ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN THE SOVIET UNION: MORE SMOKE THAN FIRE

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• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Release Decision: RIPPUB
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• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 14, 2010
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: July 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Confidential
Intelligence
in the Soviet Union:
More Smoke Than Fire
Environmental Protection
Confidential
SOV 85-10124
July 1985
Copy /1 8 1
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Directorate of Confidential
Intelligence
in the Soviet Union:
More Smoke Than Fire
Environmental Protection
Economic Performance Division, SOYA,
Office of Soviet Analysis. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be directed to the Chief,
This paper was prepared by
Confidential
SOV 85-10124
July 1985
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Environmental Protection
in the Soviet Union:
More Smoke Than Fire
Key Judgments As in the industrial West, neglect and abuse of the environment is a serious
Information available problem in the Soviet Union. Official statistics are sparse, but a wealth of
as of 1 May 1985 anecdotal evidence from official Soviet writings and statements indicates
was used in this report.
that pollution and other environmentally harmful conditions have created
health hazards and placed limits on productive potential. Water pollution
appears to constitute the greatest threat to health, while erosion of soil by
wind and water probably causes the most economic harm.
The Soviets have evidently made some progress in cleaning up the
environment in the last several years. For instance, they claim to have
reduced the discharge of industrial wastes into rivers and lakes since 1977
and to have reduced emissions from fixed sources of air pollution. 25X1
But maintaining this trend is in doubt as environmental protection still
appears to have low priority, and investment remains clearly inadequate.
The share of both GNP and investment devoted to environmental protec-
tion in the United States is roughly double that of the USSR. Indeed, while
the post-Brezhnev regimes have given greater attention-at least rhetori-
cally-to environmental problems, under Andropov investment in protec-
tion facilities fell.
Instead, in recent years, Moscow's environmental protection campaign has
focused on administrative measures. Under Andropov, the Politburo
formally reprimanded five industrial ministers for environmental neglect
and ordered the Council of Ministers to draw up tougher protection laws
and increase enforcement activities. Under Chernenko, a "vast" program
to combat air pollution was announced, though without details as to timing
and size. Both Andropov and Chernenko in major speeches to the Central
Committee during their tenures blasted the laxity of current efforts to curb
economic activity that damages the environment. Since taking office in
March 1985, Gorbachev has not addressed the environmental problem. His
past experience as party secretary for agriculture, however, suggests he
realizes the extent of economic damage from environmental disregard and
will continue, if not increase, the level of the leadership attention to
pollution problems.
Because negligence and improper use of equipment are major causes of
pollution in both industry and agriculture, the regime's antipollution
campaign may be aimed primarily at making industrial and agricultural
Confidential
SOV 85-10124
July 1985
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managers more aware of their responsibilities for environmental protection.
The best known recent example of negligence occurred in September 1983
when the carelessness of officials at a chemical plant resulted in a spill that
seriously polluted the Dnestr River, killing more than 2,200 metric tons of
fish and depriving large cities in the Ukraine and Moldavia of drinking
water for several weeks.
Progress is difficult, however, because the machinery for enforcing environ-
mental laws and regulations is weak-in part because no central body
coordinates the efforts of the variety of agencies responsible for enforce-
ment. Moreover, policing is often left to producing enterprises themselves.
But enterprise managers have few incentives (or disincentives) to protect
the environment. Bonuses are not given for pollution-control activities, and
the modest charges on land and water resources do not impel managers to
treat them with greater care.
As the economy continues to grow, the task of controlling an increasing
amount of pollutants will become more difficult. To sustain or even to
preserve the environmental gains of recent years, the regime must go
beyond reliance on exhorting managers to use existing environmental
protection tools more effectively. The leadership must step up investment
in protection facilities, strengthen mechanisms for enforcing antipollution
laws, and provide incentives for economic managers to give higher priority
to environmental concerns. But such measures are unlikely in the current
period of slow growth where official policies give overriding priority to
production goals. The demands of the food, energy, and machine-building
programs will leave little room for investment in environmental protection,
which contributes little to improving productivity.
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Contents
Key Judgments
The Soviet Approach to Environmental Protection 4
Evolving Recognition of Environmental Problems 4
Andropov's Campaign and Chernenko's Followthrough 6
The Essence of the Problem 7
Inferior Equipment 9
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In the Soviet Union:
More Smoke Than Fire
Until the late 1960s the Soviet Union almost totally
ignored the effects of economic activity on the envi-
ronment. So completely did economic output goals
dominate that until then, according to one Soviet
author, industrial use of water received priority over
drinking water in many arid southern cities. By the
early 1970s it was becoming increasingly obvious that
disregard for environmental issues was jeopardizing
the availability of clean water for agriculture, deplet-
ing fish reserves, and causing significant health haz-
ards. Moscow reacted by increasing expenditures on
environmental control and laying at least an adminis-
trative framework to oversee protection efforts. Capi-
tal investment in environmental protection, measured
in constant prices, rose in the first half of the 1970s,
peaking in 1975 at 2 billion rubles-1.8 percent of
total investment. Since then, investment in environ-
mental protection has fallen to a fairly steady level of
about 1.3 percent of total investment, and the pace of
government activity in the area has eased.
