SOVIET DISSENT AND ITS REPRESSION SINCE THE 1975 HELSINKI ACCORDS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00591R000300330003-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 15, 2011
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: July 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/15: CIA-RDP86T00591 R000300330003-3
Directorate of
intelligence
Soviet Dissent and Its Repression
Since the 1975 Helsinki Accords
SOV 85-10130X
July 1985
Copy 4 6 0
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/15: CIA-RDP86T00591 R000300330003-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/15: CIA-RDP86T00591 R000300330003-3
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/15: CIA-RDP86T00591 R000300330003-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/15: CIA-RDP86T00591 R000300330003-3
Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Since the 1975 Helsinki Accords
Soviet Dissent and Its Repression
Domestic Policy Division, SOYA,
Office of Soviet Analysis. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be directed to the Chief,
This paper was prepared by
Secret
SOV 85-10130X
July 1985
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/15: CIA-RDP86T00591 R000300330003-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/15: CIA-RDP86T00591 R000300330003-3
Secret
Soviet Dissent and Its Repression
Since the 1975 Helsinki Accords
Key Judgments Since signing the 1975 Helsinki Accords, Moscow has intensified its
Information available repression of Soviet citizens. The increase in repression occurred in large
as of 15 June 1985 part in response to the upsurge in dissent that Moscow's signing of the Ac-
was used in this report.
cords inspired. In addition, it probably was intended as a firm rebuff to
what the Soviets perceived as US efforts to intervene directly in their
internal affairs by making the easing of Soviet restrictions on human rights
a condition for improved bilateral relations.
The Soviet regime was slow to crack down on the post-Helsinki spread of
dissent. Shortly after the publication of the Accords in Pravda in August
1975, Moscow dissidents-ignoring KGB warnings to desist-began to
organize a group to monitor Soviet adherence to them. By early 1977,
dissidents in Lithuania, the Ukraine, and Georgia as well as in Moscow
had established a network of Helsinki monitoring groups. The KGB
allowed the members of this "human rights movement" to meet freely with
Western supporters and even hold press conferences with foreign newsmen.
Older, underground dissident groups, for the most part nationalist and
religious in focus, also stepped up their activities in anticipation of
receiving greater international attention and support. Dissident scientist
Andrey Sakharov even appealed in writing to US President Jimmy Carter
to champion the cause of Soviet human rights activists-and received a
personal letter from the President promising to do so.
In early 1977, the Soviet authorities, increasingly aware of the extent of
their dissident problem and Washington's willingness to press the human
rights issue, cracked down hard on the Helsinki monitors, arresting such
leading dissidents as Aleksandr Ginzburg, Mykola Rudenko, Yuriy Orlov,
and Anatoliy Shcharanskiy. Aside from verbal attacks, however, the
regime did not move against Sakharov, the most prominent Soviet
dissident, and Jewish emigration was allowed to increase in 1978 and 1979.
This mixed response may well have been designed to keep Western critics
off balance and thereby allow for positive movement on bilateral issues of
arms control and trade.
In 1980, in the wake of the Western condemnation of the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan and the subsequent virtual suspension of superpower dialogue,
Moscow dropped any pretense of concern with foreign criticism of its
human rights record. Sakharov was exiled from Moscow and placed under
house arrest, Jewish emigration was cut by half, and the Soviet security or-
gans were allowed to move even more freely against dissident activists.
iii Secret
SOV 85-10130X
July 1985
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/15: CIA-RDP86T00591 R000300330003-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/15: CIA-RDP86T00591 R000300330003-3
Secret
Under its chairman, Yuriy Andropov, the KGB refined existing techniques
of repression and developed new, more sophisticated measures to manage
the dissident problem:
? Many of the most prominent dissidents were allowed or forced to
emigrate.
? Others were arrested on criminal rather than political charges or
confined in psychiatric hospitals.
? Induction of would-be Jewish emigrants into the military enabled the
authorities to cite reasons of "state security" to deny permission to leave
the USSR.
? The criminal code was revised to simplify the antidissident effort.
? Intimidation of Western journalists was stepped up in an effort to stop
their reporting about the dissidents' lot.
By these and other measures, open human rights activity and nationalist
dissent have been effectively repressed. Unofficial religious activity is
currently the most vigorous form of dissent, but it, too, has been hard hit.
Emigration has ceased to be a practical option for Jews and other minority
peoples. Despite a recent small increase in the number of Jews permitted to
leave the USSR, Soviet officials have indicated that they consider the era
of large-scale emigration to be over.
To encourage dialogue with the West on longstanding issues of concern,
General Secretary Gorbachev may make some minor concessions on
human rights. His past and recent statements suggest, however, that no
significant easing of restrictions on dissent is likely. Such actions could give
his critics an issue on which to fault his performance and alienate even
longtime supporters.
Although the "human rights" movement with its reliance on overt dissent
has little prospect of recovery under current conditions, religious and
nationalist dissidence, because it is so diffuse and difficult to control, is
likely to reemerge. Religious believers have displayed an unusual willing-
ness to take great risks in their efforts to worship according to their
conscience. They also have developed an extensive clandestine network of
activists and supporters from which to recruit replacements for arrested
leaders. Nationalist dissidents have displayed similar tenacity, and regime
actions on issues such as the regional allocation of resources and education-
al policy could spark nationalist tensions that, in turn, could stimulate
nationalist dissent.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/15: CIA-RDP86T00591 R000300330003-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/15: CIA-RDP86T00591 R000300330003-3
Secret
Key Judgments
Emigration and Exile
6
Making the Crime Fit the Punishment
7
Cutting Off Foreign Support
8
Western Reaction to Soviet Human Rights Policies
8
Prospects for Future Dissent
10
A.
Soviet Nationalist and Religious Dissent in the Helsinki Era
13
B.
Jewish Emigration and Dissent
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/15: CIA-RDP86T00591 R000300330003-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/15: CIA-RDP86T00591 R000300330003-3
Secret
Soviet'Dissent and Its Repression
Since the 1975 Helsinki Accords
The Ascent of the Human Rights Movement
The signing of the 1975 Helsinki Accords' by the
Soviet Government gave new life to a moribund
dissident movement.' Following the publication of the
full text of the Accords in Pravda, discussion of
relevant clauses on human rights, self-determination,
and the free flow of people and information became
widespread within intellectual circles, according to an
emigre dissident (see inset for human rights provisions
of the Accords). In May 1976, this ferment resulted in
the formation of the Public Group for Monitoring
Implementation of the Helsinki Accords in Moscow.
Subsequently, branches were formed in Lithuania and
the Ukraine (November 1976), Georgia (January
1977), and Armenia (April 1977).
The upsurge in dissent was subsequently fueled by the
international support that it aroused. In the United
States, in particular, support for Soviet human rights
activists came to enjoy a higher official priority than
in the past. According to US Embassy reports, Wash-
ington's open advocacy of the dissidents' cause was
viewed by some Soviet human rights activists as a
potential shield against persecution.
To judge from their public statements and actions, the
Soviet activists monitoring the Helsinki Accords per-
ceived themselves as apolitical defenders of the rights
of citizens rather than as critics of the state. Citing
the Accords and the other human rights declarations
signed by the Soviet Government, they carried out
their work in an open manner, signing names to
documents, meeting freely with Western supporters,
and even holding press conferences with foreign news-
men. Under the leadership of Yuriy Orlov, the Mos-
cow Helsinki group brought together veterans of the
Human Rights Provisions of the
August 1975 Helsinki Accords
The participating states will:
Respect human rights and fundamental freedoms,
including the freedom of thought, conscience, reli-
gion, or belief for all....
Promote and encourage the effective exercise of
civil, political, economic, social, cultural, and oth-
er rights and freedoms....
Ensure that all peoples have the right to pursue
their political, economic, social, and cultural
development.
Facilitate freer movement and contacts among
persons and institutions....
Allow persons to enter or leave their territory
temporarily to visit members of their families.
Deal in a positive and humanitarian spirit with
applications of persons who wish to be reunited
with their families....
Examine favorably requests from persons who
have decided to marry a citizen from another
participating state.
Facilitate freer and wider dissemination of infor-
mation, encourage cooperation in the exchange of
information with other countries, and improve the
conditions under which journalists exercise their
profession....
' The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE),
attended by 33 European nations plus the United States and
Canada, was held in Helsinki in 1975 and addressed a wide range
of security, economic, and humanitarian issues. Followup confer-
ences were held in Belgrade in 1978-79 and Madrid in 1980-83F
2 For the purposes of this paper, dissent and dissidence will mean
deliberate activity by an individual or group that is designed to
protest the policies of a given regime and bring about change in
those policies. This definition does not encompass spontaneous mass
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/15: CIA-RDP86T00591 R000300330003-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/15: CIA-RDP86T00591 R000300330003-3
dissident community such as Aleksandr Ginzburg,
Ludmilla Alekseyeva, Petr Grigorenko, and Yelena
Bonner, who provided continuity for the group and
valuable guidance to the younger, inexperienced ac-
tivists. Anatoliy Shcharanskiy served as liaison be-
tween the Helsinki group and the Jewish emigration
movement. Other group members included Aleksandr
Podrabinek and Irina Grivnina, the founders of the
Psychiatric Abuses Watch Group. Andrey Sakharov
did not officially belong to the group but used his
protected position and status as a member of the
Soviet Academy of Sciences to support its activities
and publicize regime measures against its members.
