% the dr~c isive criteria for the e`.fec-
tiveness cf political-ideological work. From it, accordingly, the high
responsibility of agitation is derived. It must make daily contributions
to the political?-moral education of socialist soldiers' personalities
and of military con~!~at collectives, whereby to ensure a High combat readi-
ness and fighting strength.
Agitation sees its function within the unity and interaction of all other
areas of political-ideological work. Its special importance lies in that
it will exercise its function r~ithout: interruption, that: is to say, in
all situations.
In struggling for high r_ombat readtne;~s and growing fighting strength,
agitation makes a very important contribution, in that it helps provide
the members of the NVA and the GDR bnrclex' troops with the ideas of Marxism-
Leninism, strengthen them in their socialist convictions and modes of
conduct, and develops their political-moral a.nd psychological combat skills;
as it constantly explains the pol:Lcy of the SED, the CPSU and the other
fraternal TMarties, informs on current p~lit ical events, addresses itself
at the daily tasks of military service and mobilizes for the fulfillment
of orders, service regulations and instruct ions; and ass it responds to
moods and views, effectively exploits for educational purposes the attitude
and performances of the individual and of the collect:Lve, popularizes good
experiences and raleases and motivates actions that are rich in initiative.
Viewed in this light, much depends on how the political organs succeed on
all levels in proceeding strictly in accordance with the deter~^ ...~tions
of the agitation order in their applying agitation as a compon~~ni o` their
overall political-ideological work. It includes the setting of prioitties
and giving variety and differentiation to agitation, pouring into it a
demanding ideological-theoretic content--which also means being pertinent
to what happens within the troops--and precise planning and organization.
2
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Offensive and Militarily Effective Agitation---a Leadership Requirement
In discussing agitation one can often hear the opinion that content is
what counts. Quest~_ons of planning and organization, however, are not
always given the attention they deserve. True enoLgh, incr.?easing the
effectiveness of. agitation is principa~ly connected with enhancing its
political-ideological content, its power of conviction. This truth ye.
does not justify ignoring other factors.
Today more than ever precise planning and organization in agitation work
are indispensable to the commanding officer's deputy for political work
and his work group in the troop un'_t. The increasing dynamics and com-
plexity of political life call for circumspection, mobility and the
.ability to understand the essential tasks and connections and to shape the
political work with foresight, accordingly.
The development of socialist military affairs also constantly brings up
new questions. Combat training carried out in accc~rda.ice with the new
programs and the sys?_em of military service have given a different rhythm
to the course of everyday service. No longer is agitation work restricted
to the conventional time periods one was accustomed to.
Good experiences have this to teach: Wherever agitation is an equal and
firm component of the systematically led total process of political-
ideological work, a suitable conc~.irrence and coordination exists with
advanced social science education, political training, party, youth and
culture-political work.
Proceeding from the unity and the specifics of these various sides, the
concurrence and coordination is arranged in such a way that to a con-
siderable degree, precisely through the help of~ agitation, the political-
ideological work can be carried out uninterruptedly and continually,
operationally and on a timely basis.
I think attention should also be paid to the experiences reported by our
comrades, Lt Col Depka and Lt Col Pommer, in AUSBILDER, No 4, 1974, to
thc: effect that many commanding officers include the most important measures
on political work in the training schedules. As they also remark, this
does not obviate the elaboration of special plans for certain training
assignments, field camps or exercises. It remains important that the
planning of political worl: be. geared precisely to the fulfillment of
training assignments, is coordinated in time with training schedules, is
flexible to a certain extent and provides for responses to any given situ-
ation arising.
Practice in the Winter Unit proves: Newspaper exhibits during training
breaks, individual political talks and agitation assignments, readings
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and song evenings around the camp fire, listening to radio news and in-
forming all about what is essential, and working with the dailies, the
camp papers, fliers and the radio-movie-van--none of this depends on
being housed in barracks.
'when one talks about the higher demands that have to be made on the organi-
zation ~~f agitational work, it definitely includes that one x-'_11 consis-
tently ~:nforce the political talks that must constantly be led by all
forces of, agitation. It must be carried on wherever our army members are,
under the conditions of regular service in the barracks, of complex tr:.in-
ing ir. the field, in the servicE .system, under alert conditions and at all
other opportunities. Everywhere our superiors, officers and functionaries
must explain to the army members the Harty policy, clarify now political
phenomena and their connections, and answer the questions raised by the
soldiers, NCO's, officer candidates and officears.
This is riot primarily a matter of sufficient time, but it is an ideological
matter. Therefore one should also make emphatically clear that the 90
minutes set down for daily political mass activity are not a matter that
one may fulfill or not fulfill, but they are the minimum. There are no
regulations, of course, on when and where the time is to be used for it.
The problem is that the superiors and functionaries will in fact make
use of every oppo-tunity and that they, in doing so, apply on the whole
the ~~urious forms and methods for political mass activity. Stereotypes,
onesidedness and repetitiveness testify to impoverishment in the applica-
tion of possibilities and means.
Ir.:proving the Work. With the Mass Media--~n Important Political-ideological
Leadership Task
Certainly, the interest in using rra mass media for information and educa-
tion has grown in all coliectiv~s. Analyses, however, show that th~~ mass
media are not being used sufficiently. For example, too few comrades
still read a daily newspaper regularly. The same holds true for the
weekly VOLKSARMEE. Nor can the work with certain radio and TV programs
yet be called satisfactory. TV programs such as "Aktuelle Kamera" (Candid
Camera), "Der. schwarze Kanal" (The Black Canal), and the TV-Press-Con-
ference" are not regularly being watched by the soldiers and NCO's, for
example. That affects the leadership activity, of course. The mass media
are weapons of our party. Their use must nut be left at random in any
unit.