The post-Brezhnev regimes have not increased the
allocation of resources to environmental protection,
although there has been a revival of high-level atten-
tion to environmental problems. In December 1983,
former General Secretary Andropov's speech to the
Communist Party (CPSU) Central Committee force-
fully assailed the inadequacy of protection policies.
This speech followed an environmental calamity in
September when a dam holding chemical wastes
In this paper we will first discuss the current environ-
mental situation in the USSR, assessing the extent
and consequences of environmental neglect. We will
then describe past environmental protection efforts
and evaluate their effectiveness. Finally, we will
discuss current policies and assess their chances for
success.
The extent to which economic activity is harming the
Soviet environment is difficult to establish. The
USSR publishes few statistics on environmental mat-
ters and does not explicitly define what is meant by
environmental damage. Published Soviet commentary
suggests that the authorities view environmental dam-
age as comprised of two major elements: (a) health
hazards caused by pollution of various sorts and (b)
reduction of the productive potential of land and
water through pollution and other causes.
Soviet publications indicate that, while air pollution is
a serious problem, water pollution probably is the
greatest threat to health, and erosion of soil by wind
and water accounts for the greatest direct economic
losses. Furthermore, although environmental invest-
ments have not risen, the leadership statements and
other official commentary of the last two years sug-
gest heightened awareness of severe pollution and
other environmental problems and of the need to deal
with them.
burst, seriously polluting the Dnestr River.
The Dnestr River incident seems to have seized the
attention of the leadership. Since then, enterprise
managers and workers have been warned in major
speeches by Soviet leaders to take their responsibil-
ities in environmental protection more seriously, and a
"vast program to fight air pollution" has been an-
nounced by the Politburo. The importance of environ-
mental protection was recently emphasized by a high-
ranking official of the State Planning Committee
(Gosplan), who listed pollution as one of five causes
A Soviet underground (samizdat) report by Boris
Komarov suggests that the Soviet economy currently
produces more pollutants per unit of output than the
United States for any given activity.' While not
'Boris Komarov is a pseudonym of Vladmir Volfson, who from
1968 to 1978 was the senior lecturer with the Biological and
Environmental Department of Educational TV in Moscow. The
report was published in 1980 by Sharpe, White Plains, NY, under
the title The Destruction of Nature in the Soviet Union. Mr.
Volfson emigrated to Israel in 1981 and is a senior adviser in
Israel's Environmental Protection Service, Ministry of the Interior.
for declining male life expectancy.
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According to the samizdat account by Boris Ko-
marov, a special commission was tasked in the mid-
1970s to study the state of the environment and
forecast conditions in 1980 and 1990. The group of
experts projected the annual loss caused by air and
water pollution alone to the nation's economy at 20
billion rubles by 1980-nearly 5 percent of the
officially measured value for national income. The
group also projected that these losses would grow at
a rate much faster than national income in the 1980s
to a level of 45 billion rubles by 1990, an average
annual rate of increase of 8.5 percent. The account
claimed that data not included in the commission's
forecasts suggest a much higher economic cost for
environmental damage-50-60 billion rubles in 1980
and up to 120 billion rubles by 1990. We do not know
how these estimates were derived or what is actually
being measured.
Most press accounts of economic activities harmful to
the environment do not give ruble estimates of the
damage but do say that adverse indirect effects can
more than offset the benefits such activities may have
for specific sectors. For example, increased water
consumption by agriculture and industry has reduced
the water level of the Caspian Sea and threatened the
catch of sturgeon-thus endangering the Soviet hold
on the world caviar market, an important hard
currency earner. TASS warns that, if the water level
of the Caspian, which has stabilized in the last few
years, drops by just one more meter, the warm waters
of the northern shallows where 85 percent of the
world's sturgeon breed will become dry land. In one
example in which a ruble value is attached to dam-
age, the press claims that, despite the expenditure of
about 40 million rubles yearly to protect the soil
from acid rain, harvest losses, in the central and
northwest USSR, average 80-120 million rubles an-
nually.
offering any supporting documentation or detailed
methodology, he asserts, for example, that the Soviet
economy overall produces twice as many air pollut-
ants per unit of output as that produced in the US
economy. Komarov also reports that a special Soviet
journal published for a select readership of high-level
bureaucrats and natural resource specialists has esti-
mated that the levels of noxious gases in the atmo-
sphere of more than 1,000 Soviet cities are so high
that they are a "hazard to health."