The activism of the Helsinki movement encouraged
established dissident groups and led to the formation
of new ones. According to Soviet dissident contacts of
our Embassy in Moscow, the dissident aid organiza-
tion, the Solzhenitsyn Fund, was able to bolster its
widespread network of activists to provide assistance
to dissidents around the country. Also, an unofficial
trade union, SMOT, was formed to defend workers in
disputes with official bodies and to push for better
worker representation by official trade unions.
In this environment of accelerated dissident activity,
samizdat materials (protest literature written and
disseminated illegally by individuals or groups) prolif-
erated. Following the example of the most important
samizdat journal, the Chronicle of Current Events,
these publications reported the arrests and trials of
apolitical prisoners and persecution of religious believ-
,,trs and ethnic minorities. Some groups concentrated
their publishing efforts on subjects that Soviet dissi-
dents had generally neglected in the past. The tiny
Group for the Defense of the Rights of Invalids
produced a large volume of samizdat that exposed
~oviet discriminatory practices toward the handi-
capped. A small group of Leningrad women produced
two feminist journals, Zhenshchina i Rossiya (Wom-
en and Russia) and Maria, that criticized the inability
of the regime to correct the injustices from which
Soviet women suffer.
The human rights movement enjoyed and indeed
depended on a large foreign support network. Foreign-
ers-newsmen, official visitors, and even tourists-
channeled samizdat reports out of the country. This
information was used to confront official Soviet repre-
sentatives at international meetings. Western radio-
broadcasts into the Soviet Union used this same
material as part of their efforts to serve as a commu-
nications channel between dissident groups through-
out the country and to provide an alternative to the
official version of events for nondissident citizens,
Foreign
supporters were also able to render vital material aid
to dissidents who were often unemployed with families
to support.
The Spillover Effect
The signing of the Helsinki Accords also gave new life
to nationalist and religious dissent and the Jewish
emigration movement. These sources of dissent long
predated the rise of the human rights movement, but
their leaders evidently believed that their groups could
benefit from the increased international attention to
the plight of Soviet dissidents that had been aroused
by the activities of the Helsinki monitors. (See the
appendixes for a more extensive discussion of nation-
alist and religious dissent and the Jewish emigration
movement.
The Moscow-based human rights activity had a sig-
nificant impact on nationalist dissidents in the
Ukraine and the Baltic republics. The Ukrainian and
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/15: CIA-RDP86T00591 R000300330003-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/15: CIA-RDP86T00591 R000300330003-3
Secret
Lithuanian Helsinki groups were populated by veter-
an nationalist activists who used the Accords as a
The Jewish emigration movement had been perhaps
the most active and well-organized branch of Soviet
dissent in the few years before the signing of the
Helsinki Accords. The new Helsinki-inspired human
rights groups made a conscious effort to draw upon
the expertise and enthusiasm of the Jewish movement,
designating Anatoliy Shcharanskiy to serve as liaison
with its leadership and recruiting Jewish refuseniks
(Jews denied permission to emigrate) as Helsinki
monitors. The well-established Jewish movement had
less reason than weaker dissident groups to imitate
25X1
25X1
25X1
vehicle to promote local objectives.
the Lithuanian group also agreed to
represent Estonian and Latvian interests at the re-
quest of leading activists of those republics.
In the Baltic republics in 1977, nationalist dissidents
not directly affiliated with the Helsinki groups formed
an organization of their own-the Supreme Commit-
tee of the National Movement of Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania-that imitated the tactics of the human
rights activists.
the Supreme Committee was formed to
coordinate the activities of dissidents who intended to
work within the system to obtain the rights promised
to minority nationalities by the Soviet constitution.
Religious dissidents also were able to capitalize on the
publicity and foreign support generated by the human
rights activists to gain international attention for their
cause. their efforts
to attract such publicity a so won them many Soviet
supporters who were impressed by the boldness of the
nonconformists in contrast to the subservience of
officially regulated church groups.
An early example of post-Helsinki activism by reli-
gious dissidents came in December 1976 when Rus-
sian Orthodox priest Gleb Yakunin and several asso-
ciates formed the Christian Committee for the
Defense of Believers' Rights to report official persecu-
tion of believers. A similar group was formed in
Lithuania in December 1978 by the Lithuanian priest
Alfonsas Svarinskas. Later, some Ukrainian Uniate
Catholics, led by activist priest Josef Terelya, formed
the Initiative Group for the Defense of Believers'
Rights to coordinate the activities of Uniates attempt-
ing to win legal status for their church.
Pentecostals and other fundamentalist Protestant
groups have also sought to take advantage of the
international attention focused on Soviet dissent in the
Helsinki era. In November 1980, according to dissi-
dent and Embassy sources, 30,000 Pentecostals staged
a five-day hunger strike to bring their situation to the
attention of participants at the Madrid CSCE meet-
ing.
the Helsinki monitors, but its members apparently 25X1
believed that they could benefit from the increased
international attention to Soviet dissidents that the
activity of the Helsinki groups fueled.
Soviet Reaction to Increased Dissent
The Soviet regime, which historically had reacted to
incipient dissident activity with swift and harsh re-
pression, was slow to crack down on the spread of
dissent that its signing of the Helsinki Accords in-
spired (see inset). Moscow dissident Yuriy Orlov
reported that in the winter of
1975-76 the KGB was aware of his efforts to organize
a Helsinki monitoring group and warned him not to
do so. However, from May 1976, when Orlov's Mos-
cow group was formally established, until early 1977,
he and his associates were able to conduct their
activities in an open fashion. By November similar
groups had been openly established in Lithuania and
the Ukraine, and by year's end religious dissidents-
picking up on the tactics of the Helsinki monitors-
were becoming more open in their dissent.
There are several possible explanations for the initial
tolerance of the spread of overt dissent. With the
dissident movement all but dormant at the time the
Accords were signed, the leadership may have felt
there would be no significant reaction to them. The
authorities may also have been playing a cat-and-
mouse game, allowing the dissidents to organize to
make it easier to pounce upon them all at once. The
Soviets may also have deferred their crackdown out of
concern for its potential impact on their relations with
Washington during a presidential election year. In
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/15: CIA-RDP86T00591 R000300330003-3
 Secret Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/15: CIA-RDP86T00591 R000300330003-3
Early Dissident Actions and
Soviet and Western Reactions
1975 August CSCE Accords signed in Helsinki; pub-
lished in Pravda.
Fall and
winter
Widespread discussion of Accords report-
edly occurs among Soviet intellectuals;
Yuriy Orlov and other Moscow-based dis-
sidents begin organizing overt groups to
monitor Soviet adherence.
1976 May Yuriy Orlov and others found Moscow
Helsinki monitoring group.
November Mykola Rudenko founds Ukrainian Hel-
sinki monitoring group. Lithuanian Hel-
sinki monitoring group founded. Both
groups imitate the overt activities of the
Moscow monitoring group.
December Vladimir Bukovskiy exchanged for Chil-
ean Communist Party leader Luis Corva-
Ian. Orthodox priest Gleb Yakunin founds
Christian Committee for the Defense of
Believers' Rights.
1977 January Aleksandr Podrabinek founds Psychiatric
Abuse Watch Group. Andrey Sakharov
sends letter to President Carter urging
him to defend Soviet dissidents.
Georgian Helsinki monitoring group
founded.
February Aleksandr Ginzburg, head of Solzheni-
tsyn Fund, arrested. US correspondent
ordered to leave the USSR (first expulsion
since 1970).
President Carter sends letter to Sakharov
reaffirming support for human rights.
Ethnic Germans demonstrate for emigra-
tion permission in Red Square.
April Armenian Helsinki monitoring group
founded.
June President Carter criticizes Soviet human
rights abuses in report to Congress on
CSCE implementation.
US correspondent held in Lefortovo prison
for three days for allegedly receiving se-
cret information; allowed to depart USSR
after release.
July Podrabinek's expose of Soviet psychiatric
abuse, "Punitive Medicine, " arrives in
West.
August Supreme Committee of National Move-
ment of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania
founded.
September Sixth World Psychiatric Congress con-
demns Soviet abuse of psychiatry for po-
litical purposes.
KGB Chairman Andropov delivers speech
asserting that the USSR has only a small
number of dissidents, that they must be
punished in accordance with Soviet laws,
and that "efforts to interfere in Soviet
internal affairs" conflict with detente and
the Helsinki Accords.
US State Department statement in defense
of Ginzburg.
December Vladimir Klebanov announces formation
of Association of Free Trade Unions of
Workers.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/15: CIA-RDP86T00591 R000300330003-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/15: CIA-RDP86T00591 R000300330003-3
Secret
any event, throughout 1976, despite unprecedented
overt dissent, the Soviet security organs limited their
antidissident actions to low-level warnings and harass-
being charged or tried for a specific crime.'
