SOVIET NAVAL EXERCISES WITH THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00591R000300320003-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 2, 2010
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: July 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Soviet Naval
Exercises With Third
World Countries
Secret
' July 1985
I
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Soviet Naval
Exercises With Third
World Countries
This paper was prepared by
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]the Office of Soviet Analysis. Comments and
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queries are welcome and may be directed to the
Chief, Third World Activities Division, SOVAO
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Secret
July 1985
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Secret
Soviet Naval
Exercises With Third
World Countries ~
Key Judgments Combined naval exercises with Third World countries are becoming an
/,~/'ormation available increasingly important feature of the Soviet military assistance program.
as of 1 June 1985 The Soviet Navy first held small-scale exercises with Third World
was used in this report.
countries in the late 1960s, using amphibious assault exercises in the
Mediterranean to train the Egyptian and Syrian Navies. In 1971 the
Soviets began exercising periodically with the Cuban Navy. In the 1980s
the number, complexity, and scope of combined exercises have increased as
has the number of countries operating with the Soviets. Since 1980 the
USSR has conducted some 14 exercises with Syria, Libya, the People's
Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen), Ethiopia, Cuba, and
Vietnam-countries whose navies are mostly Soviet supplied. It has sought
exercises with other countries-including India, Algeria, and Madagas-
car-that also rely on Soviet naval exports, but so far has had no success.
Most Soviet combined exercises have been designed to provide a political
show of support for Moscow's Third World clients by warning of a possible
Soviet military confrontation, particularly with the West, and to counter
the extensive US program of combined exercises:
? The Soviets conducted a fairly large-scale antisubmarine warfare and
coastal defense exercise with Syria in mid-1981. Although planned
earlier, the exercise probably was expanded to show Moscow's firm
commitment to Damascus during the period of heightened tensions after
Syria placed air defense missiles for the first time in Lebanon.
? The large Soviet-Vietnamese amphibious assault exercise that occurred
last year during Sino-Vietnamese border clashes signaled a Soviet
willingness to use military operations to demonstrate support for Vietnam
against the Chinese.
? Several exercises over the past five years with South Yemen and Ethiopia
probably have been aimed at showing support for their pro-Soviet
regimes and at counterbalancing US exercises in the Indian Ocean area.
Moreover, Moscow has benefited from its naval operations with key Third
World clients by preparing its forces for possible intervention in regional
conflicts. The Soviets probably also see such exercises as a means to gain
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SOV 85-10125CX
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more access to Third World naval facilities, and may even hope to enlarge
their close allies' potential to supplement Soviet naval capabilities in a
general war with the West. So far, however, Third World forces have not
played a role in any exercise directed from the Soviet Union, indicating
that they do not currently figure in Moscow's calculus of its wartime
assets. Moreover, these countries presumably would prefer to remain
outside superpower confrontations.
Moscow's Third World clients have gained important military experience
and political support from the combined exercises, and they probably
welcome-indeed, even request-such operations as a public reminder of
Soviet backing:
? Libya probably requested Soviet participation in their first combined
naval exercise in 1982, probably held to demonstrate Libya's capabilities
in the wake of the 1981 shootdown of Libyan fighters by US naval
aircraft in the Gulf of Sidra.
? The Soviet Navy has operated most extensively with the Cubans, helping
to make them the most capable navy among Third World states in the re-
gion. The exercises also reaffirm the Soviet right to operate in Caribbean
waters.
The Soviets have stressed antisubmarine and antiship warfare and coastal
defense tactics during combined exercises, primarily to improve their allies'
capabilities to counter the threats posed by hostile regional navies.
During the remainder of the decade we expect a modest increase in Soviet
use of combined naval exercises, particularly in the Mediterranean,
Caribbean, and South China Seas, to secure influence in the Third World.
Moscow will be most successful in expanding exercises with traditional
allies that face a major regional opponent-particularly Cuba, Syria, and
Vietnam. More important, as the scope, scale, and frequency of combined
exercises expand, these operations may begin to figure more prominently in
the USSR's calculus of its wartime capabilities and, at a minimum, to
complicate US naval planning. We see little prospect, however, that the
Soviets will be able to broaden their program to include such clients as In-
dia, Algeria, or Madagascar. These countries profess nonaligned policies
and probably want to avoid the kind of closer military relationship that
would result from combined exercises.
