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• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00591R000100090001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: April 21, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Relations
Prospects
for Soviet-West German
cret_
-S -0 Q_ F a- t
SOV 85-10019X
EUR 85-10017X
February 1985
COPY 4 7 9
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Directorate of
Intelligence
Relations
Prospects
for Soviet-West German
of the Office of European Analysis. Comments and
queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief,
Policy Analysis Division, SOVA,O or
the Chief, Western Europe Division, EURA, on
This paper was prepared by
the Office of Soviet Analysi;
Secret
SOV 85-10019X
EUR 85-10017X
February 1985
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Secret
Prospects
for Soviet-West German
Relations
Summary Soviet-West German relations in the coming year are likely to feature a
Information available continuation of both verbal acrimony and substantive cooperation. In
as of l February 1985 recent years, bilateral relations have suffered a series of jolts that has
was used in this report.
turned the relatively friendly atmosphere of the 1970s into a tense and
sometimes bitter climate in the 1980s:
? In October 1982 a center-right coalition government led by Helmut Kohl
came to power in Bonn, ending 13 years of Social Democratic-dominated
rule in which the policy of Ostpolitik flourished.
? In 1983 a long campaign of Soviet persuasion and intimidation failed to
block the Kohl government's plans to permit INF deployments to go
forward on schedule. The Soviets had warned that political and economic
relations with Bonn would suffer if the missiles were deployed.
? In 1984, after a brief period of relative calm in relations, Moscow
unleashed a barrage of propaganda attacking the West German Govern-
ment's alleged revanchist and militarist ambitions. Moscow also inter-
vened to block Bonn's efforts to improve ties with Eastern Europe,
apparently putting pressure on both East German leader Honecker and
Bulgarian leader Zhivkov to postpone visits to Bonn scheduled for the fall
of 1984.
Despite these setbacks, both sides have allowed the practical aspects of
bilateral relations to continue uninterrupted. Moscow and Bonn continue to
have a strong interest in political dialogue and economic cooperation,
providing a certain amount of stability to their relationship:
? From Moscow's perspective, West Germany is the linchpin of the NATO
Alliance in Europe, and the pursuit of a dialogue aimed at luring West
Germans away from close support of Alliance policies remains a central
long-term Soviet foreign policy objective. West Germany is also Mos-
cow's largest source of hard currency and a major Soviet source of
Western technology.
? West Germany, because of its ties with East Germany and location along
the border between East and West, remains fundamentally committed to
dialogue and cooperation aimed at reducing East-West tensions. Bonn
realizes that its relations with Moscow ultimately influence the extent of
its ties to East Germany. In addition, the West Germans are eager to
continue expanding trade with the USSR because they believe this will
Secret
SOV 85-10019X
EUR 85-10017X
February 1985
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both help overcome East-West tensions and ease domestic unemploy-
ment. Although trade with the USSR accounts for only a small part of
overall economic activity, several industries, including steel, could be
hurt by a cutback in Soviet purchasing.
At the same time, the interests of Bonn and Moscow diverge on a number
of issues such as Berlin, the fate of ethnic Germans in the USSR, and Eu-
ropean security. Such issues serve as persistent sources of friction in the bi-
lateral relationship and, given the unequal power relationship between the
two countries, provide Moscow with some leverage on issues of major
importance to Bonn. Soviet actions in 1984 affecting Allied access in and
around Berlin may have been, at least in part, reminders to Bonn and the
West of the costs of East-West tensions.
Moscow, however, has missed some important opportunities to advance its
own interests in dealing with the West Germans. Whereas government and
opposition parties in 1983 were polarized over security policy as a result of
the bitter INF debate, Moscow's hardline position in 1984 on the
conditions for resumed arms talks and its heavyhanded anti-German
propaganda have helped undercut the peace movement, forced the Social
Democrats to defend the Kohl government-and its intra-German policy-
from charges of revanchism, and made it politically easier for Kohl to
support US policies.
The Kohl government seems determined and capable-at least for the time
being-of resisting pressure from the political opposition to take initiatives
beyond simple calls for greater East-West dialogue to improve bilateral
relations. From the government's standpoint, improved bilateral relations
are somewhat less important now than they were only a few years ago,
when they more clearly were a prerequisite to closer intra-German
relations and expanded ties with Eastern Europe. Still, despite the Kohl
government's irritation with Soviet heavyhandedness, it will not want to do
anything to provoke Moscow. If Moscow indicates a readiness for a thaw in
relations, the West Germans will probably move to exploit it. Bonn also
will press its fellow NATO members to respond to any future Soviet arms
control initiatives so as to counter any Soviet efforts to gain the propaganda
advantage in Western public opinion.
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We believe that, in the near term at least, the frosty climate of So-
viet-West German relations is likely to continue. Moscow's anti-German
campaign may well culminate in an orgy of patriotic propaganda next
May, when the USSR celebrates the 40th anniversary of the victory over
fascism. In this sense, Moscow views its propaganda campaign not only as
an instrument of pressure against Bonn, but also as a means of rallying its
own population and its East European allies to meet what it portrays as a
broader politicomilitary challenge from the West. Regardless of how long
these attacks continue, the Soviets will be reluctant to jeopardize the
practical benefits of bilateral cooperation with West Germany.
Some uncertainties could affect relations more dramatically in the longer
term:
? Given Soviet paranoia about the Germans, Moscow will have a difficult
time adjusting to changes taking place in West Germany. These include
the recent electoral decline of the Social Democratic Party, Bonn's quest
for a more prominent role in NATO and in European security discus-
sions, the Kohl government's demands for the removal of remaining
vestiges of West Germany's postwar subservience, and Bonn's aggressive
efforts to improve intra-German relations.
? Future Soviet leadership changes-and their ripple effect through the
foreign policy hierarchy-seem likely to affect the course of bilateral
relations. Moscow's propaganda offensive against alleged German revan-
chism and its effort to force East Germany to curb its incipient
rapprochement with Bonn gathered steam after General Secretary
Andropov died in February 1984. Both his successor, Chernenko, and
Foreign Minister Gromyko-widely believed to be the force behind
Moscow's current hard line-are in their seventies and unlikely to be in
power more than a few years longer.
? Leadership changes also are possible in West Germany. Kohl could seek
to reduce criticism of his leadership by playing a more active internation-
al role. Moreover, a different CDU chancellor could be less inclined to
take a backseat to Washington in pursuing improved relations with the
Soviets. And if the Social Democrats gain greater influence at the
national level after the next election in 1987, they almost certainly would
pursue a more independent policy or pressure a CDU/CSU minority
government to do the same.
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The West Germans-the Social Democrats' rhetoric notwithstanding-
realize that their room for maneuver between East and West is limited.
Nonetheless, a more active and independent West German policy toward
the USSR aimed at improving East-West relations and arms control
prospects could entail problems for the United States. For example,
Alliance disunity could result if the West Germans begin to present
alternative views on arms control prospects-derived from their own
meetings with the Soviets-in NATO forums.
Ultimately, the climate of Soviet-West German relations may depend on
the course of US-Soviet relations. If the latter remain tense and the Kohl
government maintains its close support for US positions, Moscow will most
likely continue to attack Bonn and press Soviet allies in Eastern Europe to
keep their distance. If Moscow perceives US-Soviet arms control negotia-
tions in 1985 to be productive and begins to adopt a more conciliatory
approach toward the United States, however, a continued harsh line
toward West Germany will be difficult to sustain and, perhaps,
undesirable.
Although Kohl appears content to follow the lead of the United States in
the hope that US-Soviet relations will improve and lead to better So-
viet-West German relations, he probably would be compelled to take a
more activist approach if US-Soviet relations or arms control prospects
show no sign of improvement by the end of 1985. The present period in
which Bonn is content to take a backseat to Washington is unnatural given
West Germany's interests, the advanced state of Soviet-West German
relations, and the belief prevalent in West Germany-although not shared
by Kohl-that West Germans are more capable of dealing with the East
than is the United States.