25X1
25X11
ment.
By early 1977, however, it was probably clear to the
Soviet authorities that growing numbers of their
citizens were perceiving Moscow's well-publicized
signing of the Helsinki Accords as an indication that
it would condone overt dissent. The regime's problem
was exacerbated by the US decision to give public
support to Soviet dissidents-a decision highlighted
by President Carter's exchange of letters with Sakha-
rov. In a series of actions clearly designed to signal
that both dissent itself and foreign involvement in
Soviet internal affairs had reached the limits of their
tolerance, the authorities moved decisively against the
human rights movement by arresting Ginzburg,
Rudenko, Orlov, and Shcharanskiy. Other arrests
were made as the year progressed, and a number of
prominent dissidents were allowed or forced to emi-
grate. When these initial measures failed to bring
dissident activity under control, the regime acceler-
ated repression. A methodical pattern of arrests and
trials, often accompanied by scurrilous propaganda,
continued through 1978 and 1979. Moscow Helsinki
group members, as well as prominent refuseniks and
religious and nationalist leaders, were imprisoned.
At the same time, the regime took no direct action
against Sakharov, the Soviet Union's most prominent
dissident, and Jewish emigration was allowed to in-
crease. This mixed response may have been an at-
tempt to keep Western critics off balance and allow
for continued superpower dialogue on issues of Soviet
interest while sending a clear repressive signal to the
Soviet populace.
After the December 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghani-
stan, however, Moscow dropped any pretense that it
was concerned about foreign reaction. Probably per-
ceiving that it had little to lose, the leadership allowed
the security organs to move even more freely against
activists and accelerate its rate of arrests. Most
notably, in January 1980, Sakharov-who had con-
demned the Afghan invasion-was exiled to the city
By late 1980
morale in the human rights community was low" and
activists were seriously questioning the wisdom of
their open approach, which allowed the authorities to
identify them so easily. By mid-1981, no new mem-
bers were coming forward, and the few remaining
dissidents were not asking for volunteers because it
meant inevitable arrest for the new activists. By the
end of 1981, the human rights movement had been
effectively crushed:
? The four republic Helsinki groups were defunct, and
the Moscow group had only three semiactive
members.
? The Helsinki auxiliary groups-Psychiatric Abuses
Watch Group and the Christian Committee for the
Defense of Believers' Rights-were inactive.
? Several dissident journals, including the Chronicle
of Current Events, had been forced to cease publica-
tion.
The other variants of dissent were severely affected by
repression as well:
? In 1980 the Soviets cut Jewish emigration by over
50 percent, issuing only 20,340 visas. The downward
spiral has continued, and last year's total of only
896 was the lowest since 1970.
? Dmitriy Dudko, a leading Russian Orthodox dissi-
dent, was forced to recant his views in a televised
appearance in 1980 and subsequently withdrew
from dissident activity.
? A fledgling cooperative group formed by activists
from all three Baltic republics was crushed by
arrests and forced emigration of members.
There were several reasons for the human rights
movement's inability to withstand the intensified
crackdown. In addition to the strength of its adver-
sary-the KGB-the movement also suffered from
internal problems including the absence of a vigorous,
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/15: CIA-RDP86T00591 R000300330003-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/15: CIA-RDP86T00591 R000300330003-3
charismatic leader of international renown, lack of
organization and dispersal of resources, and what
proved to be an increasingly naive belief that foreign
support would provide protection from regime repres-
sion.
The Role of the KGB
The KGB has the primary responsibility for quelling
domestic dissent. More than in earlier periods, howev-
er, the KGB has had to deal with leadership concerns
over its international image. In response, under the
leadership of its chairman, Yuriy Andropov, the KGB
refined existing techniques and developed new, more
sophisticated methods of repression, deemphasizing
simple thuggery and making greater use of adminis-
trative and judicial means of containing dissent. The
KGB's goal was both to get the dissidents off the
streets and to keep them off the pages of the interna-
tional press.
Emigration and Exile. Many of the most prominent
and effective dissident intellectuals and refuseniks
were allowed or forced to emigrate. In our view, this
tactic was designed to limit adverse Western reaction
to the antidissident crackdown. Arresting such dissi-
dents would have been the simplest means of stopping
their activities. In prison, however, well-known dissi-
dents might well have become rallying points for
Western critics of Soviet human rights policy. Exile
and emigration, moreover, were as effective as arrest
in depriving the dissident community of its best
known and most respected leaders. The KGB also
used emigration as a carrot and stick-granting it as
a reward for refuseniks (and sometimes non-Jewish
dissidents) who kept quiet, while denying it to those
who sought publicity for their cause. Examples in-
clude Lev Kopelev and Vasiliy Aksenov, prominent
intellectuals, who were allowed to go abroad in 1981
only to have their citizenship revoked later; Georgiy
Vladimov, noted author and head of the Moscow
chapter of Amnesty International; and peace activist
Sergey Batovrin, who chose emigration over the
threatened alternative of imprisonment.
Arrest on Criminal Charges. Another technique em-
ployed by the KGB has been to arrest some dissidents
on criminal charges rather than the more typical
political charges, such as anti-Soviet behavior. This
approach reinforces domestic propaganda that paints
dissidents as criminal renegades. Additionally, if the
activist is unknown in the West, his plight may not
come to the attention of concerned parties as it might
if he were charged with a political crime. To support
the criminal charge, the KGB recruits a victim and
witnesses to the alleged crime, or plants false evidence
during a search. In 1981, for example, refusenik
Stanislav Zubko was sentenced to four years in labor
camp for possession of a pistol and narcotics that,
in his unattended apartment.
ted
Rearrest) many of
their colleagues, already in prison or internal exile,
have been rearrested on trumped-up political or crimi-
nal charges and given another labor camp sentence
before their initial term was completed. This approach
keeps dissidents out of action and demoralizes their
friends and associates. It befell numerous Helsinki
monitors who otherwise would have been released
almost simultaneously and who might have brought
about a resurgence of human rights activity. Vladimir
Skvirskiy, a SMOT activist, was arrested in 1978 for
theft, rearrested in 1980 or 1981 on the same charge,
and sentenced to one and a half years in labor camp.
He was arrested a third time, for anti-Soviet slander,
and sentenced in February 1983 to three years in
labor camp.
Confinement in Psychiatric Hospitals. The practice
of sentencing dissidents to psychiatric hospitals has
been a favorite KGB technique because the prisoner
can be confined indefinitely without being charged.
The late Aleksey Nikitin, for example, spent almost
11 years in psychiatric hospitals for defending
workers' rights in the Ukraine. Although the tech-
nique had been common as early as the 1960s, it
became more widespread in the years after the signing
of the Helsinki Accords. International criticism of this
practice led to the release of some victims (see inset),
but in 1981 Amnesty International estimated that up
to 1,000 persons were confined in psychiatric hospitals
for political reasons.
Inducting Dissidents. Drafting dissidents into the
military is a technique that has been especially effec-
tive against Jews and Pentecostals wishing to
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1,
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/15: CIA-RDP86T00591 R000300330003-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/15: CIA-RDP86T00591 R000300330003-3
Secret
A Successful Criticism of
Soviet Human Rights Abuses
A rare example of human rights activity having an
effect on Soviet behavior was the work of the Psychi-
atricAbuse Watch Group, established in 1977.
Founding member Aleksandr Podrabinek, a medical
technician, compiled a report documenting numerous
cases of wrongful incarceration of political prisoners
in psychiatric hospitals. Podrabinek's report was
smuggled to the West and was instrumental in the
World Psychiatric Association's (WPA) 1977 denun-
ciation of Soviet practices and sparked anew the
Western psychiatric community's debate over the
possibility of forcing Soviet compliance with world
standards in the field of psychiatry. The debate
reached such a pitch that in early 1983 the Soviets
withdrew from the WPA rather than be subjected to a
minute examination of their methods and probable
expulsion. Of the 22 victims of psychiatric abuse
documented in Podrabinek's report, 14 were later
released.
emigrate, because it delays emigration and enables
the regime to cite reasons of "state security" to deny
applicants permission to leave the USSR. Draftees
who refuse to take the oath of loyalty are often court-
martialed for pacifism or brutally assaulted by fellow
conscripts to force them to denounce their religious
beliefs. Young men who refuse to report for military
service are arrested for draft evasion. In May 1980,
four Baptist recruits were pressured by military au-
thorities to take the oath of loyalty or face long prison
sentences. One of the recruits had two brothers who
had served prison terms for failure to take the oath. In
August 1984, refusenik Aleksandr Yakir was sen-
tenced to two years in labor camp for draft evasion,
according to Embassy reporting.
Making the Crime Fit the Punishment. The practice
of fine-tuning the criminal code to simplify the work
of the KGB is not new in the Soviet Union. In 1966
Andrey Sinyavskiy and Yuliy Daniel were tried for
violation of Article 70, which forbids "agitation or
propaganda carried on for the purpose of subverting
... the Soviet regime." The defendants asserted they
had not intended to weaken the Soviet state by
sending their literary works abroad for publication.