Two things are indispensable: For one thing, comrades must be given the-
most favorable pos~3ible conditiuns, in terms of space and time, for the
work with the press and other written materials and for receiving radio
and TV programs. And secondly, the superiors, the communists and agitators
must caii for attention to important articles, reports and transmissions
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and must strengthen the soldiers' an~3 non-corns' need to tune in regularly
to the mass media. Part of it, finally, also is to engage in discussions
on what has been read, seen or heard. The mass media not only satisfy
the need for information, they elicit new needs too and stimulate con-
tinuing deliberations and the asssmption of a personal position.
In agitation, as in political-ideological. work altogether, progress is
ensued to the extent that- *_he unity between subst~mtive-theoretic and
organizational leadership in the ideological work -Ls realizt,:, Neither
may ui~= assume that uninterrupted andrigid leadership principally is an
organizational problem, nor must the neglect of organization lead to th e
result that the correct substantive orientation fails to be realized.
The organization of the ideological work requires n,o less prudence and
creativity than does the determination of its ide~o:logical content. Other-
wise, good substantive conceptions frequently re?ma.in lonely thoughts.
Therefore the point is, by payir` attention to content and to the con-
crete conditions of the situation, always to select the most suitable
forms, methods and means and to coordinate them carefully in the way they
work together. This selection and coordination turns out to be a high
leadership requirement for every political organ, every work group for
political work.
On the one hand this requires to focus all .the orchestration of the ideo-
logical work purp~~sefully on the fulfillment of the military class cask,
without being narrow-minded about it.
Gn the other hand it requires that the specific ways in which the manifold
forms, means and methods can work in ali areas of the ideological work
will be given attention in a still more differentiated meaner, so that
one's o:?m potentials in consciousness formation can be brought fully to
bear.
Proper Determination of the Cont,snt of agitation!
We have the obligation still more thoroughly to connect agitation work
with the ideological requirements of the class struggle in our times and
with the ideological demands of everyday military service. The point is
more deeply to penetrate the social connections, the historical inevita-
bilities of our epoch, and still better to understa~-d the concerted police
of the SED and of the fraternal parties in order to be able to carry it out
more effectively. Therefore every political organ must know how to lend
a higher theoretical substance to agitation work and how to interest army
members in new insights, developing in them an eagerness to dispute prob-
lems and to assume a position.
That implies that the opinion by anyone who is honestly struggling for
truth and lucidity should be listened to ~,aith patience and that an answer
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be given to him. No one must shy away from frankly stating his opinion,
no one must be afraid of being accused of being "obscure" only because
he expresses a view that is not completely thought through to the end.
The Twelfth SED Central Committee session has emphatically worked out that
clear political-ideological work is she key for further successes in all
areas. First Secretary Comrade Erich Honecker states this in his con-
cluding speech: "Nobody ahould neglect the fact that tt-e unity of policy,
ideology and. economics exists not only in big and ?.arge?-scale connections,
but that it is effective as an Inseparable unity in daily practical de-
cision-making at every place of work, however, remote, in the motives
underlying the activities of all people. All human activities are the
result of coinciding economic, political and ideological interests and
needs of whatever form. What creative powers and forward-pushing energies
are being mobilized when tYie ptirty organizations succeed in enco~iraging
this concurrence and making it more distinct."2
It is my opinion that the unity to military policy, to our military tasks
and to the daily activities is also formed in this manner. For that
reason agitation must be given a content suc'n that each comprehen3s his
daily performance with respect to social effects and that it encourages
him for further creative action.
The content of all measures of agitation a:ways aims at one task--increas-
ing the combat readiness and fighting strengti. ~f the units, troop com-
ponents anal staffs. 7'he s?.iccess of the work will be measured on how one
succeeds in educa~:ing, the soldiers, NCO's and officers to become military
glass fight,,^_rs who struggle with conviction for permanently high perfor-
mances in their political work, in combat training, in the service system,
and in reliably securing the state borders. PoJ.itical consciousness and
a deep understanding of the combat task are expressed in the conscientious
and disciplined fulfillment of all. military duties.
It i:; being confirmed time and again that it is correct to place the daily
strug?le on behalf of fulfilling the concrete ~.~olitical and military tasks
into the sphere of fundamental questions. It is Trecisely this that makes
clear why it is our concern, again and again, to comprehend those funda-
mental questions in their historical signif icance. Aware of the reper-
cussions of clarity in the fundamental questions, agitation will:
--further strengthen the conviction of the growing superiority of socialist
society. "The strengthening and bJ.assoming of world socialis:a, on the one
hand, and the unprecedented intensification of t?ie general crisis of
capitalism, on the other, supply the proofs, every day anew, for ~..he truth
that only socialism can solve the basic social problems of mankind and
ensure social progress."3
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--prove the correctness of the SED policy and of the road we have taken.
Wit demonstrated
over and over again in daily practical experience that there is nothing
which divides us, but that everything binds us more strongly together.
