SOVIET NAVAL PERSONNEL: QUALITIES AND CAPABILITIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00591R000400510004-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 63
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 25, 2010
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: December 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
Soviet Naval Personnel:
Qualities and Capabilities
Top Secret
, SQY 8s1~~s
December 1985
coptC i -1 2
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Soviet Naval Personnel: Qualities and Capabilities
Summary
Information available as of October 1985 was used in this
report.
The Soviets face many difficulties in operating a modern,
high-technology navy with a largely conscript force. They have
attempted to minimize the effects of conscript shortcomings
through a system of highly centralized decisionmaking, narrowly
focused training, and reliance on setpiece battle plans. Their
approach has yielded mixed results.
The principal strengths of the naval personnel system are:
--Professional officer corps. Officers constitute less than
one-fifth of the Navy's personnel but provide most of the
technical expertise needed to run the fleet. They are an elite
group, predominately drawn from the urban, upper strata of Soviet
society. They are mostly volunteers who have been competitively
selected for their academic talents, psychological traits, and
demonstrated loyalty to the state. On the whole, they appear to
be good engineers with a sound education in math, science, and
the theoretical aspects of their naval specialties. They also
appear to be motivated, hard workers with extensive ''hands-on''
experience in equipment maintenance and operations.
--Long-serving career personnel. Most officers and some
warrant officers serve in the Navy for at least 25 years. These
men form a corps of experienced personnel who know well the
Navy's equipment, procedures, and fleet operating areas. Their
experience partially offsets the problems resulting from the
regular turnover of short-term conscripts.
--Tight control of personnel. Despite some glaring failures
of discipline, the party generally has been effective in
maintaining its grip on the Navy, checking dissident activity and
securing the obedience of sailors--a task made difficult by
problems associated with a multiethnic force and harsh service
conditions. Sailors' activities are strictly regimented and
closely monitored. The system is highly dependent on the threat
of punishment, however, and provides little incentive for self-
motivation.
--Selective unit manning. The Navy has been fairly
successful in concentrating its best personnel in the most
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important jobs. Career inducements are used to attract the
better officers to the more critical Navy components--personnel
in the submarine force, for instance, are a cut above the rest of
the Navy. Ethnic reliability and competency problems are
controlled somewhat through a policy of largely staffing combat
units and key leadership and technical positions with Slavic
personnel while placing non-Slavs mostly into low-skill or less
essential support tasks.
The following deficiencies, we believe, will impair the
Navy's wartime performance:
--Poor quality of enlisted men. Limited career
opportunities for petty officers and warrant officers have
prevented the Navy from attracting either the number or quality
of men needed to form a reliable cadre of career enlisted
personnel. Three out of four Soviet sailors are short-term
conscripts, who are usually young, unmotivated, and capable of
performing only elementary, narrowly specialized tasks.
--Overburdened officer corps. Officers thus serve both as
unit commanders and as technical specialists who conduct much of
the ''hands-on'' equipment maintenance and operation. Officers
are usually overworked, and the almost total reliance on them to
operate ships means that even a few casualties among them could
cripple a ship.
--Lack of cross-training. Both officers and enlisted
personnel tend to be narrow specialists. This inhibits their
understanding of the interrelationship and capabilities of
various weapon systems that must operate together to be effective
in combat. Should combat casualties or other circumstances make
select personnel unavailable for duty, most Soviet sailors would
find it difficult or impossible to fill in.
--Low sustainability. A lack of emphasis on training in at-
sea equipment repair, safety, and damage control, together with
the reliance on overworked officers to operate ships, is likely
to cause Soviet naval units to have less endurance than their
Western counterparts. If forced to conduct prolonged sea
deployments, they will be more likely to suffer casualties from
maintenance problems and mistakes made by fatigued officers or
less qualified relief personnel. In addition, the poor training
of naval reservists will hamper casualty replacements in a
protracted war.
--Rigid operating patterns. The Soviets have exhibited a
marked tendency toward stereotyped training exercises, tight
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control of ships by higher authorities, and an insistence on
commanders conducting operations ''by the book'' with no room for
individuial flair or variations. Such practices discourage the
development of initiative by tactical commanders and, during
wartime, can lead to inappropriate responses, lost opportunities,
and a severe vulnerability to communications interruption. If
opponents
can keep combat operations moving quickly, emphasizing unexpected
actions and the disruption of Soviet command communications,
Soviet commanders will be forced to deviate from their plans and
make rapid, on-the-spot tactical decisions--a behavior not
emphasized in their training. This rigidity may also make the
Soviet Navy more susceptible to operations analysis than Western
forces. A study of Soviet methods may reveal behavior patterns
that can serve as a tipoff to Soviet intentions in battle.
--Coverups. The Soviet naval personnel system encourages
coverups of deficiencies at all levels. Performance appraisals
often emphasize quantitative or time-oriented accomplishments at
the expense of quality work.
We believe the Navy's personnel system, despite its
weaknesses, is adequate to support the limited naval operations
required by Soviet war plans. The Soviets have taken personnel
limitations into account in developing equipment, tactics, and
operating procedures. Their war plans do not require most of
their naval units to conduct operations as complex and demanding
as those expected of the US and other Western navies. Most of
their fleet is intended to conduct defensive operations lasting
only a few weeks, in waters relatively close to Soviet shore
facilities, and characterized by setpiece combat situations.
Under such conditions, personnel problems that would be serious
in Western navies would be less troublesome. If a war with the
West became a prolonged conflict, however, involving repeated
combat situations over large areas and placing a premium on
tactical imagination and flexibility, we believe the personnel
shortcomings would make it difficult for the Soviet Navy to
adjust.
The Soviet naval personnel system has been resistant to
change over the years. It is likely to face an increasing demand
for quality personnel, however, with the continued introduction
of more sophisticated equipment. In addition, recent fleet-level
exercises suggest the Soviets are considering wartime operations
that will place increased demands on personnel--for instance, to
operate conventional takeoff and landing aircraft carriers, to
manage large surface task groups, and to extend sea control and
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sea denial areas farther from the USSR. Weaknesses in their
personnel system may become more pronounced under such
circumstances.
The declining proportion of Slavs in the draft-age
population will also pressure the Navy's personnel system. We
believe the Soviets will deal with this problem by tightening
restrictions on military service deferments and possibly by
improving preinduction training of Soviet youths.
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Scope Note
Analysis of the fighting capabilities of the Soviet Navy
usually emphasizes the qualities and capabilities of its
equipment. A thorough assessment of the Navy, however, requires
close scrutiny of its personnel system. This study evaluates how
the Soviets select, train, use, and motivate their naval
personnel.
e judgments expressed in this study are necessarily subjective
because of the nature of the problem and evidence on which they
are based. The limitations and biases of the evidence were
considered in making the assessments contained herein.
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Soviet Naval Personnel: Qualities and Capabilities
Availability of Manpower
Service Obligation
All Soviet males between 18 and 26 are liable for service in
the armed forces. Most conscripts serve a two-year term, but
seagoing naval personnel serve three years, which probably
explains why many young Soviets fear conscription by the Navy.
Permanent deferments, for medical problems or family hardships,
are rarely granted.
Temporary draft deferments, which offer a number of
advantages, are sometimes available to university students. The
students are still liable for military service after graduation,
but for shorter terms than nongraduates--one and a half or two
years instead of the usual two or three. Also, those who
complete college ROTC programs can be commissioned in the
reserves, so they can serve their commitment in the preferred
officer ranks. Some of these reservists are never called to
active duty after graduation.
The availability and advantages of educational deferments
have been curtailed over the last decade. Soviet draft laws were
revised in 1977 and again in 1980, resulting in longer service
terms for college graduates and fewer deferment opportunities. A
deferments for college are now available at
only three or four academic institutions in the USSR, suggesting
that additional restrictions have been imposed since 1980.
If enforced, the stricter policies are probably unpopular
with the Soviet elite. Bribery of university and draft board
officials has been a common way of obtaining preferential
treatment in the USSR; the new policies, however, would make it
more difficult for members of the elite to obtain deferments for
their children.
Demographic Trends
The leadership's willingness to force such unpopular
measures on the upper strata of Soviet society presumably
reflects its increasing concern about the demographic dilemma
facing the military forces. In 1985, the number of draft-age
males is expected to decline to 2.1 million--a 20-percent drop
from its 1978 peak of 2.7 million. The number is not expected to
reach the 1978 level again in this century. Moreover, the
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proportion of non-Slavic minorities among 18-year-olds--25
percent in 1970--is rising steadily and is expected to reach
nearly 40 percent by 1990. Non-Slavs generally are less educated
than Slavs, have more difficulty with the Russian language, and
come from rural cultures that make it more difficult for them to
adapt to a technology-oriented service like the Navy. In
addition, the military leadership considers non-Slavic conscripts
to be politically less reliable.
Because the Navy's manpower requirement is only about 6
percent of the USSR's total annual conscription, the demographic
trend has not yet been felt by the Navy to the same extent as it
has by the other services. In addition, the Navy may have a high
priority in the selection of conscripts. The Navy's officer
corps is almost exclusively Slavic and its fighting units are
predominantly so. Non-Slavic minorities are usually relegated to
construction and sentry units where language and technical skills
are not essential. Nonetheless, the Navy is not immune to the
problems of the changing demographics. The Soviet press has
described problems of sailors who cannot speak Russian serving
aboard major surface combatants--a large antisubmarine warfare
(ASW) ship in the Pacific Fleet had at least 24 nationalities
among its crew. Competition with other segments of Soviet
society for the declining number of Slavic males in the manpower
pool could induce minor changes in the Navy's personnel system.
The share of the current 18-year-old cohort with at least a
high school diploma is high by Western standards. High-ranking
Soviet officials have claimed a steady rise in the educational
level of recruits, and the Chief of the Main Political
Directorate for the Army and Navy stated that virtually all now
have at least a high school education. Such statistics are
probably misleading, though; there has been much criticism in the
Soviet press of school officials who relax graduation standards
to increase'the number of awarded diplomas. Educational
standards also differ from those in the West, making direct
comparisons difficult. Soviet schools discourage students from
exercising independent thinking or creativity, emphasizing
instead the memorization of class materials. Practical exposure
to technological subjects, such as computers or automobile
maintenance, is also likely to be limited, particularly in rural
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Preinduction Training
Soviet youths are exposed to a variety of military training
programs prior to service in the armed forces. We believe the
primary value of these programs to the Navy is that they
familiarize youths with military life, foster an interest in
hobbies and activities with military applications, and encourage
martial attitudes and patriotism.
The primary organization for preinduction military training
in the USSR is the All-Union Voluntary Society for Assistance to
the Army, Air Force, and Navy (DOSAAF). Local branches are
supposed to conduct classes on military subjects, promote sports
and hobbies with military applications, and instill young people
with proper Communist attitudes toward service in the armed
forces as well as hatred for enemies of the state. Activities
are conducted at sponsoring factories, farms, schools, and
special DOSAAF training centers.
Participation in DOSAAF is supposed to be voluntary,
although in many cases young men may be subjected to official or
parental pressure to join in order to demonstrate a willingness
to conform to socialist norms. Teenagers are sometimes advised
by their local draft board that they will soon be drafted
and things will be easier on them if they volunteer for a DOSAAF
class. Also, participation may be the only way for young people
to engage in certain recreational activities such as driving,
racing motorcycles, shooting, or amateur radio.