Seven months after the conviction of Sinyavskiy and
Daniel, Article 190-1, which prohibits anti-Soviet
agitation and propaganda but does not require proof
of subversive intent, was added to the criminal code.
In the short period from September 1983 to January
1984, a number of additions and revisions were made
to the Soviet legal code that broadened the criteria for
determining a political crime and defining evidence in
political cases. These changes gave authorities greater
control over political prisoners. The change potential-
ly most detrimental to dissidents was the addition of
Article 188-3, which states that a prisoner who is
accused of "malicious disobedience" of camp authori-
ties and confined to "cell-type accommodations' 1 4 as a
result may be sentenced to another three years in
camp. This law simplifies the resentencing of prison-
ers by replacing a criminal procedure with an admin-
istrative one more easily controlled by camp officials.
Under Article 188-3, the camp director need only
interpret some action of a prisoner as "malicious
disobedience," recruit a member of his staff as a
witness, and proceed with the trial. Thus, political
prisoners who attempt to continue their dissident
activities while in labor camp by smuggling out
reports of camp conditions and maltreatment of pris-
oners, staging hunger strikes, or circulating samizdat
are automatically vulnerable to further prosecution.
The regime also revised Article 70 of the criminal
code, which deals with anti-Soviet agitation and pro-
paganda, to prohibit "actions perpetrated with the use
of financial means or other material valuables re-
ceived from foreign organizations or individuals."
This clause applies to a wide range of dissidents-
refuseniks, religious believers, and members of dissi-
dent aid groups such as the Solzhenitsyn Fund-who
receive vital financial and material aid from foreign-
ers.
? This refers to temporary detention in the prison, located in every
labor camp, for even the smallest infraction of camp regulations.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/15: CIA-RDP86T00591 R000300330003-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/15: CIA-RDP86T00591 R000300330003-3
A revision of Article 77-1-on activities that disrupt
the work of corrective labor institutions-added a
clause that states that prisoners who "organize crimi-
nal group actions" or who "terrorize" fellow inmates
will be punished by a sentence of three to eight years.
This clause could be stretched to cover anything from
a hunger strike by several political prisoners to a
large-scale camp riot. Also at risk are religious believ-
ers who often evangelize fellow prisoners-activity
that the regime has in the past labeled "terrorizing."
A final change in the criminal code relevant to
dissidents was the revision of Article 198-2--on will-
ful abandonment of a residence by a person under
administrative supervision to avoid supervision. Dissi-
dents sometimes try to evade capture by going under-
ground or traveling to another region. Now, any such
attempt at evasion is punishable by one to three years
of deprivation of freedom in addition to other political
or criminal charges.
Cutting Off Foreign Support. The Soviet authorities
accompanied the crackdown on dissent with an effort
to curtail dissidents' contacts with their Western
supporters. During the heyday of the human rights
movement in 1976 and early 1977 many Western
journalists in Moscow had close ties to the dissident
community. The correspondents were well placed to
report each act of official repression, with US journal-
ists being the most aggressive. The regime responded
with warnings in the press accusing some journalists
of criminal activity and espionage, and one US jour-
nalist was expelled. When these warnings did not
dampen the correspondents' zeal, the authorities de-
tained a US journalist in June 1977 for three days of
interrogation in Lefortovo Prison in connection with
the Shcharanskiy case. Although the Soviets gave the
strong impression that he would stand trial, they
apparently decided they had made their point and
allowed the journalist to leave the country.
Since 1977, the Kremlin has kept pressure on foreign-
ers with occasional reminders that they can be held
accountable for their actions while in the Soviet
Union:
? In 1978, two US newsmen were summoned to
appear in a Moscow courtroom on slander charges
stemming from their coverage of nationalist distur-
bances in the Transcaucasus.
ber of the Solzhenitsyn Fund.
? In 1982, members of an official Canadian Jewish
Congress delegation were beaten and robbed by
unidentified assailants when they attempted to visit
a Leningrad refusenik.
? In February through April 1984, at least 16 US and
West European refusenik supporters, in the USSR
on tourist visas, were expelled for "pro-Zionist
activities."
? In July 1984, two US Embassy officers were forc-
ibly detained during a routine contact with a mem-
Moscow also has suspended some communications
services and disrupted others to hinder dissident links
with foreigners, prevent Soviet citizens from being
exposed to foreign influences, and keep information
embarrassing to the regime from getting to foreign
audiences. In 1980, the number of telephone lines to
the West was drastically cut, and direct dial service
was suspended because of "technical difficulties."
Soon thereafter, increased Soviet interference with
the international mails disrupted postal deliveries in
both directions. A few halfhearted attempts have been
made to interrupt Finnish television reception in
Estonia, but these have been unsuccessful.
Western Reaction to Soviet Human Rights Policies
The West European approach to Soviet human rights
in the bilateral context is generally low key. The West
Germans have been the most persistent in their efforts
on behalf of ethnic Germans wishing to emigrate from
the USSR, and West German leaders consistently
raise the issue with the Soviets, even though they
invariably receive a sharp rebuff. More representative
of the type of "individualized" approach favored by
West Europeans is the customary representation
made on behalf of one or several specific cases. Many
European heads of state have at one time or another
indicated their support for Orlov, Shcharanskiy, and
other selected individuals in official discussions with
Soviet leaders. For example, the situation of Andrey
Sakharov last summer prompted West German Chan-
cellor Kohl, British Foreign Secretary Howe, and
French President Mitterrand to make strong declara-
tions in support of Sakharov during their 1984 visits
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/15: CIA-RDP86T00591 R000300330003-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/15: CIA-RDP86T00591 R000300330003-3
Secret
Figure' 2. Sakharov walking with doctor and
psychiatrist at a Gorkiy hospital after his hunger
to Moscow. By confining their comments to specific
cases, West European leaders seek to demonstrate
their regard for human rights and support for the US
position while minimizing damage to their ties to the
USSR.
CSCE. The United States and Western Europe have
also raised the issue of Soviet violations of human
rights at the followup conferences to Helsinki, but
such actions have not led the Soviets to comply with
the human rights provisions. At the 1978 Belgrade
CSCE Review, for example, Western governments
insisted on a complete review of Moscow's lack of
compliance with the 1975 Accords, but the Soviet side
refused to allow any discussion of human rights. The
result, in the words of the Belgrade concluding docu-
ment, was that: "different views were expressed as to
the degree of implementation of the Final Act ...
consensus was not reached on a number of proposals
submitted to the meeting." The CSCE process, none-
theless, was preserved by scheduling the 1980 Madrid
followup conference.
The troubled three-year Madrid conference eventual-
ly yielded positive, if symbolic, results on human
rights, but only after considerable friction. Moscow
was on the defensive going into the meeting because
of its military presence in Afghanistan. Its position
deteriorated further after the imposition of martial
law in Poland in December 1980. Western recrimina-
tion on these two points resulted in a nine-month
adjournment. After the session reconvened, the West-
ern side cited numerous Soviet human rights viola-
tions and listed 65 individual dissidents who were
victims of Soviet violations. The West called for
inclusion in the final act of provisions for religious
freedom, the right to form free trade unions, and
improved working conditions for foreign journalists.
The West also pressed for a followup meeting on
human contacts (later scheduled for April 1986) and a
meeting of human rights experts (held in May and
June 1985).
Moscow, in pursuit of a Conference on Disarmament
in Europe (CDE), apparently felt that a certain
amount of Western tongue lashing could be tolerated
if an agreement on CDE could be obtained. The
Soviets did not take the criticism meekly, however,
but charged the United States with trying to bring
about the failure of the conference. Moscow ultimate-
ly accepted the human rights provisions and the two
followup conferences on human contacts. But, in his
speech at the concluding session, Foreign Minister
Gromyko declared that interference in the internal
affairs of socialist countries was "hopeless" and that
the Final Act does not authorize anyone to act as
"umpire" on human rights questions.
The symbolic victory scored by the West at Madrid
will probably have little practical significance. Mos-
cow almost certainly will not comply with any of the
provisions concerning religious freedom and trade
unions. And, in the light of Soviet behavior at Bel-
grade and Madrid, the probability of meaningful
dialogue occurring at the followup conference on
human contacts is slight. To defuse Western comment
immediately before the conference, the Soviets could
make some cosmetic concessions such as releasing
several prominent dissidents or resolving several long-
standing family reunification cases. But at the meet-
ing the Soviets are likely to adopt the same type of
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/15: CIA-RDP86T00591 R000300330003-3
 Secret Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/15: CIA-RDP86T00591 R000300330003-3
stubborn, uncompromising stance that they took at
Belgrade and block any worthwhile discussion on
human rights.
Prospects for Future Dissent
There is little reason to believe that the current
regime will be more responsive to human rights issues
than past regimes. General Secretary Gorbachev, in
his few public statements on the issue, has taken the
standard Soviet line that human rights is an internal
matter not subject to foreign meddling. During a visit
to Canada in May 1983, for example, he maintained
that existing Soviet legislation guaranteed equitable
treatment of requests by Soviet Jews to emigrate.