We also know, however, that imperialism has not changed its nature in any
way despite the intensive efforts at detente by the socialist community
of states, and despite obvious successes in the implementation of the
policy of peaceful coexistence. For this reason, working up a real image
of the enemy occupies a key place in the political-ideological educational
work of our unit. Reala.ty proves that every member of the Coastal Border
Brigade must reckon with the use of force by those involved in attempts
to violate the maritime borders of the GDR. The necessity can thus arise
for him of 'having to make thoroughgoing use of his firearms also in pro-
tecting maritime borders.
The members of our unit, a majority of whom are young men without any
experience in class struggle, today understand very well how to distin-
guish between friend and foe in daily border service.
And because the reliable accomplishment of our battle assignment depends
in the last analysis upon the co.:sciousness of our comrades, all commanders,
political organs and party and FDJ organizations are guided by this con-
sideration, to develop ever more strongly the readiness and the will o`.
a~.l members to prevent, to the extreme, every enemy of our state from
ca~~rying out his plans on the maritime borders.
And still another important political-ideological issue should be specified:
working with the border population. The continuous strengthening of the
connectiun and cooperation with party and state organs of the kreises, with
party organizations, mayors, section agents of the People's Police, schools,
fishery production cooperatives, enterprises, mass organizations and
citizens of the border communities is an inseparable component part of
our struggle for the reliable protection of the maritime borders and
therewith for thy- fulfillment of the principal military task which ha:
been assigned to us.
Successful cooperation was and is essentially determined by the attitude
of our comrades in the border area. The getter we distinguish ourselves
by model discipline and order, the more resolutely we accomplish our tasks
and guarantee security in the border area, just that much more rapidly
will there develop among all strata of our population a wi'lingness to
support the border security for:.es.
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The forms and methods of cooperation are very many-sided. They begin with
3oint cultural and sporting events, with clarification of current poli-
tical questions, and extend via the collaboration of regimental officers
in state and social organs of the kreises and border communities, to
direct support for daily border defense by the border population.
The development of the Coastal Border Brigade proves that the assignment
made by the party and of the leaders of the state, to reliably protect
the maritime borders of the GDR against all imperialist assaults, has
been correctly understood by us and fulfilled with rich deployment of
initiatives. The visible increase in the fighting strength of the party
organizations, the further implementation of the leading role of the
party in all areas of social life, and the consolidation and strengthening
of our combat collectives constituted basic precondition for this.
The successes attained of course make us optimistic, but they are still
no reason for self-satisfaction.
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FIGURES PROVIDED ON CEMA MERCHANT FLEET ACTIVITIES
East Berlin I~IILITAERWESEN in German Oct 74 pp 104C-108C
[By Naval Capt Dr. K. Baerwinkel]
/Text/ At the most recent session of the Political Advisory Committee ~f
the member states of the Warsaw Pact, April 1974, a positive balance was
drawn up of the universal cooperation of the fraternal socialist states.
The communique reads:
"The participants in the meeting emphasize with satisfaction the further
development of the universal cooperation of the fraternal states, which
is accelerating the growth of economic potential, strengthening the
capacity for unification of the member ,stages of the Warsaw pact, and
contributing to increased prosperity of the peoples and the development
of culture and science."1
This evaluation of the successful development of socialism is also true
for CEMA maritime navigation, which is strengthening economic potential
and contributing to the accomplishment of the principal tasks set by the
socialist states.
Maritime navigation can point to successful development during the 25-year
history of the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance /CEMA/. This is
to be seen from the increasing quantities ~f freight transported by CEMA
maritime navigation (in million tons):2
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1950
1960
1970
1972
Bulgaria
0.3
1.1
14.5
15.9
GDR
---
1.4
8.5
10.3
Cuba
---
1.0
2.1
3.2
Poland
2.5
6.0
17.6
21.5
Romania
0.2
0.2
4.4
5.2
CSSR
---
0.5
0.9
0.9
USSR
33.7
75.9
161.9
178.0
Hungary
---
0.1
0.4
0.5
CEMA Total
36.7
86.2
210.3
235.5
Maritime transport performed by CEMA countries thus rose more than six-
fold during 2~ years. As a consequence of this development it was pos-
sible to reach goals set for foreign trade and also to establish the
socialist foreign tradE~ monopoly. Here it must be taken into consider-
ation that the CEMA stares, with the exception of Cuba, as a result of
their geographic situation have control over an integrated territory and
that a large portion of all transport is overland. In conformity with
the varying territorial conditions, the share of maritime transport as
a percentage of total transport by countries was as follows:3
1960
1970
1972
Bulgaria
23.0
67.1
61.8
GDR
21.9
57.3
55.5
Cuba
----
----
66.5
Poland
33.6
48.6
54.4
Romania
4.7
41.8
39.5
CSSR
13.4
13.1
15.0
USSR
7.3
17.9
17.1
Hungary
1.5
4.3
7.2
The conclusion to be drawn from the preceding table is that among the
CEMA states, in part, cons=Lderable changes in fa?/or of maritime transpo rt
are recorded. Maritime navigation of CEMA as a whole in 1970 came to a
12.7 percent share of the freight transported among CEMA member countries,
to be compared with 7 to 7.5 percent during the 1950-1960 peri~?.i. The
tendency of the maritime transport share to rise at the very time the
rate of growth of all kinds of CEMA transport was increasing reflects the
importance due maritime transport at the present time. As a consequence
of the fact that maritime transport among the countries of the socialis t
community of states is being built up and developed to the extent that
geographical conditions make this possible, the opportunity has arisen of
taking advantage of the transport cost savings for greater distances and
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thereby contribute to lowering the prime costs of the goods to be trans-
ported. In addition to the foregoing, a large share of the rising volume
of foreign trade transport between socialist and non-socialist countrie s
is being handled by the CEMA merchant marine and through socialist ports,
with the result that foreign exchange is being saved, which can therefore
be utilised to import additional important products for the accomplish-
ment of. our principal task.