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Summary
Changing Relations After INF Deployment
The Impact in West Germany
5
Political Contingencies and Their Implications
14
West German Political Developments
14
Soviet Responses
15
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Prospects
for Soviet-West German
Relations
The West German Bundestag's approval of INF
deployments in West Germany in November 1983
marked a watershed in Soviet-West German rela-
tions. The Soviets had waged a major diplomatic and
propaganda campaign to persuade two West German
governments to forgo deployments. From Moscow's
perspective, the stationing in West Germany of US
Pershing II ballistic missiles capable of striking deep
into Soviet territory presented serious military and
political problems and raised the specter of West
German access to NATO nuclear weapons. The
Christian Democratic (CDU/CSU)-Free Democratic
(FDP) coalition government of Chancellor Helmut
Kohl was determined to follow through on former
Social Democratic Party (SPD) Chancellor Schmidt's
commitment to deploy the missiles in the absence of
an arms control agreement, even as the SPD back-
tracked on INF. Bonn fully realized, however, that
deployments could bring a chill to East-West and
Soviet-West German relations and jeopardize the
important humanitarian gains made over the last
decade in intra-German relations.
The Soviet-West German relationship since INF
deployments began has become more complex. On the
one hand, the climate of bilateral relations has wors-
ened considerably. This has been most evident in
Moscow's harsh rhetoric alleging a resurgence of
revanchist sentiment in the Federal Republic. At the
same time, the Soviets have permitted the practical
aspects of bilateral relations-economic cooperation
and political meetings-to continue uninterrupted,
Bulgarian leader Todor Zhivkov drove home the fact
that, in conducting relations with Eastern Europe,
Bonn cannot ignore Soviet interests.
Despite Moscow's obvious ability to control certain
actions of its allies, we believe that its behavior over
the last year-especially its inability to respond con-
sistently to West German policy-has reduced Soviet
influence in West Germany. In particular, Moscow
has been unable to reconcile its desire to punish Bonn
for accepting INF deployments with its desire to
exploit West German offers for a continuation of
detente, which the Soviets probably believe could
foster longer term divisions between Bonn and Wash-
ington. The West Germans have pursued their foreign
policy goals without suffering a precipitate decline in
relations with Moscow because the Soviets have been
unwilling to sacrifice the substance of their bilateral
relations with Bonn to curb tendencies they find
displeasing.
Moscow Responds to Bonn's Assertiveness
The Kohl government began to pursue "German
interests" in its foreign policy more assertively follow-
ing the onset of INF deployments. The long INF
debate had ruptured the decades-old consensus be-
tween the major parties on security issues and fueled
public concern that West Germany was not in control
of its own destiny. The Kohl government was anxious
about the potential dangers these sentiments could
pose to West Germany's long-term reliability as a
NATO Ally and moved quickly to restore some
semblance of a consensus between the governing
coalition and the opposition SPD.' West Germany's
within previous limits.
The readiness of some East European countries-
most notably East Germany, Hungary, and Bulgar-
ia-to maintain a dialogue with West Germany en-
couraged Bonn to pursue closer relations with them
despite obvious Soviet misgivings. Bonn's Ostpolitik
has come a long way from the days when the prevail-
ing view was that the road to Eastern Europe went
through Moscow. Nevertheless, Moscow's clear role
in the postponement of visits last fall to West Germa-
ny by East German leader Erich Honecker and
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Moscow's Initial View
of Chancellor Kohl's Government
Moscow's early ambivalence toward the Kohl govern-
ment was evident in divergent themes that emerged in
Soviet media commentary after the new coalition
took office in October 1982. Most commentators were
cautious, predicting a swing to the right in domestic
policy but no significant shift in Bonn's foreign policy.
Izvestiya's Aleksandr Bovin was perhaps most san-
guine, declaring on Soviet television on 17 October
that for `political" and "geopolitical" reasons Bonn
had no choice but to continue cooperation with the
Soviet Bloc. Bovin added, however, that although
Kohl hoped to achieve a "synthesis" of Adenauer's
pro-US policies and Brandt's Ostpolitik, West Ger-
man policy was likely to look more like Adenauer's
than Brandt's.
Literaturnaya Gazeta's Bonn correspondent, Anatoliy
Frenkin, painted a somewhat starker portrait of West
German foreign policy under Kohl in the 13 October
issue of the weekly newspaper. Frenkin predicted that
changes would take place, given the political proclivi-
ties of the conservative politicians coming into office.
He voiced particular alarm over the potential influ-
ence of CSU Chairman Franz Josef Strauss. Frenkin
said that the government changeover marked the end
of the Eastern policies of Brandt and predicted that
West Germany would harden its line toward East
Germany in particular.
The Soviets were apparently more anxious in private
over the implications of the political change in Bonn.
According to a West German diplomat in Moscow,
Ukrainian party boss Vladimir Shcherbitskiy told
the West German Ambassador that the CPSU Polit-
buro and Central Committee were consciously re-
fraining from commenting publicly on the situation.
The West Germans reportedly assured Shcherbitskiy
that the breakup of the center-left coalition was
largely due to economic differences and that West
German foreign policy would not be greatly affected.
Shcherbitskiy was reluctant to accept this and insist-
ed that the United States had caused the political
crisis to put an end to Ostpolitik and facilitate
Pershing II deployments.
new assertiveness has manifested itself in several
ways:
Following the lead of French President Francois
Mitterrand, the Kohl government has been seeking
to strengthen European defense cooperation through
bilateral arms production agreements and a revital-
ization of the Western European Union (WEU).
To remove the vestiges of subservience to its Allies,
Bonn requested and received a WEU decision in
June to remove the remaining restrictions on West
German conventional armaments.
The Kohl government actively-and with some
success-has pushed for improved intra-German
relations, and in its public rhetoric has emphasized
that the "German Question" remains open.
We believe the Kohl government's actions have
worked to ameliorate the damage caused by the INF
debate and, indeed, to create the appearance of a new
consensus on at least some aspects of foreign and
security policy. Almost all of the government's actions
on intra-German relations and European cooperation
have been supported by the SPD.
Moscow did not embark on its harsh policy toward
West Germany immediately following INF deploy-
ments. Despite their earlier threats to freeze relations,
the Soviets indicated that their dialogue with Bonn
might continue without interruption or undue acrimo-
ny. Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko met
with West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich
Genscher at the opening of the Conference on Disar-
mament in Europe (CDE) in January 1984, and
General Secretary Konstantin Chernenko received
Kohl in Moscow at the time of Yuriy Andropov's
funeral in February. These meetings were reported to
have been businesslike and not unusually discordant.
The Soviets became increasingly annoyed and
alarmed, however, at West Germany's assertive be-
havior. In particular, the rapid pace of events in the
intra-German sphere in the first few months of 1984
and Kohl's public statements denying the Soviet
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Figure 1. Kohl and Honecker
meet at Andropov's funeral.
Moscow worried about the ex-
panding intra-German dialogue
Figure 2. Kohl and Chernenko
meet on the occasion of Andro-
pov's funeral.
theme that East-West relations were suffering as a discussions of the alleged rebirth in West Germany of
result of INF deployments seemed to increase Mos- a determination to restore German hegemony in
cow's interest in making a dramatic gesture to under- Europe, West German efforts to undermine East
score the changed East-West climate. Germany, and the danger of rising fascist and neo-
Nazi sentiment in Europe at large.
In response, Moscow unleashed its "revanchism"
campaign in the spring and summer, and the atmo- When Genscher went to Moscow for talks in late
sphere of Soviet-West German political relations May, Gromyko took a harsher line than he had during
began to worsen. The volume of Moscow's propagan- a meeting in January. In their private discussions,
da concerning a possible revival of West German Gromyko upbraided West Germany for supporting
revanchism and militarism took a significant leap in
April and May. Soviet media became filled with
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US policies and replayed propaganda charges about
an alleged revival of revanchism in the Federal Re-
public. At the same time, the Soviets remained com-
paratively circumspect on bilateral questions. They
agreed to attend a West German-sponsored East-
West environmental conference in late.June and
appeared willing to be more flexible on the longstand-
ing difference over participation of West Berliners in
bilateral Soviet-West German agreements.