During his visit to Great Britain last December,
Gorbachev's temper flared in response to a British
official's question on human rights. Gorbachev's re-
sponse was curt: "You govern your society and leave
us to govern ours."
While strengthening his grip on power, moreover,
Gorbachev is not likely to ease restrictions in the
sensitive area of human rights. Such actions might
give his critics an issue on which to fault his perfor-
mance and could alienate even longstanding support-
ers uncomfortable with any moves that might appear
to justify Western criticism of the Soviet system. At
the same time, with dissent at its lowest ebb in a
decade, Gorbachev probably is under little pressure to
adopt additional repressive measures.
Gorbachev and his colleagues may make some conces-
sions in the human rights area to give the impression
of an openness to an expanded dialogue on issues such
as arms control and trade-which have been linked in
Western eyes to Soviet performance on human rights.
Indeed, there is some evidence that, early this year,
Moscow may have manipulated Jewish emigration for
this purpose. Emigration increased slightly over the
same period last year with most of the increase
representing longtime Moscow refuseniks. This in-
crease was widely publicized in the West, and, ac-
cording to US Embassy officers, some members of the
refusenik community also seem more optimistic now
than at any time in recent years. Still, the repression
of religious activists is continuing unabated, and labor
camp conditions for imprisoned activists are worsen-
Another move that Gorbachev might make to improve
Moscow's image in the area of human rights would be
the release of several high-visibility dissidents, possi-
bly even Orlov or Shcharanskiy. Such a step, whether
tightly negotiated or a unilateral gesture, would prob-
ably reap immense public relations gains with little
real cost to Moscow.
The regime is likely, however, to stonewall any explic-
it attempt to link human rights with arms control or
trade as has been done in the past. Their experiences
with the Jackson-Vanik and Stevenson amendments
and the three acrimonious CSCE conferences have
put the Soviets on guard against letting what they
view as an internal national security matter become
entangled in foreign policy issues and forums they
may not be able to control. Moreover, the leadership
may believe there is a good chance that US attempts
to use substantive levers rather than public opinion to
force Soviet compliance would not be supported by
the NATO allies. The West Europeans are willing to
condemn Moscow with rhetoric but shy away from
economic sanctions, as was demonstrated when the
United States tried to impose such sanctions against
the USSR at the height of the Polish and Afghan
crises.
With no significant easing of repression in sight, the
prospects for a revival of dissent in the near term are
generally dim. Yet, because the strength of the differ-
ent dissident groups and the impact of the regime's
repressive measures on them have varied, some vari-
ants of dissent are more likely than others to re-
emerge.
The wholesale depletion of the ranks of open dissent-
ers in the Helsinki groups almost certainly has per-
suaded dissidents of the necessity of underground
operation, and precluded the reemergence of the
"human rights" movement. Early on, members of the
Ukrainian Helsinki group realized the cost of their
overt activity and began to turn toward clandestine
operation, according to Embassy reporting. The re-
turn to underground dissent probably will be accom-
panied by an increase in samizdat production. Though
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/15: CIA-RDP86T00591 R000300330003-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/15: CIA-RDP86T00591 R000300330003-3
Secret
currently at a low level, samizdat is the logical vent
for dissident views that cannot be openly expressed by
other means during periods of harsh repression.
The future seems particularly grim for Jewish emigra-
tion and dissent. Despite the recent small increase in
the rate of emigration, Moscow's apparent decision to
end large-scale emigration probably is not likely to be
reversed. The regime has expended considerable effort
over the last several years in getting the emigration-
refusenik problem under control and appears unwill-
ing to undo all its hard work for possibly fleeting
bilateral gains. Moreover, the domestic consequences
of allowing some minorities to leave the country while
denying that right to others also works against a
renewal of large-scale emigration. As the virtual
cessation of emigration continues over time, the futili-
ty of seeking exit permission will discourage all but
the most desperate Jews from even applying. Mean-
while, the unauthorized practice of Jewish cultural
customs, such as teaching the Hebrew language, will
continue to be prohibited.
Religion and religious dissent, however, because they
are so diffuse, will continue to be difficult for the
regime to control. Believers in the past have shown
that they are deeply committed and willing to take
risks to be able to worship according to their con-
science. Dissident religious leaders have been able to
instill a significant degree of militancy and activism in
their followers; attesting to this is the willingness of
believers to endure daily official harassment and,
increasingly, to risk arrest. This is especially true of
Catholics and the Protestant sects that have engaged
in wide-ranging dissident activity on a mass scale for
many years. They have developed an extensive clan-
destine network of activists and supporters as well as
some support among registered, nondissident believ-
ers, It is this pool of
nondissident believers that will provide replacements
for those who are arrested. Russian Orthodox dissent,
which is less well organized and has a less active base
of support, probably will continue in samizdat chan-
the regime has recently resorted to arresting local
church leaders. At the same time, however, the light
sentences meted out to local leaders reflect the re-
gime's awareness that severe sentences are not always
suitable for this particular problem. Although in-
creased persecution will probably lead some unofficial
congregations to register with the state and some
individual believers may turn away from religious
observance, in the past such tactics merely led to more
underground religious activity.
Nationalist dissent also enjoys an underlying strength
that makes its recovery likely. Though subdued now,
Ukrainian, Baltic, Georgian, and Armenian national-
ism is never far below the surface. Economic con-
straints, unfavorable changes in nationality policies,
or inept handling of local problems by Russian au-
thorities could easily spark nationalist tensions among
the populace. This tension might, in turn, stimulate
dissident nationalism and even spark occasional out-
bursts of violence, as it has in the past. But, because
republic security officials can be more relentless and
severe than their Moscow counterparts, the likely
method of operation for nationalists would be under-
ground activity, including circulation of samizdat.
nels as it has in the past.
Religion's grassroots support is difficult for the re-
gime to tackle. The failure of the previous antireligion
efforts through propaganda, harassment, and the ar-
rest of dissident leaders is reflected by the fact that
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/15: CIA-RDP86T00591 R000300330003-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/15: CIA-RDP86T00591 R000300330003-3
Secret
Appendix A
Soviet Nationalist and Religious
Dissent in the Helsinki Era
Although less well publicized in the West than the
activity of the Helsinki monitors, Soviet nationalist
and religious dissent has deeper historical roots. It
also touches upon issues with potentially broader
appeal than those of concern to the intelligentsia-
dominated Helsinki monitors in Moscow. As a result,
it probably has been and still is viewed as more
threatening by the Soviet authorities.
Nationalist Dissent
Latent nationalism exists in virtually every republic in
the USSR, but the formation of dissident groups and
the publication of samizdat are not as widespread.
During the period under review in this study, such
activity was largely confined to the Baltic states and
the Ukraine. Nationalist activity in Georgia and
Armenia was channeled into the Helsinki forum, and
in Azerbaijan and the Central Asian republics Islam
has been more important than national consciousness
youths following Lithuanian-Russian sporting events.
The Lithuanian national movement, however, appar-
ently suffers from a lack of leadership and coordina-
tion. Over the last decade,
a number of groups have been formed with
aims ranging from greater Lithuanian autonomy to
total separation from the USSR; these groups, howev-
er, have quickly collapsed under KGB pressure and
have been unable to give direction to popular hostility
toward the Soviet regime.
An unusually frank official acknowledgment of na-
tionalist activity came in a 1982 speech by republic
Second Secretary Nikolay Dybenko to the Lithuanian
Komsomol Central Committee. Dybenko described a
nationalist group formed in 1981 by a Komsomol
member at a Telsiai high school that made public
anonymous anti-Soviet letters before being discovered
and disbanded in February 1982. According to
Dybenko, similar groups had also been discovered in
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
In the Baltic Republics. Estonia has a strong tradition
of nationalism that affects all segments of society,
and, in the Helsinki era, samizdat has been an
important outlet for Estonian nationalist dissent.
Samizdat journals have published numerous open
letters to republic, national, and foreign leaders on
topics ranging from reports of arrests to the detrimen-
tal effect of oil-shale exploration on the Estonian
environment. Mart Niklus, perhaps Estonia's most
prominent nationalist, was involved in many of these
publishing activities as well as in efforts to coordinate
dissident activities throughout the Baltic republics,
until his arrest in January 1981. After Niklus's arrest,
several samizdat journals were able to continue opera-
tion a major
crackdown by the regime in 1983 and 1984 resulted in
the arrest of several key dissident leaders and the
curtailment of samizdat publishing.
In Lithuania, nationalism has been as widespread as
in Estonia and, at times, more violent. In October
1977, for example, armed force was required to
disperse two nationalist demonstrations by Lithuanian
Kaunas, Vilnius, and several other towns.
Even more so than in Estonia, samizdat has been an
important force in Lithuanian nationalist dissent. The
most important journal (other than the Chronicle of
the Lithuanian Catholic Church, discussed below) has
been Ausra (The Dawn), established in 1975 to defend
and preserve Lithuanian culture. Other relatively
long-lived journals, such as Perspektyvos (Perspec-
tives) and Alma Mater, like Ausra, have as their
central theme the pursuit of an independent Lithua-
nia.
