THE SOVIET ANTICORRUPTION CAMPAIGN: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND PROSPECTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00591R000300380001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 14, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Seeret
Intelligence
and Prospects
The Soviet Anticorruption Campaign:
Causes, Consequences,
An Intelligence Assessment
soy 85-10145X
August 1985
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
The Soviet Anticorruption Campaign:
Causes, Consequences,
and Prospects
This paper was prepared byl (Office
of Soviet Analysis. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be directed to the Chief,
Domestic Policy Division, SOYA,
Secret
SOV 85-10145X
August 1985
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The Soviet Anticorruption Campaign:
Causes, Consequences,
and Prospects
Key Judgments Over the past four years, a campaign to curb corruption at all levels of the
Information available political system has become a key feature of the Soviet regime's domestic
as of 15 July 1985 policy and a central issue in leadership politics. Several factors impelled the
was used in this report.
leadership to embark on the anticorruption course:
? The crisis in Poland became an object lesson for Soviet officials, who
recognized that pervasive corruption had contributed significantly to the
erosion of the Polish Communist Party's position.
? Soviet leaders were willing to act on the realization that measures to
instill discipline in society and in the elite could have both an economic
and a propaganda payoff.
? As the KGB grew in power and prestige, it took a more active role than it
had previously done in pushing firm measures against corruption.
? As politicking heightened in the months before Brezhnev's death, KGB
chief Yuriy Andropov recognized that charging some of his opponents
with corruption could be politically useful.
The anticorruption policy has already had a significant political impact:
? It has helped to boost popular and elite morale and improved the regime's
image in the eyes of the population. The campaign unleashed an element
of candor and realism about the failures of the system, a prerequisite to
remedying the situation. Especially among those who have gained by the
campaign-younger, more technocratic cadre members-and for those
who identify with its overall goals, confidence about the regime's ability
to rule effectively and cope with serious problems has increased.
? The KGB has expanded its mandate, increased its political weight, and
emerged as the protector of the party and the system. Other police
institutions (for example, the militia) have been made more effective and
brought more tightly under the regime's control.
? The party itself has been rejuvenated to a degree, and anticorruption has
been used as one vehicle to accomplish cadre changes. A new cadre policy
has accompanied the campaign. Most of the personnel changes have
occurred at the lower ranks, but since 1982 more than 60 officials have
been elevated to positions that in the past warranted full membership on
the Central Committee.
iii Secret
SOV 85-10145X
August 1985
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Upon taking power Andropov attempted to implement the anticorruption
policy, primarily through coercive measures-seeking to raise the cost of
corrupt behavior by increasing the certainty and severity of punishment.
His intention to curtail corruption at all levels was apparent in a series of
party and government decrees, administrative measures, quiet removals of
some corrupt officials, and selected public arrests of others.
Chernenko publicized the regime's continued "commitment" to combat
corruption. In practice, he went after easy targets and avoided moves
against those officials connected to him or his colleagues. Toward the latter
half of his tenure, however, when his health and power were failing, some
officials connected to leadership circles in Moscow became targets of the
anticorruption campaign. This more vigorous activity probably reflected
Gorbachev's political ascendance.
Gorbachev has revitalized the campaign against corruption. He has
publicly denounced official abuses in unusually harsh language, calling on
the party to rid itself of "moral degenerates," and he has removed a
number of corrupt officials. Like his predecessors, Gorbachev undoubtedly
realizes that corruption is so deeply rooted that it cannot be eliminated in
society or officialdom without systemic changes that are neither desired
nor politically possible. Rather than destroying the hydra of corruption
altogether, Gorbachev probably sees the campaign as serving several less
ambitious purposes:
? It supports his stated goals of cadre renewal and better accountability
and performance by bureaucrats. By exposing, censuring, and prosecut-
ing cases of especially blatant corruption, he probably hopes to reduce the
worst excesses among officials, restore a semblance of propriety in the
bureaucracy, and strengthen central control over regional officials.
? He may also use the campaign as a weapon against political opponents,
as Andropov did. Because almost all Soviet officials engage in illegal
abuse of power to some extent, almost everyone is vulnerable to charges
of corruption.
? Finally, he probably sees the campaign as supporting his key objectives of
stimulating economic productivity and improving the regime's image in
the eyes of the population. He probably believes that he must move
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against corruption among the elite to gain broad public acceptance of the
parallel campaign for worker discipline. The anticorruption course also
reinforces the regime's propaganda effort to marshal popular support for
its policies.
Gorbachev probably can count on the support of several key segments of
the elite for expanding the anticorruption campaign. But he almost
certainly will encounter resistance from segments of the elite who stand to
lose most: the venal members of the entrenched bureaucracy who have
survived earlier corruption campaigns; regional party officials who may see
the anticorruption campaign as part of a larger policy of tightening central
regulation of republic party organizations; and the economic bureaucracy
(especially the ministries), which may fear that moves against corruption
will go hand in hand with some kind of economic reform.
Gorbachev will have to manage the campaign carefully so as not to give his
opponents an opportunity to rally against him. The corruption issue,
nevertheless, has proved to be a useful weapon to use-or threaten to use-
against political enemies. Gorbachev has given strong signals that he
intends to pursue it.
The extent and particularly the character of cadre renewal will serve as an
indicator of the seriousness and direction of the anticorruption course:
? Changes in the party statutes at the 27th Party Congress concerning
personnel assignments could presage an expansion of the anticorruption
campaign. A number of regional and republic party plenums in April
1985 called for adherence to a cadre policy that eradicates abuse of
office, nepotism, and careerism, and such taboos could be written
formally into the party's rules.
? An increase in the number of officials who are fired for cause, demoted to
a much lower position rather than given lateral assignments, and publicly
criticized for corrupt practices, would also indicate an intensification of
the campaign. An unwritten rule of the nomenklatura system, by which
the party determines appointments to key positions, has been that if an
official fails in one job he has the right to another at the same level. In a
few recent cases, this rule has not been followed.
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? A move to hold local party committees accountable for the shortcomings
of officials under their purview-in practice as well as in rhetoric-would
signal a greater effort to combat the tendency of party apparatchiks to
protect their own.
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Growing Dimensions
Genesis of the Campaign
Brezhnev's Debilities: Physical and Political 3
Economic Payoff and Propaganda Gain 5
The KGB's Larger Role 5
Regime Legitimacy 6
Andropov's Tough Tactics 7
The Targets 7
During Chernenko's Tenure 9
Well-Connected Targets 10
Gorbachev's Approach 11
Support Base 13
Gauging the Campaign 14
Response of Soviet Emigres to the Question: "Did You Use Pull To Get
Your First Soviet Job?"
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The Soviet Anticorruption Campaign:
Causes, Consequences,
and Prospects
Growing Dimensions
Corruption, long a prominent feature of Soviet life,
cannot be measured precisely, but considerable evi-
dence indicates it has grown significantly since the
mid-1970s: '
? A survey of recent Soviet emigres to the United
States shows that the use of political influence in the
job market has steadily increased since the 1960s
(see table).