Soviet rhetoric grew even more shrill in the summer
months in reaction to the WEU decision lifting
restrictions on Bonn's right to produce long-range
offensive weapons. The Soviets mounted a campaign
of both public and private pressure directed not only
at Bonn, but at West Germany's allies as well. In late
June top Soviet officials told visiting British Foreign
Secretary Geoffrey Howe that the revival of the
WEU would only serve to strengthen revanchist
trends in West Germany. In July the Soviet Govern-
ment delivered a memorandum to West Germany
protesting the WEU decision, and Moscow made
related demarches to other WEU members and to the
United States. In subsequent public and private state-
ments, the Soviets warned that they would act "inde-
pendently" to prevent a recurrence of the German
military threat if the Western powers did not con-
strain their West German ally.
In late July the Soviets decided to publicize more
directly their disquiet over the proliferation of intra-
German ties. Soviet concern apparently was increased
by Bonn's tacit claim to have secured East German
humanitarian concessions in exchange for the $330
million loan guarantee it announced on 25 July. Two
days after Bonn announced the loan guarantee,
Pravda published an article by veteran German af-
fairs writer Lev Bezymenskiy warning that Bonn was
trying to undermine East German sovereignty by
using "economic levers and political contacts" to
solicit concessions on "matters of principle." Pravda
repeated the attack on 2 August in an unsigned
commentary, a device frequently used to convey au-
thoritative views.
In September, Honecker, apparently responding to
Soviet pressure, postponed a long-anticipated visit to
West Germany scheduled for the end of the month.
Shortly afterward, Zhivkov announced that he, too,
would be unable to go to West Germany as planned in
September. Zhivkov made his announcement the day
after meeting with Soviet Politburo member Gorba-
chev in Sofia.
The Soviets continued their strident attacks on West
Germany through the remainder of the year, often
choosing occasions when the message would not be
lost on the East Europeans. In early October, Gromy-
ko emphasized Bonn's alleged revanchist ambitions in
a speech in East Berlin commemorating the 35th
anniversary of the founding of East Germany. Clearly
following the Soviet lead, the Warsaw Pact foreign
ministers' communique on 4 December claimed that
West German revanchism was hindering the estab-
lishment of better relations between European states.
On 6 December the Soviet representative to the
mutual and balanced force reduction (MBFR) talks in
Vienna made an unusual attack on Bonn during a
plenary meeting. He cited Bonn's positions on MBFR
and conventional defense, as well as INF and the
lifting of WEU restrictions on West German arms
production, as evidence of increased West German
militarism. The Soviet representative to the Confer-
ence on Disarmament in Europe (CDE) unexpectedly
made a similar attack on Bonn in a 14 December
session marking the close of the conference's regular
session.
Motives for Moscow's Behavior
Moscow's pressure tactics against Bonn apparently
have been designed not only to punish it for accepting
INF deployment, but also to preempt the emergence
of West Germany as a more powerful and independ-
ent actor in either political or military terms on the
European scene. Viewed in conjunction with INF
deployments, Bonn's push for a prominent role in
European defense planning and its aggressive courting
of East Germany have aroused Moscow's historical
fears of a recurrence of the German threat.
Moscow also has tried to generate political pressure
on the Western powers to exercise greater control over
their German ally. Soviet criticism of efforts to
promote "European defense" suggests that Moscow
may be concerned that a perceived loosening of US
and NATO reins on Bonn in this manner could work
against longer term Soviet interests and objectives in
Europe.
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Secret
Moscow's attacks on Bonn probably have been target-
ed at Eastern Europe and the Soviet public as well. By
evoking dreaded images of Germany's past, Moscow
has reinforced the theme that East-West relations
have reached an unprecedented level of danger, there-
by justifying its obstreperous approach to dealing with
the West and its demands for greater sacrifice at
home and increased Bloc unity. Soviet propaganda
attacks last summer on West German motives in
dealing with East Germany were clearly aimed as
much at East Berlin as Bonn. Moscow may also have
seen the supposed German threat as an especially
useful bogeyman for diverting public opinion in Po-
land from the regime's internal problems. Both Soviet
Premier Nikolay Tikhonov and Polish leader Woj-
ciech Jaruzelski made the threat of German revan-
chism a central theme in speeches to the Polish Sejm
on 21 July.
The Soviets have probably been concerned that Bonn
is trying to exploit East European fears concerning
the effects of US-Soviet tensions on their own rela-
tions with the West. Genscher publicly called on the
smaller states of Europe to play a role in overcoming
the East-West chill, a position that has some support
in Eastern Europe despite apparent Soviet opposition.
Indeed, Moscow's differences with some of its allies
over the issue spilled into public in April 1984, when a
Soviet magazine took the unusual step of reprinting a
Czechoslovak newspaper attack on views expressed
earlier in the year by Hungarian party secretary
Matyas Szuros. Szuros had endorsed the idea that
smaller European states should play a mediating role
between the "great powers," a position the Czechoslo-
vaks-and, indirectly, the Soviets-labeled a "pecu-
liar" distortion of Communist "internationalist" obli-
gations. East Germany signaled its support for
Hungary's position by reprinting in Neues Deutsch-
land Szuros's rejoinder to the Czechoslovak attack-
originally published in the Budapest daily Magyar
Hirlap.
The issue later reappeared in the more specific con-
text of intra-German relations. In an interview pub-
lished in Neues Deutschland in August, Honecker
said that relations between East and West Germany
could have a positive effect on the situation in Europe
and that East Berlin wanted to limit the damage that
INF deployments had done to East-West relations.
The Soviet party daily Pravda published a lengthy
report on Honecker's statement but failed to reprint
these remarks.
The economic benefits for East European countries of
trade with the West have compounded Moscow's
difficulty in maintaining Bloc cohesion, a point of
vulnerability clearly recognized by the West Ger-
mans. Last year, East Germany, Hungary, Romania,
and Bulgaria all had indicated to Bonn they were
interested in increasing trade with West Germany.
Chancellor Kohl perceived that this could be an
advantage for the West if the USSR finds it more
difficult to manage its allies. Soviet behavior in the
ensuing months almost certainly reflected Moscow's
realization of this danger.
The Impact in West Germany
Soviet efforts to punish the West for INF deploy-
ments and to constrain West Germany's renascent
activism in Europe have weakened Moscow's influ-
ence and image in the Federal Republic. Polls indi-
cate that many West Germans believed the Soviets
were not justified in breaking off the Geneva INF
talks.Although the SPD initially took an "I told you
so" attitude toward the Soviet walkout, by last spring
many party leaders privately were acknowledging
frustration about Moscow's inflexible stance on re-
turning to the arms control negotiations, as well as its
lack of enthusiasm for preferred SPD positions on
arms control such as merging START and INF (see.
the inset).
The Soviet revanchism campaign, which has been
publicized widely in West Germany, has further
damaged Moscow's image. Bonn has responded to
Soviet charges by emphasizing West Germany's com-
mitment to detente and its belief that reunification
and border changes can only come about peacefully.
Moreover, government and opposition leaders have
insisted that the Soviets implicitly accepted the West
German commitment to eventual reunification in a
letter of understanding associated with the 1970
Moscow Treaty normalizing bilateral relations. The
Soviets have denied any such acknowledgment.
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Moscow's View of West Germany's
Political Opposition
The SPD. Moscow has been encouraged by the
leftward drift of the Social Democratic Party in
recent years. An article published in a Soviet ideolog-
ical journal in late 1983 observed that the SPD had
turned back toward its Marxist roots, citing the
revitalization of the party's left wing and the radical-
ism of its youth movement. The author concluded
that, while the Social Democrats are still reformists
rather than revolutionaries, the similarity of their
views and lexicon with those of "Marxist-Leninists"
creates a "basis for constructive dialogue" and raises
the possibility of forming a "single action platform. "
While the Soviets publicly applauded
the SPD's decision to oppose NATO INF
deployments, they have been more ambivalent about
recent trends in SPD thinking on security issues.