The growth in the volume of our maritime transport was made possible by
a purposeful expansion and development of the CEMA state merchant marine s
and their ever-improving coordinated deployment, especially for line
navigation of the CEMA navigation organizations,
The development of
the CEMA state merchant marines in recent years is shown by the following
statistics:4
Overall Situation
as of 1 January
Number
of ships
GRT in
millions
tdw in
millions
1970
1,930
11,408
15,582
1971
2,010
12,070
16,656
1972
2,058
12,437
17,345
1973
2,104
12,838
18,115
Situation by
in 1973
Country
Percent
USSR
1,451
9,200
71.3
12,688
Poland
264
1,474
11.4
2,219
GDR
194
1,028
8.4
1,464
Bulgaria
104
638
4.9
959
R~~mania
61
339
3.2
577
CSSR
11
115
0.9
168
Hungary
19
44
0.3
60
These data reveal the continuous development of the CEMA merchant marine
which took place by putting newly built tonnage into service while elim-
inating at the same time overage tonnage, The CEMA fleet was composed a s
follows on 1 January 1973:
Number
of ships
GRT in
millions
Percent
tdw in
millions
Tankers
339
3,738
28.2
5,609
Freighters
1,765
9,160
71.8
12,506
The prima tendency of CEMA s*.ates is in tt-e direction of dry freight
tonnage, because petrc'.P~~m -~^d petroleum products are transported overland
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in the first instance, especially over pipelines. In the course of the
further growth and development of internation trade relations, however,
tanker tonnage is also being increased. Indicative of this are the giant
tankers presently being constructed, particularly for the Soviet Union.
From the differences between unit number and tonnage of the tanker fleet
as compared with that of the freighter fleet there also is the consequence
fur the CEMA fleet that the average tonnage per ship is greater for
tankers than for freighters. This is a result of the sharp diminution
in the cost of transporting cargoes in tankers of ever increasing size.
The age composition of the CEMA merchant marine as of 1 January 1973, in
percentages by age group, was as follows:5
Age Group by YE~ars
Country
1-5
6-10
11-15
16-20
21-25
26 and over
USSR
30.0
40.8
17.1
8.4
0.6
3.1
Poland
46.8
27.7
17.6
3.2
0.8
3.9
GDR
16.1
30.1
35.5
11.5
6.5
0.3
Bulgaria
16.3
35.0
11.3
17.4
11.3
8.7
Romania
30.3
53.8
10.5
3.2
0.3
1.9
CSSR
31.5
60.8
7.i
----
----
____
Hungary
51.0
28.6
2.7
----
11.7
----
To be emphasized is that 68.9 percent of CEMA merchant ships are under 10
years of age, an3 only 4.9 percent of the ships are more than 20 years
old. CEMA shipping is thus below the average age of the world merchant
marine, and occupies a favorable position in view of the difficult condi-
tions of the world market struggle. The profitable age composition,
generally good condition of the ships, and the conscious, disciplined
bearing of the crews all contribute together to the growing prestige and
increasing recognition enjoyed by the socialist states among the people
in all the ports of the world. The analysis of the CEMA merchant mar'.ne
would be incomplete without presenting a breakdown by size.
The situation achieved as of 1 January 1973 was:6
GRT Grouping
Ships
GRT Totals`"
tdw Totals
100-500
77
30,000
53,000
500-1,000
45
29,000
38,000
1,000-2,000
282
400,000
501,000
2,000-4,000
613
1,929,000
2,561,000
4,000-6,000
314
1,556,000
2,096,000
6,000-8,000
144
1,018,000
1,408;000
8,000-10,000
301
2,746,000
3,711,000
10,000-15,000
178
1,952,000
2,702,000
15,000-20,000
74
1,206,000
1,752,000
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GRT Grouping
Ships
GRT Totals
tdw Totals
20,000-25,000
39
868,000
1,389,000
25,000-30,000
4
103,000
174,000
30,000-40,000
31
978,000
1,577,000
40,000-50,000
2
83,000
153,000
Totals
2,x.04
12,898,000
18,115,000
This table makes it clear that over half of the CEMA merchant marine
consists of ships up to 6,000 GRT. This characteristic and the large
proportion of ships in the 6,000 to 20,000 GRT range have been determined
by the tasks to be accomplished, the routes to be traveled, harbor con-
ditions and various other considerations.
The Soviet Union, as the leading and strongest CEMA country, disposed of
more than 1,535 general cargo freighters with a total tonnage of 6.2
million GRT in 1972, and ranked fourth in the world. It is anticipated
in international shipping circles that the Soviet Union, after the com-
pletion of the extensive building contracts it has given out, will, with
a total of more than 2 million tdw of general cargo freighter tonnage,
take first place in the world in 1975. At the present time a large
series of lumber transports, bulk carriers (32,000 up to 50,000 tdw),
container ships (uP to 40,000 tdw),_roll-on-roll-off 'ships (4,000 to over
20,000 tdw), OBO /expansion unknown/ freighters (up to 100,000 tdw), and
tankers (including other special constructions for arctic waters and
giant tanker units) are either in process of being constructed or ordered.