Published commentary suggests that the major
sources of air pollution are thermal power stations, the
ferrous and nonferrous metallurgy industries, and the
petrochemical industry. According to Yuriy Israel',
the Chief of the State Committee on Hydrometeorolo-
gy and Environmental Protection (Goskomgidromet),
damage from sulfur dioxide emissions is an especially
critical problem. He reports that in the northern and
northwestern parts of the USSR such emissions,
falling in the form of acid rain, have caused great
harm to the water, soil, and vegetation. In the
Ukraine, for example, acid rain has caused high
concentrations of heavy metals to be leached from the
ground and find their way into drinking water.
Water pollution is also extensive. Soviet journals have
reported that 40 percent of the water discharged into
surrounding bodies of water by industrial enterprises
in the following ministries is polluted: Timber, Pulp,
Paper, and Wood Processing; Chemical and Petro-
leum Machinery; Nonferrous Metallurgy; Petroleum
Industry; Meat and Dairy Industry; and Mineral
Fertilizer Production. Water pollution is especially
critical because the USSR is relatively underendowed
with freshwater resources. The densely populated
western portions of the country account for about 80
percent of industrial output but contain less than 25
percent of freshwater resources. The arid southern
regions constitute 27 percent of the Soviet landmass
but possess only 2 percent of the fresh water.
Agriculture also presents a major danger to fresh-
water resources. It accounts for more than half of the
country's total water consumption-mostly for irriga-
tion. So much water is used for irrigation that, in
combination with industrial consumption, agricultural
use has led to an alarming fall in the water level of the
Caspian and Aral Seas. Since the 1960s the level of
the Aral Sea has dropped by 7 meters and the
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some statistical and abundant
anecdotal evidence of the severity of the USSR's
environmental problems. For example, according to
1983-84 press reports and emigre interviews:
? A dam holding chemical wastes burst, seriously
polluting the Dnestr River, killing more than 2,200
metric tons offish and depriving large cities in the
Ukraine and Moldavia of drinking water for several
weeks.
? Only one-third of the harmful emissions from
plants under the Ministry of Ferrous Metallurgy
are treated.
? Pollution from the processing of phosphate rock on
the Kola Peninsula was so severe in the summer of
1983 that "in the city of Apatity for two days the
polar day turned into night; small ventilating win-
dows in residential buildings couldn't be opened
even a crack; people walking along the streets
wrapped their faces in whatever they could, for
what they breathed was not air but stinging dust."
? Heavy industrial pollution is killing thousands of
acres offorest around the Soviet automaking city of
Togliatti.
? Large areas of the Crimean seascape-well known 25X1
as vacation spots-have been polluted by industrial
wastes.
? Environmental problems in the Kuznetsk Basin are
"causing increasing deaths and genetic defects
among babies. "
? In Iskitim, a city in Novosibirsk Oblast, several
cement factories and chemical plants polluted the
air so badly that a physician responsible for screen-
ing the population for lung disorders found that
fully 40 percent had some degree of silicosis. He
reported this fact to the city party committee, and,
when he persisted in calling for action to control
industrial emissions, he was transferred to another
job.
? Dozens of industries pour poisonous waste products
virtually untreated into Lake Ladoga, "severely
endangering" the water supply of Leningrad.
? The forests in the north are rapidly receding, not
from global changes in climate but from the mass
felling of trees and the destruction of the surround-
ing terrain.
shoreline has retreated by as much as 40 kilometers.
The Aral is becoming more and more saline, thus
reducing a fisheries potential that had been consid-
ered one of the greatest in the USSR. Nor is irriga-
tion itself an unmixed blessing for agriculture. An
authoritative Soviet journal reports that half of the
fresh water used in irrigation is wasted. The misuse of
irrigation water has resulted,
in severe damage to almost 20 percent of all arable
land in Uzbekistan. Additionally, the Soviet Union
has lost about 7 million hectares of farmland to the
desert through "salinization," a condition resulting
when desert soil becomes waterlogged and salt rises to
the surface to poison the ground.
Agricultural chemicals also represent a growing prob-
lem. Fertilizers are a main source of water pollution,
but pesticides and other substances such as DDT also
contribute. Much of the "chemical pollution" of both
water and land is caused by negligence and improper
use of material and equipment. Recent reports indi-
cate that residents of several villages in Uzbekistan
applied so much fertilizer to their crops that the 25X1
chemical content of produce sold in open-air markets
significantly exceeded toxic levels. Many people de-
veloped skin sores and/or serious stomach disorders as
a result
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The consequences of Soviet abuse of the environment
spread beyond the USSR's own borders. Eastern
Europe already suffers from acid rain that has been
carried by the wind from Soviet territory. In addition,
the Arctic air, once crystal clear, is now loaded with
sulfur and carbon-most of which scientists have
concluded comes from Soviet industry in the Southern
Urals. The Arctic pollution, some scientists argue,
could affect the Northern Hemisphere's weather pat-
terns by causing a partial melting of the polar icecap.
