USSR: COST OF THE SPACE PROGRAM

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• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 8, 2011
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: April 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
USSR:
Cost of the Space Program
Secret
SOV 85-10069
April 1985
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Directorate of
Intelligence
USSR:
Cost of the Space Program
This paper was prepared by
Office
of Scientific and Weapons Research. Comments and
queries are welcome and may be directed to the
Chief, Defense Industries Division, SOV~~
Secret
SOV 85-J 0069
April 1985
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Summary
Information available
as of 1 March 1985
was used in this report.
USSR:
Cost of the Space Program
percent.
The Soviet space program in the 1980s is undergoing rapid growth
comparable to that achieved soon after the program was initiated in the
mid-1950s. As the program has matured, its orientation has shifted to
emphasize military and future economic applications over lunar and
planetary programs designed primarily to enhance national prestige. To
assess the overall pace of these programs and their changing orientation,
we use the common denominator of dollar costs-estimates of what it
would cost the United States to duplicate the Soviet program. We estimate
the annual dollar costs of the program (including research and develop-
ment, procurement, operating, and support costs), expressed in 1983 prices,
have risen from the equivalent of over $8 billion in 1965 to over $23 billion
in 1984-averaging growth of about 6 percent per year. The average
annual growth rate in the early 1980s has been a more dramatic 18
We estimate that R&D has accounted for just over one-third of the
cumulative space program costs and has driven the major trends:
? About two-thirds of the R&D costs are accounted for by space launch
vehicles (SLVs). Failure of the SL-X-15 heavy-lift booster-the largest
cost item-in the early 1970s resulted in a retrenchment in the entire
space program. The new SL-W heavy-lift booster probably will be first
launched in the mid-1980s and is one of the major drivers of the upturn
in space program costs in the 1980s.
? Estimated spacecraft R&D costs have experienced less fluctuation.
Unmanned spacecraft-mainly for intelligence collection and communi-
cations-accounted for a large share of early expenditures, but expensive
programs to develop a manned space shuttle, a spaceplane, and large
space stations have begun to dominate spacecraft R&D expenditures.
procurement costs.
Space system procurement and operating costs have grown more steadily
than R&D costs. Growth through the early 1970s was accounted for
mainly by increasing launch rates; since then, these costs have risen largely
because of the introduction of new and considerably more expensive SLVs
and spacecraft. Throughout the space program's history, however, Soviet
emphasis on evolutionary space system design, component commonality,
and proven technology have held down the rate of growth in both R&D and
iii Secret
SOV 85-10069
Apri! 1985
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Since the mid-1970s the Soviet space program has steadily become more
oriented toward the military. We estimate the civilian share of the costs
has declined from about two-thirds of the costs in the late 1960s to about
one-third in 1984.
We believe the growth in space program costs will be sustained through the
late 1980s. Manned missions (including military applications) and intelli-
gence collection missions will dominate, each accounting for about one-
third of the estimated dollar costs for the next five years. Other military
missions will account for much of the remaining costs. Failure of or delays
in key development efforts would result in lower cost growth than we
project, however, especially in procurement and operating costs. Signifi-
cant delays in developing the SL-W booster would be particularly disrup-
tive, especially to those missions dependent on it, such as the manned
program.
Statements by Soviet scientists indicate there may be a resurgence in
civilian lunar, planetary, and astronomical programs by the late 1980s or
early 1990s. This would occur after most of the major new military
spacecraft had been deployed, thereby lessening the competition for
funding. However, a Soviet response to the US Strategic Defense Initiative
would probably retard and possibly eliminate this anticipated resurgence.
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Summary
iii
Background
1
Space Program Cost
3
Research and Development
5
Space Launch Vehicles
5
Spacecraft
6
Procurement and Operations
7
Support Systems
8
Military Versus Civilian Costs
9
Prospects
9
Appendix
Cost-Estimating Methodology
13
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USSR:
Cost of the Space Program
Since its origin in the 1950s the Soviet space program
has been given a high priority and has grown more
rapidly than most other military or scientific pro-
grams. Although the Soviets were the first to enter
space, they have generally trailed the United States in
achieving new space capabilities.' Nevertheless, the
Soviets now have systems in operation or in develop-
ment that will enable them to duplicate most of the
basic missions in the US program, and they are
developing manned spacecraft-such as the space-
plane and large space stations-that may afford them
unique capabilities in the near future.z
In the 1950s the Soviets established the research and
development (R&D) and production infrastructure for
the space program and initially concentrated on devel-
oping space launch vehicles (SLVs). In so doing, the
industry borrowed many facilities and programs from
the existing missile and aircraft industries.' All of the
SLVs operational through the early 1970s, and six of
the eight currently operational, were derived from
IRBMs or ICBMs that flew prior to 1965. The first
scientific and manned missions, flown in the late
1950s and early 1960s, provided a series of space
firsts, including Sputnik, the first manned orbital
flight, and the first space walk. The spacecraft flown
on these missions probably were designed, at least in
part, to enhance Soviet prestige; but they also were
being considered for military applications-either as
gious lunar and planetary missions.