According to Embassy reporting in both Bonn and
Moscow, the Soviets failed to score points with the
SPD during a September 1984 joint conference in
Moscow on security issues. The heavyhandedness of
Soviet attacks on US and NATO security policies
and West German "revanchism"forced the SPD
delegation to rise to the defense of both Washington
The Greens. Moscow was slow to respond to the rise
of the Green Party as a political force in West
Germany but moved to exploit its opposition to INF
deployments once the party gained representation in
the Bundestag. Candidate Politburo member Boris
Ponomarev received a Green delegation in Moscow
just prior to the Bundestag vote on INF in November
1983 and, according to an account of the meeting in
Pravda, expressed `profound sympathy"for the
Greens' participation in the West German antiwar
movement and welcomed their 'positive assessment"
of Soviet peace initiatives. In May 1984 Chernenko
personally issued a public reply to a letter on nuclear
arms policy from Petra Kelly, a leading figure in the
Green Party. Even if the Greens never gain participa-
tion in a West German government, Moscow will view
them as a useful source of pressure on Bonn to curb
military spending and reduce West Germany's com-
between the Reds and the Whites.
mitment to NATO.
At the same time, the Soviets are under no illusions
about the ideological reliability of the Greens. Soviet
writings have criticized the party for holding the
Soviet Union equally responsible with the United
States for the arms race. In a May 1984 conversation
with Ambassador Burns, Soviet Ambassador to East
Germany Kochemasov compared the Greens to
groups in postrevolutionary Russia that vacillated
Nevertheless, the Soviets realize that the Greens
could become a potent and durable force in West
German politics. One Soviet analysis, published in
the premier Soviet international relations journal in
early 1983, discounted predictions that the Greens
would be a "nine-day wonder, " arguing that the party
had "good possibilities" of gaining "immeasurably
bigger successes" in the future. Indeed, the Green
Party eclipsed the Free Democratic Party in June
1984 elections for the European parliament and in
recent West German state and communal elections. If
the present trend continues, the Greens could eventu-
ally replace the FDP as the third-largest party in the
Bundestag.
and the Kohl government.
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Even the Social Democrats have been critical of the
revanchism campaign. Egon Bahr, the SPD's arms
control expert, told Soviet party officials during a visit
to Moscow in July that the lifting of WEU armament
restrictions should be viewed as West Germany's
gaining full sovereignty. Bahr, who negotiated the
Moscow Treaty, also warned the Soviets that charac-
terizing West Germany's desire for eventual reunifi-
cation as revanchism would undermine that treaty.
Indeed, a top CDU official in late July publicly
praised the SPD's reaction to the Soviet revanchism
charges, including Bahr's stand on the question of
German unity. The US Embassy in Moscow reports
that West German diplomats were pleased that SPD
leaders (particularly Bahr and Bundestag Deputy
Caucus Chairman Horst Ehmke) continued to defend
the Kohl government against revanchism charges
during a visit to Moscow in late September.
In short, Moscow's behavior has undercut those forces
in West Germany most critical of the Kohl govern-
ment's security policy-notably in the peace move-
ment and political opposition-who have argued that
NATO does not always serve "German interests" and
that West Germany is not truly sovereign. They
interpreted Moscow's protests against removal of the
WEU restrictions on West German arms production
as demonstrating that the Soviets are more interested
than the Western Allies in keeping the West Germans
subservient. And Moscow's role in the cancellation of
the Honecker visit showed them that it is the
Soviets-not the Americans and the West
Europeans-who are interested in blocking pursuit of
improved intra-German relations.
Despite their unified rejection of Moscow's revan-
chism charges, the government and the opposition still
differ on how to deal with the Soviet Union, especially
since the announcement in early September postpon-
ing Honecker's visit. The SPD is operating under the
earlier Ostpolitik assumption that intra-German and
West German-East European relations are totally
dependent on the overall East-West climate, and that
the road to Eastern Europe goes through Moscow. In
line with this belief, the opposition tried to use the
postponement of the Honecker and Zhivkov visits to
score political points by claiming the Kohl govern-
ment was incapable of conducting Ostpolitik. The
Social Democrats played down the Soviet role in
Honecker's decision, preferring to accept the official
East German explanation that the political climate in
West Germany was not right for a visit. SPD Chair-
man Willy Brandt blamed INF deployments and
argued that the postponements refuted Kohl's position
that intra-German relations could be insulated from
the chill in East-West relations. The rhetoric of the
Social Democrats indicates that they believe the Kohl
government must pay far more attention to relations
with the USSR and to measures to improve overall
East-West relations. Brandt even suggested an un-
specified "European disarmament initiative."
The Kohl government does not appear to place as high
a priority on making concessions to Moscow to im-
prove bilateral relations as do the Social Democrats.
Given Moscow's attitude, the government probably
believes further efforts at this time to improve bilater-
al ties would be futile. Moreover, Bonn appears to
believe that improved US-Soviet relations are a pre-
requisite to improved Soviet-West German relations,
and the Kohl government has been content to be
viewed simply as working closely with Washington
rather than taking the lead in breaking the East-West
impasse.
We believe the Social Democrats' politically motivat-
ed behavior could backfire domestically by creating
the impression that they are too critical of the West
and are breaking the consensus on intra-German
policy. The Kohl government realizes this and has
shown no nervousness about publicly challenging the
Social Democrats. Kohl even complained in public
that the Social Democrats had made themselves
"useful idiots" of the East by the nature of their
reaction to the postponements. West Germans appear
to accept that Moscow is responsible for the postponed
visits, and there does not appear to be a groundswell
of support for making concessions or overtures to
Moscow to improve prospects for a Honecker visit.F-
Despite the emotionally charged atmosphere, the So-
viet Union and West Germany retain long-term inter-
ests in good bilateral relations. These strong interests
provide a stabilizing factor in the overall relationship
even when rhetoric turns strident.
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Security Interests
Moscow has a long-term interest in weakening West
Germany's support for NATO. The Soviets view West
Germany as the pivotal NATO member in Western
Europe. Its location along the border between East
and West ensures that the bulk of NATO forces
associated with forward defense will be located on
West German territory. This automatically gives the
West Germans an important voice in the formation of
Alliance policies and makes them a natural target for
Soviet exploitation. Moscow no doubt finds it in its
own interest to encourage West German advocacy of
arms control and detente within NATO and to play
on opposition in West Germany to new NATO weap-
on systems or major new NATO defense programs.
At the same time, the Soviets historically have been
fearful of West Germany's coming to play an impor-
tant role in European security outside NATO. In the
1950s they vehemently opposed the creation of a
European Defense Community-a plan for West Eu-
ropean military integration that was ultimately vetoed
by the French-largely because of concern over West
Germany's potential role in the organization. Soviet
reaction to Bonn's role in the revitalization of the
WEU has been similar, reflecting a continued fear
that developments beyond Moscow's control may lead
to greater West German independence or actual
withdrawal from NATO.
Bonn's security interests in relations with the USSR
are equally basic, long term, and unlikely to change.
West Germany, because of its location, would suffer
enormous damage even in a limited military conflict
with the Warsaw Pact. In an age of US-Soviet
strategic nuclear parity, Bonn believes it essential to
reduce the risks of war-deliberate or accidental-by
encouraging East-West dialogue, arms control, and
the adoption of confidence-building measures. Public
statements by West German officials
across the political spectrum indicate an assumption
that a broad web of West German economic, cultural,
and political ties with the East will reduce tensions,
improve mutual understanding, and thereby reduce
the risk of conflict.
perceive Moscow as having a continued interest in
cooperation with the West. They also have a tendency
to listen sympathetically to Soviet concern about
perceived or potential areas of inferiority.
statements by politicians in all parties suggest
that many influential West Germans share these
views.
The West Germans also realize that-although the
East Europeans appear to have greater room to
maneuver-the Soviets ultimately control the extent
to which intra-German reconciliation can occur and
West German-East European cooperation can im-
prove. Moscow can encourage progress in intra-Ger-
man relations, as it did in the early 1970s in the face
of reluctance on the part of East Germany's Walter
Ulbricht, or it can slow progress, as it did in forcing
Honecker to postpone his visit.
Political Interests
Dialogue. Moscow's historical fear of a German
threat actually increases its stake in political ties to
Bonn. Indeed, with US-Soviet relations severely
strained, Moscow appeared in early 1984 to be trying
to demonstrate its ability to maintain a dialogue with
West European countries, including West Germany.
This was illustrated by the number of high-level
visitors invited to Moscow, including Genscher. Bonn
also is eager-for domestic political reasons-to dem-
onstrate an ability to maintain a dialogue with the
USSR. Indeed, in view of its symbolic importance, the
dialogue is viewed as a positive development in itself.