25X1
25X1
Latvia is the most Russified of the Baltic republics
and the most tolerant of things Russian and Soviet.
As a result, the vital grassroots sentiment that feeds 25X1
national dissent in the other Baltics is lacking, and the
Soviet authorities have been able to move against
dissent with little need to worry about antagonizing
the population.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/15: CIA-RDP86T00591 R000300330003-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/15: CIA-RDP86T00591 R000300330003-3
Secret
Despite this lack of popular support, some Latvian
nationalists have continued to struggle for indepen-
dence. In June 1981, Juris Bumeisters and Dalnis
Lismanis were tried on a charge of treason for their
participation in the Social Democratic Party of Lat-
via, This underground
party had contacts with supporters in Sweden and
demanded Latvian independence from the USSR.
Bumeisters was sentenced to 15 years in a labor camp
plus 10 years of internal exile, and Lismanis was
sentenced to 10 years in a labor camp. More recently,
concurrent with the 1983-84 crackdown on Estonian
dissent, the authorities carried out a similar campaign
in Latvia that, resulted
in several convictions o members o t e un erground
"Movement for the Independence of Latvia."
An important development in Baltic national dissent
has been the trend toward cooperative efforts by
activists of all three nationalities. Because the modern
histories of the three republics are similar, dissidents
have seized upon the idea of combining forces to
present a unified front to their common adversary.
Early advocates of this approach were Lithuanian
Viktoras Petkus, Estonian Mart Niklus, and Latvian
Ints Calitis. Private discussions among such like-
minded individuals led in 1977 to the founding of the
Supreme Committee of the National Movement of
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.
the committee was formed to
coordinate the activities of Baltic nationalists who
intended to work within the system to obtain the
rights provided by the Soviet constitution to minority
nationalities. The authorities, however, were quick to
realize the inherent possibilities in such an alliance
and moved immediately to crush the group. The three
principles-Niklus, Calitis, and Petkus-are now
serving long labor camp sentences. Similar coopera-
tive activities-an earlier group and numerous samiz-
dat efforts-have likewise met with quick reprisals.
In the Ukraine. The Ukrainian nationalist movement
has long been comprised of two distinct groups. In the
western Ukraine, which did not fall under Soviet
control until 1939, the main objective of the largely
clandestine dissent is Ukrainian independence. The
illegal but still functional Uniate Church, the reposi-
tory of much Ukrainian nationalist feeling, has its
strongest following in this area. In the eastern part of
the republic, which is more Russified, nationalist
dissent is oriented toward cultural preservation and
has attracted the support of well-known figures from
the local intelligentsia. These dissidents stress the
importance of defending the Ukrainian language,
history, and culture from Russian encroachment.
Although much of this activity is also clandestine, the
public prominence of some participants and their
greater access to the media have given them more
publicity both at home and abroad than the West
Ukrainian dissidents.
The formation of the Ukrainian Helsinki group was
an important step in the recovery of the Ukrainian
nationalist movement, which had suffered from inten-
sified repression after Ukrainian First Secretary Petr
Shelest-a Politburo member-was ousted for nation-
alist offenses in 1972. The rapid destruction of the
group, however, further aggravated the bleak situa-
tion of Ukrainian national dissent by removing yet
another layer of activists.
Ukrainian nationalist dissent has since been confined
to scattered activity by individuals and an occasional
short-lived group. In August 1981, for example, Niko-
lay Krainik was sentenced to seven years in labor
camp and three years of internal exile for founding
the "Ukrainian National Front," a group that alleg-
edly had 40 members, had published several samizdat
documents, and had advocated Ukrainian indepen-
dence.
Ukrainian nationalist samizdat production has been
erratic, following the ups and downs of the movement
as a whole. The Ukrainskiy Vestnik (Ukrainian Her-
ald), a journal similar to the Chronicle of Current
Events, catalogued the progress of Russification and
chauvinistic behavior by state officials toward Ukrai-
nians until three members of its staff were sentenced
to labor camp in December 1980. Thereafter, the
journal apparently ceased publication. At present,
there is little Ukrainian nationalist samizdat.
In Georgia and Armenia. National feeling in the
Caucasus, particularly in Georgia and Armenia, runs
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/15: CIA-RDP86T00591 R000300330003-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/15: CIA-RDP86T00591 R000300330003-3
Secret
high but has only rarely led to mainstream dissident
activity. Several factors have accounted for this:
? Local authorities generally give their compatriots
greater freedom of action than other national mi-
norities are allowed and are more tolerant of "free
enterprise" and corruption than in other republics.
? Georgians have taken to the streets in spontaneous
mass demonstrations to wrest concessions from the
republic leadership. Since 1978, there have been at
least eight large-scale nationalist demonstrations in
Georgia that the regime has responded to with
conciliatory measures that hindered the spread of
organized dissent.
? Armenians are traditionally more pro-Soviet than
other national minorities because of their historic
fear of Turkish aggression.
? Disillusioned Armenians, like the Jews, have had
the option of emigrating from the Soviet Union,
although that avenue has been severely constricted
since 1980.
As a result of these constraining factors, the few
dissident groups that have been formed have been
small, ineffective, and nonthreatening to the regime.
In Azerbaijan and Central Asia. To judge from Soviet
statistics on education, family size, and intermarriage
among national groups, the native people of Azerbai-
jan and Central Asia remain culturally and socially
resistant to assimilation with the European population
of the USSR. For reasons ranging from the ethnic
diversity of the local populace to their frequent lack of
historical experience as independent nation states,
nationalism in Central Asia and Azerbaijan has not
been a problem for the Soviet authorities. Soviet
media indicate, however, that, despite regime efforts,
Islam continues to have a strong influence on the way
of life in these areas, and, in the aftermath of the
revolution in Iran and the Soviet intervention in
Afghanistan, the Soviet leadership apparently views
the persistence of an Islamic consciousness as a source
of potential problems. Numerous public statements by
Soviet leaders demonstrate anxiety on this score. In
December 1980, for example, in an address to repub-
lic KGB officers, then Azerbaijan First Secretary
Geydar Aliyev emphasized the need for tighter securi-
ty measures on the Soviet-Iranian border, presumably
to prevent Iranian Islamic fundamentalists from pro-
pagandizing in the USSR. Aliyev's speech followed a
tough statement by the republic KGB head warning
that US intelligence services would attempt to use the
situations in Iran and Afghanistan to influence Soviet
Muslims.
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, particularly in its
early stages, appears to have aroused some resentment
among Central Asians. According to Embassy report-
ing, riots took place at a Tashkent induction center,
and spontaneous demonstrations against the interven-
tion also occurred at the military commissariats in
Issyk and Chilik, Kazakhstan. There also have been
scattered reports that Soviet Central Asian reservists
refused to fire on their Muslim brothers in Afghani-
stan and, on occasion, deserted to the other side.
Despite the potentially disruptive influence of Islamic
fundamentalism and the Afghan invasion, no wide-
spread political or nationalist dissent among Central
Asians is evident today. In contrast to the situation in
the European USSR, there have been far fewer
reports of dissident activity in Central Asia and
Azerbaijan. Nonetheless, in 1980 a Soviet dissident
told US Embassy officers he was in contact with
"nationally motivated groups" in Kazakhstan, and a
samizdat publication, Sharqiy Turkistan Arazi (The
Voice of Eastern Turkistan), reportedly was circulat-
ing in Central Asia as of 1981.
In light of the inferior political and economic status of
the Asiatic populace relative to the Slavic majority,
Central Asia and Azerbaijan are potential trouble
spots for the Soviet regime. A small native intelligen-
tsia elite has emerged in each republic. These elites
are seeking a greater participatory role in both repub-
lic and national-level policymaking, which their Sovi-
et overlords may not be willing to relinquish. Issues
such as demographic distribution, resource allocation,
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/15: CIA-RDP86T00591 R000300330003-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/15: CIA-RDP86T00591 R000300330003-3
Secret
Reliable statistics on religious participation in the
Soviet Union are difficult to come by. Official Soviet
estimates of the number of Russian Orthodox believ-
ers fall in the range of 30-50 million. Some Western
observers believe, however, that the figure is much
higher. The Catholic Church claims more than 2
million adherents in Lithuania, or two-thirds of the
republic's population. There are also several million
Catholics of the illegal Eastern Orthodox (Uniate)
rite in the Ukraine. Of the Protestant sects, Baptists
are the most numerous with at least 535,000 official-
ly registered members. Exiled Baptist minister Geor-
giy Vins, however, maintains that almost half of all
Baptist congregations are unregistered.
there are about 33,000 officially
registered Pentecostals, but Western estimates place
the number in the range of 200,000 to 500,000. There
are 45-50 million cultural Muslims in the Soviet
Union, most of whom reside in Central Asia and
Azerbaijan. There are about 2 million Soviet Jews.
and the "yellowing" of the Soviet military could cause
friction between Moscow and the Central Asians. At
this time, however, Moscow remains firmly in control.