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Considering the relative success of their program of combined naval
exercises, we believe that the Soviets may well extend this practice into
joint air or ground forces operations in the Third World. The deployment
of Soviet ground or air forces to a client's soil probably would be perceived
as an even firmer signal of Soviet support. The Soviets. have not conducted
such exercises thus far in the Third World, probably to refrain from
demonstrating so strong a commitment of forces to an ally and to avoid
provoking a negative reaction from other regional states. Nevertheless, over
the next several years the USSR may practice moving small representative
units of ground and air forces into a distant area to exercise with client
forces in response to a hypothetical regional crisis. Initially, limitations on
Soviet power-projection capabilities probably would restrict such exercises
to allies close to the Soviet periphery, like Syria. But over the longer term,
as these capabilities improve, the Soviets may be willing to exercise with
more distant allies.
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Prospects for Combined Ground or Air Exercises 18
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Chronology of Soviet Combined Naval
Exercises in the Third World, 1980-85
USSR-Ethiopia- May 1984
South Yemen
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Soviet Naval
Exercises With Third
World Countries
The USSR has taken advantage of opportunities in
several regions to use combined naval exercises to
further its political and military goals in the Third
World (see table). The success of these exercises
differs widely among the regions as do the constraints
on Soviet abilities to capitalize on joint military
cooperation. Moscow's military and economic support
for Vietnam, for example, has resulted in a substan-
tial Soviet naval buildup in the South China Sea, and
the Soviets used an amphibious exercise held with the
Vietnamese last spring to demonstrate that Soviet
interests and capabilities must be taken into consider-
ation by regional countries and the United States.
Increasingly complex naval exercises held between the
USSR and Cuba contribute to the development of
Cuban military capabilities, which far outdistance
those of other Third World states in the region, while
asserting Moscow's right to operate in the Caribbean
and Gulf of Mexico.
Soviet naval cooperation with certain allies in the
Middle East, South Asia, and on the Arabian Penin-
sula, however, appears to be more constrained by
those countries' nationalistic or nonaligned attitudes
and their political objectives. Combined naval exer-
cises in these regions often aim primarily at improving
the ally's naval capabilities or occur only when both
the USSR and its ally perceive a need to demonstrate
Soviet commitment.
Middle East
The Middle East has received Moscow's greatest
attention in the Third World in terms of combined
naval exercises, primarily because it is so near the
USSR and so critical to Western economic and
strategic interests. Soviet naval ships began operating
continuously in the Mediterranean in 1964, and, after
the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, the force was designated a
squadron by the Soviets. The squadron is normally
composed of about 45 ships, including seven attack
submarines, eight surface combatants, and about 30
auxiliaries and other ships. In peacetime it monitors
Western naval forces, patrols choke points, provides
support to clients, and is positioned for possible
combat operations. During regional conflicts, particu-
larly Arab-Israeli wars, the squadron has nearly
always been reinforced but has not played a combat
role.
Soviet naval ships operating in the Mediterranean rely
for logistic support mostly on their own auxiliaries
stationed at anchorages or at ports in Syria and
Libya. The USSR also uses some Yugoslav and
Tunisian naval facilities to refurbish Mediterranean-
deployed submarines and submarine tenders, but this
access is strictly controlled.
During the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Soviet
Navy conducted several amphibious landing exercises
with the Egyptian Navy, its first combined exercises
in the Third World. The Egyptians terminated Soviet
use of all their air and most of their naval facilities in
1972, however, and in 1976 all Soviet military person- 25X1
nel were expelled from Egypt. Since then, the Soviet
Mediterranean Squadron has operated only with Syri-
an and Libyan forces 0 Soviet naval units
conducted small-scale landing exercises in the late
1960s and antisubmarine warfare (ASW) training
throughout the 1970s with the Syrian Navy, and the
two countries held a larger, more complex exercise in
1981, possibly in response to events in Lebanon. Libya 25X1
has participated in two exercises with the Soviets
during the 1980s;
Syria relies exclusively on the USSR for naval train-
ing, for almost the entire Syrian Navy has been
provided by the Soviets. Libya, however, purchases
naval ships and weapons from several countries and
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The USSR has supplied Algeria with most of its naval spare parts and perhaps weapons will ensure a contin-
units, but so far Moscow has not been able to
persuade the Algerians to hold combined naval exer-
Over the past several years, Algeria has refused
to allow regular repair or replenishment of Soviet
ships in Algerian ports. Even if Algeria maintains this
policy with regard to Soviet access to military facili-
ties and naval cooperation, a steady need for Soviet
ued military relationship between the two countries.