Arms Control. Soviet-West German bilateral discus-
sions over the last few years have been dominated by
arms control and security issues. The return to power
of the Christian Democrats and their firm commit-
ment to INF deployments diminished Moscow's hopes
that Bonn would act as a force for flexibility in
NATO circles, but it did not completely eliminate
them. The Soviets still hope that their actions will
produce domestic pressures on Bonn that will weaken
West Germany's support for NATO force moderniza-
tion plans. The Kohl government generally has de-
fended Alliance positions in bilateral discussions with
The West Germans do not believe the Soviet Union
would attack Western Europe given NATO's present
military capabilities. Despite increased US-Soviet and
East-West tensions generally, the West Germans
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There are 1.9 million ethnic Germans in the USSR.
Their ancestors were invited to Russia in the 18th
century by Empress Catherine the Great. Although
they originally settled in the Volga River region, most
were forcibly moved eastward to Kazakhstan after
the German invasion in 1941.
The Soviets permitted greater ethnic German emigra-
tion following conclusion of the Moscow Treaty in
1970. The number of emigrants peaked during the
mid-1970s and fell off sharply during the 1980s (see
figure 3). In the late 1970s, 600 to 800 emigrated
monthly; during the first six months of 1984 only 455
were permitted to emigrate. In the face of Bonn's
repeated protests, the Soviets insist that there are no
more ethnic Germans who wish to leave. The West
German Red Cross, on the other hand, claims to
know of 100,000 ethnic Germans who want to
emigrate.
Figure 3
Ethnic German Emigration From the
Soviet Union, 1970-83
Source: Figures for 1970-80 are based on visas issued
by the West German Embassy in Moscow. Figures for
1981-83 are from the West German Red Cross.
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West Germans-including the SPD-also use their
contacts to probe for signs of Soviet flexibility, which
then can be related to NATO and the United States.
Since last fall, both the government and its opposition
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Human Rights and Ethnic German Emigration.
Bonn's overriding nonsecurity objective in its dealings
with Moscow is to increase the number of ethnic
Germans permitted to emigrate (see the inset). The
number has fallen sharply in recent years, from a high
of more than 9,600 in 1976 to 455 during the first six 25X1
months of 1984. This issue is raised by the West
Tourist travel requests by ethnic Germans reportedly
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of emigration severely worsens the Soviet image in
West Germany and-given the political influence of
emigre groups-sometimes restricts the conservatives'
room for maneuver in dealing with the Soviets. Mos-
cow has given no indication that it is prepared to
increase the level of emigration.
Bonn generally makes pro forma protests on other
Soviet human rights violations. It apparently does not
believe that strong public protests will bring greater
Soviet flexibility and seems to fear that Moscow
might take an even harder line on ethnic German
emigration if it were to play up Soviet human rights
Berlin. The Soviets recognize Berlin as a point of
vulnerability for West Germany and the West as a
whole. In 1984 they took a number of relatively
technical actions that, viewed collectively, under-
scored the city's continued susceptibility to Soviet
pressure. While the Soviets do not wish to precipitate
another Berlin crisis or undermine the Quadripartite
Agreement, we believe their actions were at least in
part reminders to Bonn and the West of the costs of
East-West tensions.
Kohl has been
closely watching what he considers to be Soviet
"salami-slicing tactics" concerning Berlin, especially
unilateral changes in air corridor reservations and
periodic harassment of Allied military trains. Al-
though Kohl is concerned about these actions, he
believes they are primarily a matter for the three
wartime Western Allies-the United States, France,
and the United Kingdom-to deal with. The Chancel-
lor does not want to publicize the actions in part for
fear that this would make West German citizens more
hesitant to travel to Berlin.
On a more routine level, the USSR consistently
objects to what it perceives as increasing West Ger-
man efforts to build ties with West Berlin and to
maintain that West Berlin is part of West Germany.
Moscow does not formally discuss Berlin issues direct-
ly with Bonn. To do so would amount to tacit
recognition that West Germany has a role in the city.
Moscow addresses its concerns instead to the three
other Protective Powers.
ment.
Soviet protests to the Allies about West German
behavior are nothing new, but their intensity appears
to be increasing. The Soviets were particularly in-
censed by West Berlin's participation in the European
Parliament election in June 1984. More recently,
Moscow objected strenuously to plans by the West
German states to establish a German Cultural Foun-
dation in West Berlin. Given the Kohl government's
rhetorical emphasis on West Berlin as legally being a
part of the Federal Republic and its commitment to
increasing the number of high-level West German
visitors there, Moscow will almost certainly continue
to accuse Bonn of violating the Quadripartite Agree-
The West Germans-determined to maintain and
strengthen linkages to West Berlin-can be stubborn
on this issue. Last May a West German canoe team
departed prematurely from a competition in Moscow
because the Soviets refused to permit the inclusion of
West Berliners in the team. The West German For-
eign Ministry interpreted the Soviet action as a
hardening of the general Soviet position on inclusion
of West Berliners in West German groups. The three
outstanding bilateral agreements being negotiated
between Moscow and Bonn (Science and Technology
Cooperation, Cultural Exchanges, and Legal Assist-
ance) have long been stalemated because the two sides
cannot agree on the status of West Berliners.
ings have yet to be decided
Environmental Cooperation. Progress is being made
with regard to Soviet-West German cooperation on
environmental protection. According to West German
officials concerned with East-West relations, working-
level experts from both sides met in early September
1984, and four additional meetings have been sched-
uled for 1985. The first two will address problems of
atmospheric pollution; the themes of the other meet-
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Figure 4
Structure of West German Trade With the Soviet
Union in 1983, by Value
Manufactured goodsa-41.8
a Excluding machinery.
Source: Statistisches Jahrbuch.
There are, however, political obstacles to expanded
environmental cooperation. According to a West Ger-
man diplomat in Moscow, serious work on environ-
mental matters cannot occur without the participation
of Berliners since the bulk of West German experts
are located in that city (the West German decision in
the 1970s to locate the Federal Environmental Office
in West Berlin evoked strong Soviet protests). A
further requirement for more extensive exchanges,
according to the diplomat, is conclusion of the Science
and Technology Agreement. The West Germans be-
lieve-perhaps too optimistically-that Soviet eager-
ness to exploit West German scientific expertise on
environmental questions will put pressure on Soviet
authorities to satisfy Bonn on the Berlin issue so that
the agreement can be concluded.
Economic Interests
Trade. Moscow may have its greatest stake in eco-
nomic relations with Bonn. West Germany is Mos-
cow's largest source of hard currency and a major
source of Western technology. The value of bilateral
trade grew from $1.1 billion in 1972 to nearly $10
billion in 1983. Not only does Moscow demonstrate a
strong preference for trading with West German
suppliers, but West Germany also is the most impor-
tant Western market for Soviet exports, more than 85
percent of which consist of raw materials, natural gas,
crude oil, and oil products (see figure 4).
Moscow relies heavily on West German participation
in major construction projects. For example, on the
Siberian gas pipeline project, West German firms
provided substantial engineering services, nearly half
of the large-diameter pipe, and more than one-third of
the gas turbines for compressor stations. The West
Germans also are providing drilling equipment for a
Soviet natural gas field near Astrakhan at the Black
Sea. Other active cooperative development projects
include modernization and reconstruction of a Soviet
papermill, the Oskol electrometallurgical combine,
the Sayansk aluminum plant, and supply of train-
handling equipment to update and expand existing
facilities at several Soviet seaports.
In 1983, West German exports to the Soviet Union-
more than 90 percent of which are manufactured
goods (see figure 4)-jumped 14.2 percent to $4.4
billion (see figure 6). By comparison, exports to the
EC remained flat and sales to OPEC fell by 21
percent. Nonetheless, exports to the USSR in 1983
accounted for only 2.6 percent of total West German
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exports, still below the high of 3.1 percent in 1976 (see
figure 7). During the first half of 1984, West German
exports to the USSR were 16.3 percent less than for
the same period in 1983. Declining Soviet purchases
of manufactured goods-particularly semifinished
goods-accounted for 93.7 percent of the drop in
exports.