Some localized melting could also result if the Soviets
go ahead with a leviathan scheme to divert some of
the flow of their western Siberian rivers to the more
arid southern regions. A decision on whether to
proceed with this project is expected in 1987.
In contrast to capitalist production which plunders
nature, the socialist system, based on a planned
economy, ensures not only the steady growth of
industry but also the protection and improvement of
nature.
Krokodil
February 1984
Evolving Recognition of Environmental Problems
The theoretical argument that socialist economies
have an inherent advantage over capitalist economies
in protecting the environment because they are better
able to incorporate social costs into planning decisions
has inhibited the willingness of Soviet leaders to
recognize and discuss ecological difficulties. Until the
latter half of the 1960s, Moscow rarely publicly
admitted that the USSR had a pollution problem.
Despite a fairly substantial body of environmental
laws, resource planning was virtually nonexistent.
Legislation was often local and did not have general
application; it was reactive rather than preventive.
This situation has slowly changed. Soviet environmen-
tal consciousness was raised by the debate over the
pollution of Lake Baikal, the world's largest fresh-
water body and considered by many a national trea-
sure. The government announcement that a large
papermill would begin operation on the lake's shores
in 1966 touched a raw nerve among scientists and
journalists aware of the pollution danger. Environ-
mental protection, rarely a public issue, soon became
a cause championed by several Soviet newspapers,
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Krokodil
March 1984
notably Literaturnaya gazeta-the widely read week-
ly of the Union of Soviet Writers. Public pressure did
not prevent the papermill from opening but did enable
a wide airing of the conservationist point of view. Still,
by the early 1970s, islands of alkaline sewage were
reported to be floating on Lake Baikal's surface.
Industrial wastes and logging operations had de-
stroyed important fish breeding grounds and threat-
ened unique species of flora and fauna. Pravda report-
ed that the population of plants and animals had
decreased by a third to a half in the areas where the
plant's sewage was being discharged. In response, the
government ordered construction of additional waste
purification units and removal from the lake of sunk-
en logs and other wooden debris. The debate on the
effectiveness of these measures continues today.
pollution had caused the catches of freshwater fish-
including those of important foreign exchange earners
like sturgeon-to plummet. Cholera and typhus,
caused by untreated sewage, had broken out along the
lower Volga.
The Kremlin reacted to these developments in 1973
by quadrupling expenditures to protect water re-
sources to over 1 billion rubles a year. Capital invest-
ment for all environmental protection almost doubled
during 1973-75, reaching a high of over 2 billion
rubles in 1975-1.8 percent of total investment. Since
then capital investment has decreased, and total
capital spending in 1976-80 fell short of the goal of 11
billion rubles given by Brezhnev in his 1976 report to
the 25th Party Congress.
Developing an Administrative Structure
While the pace of environmental investment deceler-
ated after 1975, Moscow did take steps to incorporate
environmental protection bodies into the formal gov-
ernment structure. A network of environmental pro-
tection institutes was developed in various ministries.
They operated in an uncoordinated manner, however,
often coming into conflict with each other. In 1978
Goskomgidromet was formed, in part to provide the
Council of Ministers with control over the entire
environmental protection structure. But Goskomgi-
dromet did not take over existing authorities; rather it
was charged with coordinating their activities-a
thankless task because it did not have the necessary
enforcement powers. In 1981 the Council of Ministers
formed the Commission for the Protection of the
Environment and the Rational Utilization of Natural
Resources. In addition to studying problems of re-
source protection, the Commission was tasked, like
Goskomgidromet, to help coordinate the work of
government organizations on questions of environ-
mental protection.
The combination of a steady flow of spending, in-
creased state enforcement of environmental laws, and 25X1
new administrative arrangements appears to have
done some good. during
1975-82, harmful emissions from fixed sources of air 25X1
The Lake Baikal controversy was not the only impetus
for increasing environmental Awareness and pressures
to protect natural resources. By the early 1970s
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pollution fell by 12 percent and the monitored dis-
charge of polluted effluents into bodies of water by 28
percent.
Andropov's Campaign and Chernenko's Followthrough
After Brezhnev's death in November 1982, the level
of leadership attention to the environment picked up.
Yuriy Andropov instituted an antipollution campaign
that continues to this day:
? In July 1983 the USSR Supreme Court instructed
lower courts "to improve their voice in hearing cases
involving violations of environmental laws."
? In September 1983 the Council of Ministers Com-
mission on Environmental Protection and the Ratio-
nal Utilization of Natural Resources ordered banks
to stop financing the startup of production facilities
with unfinished pollution-control units.
? In November 1983 the State Prizes for Technology
were awarded. Of 29 prizes, three went for achieve-
ments in a new area-ecology.
? In December 1983 Andropov, in a speech before the
Central Committee, used language of unprecedent-
ed force in labeling environmental problems "acute"
and assailing the "inadequacy of past policies" to
deal with them.