orbit continued to be prominent but were constrained
by the relatively low-lift capabilities of the first
generation of SLVs. In the late 1960s the Soviets
tested the larger and more complex SL-12/13 Proton
and SL-X-15 systems, developed strictly for use as
SLVs.' The SL-12/13 proved highly successful, but
the SL-X-15 (comparable in size to the US Saturn V)
failed and caused a number of development programs
and missions to be aborted.
After this setback Moscow redirected its space pro-
gram in the early 1970s, emphasizing manned mis-
sions in low Earth orbit. The Soviets partly compen-
sated for the lack of a heavy-lift booster by using
smaller SLVs for frequent spacecraft launches and by
assembling smaller modules to construct space sta-
tions. Since 1971 small space stations have been
orbiting almost continuously, and each mission has
been longer and more complex
weapon platforms or as support systems.
In the early 1960s the Soviets began to broaden the
space program to include more practical economic
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The US space station will not be operational until at least the
early 1990s, a few years after deployment of the Soviet station is
ezpected.0
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Figure 1
Soviet Space Launch Vehicles
Meters
100
0 SL-8a SL-lle SL-14n
1,500 4,000 5,000
n
i~
6,000 7,000 7,000 ]4,000 18,000
Payload weight (kg) in near-Earth orbit
~~ Derived from SS-5 IRBM. ~ Derived from SS-6 ICBM. ~ Canceled in mid-1970x.
b Derived from SS-9 ICBM. d Under development.
such as the space shuttle and probably the space-
based laser will use this new booster.
SL-13
19,000
SI_-Wd
150,000
slightly in the late 1980s or early 1990s when the
space shuttle becomes operational. We estimate the 25X1
number of spacecraft in orbit will grow to about 140 25X1
by 1990.
'analysis of systems in development 25X1
The space program in the 1980s is undergoing rapid indicate that space-related design bureaus, produc-
growth comparable to that achieved soon after the tion facilities, launch complexes, control sites, sup- '
program was initiated in the mid-1950x. Our analysis port ships, and cosmonaut training facilities will
of system developments and operations indicates this grow at rates equal to or exceeding their average
growth will continue throughout the decade: growth rates since the 1950s.~~ 25X1
Figures 1 and 2 and table 1 provide an overview of
Soviet space system developments and operations.b
We have identified a total of 17 SLVs and 38 major
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ri
SL-X-15e
150,000
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types of spacecraft, including those still in develop- Space Program Cost
ment Although the number
of launc es ias een roug y stable since the early We estimate the cost of Soviet space activities by
1970s, the launches have supported an array of calculating what it would have cost the United States
increasingly more capable, longer lived spacecraft. (in dollars) to develop, launch, and operate identified
The Soviets launch more satellites annually than the
United States, but maintain about the same number
in operation because of shorter lifetimes (see figure 2).
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Figure 2
Successful Launches Per Year,
United States Versus USSR, 1957- 84
Figure 3
Total Dollar Costs of Identified
Soviet Space Activities, 1965-84
~ Total space R&D
~ (SLV plus
satellite)
Total hardware
(includes procure-
ment and launch
and flight opera-
tions)
Support
0 1965 70 75 80 84
Dollar estimates represent what it would cost to replicate Soviet development
and procurement in the United States and then launch and operate systems as
the Soviets would. These costs repro sent only those programs-existing or plan-
ned-lor which we have evidence. They may, therefore, underestimate total
program costs in general and R&D in particular.
operations, and support costs-have risen from over
$8 billion in 1965 to over $23 billion in 1984 (ex-
pressed in 1983 dollar prices). This represents an
average annual growth rate of about 6 percent (see
figure 3). The average annual growth rate in the early
1980s, however, has been almost 18 percent. R&D has
accounted for about 35 percent of the cumulative
estimated costs, a high share that demonstrates the
technical challenges of operating in space
Dollar costs convey an impression of the pace and
magnitude of the Soviet program and permit compari-
sons between elements of the space program as well
as, in the aggregate, between the Soviet and US
programs. Estimates in rubles are needed to portray
actual Soviet spending and to measure the impact of
space programs on the economy or Soviet perceptions
of their usefulness. Our estimates probably under-
estimate total costs because we figure costs only for
what we observe. We do not believe this is a signifi-
cant problem, however, because we are confident we
do not miss any large programs.