Sales to the USSR have only a limited impact on
overall West German economic activity. In the 1980s,
exports to the USSR have constituted about 0.5
percent of total West German GNP. And, according
to West German estimates, only about 100,000 work-
ers out of a total work force of more than 27 million
are employed directly in producing goods for export to
the Soviet Union.
West German exports to the USSR are concentrated
in several key industries, however, and a cutoff or
disruption could significantly affect a few firms. Plant
equipment, large-diameter pipe, and other steel prod-
ucts in 1983 accounted for 60 percent of sales to the
Soviets. Exports in general accounted for about 40
percent of West Germany's total steel production and
over 45 percent of machine tool production. Soviet
purchases alone accounted for about 11 and 9 percent
of total steel and machine tool exports, respectively.'
' The USSR has been an especially welcome buffer against hard
times for West German steel firms. Total production is well below
capacity and unemployment in the iron and steel industry currently
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Figure 6
West Germany: Trade With the
Soviet Union, 1970-83
During 1983 the value of imports from the Soviet
Union declined by 1.3 percent to $4.6 billion, as
compared with the previous year. West German im-
ports of Soviet crude and oil products actually in-
creased in volume, but falling prices held down Soviet
revenues (see appendix A). As a result, West Germa-
ny's trade balance with the Soviet Union, which had
shown large deficits in 1981 and 1982, moved closer
to balance in 1983 (see figure 6). This year, however,
West Germany's deficit probably will increase again.
While exports are declining, total imports from the
USSR in the first half of 1984 were up 9.2 percent
(led by a 12.2-percent increase in fuel imports) over
the same period in 1983.
West German banks helped arrange three credits for
the Soviet Union in 1984 totaling more than $500
million. These include a $250 million credit extended
by a consortium led by Dresdner Bank, a $100 million
credit extended by a Deutsche Bank-led consortium,
Figure 7
West Germany: USSR's Share of
Total Exports, 1970-83
I I I I I I I I I I I
and, most recently, a $162 million credit by an
international consortium headed by Commerzbank.
The Commerzbank credit, announced in September,
has a seven-year maturity with a four-year grace
period. Interest is to be 0.5 percentage point above the
London interbank offer rate (LIBOR) during the first
four years and 5/8 of a percentage point above
LIBOR for the remainder of the term. The loan was
not tied to Soviet purchases of West German exports.
Prospects for Expanding Trade. Even though the
deterioration in East-West relations has not adversely
affected bilateral Soviet-West German economic re-
lations, the Soviet economic situation may slow trade
expansion in the near term. Soviet exports to the
West-hence Soviet hard currency earnings-depend
heavily on world energy markets. While the USSR
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managed to expand the volume of its hard currency
oil sales last year, the declining availability of oil for
export is likely to cut these sales sharply by 1990.
Exports of natural gas to Western Europe and to
West Germany will almost double over the next few
years as the new Soviet export pipelines go into full
operation. The West European gas market has been
softer than expected, however, and the West German
gas company Ruhrgas does not expect Soviet gas
purchases in the 1980s to increase beyond the mini-
mum amounts already contracted for. Additional
Soviet gas earnings will be offset over the next decade
by pipeline loan payments. Further, the Soviets have
had little success in expanding hard currency earnings
by exporting to the West manufactures beyond basic
commodities such as fertilizer, petroleum products,
and some other chemicals. When pressed on this
matter during the November 1983 meeting of the
Soviet-West German Mixed Economic Commission,
former West German Economics Minister Lambs-
dorff told his interlocutors that increased purchases of
manufactures would depend on the competitiveness of
Politics and Sanctions. The West Germans will be
reluctant to agree to economic sanctions against the
Soviet Union in the absence of a major Soviet provo-
cation. Across the political spectrum, most West
Germans do not believe that sanctions work and are
concerned about the possible impact on employment.
Although the employment effects of trade with the
USSR are not great, the concern over this issue is
magnified by West Germany's high jobless rate.
Most important, however, the West Germans believe
that economic relations with Moscow help to promote
detente and stabilize political relations with Eastern
Soviet goods.
At that meeting, Moscow also called for greater long-
term cooperation with West German firms, especially
in energy conservation, consumer goods, and agricul-
ture. Lambsdorff apparently was concerned, however,
by the paucity of proposals for joint large-scale pro-
jects. He was given the impression that the large coal
conversion project in Siberia's Kansk-Achinsk re-
gion-one of the few major development projects
discussed-remains well in the future. The Soviets
instead focused on small and medium-sized projects in
the food-processing and consumer goods areas. Even
here, they did not discuss specific factories.
The West Germans also are concerned about the
possible impact of Soviet countertrade requirements
on bilateral trade, especially in the important machine
tool sector. The Soviets reportedly now are insisting
that contracts for machine tool sales to the Soviet
Union include provisions for West German purchases
of Soviet machine tools of at least 10 percent of the
value of the contract. West German exporters are
having difficulties in marketing the Soviet machine
tools they are being forced to accept in these arrange-
The future course of Soviet-West German relations
may well be determined by internal political evolution
in both countries. In the past, domestic political
factors-especially in West Germany-have had a
profound influence on the nature of the bilateral
relationship. The effect of changes in the Soviet
leadership has been less perceptible, but they probably
have played some role in the twists and turns of Soviet
policy and could produce more dramatic changes in
the future.
ments.
West German Political Developments
Moscow built a degree of rapport with West Germa-
ny's SPD-led governments between 1969 and 1982.
The SPD clearly was committed to improved relations
with the East and, in contrast to the Christian
Democrats' rhetoric at that time, was more attuned to
accepting the postwar status quo in Europe. More-
over, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, Chancellor
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Schmidt's periodic willingness to challenge US ad-
ministrations and NATO security policies probably
encouraged Soviet efforts to weaken West German
support for NATO policies. On the negative side,
however, the Soviets almost certainly did not approve
of Schmidt's overall security policy-including his
government's steady increases in defense spending in
the 1970s, its focus on increased European coopera-
tion, and the Chancellor's own warnings in the late
1970s about a growing Soviet superiority in
intermediate-range nuclear forces. Despite these
drawbacks, the Social Democrats clearly appeared to
the Soviets to be preferable to the Christian Demo-
cratic alternative.
The deterioration in East-West relations following the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Soviet threats to
Poland increased Moscow's stake in courting the
SPD. Moreover, Moscow's conciliatory talks with
SPD leaders encouraged the party to overestimate its
role as mediator between East and West. Schmidt
came to see himself as an "interpreter" between the
United States and the USSR, and the SPD regarded
itself as having significant influence in both Moscow
and Washington.'
Given the contacts between Moscow and the SPD, the
return of the Christian Democrats to power could
have had profound implications for Soviet-West Ger-
man relations. For domestic political reasons, howev-
er, the new West German Government felt compelled
to demonstrate that it too could maintain a dialogue
with the Soviets and was not overeager to deploy new
missiles. In line with this, the government emphasized
its commitment to detente, its desire for an arms
control agreement that would reduce or eliminate
INF deployments, and its determination to maintain
the "continuity" of the Schmidt government's Ostpo-
litik. The Kohl government, like its predecessor,
continued to object to the US pipeline sanctions
' Although the SPD does not desire to be a tool of Moscow-and
does not think of itself as one-the weakness of the SPD leadership
(Schmidt being the notable exception) made it vulnerable to
manipulation by Moscow during the INF debate. In addition to
stirring up public fears over the consequences of INF deployments,
SPD leaders-particularly Willy Brandt-publicized even the most
minor Soviet moves as "concessions." Doing this made it appear
that SPD pressure helped to bring them about and that Moscow
decision. The government decided to extend the dura-
tion of the 1973 and 1974 West German-Soviet joint
economic cooperation agreements for another 10
years. Kohl met with several visiting Soviets during
his first few weeks in office. Indeed, given the pace of
events designed to demonstrate "continuity," one
senior CDU party official sought out US Embassy
officers to preempt any concerns that Kohl's meetings
with Soviets represented a rush effort to establish
contacts with Moscow.