Syria. The USSR's first large-scale combined naval
exercise with Syria was in July 1981. The exercise
was a significant political event in that it occurred
amid the substantial augmentation of both US and
Soviet naval forces in the Mediterranean in response
to escalating tensions between Israel and Syria over
the placement of Syrian air defense missiles in Leba-
non. Although the exercise evidently had been
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planned several months before, the Soviets subse-
quently claimed that it was a direct response to Israeli
belligerence. It is more likely that the scope of the
exercise was expanded because of the instability in
Lebanon and to firmly signal a Soviet commitment to
Syria probably also hoped that, in addition to improv-
ing its navy, joint operations would magnify the
perception of its war-fighting capabilities by regional
states. Both countries took advantage of the opportu-
nity for local publicity with brief port calls by Soviet
landing ships, shore leave for the Soviet crews, and a
parade of Syrian naval and air forces after the
exercises.
Syria.
While the political implications of the exercise out-
weighed the military significance, some aspects of the
joint training were noteworthy. It was the first Soviet
amphibious operation in the Mediterranean since the
bulk of the Soviet personnel left Egypt in 1972.1
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Syria probably saw the
exercise as a means of reinforcing its claim to a
central role among the Arab states and affirming
Soviet political and military support of Damascus.
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 The continued tensions between Israel and Syria over
Lebanon increase the prospects, in our view, that
President Assad will permit more joint exercises to
demonstrate Soviet support for Syrian goals in the
area. Moscow ultimately may be successful, by using
promises of continued high levels of arms assistance,
at obtaining increased military access and coopera-
tion. So far, however, Damascus has been careful not
to allow the Soviet Navy unrestricted use of its ports
and airfields.
Libya. After a hiatus of over a decade, the Soviet
Mediterranean Squadron in 1981 resumed port calls
to Libya and apparently was granted permission to
perform maintenance of Soviet submarines using a
Soviet repair ship at the isolated port of Tobruk.
The Libyans have not operated with the Soviet Navy
since 1983, but they have held increasingly compre-
hensive naval, air, and ground exercises on their own.
In July 1983 the Libyan Navy, probably with some
assistance by Soviet ships, held its largest naval
exercise ever. As in the first combined exercise, these
operations apparently were dedicated to training the
Libyans in the defense of their waters and coasts
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Arabian Peninsula, I-Iorn of Africa,
and Indian ?cean Regions
The main Soviet goals in the Indian Ocean, especially
the region around the Arabian Peninsula, are to
counter or limit the US military presence and to
promote regimes responsive to Soviet interests. Since
1968 the size and composition of Soviet naval forces
in the Indian Ocean have fluctuated widely, driven by
the level of US naval forces deployed to the region as
well as by Soviet interests there.
support the airlift and sealift of Soviet military sup-
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Since the Soviets were ousted from Somalia in 1977,
the USSR has concentrated on gaining access for its
naval forces to facilities in South Yemen and Ethio-
pia. Ethiopia's Dehalak' Deset (Dahlak Island) in the
Red Sea has become the primary maintenance and
repair facility for the ships of the Indian Ocean
Squadron, although the Soviets have invested little in
fixed facilities there, preferring to rely on their auxil-
iaries. In South Yemen, the squadron uses the port of
Aden, where ships generally anchor in the harbor, or
uses anchorages near South Yemen's Socotra Island.
regimes.
regional crisis or specific military threat to South
Yemen or Ethiopia, and they probably were intended
primarily to show broader support for their pro-Soviet
South Yemen. The first combined exercise involving
the Soviet Navy in the Indian Ocean region was held
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The USSR and South Yemen again held a combined
naval exercise in April 1983. These operations proba-
bly involved a greater role for the South Yemeni
Navy and apparently included an amphibious landing
and joint ASW maneuvers.
