MOROCCAN PLANS TO INVADE SPANISH SAHARA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00608R000200020013-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 19, 1999
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: October 3, 1975
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President (National
Security Affairs)
SUBJECT : Moroccan Plans to Invade Spanish Sahara
25X1X6^
2. With the Spanish military still in the Sahara, a serious
conflict could develop. If Morocco loses this gamble, it could
ultimately lead to the downfall of the present goverrment in Rabat.
On the other side, prolonged fighting and heavy Spanish casualties
could provoke a political crisis in Madrid. There is also potential
for drawing ilgeria into the conflict. Mauritania, which also has claims
to Spanish Sahara, is likely to avoid any military involvement.
3. The attached Intelligence Alert Memorandum examines this
situation and its implications in greater depth. It has been discussed
at the working level with CIA, DIA, State/INR and NSA. The colleccion
and analytical elements of the Intelligence Community have been alerted
and will report further developments through .normal channels or in further
Alert Memoranda, as appropriate. 25X1A9a
W:f E. Colby
Director
A VA
4
Classified be 038097
Exempt from genera
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption catego-y 58(1),(2),0)
Automatically declassified on
Dot, Impossible to Determine
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INTELLIGENCE ALERT MEMORANDUM
SUBJEC'': Moroccan Invasion of Spanish Sahara
2. King Hassan has pursued a high-risk policy on Spanish Sahara
for some time. Last August, he reiterated his intention to acquire Spanish
Sahaia before the end of the year, with -urce if necessary. Although he
promised then to await an advisory opinion from the International Court
of Justice on Moroccan-Mauritanian claims to the territory, he may now
have decided to act in a moment of what he perceives as Spanish weakness.
There is also increasing anxiety in Rabat that the Court's decision may be
ambif,uous or unfavorable to Morocco and that tha report of a fact-finding
mission of the UN Committee on Decolonization will favor independence for
the territory. Finally, it is possible that Hassan has concluded that
armec' intervention will provoke favorable international mediation. To
date most Moroccans have supported Hassan's position on Spanish Sahara,
but if a military gamble fails he could be in serious trouble and
vulnerable to a coup.
3. Rabat expects effective resistance only from some 5,000
Spanish legionnaires in the Sahara and Spanish air force units stationed
in tF,e Canary Islands and possibly from Algerian ground forces. The
Moroccans are skeptical that Algeria will intervene militarily, but
Morocco reported.'.y is arranging for a token presence in Rabat of troops
from Syria, Egypt., the PLO, and possibly Saudi Arabia as a psychological
deterrent to an Algerian military reaction. We have n) evidence, however,
that other Arab troops are arriving in Morroco, although small conti.xgents
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could arrive quickly by air without being detected. We doubt that most
eastern Arabs would involve themselves in a potential inter-Arab conflict
except in a mediating role, although the PLO may be an exception.
4. Morocco has kept approximately one fourth of its more than
55,000-man army in southern Morocco since mid-1974, despite considerable
supply problems, and low troop morale because of the primitive conditions.
We estimate that most of the 12,000 to 15,000 Moroccan troops in the
southern zone have been tactical infantry, with some armor, artillery, and
air defense units. Although the army has established a command-and-support
structure in the south, the Moroccans would nonetheless face considerable
obstacles in launching and sustaini?ag a major offensive against either
Spanish or Algerian forces.
5~ Madrid could muster sufficient strength from its own forces
to defeat a Moroccan invasion. The Spanish have some 16,000 army and air
force personnel in the Sahara, w-'.,n an additional 20,000 located nearby
in the Canary Islands. The Spanish have 51 medium tanks and 35 armored
care that could provide immediate armored support. Spanish forces are
well-equipped and trained, compared to the Moroccan army. In terms of
air power, Madrid has more than 60 sub-sonic fighter-bombers immediately
available; two squadrons of F-5 tactical fighter-bombers and a total of
four squadrons of air defense command Mirage III and F-4C interceptors are
in reserve in Spain.
6. If he has decided in favor of war, we believe King Hassan has
seriously misjudged the likely Spanish response to an invasioni. Although
Madrid does not want to remain in Spanish Sahara or fight a r.olonial war,
Spanish troops in the Sahara would resist a forcible eviction. At the
same time Madrid would call on the UN to restore peace and ask Washington
for its support. The US response to this request would strongly influence
Spair's attitude toward accommodatin, the US position in the current base
negotiations. The Spanish government would expect that longstanding US-
Spanish defense cooperation should justify at least US diplomatic support,
particularly if the Moroccans, contrary to early assurances, employed US-
made weapons in any attack. The Moroccans, on the other hand, will also
look to us for at least diplomatic support and react strongly to anything
we do that might be interpreted as favoring Spain. A position of strict
neutralism is probably about the most that King Hassan will tolerate with-
out serious strain in our bilateral relations.
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7. Initially, an armed conflict with Morocco would unite most
Spaniards and help the regime divert the public's attention away from
internal problems. If the fighting dragged on, however, the war could
become another issue that would divide Spaniards. Divisiveness would
also appear in the military -- heretofore the most stable element in
Spanish society -- who eventually would disagree over the merits of
fighting a war for a territory the government has already announced it
is prepared to give up.
8. Algeria, which favors independence for Spanish Sahara, will
probably stop short of direct military intervention. It would, however,
create as many problems for Morocco as possible. We would expect Algiers
to support the POLISARIO Front, a pro-independence Saharan group, in
waging a sustained insurgency effort. Algiers might also move troops to
Morocco's northern border to exert pressure on King Hassan and renew its
support of Moroccan dissidents. The Algerians would almost certain:2.y
mount an intensive international diplomatic effort to denounce Moroccan
aggression.
9. In the less likely event that Algiers did intervene wita direct
military force, the Moroccans might achieve some initial success cause
they outnumber the 4,000 to 6,000 troops estimated to be in south-western
Algeria. The Algerian air force of some 200 combat aircraft could, however,
turn the tide against Morocco's 40 combat aircraft, and play a decisive role
in support of Algeria's ground forces, which are about the same size as
Morocco's, but better trained and equipped.
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