Religious Dissent
Despite the best efforts of successive Soviet regimes,
organized religion has not ceased to exist in the
USSR. Over the years, antireligion campaigns and
purges have taken a heavy toll with massive arrests of
clergy, destruction of thousands of religious buildings,
confiscation of property, and the enactment of laws
restricting religious activity. Religion has survived,
however, and in the Brezhnev era, when the regime
slowed the pace of the antireligion campaign, religious
activity and membership seem to have stabilized.
The Russian Orthodox Church. The Russian Ortho-
dox Church (ROC) occupies a unique position in both
Soviet domestic and foreign policy. At home it has the
largest number of adherents of any religious group
and is part of the dominant Russian culture. As under
the czars, however, the church organization is closely
controlled by the state and is used to serve regime
interests. This subservience limits its influence. In the
foreign policy sphere, ROC spokesmen are important
hucksters for Soviet propaganda initiatives such as the
peace program. In return, the regime occasionally
makes concessions to the church, such as the June
1983 return of the ancient Danilovskiy monastery.
Such accommodation, however, reduces ROC credi-
bility and prestige, and some evidence indicates that
believers and recent converts sometimes switch to
another denomination because they are offended by
ROC "collaboration" with the state.
Most ROC dissent stems from protests against the
church's willing acquiescence to regime control. Reli-
gious critics of the ROC in the 1970s built on the
legacy of earlier Orthodox dissenters such as the
prolific samizdat essayist Anatoliy Levitin-Krasnov.
The most prominent critics were Fathers Gleb
Yakunin and Dmitriy Dudko. Yakunin authored a
series of reports detailing specific shortcomings of the
ROC. One of these papers was an appeal to a World
Council of Churches (WCC) assembly that provoked
the first discussion of Soviet religious persecution by
that organization. Dudko preached sermons openly
condemning the spiritual emptiness of Soviet life and
accusing the ROC hierarchy of passivity in the face of
increasing government repression. According to dissi-
dents, as word of Dudko's frank commentary spread,
hundreds of believers and intellectuals flocked to his
small church just outside Moscow. Dudko and his
supporters wanted to free the ROC from state domi-
nation and bring about a religious revival in the Soviet
Union.
Predictably, the authorities moved to repress the two
priests and their followers. Yakunin was arrested and
in August 1980 sentenced to five years in labor camp
and five years of internal exile. In a televised appear-
ance in June 1980, Dudko recanted his views and
confessed to anti-Soviet activity. Dudko's recantation
was a severe blow to ROC nonconformists and to the
dissident community in general. At a time when the
morale of dissidents reportedly was already very low,
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/15: CIA-RDP86T00591 R000300330003-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/15: CIA-RDP86T00591 R000300330003-3
Secret
the public humiliation of a respected activist seemed
to point up the futility of any type of dissident
activity.
At present, Orthodox dissent is all but inactive. The
Christian Committee for the Defense of Believers'
Rights sent a message to the WCC's 1983 conference
stating that it was not defunct but merely waiting for
more'favorable conditions to continue its activity.
Last fall, an Orthodox priest, Aleksandr Pivovarov,
was sentenced to three and a half years in labor camp,
becoming the latest casualty in the dismantling of a
dissident ring that had disseminated Bibles and other
religious literature.
Catholic Dissent. The election of a Polish cardinal to
the papacy in 1979 was an inspirational event for
Catholics in the Soviet Union as well as for those in
Poland. Although activist Catholics in the USSR have
sometimes taken exception to John Paul's decisions,'
according to US Embassy sources, Pope John Paul II
is viewed by Soviet Catholics as a strong ally. This
perception was almost certainly reinforced by the
Pope's ability to negotiate successfully with the Krem-
lin on church affairs. For example, in 1982 Bishop
Vincentas Sladkevichus, who had been in exile since
1958, was appointed Apostolic Administrator of the
diocese of Kaisiadorys in the Lithuanian SSR.
The Lithuanian Catholic Church (LCC) is the stron-
gest and most vigorous religious body in the Soviet
Union, enjoys the support of all segments of the
population, and has a dissident history that predates
the Helsinki Accords. Although most Catholic dissent
in Lithuania is nonviolent, on occasion spontaneous
violent incidents do occur. In 1972, a series of
religious-nationalist demonstrations occurred after
the self-immolation of a student in Kaunas.
the incident
sparked two days of rioting in Kaunas and several
months of youth unrest, including 10 other immola-
tions, throughout the republic. The same year also
witnessed the appearance of the first issue of the
The '1983 appointment of an aged and ailing Latvian priest as the
only Cardinal representing Catholics in the Soviet Union was
viewed by the Lithuanian samizdat journal, Chronicle of the
Lithuanian Catholic Church, as a favorable gesture toward "the
passive and capitulationist stance of the Catholic Church of Latvia"
and an attempt to ignore "the sacrifices, stubborn struggle, and
resolute stance" of Lithuanian Catholics.
Chronicle of the Lithuanian Catholic Church, a
journal that has sought to promote greater unity
among priests and laymen and strengthen their will-
ingness to stand up to the authorities.
In the Helsinki era, another important force in Lithu-
anian Catholic dissent has been the Catholic Commit-
tee for the Defense of Believers' Rights, founded in
November 1978. The Catholic Committee, headed by
Father Alfonsas Svarinskas, has used samizdat to
criticize Soviet discriminatory laws and practices. Its
first major statement, signed by Bishop Sladkevichus
and over 500 Lithuanian priests, was a condemnation
of the official "Regulations on Religious Associa-
tion," which, among other things, require a committee
of nonmembers to oversee the activities of every
congregation. Until January 1983, the group was
untouched by arrests, probably because most of its
members were priests. In that year, however, Svarins-
kas was arrested-the first time since 1971 that a
Lithuanian priest had encountered such treatment.
After Svarinskas's confinement in a labor camp,
25X1
25X1
another member priest was sentenced to labor camp 25X1
and several other members were persuaded to resign
from the committee. The current status of the Com-
mittee is unknown.
In the Ukraine, the Uniate Church, outlawed in 1946,
still claims several million adherents who are also
zealously nationalistic. The majority of practicing
Uniates, preferring the safety of a nonconfrontational
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/15: CIA-RDP86T00591 R000300330003-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/15: CIA-RDP86T00591 R000300330003-3
stand, have accepted forcible integration into the
Russian Orthodox Church. A smaller group of Uni-
ates, however, has a semisecret independent church
organization with about 350 priests,
This group of Uniates has long
petitioned the Soviet authorities to legalize their
church. Although failing to secure legalization, the
Uniates still attempt to worship according to their
conscience, usually in secret services that leave them
vulnerable to prosecution. The Lithuanian Chronicle
reports that, in October 1981, two Lvov priests were
found guilty of conducting illegal church services and
sentenced to five years in labor camp, three years of
internal exile, and confiscation of property.
Baptists and Pentecostals. To judge from reports that
have been smuggled abroad, the unofficial (unregis-
tered) Protestant sects-especially the Baptists and
Pentecostals-have attracted large numbers of rural,
factory, and white-collar workers throughout the
country in the past 10 years. In their efforts to avoid
state regulation and protest their treatment at the
hands of the Soviet authorities, unregistered Baptists
and Pentecostals have formed action groups and
established several important samizdat publications
and printing shops.
Baptists have produced the lion's share of all religious
samizdat. The Church Council of Evangelical Chris-
tians and Baptists (CCECB) and its offshoot, the
Council of Prisoners' Relatives (CPR), have continu-
ously published three journals for almost 20 years.
Bratski Listok (Fraternal Leaflet) is the "official"
journal of the CCECB and sets forth its policy toward
the official Baptist Church and the state. In addition,
unregistered Baptists produce Yestnik Istiny (Herald
of Truth), which exposes official persecution against
believers and publishes some inspirational-theological
pieces. The CPR produces a bulletin that includes
regularly updated lists of religious prisoners. These
journals are published by the Khristianin publishing
house (see inset).
Aside from petitions and letters to international hu-
man rights and church groups, there has been little
Pentecostal samizdat. Pentecostals have instead con-
centrated on securing emigration permission from the
regime. Though basically unsuccessful-fewer than a
dozen Pentecostal families have been given exit per-
mission-the Pentecostal emigration movement has
been publicized in dramatic ways. In mid-1983, two
Pentecostal families were allowed to emigrate after
seven members lived in the US Embassy for five
years.
The regime's response to such activities has been an
increased attempt to control unregistered Protestant
congregations through a renewed emphasis on regis-
tration with the official watchdog agency, the Council
for Religious Affairs (CRA). In a Soviet press article
last year, for example, former CRA Chairman Vladi-
mir Kuroyedov outlined the benefits of registration
while criticizing local officials for "restricting the
rights of believers." Less benignly, the authorities
have lately been singling out for repression the leaders
of unregistered congregations who are otherwise ex-
emplary citizens. Last August, Yevgeniy Goula, dea-
con of a small Pentecostal congregation near Moscow
and a popular leader who counseled moderation in
dealings with the government, advising against emi-
gration, and described by acquaintances as a "model
citizen," was arrested for conducting unauthorized
religious services. Goula, the sole support of a family
of 10, received a suspended sentence. If believers do
not register with the state, however, the authorities
probably will become tougher.