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The USSR has supplied both South Yemen and
Ethiopia with virtually all of their naval equipment
since the mid-1970s, and the South Yemenis now
have one of the largest forces of amphibious and
missile attack craft in the region. Both navies are
dependent on the Soviet Union for spare parts and
maintenance. The Soviets have operated with the
South Yemeni Navy at least twice and possibly three
times and with the Ethiopians once
Ethiopia. In May 1984 the USSR apparently con-
ducted its first multinational exercise with Ethiopian
and South Yemeni naval units. The exercise lasted
several days in the area north of Dahlak Island and
probably included the flagship of the Soviet Indian
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None of these exercises was held in reaction to any
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India. No formal naval exercises between India and
the USSR have ever been reported. Despite the
growing number of advanced Soviet surface ships,
submarines, and aircraft procured by the Indian
Navy, India has been careful to guard its nonaligned
policy and obviously is concerned that visible opera-
tions with the Soviet Navy would compromise its
position. In addition, the Indian Navy is both larger
and more sophisticated than those of other Soviet
Third World clients, and the Indians may see less to
gain from operating with the Soviet Navy.
Madagascar. Since the late 1970s, the Soviets also
have attempted to expand their political influence and
military access in Madagascar, to include combined
naval exercises. President Ratsiraka, however, consis-
tently has upheld Madagascar's nonaligned status and
adhered to a policy of denying foreign military access
Southeast Asia
Soviet military activities in Southeast Asia have
become increasingly important to the USSR as a
means of exerting pressure on China, competing with
US forces stationed in the area, and facilitating
deployments to the Indian Ocean. The USSR's pos-
ture in Southeast Asia hinges mainly on its close
relationship with Vietnam. Hanoi depends heavily on
Soviet aid to sustain its crippled economy, consolidate
its control in Cambodia, and deter or counter the
Chinese on its northern borders. Since the 1979 Sino-
Vietnamese border conflict, the Soviets have provided
Vietnam massive economic support and military aid
in exchange for extensive naval logistic and operating
privileges at Cam Ranh Bay.
most exercises.
In addition, a close working relationship is developing
between the Vietnamese and Soviet Navies. Most of
the Vietnamese naval equipment has been provided by
the USSR, and Soviet military advisers probably are
active at high administrative and operational levels of
that service. Soviet naval personnel, for example,
probably are on board Vietnamese naval ships during
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Latin America
Latin America's distance from the USSR presents
practical military constraints that probably account
for the lower levels of Soviet naval presence there than
in other Third World areas. Nevertheless, the Soviets
have exercised more frequently and consistently with
the Cuban Navy than with that of any other Third
World country. Indeed, their military relationship
with Cuba has furnished the Soviets opportunities to
assert their right to operate in the Caribbean and Gulf
of Mexico and generally to play a broader political
the region, and serves Soviet foreign policy goals in
Latin America, Africa, and elsewhere. ~
role in the region.
Both the level of the Soviet military presence and the
scope of activities in Cuba have steadily increased
over the past two decades. Continued military involve-
ment there seems virtually guaranteed, moreover, in
view of Castro's close relationship with the Soviets
and Havana's increasingly heavy debt to Moscow.
Following the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, a small 25X1
Soviet ground force contingent was gradually expand-
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Cuba remains the single most important Soviet client
in the Third World and is the hub of Soviet access to
the Caribbean. It is ideally located for Soviet intelli-
gence collection activities against the United States,
provides an entree for further Soviet involvement in
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Soviet naval task group visits began in 1969, and the
24th such deployment was concluded in February
1985. These task groups typically involve two princi-
pal surface combatants, an oiler, and sometimes a
involved ASW operations in Cuban territorial waters.
submarine, and they now deploy to the Caribbean During the 1980s, Soviet-Cuban naval exercises have
about once a year. During these visits, the Soviet ships become an increasingly important feature of the
dock and take on supplies at Cuban naval bases, Soviet naval deployments to Cuba and are becoming
because there are no dedicated Soviet naval facilities
in the Caribbean.
All Soviet task groups visiting Cuba since late 1971
have operated with Cuban naval forces
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Observations of recent combined exercises indicate
that the seamanship and capability of the Cuban
Navy have progressed considerably over the past five
years, and they probably will continue to improve as
more opportunities to exercise with the Soviets are
Caribbean Seas.
Where we have evidence of participation by a Third
World country in combined naval exercises, the
USSR usually has been the instigator, and its objec-
tives have been both political and military. The
Soviets clearly view these military operations as an
important tool to increase their influence in a region
and to project a military presence in distant areas
such as the Indian Ocean and the South China and
interests threatened.