Using this approach, we estimate that annual Soviet
space program costs-including R&D, procurement,
The dollar costs of the space program have fluctuated
considerably over the period, mainly in response to the
fate of major Soviet R&D initiatives. Those compo-
nents of total costs that we can readily measure-
procurement, Operations, and support-have demon-
strated steady growth.' R&D costs have fluctuated
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Figure 4
Dollar Costs of Soviet Spacecraft and
Launch Vehicle Development, 1965-84
Total manned
spacecraft R&D
(includes shuttle
orbiter and
spaceplane)
Total unmanned
spacecraft R&D
Other SLV
development
SL-X-15 and
SL-W develop-
ment
Dollar estimates represent what it would cost [o replicate Soviet development
in the United States, using US technology levels. These costs represent only
those programs-existing or planned-for which we have evidence. They may,
therefore, underestimate overall R&D costs, particularly in [he late 1980s.
widely because of two significant efforts. Retrench-
ment in the early 1970s followed the cancellation of
the SL-X-15 and its associated heavy spacecraft, and
expansion in the late 1970s and early 1980s resulted
from a broad commitment to expensive manned space
programs (see figure 4). However, inclusion of only
R&D costs that we can directly associate with a
hardware development program tends to accentuate
fluctuations, insofar as we fail to account fully for the
general planning, research, and overhead expendi-
tures between major programs
booster built exclusively for the space program-the
four-stage SL-12 and its three-stage version, the
SL-13~ost more to develop than all previous SLVs
combined.
The first attempt to develop aheavy-lift SLV similar
to the US Saturn V accounts for the largest expendi-
ture in our estimate of Soviet space program costs.
Development of the SL-X-15, which commenced in
the early 1960s, was prompted by Soviet interest in
lunar landings and other manned interplanetary mis-
sions. During the first launch attempt in July 1969,
the booster exploded a few seconds after first-stage
ignition, damaging the launchpad and, according to
several emigres, killing many people. Following two
more unsuccessful attempts, a redesign effort was
initiated which probably involved extensive modifica-
tions to the propulsion system. first three
stages of an SL-X-15 at the launc comp ex during
early 1974, but no launch was attempted and subse-
quently the program was canceled. This program
failure was probably a major reason for the shift in
emphasis from lunar landings to manned space sta-
tions.
The Soviets designed the SL-X-15 using only proven
technology. The first stage had as many as 30 conven-
tional engines rather than more advanced liquid hy-
drogen engines such as those used in the United
States. Consequently, the SL-X-15 was more com-
plex, but less technologically advanced, than the
Saturn V. Its very large structure required the devel-
opment of new fabrication, welding, and handling
techniques; its larger combustion chambers created
problems in combustion stability; and its many en-
gines required a highly complex propellant feed sys-
tem. These requirements increased the SL-X-15's
development costs significantly.
Research and Development
Space Launch Vehicles. Between 1965 and 1984 SLV
development accounted for about two-thirds of the
estimated space system development costs. We esti-
mate the dollar costs (1983 prices) of SLV develop-
ment through 1984 were about $85 billion, including
$60 billion for programs since 1965. Most of the pre-
1965 programs-including the SL-3, SL-4, SL-6,
SL-7, SL-8, and SL-14-required fewer resources
than later ones because they used converted ICBM or
IRBM boosters for launchers. We estimate the first
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Spacecraft. The Soviets develop more unmanned than
manned spacecraft, but unmanned spacecraft account
for a relatively small share of space system R&D
costs. Manned versions are considerably more expen-
sive to develop because of their larger size, greater
complexity, and requirements for additional equip-
ment to provide crew habitability and safety.
We estimate the annual dollar costs for the develop-
ment of unmanned spacecraft have fluctuated be-
tween $250 million and $750 million, depending on
the number of programs conducted simultaneously,
and we expect this level of activity to rise only slightly
in the late 1980s.
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Unmanned spacecraft now in development generally
incorporate major advances in satellite payloads or
sensors. The Soviets continue to emphasize evolution-
ary improvements in propulsion, structure, and power
supply, which reduce overall development costs.
costs.