? A Georgian official, who reviewed monthly reports
of crimes in that republic from 1979 until 1983,
reported that there was a growing volume of misap-
propriation of state money and property.
? Media reports and public comments of police offi-
cials have indicated that corruption became espe-
cially prevalent in the housing sector and that illegal
trade flourished in agricultural products, consumer
goods, and automobiles.
General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev's policy helped to
create an environment conducive to rampant illegal-
ities and abuse of office. One of his key objectives was
to restore administrative order and regularity, which
Nikita Khrushchev's impulsive and chaotic policies
had threatened. From the outset, Brezhnev put the
highest premium on guaranteeing the stability of the
system of elite rule through a personnel policy that
stressed "stability of cadres." While Khrushchev's
leadership granted the bureaucrats security of life-
by abolishing the mass terror of the Stalin period-
Brezhnev's leadership granted them security of office.
' An evaluation of the extent of corruption depends on how the term
is defined. If defined in an absolute sense as the use of position or
power to further private ends, almost the entire Soviet elite is
corrupt. If defined in a relative sense as the use of position or power
to further private ends in ways that violate accepted norms of
behavior, then corruption in the USSR is less significant. The
definition of corruption narrows as the subordination of the public
interest to private interest becomes a widely tolerated feature of a
Response of Soviet Emigres to the Question:
"Did You Use Pull To Get Your First Soviet Job?"
Year Began
First Job
Total
Questioned
Yes
1919-30
29
2 (6.9%)
27 (93.1%)
1931-35
60
7(11.7%)
53 (88.3%)
1936-40
50
7 (14.0%)
43 (86.0%)
1941-45
47
5 (10.6%)
42 (89.4%)
1946-50
65
13 (20.0%)
52 (80.0%)
1951-55
66
17 (25.8%a)
49 (74.2%)
1956-60
124
44 (35.5%)
80 (64.5%)
1961-65
116
38 (32.8%)
78 (67.2%)
1966-70
132
42(31.8%)
90(68.2%)
1971-75
140
61(43.6%)
79 (56.4%)
1976-83
57
29 (50.9%)
28 (49.1%)
The steady decline in the rate of Soviet economic
growth from the late 1960s for more than a decade,
with a sharp drop after 1978, probably also gave
impetus to the growth in corrupt practices. Perfor-
mance was particularly bleak during the 1979-81
period, when unusually cold and snowy winters
snarled transportation and interrupted industrial pro-
duction and poor-to-mediocre grain harvests held
agricultural output down. Economic shortfalls, espe-
cially the failure of the official economy to produce
sufficient quantities of food and consumer goods and
services, fostered the development of black-market
activity and other economic illegalities. Moreover, an
earlier expansion of secondary education resulted in
greater competition for admission to higher educa-
tional institutions, and the use of bribes to gain
admission to higher schools became more common.
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Paralleling the increase in political venality during the
Brezhnev years, discipline
and order in the economy grew worse in this period.
According to the Soviet media's treatment of the
the practice of "false accounting"-deliber-
ate inflation of production statistics-may have wors-
ened as pressures to show greater productivity in-
creased (see inset).
statistical reports, which
to Moscow and encom-
passed a broad range of activities and events, were
routinely falsified to conceal local problems from the
central authorities. Also in 1984,
the former party leader of
Uzbekistan had been involved in a scandal concerning
falsification of cotton production figures in his repub-
lic. Geydar Aliyev, when he
was Azerbaijan party chief, falsified production sta-
tistics.
Beginning in the last few years of Brezhnev's tenure,
evidence was growing that many segments of the
Soviet elite-especially nonparty members-believed
that corruption was becoming a serious problem at all
levels of the system. Corruption was adversely affect-
ing society, and questions were being raised about the
party's capacity to govern effectively. For example:
concern about
widespread theft and bribery was increasing among
party leaders. Corruption was eroding the regime's
legitimacy in the eyes of the population.
members of
the elite holding jobs in nonparty institutions were
increasingly speaking out against party abuses of
power, that some military officers believed the party
had lost its ideological bearings, and that many
young government officials had lost confidence in
the party. the party's de
facto toleration of corruption in society and its use
of corruption for its own gain was causing it to lose
support across a broad spectrum. The disaffected
ranged from those excluded from privileged access
to those interested in restoring the system's integrity
to ensure the continued efficacy of political controls
on the population.
Sham Production Units at
Garment Plant in Kurgan
In 1984 Soviet media reported that a garment-
manufacturing enterprise in Kurgan was allocated
targets that exceeded the capacity of the plant by 13
million rubles. When his objections to the plan were
rejected, the director spread 13 million nonexistent
rubles around factories in the enterprise, creating
fictitious production units (called zero units). These
had 71 imaginary workers, who were supposed to
produce 168,000 men's shirts and 43,000 pairs of
trousers. The newspaper Sotsialisticheskaya
Industriya reported that this case was not exceptional
but reflected normal practices.
? In an interview published in Literaturnaya Gazeta
in August 1984, MVD chief Vitaliy Fedorchuk
suggested that corrruption was undermining popular
respect for law and order and contributing to growth
in the overall crime rate.
recognition in the USSR that the levels of corrup-
tion and inefficiency were such that the entire state
machinery was grinding to a halt.
Moreover, it is likely that Soviet officials are aware
that increased opportunities for lucrative black-
market dealings potentially weaken regime control
over the elite, because they provide alternative sources
of income and make lower level officials less depen-
dent on privileges bestowed by the party. And, at a
minimum, the false economic reporting from the
provinces complicates planning.
Despite the growth of corruption and of the elite's
concern in the late 1970s, Brezhnev's regime made no
serious attempt to tackle corruption among high-level
officials. The gestures made to curb corruption among
the lower ranks seemed largely cosmetic. The very
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fact that corruption was so widespread meant that an
aggressive campaign against it would require consid-
erable political energy and determination, which
Brezhnev lacked in the latter part of his tenure. To
move actively against corruption within the elite
would risk political confrontation with those whose
support Brezhnev had in effect bought by a policy of
indulgence and who viewed opportunities for corrup-
tion as an extension of the system of privileges.
Brezhnev may also have feared that exposing and
prosecuting corrupt officials would damage the repu-
tation of the party even more than the corruption
itself. Moreover, at the time when corruption seemed
to be increasing-as the economy faltered in the late
1970s through 1981-Brezhnev's political power was
declining. A drive against corruption in such circum-
stances would entail even greater political risks for the
party leader (although it afforded his rivals political
opportunity).
Also arguing against decisive action during this period
was the fact that some forms of corruption helped to
satisfy demands that the official economy could not.
Specifically, the black market and other illegal activi-
ty-according to numerous reports from the US
Embassy in Moscow-help to keep the entire system
running and serve as a safety valve that channels
popular frustrations into apolitical activity. Destroy-
ing the black market would only increase pressure on
the regime to deliver the goods that had previously
been obtained through it.