Some differences have emerged, however, between the
approaches of the Schmidt and Kohl governments to
dealing with the Soviets. Kohl has acted much less
like a mediator than Schmidt. Moreover, to differenti-
ate his government from the SPD's, Kohl clearly has
stressed in public West Germany's overriding com-
mitment to the West: "We will extend a hand to the
East, but only with both feet firmly planted in the
West."Kohl was not shy in telling his Soviet interloc-
utors that West Germany would proceed with INF
deployments in the absence of an arms control agree- 25X1
ment. He even complained to Soviet officials about
the continued division of Germany during his visit to
Moscow in July 1983.
Soviet Responses
Moscow clearly was displeased by the return of the
Christian Democrats to power in West Germany and
has taken a harsher tone in dealing with Bonn. During
its campaign to derail initial INF deployments, the
Soviets tried to intimidate the Kohl government with
threats of political and economic retaliation while
they simultaneously nurtured their ties with the SPD
and the West German peace movement. More recent-
ly, Moscow's revanchism campaign has tried to por-
tray the Kohl government as moving West Germany
dangerously to the political right.
Despite its clear preference for the Social Democrats,
Moscow apparently wanted to establish a working
relationship with the Kohl government and to preserve
the essence of Ostpolitik. High-level bilateral contacts
have continued at an uninterrupted pace (see the
inset). Kohl's visit to Moscow in 1983 continued the
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practice of regular summits established in the 1970s.
During that visit, Andropov indicated he would accept
Kohl's invitation to visit West Germany. While con-
demning Kohl's stance on INF, the Soviet media
applauded the Chancellor's interest in maintaining
the dialogue with Soviet leaders established by his
predecessors. Moscow particularly welcomed Kohl's
public endorsement of the 1970 Moscow Treaty,
which heralded a significant expansion in bilateral
cooperation. Soviet commentators noted approvingly
that Kohl's statement marked a formal reversal of the
Christian Democrats' attitude toward Ostpolitik.
Even after INF deployments began, Moscow contin-
ued to show interest in working with the Kohl govern-
ment and to view Kohl as a potential force for detente.
Following Kohl's visit to Washington in March 1984,
influential Izvestiya commentator Aleksandr Bovin
said on Soviet domestic radio that Kohl's message to
President Reagan was, "Let's not break with the
Soviet Union; let's have a dialogue." Bovin asserted
that "the pressure from Western Europe on America
inclines toward greater political moderation, greater
realism." In a conversation with a US Embassy
official in Moscow the following month, Yuriy
Davydov,, head of the European Department of the
Institute of USA and Canada, suggested that West
Germany and other West European countries might
repeat the pattern of the late 1960s and early 1970s
by establishing a detente with Moscow that would
Soviet Leadership Politics
Although we have no direct evidence that Soviet
leadership changes have affected policy toward West
Germany, the timing of certain shifts in Moscow's
approach to Bonn suggests that internal politics may
have had an impact. In particular, Andropov's death
may have paved the way for a harder line toward
Bonn.
The Andropov regime, while not departing substan-
tially from the basic outlines of Brezhnev's German
policy, moved West Germany to the center of the INF
issue, seeking to forestall US deployments by playing
upon West German public opinion rather than by
continuing negotiations with the United States. Under
Andropov, Moscow clearly sought to exploit opportu-
nities to sow discord between Washington and Bonn
and to highlight supposed common "European" inter-
ests of the West German and Soviet peoples.
Future leadership changes could also affect Moscow's
German policy. For example, candidate Politburo
member Boris Ponomarev, the party's longtime secre-
tary in charge of relations with the European left
including the SPD, is nearly 80 years old and is
widely viewed as a voice for ideological orthodoxy.
His most likely successor is Vadim Zagladin, who,
while no liberal, is generally regarded more highly in
Western Europe than Ponomarev and could bring a 25X1
more pragmatic and flexible hand to the job
lead to a broader East-West accord.
Meanwhile, Soviet officials have kept up regular and
frequent contact with the SPD in both Bonn and
Moscow. SPD Bundestag caucus leader Hans-Jochen
Vogel was received in Moscow by Andropov in Janu-
ary 1983 and by Chernenko in March 1984.
Moscow still views the SPD as an attractive target for
Soviet manipulation, even though the party has been
relegated to an opposition role. As the anti-INF
campaign demonstrated, Moscow places a premium
on cultivating strong opposition to US security poli-
cies in Europe, even if the payoffs initially are only
We believe that the current frosty climate of So-
viet-West German relations is likely to continue in
the near term. The Soviet campaign of vilification
may reach a crescendo in May 1985, when Moscow
and its allies mark the 40th anniversary of the end of
World War II in Europe and renew the 30-year-old
Warsaw Treaty. Soviet propaganda will probably
emphasize the themes of German revanchism and
wartime aggression to underscore the need for Pact
unity and discipline, particularly since some Pact
members reportedly favor a shorter renewal period for
modest.
the Warsaw Treaty than Moscow does.
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How long Moscow will continue to take a harsh line
toward Bonn may hinge on factors over which the
West Germans have little control. Although fears of a
resurgent German threat are probably quite real for
Soviet political leaders, the current anti-German cam-
paign is also a response to the broader politico-
military challenge from the West and the resultant
pressures on Soviet Bloc unity. Regardless of what the
West Germans might do to allay Soviet fears, Mos-
cow may continue to use the supposed German threat
to rally Eastern Europe and the Soviet population
behind Soviet foreign and military policies.
Moscow faces a dilemma in deciding how far to go in
cooling relations with Bonn. The Soviets obviously are
loath to jeopardize the substantial benefits of ties to
West Germany, especially in the economic field. That
is why, to date, damage to relations has been limited
mainly to the atmosphere in which they are conducted
and, perhaps, the pace at which cooperation can be
accelerated.
The inconsistency and frequent heavyhandedness of
Soviet policy have in some ways worked to the Kohl
government's advantage and made it politically easier
for Kohl to support US policies. Moscow's belated
efforts to exert pressure on West Germany through
hostile propaganda and to circumscribe intra-German
ties came only after the internal political polarization
produced by the rancorous INF debate in West
Germany had eased. Consequently, the Soviets missed
an opportunity to increase domestic pressure on Bonn
to advocate Western arms control concessions. Do-
mestic pressure on the Kohl government would have
been much greater if the Soviets had not broken off
the Geneva talks and, after deployments began, had
followed through immediately on threats to make
their displeasure felt by West Germans, especially
through a reduction in economic ties or a curtailment
of intra-German contacts. Although the postpone-
ment of Honecker's visit to West Germany brought to
the fore some differences between the Christian Dem-
ocrats and the SPD, even the Social Democrats feel
under domestic pressure to defend the Kohl govern-
ment against some of the more outlandish Soviet
charges.
We believe that the Kohl government still will be
careful to avoid provoking Moscow unneccessarily,
especially by playing up current frictions in the Bloc.
It realizes that the Soviets-as the postponements of
the Honecker and Zhivkov visits illustrate-can in-
hibit, if not halt, the expansion of West Germany's
ties with Eastern Europe whenever they choose. For
similar reasons, in the absence of a major new Soviet
provocation perceived as threatening West German
interests, we believe the Kohl government will resist
any moves to substantially tighten restrictions on
technology transfer to the Soviet Union or to impose
economic sanctions. Bonn also realizes that provoca-
tive actions on its part-such as public attacks on the
Soviets or blatant expressions of German national
ambitions-probably would weaken Bonn's position in
Eastern and/or Western Europe by giving credibility
to Soviet allegations of aggressive and revanchist
tendencies.
At the same time, the Kohl government almost cer-
tainly will not modify its position on German unity in
the face of Soviet threats. Not only does it view the
pursuit of reunification as fulfillment of a constitu-
tional obligation, but it also derives substantial do-
mestic political benefits from emphasizing the issue.
Bonn may be forced by Soviet pressure to slow the
pace of its rapprochement with East Berlin, but it will
continue to pursue greater interchange between East
and West Germans and resist pressure to accept de
jure the postwar division of Germany.
The West Germans remain fundamentally committed
to good relations with the East and to arms control. If
Moscow indicates a readiness for a thaw in relations,
the West Germans will want to exploit it.