A network of data relay satel-
lites will provide intersatellite linking. New communi-
cations satellites-the Gals, Luch, and Volna net-
works-will use a common platform, and the resulting
hybrid satellite programs will share its development
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Figure 5
Soviet Space Program Procurement and
Operating Costs by Mission Category, 1965-84
Scientific/Lunar/Planetary
Military support
Intelligence
The costs of procuring [he spacecraft and associated launch vehicles, as
well as [he costs of launching and supporting a system, are included here.
~We
estimate the cumulative dollar costs since 1965 of
developing this relatively simple and slowly upgraded
system have been about $500 million.
The manned program, a major factor in space pro-
grams since the first Vostok launch in 1961, is now
beginning to dominate Soviet space efforts. The Vos-
tok series, used for low-altitude checkout of life
support systems, was followed by Voskhod tests of
multiman spacecraft and rendezvous procedures. The
next new design-the Soyuz-was the basis for the
Soyuz-T, the Progress cargo resupply vehicle, and the
military and civilian Salyut space stations. In 1977
the Soviets tested a new smaller station or multi-
purpose vehicle, Cosmos 929. This vehicle has a
unique two-section configuration with a recoverable
front end. Soviet statements suggest versions of this
spacecraft will be used as part of a modular space
station and possibly to recover materials from the
space station complex. Throughout the manned pro-
gram, evolutionary design approaches have signi
cantly reduced development costs (see appendix).
Procurement and Operations
The estimated dollar costs of procurement and flight
operations have risen since 1965 at an average of
about 7 percent per year; since 1980 they have
increased about 10 percent per year. This growth is
attributable mainly to increases in the estimated costs
of procuring newer SLVs and spacecraft (see figure 5).
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Recent growth in the SLV component of procurement
and operating costs has resulted from increased use of
the SL-12/13. The manufacturing facilities for this
vehicle were expanded in the late 1970s to more than
double their previous production capacity. In 1984 the
Soviets set a new record of 141aunches of the Proton.
We believe launch vehicle costs will continue to rise
substantially in the mid-to-late 1980s as the two new
launch vehicles, the SL-Y and the SL-W, enter the
inventory.
Increased use of the SL-12/ 13 has coincided with
increases in procurement of sophisticated manned and
communications spacecraft. The manned space pro-
gram has expanded especially rapidly, because the
Soviets have systematically increased the duration
and complexity of their space station operations.
Procurement costs have grown with the move to
modular Salyut/Cosmos 929-type stations, while op-
erating costs have increased with the frequent use of
crew and cargo resupply vehicles. We believe the
manned program will account for about 25 percent of
procurement and operating costs by the late 1980s.~
seven to 10 years. Geography forces the Soviets to use
numerous communications satellites to ensure reliable
communications in the higher northern latitudes; they
must deploy multiple satellites in highly elliptical,
semisynchronous orbits rather than a single spacecraft
in geosynchronous orbit.
Support Systems
Operational support for the wide variety of Soviet
spacecraft is provided by an integrated network of
land- and sea-based tracking stations. Unlike the
worldwide, land-based space tracking network of the
United States, Soviet support ground stations are
located only in the USSR. To supplement this net-
work,the Soviets deploy approximately a dozen ships
with specialized equipment to achieve global cover-
age, primarily to support manned missions. Dedicated
communications satellites and landlines link these
stations and ships with a central coordinating comput-
er center and with special mission=oriented flight
control centers. Certain high-priority programs, such
as the manned program, enjoy the exclusive use of
dedicated ground station equipment.
the Soviets are upgrading
The number of Soviet space launches has remained
generally steady since the late 1960s at about 100 per
year-a high rate necessary to maintain the networks
of single-mission, short-lived satellites and to account
for Soviet geography. In 1982, for example, the
Soviets had to launch a record 107 satellites in order
to maintain approximately 110 operational payloads
in orbit. The US Intelligence Community has estimat-
ed that improvements in Soviet spacecraft reliability
in the 1980s should afford average lifetimes of three
years-better than the one-year average in the 1970s,
but still considerably less than the US average of
nearly all of their ground stations to support more
sophisticated missions in the future. In addition, a
new satellite network is expected in the mid-to-late
1980s to relay digital data between individual ground
stations. We believe three very large support ships-
including anuclear-powered one-may be under con-
struction to augment the existing fleet of three space
operations control ships (SSOCS) and eight space
event support ships (SSESS). The SSOCS can per-
form most of the major functions of a control center,
while the SSESS are used primarily to collect telem-
etry during critical mission phases. During the 1980s
we estimate the annual dollar cost of operating this
network of tracking facilities and ships will average
$1.2 billion. The remaining support costs include the
costs of constructing new launch, tracking, and sup-
port facilities and the costs of the general support and
administrative activities necessary to maintain the
space program.