Genesis of the Campaign
Several developments may have caused the Soviet
leadership to shift its attitude and try to deal with the
corruption issue head-on:
? During Brezhnev's last months in office, heightened
maneuvering between his supporters and those who
supported Andropov invited the promotion of anti-
corruption measures as a political ploy to impugn
Brezhnev and those close to him in the leadership.
? Unrest in Poland, spurred to some extent by official
corruption, produced a political crisis there.
? The regime concluded that curbing corruption could
alleviate economic problems in a period of stringen-
cy and could have a propaganda payoff as well.
? The KGB, alarmed by the situation, evidently began
to urge more vigorous measures against corruption.
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The first salvo in the recent battle against corruption
was fired by Geydar Aliyev, who was the Azerbaijan
party leader before Brezhnev's death. In a November
1981 interview in Literaturnaya Gazeta, he gave firm
warnings to party workers that abuses of power and
privilege would no longer be tolerated. Aliyev, in
effect, urged a new policy direction on corruption
while providing an assessment of the negative conse-
quences of corruption.
Brezhnev's Debilities: Physical and Political. The
chronology of the anticorruption campaign suggests
an intimate connection with increased politicking
among Politburo members as Brezhnev's health dete-
riorated. The campaign gathered force as Brezhnev
declined physically and Andropov began to assume a
more prominent and powerful position in the leader-
ship. In Brezhnev's waning months, reporting from
Embassy Moscow suggested that
Andropov used the rumors and investigations involv-
ing Brezhnev's family and cronies (including his
daughter, son-in-law, and clients, such as MVD chief
Nikolay Shchelokov and Krasnodar Kray party head
Sergey Medunov) to undermine Brezhnev politically,
to counter Chernenko, and to position himself to 25X1
succeed Brezhnev.
Andropov also used the anticorruption campaign to
attack Sharaf Rashidov, then Uzbek party chief and
Brezhnev's client, and he may have used the vulnera-
bility of then regional leader Aliyev to charges of
corruption for political purposes.
1982 it became known in Moscow that Rashidov had
knowingly lied about harvest production figures; An-
dropov confronted Rashidov with the evidence.
1983 was a suicide, apparently triggered by the
corruption charge. A variant of the story, from West-
ern press sources, has Rashidov suffering a heart
attack after being accused of falsifying cotton produc-
tion figures.
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Aliyev's Salvo Against Corruption
? Corruption and misuse of an official position cause
complacency, poor morale, and a loss of initiative
on the part of various elements of society.
? Corruption and a weakened work ethic contribute
to chronic economic shortfalls.
? Bribes, protectionism, and nepotism in the educa-
tion system undermine the proper training of cadres
and poison the moral atmosphere for youth.
? The administrative organs (police, judicial system)
have become corrupt and rent by nepotism.
? A private ownership psychology feeds corruption
and speculation; the quest for private accumulation
leads to hoarding and a flourishing black market.
Aliyev's Vulnerability to
Corruption Charges
Geydar Aliyev, who first publicized the anticorrup-
tion campaign, may have been another high-level
party figure who became vulnerable to charges of
corruption. He may have taken the lead in the
campaign as a way to deflect charges that he had
himself become involved in corruption. Aliyev was
dubbed "Brezhnev's new broom" in Azerbaijan soon
after his appointment to the republic party post in
1969 for his sacking of more than 20 leading republic
administrators. More recent evidence indicates that
his local anticorruption campaign ran out of steam
and his own hands may not have been clean.
in 1984 a
That the anticorruption campaign had heavy political
overtones was also suggested by:
? Rumors that Andrey Kirilenko's removal from the
Politburo had been triggered by a scandal involving
his son.
? Brezhnev's memoirs, which, in recounting how his
mother had resisted corrupting blandishments,
seemed designed to forestall charges of corruption
on his part.
? The unusual assertion by Ukrainian party secretary
Vladimir Shcherbitskiy in January 1982 that the
time for party purges had passed-a statement
suggesting concern that the anticorruption cam-
paign could lead to widespread removals in the
party.
The Crisis in Poland. The Soviet leadership was
keenly aware that the revelation of pervasive official
corruption in Poland-made public at the insistence
of Solidarity in 1980-fanned the flames of rebellion
within the Polish population at large. The arrest of the
Prime Minister, 18 ministers, several first deputy
ministers, and 56 deputy ministers on charges of
bribery and theft must have greatly alarmed the
Soviet regime. Soviet media suggested that corruption
senior Soviet official indicated that Aliyev got into
serious trouble because of corruption in Azerbaijan
during his tenure (1969-82).
Brezhnev engineered Aliyev's promotion
to the Politburo and transfer to Moscow in 1982 to
protect him-even though the shift was implemented
after Andropov took office. Andropov may have used
Aliyev's vulnerability as a kind of blackmail-a
means of keeping him in line politically. In May 1983
there were Western press reports from Moscow that
Aliyev's gift to Brezhnev of a dagger encrusted with
diamonds (in 1982 or earlier) prompted Andropov to
direct Politburo members to declare what gifts they
had received and from whom.
Aliyev had career ties to Andropov as well as Brezh-
nev and may have had a foot in each camp. He
became head of the KGB in Azerbaijan while Andro-
pov was KGB chief, and he may have partly owed that
promotion to Andropov.
pressure from Andropov may have caused Aliyev to
switch his allegiance to Andropov and to follow the
anticorruption course.
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of high officials in Poland had been chiefly responsi-
ble for creating the gulf between workers and the
party and the ensuing disaffection and turmoil there.
While the strikes in Poland had no equivalent in the
USSR, the Polish situation clearly focused the Soviet
leadership's attention on internal conditions, particu-
larly those that could give rise to similar unrest. The
Polish crisis was discussed in various Soviet official
forums as an object lesson, and the Soviet regime's
concerns about public morale and ideological ortho-
doxy at home appeared to increase. Comments by
various Soviets and Moscow-based foreign observers
suggested that the regime had developed a new
awareness of corruption as a corrosive force in Soviet
society. The extent of its concern surfaced at the 26th
CPSU Congress in February 1981. In a speech laced
with pointed references to the Polish crisis, Brezhnev
emphasized that work was the sole criteria for reward.
He warned that loafing, bribe taking, speculation, and
any encroachment on socialist property must be com-
bated "by all organizational, financial, and juridical
The KGB's Larger Role.
the KGB had begun to push the
leadership to move vigorously on corruption even
before the party congress and that it took the lead in
the anticorruption campaign:
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Moscow voiced concern in early 1980 that corrup-
tion in the form of illicit acquisition of consumer
goods and food-items the economy could not sup-
ply adequately-was becoming a major problem.
KGB officials were reportedly increasingly troubled
by the prevalence of corruption at the higher levels
of government.
the KGB 25X1
became more aware of the extent of official corrup-
tion in society during an investigation of a KGB
major's death in 1980. The investigation showed
that the officer had been robbed and murdered by a
gang of corrupt militiamen (police under the direc-
tion of the Ministry of Internal Affairs).