The quality of preinduction training apparently varies
widely. We believe that, in some cases, it is quite good. For
example, DOSAAF conducts classes in technical subjects such as
radio operations and diving, which can run three to six months,
full-time--about the same length as basic specialty training in
the Navy. New draftees who have successfully completed such
programs reportedly are able to skip basic specialist training
and report directly to their operational unit. The Soviet press
has stated that one in three conscripts already has a military
specialty before callup. C
Such figures, however, are not supported by the frequent
press criticisms of the DOSAAF program. Moreover, military
officers have complained that DOSAAF-trained specialists are
poorly prepared for their service duties. High-ranking DOSAAF
officials have strongly criticized the organization's leadership
and quality of instruction. Only 70 to 80 percent of the
teaching positions are filled, and there is an acute shortage of
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teachers of specialized skills like diving. About half of the
DOSAAF instructors are college educated, but many are retired
enlisted personnel with little formal civilian or military
education. Fleet Admiral G. N. Yegorov stated in a 1983 Red
Star article that 60 percent of DOSAAF instructors are veterans
of World War II--which would make most of them over 60 years old.
Teachers have been criticized for conducting classes by simply
reading from service regulation manuals. Teacher apathy probably
is encouraged by the lack of compensation and inadequate
DOSAAF is a voluntary organization, with few paid workers,
and administration is often lax. Regional administrative
committees frequently have been criticized in the press for
failing to direct or even visit local chapters. Other problems
noted in reporting and in articles on DOSAAF include a failure to
conduct classes in the Russian language, poor military discipline
by students and staff, grade inflation, inadequate facilities,
lack of up-to-date training equipment, and ''flippant attitudes''
by students toward military subjects. Some DOSAAF organizations
are little more than amateur sports leagues. The weight of our
evidence indicates that the quality of preinduction training is
generally poor and instances of higher quality are the exception.
As a technology-oriented service, the Navy has a strong
incentive for improving the quality of preinduction training as a
means of coping with the demand for trained technical
specialists. If more recruits could be trained through quality
DOSAAF programs, more would be able to skip portions of their
basic training and report directly to their units upon
conscription. This would have the effect of indirectly
lengthening conscription terms--one way of partially compensating
So far we have seen little evidence of significant
improvements being made to the DOSAAF program. In 1981, however,
Fleet Admiral Yegorov was named to head DOSAAF, with a mandate
for improving technical training for young people. Yegorov
served as Deputy Commander in Chief for Combat Training from 1967
to 1972 and was promoted to admiral during that period. US
officials have described him as an officer with a reputation for
high competence who has written extensively on military training
topics. His appointment may indicate increased Navy support for
preinduction training.
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Training and Use of Conscripts
About 75 percent of Soviet naval personnel are short-term
conscripts. When drafted, they are usually young, unskilled, and
unmotivated. The majority are not happy about being drafted and
look forward eagerly to being discharged.
The Soviet Navy's answer to the problem of training these
men is narrow specialization. Whenever possible, naval equipment
is designed to be easy to operate and maintain. Soviet
maintenance practices complement this design philosophy by
leaving little to the discretion of unit personnel. Stress on
component replacement, rather than repair, reduces the
requirements on conscripts' abilities, according to Soviet
writings. Junior officers and warrant officers, rather than
conscripts, make most decisions about equipment operation and do
The classroom technical instruction program for enlisted
personnel is short, and on-the-job training is emphasized. By
getting draftees to their units soon after induction, the Navy
hopes to get as much useful labor as possible out of them in the
short period of active duty.
Career naval personnel reported do not regard the conscript
as a true member of their service team. Conscripts are viewed
more as temporary workers providing short-term labor under the
direction of the regulars. Therefore, naval authorities believe
there is not much point in expending significant time or effort
on developing complicated technical skills. Instead, conscripts
are expected to simply do the elementary tasks assigned to them
and not make trouble. In effect, the Navy views draftees more as
part of a ship's machinery than its crew, and this attitude is
reflected in conscript training programs and duty assignments.
Local draft boards, or voyenkomats, maintain dossiers on all
draft-age males that are supposed to be used to place them in
jobs for which they are best suited. The dossiers contain an
extensive profile of each recruit, including school records,
employer references, political records, social contacts,
relatives living abroad, ethnic background, and health status.
Twice a year, representatives of the different services, known as
military buyers, review the dossiers to decide on a service and
service branch for each draftee. told Western
officials that the Navy has a high priority in the selection
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process because its work generally requires more educated,
technically oriented personnel. We do not have sufficient
evidence to substantiate that claim, however.
Specialty Assignment and Training
After a four- to six-week boot camp, recruits will be
assigned their naval specialty--the job they will probably hold
for the rest of their service term. Conscripts normally are not
given a choice, and we believe that failure to consider their
individual talents and preferences reduces their effectiveness.
Fleet authorities base their decisions on background records
and simple selectivity tests; radio operators, for example, have
been chosen simply on their ability to tap a pencil quickly or
how fast they could write a word legibly. Information in draft
board dossiers on premilitary training is supposed to affect
specialty assignments, but press articles indicate it is often
ignored. The chief of a DOSAAF radio school cited a case where
his honors-graduate telegraph operator became a battery handler,
and, in another example, a ham-radio enthusiast was assigned to a
The manning depots' penchant for putting ''square pegs in
round holes'' probably results in part from the large numbers of
recruits they process. Some 2.2 million people must be processed
in the annual draft--a large burden by any standard and one that
is particularly taxing for a Soviet bureaucracy that is not known
for its efficiency.
Most Navy recruits are sent to a five-month basic specialist
course after boot camp. Here, they are supposed to become
familiar with the equipment they will be using in their units and
learn basic theory and skills related to their job. The
theoretical instruction may address topics such as the basic
principles of electricity, radar, engines, or submarine
structure. Depending on his specialty, a new sailor may also be
taught a skill like schematic diagram reading, circuit tracing,
knot tying, soldering, or Morse code. Familiarization with ship
damage control is also given to some.
Reports indicate that, quite often, training centers do not
have classroom models, mockups, or equipment for recruits to
practice on. Tests are sometimes so simple that everyone passes.
A typical example came from a sailor who graduated with the
specialty of ''ship's crane operator,'' even though he had
neither seen a crane nor received any instruction on it. His
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specialty training had consisted solely of instructors reading
from prepared lesson plans on general naval topics, unsupported
by teaching aids and without tests or exams.
Other reports however, give a different picture. They
describe competent instructors who make good use of slides,
films, equipment mockups, and models. Classroom instruction is
sometimes supplemented by training on simulators for specialties
like radar and sonar operators.
The variance in reporting suggests that the quality of naval
specialty training is uneven. This is probably not a serious
problem, since the Soviets intend for the most significant
training to occur after a sailor has joined his operational unit.
Prior training does appear to break recruits into the discipline
of military life, however, and most sailors bound for the more
important combat assignments, such as submarines, probably go
through the better quality training centers.
Some recruits skip specialty training and report directly to
their units after boot camp. Besides those who have received
equivalent training from DOSAAF, they include about one out of
four conscripts who are assigned to jobs for which special skills
training is not necessary, such as sentries, construction
laborers, or warehouse workers. These jobs are predominantly
filled by recruits who are considered to be politically
unreliable, to speak Russian poorly, or simply to be less
intelligent.
Unit Training
The most important part of conscript training is conducted
on the job by operational units. The Soviets use a structured,
Navy-wide system tied to the semiannual conscription cycle and
geared toward rapid assimilation of new personnel. A few months
before a group of draftees completes its service obligation, the
Navy brings in new recruits to receive their orientation from the
sailors they are to replace.
As a result of this regular influx of new draftees, a Soviet
ship, at any given time, will have a fair number of novices among
its crew. These men contribute little to the operation of their
ships, and Soviet military writings have indicated that in some
cases they may even hinder smooth operations. Training and
supervision of the new sailors require a considerable amount of
time from experienced officers and warrant officers.
A new conscript is assigned to the specialist he is to
replace for an initial training period of about two months. One
report noted that a conscript could not leave the Navy until his
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successor passed his proficiency exam--a powerful incentive for
dedicated teaching. Testing standards, however, are sometimes
relaxed in the interest of expediency.
Enlisted personnel in the Soviet Navy are awarded one of
four specialist grades that are supposed to signify their
proficiency in their particular jobs. To advance a grade,
conscripts are supposed to pass an examination by a committee of
officers. In the 1960s, the average times to achieve specialist
grades were as follows:
3rd
class
7
to
9 months
2nd
class
13
to
15 months
1st
class
19
to
21 months
Master
6
to
8 years
In 1974, however, the Navy adopted the slogan ''from 3rd to
1st in a year,'' indicating that the time to achieve each step
had been reduced to only six months. A sailor usually achieves a
3rd class specialist grade upon completion of the initial
specialist training period, although some do not receive this
grade until after they join their units. It often takes about a
year before they feel confident in their specialty.
Soviet sonar operators are not allowed to identify contacts
on their screens. Instead, they must report the existence of a
reading to an officer or warrant officer on the bridge, who
determines if the contact is a viable target.
Unit training is required of a ship's crew before it can be
certified as combat ready. Such training allows sailors to
practice their skills and raise their specialty grades, complete
their assimilation into shipboard routines, and gain needed
experience in working with others in their department.
A structured unit training program begins at the pier, where
the crew is instructed on standing watch and is familiarized with
department operations. The next phase takes place in port and at
sea and involves systems testing, damage-control procedures, and
a general progression to full combat readiness. Training then
moves to short cruises, during which the crew fires weapons
occasionally and practices responses to various conditions.
Multiship exercises, simple at first and later more complex,
complete the training process.
The Soviet unit training program uses simulators, training
ships, small-group demonstrations, and classroom instruction.
Military press articles indicate that the most prevalent method
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of instruction involves small-group training in equipment
maintenance and operations under the direction of an officer or
warrant officer. This approach probably is effective, but press
articles also indicate that it takes a significant portion of the
officer's time away from his other duties. Given the officers'
many other responsibilities and their general attitudes toward
conscripts, they probably do not undertake this duty with
Training simulators are especially attractive to the Soviet
Navy. They enable sailors to get hands-on practice without
putting wear and tear on combat equipment. This reduces training
costs and is in keeping with the Soviet policy of limiting
peacetime use of equipment in order to conserve it for wartime.
Simulators also provide controlled environments that facilitate
competency evaluations based on preestablished performance norms.
Soviet military writings have stressed the advantages gained from
recording training performances on tape for more accurate
evaluation and critiques. A recent Red Star article praised
advances in computers that enable entire submarine crews to train
together on simulators, using complex scenarios; previously, the
various crew components had to train separately because of
equipment limitations.
The operational unit training program is driven by
''socialist competitions.'' At the beginning of every training
period, each sailor makes pledges detailing the level of
expertise he will attempt to achieve in the coming year. These
pledges become the criteria against which his performance is
judged. Competitions are held among watches, departments, ships,
and so on, up to the fleet level. Results are used to evaluate
individuals and identify training deficiencies, but primarily the
competitions are a management tool to motivate sailors and
stimulate improved performance.
Peer pressure is the key to making the socialist
competitions work. The names of leaders as well as laggards are
publicized in an effort to appeal to the Russian sense of
sacrifice to the group. Such competitions are probably effective
motivators in the better combat units, which have higher morale.
It is evident from statements by the chief of the Navy's Main
Political Directorate and frequent press criticisms, however,
that competitions are often characterized by ''formalism''--to
achieve quantitative goals, units only go through the motions of
competition at the expense of quality work.
Increasing the number of conscripts with dual specialties is
often one of the goals of a ship's socialist competitions.
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Soviet naval writings pay much lipservice to the benefits of
having sailors learn additional specialties and bestow praise on
ships with a high percentage of cross-trained sailors. Exemplary
ships are commonly cited as having a third of their crew cross-
trained in another specialty.