During the immediately upcoming years the other CEMA countries are also
further developing their merchant marines in the light of the experiences
gained from scientific-technical progress in shipbuilding. At the same
time harbors are being built up and developed in goal-directed fashion
to speed up transshipments resulting from fleet growth and the increasing
role of special-construction ships.
The CEMA Comprehensive Program: Guideline for Socialist Economic Inte-
gration of Navigation
With the Comprehensive Program for rurther Deepening and Perfecting Coopera-
tion and the Development of Socialist Economic Integration of the CEMA
Member Countries, which was adopted by the 25th CEMA Meeting, July 1971,
and which has been laid out for a 15 to 20 year period, there began a new
historical stage in the economic and political integration of the com-
munity of socialist states. The elaboration and formulation of this all-
embracing Comprehensive Program, only realizable under socialist conditions,
corresponds in full measure to objective requirements for the development
of world socialism.
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By socialist economic integration we mean a process of long-term, planned
interweaving and gradual blending together of the various national econ-
omies into a unified economic organism. The Soviet Union has the leading
role in this procesG, which is above all a product of the many long years
of experience and the high level of social development that was achieved
under the leadership of the CPSU. This process leads inevitably to a
still closer drawing together of the peoples of the community of socialist
states, and to a further shift of the international balance of forces in
favor of socialism.
The Comprehensive Program also contains important findings for the area of
transport and the maritime and harbor economy. A Working Group for Trans-
portation has been part of the council from the beginning, and in 1958
there was constituted the CEMA Permanent Commission for Transport, whose
principal task is the implementation of economic and scientific-technical
cooperation in the development of all branches of transport. The -k
organ for navigation attd shipping is Section Three of the CEMA Pe; ant
Commission for Transport. This is where the maritime transport problems
that arise from the process of socialist economic integration are directly
discussed and solved. Section Four is a permanent organ for the manifold
coordination of the CEMA shipbuilding industry. The activity of this
section contributed to the specialization and standardization of the con-
struction of oceangoing vessels and inland waterway ships, and of ship
equipment. Because of the specialization of the shipyards, which accom-
panied this, and because of the construction of great series of ships,
positive results were achieved for CEMA navigation. A Bureau for Coor-
dinating the Chartering of Oceangoing Vessels was formed as an interstate
organization. It coordinates the chartering of ships and performs very
extensive work in synchronizing plans for reciprocal ut:Llization of CEMA
shippin; tonnage. Thr require~e;:nt of the Comprehensive Program, "to con-
duct mutual cons~llta*_ions on a bi- or multilateral basis concerning the
principal tendencies of transport policy, end to coordinate transport
plans with individual problems for the sake of longer-term planning," was
purposefully implemented. Mutual consultations, synchronization of navi-
gation policy, and joint operations in the maritime transport markets are
regular daily practices today and contribute importantly to the fact that
the merchant marines of the CEMA countries are also respected by the tra-
ditional maritime shipping countries, and are experiencing a growing
measure of recognition.
In recent years a great number of bilateral and multilateral agreements at
the governmental level concerning problems of the maritime and harbor
economy were concluded among the CEMA countries, and also among VEB's
and institutes. The "general conditions for mutual provision of shipping
tonnage" called for in the ~EMA Comprehensive Program have come into
force in the meantime, and the agreements for meeting the need for repair
capacity for the merchant marines have resulted in the improvement and
acceleration of repair work, and also ii- raising maritime operational
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readiness. Data processing and mathematical methods are being employed
to an ever greater extent for the regulation and management of maritime
transport and harbor economy, and contribute to a more rational and fuller
utilization of basic capital resources. The automated management system
"ASU /expansion unknown/-Ocean Transport" of the USSR,B which embraces
2,000 ships, 70 Soviet ports, and some 3,000 ports of call throughout
the world, constitutes the long-term basic guide for perfecting the manage-
ment of the shipping and chartering organizations of the other CEMA mari-
time countries.
Essential progress was achieved in the area of international line navi-
gation because of implementation of the Comprehensive Program through in-
tensification of cooperation. Whereas in 1970 a total of 426 CEMA ships
were employed in 93 navigation lines that shipped 16 million tons of
freight, the use of line navigation rose in 1972 to 604 ships on 98 lines,
which transported a total of 18.5 million tons of goods. This progressive
development is being purposefully continued by further productivity in-
creases on the existing lines and by setting up new lines. It is a matter
of joint line services of CEMA states on the one hand, and on the other,
also of such as are set up on a contractual basis with capitalist ship-
owners. All these measures contribute to the extension of international
economic relations and reflect the growing influence of the community of
socialist states in the world.
Cooperation in economic, technical and organizational areas of navigation
was enriched by t~-e foundation of the International Shipowners Association
(INSA) in June 1970, to which shipowner organizations of all CEMA countries
engaged in navigation belong, including Yugoslavia. The activity of the
Permanent Commissions for Technology, Economy, Juridical Questions and
Documentation made possible more intensive coordination of work and a
unified posture in the world economy.9
The establishment of the economic organization "Interport" between Poland
and the GDR in the area of harbor economy also reflected the transition
to new and higher forms of cooperation pursuant to the Comprehensive Pro-
gram. The joint communique concerning the visit of the GDR party and
government delegation to Poland in June 1974 especially emphasizes the
significance of this economic organization for future cooperation. A
great number of bilateral state navigation agreements were concluded with
capitalist states in recent years by CEMA countries, particularly by the
Soviet Union. These contracts contribute to an improvement of inter-
national relations and constitute a component part of the foreign policy
for the implementation of peaceful coexistence which has been agreed upon
within the community of socialist states.