Economic Payoff and Propaganda Gain. Another key
element in the regime's decision to pursue an anticor-
ruption policy was the growing concern to find some
way to revitalize the sluggish economy without resort-
ing to major structural reforms. Once Andropov
became General Secretary, he used anticorruption as
a shock treatment for all of society, and it was
intended to create the atmosphere for greater disci-
pline in other spheres as well, especially in the
economy. Under Andropov, anticorruption measures
were accompanied by a parallel campaign designed to
improve discipline and order in the economy. Corrupt
or incompetent officials and plant managers were
fired; waste in the transportation, consumer goods,
and agricultural sectors was curbed where bribery,
speculation, and large-scale cheating had a deleteri-
ous effect on the overall economy and worsened
shortages of consumer goods.
Andropov dismissed over 1,500 enter-
prise directors for corruption or malfeasance.F_
KGB officers were 25X1
worried that the party had become more interested
in preserving its privileges and prerogatives than in
addressing national needs. 25X1
the KGB was acting to raise its
own standards to ensure its integrity. 25X1
the
party Central Committee circulated a lengthy top
secret memorandum on the problem of widespread
corruption, especially large-scale bribery and theft
in the transportation and industrial sectors of the
economy. The letter was reportedly well received in
the KGB, and it is clear that the KGB itself used
the letter and similar pronouncements to launch its
anticorruption activities.
? In late 1981 a reliable contact of the US Embassy in
Moscow said that a secret Central Committee letter
circulating in the party had accused the KGB of
corruption. Although the Embassy's contact may
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Moscow to undercut the KGB's role in the anticor-
ruption campaign.
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this rumor may have been circulated in
KGB Investigation Involves
Brezhnev's Daughter
The KGB's most dramatic participation in the emerg-
ing anticorruption campaign occurred during 1981
and 1982, when it
replaced the militia in an investigation of a diamond
theft that had unearthed evidence of the involvement
of Brezhnev's daughter and her close associates,
particularly the head of the Moscow State Circus, in
various illegal activities. The KGB's investigation of
the case reportedly accounted for Brezhnev's failure
in January 1982 to sign the obituary of its second-in-
command, Semyon Tsvigun, who had led the investi-
gation. Despite the potential for embarrassing top
leaders and the warnings by party secretary Mikhail
Suslov that the investigation should be stopped, the
KGB reportedly pursued the case and even made
arrests on the day of Suslov's death. In continuing
this investigation of corruption that touched Brezh-
nev's family-a highly visible and high-risk ven-
ture-the KGB probably intended to signal its deter-
mination to root out corruption even at high levels.
There was also a political motive in this activity; the
KGB was used by Andropov or his supporters to
impugn Brezhnev and weaken his hold on power. F_
? A series of articles in a Moscow newspaper in late
1981 gave unusual publicity to a case in which the
KGB uncovered a group of diamond smugglers.
the KGB was investigating larg
scale corruption among Soviet Embassy officers and
trade officials in Kabul.
Some KGB cadre members probably also supported
the anticorruption campaign because it promised to
enlarge the KGB. Indeed, expansions since the late
1970s include:
? Creation by 1978 of a special subunit (Department
Eight) in the First Chief Directorate's counterintel-
ligence unit (Directorate K) to investigate misappro-
priation of funds and kickbacks by officials dealing
with Westerners.
? Creation sometime in 1982, probably before
Brezhnev's death, of a Fourth Directorate to oversee
the corruption-ridden transportation sector.
? Establishment of a Sixth Directorate in 1982 (also
probably before Brezhnev's death) responsible for
economic counterintelligence, such as the investiga-
tion of kickbacks and similar crimes.
Yuriy Andropov was a
prime mover in the campaign. He may have been
motivated by a combination of political, ideological,
and pragmatic considerations.
Andropov reportedly said at a closed
meeting of officials that Communism was fighting for
its life against corruption, and, as KGB chief, he
reportedly collected incriminating information on offi-
cials guilty of serious offenses. But the following
evidence suggests that he also saw the anticorruption
campaign as a weapon to be used in political competi-
tion.
Regime Legitimacy. At the same time, Soviet leaders
(such as Andropov and Gorbachev) undoubtedly
hoped that the publicity endorsing stronger measures
against corruption would also improve the regime's
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image in the eyes of the masses. A considerable body
of evidence indicates that by 1982 Soviet officials
were becoming more concerned than before about
popular alienation and cynicism, especially among
young people. In a period when popular expectations
of progress, particularly in living standards, went
unfulfilled because of slowing economic growth, the
anticorruption campaign may well have been seized
upon as a public relations tactic. Some top leaders
probably hoped the campaign would deflect criticism
onto selected scapegoats-mainly corrupt managers
and lower level officials-and persuade the population
that the Soviet system was not to blame for consumer
shortages; instead, corrupt individuals prevented the
system from providing for popular wants and needs.
Andropov's Tough Tactics
Yuriy Andropov, the shrewd, tough former KGB boss,
ruled as party General Secretary for a little over a
year (November 1982 to February 1984). Among the
Soviet people, however, memory has made him a
leader who combined the call for tough discipline and
higher performance standards for both managers and
workers with the promise of eventual substantial
change in the management of the economy. Although
this may exaggerate the scope of his drive to upgrade
the political and economic system, Andropov clearly
intended to curtail corruption at all levels-as wit-
nessed by a series of party and government decrees,
administrative measures, quiet removals of some cor-
rupt officials and arrests of others made with a
theatrical swagger that drew colorful news coverage,
and highly publicized police raids of bathhouses and
movie theaters to find shirkers. The point was to
enhance economic productivity and restore the integ-
rity of the system by showing that no one was safe
from the crackdown.
The Targets. Immediately after Andropov became
party leader, Pravda began to publish brief accounts
of Politburo deliberations; the first account dealt with
purported letters to the leadership complaining about
inaction on corruption. Subsequent media accounts
further developed and emphasized this theme, and the
regime moved against selected targets on a broad
front. These included the MVD; the Uzbek Soviet
Socialist Republic's party and government bureaucra-
cies; organizations engaged in trade and food produc-
tion and distribution; and other institutions, including
the military, with access to foreign goods and curren-
cies.
Details of a wholesale purge of corrupt officials in
Uzbekistan were revealed in the Soviet press only in
June 1984, but the massive shakeup in that republic 25X1
began while Andropov was party leader.
nepotism, bribery, embezz ement, and 25X1
padding of production figures had become rampant;
Andropov probably focused on Uzbekistan because of
the sheer scale and apparent openness of the corrup-
tion. The thoroughness of the purge probably also
served to warn others that he was serious about the
campaign.