Soviet Political Objectives
Combined exercises serve as a political show of
support for Moscow's Third World clients. For exam-
ple, the USSR publicly asserted that the combined
amphibious and ASW exercise off the Levant coast in
1981 was in direct response to Israeli provocations
over Syrian air defense missiles in Lebanon. The crisis
was overtaken by other events in Lebanon, but Syria
did not remove the missiles and Moscow probably
took credit, at least with the Syrians, for effectively
challenging Israel. Furthermore, the 1982 Soviet-
Libyan exercise probably was held partly in response
to the shootdown of Libyan fighters by US naval
aircraft in mid-1981. The Soviets probably intend
such exercises to warn of a possible military confron-
tation with the West if their client is attacked or its
The USSR consistently seeks to counter or undermine
US influence in the Third World. In some cases the
Soviets press for exercises to serve as a counterweight
to certain US combined military exercises-such as
"Cobra Gold" with the Thai Navy in the Gulf of
Thailand and "Bright Star" with the Egyptian and
Omani military forces in the Mediterranean and Red
Seas-and to US naval maneuvers off Latin America.
The Soviets' largest combined exercises with Third
World countries have been in these same areas.
Although the Soviet exercises do not approach the
scale of US combined operations or major Soviet fleet
exercises closer to the USSR, they are another signal
of Moscow's determination to compete with the Unit-
ed States for influence and access to these regions.
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Figure 8. Combined naval operations in the GuUojMexico, April
Moscow also uses combined operations to Increase its
ittflu~ence within a Third World country's military
forces and probably hopes this will promote closer
political ties as well. The navies of Cuba and Vietnam
have adopted Soviet-style tactics and organization,
and ithe combined operations reinforce these develop-
ments.
l
t Military Goals
Sovi
The `chief military value to the USSR of combined
exercises probably is the experience in operating in a
distant area with Third World navies. During a
regional crisis in which the Soviet Navy offered or
was asked to provide support for a client, any previous
training would help to ease the complex problems that
almost certainly would arise in coordinating combat
or s
pport operations.
I
Combined naval training also is one of many military
instruments (which also include arms sales and mili-
tary~advisers) that Moscow uses to press countries for
incr~ased military cooperation, including increased
access toJacilities. The Soviets already have parlayed
military assistance into access to some facilities in all
six of the countries that participate in combined
exercises. Thus far, however, combined exercises have
1984: underway replenishment ojSoviet and Cuban warships
reinforced already existing relationships; earlier provi-
sions of weapons probably have had far more impact
on the countries' decisions to grant such access.
The USSR also may hope that combined naval
exercises can be used to groom certain Third World
navies to supplement Soviet capabilities during war-
time. Although we have no evidence to support such
an intention, most of the clients with whom they
exercise are located near states hostile to the USSR or
on maritime routes that would be important for the
transit of naval forces and supplies during wartime.
(Vietnam, for example, is close to the Strait of
Malacca, connecting the Pacific and Indian Oceans,
and the Cuban Navy could operate in the Florida
Straits or the windward passage into the Caribbean.)
The Soviets have stressed training Third World cli-
ents in ASW and antiship tactics, possibly in part
because Moscow may expect these navies eventually
to help the Soviet Navy counter hostile submarines
and ships in distant areas. The naval capabilities of
these countries are limited, however, and we have
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never seen Third World forces employed in any
exercise directed from the Soviet Union. These coun-
tries, moreover, almost certainly would prefer to avoid
having their navies dragged into superpower conflicts.
Third World Motivations
Probably the most important benefit derived by Third
World countries from combined naval exercises is the
visible demonstration o.1'Soviet military support for
their regimes and policies. The USSR has been most
successful in negotiating joint exercises with countries
like Cuba, Vietnam, and Syria that face a predomi-
nant, neighboring, hostile power. These countries
probably feel they could not compete with or confront
these powers without Moscow's military and political
support, and they welcome joint operations as a public
reminder of this backing. Some of Moscow's Third
World clients probably have initiated requests to hold
combined exercises, as Libya presumably did after the
Gulf of Sidra confrontation. Communist leaders such
as those in Cuba and Vietnam and Marxists such as
those in South Yemen and Ethiopia probably also
perceive that combined exercises demonstrate Soviet
support for their regimes.