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The CEMA Merchant Marine: An Important Factor in International Navi-
gation and International Policy
An essential goal set by the CEMA Comprehensive Program reads to the
effect: "Strengthening the position of the CEMA member countries in the
world economy, and as a consequence guaranteeing victory in world com-
petition with capitalism and strengthening the defense capability of the
CEMA member countries."l~
As is apparent from the way this goal has been formulated, thus socialist
economic integration is also a decisive factor. in making economically
secure the national defenses of the Warsaw Pact states. Growing impor-
tance is accorded this point of view in socialist military science and
socialist military economics.
The uninterrupted development of navigation and the :,'LMA fleet, their
increasingly coordinated deployment in building up foreign trade relations
among the CEMA countries and with third countries has resulted in the
fact that socialist merchant vessels are permanently to be found today on
all the oceans of the world and in almost all big harbors. Because of
the level of development achieved, it also became possible for socialist
countries to participate in ever increasing measure with their fleets in
the traditional international navigation conferences. It thereby became
possible to obtain, among other things, more favorable conditions for
the employment of our merchant marine, without having to renounce basic
principles of foreign trade policy in the process.
The deployment of the merchant vessels of the CEMA countries is of de-
cisive importance in maintaining maritime ties and for protecting vitally
important transportation both for the community of socialist states as
well as for the peoples who are fighting imperialism for their national
liberty.
Imperialist states repeatedly used embargo policy and maritime blockade,
in old imperialist style, to eliminate progressive governments and move-
ments from the world. In this connection the behavior of U.S. imperialism
may be recalled, with its moves to choke off the revolution in Cuba by a
trade and shipping blockade. The objective here was to exploit unscrupu-
lously the one-sided economic structure of Cuba as a sugar cane producer,
and its consequent dependence on export trade as well on the importation
of almost all necessary consumer goods. When in March 1960, however,
the first tanker, flying the flag of the Soviet Union, delivered 11,000
tons of petroleum to revolutionary Cuba, it became very apparent that
even in overseas areas imperialism can no longer operate without hindrance.
Today r:ilJ:ons of tons of petroleum and many other products are transported
? annually to Cuba from the Soviet Union and tt-e other countries of the
community of socialist states. Imperialist blockade moves were thereby
proven to be ineffectual.
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The support of the heroically fighting ~tetnamese people by the long-term
maintenance of ocean transport by the socialist fleets also contributed
to an important degree to victory over U.S. imperialism. The sailors of
the participating socialist fleets accomplished outstanding things in
this connection, and fulfilled their internationalist obligations with
honor. Just these few facts make clear the close connection of policy,
economy and national defense, and prove that in the case of the socialist
merchant fleets, the economic and the political-military areas must both
be taken into consideration.
Not only the flags of the socialist merchant marine, but also those of
USSR Navy, today fly on all oceans ~f the world. In this way our Soviet
brothers-in-arms fulfill upon these oceans an important international
task, that of preserving and guarantezing peace in the world.
1. "Communique of the 18 April 1974 Meeting of the Political Advisory
Committee of the Warsaw Pact Member States." In: HORIZONT (Berlin),
No 18, 1974, p 4.
2. Gathered together from: "Statistisches Jahrbuch 1973 der DDR" (GDR
Statistical Yearbook for 1973), Berlin, 1973, p 21 (Appendix); and
the "Statistisches Jahrbuch des RGW" (CEMA Statistical Yearbook),
Moscow, 1973, p 284 (Russian).
3. "Statistisches Jahrbuch des RGW," Moscow, 1973, p 296 (Russian).
4. "Die Seetransportflotte der Laender des RGW" (The Ocean Transport
Fleet of the CEMA Countries), Moscow, various annual series (Russian).
All merchant ships above 100 GWT, exclusive of fishing vessels and
other ships not used in mercantile navigation.
7. Cf "Komplexprogramm des RGW, Ausschnitt 12, Pkt. 3" (CEt~IA Comprehensive
Program, excerpt 12, point 3). In: DOKUMENTE RGW, Berlin, 1971,
p 11 ff.
8. SeP J. Buresch and others: "ASU-Seetransport der UdSSR" (ASU-Oceai:
Transport of the USSR). In: SEEWIRTSCHAFT (Berlin), Vol 10, 1973,
p 730 ff.
9. See H. Prager, "Tasks and Goals of the INSA." In: SEEWIRTSCHAFT
(Berlin), Vol 7, 1973, p 485 ff~.
10. Cf "CEMA Comprehensive Program," loc. cit., p 17 f.
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000200110007-2
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PROBLEMS CITED IN ANTI-MINE EQUIPMENT
~~~~8 R000200110007-2
East Berlin MILITAERWESEN in German Oct 74 pp 119C-122C
[By Lt Comdr A. Godomski~
/Texr_/ The experiences and insights which have been collected in the
course of breakdowns, damages and losses of anti-mine equipment must be
used as a basis for prophylactic measures and for highly specialized
training for anti-mine personnel on board. This conclusion is 'used on
the following facts:
--Breakdowns, damages and losses take place annually, and their repair
and replacement calls for a considerable financial expenditure;
--The length of time the materiel is out of service, due to requisition-
ing, procurement and delivery, is still relatively high;
--The net inventory of ships and boats ready for prompt employment is
thereby reduced.