Enlisted sailors with rare exceptions are not at all
interested in learning how to perform additional duties.
Moreover, Soviet naval officers are hard pressed to find time to
teach new sailors a single specialty in light of the high
conscript turnover rate. Competing priorities for officers' time
discourages them from teaching additional skills to unmotivated
conscripts who will be leaving the Navy in a few months anyway.
A ship's commander who needs to inflate his percentage of cross-
trained crewmen in order to impress fleet authorities can more
easily meet his goal by relaxing the specialists' examination
requirements than by diverting more of his officers' energies to
teaching. For those few conscripts motivated to do so, learning
a new specialty is probably not very difficult because of the
simplicity of naval conscript duties and because, in most cases,
it would be a specialty closely related to the conscript's first
Extended-Service Careers
Naval enlisted careers traditionally have been held in low
esteem in the USSR, and retention of career servicemen remains a
serious problem for the Navy. The actual reenlistment figures
for the Soviet Navy are not known, although observations of the
rank structure of Soviet crews indicate they are extremely low.
Some Western analysts estimate that retention is as low as 1
percent. Career petty officers and warrant officers make up only
about 8 percent of the Navy's personnel total. In an effort to
attract more enlistments, the Soviets decreed in 1971 that petty
officer ranks for extended service personnel would be phased out
and replaced with the new rank of michman (warrant officer). The
new rank was introduced with much press fanfare, a more
distinguished uniform, and better pay and benefits than petty
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Enlisted Ranks in the Soviet Navy
Senior warrant officer
Warrant officer
Ship's chief petty officer
Chief petty officer
Petty officer 1st
Petty officer 2nd
Senior seaman
Seaman
Promotion through the enlisted ranks can be extremely rapid.
Most conscripts will make at least senior seaman or petty officer
2nd by the end of their shipboard service, and a few even reach
chief petty officer (although most at this rank are extended-
service personnel). Although an integral part of the Navy,
personnel in naval aviation, infantry, construction, coastal
defense, and various shore support branches use ground forces
Comparing Soviet Navy enlisted ranks, particularly at the
senior levels, to corresponding US Navy ranks could be
misleading. Soviet petty officers and warrant officers have
considerably less training, responsibility, and status than do
most noncommissioned personnel in the US Navy. Senior US
enlisted personnel perform duties that, in the Soviet Navy, are
more often performed by officer specialists.
The Soviet Navy still has some petty officers among its
extended-service personnel, however. Warrant officers must
initially serve five-year terms, whereas petty officers need only
enlist for two years. Some conscripts probably were unwilling to
commit themselves to the longer service terms, prompting the
Navy's decision not to phase out the petty officer rank entirely.
Nonetheless, the pay benefits probably prompt most career
enlistees to opt for service as a warrant officer.
Soviet press articles claim that only the best of sailors
may be chosen to become warrant officers. Virtually anyone
willing to sign the five-year commitment is accepted. Prior to
boot camp, new draftees are offered the opportunity to go
directly to warrant officer school, but almost all reject the
offer. Most conscripts who complete their term of service and
reenlist are promoted directly to warrant officer.
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Training
The primary role of the warrant officer in the Soviet Navy
is to assist the officers by lifting some of the burden of
supervising and training conscripts and by providing continuity
and experience. Warrant officers usually serve in the same
specialty--often on the same ship--for as long as they remain in
the Navy. They are used to train new junior officers and
conscripts and assist in maintaining equipment. They also have
some responsibility for maintaining discipline at the subunit
level, although press articles indicate that most warrant
officers are poor leaders. The Navy provides little, if any,
leadership training to its career enlisted personnel.
Before they are sent to the fleets, warrant officers usually
receive training in special programs lasting from six months to
two years. Those with previous naval experience (as conscripts
or petty officers) sometimes are allowed to skip this training.
admissions standards for warrant officer
training are for appearances only and that, in fact, because of
the Navy's recruitment difficulties, almost anyone is admitted t
Military press articles suggest that teaching staffs at
warrant officer schools are of poor quality and that schools lack
adequate facilities, instruction materials, and training
equipment. Much of the instruction is in basic academic subjects
such as algebra, writing, and Russian grammar. The program
reportedly is entirely self-study, with every two cadets sharing
one book. In place of instructors, there was only a sergeant who
watched over the class to guard against discipline infractions
but provided no instruction or assistance. Even the warrant
officer training within the fleet itself appears substandard.
Ship commanders have been criticized for ignoring warrant officer
cadets assigned to their ships on orientation cruises and for
using cadets on cleanup details, which teach them little about
shipboard equipment and operations. A rear admiral admitted, in
a Soviet naval journal, that some instructors at warrant officer
schools are Navy misfits who are not qualified to teach their
subjects and who often have never been to sea. The Soviets
attribute much of the problem to the Navy-wide view that service
at these schools is a dead end in terms of career prospects.
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Apparently, this applies even to the schools associated with the
all-important submarine fleet.
Apparently almost no one fails to graduate from the warrant
officer schools. Those who fail the final exam are reportedly
encouraged by school officials to retake it until a passing grade
is achieved. If the cadets still could not pass, transcripts
were altered to ensure they graduated anyway.
The Soviet naval warrant officer also has a problem with
status. Officers and conscripts look down upon, if not despise,
warrant officers. They are viewed as individuals who could not
make it in the civilian world and who were not good enough to
earn commissions. They are widely viewed by conscripts as being
corrupt (press articles on corruption commonly mention warrant
officers), brutal disciplinarians, and petty bureaucrats who are
fond of enforcing trivial regulations and abusing their
Career Prospects
Career opportunities for extended-service personnel in the
Soviet Navy are dismal. These sailors are strongly discouraged
from transferring to another unit or even changing ship
departments. Although young warrant officers can become officers
if they display talent and have the academic skills to pass the
entrance exams for higher naval school, such advancement appears
uncommon. Even if a candidate can pass the exams, unit
commanders are reluctant to lose a good warrant officer and tend
to discourage such attempts. Thus, most warrant officers are
locked into their ranks and billets with little chance of
promotion or transfer. Low compensation has also been a problem.
Despite regular raises, their pay has not kept pace with wages in
comparable civilian jobs.
When low status and limited career prospects are added to
the usual hardships and family strains associated with Navy life,
it is not surprising that few choose to reenlist. Admiral of the
Fleet of the Soviet Union S. M. Gorshkov has admitted that many
of the more skilled warrant officers are being lost to civilian
industry.
Value to the Navy
Despite the weaknesses in the warrant officer program, the
Soviet Navy depends on these personnel to provide experience,
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continuity, and skilled assistance. The Navy reasons that even
people with little talent are bound to acquire useful knowledge
and skills if they remain in the same job for their entire
Because of their experience, warrant officers can become
stabilizing factors in a unit. They are useful for helping
junior officers learn to maintain and operate shipboard
equipment. Perhaps most important, warrant officers provide some
relief for commissioned officers from the time-consuming tasks of
maintaining equipment and training and supervising conscripts.
Red Star offered an example of a naval aviation unit, whose
personnel averaged age 28, in which a 33-year-old warrant officer
was the primary source of experience--even the captain turned to
The value of warrant officers is demonstrated by the Navy's
willingness to relax standards whenever their enforcement might
drive career enlisted personnel from the service. An article in
Red Star addressed the case of a captain 3rd rank who wrote a
flawless fitness report for a warrant officer in exchange for his
agreement to reenlist. No mention was made of the serviceman's
five serious violations of discipline or the poor condition of
his squad.
The Soviet Navy faces a paradoxical situation. Warrant
officers as a group are held in low regard by sailors and
officers alike, but their services are considered indispensable.
We believe the naval personnel system is squandering a
potentially valuable human resource by permitting such a
discouraging environment to exist for its career enlisted. Many
of the sailors who could potentially fill petty or warrant
officer ranks will be lost to the Navy because there are no
attractive career prospects outside of the officer ranks.
Women in the Navy
There appears to be only a small number of women in the
Navy; they almost always serve in the enlisted ranks, holding
jobs such as radio or telephone operator, typist, nurse, supply
Naval careers do not appear to be popular among Soviet
women.
Many female sailors
are married to career Navy men and probably only enlist because
civilian jobs are sometimes hard to come by at remote garrisons.
The Soviets have shown little interest in inducing more women to
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enlist in the Navy beyond the occasional low-key press articles
praising women sailors for their contributions as ''combat
helpmates.'' In conversations with US naval personnel, Soviet
officers have generally disparaged the practice of allowing women
to serve in the Navy.
In the future, however, the Soviets may be forced to make
changes in these practices. If greater career opportunities were
available to them, the Navy might attract more educated women
from Slavic backgrounds who might help ease the problems
resulting from demographic changes in the USSR. Even if they
were not employed in combat billets, more women in more
responsible roles could free men now holdin support jobs for
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The backbone of the Soviet Navy is its professional officer
corps. Naval officers are an elite group, predominantly drawn
from the urban, upper strata of Soviet society. They are mostly
volunteers who have been carefully selected for their academic
talents, psychological traits, family backgrounds, and
demonstrated loyalty to the state. Almost all are career men who
enter the Navy with the intention of serving at least 25 years.
Officers make up about 17 percent of the Navy's personnel.
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There are substantial differences between Soviet and Western
views on the role of naval officers. In contrast to Western
officers who delegate equipment maintenance and repair to
enlisted technicians, Soviet officers serve both as commanders
and as technical specialists who conduct much of the hands-on
work. Because of the general inadequacies of Soviet conscripts,
an officer is expected to be able to perform virtually all of his
enlisted subordinates' duties, including routine maintenance. [~ 25X1
Leadership in the Soviet officer system is reserved for a
select few who receive special preparation and training. This is
accomplished through the use of a two-track career system: a
command track for ship captains and various squadron and fleet
commanders, and a specialist track for technicians and staff
specialists. Commanding officers are chosen from those junior
officers who exhibit both technical know-how and leadership
skills in their first assignment. These men are groomed for
command through broad (by Soviet standards) career assignments
and higher schooling. The rest of the officers are expected to
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develop an even greater depth of knowledge of their specialties
and serve the fleet as career specialists and staff officers. ~
Soviet naval officers, including those in command career
tracks, are more specialized than their Western counterparts.
While Western navies stress the development of general line
officers with a broad range of fleet experience, the Soviets
prefer an officer to serve in one area--often on one ship--where
he can develop detailed knowledge of the capabilities and
limitations of his particular ship class.
The real authority and leadership in the Navy is
concentrated in the officers in the senior command career track.
These men generally are well trained, experienced, and dedicated
to the Soviet system, which rewards them with high prestige and
material benefits. They have more self-confidence than other
naval officers because of their higher social class and special
Officer specialists and junior officers make up the
administrative level of the Soviet Navy. They are valued more
for their technical expertise than their leadership skills,
although they conduct low-level supervision of enlisted sailors
in addition to assisting commanders as staff officers and special
technical troubleshooters. Many of these men perform functions
that, in Western navies, would be performed by petty officers or
Specialist officers generally are slow to take initiative,
unwilling to deviate from established operating patterns, and
better at obeying than giving orders. Their fear of deviating
from established procedures is likely to be greater than any urge
to take advantage of an opportunity.
The Appeal of an Officer Career
A career as a naval officer offers a number of attractions
in the USSR; status is a major one. The Navy considers itself an
elite force, and press articles furnish evidence that the Soviet
public views it as a select group, working in the forefront of
glamorous new technology. An officer career also offers generous
pay and health care, employment security, an opportunity to
travel beyond Soviet borders, and a good pension.