The removal of CRA Chairman Kuroyedov last No-
vember may foreshadow a further intensification of
the regime's antireligion efforts.
removal resulted from his inability to curb youth
interest in religion. His replacement, Konstantin
Kharchev, who has experience in youth affairs, is said
to be a man with especially strong antireligious views.
Since entering office, Kharchev reportedly has as-
sumed personal responsibility for the ROC and has
taken an extensive tour of ROC dioceses in prepara-
tion for personnel changes at the diocesan level. He
has also made a similar tour of registered Baptist
Churches.
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/15: CIA-RDP86T00591 R000300330003-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/15: CIA-RDP86T00591 R000300330003-3
Secret
The Baptist publishing house, Khristianin, was estab
lished in the mid-1960s by Georgiy Vins and CCECB;
Chairman Gennadiy Kryuchkov. In June 1972, the
CCECB sent an open letter to former Premier Kosy-'
gin informing him of the existence of Khristianin,
explaining that for several years they had requested
Bibles and other literature and that when their
requests were denied they decided to produce the
publications themselves. Khristianin printing shops,
as widespread as Baptists themselves, are built and
operated by networks of believers, usually in their
own homes. Vins estimates that Khristianin has
produced about 500,000 religious books, including
samizdat journals, Bibles, hymnals, and theological
works some
regist Khris-
tianin effort.
The printing shops have been the object of numerous
raids by the`security organs. In February 1982, for
example, in Tokmak, Kirgizia, six operators were
arrested and',600 newly printed Bibles were confiscat-
ed. In what may have been a coordinated action,
massive searches were also carried out in Tashkent
and Vostochno-Kazakhstan oblast. Although KGB
pressure on Khristianin has been intense, Baptists
have proven extremely determined and resilient in
their efforts to continue their publishing work. F_
Islam. It is clear from the official Soviet press that in
many areas of Central Asia and Azerbaijan there has
been a revival of interest in the religious aspects of
Islam in the past few years. Underground seminaries
are educating unofficial mullahs who teach Islam to
children in unofficial mosques. Soviet authorities have
repeatedly criticized these practices in the media,
calling them the "antisocial activity of religious extre-
mists," and have intensified the teaching of atheism in
schools. This relatively mild reaction suggests that
although the revival is widespread it is not a mass
phenomenon.
Figure 4. Homemade Khristianin printing press
built and operated by unregistered Baptist
In addition, the Soviet press suggests that there has
been a minor resurgence of membership in secret Sufi
brotherhoods, particularly in the North Caucasus.
Such clandestine brotherhoods, which combine reli-
gious fanaticism and nationalism, led the great Mus-
there is widespread but diffuse anti-Soviet sentiment
among Muslims that occasionally erupts in violent but
easily containable incidents. To date, however, well-
organized dissident activity by Muslims has not sur-
faced.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/15: CIA-RDP86T00591 R000300330003-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/15: CIA-RDP86T00591 R000300330003-3
Secret
Appendix B
Jewish Emigration and Dissent
The Jewish emigration movement was perhaps the
most active and well-organized branch of Soviet
dissent in the few years before the signing of the
Helsinki Accords. As a result, the new Helsinki-
inspired human rights groups made a conscious effort
to draw upon the expertise and enthusiasm of the
Jewish movement. Anatoliy Shcharanskiy, as previ-
ously noted, served as liaison between the two groups,
and a number of Jewish refuseniks were Helsinki
monitors. Predictably, these activists were among the
earliest targets of the KGB's crackdown-Shcharans-
kiy, for example, was arrested in 1977.
Emigration. While arresting prominent Jewish dissi-
dents and cracking down on other forms of dissent in
1977 and 1978, the regime allowed the rate of Jewish
emigration to rise dramatically. By 1979, the rate had
reached an alltime high of 50,460 visas issued. The
reasons for the increase during a period of repression
are unclear. The Soviets may have been attempting to
sway the US SALT II ratification process. Moscow
was also pushing for increased trade with the United
States, and easing emigration may have been intended
to forestall problems with US policymakers who had
earlier linked trade and emigration through the
Jackson-Vanik amendment. Or, more simply, the
regime may have been clearing out the backlog of
applications before cutting emigration.
In any event, in 1980 the Soviets reduced the emigra-
tion flow. Only 20,340 visas were issued in 1980, and
since then emigration has practically stopped. The
1984 total was only 896, the lowest since 1970.
Legitimate family reunification has essentially be-
come the only reason accepted for exit permission,
and most of those approvals are for Jews with rela-
tives in Israel rather than the United States.
There is considerable evidence to suggest that Mos-
cow made a decision in late 1979 or 1980 to dispense
with emigration, including that of Armenians and
ethnic Germans, as well as that of Jews. The 1980
high of 6,109 Armenians receiving exit permission
was reduced to 88 by 1984. German emigration fell
from 6,947 visas issued in 1979 to only 910 in 1984
Figure 5
USSR: Emigration, 1973-84
Statements by Soviet emigration officials and political
figures indicate that these cutbacks reflected formal
policy decisions. In 1982, Soviet emigration officials
began telling applicants that "Jewish emigration from
the Soviet Union has come to an end." In 1983,
apparently to publicize this decision, the authorities
established the Anti-Zionist Committee of the Soviet
Public. Soviet officials also began implying to foreign
governments that emigration had ended, even as a
"gesture." In April 1983, Soviet CSCE delegate
Sergey Kondrashev said that an increase in Jewish
emigration was unlikely because past Soviet experi-
ence with such gestures had been unsatisfactory. In
his January 1983 visit to Bonn, Foreign Minister
(see chart).
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/15: CIA-RDP86T00591 R000300330003-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/15: CIA-RDP86T00591 R000300330003-3
Gromyko reportedly told German officials that, be-
cause so many ethnic Germans had already emigrat-
ed, the downward trend in emigration was "natural."
He repeated this line to Chancellor Kohl, who visited
Moscow last February.
The across-the-board cut has been achieved by a
series of bureaucratic measures designed to compli-
cate the already cumbersome emigration process.
Although family reunification remains a valid reason
for seeking to emigrate, the concept of "family" has
been gradually narrowed to include only spouses,
children, and "perhaps" parents. The authorities have
refused to honor invitations to emigrate from relatives
abroad from former Soviet Jews living in the United
States. Their justification has been that such Jews
had achieved emigration under false pretenses and
"forfeited" the right to invite relatives to join them.
The existence of a large number of refuseniks-
possibly as many as several thousand-as well as
thousands of Germans still awaiting exit permission
refutes the claim that all who wish to emigrate have
done so. Potential emigrants nonetheless probably
have been discouraged from risking their economic
security, peace of mind, and possibly their freedom for
a highly problematical chance at emigration. An
informal Embassy Moscow poll of Armenians and
Jews bound for the United States in late 1983 re-
vealed that only 8 percent had relatives who were also
seeking exit permission, compared with 20 percent in
a similar 1982 poll. Thus, the proclamation that
emigration has ended may become a self-fulfilling
prophecy.
Refuseniks. In addition to moving against Jewish
emigration, the Soviet regime has intensified its re-
pression of Jewish refuseniks within the USSR. To
judge from the accounts of Soviet Jews, however, this
repression often had unintended consequences. Jews
who actively maintain ties with foreign supporters and
those who attempt to foster a sense of Jewish cultural
pride and group identity are harshly repressed. These
activities nurture a sense of Jewish uniqueness and
pride and keep emigration hopes alive, thus preclud-
ing assimilation.
In 1982, authorities began to warn refuseniks who
had been able to maintain ties to Western supporters
to cease all contact with foreigners. According to
reliable US Embassy contacts, refuseniks who ignored
the warning have been visited by the KGB, had their
homes searched and belongings confiscated, and
sometimes have been taken away to spend a day or
two in jail. This routine may be repeated several times
until the authorities are satisfied that the refusenik is
sufficiently intimidated. Occasionally, the authorities
try the opposite tactic and promise some refuseniks
emigration permission if they voluntarily "keep
quiet." Aleksandr Lerner, a leading figure of the
Leningrad refusenik community, for example, with-
drew from action for over a year after the KGB made
such a promise to him. The KGB, however, reneged
on its promise.
The regime's attitude toward refuseniks who attempt
to perpetuate feelings of ethnic consciousness and
group identity has gradually hardened over the past
three or four years. An early victim was Viktor
Brailovskiy, who had hosted the Sunday Scientific
Seminar, a forum-sometimes attended by foreign
scientists-that enabled refusenik scientists who had
been dismissed from their jobs to keep current with
scientific advances. In November 1980, Brailovskiy
was arrested and in June 1981 he was sentenced to
five years of internal exile. More recently, losif Begun
was given the maximum sentence of seven years in
labor camp and five years of internal exile for giving
Hebrew lessons and lectures on Jewish history and
culture. Begun's severe sentence reflects the tougher
stand that has evolved toward refuseniks.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/15: CIA-RDP86T00591 R000300330003-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/15: CIA-RDP86T00591 R000300330003-3
Secret
Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/15: CIA-RDP86T00591 R000300330003-3