Combined naval operations with the Soviet Union also
enhance the prestige of a Third World navy. These
exercises display the country's growing military capa-
bilities to other nations in the region and signal that
the country is a power to be reckoned with, given its
strong military ties to the Soviet Union. Countries like
Cuba, South Yemen, Syria, Libya, and Vietnam
probably also intend the exercises to counterbalance
US military operations with other countries in the
region
Finally, Moscow's Third World clients probably real-
ize that combined naval training helps to sharpen
their forces' military skills. Because most of their
ships and weapons are Soviet supplied, they depend on
Soviet instruction in employing and maintaining their
naval systems. Most of these countries have a limited
maritime tradition, if any, and combined exercises
under the tutelage of the USSR are useful for learn-
ing operational naval tactics. During a regional con-
flict, these countries' navies primarily would face
hostile submarines, missile patrol boats, and amphibi-
ous assault ships. The Soviets' emphasis on ASW,
antiship, and coastal defense tactics in combined
exercises probably is intended to improve their allies'
capabilities to counter these threats. Indeed, navies
like those of Cuba and Vietnam that have operated
frequently with the Soviet Navy have shown consider-
able improvement in ASW capabilities, although they
still probably would be unable to locate and destroy
Western submarines.
We expect a modest increase over the next five years
or so in the frequency and scale of Soviet combined
naval exercises with Third World allies. Soviet offi-
cials probably are pressing arms customers in the
Third World to hold more combined exercises to
strengthen existing relationships and create new op-
portunities to expand Soviet influence. The Soviets
will be most successful in promoting joint operations
with traditional clients like Cuba, Vietnam, and Syria
that have major regional opponents. Their need for
strong Soviet support, especially during regional cri-
ses, provides Moscow leverage to use combined naval
exercises to help bolster these regimes, to reinforce
Soviet influence with local military and political
cadres, and to influence regional security relations
more generally
The Soviets probably will continue to be unsuccessful
in holding combined naval exercises with countries
such as India and Algeria that evidently do not want a
stronger alignment with the USSR. India and Algeria
depend on Soviet weapons, but Moscow almost cer-
tainly would not jeopardize its military trade with
either country by forcing the issue of naval coopera-
tion. Under present conditions, there also appears to
be little opportunity for the Soviet Navy to operate
more frequently with Libya. The Libyan Navy stages
only about one major exercise a year and probably
will continue to conduct these alone to gauge its
progress as an independent fighting force. Exercises in
alternate years or smaller scale training with the
Soviet Navy are likely, however
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The trends toward more complexity and wider scope
in Soviet-Third World combined naval exercises are
likely to continue. Such exercises in the late 1960s
and 1970s usually focused on improving one specific
area of a country's naval capabilities, such as ASW or
amphibious assault. More recent naval exercises held
with Syria, Vietnam, and Cuba, however, have fea-
tured multiphased scenarios incorporating ASW,
antiship, and amphibious assault operations. ~~
More important, as the scope, scale, and frequency of
combined exercises increase, they may begin to figure
more prominently in the USSR's calculus of its
wartime capabilities against Western naval forces.
While the antiship and ASW capabilities of Third
World navies currently are limited, over the next
decade some navies-the Cuban, Vietnamese, Syrian,
and possibly the South Yemeni-will gradually im-
prove and thus could further complicate US naval
planning. While these countries almost certainly
would prefer to remain outside any superpower con-
frontation, this could prove to be increasingly difficult
for states where Soviet naval combat forces are
stationed.
The Caribbean
Soviet naval task groups visiting Cuba probably will
increasingly emphasize combined exercises to improve
Cuba's status as a regional military power and to
reinforce the USSR's claim to free access to the
Caribbean operating area. Future operations in the
Gulf of Mexico probably will include participation by
Cuban warships in both ASW and antiship training.
Additionally, the Soviets and Cubans could very well
begin to practice amphibious exercises, including op-
posed landings on Cuban beaches, to demonstrate the
Cuban ability to counter such assaults as well as to
exhibit the improved Cuban assault capabilities to
regional states. It is even possible that, over the next
several years, the Soviet and Cuban Navies could hold
combined exercises near Nicaragua to demonstrate
their support for the Sandinista regime.
Southeast Asia
We expect the Soviet-Vietnamese naval relationship
to expand over the next few years as the Soviet naval
contingent at Cam Ranh Bay increases and the
Vietnamese Navy receives more ships with amphibi-
ous assault and antiship capabilities. The Soviet Navy
will try especially to use more frequent, large-scale
combined exercises in the South China Sea to demon-
strate to the United States its growing military
strength in the region, as well as to intimidate China
and the ASEAN nations. Combined naval air and
amphibious assault exercises would be well suited, for
example, to underscore Soviet intentions to protect
Vietnamese and Soviet oil exploration and drilling
activities in the South China Sea. The Soviet Navy
may also hold combined show-of-support exercises,
including units from Soviet Pacific Fleet bases, during
periods of increased hostilities on the Sino-Vietnam-
ese border.