The scale of the purge in Uzbekistan became evident
when Pravda and the republic party newspaper car-
ried reports of a plenum in June 1984, attended by
party secretary Yegor Ligachev, which revealed that
Andropov had removed many Uzbek officials without
subjecting them to public disgrace. More details were
revealed in reports of the plenums of 13 republic
oblast party committees. The Uzbek officials re-
placed included the second secretary (May 1983);
ministers offnance, cotton industry, and justice; the
republic KGB and MVD chiefs and the republic
procurator; the chairman of the state committee for
publishing, the first deputy chairman of the People's
Control Committee, and the republic party adminis-
trative organs department head; a deputy minister of
health and the first deputy and another deputy of the
cotton industry; two district prosecutors and a dis-
trict KGB chief; at least seven deputies of the Uzbek
Supreme Soviet and more than 60 deputies to local
soviets; the head of the Tashkent medical school; and
the chairman of the republic union of journalists. F_
Uzbek newspapers also revealed that 155 policemen
in the city of Bukhara had been fired for corruption
and another 157 fired in the Karakalpak area. In
Ferghana Oblast, nearly 400 employees of the militia
and other law enforcement agencies were fired in a
three-year period, and over a thousand lower level
employees in Tashkent were removed from their posts
and charged with corrupt activities. Moreover, since
January 1981 there has been a turnover of 40 percent
among the Oblast party secretaries; in Kashkadar'ya
Oblast nearly every ranking official in the party and
government was removed, almost certainly as part of
the anticorruption drive.
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The MVD bore the brunt of the attack. Among the
first corruption-related personnel changes announced
under Andropov was the ouster of Brezhnev's old
crony Shchelokov and the appointment of career KGB
official Vitaliy Fedorchuk to oversee a cleanup of the
scandal-ridden militia. From January 1983 to Janu-
ary 1984, at least 22 articles in the Soviet press
chronicled personnel and organizational changes in
the MVD. In several instances, MVD officials were
shown to be under criminal investigation or already
Other Soviet officials with access to foreign goods and
foreign currencies became targets of the anticorrup-
tion drive.
the KGB began investigating corruption among Soviet
Embassy officers and trade officials in Afghanistan.
sentenced for crimes of corruption.
Fedorchuk alluded to the scope of the purge of MVD
officials in August 1983 when he said the Ministry
had been "restructured" and "personnel are being
purged of slackers and of those who are ideologically
and morally immature." In July 1983 the Politburo
announced the creation of new MVD political bodies
to "organize and guide party political, ideological,
educational, and cultural work within the Ministry"
and to "enhance the responsibility of personnel for the
discharge of their duties." These new bodies appeared
to be both a means of tightening party control over
the militia and an attempt to rebuild morale after
months of media exposure of corruption.
Andropov's campaign
netted a broad range of Soviet Foreign Ministry and
trade officials:
? In February 1983 the First Deputy Prosecutor
General of the USSR revealed that two senior
foreign trade officials in the Ministry of the Avia-
tion Industry had been fired for currency abuses.
? A contact of the US Embassy in East Germany
reported in May 1983 that former Soviet Ambassa-
dor Abrasimov had run afoul of Andropov because
of corrupt practices at Soviet missions in East
Germany. (Chernenko may have limited the damage
to Abrasimov, who was appointed Ambassador to
Japan before Chernenko's death.)
cials were being forced to cease their corrupt
practices.
Even the military failed to escape Andropov's cam-
paign. The media publicized several abuses in the
military that have been rarely acknowledged in print.
For example, in January 1983 Krasnaya Zvezda (the
main military newspaper) announced investigations
into corruption in material and technical supply activ-
ities. In July it carried an extraordinary public denun-
ciation of a general for soliciting a bribe. Additional
articles dealt with cases of bribery and illegal use of
manpower.
Just before Andropov's death in February 1984, a new
statute was issued on servicemen's material liability
for damage caused to the state. The law was appar-
ently aimed at soldiers' theft of materials for sale on
the black market. A further warning could have been
intended by the official announcement in November
1984 that Shchelokov, who had been working in the
Ministry of Defense following his removal as MVD
head, had been stripped of his military rank of general
of the army for abuse of office.
the removal of the first deputy head of the
State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations
(GKES) and the censuring of 20 or 30 more GKES
officials for corruption.
Soviet foreign trade offi-
the crackdown on
corruption extended to the CEMA Secretariat. So-
viets who had a role in CEMA finances came under
investigation in the fall of 1983, and the head of the
Secretariat was retired late in the year.
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While Andropov was party leader, there were also
periodic press attacks on corruption in the Ukraine,
the Caucasus, the Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic
(where two candidate members of the Central Com-
mittee and two members of the central auditing
commission were expelled for corruption in September
1983), Armenia (where three republic ministers were
fired in April 1983), and Krasnodar in the RSFSR
(where senior MVD officials were sentenced to long
prison terms).
Action against more sensitive targets-possibly
Andropov's political opponents-was apparent in No-
vember, when the well-connected director of Mos-
cow's Yeliseyev food store was convicted on charges of
corruption and sentenced to death. This was followed
by a particularly critical Central Committee decree
attacking the party organization in Moldavia, where
Andropov's rival, Chernenko, began his political rise
under Brezhnev. The Moldavians were rebuked for
foot-dragging and a bureaucratic approach to solving
economic problems.
Personnel changes approved at the December 1983
plenum suggested that Andropov had strengthened his
capacity to implement the anticorruption campaign.
For example, KGB chief Chebrikov was made a
candidate member of the Politburo, and Party Control
Committee head Mikhail Solomentsev was made a
full member of the Politburo. Both the KGB and the
Party Control Committee (which serves essentially as
a party court) have played key roles in the campaign
to curb corruption and bolster discipline.
Andropov, in his December plenum speech-which
was sent to the Central Committee in his absence
(because of his failing health)-placed even stronger
emphasis than before on the need to increase execu-
tive responsibility. Not surprisingly, he deemed his
strategy of applying administrative measures to the
economy a success, but he warned against losing
"tempo" in the drive to achieve greater accountabil-
ity. After the plenum, the campaign continued at full
tilt until the time of his death. For example, two
GKES officials were executed in January, and the
Soviets highlighted Andropov's personal involvement
in the matter by publicizing that the accused officials'
appeal for clemency to the Presidium of the Supreme
Soviet (headed by Andropov) had been denied. F_
Use of the KGB. During Andropov's tenure as party
leader, the KGB expanded its role as the major
instrument (and a beneficiary) of his anticorruption
policy. For example, only days after Andropov took
office, Minister of Internal Affairs Nikolay Shchelo-
kov, a notoriously corrupt crony of Brezhnev, was
replaced by a career KGB official, Vitaliy Fedorchuk,
who had succeeded Andropov as KGB chief. Two
more senior KGB officials were later moved into the
MVD as deputy ministers. In May 1983
Andropov had dispatched
two KGB officials to Poland to promote a Soviet-st le
discipline campaign in that country.
the KGB was
running the investigations.
a senior party official concerned
with economic affairs had stated that the KGB had
become much more active in economic affairs and was
now monitoring compliance with official directives by
ministries and enterprises.