Changes in Naval Weaponry
Anti-mine and antisubmarine equipment play an important role. Depending
on the combat functions of the units, their principal armament is either -
anti-mine or antisubmarine equipment, and they possess mine-sweeping
boats, mine-laying and mine-clearing ships, antisubmarine ships, and
coastal defense ships.
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Every sailor in the coastal blockade and antisubmarine service must
master the performance under all conditions of all the tasks prescribed
by regulations for mine-laying, mine-clearing, use of depth charges and
thy. deployment of ship demolition squads. In doing this, it must be
boc~ne in mind that great char.;es have taken place in anti-mine equipment
and will also Lake place more rapidly in the future. With the introduc-
tion into the area of responsibility of anti-mine personnel of complete
installations, including complex combinsitions of power machinery, switch-
boards, control apparatus and service consoles, it has become necessary to
put a stop Co thinking in old terms about anti-mine equipment.
The manifold nature of anti-mine equipment not only makes high demands on
the sailors in the coastal blockade znd antisubmarine service, but also
calls for a rethinking on the part of instructors and commanders, above
al'1 with reference to the training and educational processes. Here the
goals for the instructors should be:
--personally inducing a correct attit~ide toward his weaponry;
--increasing his own personal responsibility;
--correct evaluation of the function and sign{ficance of his area of
responsibility;
--perfecting knowledge, capacities and skills for the sake of a permanent
increase in combat and deployment readiness.
Attitudes that find expression in low evaluations of anti-mine equipment
must be fought energetically. That really constitutes a prophylactic
procedure in the truest sense of the word.
The avoidat-ce of breakdowns is principally a matter of:
--the observance of equipment parameters with still more consciousness of
responsibility on the part of the commanding officers during the practices 1
use of anti-mine equipment and technical devices;
--a more precise implementation of the "organization of planned preventiv e
maintenance" and;
--overcoming all kinds of superficiality and lack of aFpreciation for
analytical activity at all levels.
Implementation of the DaB /Service Regulations at Sea/: Basis for the
Effective Use of Anti-mine Equipment
Thoroughgoing analysis of breakdowns proves that investigations are still
often concluded with superficial finding.
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Jamming cutting cable, losses from running aground, the ripping out of a
towing pin are only secondary phenomena. The occasion or primar~~ cause
lies in the fact that the basic regulation for service on board is still
not ?'_~aays being observed adequately. It is not necessary in this place
to go into detail interpreting and explaining particular passages, for
the regulations are quite clear. They demand from the responsible party
in practice corresponding to concrete conditions a great deal of circum-
spection, initiative and independent judgment. Under no circumstances
is it correct to say: "This is only an exercise or a training task--in
actual use everything is clear." Precisely the DaB, just like all other
regulations, mak"s n.~ distinctions of this sort, and does not permit
shortcuts and cutbacks.
Just how necessary it is to hold as closely as possible to the principles
in the basic document shall be set forth ~n what follows.
Changes in course and maneuvers of all kinds are elements of training and
required, depending on the situation, in managing the ship. They are
simulated, but also necessary when the situation suddenly calls for it.
It is particularly important to take into consideration, as early as when
the data are being worked up, maneuvers for traveling with fully deployed
equipment or during the deployment or packing up of the equipment.
Practice shows, however, that the required parameters, tike those for
speed, adjustment of equipment, changes of angle on the horizontal plane
during changes in the ship's course are not always followed. This leads
irresistibly to damage and even loss of equipment. To eliminate damage
and loss+s of this sort in the future, the following should be observed:
first, the correct use of equipment; second, language for giving orders
and rEports which confirms to the regulations.
Clearing ar.d mine sweeping equipment of all kinds are not completely self -
supporting, self-moving, floating devices. They require floating support
buoys, cutting cables and other kinds of control equipment. Even before
their deployment some devices have to be adjusted to or controlled b;
settings ordered or which have been prescribed by the regulations. That
is one precondition. The second aspect is the speed prescribed and re-
quired by each type of device. Only when both components are functioning
is it possible to accomplish the task prescribed for the device, acid to
guarantee a successful sweeping operation. The way in which the framework
of the mine sweeping device is put together is of course not unimportant,
particularly with reference to the lines, cables and other parts of the
equipment. This work was mastered in its essentials. Mistakes did, to be
sure, show up in the w.ay the lines were attached. For this reason it
should once again be poi.~ted out that it must not be allowed to happen that
lines cast to the right or to the left are then a*_tached to the wrong side
of the framework. When the lines in question are switched in error,
differences in the depth of the position of the framework then occur,
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caused by the force which is the result of the lay of the line and the
velocity.
The language for giving orders and the language for making reports plays
a particularly large role in the employment of anti-mine equipment, and
it must be implemented absolutely without compromise. With reference to
the deployment of anti-mine equipment, the following points of view are
pertinent:
--As a matter of general principle, the selection of the equipment, of
the system, and of the procedure, as well as the deployment for action or
the closing down for storage are all subject to the command process;
--Proven and suspected ch:;;ges, which weaken and limit the readiness of
anti-mine equipment for deployment must be reported without delay;
--Necessazy steps are to be taken itvnediately;
--Maneli:;ering must as a rule be subordinated to the exigencies of deploying
one`s own weapons.
From this there flows the additional conclusion: For the effective de-
ployment of one's own combat resources, the management of the ship, the
navigation section, and the anti-mine section must be adjusted to one
another, must remain in permanent contact, and must work closely together.