For the sons of naval officers, encouragement to follow in
their fathers' footsteps can provide an incentive to join the
Navy, and there is evidence that a naval tradition continues in
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some Soviet families. The importance of nepotism and other
connections may be a persuasive factor in some decisions to
pursue an officer career.
A prospective officer also faces a number of disincentives.
Virtually mandatory membership in the CPSU and closer party
supervision might dissuade some from pursuing a commission.
There are also the usual problems that often accompany a Soviet
sailor's life: hardship posts in remote areas, family
separations--with resultant marital difficulties--and being
forced to live and work closely with lower-class conscripts.
Ways To Be Commissioned
The majority of Soviet naval officers earn their commissions
by graduating from one of the higher naval schools. The Navy
sometimes drafts graduates of other service schools to fill
officer billets in naval aviation or naval infantry units (in
which case cadets are not given a choice of service). A small
percent of active-duty officers are university and technical
institute graduates commissioned through ROTC programs or officer
candidate school (OCS) courses, but these officers usually only
serve their minimum service requirement of one and a half or two
years. Qualified warrant officers may take the entrance exams
for higher naval school or be commissioned through a six-month
OCS program for technical specialists. They, too, probably
account for a small fraction of career naval officers.
Higher Naval Schools
The higher naval schools are the Soviet Navy's equivalent of
the US Naval Academy at Annapolis. Each school has a five-year
program that awards an engineering degree--except the political
school, which has a four- ear program leading to a bachelor of
arts degree.
Naval aviation and naval infantry officers attend joint-
service schools operated by the Air or Ground Forces. Officers
bound for support billets (medical, supply, or finance, for
instance) also attend joint-service schools. Cadets at nonnaval
schools probably receive little or no orientation to the naval
aspects of combat operations. One Soviet press article described
a young graduate of an aviation school on his first shipboard
assignment who was afraid of water and who had not even received
basic water-survival training.
The Soviet Navy apparently believes that the basic
instruction received at joint-service schools is sufficient and
that new officers can be broken into the Navy's way of doing
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things once they join the fleet. This probably impedes readiness
somewhat by forcing operational combat units to take time from
other duties to conduct the sort of basic training that would
take place prior to reporting in Western navies.
Selection. Soviet naval officers appear to be drawn largely
from upper-class Slavic families. The ethnic composition at one
engineering school reportedly included only three or four Central
Asians out of a class of 150, with the majority of cadets being
of Great Russian origin. Eighty percent were from urban areas,
where better educated, upper-class families tend to concentrate.
The Soviet press indicates that admissions to the higher
naval schools are highly competitive and that there is no
shortage of applicants. There have been reports that Frunze, the
most prestigious school, receives nine applications for every
cadet accepted. Prospective cadets are required to furnish
admissions committees with a detailed autobiography that includes
a recommendation from the Communist Party or Komsomol and to take
written and oral exams in mathematics, physics, and Russian.
Applicants must also pass a psychological test, which is used to
assess such factors as emotional stability, motivation, reasonin
ability, attention span, and reaction time.
(psychological
evaluations are of great importance in the selection process and
that the school dropout rate has declined since their
introduction. The Air Force schools that furnish naval aviators
also use such tests.
Family connections can play an important role in a young
man's acceptance by one of the naval schools. Press articles
have confirmed that the entire admissions process can be bypassed
for the sons of high-ranking naval officers and party officials.
Such practices no doubt result in the admittance of some persons
who otherwise could not meet the entry requirements.
Quality of Instruction. Faculty at the higher naval schools
are generally well versed in their disciplines. Most instructors
are naval officers, although some civilians are used to teach
mathematics and science. An impressive ratio of one instructor
per 10 cadets appears typical. Faculty members tend to remain at
the higher schools for long periods, potentially leading some to
lose touch with the requirements of the operational fleet.
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The curriculums at the higher naval schools are slanted
toward quantitative and scientific studies and are much more
specialized than the academic training most US officers receive.
Students specialize in one area, such as navigation, gunnery, or
communications. At the Frunze general officer school, students
spend the first two years concentrating on math, natural
sciences, geography, and elementary navigation. In the third and
fourth years, more emphasis is placed on naval subjects such as
tactics, weapons technology, or engineering. By the fifth year,
students progress to advanced tactics and navigation and prepare
Practical training at sea (or field exercises for shore
specialists) is conducted during the summer between regular
terms. Special training ships are often used, although cadets
are placed on operational ships as well. Some cadets serve
several weeks on a ship of the class to which they eventually
will be assigned. Press articles indicate that ship captains
tend to regard cadets as a nuisance to be avoided, and,
apparently, cadets on training cruises are sometimes ignored by
'
the ship
s regular crew. Some practical training of
cadets is also conducted in naval yards and factories.
A good deal of the students' time also is spent on political
education in Marxism-Leninism, foreign language study, and
physical training. In addition, all cadets go through a two-
month naval infantry course covering such subjects as the use of
small arms and chemical warfare.
The curriculums at the other higher naval schools are
similar to, but more specialized, than those at the general
officer schools. At one higher engineering school all students
take the same standard courses in the first three years, most of
which deal with naval propulsion systems. At the beginning of
the fourth year, the cadets are assigned a specialty such as
submarine propulsion, surface diesel systems, or surface gas
turbine systems. Graduates of the engineering schools are
usually limited to careers as technical specialists.
Graduates. The higher naval schools graduate narrow
specialists, not generalists. On the whole, they appear to be
good engineers with a sound background in math, science, naval
engineering, and the theoretical aspects of their particular
specialties. These young officers, although they may be unsure
of themselves at first, are highly motivated, hard workers who
are not ''afraid to get their hands dirty'' when it comes to
working with shipboard equipment.
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The primary deficiency in new Soviet naval officers is a
lack of adequate leadership and managerial skills. Soviet press
articles indicate that junior officers often have trouble dealing
with conscripts, setting priorities, and organizing their time.
The leadership and management knowledge of naval school cadets
appears limited to experience gained on cadet training cruises.
This probably reflects the Soviet belief that command training is
more appropriate later in an officer's career, and then only for
those who have demonstrated leadership qualities and are destined
for command assignments.
There also has been some criticism in the military press of
graduates of higher naval schools who lack basic naval skills and
are unable to put their theoretical knowledge into practice. One
officer on his first assignment was horrified to discover the
shipboard equipment he was responsible for was completely foreign
to him, while another could not properly operate a sextant. The
higher naval schools have been faulted for not having good-
quality training aids, scale models, and simulators--a view that
has been supported by Western visitors to the Frunze school.
This may account for some of the practical-skill deficiencies
experienced by junior officers on their first assignments.
Junior officers seem to develop confidence in their technical
skills after about their first year.
Postgraduate Officer Education
Once an officer graduates from a higher naval school, he
tends to stay on a ship for several years, so there is not much
opportunity for coursework ashore. Some postgraduate programs
exist for young officers, but little is known about them.
Correspondence and resident courses, including precommand and
various specialist courses, are apparently conducted by the
higher naval or joint-service schools.
A midcareer course is conducted by the prestigious Leningrad
Naval Academy A. A. Grechko, the highest educational
institution operated exclusively by the Navy. The Academy takes
officers under age 36 with at least six to 10 years of fleet
experience and prepares them for commanding large ships or for
senior staff appointments. The majority of the students are
captains 3rd or 2nd rank.
The Grechko Academy has a high reputation in the Soviet
Navy, and attendance there is an important step in attaining flag
rank. The Academy is very selective; Western observers were told
in 1969 that only 7 to 8 percent of all Soviet naval officers are
able to attend during the course of their careers. There are
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four faculties: command, weapons, engineering/construction, and
electronics. The faculty includes a large number of flag
officers and receives the most modern equipment available. In
addition to its educational functions, the school also serves as
a think tank for naval doctrine and technical matters.
The highest level of officer training is provided by the
General Staff Academy in Moscow. Its two-year program covers
tactical, operational, and strategic employment of large units,
fleets, and groups of forces. Admission is limited to senior
command officers from all services, and naval officers probably
account for only a small fraction of those attending. Navy
graduates go on to fill the highest command and staff positions
in the Navy and Ministry of Defense.
Through higher command postgraduate training, officers who
have spent their careers on one class of ship presumably are
given a broader exposure to naval operations. Through classes,
seminars, war gaming, and other school activities, they get the
opportunity to work with officers from varied service
backgrounds. This perspective is probably further enhanced in
higher assignments, as the officers become involved in fleet-
level staff and exercise planning.
First Assignment
A newly commissioned officer usually is assigned to a billet
that corresponds to his school specialty (navigation, gunnery, or
engineering, for instance). Typically, he will stay in one
department on the same ship for
the next three to six years, progressing through positions
equivalent to assistant division officer, division officer,
assistant department head, and department head. During this
period, he is expected to become well versed in the operations of
his department, with some assistance from more experienced
officers and warrant officers. In the Soviet system, junior
officers take the same specialty rating tests as enlisted sailors
to demonstrate their ability to perform hands-on technical work.
An officer's initial assignment is ordinarily quite hectic
and provides a demanding introduction to Navy life. Soviet press
articles indicate that naval officers generally are overworked,
and, for the junior men trying to learn the ropes, the pace must
seem especially grueling. A new officer's principal
responsibilities are:
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--To master his own specialty.
--To learn the general operations of his department.
--To replace or repair broken equipment and conduct
regularly scheduled maintenance.
--To train and supervise conscripts and lead unit political
meetings.
--To keep abreast of new technological developments and
pursue self-improvement courses.
--To handle the paperwork.
Like enlisted sailors, officers are encouraged to push themselves
harder through ''socialist competitions.'' The competitions are
more effective motivators for officers than for enlisted men,
because the former have long-term career prospects to consider.
Command Officer Selection
While junior officers perform their duties and work on
mastering their given specialties, their potential for future
command is evaluated by their ship commanders, adding further to
the pressure of first assignments. Soviet writings indicate
that, in making this assessment, a ship's captain will consider
factors such as the junior officer's leadership qualities and
success in training and supervising conscripts; how effectively
he identifies priority tasks, organizes his time, and performs
under pressure; his status among fellow officers; his standing in
the socialist competitions; how well he follows orders and
conforms to established procedures; and his technical expertise.
A spotless political record is mandatory to be consid
command,
that might well have an influence is an officer's connections--
particularly a relative or close family friend in a high Navy or
party position (one Soviet officer said the surest way to be
promoted in the Soviet Navy is to be related to Admiral
Gorshkov). The evaluation of these factors is highly subjective,
and the commanding officer (CO) of a Soviet ship has wide
discretion in choosing who, from among his officers, will be
given the opportunity for a career as a commander.
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Major Ship Departments
1. Navigation
2. Gunnery/missiles
3. Mine/torpedo
4. Communications
5. Engineering
6. Aviation
7. Control
Command officers are usually drawn from the navigation, gunnery,
control, and sometimes communications departments. Captains of
surface vessels are most often gunnery officers, while
submariners are typically navigators. There are few command
opportunities for engineering officers, who tend to be career
specialists.
At the end of the evaluation and selection process, the
junior officers are categorized into two groups--those who will
remain specialists throughout their careers and those who will be
trained as line commanders. Each career track has its own
career-development program.
Ranks, Positions, and Career Tracks
Rank and position are separate in the Soviet Navy. Rank is
mostly dependent on time in grade. Position is based on an
individual's leadership qualities, technical background, and
general experience and education. Because the Soviets have a
much different view of the importance of age and experience than
that of Westerners, Soviet naval officers are often given
significant command assignments at an earlier age, then stay in
these positions to develop experience. It is not unusual to find
a young, relatively junior officer in a command position with
older, more senior officers serving under him in various career-
specialist billets.