During Chernenko's Tenure
After Andropov's death in February 1983, some
officials, fearful of the drive against corruption, greet-
ed the accession of longtime party functionary Kon-
stantin Chernenko with relief.
corruption drive would gradually fade away and that
it was just a matter of time before everything would
be back to the way things were under Brezhnev. C
some younger officials, dis-
gusted with the corruption of the old guard, also
believed that Chernenko's accession represented a
turning back of the clock.
In any event, the campaign that Andropov had set in
motion, while losing momentum, continued to grind
ahead. Some cases that were begun under Andropov
and that some people thought would be allowed to die
quietly, such as those involving Shchelokov and
Brezhnev's son-in-law, were continued. There appear
to be several reasons for the continuation of the
anticorruption campaign, albeit at a slower pace:
? In various proclamations, Chernenko had routinely
touched on the goals of greater discipline and
honesty, and his remarks on the need for attention
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to public opinion and for strengthening the party's
ties to the masses suggest that he probably at least
shared with Andropov the belief that corruption was
a corrosive factor that had negative effects on youth
and elite attitudes.
? Andropov's anticorruption campaign seemed to
evoke a genuinely popular response among the
citizenry, according to reporting from the US Em-
bassy in Moscow From Cher-
nenko's perspective, therefore, a campaign against
carefully selected targets probably was, on balance,
more useful than risky politically.
? Those who had been advanced during Andropov's
tenure (for example, secretaries Mikhail Gorbachev
and Grigoriy Romanov) continued to exert influence
on policies while Chernenko was in office.=
Gorbachev wielded consid-
erable political influence while Chernenko was par-
ty chief, acting as de facto party leader during
periods when Chernenko was incapacitated-which
included much of the latter half of his tenure. There
is good evidence that Gorbachev was strongly inter-
ested in pursuing the drive on corruption.
? Below the top leadership, the key players and
proponents of the drive on corruption during Andro-
pov's tenure-Fedorchuk, Chebrikov, and Procura-
tor General Aleksandr Rekunkov-continued in of-
fice under Chernenko.
During Chernenko's tenure, the campaign focused on
lower level officials in the provinces. The chief thrust
of Chernenko's policy was to highlight the anticorrup-
tion campaign in the media as a means of scoring
gains in public relations and to go after some easy
targets to give the impression that there would be no
letup, while at the same time avoiding moves against
high officials or those officials connected to the
existing group of leaders.
In the Provinces. In July 1984, lengthy media ac-
counts of an investigation into corruption among
managers in Rostov Oblast appeared. According to
Izvestiya, criminal charges were brought against 76
Rostov officials in the trade system, and three top
leaders of the RSFSR Trade Ministry were arrested.
The party first secretary in Rostov was also removed,
although the media characterized this change as a
retirement for reasons of health.
Chernenko also referred several times to the continu-
ing massive purge of corrupt Uzbek officials that had
begun under Andropov, using it as an example to
encourage other party organizations to rid themselves
of corruption. For example, in a December 1984 issue
of Kommunist, Chernenko charged that, because
leaders from Uzbekistan and other areas had ignored
"negative phenomena," it was necessary for the cen-
tral leadership to take "strong action." He also told a
conference on people's control on 5 October 1984 that
"central bodies" of the party and state had taken
severe steps to curb corruption in Uzbekistan and
other areas. Pravda had also declared that the lesson
of the exposures of corruption in Uzbekistan should
not be lost on other republics.
In addition to the removal of the premier of Uzbeki-
stan (November 1984), the lower level changes in the
republic included the removal of several regional
party leaders. These changes included the firing of the
head of the party committee in Tashkent, the capital,
in January 1985; the expulsion of four members of the
republic Central Committee in October 1984; and the
replacement of the minister of justice in mid-January
1985, only five months after he had been appointed.
Well-Connected Targets. Toward the latter half of
Chernenko's tenure, when his health was failing, the
targets of the anticorruption campaign appeared to be
connected to Brezhnev associates in Moscow. More
vigorous anticorruption activities may well have re-
flected the political ascendance of Gorbachev, who,
perhaps more than any other leader, had an interest in
continuing Andropov's policies. These included:
? The long-delayed execution of the corrupt but well-
connected Yu. Sokolov, once head of an exclusive
Moscow store, in August.
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? A national meeting of security organs, devoted to
formulating new measures to combat "parasitism"
and to a party Central Committee resolution direct-
ing the Komsomol to improve its monitoring of
wayward youth.
? Chernenko's major speech in October, which strong-
ly criticized "living beyond one's means," bribe
taking, speculation, the theft of socialist property,
and the abuse of office.
? Pravda's report that two deputy ministers of power
and electrification were fired for abusing their
official positions.
? Removal of the rank of general from former MVD
chief Shchelokov in November for "abusing his post
for profit and discrediting the military rank of
Soviet general." (He later reportedly committed
suicide.)
? Dismissal in late December 1984 of Brezhnev's Bon-
in-law Yuriy Churbanov from his post as a first
deputy minister of internal affairs. Reports that
Churbanov had been involved in corruption had
circulated for several years.
Chernenko broadened the role of the party and gov-
ernment control committees and narrowed that of the
KGB in the anticorruption campaign. For example, in
October he addressed a meeting of the People's
Control Committee (the government committee) and
called for improved state control work in combating
corruption. In late November an unusual special
Central Committee conference announced an expan-
sion of Party Control Committee activities. The Party
Control Committee became more active in fighting
corruption and frequently published disciplinary ac-
tions taken against corrupt party officials. Chernenko
may have emphasized the role of the control commit-
tees because he had greater control over them than
over the KGB and believed that by working through
them he could counter KGB influence and could
retain his supervision of the anticorruption campaign.
(General Secretary Andropov also may have intended
the Party Control Committee to become more active
when he appointed Mikhail Solomentsev, an indepen-
dent figure, to head it in 1983.)
Gorbachev's Approach
Gorbachev, like Andropov before him, probably sees
anticorruption primarily as a political tool. He has
identified it as an issue that he can use to achieve a
number of aims simultaneously-active pursuit of the
drive will improve the image of the regime, will help
in alleviating ills, and can be used to get rid of actual
or potential rivals. Gorbachev knows that it is not
possible to rid the system of corruption altogether. His
goal, realistically, is to curb the most flagrant excesses
in officialdom while using the campaign for his wider
political objectives, such as gaining a more disciplined 25X1
party machine that is responsive to his policy wishes,
and to complement his domestic policy agenda.
Gorbachev's atti- 25X1
tude toward corruption in terms similar to those used
for Andropov when he first became party leader. For
example, Gorbachev has 25X1
a reputation for incorruptibility, established when he
was party first secretary in Stavropol' Kray.
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Gorbachev shared Andropov's concern over corrup-
tion at all levels in Soviet society and that he would do 25X1
something about it.