PVI /Planned Preventive Maintenance/ as Criterion of Readiness for De-
ployment
The principal task of the. PVI i:z the maintenance system is to reduce ex-
penditures for repairs which have not been planned for, by planned pre-
ventive measures, and to guarantee reliable deployment of military tech-
nology during the period of utilization. When PVI is neglected or abso-
lutely not carried out, then that results in increased breakdown times
completely left to chance.
In the area of anti-mine equipment there are a few concentration points
for breakdowns which are for the most part avoidable. These are, without
regard to their proportionate share overall: servicing not in accordanc.~
with the regulations; utilization .for purposes never intended; imperfect
or incomplete maintenance; PVI that is not carried out in a professional
properly informed manner; disregard of the required parameters and accuracy
to guage; inattention to the completeness and balanced supplementing of
devices and facilities, systems, accessories, replacement parts and tools;
neglected replacement of worn out and obsolescent structural elements;
failure to analyze fuels; incomplete and imperfect changeovers in fuels,
inadequate lubrication, preservation procedures and cleanings; arbitrarily
ordered interruptions in PVI work and the redeployment of personnel to
other work.
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The reasons for this are varied. There are subjective and objective
causes. All reasons have not been determined as yet. Here are a few:
--the partially insufficient preparation ~f all comrades ideologically
and materially;
--insufficiently stabilized consciousness of responsibility;
--deficient practical knowledge and skills;
--operations executed in parr in superficial way;
--inadequately full utilization of time available;
--no technological work cards appropriate to the level of training;
--incomplete controls;
--unsatisfactory cooperation between personnel aboard ship and the mechanics
in the workshops.
The situation is by no mans such that the key problems named, and their
causes, are to be generally encountered or even show up in concentrated
fashion. The important thing is to take these key problems into consider-
ation in all training measures and in daily work. This affects personnel
aboard ship as well as the mechanics in the workshops and warehouse
administrators.
Only if every comrade completely devotes himself day in and day out with-
out interruption to overcoming the still existing deficiencies in his
area of responsibility, will we be in a situation where we can further
expand the success and progress hitherto achieved in our joint work.
We, that is to say the coastal blockade sailors, mates, master, mechanics,
warehouse administrators and specialists at all levels.
Analytical Activity
Analytical activity serves as a resource and a method for raising readiness
for service.
Every analysis must be appropriately exploited with staff personnel., that
i~, it is no end in itself. It does not just interpret a condition, but
must serve as a practical introduction to operations, deeds and changes.
Every analytical activity likewise calls for a self-critical evaluation
of one's own work, regardless of the level at which ~he work is performed.
Analytical activity is not only analysis in the f-~.rm of reports and pro-
posais, but also controls of every kind and exploitations and evaluations
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at every level of command. ru rthermore, attention must unquestionably
be paid to saei~.zg to it that findings, conclusions, pronouncements and
results find expression in daily labor and highly specialized training.
There not only exists a close connection between PVI and highly specialized
training, but also between analytical activity, highly specialized train-
ing, and the degree of readiness for operations.
In what follows, breakdowns, damages and losses as well as short-time
disturbances are viewed analytically.
What is a disturbance? A disturbance is every kind of impact on normal
conditions which results in breakdown or loss of a ship, of technical
facilities, systems, equipment and arrangements, or to a diminution of
the utility value and security of operations of the same witho,~t con-
sideration of the duration of the breakdown.
When a disturbance has taker. place, there must then be, in addition to
an i.nvestigatio..i of the causes and of the full extent of disturbing event,
a professionally correct report setting ~~orth the situation. This is
necessary and useful for filling out the technical report (TM) and sub-
sequently in initiating concrete measures.
Also useful to this end are practical exercises on board ship or instruc-
tional methodological courses.
This is also true as regards evaluations of disturbances, which currently,
at least in part, are still under-appreciated. The evaluation of a dis-
turbance serves as an analysis of the event of the disturbance, its causes,
and for an evaluation of the operational security of the ship and of the
level of training of the crew. The content of the disturbance question-
naire is specifically directed at the evaluation or investigation of:
--the operational security of the technology;
--the training level of the crew;
--attrition values for certain parts of the facilities so as to establish
maximum duration norms;
--the degree of appropriateness with which ships and warehouses are equipped
with spare parts;
--demand requirements for repair capacity;
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Only in this connection and in their full range are disturbance evaluations
to be viewed and set forth, so as to obtain from those directly involved
in serving there the necessary data and testimony.
Incidentally, these necessary paperwork fobs are executed superficially
because of ignorance of the relationships involved or for other reasons.
And so it is precisely here that large reserves are to be found for pro-
phylactic worl~. whereby breakdowns are to be avoided.
The same manner of lookins at things is also required for controls, ex-
pansions, instructional methodological courses, and analyses of the
specialists.
To give controls, exploitation schemes and analyses the place and content
that is intended for them, they must serve for guidance, help, education,
forward moving development and improvement in the sense of heightening
readiness to serve.
In closing it should be emphasized once again that anti-mine and antisub-
marine equipment have been further developed in considerable degree in
recent years. Extensive knowledge and a great many skills as well as a
consciousness of responsib~.lity are consequently necessary for training,
servicing, care, maintenance and repairs of this equipme?at.
Since there can be no limit in our work as regards the continuous increase
in combat readiness and readiness to serve, all reserves for effective
deploymen~. must be utilized, and deficiencies still existing must be
eliminated. ~dhat is called for is to overcome by great initiative, cir-
cumspectly and consistently all obstacles, difficulties and contradictions.
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