The trend since the 1960s has been toward increasingly
younger commanders at the helms of Soviet ships. Half of the
Kara-class cruisers are now commanded by captains 3rd rank
between 31 and 34, and others began the post at that rank and
were promoted to captain 2nd in the job. Most Krivak-class
frigates are commanded by captains 3rd rank who took command as
captain lieutenants (ages 27 to 30), and Kresta-class cruisers
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are now commanded by captains 3rd; they were once commanded by
captains lst. The skipper of the aircraft carrier Kiev assumed
command of the ship when he was only 33.
Some young officers may find themselves in charge of ships
or ship departments before they have enough experience at sea.
This could prove dangerous in combat or emergency situations, and
it probably contributes to accidents and equipment breakdowns on
Soviet ships. Experienced staff specialists can provide
assistance to inexperienced command officers, but, in situations
that call for quick reaction and decisive action, the opportunity
Fleet Admiral N. I. Smirnov has stated that flag officers
have a special responsibility to watch over newly appointed
commanders as they develop experience. This may partially
account for the tendency for a ship commander's authority to be
superseded during special situations (such as sea rescue
operations, foreign port calls, and exercises) by embarked
squadron commanders or staff specialists or through rigid control
from headquarters ashore.
When Things Go Wrong, Soviet Style
The following account of a salvage operation gone awry
illustrates several of the problems to which the Soviet Navy is
vulnerable during emergency situations. In this instance, the
line of command among officers was unclear. Most of the work was
performed by the officers, with enlisted sailors merely looking
on. Alcohol abuse reduced personnel effectiveness, and sailors
demonstrated a lack of knowledge regarding damage control and
safety.
In December of 1965, a Northern Fleet freshwater
distillation ship ran aground in the Kola inlet, and a submarine
rescue ship was sent to offer assistance. Upon arrival, it was
discovered that the distillation ship had a broken keel and
flooded engineroom. The ship's crew had erected a tent-like
shelter and lit a fire to keep warm. In addition, they had
become intoxicated from consuming the ship's entire monthly
ration of alcohol (Soviet ships are issued alcohol for
maintaining equipment, but it is often consumed by the crew
After the salvage party boarded the disabled ship, officers
began issuing orders that were countermanded by other officers,
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resulting in mass confusion. There were many instances where
officers performed work while sailors merely watched. After
approximately 20 hours of pumping, most of the water had been
removed. At this point, however, pandemonium set in.
Funnels were not available for refueling the pumps, and a
decision was made to carry gasoline from a storage tank in
buckets. The resultant fuel spillage on the hot engines caused a
fire, which rendered several water pumps inoperable. Fuel
spillage also made the decks slippery, and several sailors
sustained injuries by slipping and falling. Lubricating oil from
the pump engines was used up, but no one replaced it, causing the
remaining pumps to burn out. New pumps were brought to the scene
and connected to the existing hoses, which by this time had
frozen. Sections of hose were disconnected and the ice inside
broken up with hammers--causing them to spring leaks. During
this time, officers continued to countermand one another's
Eventually, the water was pumped out and a line attached
from a tugboat to the disabled ship. After several attempts, the
ship was pulled free, but apparently the damaged hull was not
properly patched, and the ship began taking on more water. The
pumps could not keep up, and the ship settled deeper into the
water. Additional pumps were brought aboard, and, after more
pumping, pontoons were lashed alongside. Two weeks after the
start of the salvage operation, the distillation ship was towed
to port. Unfortunately, the ship with the two pontoons attached
was too large to enable it to tie up alongside a pier, and so the
makeshift contraption had to be beached. A month later, the ship
was towed to a floating drydock where it was eventually repaired.
This tendency can be viewed as part of the general pattern
characteristic of the Soviet command structure of important
decisions being referred upward. This approach probably inhibits
the development of a young commanding officer's self-confidence
and instills in him a dependency on higher authority for
direction in demanding situations.
We cannot be certain how such usurpation of a ship captain's
authority would affect Soviet wartime operations at sea. While
few Western captains would accept such a situation, it appears
that the practice generally is accepted in the Soviet military,
and the implied lack of trust in the CO's abilities does not
necessarily result in a loss of face. However, if squadron staff
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specialists were permitted to countermand the CO's orders, the
crew could begin to wonder who was in control and the resultant
loss of leadership could lead to chaos in a critical situation.
Such problems have occurred during peacetime rescue operations.
We believe the Soviet proclivity toward rigid shore control
of ship operations could be a serious problem. Tactical
decisions often are dictated by headquarters staffs ashore, tying
the hands of the on-the-scene commanders. This reduces the
ability of Soviet naval units to react to unexpected enemy
actions and rapidly unfolding situations.
There are, however, a number of advantages to the Soviet
approach to training ship commanders. Because they stay on the
same ship for four to 10 years, most know their vessels well.
Moreover, they can establish a meaningful track record from which
their superiors can evaluate them, making it easier to identify
both star performers and incompetents. Because the Navy is
willing to place young officers in command billets, it is easier
to encourage and reward talented and energetic ones with
challenging assignments.
A Soviet captain normally selects his own executive officer
(the second in command) and other assistant commanders from among
the ship's officers. An executive officer then has the
opportunity to prepare for his own command through an on-the-job
training program, which familiarizes him with all ship
departments, making him something of a generalist by Soviet
standards. He must also qualify as a watch officer and perform
well at sea. Once qualified, the executive will probably succeed
his old CO as the ship's captain. Thus the optimal career path
for a junior officer is from department head, to executive
officer, to commanding officer.
Soviet military writings have criticized the on-the-job
training for young commanders-to-be. Many COs are reluctant to
let their junior officers take over ship operations because they
don't want to deal with problems that could result from their
inexperience. Admiral Gorshkov has commented that COs tend to
want to do everything--other men are present on the bridge as
Although Soviet commanding officers are generally familiar
with all of their ship's departments, they are expected to leave
the expertise in each department to the specialist officers.
Fleet Admiral Smirnov wrote in Morskoy Sbornik that the continued
modernization of complex naval equipment makes it too difficult
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for a CO to have an expert's knowledge of every ship department.
Those officers who fail to be selected as commanders can
sometimes transfer to another, similar class of ship as a
department head, but more often they become career specialists.
A specialist officer might be a department head for three to four
years, attend a specialist course ashore, and then return to his
old unit as a staff specialist. Failure to serve in command
billets does not limit an officer's promotion prospects as it
would in many Western navies. A career specialist can continue
to advance in rank up to, and including, flag rank.
Staff officers give much-needed experience to the fleet,
often assisting ship crews in preparing for sea deployment,
accompanying them on extended cruises and exercises, and serving
on inspection teams. Soviet military writings have expressed
some concern, however, that staff officers sometimes perform work
that should be done by regular crews and that the latter become
''witnesses rather than participants in the events,'' thereby
failing to gain needed experience. Moreover, the Soviets have
written that, in wartime, such patronage would be impossible, as
there are not enough staff officers for all of the Navy's ships.
Soviet naval officers tend to be assigned to one ship for
long periods (up to 10 years in some cases). When an officer is
transferred, it is normally to another ship of the same type, in
the same department, and often within the same fleet. Even when
an officer changes ship types, he is usually in the same
department, with similar responsibilities. Soviet officers are
not encouraged to cross-specialize; the Navy believes modern
naval technology is too complex for them to master more than one
specialty.
The primary advantage of this policy is that only a limited
number of officers on any Soviet ship are likely to be in the
initial stages of learning their duties and familiarizing
themselves with equipment. The Soviets believe this is
essential, given the complexity of modern naval technology and
the shortage of qualified enlisted technicians to help run their
ships. On the other hand, Soviet officers' narrow focus and lack
of a broad range of fleet experience make it difficult for them
to fill in for one another when a given officer is unavailable
for duty. The system also probably inhibits an officer's
understanding of the interrelationship and varying capabilities
of different ship classes that must operate together in combat.
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Sea Training
The sea experience that Soviet naval officers receive is
strikingly different from that of their US counterparts. In
general, the United States operates a ''steaming navy'' with a
high operational tempo. The Soviet Navy, in contrast, conserves
its equipment during peacetime and emphasizes readiness to go to
sea, so that most of the time Soviet officers spend on their
ships occurs in port, at anchorages, or on short cruises of a day
US carrier deployments in the Pacific in 1984, for example,
averaged about eight months, with at least five and a half to six
months spent under way. A Soviet Pacific Fleet carrier
deployment will typically run for only one to five months, with
most of the time spent in ports or anchorages. On average, only
about 10 percent of the Soviet surface fleet is deployed away
Exercise training in the Soviet Navy is characterized by
short, simple, stereotyped, and carefully planned drills with
little or no ''free play'' among participants. We believe this
pattern of training does not prepare Soviet officers for
realistic battle conditions, where it is necessary to make combat
decisions in an unpredictable environment. This lack of
experience will probably result in the use of slow and
unimaginative ship maneuvers and tactics in wartime.
An example of the lack of realism in Soviet sea training is
provided by a 1982 Red Star article written by a submariner and a
surface ASW officer. The officers described an ASW exercise that
followed ''cut-and-dried patterns.'' The ASW ship commander
''reduced his risks to the minimum'' by repeatedly waiting for
the target submarine to move from ''one assigned point to the
next.'' The submarine commander did not try to shake off his
pursuer because only the surface ship commander was evaluated for
the exercise. Moreover, the submarine's actions were all planned
in advance by the ASW staff to ensure that a contact would be
Postexercise critiques of such training are of little value
to the participants, according to the article's authors, because
there is no opportunity for joint analysis by submarine and
surface ship officers. In fact, it was in a chance encounter
years later that the two authors discovered they had once
participated in the same exercise. Only then did the ASW officer
learn that the submariners were critical of the ASW staff for not
designing a realistic exercise scenario.
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The Soviets apparently have difficulty reacting to the
unexpected during exercises and sea cruises. Soviet military
writings indicate that, in cases in which the timetables of
planned exercises are changed even slightly, naval units are
sometimes unable to adjust. In one example, a crew failed an
exercise when its emphasis was changed from ASW to air defense on
short notice. In another case, a top-rated crew botched a
missile firing after a surprise inspection cut an hour from the
preparation time for the exercise. Unable to adjust to the
change of plans, the officers and men ''were nervous and making
mistakes all over the place,'' according to the article.
The Soviet Navy trains its officers to calmly choose the
''correct'' school solution to various combat situations,
according to military writings. Watch officers, for example, are
trained on simulators that present operators with various sea
combat events such as an air attack, sonar contact, or a cruise
missile attack. Officers' responses are recorded on a magnetic
tape, which is compared to the school solution tape. An
officer's rating is based on how quickly he identifies a
situation and chooses the proper action. Through this and other
training methods, the Soviets hope to make tactical decisions
automatic and almost reflexive to minimize the need for
independent thinking by tactical commanders.
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Ship repairs at sea by Soviet crews are very basic and
usually involve the replacement of defective components rather
than actual repairs. Soviet ships carry few spare parts and have
only limited shop equipment on board. When breakdowns occur at
sea, the ships usually return to a repair yard where the work can
be done by specialists. Most peacetime naval operations are not
seriously affected by this policy, because the Navy generally
leaves most of its fleet in port and limits most ship cruises to
A low emphasis on damage-control training in the Soviet Navy
has been reported, and some crews privately believe their ships
would be lost if they were to sustain even moderate damage.