? In January 1984 the Politburo ordered the Council
of Ministers to draft a comprehensive plan for
improving the environmental protection system and
publicly reprimanded five industrial ministers for
failure to implement protection measures in
Kemerovo oblast.
? In January 1984 the State Committee on Nuclear
Safety was formed to oversee plant design and
siting, reportedly prompting recently replaced Sovi-
et Minister of Power and Electrification, P. S.
Neporozhniy, to lament that the "Commission for
the Protection of the Environment and Rational
Utilization of Natural Resources, which used to be
of little importance, is now gaining weight within
the Council of Ministers."
Andropov's greater attention to safeguarding the envi-
ronment was in line with his emphasis on candidly
identifying the USSR's economic problems. It may
also have reflected his greater sophistication in recog-
nizing more clearly than his predecessors the damage
done to the economy by disregard for the environ-
ment. Andropov explicitly linked environmental pro-
tection with the drive to conserve resources, a major
element in his efforts to improve the economy in a
time of slowing growth. The shock effect of the
spectacular Dnestr River disaster of September 1983
may have further stiffened Andropov's resolve to
undertake more vigorous environmental protection
programs.
Chernenko appeared to follow through on Andropov's
activist approach. In his 10 April 1984 speech to the
Central Committee, Chernenko criticized government
departments for "breaching rules and regulations for
environmental protection." This was followed by a
series of actions. At the Munich International Confer-
ence on Air Pollution, the USSR promised to reduce
the level of Soviet transnational emissions of sulfur
dioxide by 30 percent by 1993.1 Moscow also an-
nounced that steps to strengthen environmental pro-
tection in the far north and coastal regions adjacent to
the northern shore are being considered. In addition, a
clean air inspectorate-supposedly empowered to set
limits on emissions-was established, and a program
to fight industrial air pollution was unveiled. The
program includes measures to build new control facili-
ties and improve the efficiency of those already in
operation, tighten the enforcement of air-quality laws,
convert production facilities that cause particularly
severe pollution to cleaner types of fuel, and-when
necessary-remove industry from residential areas.
No details of how these actions will be implemented
were given, but all relevant ministries and depart-
ments have been charged with preparing plans for
inclusion in the scientific-technical program for the
12th Five-Year Plan (1986-90).
Since Gorbachev came to office in March 1985, there
has been no additional movement on the environmen-
tal front. His past experience as party secretary in
charge of agriculture, however, suggests an apprecia-
tion of the damage done to the economy by environ-
mental neglect and that the antipollution efforts of
Andropov and Chernenko will be continued, if not
I The Soviet Union currently emits nearly 25 million tons of sulfur
dioxide yearly but only admits that 1-2 million tons are passed
through the air to other countries. It is 30 percent of this 1-2 million
tons that the Soviets have promised to reduce by 1993-a feat
easily achievable by carrying out current plans to commission
nuclear power plants and convert some existing power stations from
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expanded. Surely, progress will be difficult, because
continuing industrial and agricultural expansion will
necessarily be accompanied by an increased level of
pollutants produced. To sustain or improve upon past
performance, Gorbachev will have to do more than
rely on the more efficient application of current
programs and resources. He will have to deal with
several longstanding obstacles that have restrained
progress in environmental protection in the past and
without changes will inhibit progress even more in the
future. These obstacles include a low level of invest-
ment, inferior pollution-control equipment, and an
incentive system and administrative structure that
does little to encourage compliance with environmen-
tal protection laws.
State ownership of almost all production facilities
would seem to give the Soviet economy an advantage
over the industrial West economies in combating
pollution. But Moscow has chosen not to devote the
necessary resources to deal comprehensively with the
problem, and, despite progress since the mid-1970s,
continuing environmental difficulties fundamentally
reflect the low priority of environmental protection.
Perverse Incentives
The Soviet incentive system is oriented primarily
toward fulfilling traditional plan targets-preemi-
nently output goals. According to an authoritative
Soviet journal, "Enterprises do not have an interest in
the realization of environmental protection legislative
enactments or assignments." A recent Pravda article
observed: "Year after year the environmental projects
are the ones where the least amount of work gets
done. Such projects are usually avoided because they
are unprofitable. They take a lot of work but do very
little for the gross output figure."'
' Production managers who do employ abatement systems may
incur financial losses, since the diverted funds could have been used
to help reach or exceed production targets and thus increase
bonuses. A recent Pravda article quoted the response of a produc-
tion manager when asked about the status of
antipollution measures, "You mean we should get after people over
the environment too? We've got no time for that, what with the
economy cracking at its seams. We're more concerned with rescu-
ing today's plans. As I see it, even if we leave nothing after us we'll
only be doing our descendants a service. They'll be forced to work
harder to make good, and they'll grow up a healthy, gutsy
Table 1
USSR: Gas Purification and
Dust Collection Facilities-
Percent Not Functioning
Efficiently or are Faulty, 1982
Ministry of Power and Electrification
40
Ministry of the Petroleum Refining and
Petrochemical Industry
17
Ministry of Ferrous Metallurgy
25
Ministry of Nonferrous Metallurgy
27
Ministry of Mineral Fertilizers
25
Source: Sovetskaya Rossiya, 4 May 1984. No definitions for
efficiency or faultiness are given.