Gorbachev's comments to the party's ideology confer-
ence in December 1984 demonstrate an intolerance of
corruption in Soviet officialdom and signaled his plan
to renew the assertive measures associated with An-
dropov's tenure. Gorbachev was so outspoken on the
corruption issue at the conference that some of his
remarks were deleted in Soviet media coverage of the
event; only a TASS account sent to the Far East
carried his strongest language.
Gorbachev's first weeks in office were marked by a
renewed emphasis on the anticorruption theme in
policy forums. In his first speech to the Central
Committee as General Secretary, he called for "reso-
lute measures" against corruption. A number of ap-
parent corruption-related personnel actions were tak-
en. For example, the 74-year-old Minister of Power
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Gorbachev on Corruption
In remarks to a party conference in December 1984,
Gorbachev:
? Claimed "universal approval "for the anticorrup-
tion campaign and implied that it had resulted in a
break in "unfavorable economic trends and an
improvement in the moral and political atmosphere
in the country. " (There was some improvement in
GNP growth rates under Andropov.)
? Called for strict accountability and observance of
Soviet laws "by all officials and citizens" and
asserted that "any deviations from the socialist
principles of distribution ... engender such serious
phenomena as labor and social passivity, parasit-
ism, moral nihilism, and covert forms of redistribu-
tion of income and goods."
? Declared that the "inescapable force of law must be
placed in the path of those who are not susceptible
to the arguments of reason or the voice of con-
science and civic duty. "
? Criticized political inertia and patronage and, in
strikingly harsh language, declared that "the party
would become more cohesive and authoritative if
we continued to rid ourselves of those who do not
value party principles and party honor and got rid
of moral degenerates, using the CPSU rules, the
laws, and public opinion to this end."
and Electrification, Petr Neporozhniy, was dismissed
after Pravda criticized the performance of his Minis-
try. During Andropov's tenure Neporozhniy had been
implicated with the former trade union official Alek-
sey Shibayev in a scandal involving the diversion of
state funds for the construction of a villa on the Black
Sea. Another old party chief, Ivan Bespalov, was
removed as head of the Kirov Oblast. In late March,
Pravda reported that Ukrainian party leaders had
ordered republic officials to increase discipline and
eliminate corruption after disclosures of bribery, em-
bezzlement, and inefficiency had been aired in the
press.
In addition, soon after Gorbachev's remarks on cor-
ruption to the Central Committee in mid-March,
regional party meetings were called around the coun-
try to discuss the theme:
? In Ufa, according to Pravda, "officials who commit-
ted serious misdeeds had been protected." Now they
were dismissed or reprimanded.
? In Volgograd, officials were accused, among other
things, of being "more concerned with building
homes for themselves" than with public housing.
? In Irkutsk, a Pravda report listed instances of
embezzlement and poor work at Bratsk, an alumi-
num and woodpulp center based on a large hydro-
electric station. Pravda said city party secretary A.
Yelokhin, head of the city government V. Kor-
shunov, and others had been dismissed "for gross
abuse of their positions."
? A critical report in the daily Sotsialisticheskaya
Industriya about a party meeting in Yaroslavl'
noted that "the loss to the state from embezzlement
in the past year grew by 42 percent over the
previous year."
Other articles have called for increased party disci-
pline since Gorbachev became party leader. One
reported a speech by the Minister of Justice of the
Russian Republic, admonishing his staff to "strength-
en the struggle against malingering, embezzlement,
mismanagement, and abuse of official position."
Gorbachev stressed the anticorruption theme in his
April plenum remarks, and Aliyev, who spoke on
Lenin's birthday, elaborated more fully on the Gorba-
chev regime's anticorruption policy. Aliyev even as-
serted that official corruption was a vulnerability that
could be exploited in propaganda that foreign adver-
saries directed to the Soviet public. Both officials
implicitly criticized Chernenko for his laxness on
corruption.
Anticorruption is also being used as at least a partial
explanation for some of the high-level personnel
changes that have already occurred under Gorbachev.
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According to a contact of the US Embassy in Mos-
cow, who has proved right in the past, when Gorba-
chev decided to move Foreign Minister Andrey Gro-
myko upstairs to the Presidency, the Foreign Ministry
became a target of the security organs. According to
the Embassy contact, the KGB apparently found it a
major haven of corruption, and it was decided that
someone skilled at dealing with corruption was need-
ed. Thus, Eduard Shevardnadze, a former police
official who nurtured an image as a firm, austere
disciplinarian in Georgia, was selected to overturn the
habits of corruption that Gromyko had brushed aside.
While this account may overemphasize one of the
possible explanations for the political changes under
way in the Foreign Ministry and in other bureaucra-
cies, it probably accurately reflects Gorbachev's de-
termination to curb corruption. Indeed, according to
another Soviet contact of the Embassy, the new
watchword in the Central Committee is that party
functionaries must live as modestly as the rest of the
population.
The anticorruption campaign complements Gorba-
chev's other important objectives-rejuvenating the
party and governmental bureaucracy, improving eco-
nomic performance, shoring up regime legitimacy,
and further consolidating his power. He probably
hopes that by exposing, censuring, and prosecuting
cases of especially blatant corruption, he will be able
to reduce the worst excesses among officials and
restore a semblance of propriety in the bureaucracy.
By emphasizing technical expertise and youth as
criteria for advancement, Gorbachev may also be able
to tighten central control over the apparatus and
thereby inhibit lower level officials from using their
official positions for personal gain.
The party elections that precede the party congress,
which is scheduled for early 1986, will give Gorba-
chev the opportunity to clear out the deadwood in the
local ranks up through the republic level (much as
Andropov did for the regional level in 1983 and 1984).
Moreover, the chief editor of the party newspaper
Sovetskaya Rossiya told US officials in April 1985
that Gorbachev intends to pursue a "horizontal"
approach to party cadres (moving officials from oblast
to oblast as well as from the central party apparatus
or the government ranks to the provinces) designed to
break up entrenched and often corrupt party net-
works. Such a course would also help Gorbachev put
new people in Central Committee slots before the
congress.
Support Base. Gorbachev probably can count on the
support of several key segments of the elite for a
serious anticorruption policy course:
? Young party cadre members, frustrated by the
scarcity of opportunities for promotion under Brezh-
nev's "stability of cadres" policy, doubtless hope
that the anticorruption campaign will open up
headroom.
? Less bureaucratically entrenched, more technocrat-
ic men who advanced under Andropov (illustrated in
party secretary Nikolay Ryzhkov and Belorussian
leader Nikolay Slyun'kov and including economists
like Abel Aganbegyan), probably see Gorbachev's
anticorruption policy as a prelude to economic 25X1
reform, and his early remarks on this issue tend to
support this view. These cadre members probably
also perceive that they stand to gain politically as
older, corrupt officials are weeded out.
? The KGB-which has gained clout through this
campaign and sees it as a way of strengthing its
position in the elite-continues to back the
campaign.
? Other institutions involved in enforcing law and
discipline-for example, the Procuracy and the
Party Control Commission-have vested interests in
the campaign, because its continuation would ex-
pand their bureacratic role.