Fleet Admiral Smirnov criticized
amage-control training in his 1984 ''Navy Day'' article for
Morskoy Sbornik.
The low priority given to damage-control training is
illustrated in a 1983 Soviet military press article, ''Why a
Training Ship Rests Idle.'' The article focused on a Pacific
Fleet damage-control training ship that was used only 35 percent
of the time. Despite Navy regulations requiring periodic
refresher training for career personnel, almost no officers or
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warrant officers observed the requirement, and fleet authorities
showed no interest in enforcing it.
We believe a lack of emphasis on training in at-sea ship
maintenance, damage control, and crew safety will limit the
Soviet Navy's ability to conduct prolonged deployments during
wartime. The Soviet approach is probably a reflection of both
the belief that a war at sea will be brief and destructive, with
little opportunity for repairs by crews, and a recognition of the
limitations of the conscript sailors that make up most of the
Compensation
An officer's pay is based on rank, position, and length of
service with various allowances for hardship posts and special
duties or qualifications. Position pay constitutes the largest
share of an officer's income, being roughly double the pay
received for rank, and it is awarded irrespective of rank. Thus
a commanding officer will receive more pay than an officer of
equal rank in a noncommand billet.
Pay allowances and other benefits are used to reward
officers serving in assignments that are important to the Navy
but which involve family hardship or are dangerous or otherwise
undesirable. Time served in the submarine fleet or certain
hardship areas counts as double time for pension computation.
Special bonuses are given for remote area assignments, sea duty
(the biggest bonuses go to submariners on nuclear boats), under-
ice transfers, and equator crossings. Special allowances are
also given for flight duty, raising specialty ratings, and
belonging to a ''combat ready'' unit.
Coveted assignments, higher promotion prospects, and other
career inducements are apparently also used as an incentive to
attract the best officers to critical Navy components. The
importance of the submarine fleet, for example, is reflected in
the dominance of submariners in a variety of key appointments.
Submariners and naval aviators are also promoted one year ahead
of other officers at each rank level up to captain lst.
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Key Naval Posts Held by Submariners, March 1985
First Deputy Commander in Chief
Chief of the Main Naval Staff and First Deputy Commander in
Chief
Commander, Northern Fleet
Commander, Pacific Fleet
Deputy Commander in Chief for Combat Training
Deputy Commander in Chief for Training
Chief of Staff, Northern Fleet
Chief of Staff, Pacific Fleet
Chief of Staff, Black Sea Fleet
Chief of Staff, Baltic Fleet
First Deputy Chief of Staff, Northern Fleet
Deputy Chief of Staff, Pacific Fleet
Chief Navigator of the Navy
Deputy Head of the Directorate of Combat Readiness
Fleet Navigator, Pacific Fleet
Head of the Naval Academy
Head of Makarov Higher Naval School
Head of Popov Higher Naval School
Head of Leninskiy Komsomol Higher Naval School
Head of Kirov School
Head of Nakhimov School
Political Infrastructure
Purpose
The political infrastructure of the Soviet Navy is
distinctive. Its primary purpose is to monitor personnel and
ensure that the Navy remains completely subservient to the CPSU,
although it is also responsible for boosting unit morale,
increasing productivity, and preventing discipline problems. F
The Communist Party's grip on the Navy is maintained through
both direct and indirect methods. Indirect control is achieved
because virtually all career naval officers and many career
enlisted men belong to the CPSU. Although many join simply to
further their careers, they are nonetheless subject to party
discipline, which exerts a powerful control over their actions.
Every officer knows that, if he runs afoul of the party and is
expelled, his naval career will be over and his prospects for a
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The CPSU is represented directly by the zampolit, or
political officer, who serves as a combination of secret-police
officer and unit chaplain. After the commanding officer, he is
the most influential man aboard a Soviet vessel. The political
officer's principal duties are:
--To be the ''eyes and ears'' of the party aboard a ship and
recruit an informant network among the crew.
--To maintain political files on the officers and men and
screen candidates for promotion, service in sensitive positions,
or duty on foreign port calls.
--To conduct regular political meetings and indoctrinate the
crew with Marxist-Leninist ideology, the views of the CPSU
leadership, and the history of the Navy and the party.
--To be the information officer.
--To organize socialist competitions, motivate the crew to
work harder and observe regulations, and instill a sense of duty
and patriotism.
--To share the responsibility for maintaining unit
discipline with the commanding officer and to address crew
grievances.
--To serve as morale officer and sports/recreation director.
Political meetings are an integral part of Soviet Nav
life
both ashore and at sea.
while
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enlisted sailo
are not ordina
meetings, howe
rs are usually e
rily required to
ver, is mandator
ncouraged to join the party,
. Attendance at political
regardless of rank or party
they
affiliation.
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The captive audiences at these meetings are subjected to
regular doses of Marxist-Leninist dogma, and various
pronouncements by the regime are read and discussed. New
directives from naval authorities and naval regulations are also
Political meetings play a central role in organizing a naval
unit's socialist competitions. In cooperation with regular
officers, the political officer helps ensure that appropriate
competition objectives are set and progress duly noted.
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Outstanding crewmen are lauded for their efforts, while group
pressure is exerted on those not deemed to be carrying their
Political meetings at sea are reportedly shorter and more
businesslike, with considerably less emphasis on ideological
matters. On many ships, they are little more than a medium for
keeping the crew up to date on news from home, sports scores, and
Soviet writings indicate that the morale and ideological
motivation of officers and enlisted men are considered a
principal ingredient of the military might of the armed forces.
How well the Navy's political infrastructure disciplines and
motivates its people is a paramount factor in the naval morale
equation.
We believe that, despite some glaring failures
, the Soviets genera y
have been effective in maintaining a tight party grip on the Navy
and in guarding against subversive activities by real or
potential dissidents. Officer career advancement is dependent on
unquestioned support of the political system, and this, in turn,
ensures that the most significant segment of the Navy is co-opted
The informant networks operated by political officers also
seem to serve their purpose. In many units everyone knows who
the informants are and avoids them. It seems unlikely, however,
that a Soviet sailor can always be certain that what he says or
does will not somehow get back to the authorities, and this
generally serves as an effective deterrent to politically deviant
We doubt that the political propaganda and ideological
preaching to which Soviet sailors are regularly subjected are
likely to motivate them to work harder or risk their lives in
battle. Crews react with boredom and apathy to the incessant
dogmatic outpourings, a finding that is consistent with Western
observations of the Soviet civilian population.
Nonetheless, propaganda probably fulfills a useful function
in the Navy. As an element of psychological control in a
totalitarian state, the bombardment of sailors with propaganda
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serves as a constant reminder of the CPSU's pervasive presence
and authority. 25X1
Propaganda may have some effect on raising morale,
particularly in wartime or in periods of tension, if the regular
party line is supplemented by appeals to the traditional Russian
love for the motherland and suspicions about the aggressive
intentions of foreigners. The value of propaganda to the Navy's
morale in war might well be related to whether or not the average
sailor could be made to believe his country was acting in a
defensive rather than an aggressive role. The war in Afghanistan
has shown that propaganda is not effective in motivating Soviet
soldiers in countries where they are clearly invaders.
In its attempts to raise morale and instill enthusiasm, the
Navy's political structure achieves mixed results. On the
positive side, the political officer provides a special avenue
for crew grievances, and, in some cases, he serves as a special
counselor for young sailors experiencing difficulty with Navy
life. If he uses his influence effectively, he can potentially
help crew morale by allowing sailors to feel they have a well-
placed officer to represent their interests. Both emigre and
press sources, for example, have described cases where sailors,
unfairly denied liberty for extended periods, approached the
political officer, who intervened with the ship's captain.
Political training often is viewed as a panacea by the naval
leadership. For many cases of discipline, morale, or unit
performance problems, fleet authorities order more political
training rather than remedies for the specific problem.
Political training also takes time away from more practical
naval activities--a trade-off that the Soviets appear willing to
accept. Although we do not know precisely how much time is
devoted to political instruction, one unit spent three hours a
day, six days a week on it when they were in port. A more common
figure, however, is one three- to four-hour meeting each week
ashore, with short (20 minutes to an hour) daily meetings at sea.
The political officer's function of reporting on the
political reliability and general competence of commanders
potentially creates a conflict between them. Cases of strained
relations have been reported where a ship's regular officers
regarded the political officer as an ''unnecessary appendage'' in
an otherwise technically oriented group. Usually, however, there
is a significant commonality of interest between the two, because
both are rated on their ship's standing within the fleet.
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Morale and Discipline
Living Conditions
Life in the Soviet Navy is hard. Sailors generally put in
long hours with little time off. The largest and most important
fleets--the Northern and Pacific--locate most of their base
facilities in desolate areas with harsh climatic conditions. The
resultant morale difficulties are made worse by an apparent
unwillingness on the part of the Soviet leadership to devote
resources to easing living conditions. Career personnel fare
better than conscripts, although they too suffer from the effects
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of assignments in remote areas, particularly on their family
Recreational facilities at most naval bases are practically
nonexistent, so sailors depend on trips to the nearest town for
relief from boredom. Political officers, in their attempts to
arrange for entertainment on base, are hampered by the lack of
available resources and apparently confuse entertainment with
indoctrination. A Soviet admiral writing about the use of films
for entertainment, for example, listed the following titles of
films that were to be shown to various ships and garrisons:
--''The Communist Party as the Organizer and Inspirer of the
Great October Socialist Revolution.11
--''Lenin, the Founder of the Soviet State.''
--''The Friendship of the Peoples of the Socialist
Community.''
--''We Are Building Communism.''
A 1982 press article described housing facilities at naval
bases that were plagued by poor construction, leaking roofs, and 25X1
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Poor-quality food in insufficient amounts is a problem for shore
personnel throughout the Navy, and, in remote areas, where a
harsh climate inhibits local agriculture, food shortages can
cause morale problems for both sailors and their families.
The Chief of the Northern Fleet Directorate for Trade,
writing in Logistics and Supply of the Soviet Armed Forces,
described some of the conditions that interfere with the quality
of food in remote areas:
--Suppliers consider the Navy bases a low priority.
--Aeroflot does not allocate enough aircraft to transport
produce.
--Northern Fleet bases lack sufficient food-storage
facilities.
--The Navy's food trucks are not insulated.
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The Navy has attempted to ease the food shortages by
administering its own auxiliary farms in remote base areas, but,
because of the harsh climate, the results have not been good.
Harsh living conditions and the monotony of isolated
outposts take their toll on the family life of married sailors.
Among a group of 20 young officers, half of the wives who
accompanied them to Kamchatka reportedly returned to Leningrad
after only three months.
Conscripts receive very little pay. A naval infantryman who
served with the Black Sea Fleet said parents had to mail money to
their sons just so they could afford to eat a decent meal in the
servicemen's club. Conscripts do receive a few token benefits,
such as exemption from income taxes and preferential admission to
colleges and trade schools after their discharge.
Medical care for naval personnel is better than that
available to civilians. This is attributed in part to officer pay
scales, which enabled naval doctors to earn 10 percent more than
their civilian counterparts.
Leave and liberty are rarely granted for most conscripts;
the general Soviet approach seems to be to keep them confined to
the base or ship, where their activities can be more easily
monitored and controlled. Most conscripts get one 10-day leave
period during their term of service. Liberty policies vary
greatly from unit to unit. One unit was allowed only one five-
hour liberty every three months in, although a more commonly
reported figure is one six-hour pass on weekends. Career sailors
receive 30 days of leave a year (45 if they serve on nuclear
submarines) and have evenings free in home port.
When Soviet sailors are fortunate enough to get liberty,
their lack of spending money greatly restricts what they can do.