Such avoidance is usually accomplished with the
consent of local party officials who share the view of
the production manager that "overfulfilled plans
make more impression on Moscow than clean air and
rivers." Even when pollution-control facilities are
built, they often do not serve their function. For
example, pollution levels from the Semipalatinsk Ce-
ment Plant actually rose for three years after installa-
tion of abatement equipment because, in striving to
maximize production increases, the plant ignored
optimal operating procedures and produced a higher
level of pollutants than the equipment could handle.
25X1
25X1
Furthermore, maintenance of pollution abatement
equipment tends to be poor. A Soviet commentator
recently complained that, "Even when plants do have
pollution-control systems, no one takes a real interest,
and they often break down" (see table 1). This is
caused, in part, by a lack of trained specialists. About
40,000 specialists are trained a year, a number
Pravda has labeled inadequate. To make matters
worse, according to Pravda, "only a small percentage
of graduates are assigned to jobs in the field." A study 25X1
issued in the 1970s noted, "At the factory level
pollution-control work is treated as a low-status occu-
pation, and its workers are generally paid below the
scale of productive laborers; consequently the turn-
over of personnel is high." In addition, a Soviet
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Table 2
USSR: Capital Investment for Environmental Protection
Expenditures (million rubles,
1973 prices)
1981
1982
1,845
1,854
Rate of Growth Share of Total
(percent) Investment (percent)
journal reports that the quality of training for envi-
ronmental specialists is poor because "geology, cli-
mate, and biology are studied separately, leaving
blank spots where these areas meet."
Inadequate -Investment
Pollution control is highly capital intensive, requiring
large-scale introduction of new and upgrading of old
equipment. But Soviet capital investment in environ-
mental protection seems to remain a low-priority
item. It rose sharply in 1973-75 but has trended
downward since (see table 2). In 1983 investment for
environmental protection was 1.8 billion rubles-
almost 5 percent less than in 1982 and more than 100
million rubles below plan. Total outlays associated
with environmental protection, however, have been
reported to have been as much as 5 billion rubles per
year in 1976-80, rising to 9 billion rubles in 1984. A
good deal of mystery still surrounds these figures. F
Capital expenditures on environmental protection are
currently only about 1.3 percent of total investment in
the USSR-less than half the share in the United
States and Japan, but roughly comparable to the
share in France in the mid-1970s. The share of GNP
devoted to environmental protection in the United
States and West Germany is about 1.8 percent and
1.4 percent, respectively, while the USSR spends
about 1.1 percent. Available information concerning
the 1986-90 Plan, although scarce, suggests no
change in the mix or level of Soviet expenditures that
would allow the installation of equipment necessary to
substantially improve pollution control.'
Indeed, Soviet data on budgetary allocations may
overstate expenditures for environmental protection,
since many enterprises leave these funds unspent or
divert them to other purposes. In the 1976-80 Plan
period, enterprises of the Ministry of Power and
Electrification spent only 83 percent of the funds
allocated for air-pollution control; the Ministry of
Tractor and Agricultural Machine Building, 82 per-
cent; Nonferrous Metallurgy, 76 percent; and the
Coal Industry, only 48 percent. Similarly, enterprises
' Imports of Western equipment, of course, would help. A trade
show for the demonstration of Western environmental-control
equipment has been scheduled for Moscow in October 1985.
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Total Soviet Outlays for
Pollution Control: A Mystery
The Soviet Central Statistical Administration (CSA)
did not report total environmental expenditures until
1981, but occasional references in speeches and aca-
demic texts put this figure at 5.2 billion rubles
annually during 1976-80. Press reports indicated a
planned increase in 1981-85 to 6 billion rubles annu-
ally. The expenditures were loosely defined as includ-
ing capital investments, outlays for operation, and
expenditures for capital repair.
But the 1981-83 CSA economic yearbooks report
total annual environmental expenditures of 8 billion
rubles-including, probably for the first time, outlays
for the forestry sector. And, in a recent interview,
Goskomgidromet Chairman Yuriy Israel' also cited
annual expenditures of 8 billion rubles. In January
1985 the CSA reported expenditures of 9 billion
rubles in 1984.