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Military Versus Civilian Costs
Arraying costs by military and civilian programs is
inexact because it requires a number of assumptions
However, approximately 15 percent of the spacecraft
launched-including those in the very expensive
manned program-are used for both civilian and
military applications. All of the space station missions
have included military experiments, and some have
been almost exclusively military. Most Soviet commu-
nications, meteorological, and navigation satellites
support civilian and military customers, and the earth
resources satellites, although primarily designed to
provide economic data, may perform at least minimal
intelligence-collection functions as well. Even purely
scientific programs may support future military appli-
cations. Soviet statements indicate that a 1983 Venus
probe carried a synthetic aperture radar, which prob-
ably was provided by a military designer and may be
incorporated in future intelligence-collection space-
craft for an all-weather, day and night imaging
capability. For such dual-use programs, we allocate
spacecraft costs to the military and civilian categories
according to observed usage. Launch vehicle costs are
allocated to the military or civilian category based on
the usage of the satellites they launch.
This analysis indicates that the early Soviet space
program was civilian oriented and dominated by the
very expensive lunar and planetary programs; but,
after 1974 and the cancellation of the manned lunar
program, space activities became military oriented
(see figure 6). During the late 1970s and early 1980s,
we estimate that at least two-thirds of the procure-
ment and operating costs and three-fourths of the
R&D costs were accounted for by military or
military-related missions. Reports by Soviet scientists
of cutbacks in funds for civilian scientific missions
suggest that the militarization of the space program
will continue. We project a resurgence of the civilian
lunar and planetary program by the late 1980s or
early 1990s, but this resurgence will come after most
of the new military spacecraft have been developed
Figure 6
Comparison of Soviet Military
Versus Civilian Space Activities,1965-84
Billion 1983 US $
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I ~ ~ ~ ~ I ~ ~ ~ ~ I
0 1965 70 75 80 84
Soviet space missions are allocated to these categories on the basis of
whether the US Defense Department or NASA would fund a similar
program in the United States. For dual-use spacecraft we allocate a portion
of the cost, based on observed use, to each category. Costs include R&D,
procurement, and operating costs for identified programs only.
and placed into orbit, thereby lessening the competi-
tion for funding. A Soviet response to the US Strate-
gic Defense Initiative (SDI) would probably retard
and possibly eliminate this anticipated resurgence.
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Current and planned programs indicate the recent
rapid growth in Soviet space program costs will be
sustained through the late 1980s, as the new SLVs
and manned spacecraft proceed through final engi-
neering, testing, and initial procurement. We have not
identified all of the systems that will support Soviet
space operations through the 1990s, so we cannot
predict confidently the direction of space program
expenditures beyond the late 1980s. However, we
expect growth to decline after the large programs now
in development become operational.
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The rate and composition of the growth of space
program expenditures through the remainder of the
1980s depend on the success of a number of Soviet
systems now in late stages of development. By far the
most important of these systems is the SL-W heavy-
lift launch vehicle. Prolonged delay in this program
would postpone not only SL-W production-the
major component of projected SLV procurement
costs-but also procurement of the costly shuttle,
space station, and other heavy spacecraft that will
depend on the SL-W. Were this to occur-and we
believe it unlikely-it would result in a reduction in
the growth of space system procurement expenditures
similar to that which followed the failure of the SL-X-
15 in the early 1970s. SLV R&D costs could rise if
the Soviets mounted a crash program to remedy the
SL-W's problems, but this rise would not offset the
major declines in procurement.
Other possible developments that could significantly
affect future developments are:
? Major problems in the development of satellites
designed to provide timely intelligence collection or
military operations support. The cost decreases
would be offset somewhat by an increase in the
launch rate for existing systems, but Soviet opera-
tional capability would be severely degraded.
? A reexamination of the manned program's goals
and benefits. This could result either in a reduction
of the considerable resource commitment in light of
current economic difficulties or an increase in re-
sources, necessary to expand the space station's
prestige and make it competitive with the proposed
US manned space station.