In the Baltic states, they also frequently face openly hostile
civilians and occasionally are even forced to travel in groups
for safety. In the rest of the USSR, relations between locals
and Navy men are generally good.
Conditions at Sea. Living conditions at sea tend to be
spartan, as Soviet ship designs generally do not emphasize crew
habitability. Conditions are cramped by Western standards, and
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amenities such as air-conditioning are not found on many vessels.
Shortages of soap are common at sea, and one Northern Fleet
captain authorized extra leave to any sailor who caught 10 rats
aboard his ship.
Liberty in foreign ports is rarely granted for Soviet ship
crews on distant deployments. At these ports, sailors ordinarily
go ashore in small groups escorted by a junior officer or warrant
officer. They are carefully briefed by the political officer
beforehand on the dangers of contact with foreigners and are
typically told that Western port cities are ''false fronts''
designed to hide the true squalor of life for the masses in
capitalist countries. The visits are rather tame, by Western
standards, and often consist of organized sightseeing or museum
Despite the conditions at sea, many Soviet sailors prefer
sea duty to shore assignments, for a number of reasons. Soviet
cruises are usually short, and, in some cases, conditions ashore
may not be much better than conditions on ship. Food at sea
reportedly is much better and is available in ample quantities.
Ideological indoctrination is kept to a minimum on cruises. In
addition, sailors receive bonuses for sea duty of extra pay or
special credit certificates for purchasing scarce foreign goods
in special import stores in the USSR. A greater sense of
teamwork or esprit de corps has been reported at sea, where
relations between officers and enlisted men tend to be more
Effect on Readiness. In wartime, the spartan living
conditions probably would have little effect on combat
effectiveness. Russians have historically shown an ability to
accommodate hardships in war, and Soviet civilians even in
peacetime accept living conditions that would appear harsh by
In peacetime, however, substandard living conditions sap
morale, erode enthusiasm, and contribute to alcoholism, AWOL
cases, and other discipline problems. The loss of training
opportunities because of poorly motivated sailors, for instance,
indirectly affects the Navy's wartime readiness--it certainly
accounts for some of the substandard operational performance
noted in this report.
The Soviets have written that the welfare of their sailors
is a component of the fleet's combat readiness.
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Discipline
The Soviet naval leadership places little trust in its
sailors, and naval practices discourage sailors from engaging in
any activities that are not closely monitored and controlled.
Soviet military writings have stated that ''a high level of
military discipline can be achieved only when commanders and
officers constantly supervise the behavior of subordinates''
while maintaining a ''strict regimentation of behavior'' and
exact observance of naval regulations. To this end, discipline
is maintained through a variety of redundant and overlapping
informal, administrative, legal, political, and clandestine
Informal. In the Soviet Navy, senior conscripts rule over
junior ones. By tradition, new draftees are forced, under the
threat of physical violence, to serve on cleanup details, do
laundry, shine shoes, and perform other menial tasks.
The informal hierarchy is tolerated and even encouraged by
officers and warrant officers because it lightens their already
extensive supervisory duties. Senior sailors reportedly were
sometimes punished for being ''too easy'' on first-year
conscripts.
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Administrative. Commanders have considerable leeway in
disciplining subordinates. Administrative discipline generally
deals with violations of military regulations such as
communications security, dereliction of duty, and being absent
without leave (AWOL). Punishment options include assignment of
extra duties, denial of leave or liberty, demotions, or brig
sentences. A commanding officer sometimes delegates minor
discipline matters to a ''military court of honor'' composed of a
sailor's peers. 25X1
Legal. The Military Procuracy is a legal entity subordinate
to the Procurator General of the USSR and hence organizationally
outside the regular military command channels. Its function is
to investigate crimes, charge servicemen, and institute criminal
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Military journalists can also play a role in the
investigations process. By law, correspondents from Red Star can
subpoena and inspect official records pertaining to allegations
received in letters to their editor.
In March 1984, Red Star received over 24,000 letters from its
readers pertaining to problems in the armed forces such as
corrupt officers and misuse of position, in addition to numerous
complaints about inadequate living conditions for sailors and
their dependents. Although military correspondents possess no
punitive powers, their investigations and articles frequently
cause commanders to take corrective measures or result in the
filing of charges by the procuracy.
Life in a Soviet Naval Brig
Soviet sailors greatly fear being sent to the brig. The
following describes a typical brig.
Most naval brigs are overcrowded, and commanders often must
bribe wardens to have one of their sailors admitted. Upon
arrival, a sailor first has his head shaved--one of the worst
consequences of a brig term because it is an embarrassing stigma
when sailors go on pass after being released to their units.
They also have all nonissue clothing (usually sweaters from home
worn under uniform shirts) permanently confiscated, along with
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A typical brig day begins with reveille at 0500 hours,
followed by ''physical training'' consisting of running around a
room 100 times. Five minutes is allowed for a breakfast of
''terrible food'' (such as a soup made from fish and cereal) in
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small quantities. Prisoners are forced to run wherever they go.
The day's activities consist of some form of strenuous work,
such as unloading sides of beef or cement bags from a truck.
Work is accompanied by constant harassment from guards, who refer
to prisoners as ''brig rats.'' Typically, they force prisoners to
shovel snow and then move it from one corner to another. Ten
minutes are allowed for lunch before a return to work details.
After a five-minute dinner break, work continues until 2300 hours
when prisoners are returned to their cells.
Prisoners sleep on boards, which are stacked outside to
freeze during the day. No blankets are provided and cells are
unheated--forcing prisoners to huddle together for warmth. For
punishment, guards will fill a cell with water and remove bed
boards so that prisoners cannot sit on the floor.
Suicides are common in some brigs, which has led to
speculation among sailors that some are actually murders
committed by guards.
In addition to the brig, the Soviet Navy is known to use
''disciplinary battalions'' to punish serious offenses such as
striking an officer, murder, rape, or being AWOL for extended
periods. We have little information on the disciplinary
battalions, though some reports describe them as ''horrible
places'' that are worse than the brig. Time served in these
units is considered ''lost time,'' which must be made up through
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an extension of enlistment. Offenders who return to duty from
disciplinary battalions are usually described as cowed and
broken. Their value to the Navy is probably minimal, aside from
serving as a warning to other sailors.
Political. The Communist Party handles infractions of party
discipline, such as missing political meetings, as well as
nonpolitical offenses such as drunkenness, theft, and going AWOL.
Its punitive powers range from placing bad marks on a sailor's
political records to expulsion from the party. The party is also
indirectly involved in military legal and administrative matters.
Clandestine. The KGB is also involved in the process of
maintaining naval discipline, although we have only limited
evidence of its activities. KGB officers in naval uniforms
reportedly have been involved in investigations of mutinies,
uprisings, living conditions, and unit morale problems and that
The KGB may also conduct
ackground checks of crews prior to foreign deployments and is
called on to investigate incidences of political dissent and
nationalism in the Navy. Special naval forces of the KGB conduct
regular antidefection exercises in Soviet coastal waters. F
There is an ill-defined overlap between the responsibilities
of naval political and KGB officers in monitoring naval personnel
for signs of potential antiregime activities. We believe the KGB
may be employed in special cases as a doublecheck on a crew's
political reliability. Although we have no evidence to confirm
this, it would be in keeping with the distrustful nature of the
Soviet leadership and its tendency toward redundant
responsibilities for discipline among various organizational
components. Alternatively, there may be some cooperation between
the naval political and KGB components, and it would not be
unreasonable to imagine a political officer's being one of the
KGB resident's agents aboard ship.
Punitive measures taken by one component of the naval
discipline system do not necessarily rule out additional action
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from another component. Thus it is possible that a seaman
convicted of a crime could be reduced in rank by his commanding
officer, expelled from the party by a political commission, sent
to the brig by the procuracy, and finally beaten by his warrant
Despite the multiple controls on sailors and the strict
regimentation of their activities, the Soviet Navy is beset by
discipline problems. Conscripts often seem motivated to work
mostly out of fear of punishment. As soon as their supervision
is gone, work stops. Some Western observers of Soviet operations
at sea noted Soviet sailors standing around idly with their hands
in their pockets so frequently that they dubbed the practice
''HIP'' for ''hand-in-pocket syndrome.'' They speculated that
Soviet sailors may be trained in this behavior because it
occurred regularly whenever there was work to be done above deck.
More severe disciplinary problems, such as theft, assaults,
drinking on duty, and AWOL cases, are a continuing problem.
Commanders often attempt to cover up violations in order to
receive high ratings for their unit's performance. This
generally continues until an incident occurs that makes higher
authorities aware that problems exist and an investigation is
started. Those caught are punished, and political officers are
ordered to address the problems through additional ''political
instruction,'' which usually means lectures. Things usualiy
return to business as usual, and the cycle begins again.
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Coverups
The Navy's personnel system strongly encourages commanders
to cover up discipline infractions and unit performance problems.
Soviet military writings state that, according to Navy policy,
''the very fact that a breach of discipline occurs on board a
ship is evidence of deficiencies in either the organization of
the shipboard routine or the education and indoctrination of
sailors or both.'' Reporting problems indicate to naval
authorities that things are not well and can cause a ship to lose
its standing in the socialist competitions, which, in turn, can
cost a commander promotions, academy appointments, and other
career advancements.
A double standard exists regarding the reporting of unit
problems. Officially, officers are told to be honest and can be
punished if caught falsifying reports. In reality, things
operate much differently. A military press article described an
example--the case of an idealistic young lieutenant who decided
to ''report the true state of affairs'' in his unit. The ship's
commanding officer admonished him by asking, ''And do you think
they'll thank you for a report like that?''
coverups
of discipline and unit performance problems are a widespread and
recurring problem in the Navy. press
articles have referred to many cases of falsification of unit
maintenance schedules, air traffic control logs, and records on
personnel drinking problems and AWOL sailors.
instances of officers providing sailors with test
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Although press articles
indicate that naval authorities are concerned about coverups.
tney appear unable to correct the problem.
Discipline Problems
The Navy is plagued by the same types of problems that
trouble Soviet society in general--alcoholism, corruption, poor
work habits, and absenteeism. Military discipline and close
regimentation of sailors' activities control these problems
somewhat, but naval authorities still have trouble keeping them
Alcoholism. Heavy drinking has been part of the Russian
culture for centuries. Soviet studies link alcohol to 80 to 85
percent of all the crimes committed in the USSR. It is also
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linked to many of the Navy's discipline problems.
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In general, the Soviet Navy is strict regarding the use of
alcohol on duty and disapproves of, but reluctantly tolerates, it
off duty. Commanders' policies vary greatly, however, with some
being virtually ''dry'' while others tolerate widespread drinking
both on and off duty.
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All Soviet naval vessels except submarines are officially
''dry.'' In recognition of their elite status and demanding
duties, submariners are allowed one glass of wine or shot of
vodka per day while at sea.
alcohol
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abuse is not a problem among submarine crews at sea because of
both strict discipline and a sense of pride and elitism.
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Strict unit punishment for alcohol abuse has been reported.
Sailors could be given six months in a disciplinary battalion if
an officer even suspected the use of alcohol on duty. Typically,
sailors who return from liberty intoxicated are given a 10- to
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15-day brig term, and those who commit crimes while drunk can be
sentenced to five additional days.
Despite the remote location and tough discipline of many
units, naval authorities find it difficult to control alcohol
problems. The primary interests of young conscripts are women
and alcohol, and, since remote locations and restrictive leave
policies make it difficult to meet women, drinking is about the
only remaining recreation. In many units, alcohol is the
principal medium of exchange.