Even if one assumes that forestry outlays account for
most of the difference between the estimate of 6
billion rubles and the higher estimates of 8-9 billion,
an annual expenditure of 6 billion rubles for the
current 1981-85 Five-Year Plan is still 15 percent
greater than the yearly level of 5.2 billion rubles of
the 1976-80 Plan period. It is unlikely, however, that
Moscow would increase total expenditures to this
extent while allowing capital investment-the key to
the production of equipment and facilities critically
needed for environmental control-to stagnate (see
table 2). The Soviets are probably including previous-
ly omitted cost items in their estimates of total
environmental expenditures possibly research work
and plant renovation costs, as well as new production
equipment that pollutes less than the older equipment
it replaces.
in ministries exhibiting high rates of water pollution
spent less than their full allocation: Chemical and
Petroleum Machinery, 86 percent; Machine Tool and
Tool Industry, 77 percent; and Heavy and Power
Machinery, 74 percent. Plants probably will continue
to leave some of their allocations unspent as long as
Moscow fails to allocate the labor and material
resources necessary to construct and run control
facilities.
Certainly the level of expenditures has not led to the
development of adequate supplies of pollution-control
equipment. The Chairman of the USSR Commission
for the Protection of the Environment and the Ratio-
nal Utilization of Natural Resources, Z. Nuriyev,
recently complained that industry is experiencing a
shortage of gas purification and dust-trapping equip-
ment. An industry official has observed that environ-
mental-protection facilities can usually only be ob-
tained when new construction is involved.
Inferior Equipment
Inadequate investment is not the only reason for 25X1
equipment shortages, however. According to an Octo-
ber 1984 Izvestiya article, each ministry tends to
develop its own pollution-control equipment, even
when such equipment already exists in other minis-
tries. Moreover, the organizations that are tasked to
design and manufacture control equipment are usual-
ly inefficient, because they have other, higher priority
production responsibilities. Even when modern pollu-
tion-control equipment is available, compatibility 25X1
problems make it difficult to install in the many older
factories that are still operating.
As a result, according to a recent Soviet journal
article, a significant portion of pollution-control
equipment is being produced in insufficient quantity
and is of poor quality. Some types of badly needed
equipment are apparently not available at all. For
example, in agriculture the growing use of pesticides
and herbicides presents an ever increasing environ-
mental threat, best dealt with by low-volume spraying
of crops. Although machine-building ministries have
been urged to set up production of the appropriate
equipment, it is still not available.
According to the 1980 samizdat report cited above,
Soviet design inadequacies sometimes hinder the
proper functioning of installed abatement equipment. 25X1
The multimillion ruble water treatment facilities on
the Volga and in the Urals, for example, are designed
to treat sewage by converting damaging organic mate-
rial to nitrates and phosphates before emission. The
treatment, however, does not prevent damage, be-
cause the nitrates and phosphates interact with algae
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and are transformed once again into damaging organ-
ic materials that lead to high levels of water pollution.
Toothless Laws
Soviet law has encouraged environmental neglect by
allowing producers to consume natural resources vir-
tually free of charge and to pollute the land while
risking only minimal penalties. As a result, in the
USSR the environment is subject to even more wide-
spread abuse than in industrial West countries, where
owners of mines, agricultural land, and forests have
an incentive to prevent wasteful use of these assets.
Numerous strong statements favoring the introduc-
tion of resource charges have appeared in the Soviet
press since the early 1970s, and in 1979 a charge for
the use of water was introduced. Although a step in
the right direction, this action is likely to have only a
marginal impact since it applies just to industrial uses,
and exempts agriculture, which accounts for 50 per-
cent of water consumption. Moreover, as indicated
above, because of relative success indicators, industri-
al managers and their ministerial supervisors empha-
size gross output at the expense of environmental
considerations.
Meanwhile, pollution of the land continues virtually
unpunished. According to Soviet law, enterprises
guilty of spoiling and contaminating agricultural land
are subject to fines of up to 100 rubles-regardless of
the size and quality of land taken out of service. At
the same time the cost of taking agricultural land out
of service for industrial use has been set at 6,940
rubles per hectare of arable land. Thus, if an enter-
prise takes I hectare of arable land out of circulation
by establishing an illegal dump there, the maximum
penalty is a 100-ruble fine, but if the land is with-
drawn by the same enterprise to build some capital
structure it must pay compensation 70 times that
amount
Environmental protection also suffers from the ab-
sence of a coordinated administrative mechanism to
develop, implement, and enforce environmental laws.
Environmental responsibilities in any one region are
divided among ministries, agencies, and state commit-
tees. For example, responsibilities for monitoring air
quality are shared among Goskomgidromet, the Min-
istry of Health, the Ministry of Chemical and Petro-
leum Machine Building, the Ministry of Internal
Affairs, and republic environmental-protection com-
mittees. This situation has led to what Andropov
termed a "narrow departmental approach that sharp-
ly lowers the effectiveness of the use of capital
investments, hampers the pursuit of a single policy in
carrying out environmental-protection measures, en-
genders irresponsibility for the ecological conse-
quences of the decisions taken, and is conducive to
illusory economy, which in the final stages results in
great losses."