? A Soviet response to the US SDI. In the short term
we would expect little increase in either overall costs
or in hardware costs because a response would
consist mainly of relatively less costly basic re-
search. Some of this research might be conducted
aboard the space station, instead of through the use
of separate launches, to reduce costs and risk. ~~
Assuming the SL-W and other systems will reach
operational capability as expected, we have arrayed
projected Soviet space program costs over the 1985-89
period by major mission area (see table 2). These
estimates testify to the continuing military dominance
of the Soviet space program. Although we estimate
that civilian space programs will continue to account
Table 2
The Sbares of Major Missions in
Projected Space Program Costs, 1985-89
Mission Key New Systems Estimated Share of
Total Cost
Continuous Space shuttle
manned presence Spaceplane
in space, military Space station
RBtD, and space Space tug
manufacturing
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suggesting these programs will claim a major share of
the continuing growth in Soviet defense and civilian
R&D expenditures.
Through the end of this decade, responses to US
initiatives such as the manned space station and SDI
would more likely result in a reallocation of resources
within the space program than in significant increases
in spending. Reallocations would probably come from
the purely scientific and planetary missions, creating
an even more military-oriented program.
The major new and costly thrust in the Soviet space
program is the greatly expanded manned effort.
Soviet development efforts and statements suggest
that Moscow perceives two benefits, in addition to
international prestige, that justify the substantial cost:
? Multimission,flexibility. Although a single mission
could be performed at a lower cost aboard un-
manned spacecraft, the multipurpose space stations
allow several missions to be performed at once.
They also afford the potential to maintain, adjust,
and calibrate sensors and equipment and even to
redirect experiments. Recent Soviet statements in-
dicate that the cosmonauts perform a key role in
the success of numerous military and scientific
experiments conducted aboard Salyut.
? Future economic benefits. Manned space stations
have already been used to define areas of explora-
tion for natural gas. Soviet writings have also
predicted major production operations; one article
claimed "spaceships" would manufacture products
worth $50 billion by the year 2010.
Our projections suggest that military space program
costs will continue to grow more rapidly than the
dollar costs of Soviet defense activities as a whole.
Civilian programs are also expected to grow at similar
rates in the late 1980s. Both the military and civilian
space programs benefit in part from the redirection of
R&D assets from other areas, as demonstrated by the
aviation industry's current participation in the space
shuttle and spaceplane programs. Funds from other
areas, however, probably will not be sufficient to
support the projected growth in space programs,
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A recent cost
study estimated that if Soviet evolutionary systems
were to be manufactured in the United States they
would cost only one-third to two-thirds as much as
their US counterparts.
Soviet spacecraft are developed by design teams
generally unaffected by layoffs and economic fluctua-
tions and with well-established and consistent leader-
ship. This, and the emphasis on deadlines and perfor-
mance, tends to perpetuate the reuse or adaptation of
previous designs in follow-on spacecraft. Designs with
no known antecedents are rare, and multiple use of
structures, subsystems, and components in spacecraft
of the same vintage and in succeeding generations is
typical. These practices reduce both design and manu-
facturing costs and have enabled the Soviets to
achieve their space objectives quickly, economically,
and with a high degree of reliability-given their
technology.
and an orbital compartment containing the docking
assembly, which was used from 1966 to 1970 to test
rendezvous and docking techniques by forming "pseu-
do space stations" from multiple spacecraft. The
structure was modified slightly in 1971 to carry crews
to the Salyut space stations.
? The Zond series was initiated in 1967 as a test bed
for manned circumlunar flights. Although the pro-
gram was canceled in 1970 after five unmanned
tests, the reentry capsule and experience may be
applicable to future manned lunar systems.
? The unmanned and nonrecoverable Progress resup-
ply vehicle also contains three basic compartments.
The aft compartment contains instrumentation sim-
ilar to that of the Soyuz, but has been extended to
house additional electronic equipment. The center
compartment has been modified for the resupply of
propellant to the space station. The interior of the
front cargo compartment has been modified to carry
life-support systems and supplies.
? The Soyuz-T spacecraft, now the standard crew-
ferry vehicle, was developed directly from Soyuz but
also uses advanced digital computer technology and
an improved propulsion system.
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The three-man Voskhod satellite, which was basically
an enlarged Vostok, provided the technological base
for the Soyuz family. The basic Soyuz has an instru-
ment compartment, command and reentry module,
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Figure 7
Evolution of the Soviet Space Base
Low Resolotion,High Resolution I,
Earth Resources Technology Satellite,
Cosmos 1246
(photogeophysical)
Large station
resupply
Modular Skylab-size
space station space station
Manned mission
to Mars
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