The Soviet Navy uses alcohol extensively for equipment
maintenance, but very little of it may find its way to the
equipment. Sailors in some units regularly draw 15 to 20 times
the amounts authorized for cleaning equipment and consume all of
it, using water or gasoline for cleaning. On one ship, there
reportedly was a system for distributing the cleaning alcohol
based on rank. Cleaning fluids and other substances with alcohol
bases are sometimes filtered through gas masks (rendering the
masks useless) and then consumed (sometimes rendering the sailor
useless).
Parents contribute to the problem by mailing vodka to their
sons in the Navy. Soviet press articles have criticized the
practice, but some parents apparently consider it their duty to
try to ease the discomforts of their sons' service time.
Some units have a lax attitude toward alcohol abuse--with
predictable consequences. Some officers are willing to overlook
drinking on duty,
Alcohol abuse by naval personnel
has been linked to aircraft and vehicle crashes, fighting,
insubordination, theft of state property, black-market
activities, and the inability of servicemen to perform their
duties.
In general, officers are less likely than either warrant
officers or conscripts to abuse alcohol on duty. Citations for
drinking offenses can seriously damage an officer's career.I
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As a group, warrant officers are most likely to have severe
alcohol problems. This is probably a result of their having
significantly more spending money and personal freedom than
conscripts, while lacking the officers' professionalism and
concern over career prospects.
Drug Abuse. Drug abuse does not appear to be a significant
problem in the Soviet Navy because drugs are not as readily
available as alcohol, and because most sailors come from cultural
backgrounds in which alcohol use is more acceptable than drug
use. There is evidence of limited drug use, mostly among Central
Asian conscripts who are sometimes mailed drugs from home. Most
sailors, however, never come into contact with them.
Theft and Corruption. Startling instances of graft and
personal use of state property go unnoticed in the Soviet system,
according to Soviet press articles. A good example of this
problem appeared in a 1983 Red Star article--the case of a
submarine commander who used his crew to work in civilian
industry. He was caught when a political officer noticed he had
purchased three new cars in two years, prompting an
investigation. Officers sometimes allow their men to be used by
civilian factories and then order them to steal construction
materials, vehicle parts, and food for the unit. Such practices
are common in Soviet society, so it is unlikely the Navy will be
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Frustrated by low pay, sailors sometimes sell state
property, particularly vehicle parts and clothing, on the black
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market to raise money to buy vodka.
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Theft of small arms is rare, although they 25X1
are sometimes illegally ''borrowed'' for hunting. Such petty
crimes probably do not have a serious impact on readiness,
although they are a nuisance to officials. 25X1
Fighting. Although fighting is a recurring discipline
problem for the Navy, it probably has no significant effect on
fights between sailors occur regularly and often involve alcohol
or harassment of new recruits.
Desertion, AWOL, and Suicide. Despite the spartan living
conditions in much of the Navy, desertion does not appear to be a
serious problem. There are several probable reasons, including
strict controls on personal travel and relocation in the USSR,
that make it easy for authorities to track down deserters.
Punishment for those caught is severe--usually a sentence to a
disciplinary battalion. Moreover, at many bases in remote areas
there is simply nowhere for a deserter to go.
Unauthorized or overextended liberty is a common problem in
home ports. Boredom is a strong incentive for going AWOL. It
is an offense that typically carries a light punishment (such as
extra duties). In some units, officers apparently make little
effort to stop sailors from sneaking off base at night, and,
throughout the Navy, warrant officers can usually be bribed for a
pass. In foreign ports, however, discipline is strict and
sailors are not allowed ashore without an official escort.
Suicides in the Soviet Navy probably occur most often in
remote areas because of the isolation of sailors and their
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Ethnic conflict among sailors does not appear to be a
serious problem for the Soviet Navy. Occasional outbreaks of
violence between Slavs and Central Asians occur, but they are
usually confined to construction units.
The Soviet press states that one of the functions of
military service is to assist in the Sovietization of the diverse
ethnic groups that make up the Soviet empire. The Navy is
reportedly interested in controlling minority peoples, getting
Little attempt is made to accommodate minorities in the
Soviet Navy. All orders are given in Russian, and the use of
other languages on duty is forbidden. No Russian-language
instruction is available, and those who cannot speak the language
when drafted are assigned menial jobs where they are forced to
learn a dozen or so basic Russian words so they can follow
The Soviet press in 1984 made several references to Central
Asians being admitted to higher naval schools and indicated that
entrance requirements may have been lowered for minority
applicants. Although exceptional candidates will probably be
taken into the naval officer corps--with fanfare over the
''socialist brothers joining in the common defense against
capitalists''--we think it unlikely that the Navy will pursue an
active US-style affirmative action program.
Most Central Asian ethnic groups are poorly qualified for
naval service, lacking Russian-language skills and adequate
schooling or premilitary training. Many of them prefer to avoid
occupations in high-technology fields. Moreover, joining the
officer corps essentially means accepting Russification and a
career closely associated with the central government--a prospect
Naval authorities are apparently distrustful of non-Slavic
ethnic groups, and most sensitive or critical Navy billets are
reserved for personnel of Slavic origin. Submariners--even the
conscripts--are almost exclusively Slavic, and sailors of Jewish
or Baltic extraction are sometimes transferred from vessels
visiting foreign ports.
The Soviets apparently believe such discrimination is
justified. It may be influenced by memories of ethnic groups
during World War II collaborating with the Germans or proving to
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be unreliable fighters.
We do not believe the Soviet Navy's inability to integrate
or co-opt non-Slavic ethnic groups into positions of
responsibility will have a significant effect on its combat
readiness. We believe, however, that such policies will make it
more difficult for the Navy to respond to recruiting problems
associated with the changing demographic composition of the USSR.
They will also deny the Navy the services of technologically
proficient Western minorities--Germans, Jews, and Baltic peoples-
As a result of infrequent and poor-quality peacetime
training, most reserve personnel would probably be of limited
value to the Navy in combat operations--a factor that degrades
the Navy's ability to fight a protracted war at sea. Reserve
forces appear to be regarded by the naval leadership more as a
peacetime auxiliary work force than as a wartime combat reserve.
This neglect of the reserves may reflect a Soviet view that a
conventional war with the West will be brief, so there is little
point in diverting resources from regular Navy programs to
prepare for the replacement of wartime casualties.
The Navy draws its reserve personnel from discharged
conscripts, career sailors, and ROTC graduates. Some ROTC
personnel never serve a regular tour in the Navy, so their
military experience is limited to what they receive in initial
training and occasional reserve callups. A Reserve officer
training school was described as a ''boring charm school'' where
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students and faculty were indifferent and discipline was
practically nonexistent. Everyone graduated, regardless of
performance, because any failures would reflect poorly on the
Callups for naval reserve training or temporary duty occur
irregularly and infrequently. One reservist, for example,
reportedly served only one month of active duty in 18 years.
Typically, personnel are recalled once or twice, usually within
10 years of entering the reserves, and serve from one to three
months. Reservists from large cities near naval facilities
appear more likely to be recalled on a regular basis, generally
for about eight to 40 hours of evening classes per year.
The quality of naval reserve training is poor. Training at
sea is rare (one officer received his first shipboard duty 19
years after receiving his reserve commission), and reservists
tend to be ignored by regulars, who do not take them seriously
and do not have the time to supervise their activities.
Reservists often receive no military training during callups, but
instead perform manual labor for the Navy. The Soviet press has
made references to the use of reservists to work on ''urgent
construction for the nation,'' and construction tradesmen are the
personnel most often recalled.
Morale among reservists is low, as many believe their
services are neither needed nor appreciated by the regular Navy
and that time spent on reserve duty is wasted. Some reservists,
however, view reserve duty as something of a vacation, since
discipline among reservists tends to be lax.
Classroom instruction for reservists tends to consist of
lectures on theoretical and political topics. Instructors
apparently care little about these classes.
The poor training received by naval reservists would
probably limit their wartime utility to construction and rear-
area support. The Navy could recall officers and other men who
had been recently discharged in the hope they would remember
enough from their service experience to make them useful in
combat assignments. Without retraining, most of these
individuals would only be useful in the same billet and ship
class in which they had previously served because of their
narrowly specialized backgrounds.
Merchant marine personnel--many of whom have served in the
regular Navy or received ROTC training--would probably be of some
value in billets related to their civilian work, such as surface
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navigation or nonnuclear engineering. But they would also
require retraining to effectively perform many combat tasks. As
a result, the Soviet Navy could find itself unable to quickly
replace personnel losses in billets that are essential to
submarine, ASW, and surface attack forces.
Implications
We believe the Navy's personnel system, despite its many
weaknesses, is adequate to support the limited naval operations
required by Soviet war plans. The Soviets have taken personnel
limitations into account in developing equipment, tactics, and
operating procedures. Their war plans do not require most of
their naval units to conduct operations as complex and demanding
as those expected of US and other Western navies. Most of their
fleet is intended to conduct defensive operations lasting only a
few weeks, in waters relatively close to Soviet shore facilities,
and characterized by setpiece combat situations. Under such
conditions, personnel problems that would be serious in other
navies would be viewed as less so for the Soviets.
If a war with the West became a prolonged conflict, however,
involving repeated combat situations over large areas and placing
a premium on tactical imagination and flexibility, we believe the
personnel shortcomings would make it difficult for the Soviet
Navy to adjust.
If the Navy is forced to fight such a war, the strain on its
personnel will greatly reduce its effectiveness--potentially
negating many of the technological and quantitative gains made in
recent years. Western planners may be able to exploit the
vulnerabilities of Soviet naval personnel by tailoring operations
to take advantage of the following weaknesses.
Low Sustainability
A lack of emphasis on training in at-sea equipment repair,
safety, and damage control, together with almost total reliance
on officers to operate ships, means Soviet naval units will have
less endurance than their Western counterparts. If forced to
conduct prolonged sea deployments, they will be more likely to
suffer casualties from maintenance problems and mistakes made by
fatigued officers or less qualified relief personnel.
Slow Reaction Capability
Because of unrealistic peacetime training, the tight control
of ships by higher authorities, and a general lack of initiative
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by tactical commanders, Soviet naval units will probably
encounter greater difficulty in reacting quickly to enemy actions
than would Western forces in comparable situations. If opponents
can keep combat operations moving quickly, emphasizing
unpredictable and unexpected actions and the disruption of Soviet
command communications, Soviet commanders will be forced to
deviate from their plans and make rapid, on-the-spot tactical
decisions--a behavior not emphasized in their training.
Predictable Operating Patterns
The naval personnel system strongly encourages commanders to
conduct operations ''by the book'' with no room for individual
flair or variations. By studying Soviet methods, Western
planners may be able to identify behavior patterns that can serve
as a tipoff to Soviet intentions in battle. Rigidity and
intolerance of deviation from established norms make the Soviet
Navy more susceptible to such operations analysis than Western
Prospects
The Soviet naval personnel system has been resistant to
change over the years. It is likely to face an increasing demand
for quality personnel, however, with the continued introduction
of more sophisticated equipment. In addition, recent fleet-level
exercises suggest the Soviets are considering wartime operations
that will place increased demands on personnel--for instance, to
operate conventional takeoff and landing aircraft carriers, to
manage large surface task groups, and to extend sea control and
sea denial areas farther from the USSR. Weaknesses in their
personnel system may become more pronounced under such
Demographics trends--particularly the declining proportion
of Slavs in the draft-age population--will also pressure the
Navy's personnel system. We believe the Soviets will deal with
this problem by tightening restrictions on military service
deferments and possibly by improving preinduction training of
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