For the time being, at least, Bonn under Chancellor
Kohl appears resistant to opposition calls to take
greater initiative to improve bilateral ties with the
USSR. The Kohl government, believing that im-
proved US-Soviet relations are a prerequisite to im-
proved Soviet-West German relations, prefers to wait
to see what will come of renewed US-Soviet arms
control discussions in 1985. The Social Democrats, on
the other hand, still believe that Bonn must play a
more active and independent role in breaking the
East-West impasse. They will continue to maintain
that the Kohl government's strong support for US
security policy has reduced Bonn's influence with
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Moscow and hence its ability to promote German
interests through an improved East-West climate. The
Social Democrats like to think of themselves and
West Germany as indispensable world actors, and
they are likely to portray Chernenko's apparent choice
of France for his first official visit to the West as
Soviet leader as a sign of West Germany's diminished
international role under Kohl.
Kohl will probably continue to resist pressure to take
the initiative to improve relations with the Soviets or
to "mediate" between the United States and Soviet
Union provided:
? He can demonstrate that West Germany has some
influence on the formation of US policy on East-
West relations and a major influence on NATO
arms control policy. The Chancellor's visit to Wash-
ington on 30 November was important in this
regard.
? The United States is viewed as pursuing improved
relations and arms control with the Soviet Union.
If US-Soviet relations or arms control negotiations do
not advance by the end of 1985, however, Bonn will
find it more difficult to avoid taking initiatives. This
will be especially true if the Soviets are successful in
improving their image in Western Europe by placing
the blame for continued East-West tensions on the
United States.
The West Germans-the Social Democrats' rhetoric
notwithstanding-realize that their room for maneu-
ver between East and West is limited. Nevertheless, if
they decide to take the initiative in improving ties
with Moscow, problems could arise for the United
States. For example, Alliance disunity could result if
the West Germans begin to present alternative views
on arms control prospects in NATO forums.
Kohl eventually may be compelled to take greater
initiative on the East-West front for domestic political
reasons. His leadership increasingly is coming under
attack from within his own party, and he could seek to
improve or avert a further deterioration in his position
by playing a more active international role. Moreover,
if Kohl were to be replaced by another member of the
CDU, the new Chancellor might be less inclined to
take a back seat to Washington in pursuing improved
relations with the Soviets. If the Social Democrats
gain greater influence at the national level after the
next election, they almost certainly will pursue a more
independent policy or press a CDU/CSU minority
government to do the same.
Even if Bonn begins to make overtures to the Soviets,
Moscow, given its paranoia about German national-
ism, will have a difficult time adjusting to continued
West German assertiveness in Europe. With the
exception of intra-German relations, manifestations of
this assertiveness-especially the push for greater
European defense cooperation-cannot be influenced
directly by Moscow. This new assertiveness has grown
out of increased East-West tensions, changing popular
perceptions of the Soviet Union and United States,
and social and generational changes. All of these have
been exacerbated by the INF debate.
The continuing failure of the Social Democrats to
improve their electoral standing could prompt Mos-
cow to reevaluate its approach to both the SPD and
CDU/CSU. Moscow might conclude that the left-
ward drift of the Social Democrats has been counter-
productive. The prospect of long-term conservative
rule could induce Moscow to try to establish a more
cooperative relationship with the CDU/CSU and
build the foundation for a more durable bilateral
detente. On the other hand, the prospect of long-term
CDU/CSU rule in Bonn could strengthen the impres-
sion in Moscow that the basis for detente with West
Germany has eroded. Such a conclusion probably
would not lead Moscow to curtail bilateral economic
ties, but it would lower Soviet expectations about the
potential for political and military detente in Europe
as a whole. Moscow would then be more likely to
sustain its anti-German rhetoric over a longer period
and could decide to cut back on high-level political
contacts with the West German Government.
Whatever the political coloration of any new govern-
ments in Bonn, the Soviets will continue to regard
West Germany as pivotal to their interests in Western
Europe. At the least, they will keep a close eye on
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West Germany's stance on European security issues
and intra-German affairs and will react sharply to
any change they believe might lead even remotely to a
revived German threat. While Soviet policy will prob-
ably continue to be reactive regarding perceived dan-
gers from West Germany, Moscow could undertake
initiatives aimed at influencing West German politi-
cal options if it detects opportunities to shift West
German policies in a direction more favorable to
Soviet interests.
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Appendix A
West German Energy Imports
From the USSR
At the current level of trade, Bonn does not consider
strategic dependence on Soviet goods to be a problem,
even in the energy sector. The Soviet Union has
benefited from West Germany's energy crises in the
1970s, which resulted in Bonn's decision to diversify
the sources of its energy imports. The West Germans
generally consider the Soviets to be reliable suppli-
ers-certainly more reliable than alternative Third
World sources.
Petroleum and Petroleum Products. During the first
three quarters of 1984, petroleum accounted for 42.5
percent of total West German primary energy con-
sumption, down from 44.2 percent in 1983 (entire
year) and 55 percent in 1973 (entire year). This is in
line with stated government policy to reduce reliance
on petroleum in favor of natural gas and coal. Almost
all of West Germany's petroleum needs must be met
through imports. The Soviet Union now accounts for
less than 10 percent of West Germany's imports of
crude oil and oil products.
While West Germany's overall dependence on oil
imports has declined sharply, its dependence on the
USSR has grown. Between 1970 and 1980, imports of
crude oil from the USSR averaged about 3 percent of
total West German crude imports. The West Ger-
mans intended to reduce imports of Soviet oil as
imports of natural gas were being increased. Instead,
imports of Soviet crude increased from 1.0 to 4.4
million metric tons between 1981 and 1983, or about
6.7 percent of total crude imports (see figure 8). And
during the first six months of 1984, imports from the
USSR were 46 percent higher than in the first half of
1983 and accounted for 8.3 percent of total imports.
The Soviet Union is now the fourth-largest crude
supplier-behind the United Kingdom, Libya, and
Nigeria-and the largest supplier of crude oil and
petroleum products.
We do not believe that West German imports of
Soviet crude oil and petroleum products are critical to
the West German economy as a whole or to specific
industries. Although West Germany is exceedingly
dependent on world oil market availabilities, a cutoff
of supplies from the USSR could be offset from other
sources in a normal market situation.
Natural Gas. Natural gas now accounts for about 15
percent of West German total primary energy con-
sumption. Approximately two-thirds of West Germa-
ny's requirements must be met through imports. The
USSR became a major supplier in 1978, when deliv-
eries to West Germany increased from the previous
year's total of 5.1 billion to 8.3 billion cubic meters. In
that year, deliveries began under a third contract
signed in 1974 between Ruhrgas and Soyuzgazexport.
In 1980, the USSR accounted for nearly 30 percent of
total West German imports, or 16 percent of total
consumption. This figure has not changed significant-
ly since (see figure 9).
Imports of Soviet gas are expected to increase with
completion of the Siberian pipeline and will amount to
about 30 percent of total domestic consumption when
the pipeline is in full operation. The West German
Government does not see any alternative to increased
reliance on Soviet gas, and the Cabinet decided before
conclusion of the pipeline deal that dependence on
Soviet supplies for up to 30 percent of total gas
consumption was acceptable.
Ruhrgas's contract with the Soviets calls for annual
deliveries of 10.5 billion cubic meters through the
Siberian pipeline and an additional 0.5-0.75 billion
cubic meters for West Berlin. The contract also
enables Ruhrgas to take up to 20 percent less than the
contracted amount in any given year without penalty.
Given the lower-than-expected demand for gas in
West Germany, we expect that Ruhrgas will be
exercising this option at least through the end of this
decade.
Soviet gas is primarily distributed in southern West
Germany where the pipeline from the USSR connects
with the German system. A sudden and extended
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Figure 8
West Germany: Crude Oil and Oil Product Imports From
the Soviet Union, 1970-83
Share of Total Oil Imports
Percent
111111111i
0 1970 75 80
83
Volume
Million metric tons
I I I I I I I I
0 1970 75
Figure 9
West Germany: Imports of Natural
Gas, 1973-83
From Soviet
Union
I I I 1
75 80 83
a Estimated.
Source: 1982 Comite Professionnel du Petrole and
previous editions.
cutoff might cause initial difficulties in this area until
systemwide readjustments could be made. The West
German pipeline system is highly developed, and
shortfalls could be equalized throughout the system
fairly rapidly in the short term by increased imports
from neighboring suppliers, particularly the Nether-
lands, plus stepped-up domestic production.
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