The Mediterranean Sea and Indian Ocean
The Soviet Union probably will hold more frequent
naval exercises with clients in the Mediterranean and
Arabian Seas and in the Indian Ocean. Both South
Yemen and Ethiopia probably will continue to wel-
come exercises with the Soviet Indian Ocean Squad-
ron to improve their naval capabilities and enhance
their prestige, and small-scale joint landing and ASW
operations in the Gulf of Aden and the southern Red
Sea probably will increase over the next several years.
Moreover, the Soviets could arrange larger naval
exercises to demonstrate support for Ethiopia or
South Yemen during a regional crisis or to counter-
balance US combined exercises in the region. ~~ 25X1
Moscow, in our judgment, will be successful in con-
vincing Syria to increase combined naval exercises in
the Mediterranean, where the Soviet Naval Squadron
directly confronts the larger and more capable US 6th
Fleet. In addition to frequent small-scale ASW exer-
cises, we expect to see more routine antiship and
amphibious assault operations along the Syrian coast,
especially now that the Soviets apparently are focus-
ing on upgrading Syrian naval capabilities. (Since
early 1984, Moscow has delivered a dozen small naval
ships to Syria.) Although these operations could en-
hance Soviet influence on the Syrian Navy and
improve Syrian capabilities, Moscow and Damascus
probably would also intend such exercises to deter the
Israelis and the United States by raising the prospect
that Soviet forces might enter a regional conflict. In
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this connection, for example, the Soviet Navy might
begin practicing landing in Syria either the company-
sized contingent of naval infantry typically stationed
in the Mediterranean or elements of its 3,000-man
naval infantry brigade sealifted from the Black Sea.
Syrian naval, air, and ground forces most likely would
simulate attacks against the Soviet ships to practice
defending their coast.
Prospects for Combined Ground or Air Exercises
Given their growing program of combined naval
exercises, we have considered whether the Soviets
might over the next few years conduct joint air or
ground operations with certain of their Third World
clients, especially Syria. Moscow almost certainly is
aware that US joint operations-especially those in-
volving the US Rapid Deployment Force in the
Middle East-have been highly successful in demon-
strating US capabilities to support its distant allies
and in securing closer political ties with some Middle
Eastern countries.
From a Soviet perspective, air or ground exercises
with Third World clients would provide:
? Experience in handling the considerable logistic
problems that would be associated with the deploy-
ment of air or ground forces some distance from the
USSR.
? Familiarization with foreign military facilities and
local environments and the chance to operate with
the Third World country's military forces in prepa-
ration for potential Soviet intervention in the region.
? More flexibility in strengthening its show of support
for a client. The deployment of Soviet ground or air
forces into a country would be seen as an even
firmer sign of Soviet backing than conducting com-
bined naval exercises.
The USSR, however, would have to balance the;c
potential gains against the risk that its allies could
misinterpret combined exercises as a firmer commit-
ment of Soviet forces than Moscow is willing to make.
The introduction of Soviet forces-even just for com-
bined exercises-probably also would raise concerns
by other regional states that such activity could
escalate into a confrontation between the
superpowers.
We believe that over the next decade the Soviets may
practice moving small representative units of their
ground and air forces into an area to exercise with
client forces in response to a hypothetical regional
crisis. They probably would exercise only with coun-
tries that are close enough to make the projection of
forces reasonably practical, like Syria, Ethiopia, or
South Yemen. For example, Moscow might exercise
an airlift of an airborne regiment or an air defense
unit or send a tactical fighter squadron into Syria to
practice for such a contingency during an invasion by
Israel. This type of exercise would demonstrate Soviet
intentions to support Syria, improve Soviet capabili-
ties to conduct a limited airlift to the region, and
perhaps serve as a political deterrent to an Israeli
invasion. The Soviets would have to consider carefully
the timing of such an exercise, however. During
periods of rising tensions, these operations could be
perceived by the Israelis as actual prepositioning of
Soviet troops and equipment for hostilities and could
risk escalation to a larger crisis.
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