Environmental-protection authorities such as Gos-
komgidromet and the Ministry of Land Reclamation
and Water Resources are clearly at the lower end of
the governmental pecking order. They have little
control over the research and development institutes
that design pollution-control equipment, the enter-
prises that manufacture it, or the construction trusts
that install it. Moreover, the primary responsibility
for protecting a resource is not entrusted to environ-
mental-protection authorities but instead to the pro-
duction ministry that exploits the resource. Since the
number-one priority of a production ministry is meet-
ing annual output targets-a goal to which pollution
control contributes nothing-this is like putting the
fox in charge of the henhouse. Although each produc-
tion ministry seems to have its own environmental-
protection department, these departments are largely
ineffectual because they are subordinate to those they
are supposed to monitor.
Goskomgidromet and the other environmental-protec-
tion organizations are mainly advisory bodies with
limited policing authority. Government inspection
teams had twice ordered the managers of the fertilizer
plant on the Dnestr River to shore up the dam holding
industrial wastes in the months before the dam burst
causing serious ecological damage. Similarly, repairs
have been recommended for an industrial waste dam
near the Crimean Resort of Lake Saki, but, as Pravda
recently reported, "The dam can be reinforced proper-
ly only by allocating more than 1.5 million
rubles ... and the Ministry of the Chemical Industry
isn't about to come up with the money."
In the past such defiance on the part of ministry and
enterprise officials has generally gone unpunished. In
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large measure this is because of the lack of personnel
and the limited authority of the existing enforcement
bodies. For example, while water resources are techni-
cally protected by the USSR Ministry of Land Recla-
mation and Water Resources, local inspectorates are
understaffed, can only impose a maximum 100 ruble
fine, and therefore have no authority to shut a plant
down. Some reports indicate that fines are paid out of
a portion of enterprise profits that go to the State
Budget and therefore have no impact on the enter-
prise's financial position. Pravda recently stated that,
"As a rule people who are found responsible for
environmental violations get off with slaps on the
wrist every time." Still, the cases that qualify as
exceptions to this general rule seem to be increasing.
Goskomgidromet has recently been able to exercise
greater enforcement powers. For example, in 1983 it
actually closed 71 production lines for an average of
one week each for pollution violations. The plants
closed were undoubtedly carefully chosen to allow a
clear message to be sent to industry that "greater
environmental vigilance is required" while sacrificing
the least amount of production possible.
Despite some successes in reducing emissions of air
and water pollutants from monitored sources, the
Soviet record in environmental protection over the last
decade is one of struggling to stay abreast of mount-
ing problems. While slowing the march of environ-
mental damage, Soviet programs have by no means
reversed the tide. They have failed to supply the
number, quality, and variety of abatement equipment
that the United States and some countries of the
industrial West have relied on to fight pollution.
Instead, Soviet gains have been made primarily by
improving the efficiency of use of the scarce equip-
ment that is available domestically and by exhorting
managers to take their environmental responsibilities
more seriously. Efficiency and discipline, however,
cannot be expected to improve continuously. And the
tasks of environmental protection will become more
difficult as the economy grows and the level of
pollutants increases.
Sustained progress will require substantial increases
in investment to produce needed equipment as well as
major changes in the incentive system to raise the
priority of environmental targets relative to output
goals in industry and agriculture. But capital invest-
ment for environmental protection actually fell in
1983, and the characteristics of the incentive system
that discourage environmental concerns are associat-
ed with the basic economic structure and resistant to
change. Industrial and agricultural enterprises are
rarely resource owners and thus have little concern for
conservation or long-term resource management prac-
tices. In the cases where there is significant concern,
central planning denies the enterprise manager the
flexibility to develop uses or customers for potentially
valuable byproducts of environmental-control opera-
tions, such as sulfur. Additionally, the Moscow-based
ministerial structure often allows decisions concerning
industrial sitings to be made with little regard for, or
knowledge of, environmental conditions.
Increased investment and structural economic
changes to promote environmental protection are un-
likely in the current period of slow growth. The
demands of the food and energy programs will leave
little room for investment in nonproductive sectors
like environmental protection that contribute little to
improving productivity, which is key to increasing
output in the Soviet economic strategy.
The "antipollution campaign" of the post-Brezhnev
regimes is probably aimed primarily at increasing the
vigilance of industrial and agricultural production
managers. Such a campaign could result in shortrun
benefits since negligence and improper use of equip-
ment continue to be major causes of pollution in both
industry and agriculture.
But the benefits will be small, because as environmen-
tal problems mount with economic growth, the effec-
tiveness of an antipollution campaign based on in-
creasing discipline is bound to diminish. Without
large infusions of capital and major modifications to
the incentive system, the leadership will be ill pre-
pared to stem the growing incidence of environmental
disruption in the next decade
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