? Some of the more conservative party ideologists may
well be concerned that the party has evolved into a
self-serving, commercialized class that subordinates
ideology to the pursuit of private gain. These cadre
members may fear that the party's corruption and
estrangement from the population has serious impli-
cations for the regime's long-range legitimacy.
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Resistance. Despite his considerable political strength
at the outset, Gorbachev will encounter resistance to a
serious anticorruption drive from segments of the elite
and population who stand to lose by it. These include:
? The most venal elements of the entrenched bureau-
cracy who have survived earlier corruption
campaigns.
? Many regional party officials, who may see the
campaign as part of a larger policy of tightening
central regulation of republic party organizations.
? The economic bureaucracy (especially the minis-
tries), which may fear that-as Andropov had ap-
parently intended-moves against corruption will go
hand in hand with some kind of economic reform.
? The older generation of officials, who for all these
reasons resent change and for whom job security is
paramount. Of Politburo members, Premier Niko-
lay Tikhonov, Moscow party chief Viktor Grishin,
and perhaps Brezhnev crony and Kazakh party
Central Committee First Secretary Dinmukhamed
Kunayev, must be counted among those who are
likely to resist an all-out attack on corruption
because they stand to lose out as a result.
General Secretary Gorbachev will certainly weigh
additional anticorruption initiatives with respect to
their net effect on these two constituencies. He needs
to make continued progress against corruption if he is
to maintain the allegiance of those groups-young
party leaders and the technological elite-that will be
most critical to his program of economic revitaliza-
tion. Gorbachev must take care, however, to avoid
alienating the entrenched elite to the point where his
anticorruption campaign becomes a rallying point for
resistance to his broader set of economic and political
initiatives. At a minimum, these concerns call for a
program that demonstrates his determination to move
aggressively against corruption while challenging the
entrenched elite on a selective rather than an aggre-
gate level.
Gauging the Campaign. The extent and particularly
the manner of cadre renewal will be an indicator of
the seriousness and direction of Gorbachev's anticor-
ruption course. His strength in further moves against
corruption and inefficiency will depend on his ability
to effect changes in the party statutes and to engineer
a major turnover in the composition of the Central
Committee at the next party congress in 1986. F_
Changes in the party statutes concerning personnel
assignments-to be approved at the upcoming party
congress-could presage an expansion of the anticor-
ruption campaign. In April 1985 a number of regional
and republic party plenums called for adherence to a
cadre policy that prohibits abuse of office, nepotism,
and careerism. Such language suggests that freedom
from corruption could become a criterion for holding
office. Soviet press reports also indicate that the new
statutes will stipulate that new party members should
be admitted at open meetings and their sponsors
should be held responsible for the members' subse-
quent performance. Such tightened recruitment could
reduce the admission of corrupt individuals.
An increase in the number of officials who are fired
for cause and demoted, rather than given lateral
assignments, or are publicly attacked for corrupt
activity would indicate the campaign's intensification.
An unwritten rule of the nomenklatura system, by
which the party determines appointments to key
positions, has been that if an official fails in one job he
has the right to another at the same level. However, in
a few recent cases this tradition has not been followed.
In March, for example, two provincial first secretaries
congratulated themselves in Pravda on having demot-
ed to ordinary work a nomenklatura official who had
"compromised" himself.
A move to hold local party committees accountable-
in practice as well as in rhetoric-for shortcomings of
officials under their purview would signal a greater
effort to combat the tendency of party apparatchiks to
protect their own. This tendency was criticized in a
group of letters published in Pravda in March, follow-
ing the revelation that officials in Kursk had attempt-
ed to cover up the misdeeds of local party and police
officials. The calls by Gorbachev and his Politburo
colleagues for more "openness" are intended partly to
break up such conspiracies of mutual protection. F_
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Results. Whatever particular measures Gorbachev
may take in the future, the anticorruption campaign
has already had a significant political impact. More-
over, given the breadth of the drive, the fact that some
of the targets have been high-level officials, and the
publicity surrounding the removals and prosecutions,
it seems likely that the anticorruption campaign has
made a dent in the scope of corruption within Soviet
officialdom, even though it has not addressed the root
causes.
the campaign has snared some 200 persons in the
fisheries industry alone; 150 officials in Lithuania
alone; 5,000 officials in Uzbekistan, including nearly
all of the republic's top leadership and thousands of
lower level officials; tens of thousands of MVD offi-
cials; scores of ministers and their deputies in Moscow
and in the republics; hundreds of Soviet officials
posted abroad; and a significant percentage of the
officials involved in trade and finances-in addition to
the 1,500 enterprise directors reportedly removed
earlier for corruption or malfeasance by Andropov.
The anticorruption drive has also been a spur to party
rejuvenation. Most of the changes have occurred at
the lower ranks, but, since 1982 more than 60 officials
have been elevated to positions that in the past
warranted full membership on the Central Commit-
tee. The drive has also had a perceptible impact on
other key Soviet institutions. The KGB has expanded
its mandate, increased its political weight, and
emerged as the protector of the party and the system.
Other police institutions have been made more effec-
tive and brought more tightly under the regime's
control. The MVD and its militia have been reconsti-
tuted: 55,000 new cadre members have been added
recently to the Ministry, and
many thousands have been purged. Better trained
cadre members have also been installed throughout
the Procuracy. Such moribund organs as the party
and People's Control Committees have become more
active.
The anticorruption effort also reinforced the discipline
campaign-weakening the tendency to pursue illicit
gain on the job and shifting labor's attention and
efforts to approved activities. In fact, the anticorrup-
tion and discipline initiatives begun by Andropov and
reaffirmed by his successors have seemed to spur both
labor and management to greater effort and contrib-
uted to the faster growth of GNP as a whole since
1983 and in most sectors outside agriculture. The
average number of hours worked per person increased
in 1983 and 1984, presumably because of such prac-
tices as spot checks for unauthorized leave. More
generally, the official crackdown on corruption and
inefficiency resulted in firings for incompetence-
which may have led to better management.
As part of a broader range of measures intended to
improve economic performance, the anticorruption
drive has had an impact on legislation. The regime,
for example, has sought in recent legislation to in-
crease pay and incentives in a selective manner and to
link pay more closely with productivity. It has also
increased the number of private activities that are
legal. In May, Gorbachev announced that land for
private plots had been earmarked for more than a
million families. An expansion of the private sector
would authorize some economic activities that cur-
rently are illegal, removing some opportunities for
corruption and diminishing the burden of law enforce-
ment.
The fight against corruption has also provided a
psychological boost to public morale and improved the
regime's image in the eyes of the population. The
campaign unleashed an element of candor and realism
about the failures of the system-a prerequisite to
remedying the situation. Moreover, there is increased
confidence about the regime's ability to rule effective-
ly and cope with serious problems. While this uplift
will be short lived if Gorbachev does not sustain the
attack on the various domestic ills, the campaign so
far has been a political plus for him, helping to
nurture the image of an energetic and decisive new
leadership.
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