(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00590R000300480001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: May 12, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Higher Profile
Indonesia's Foreign Policy:
Implications of Seeking a
EA 85-10165 .
September 1985
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Directorate of
Intelligence
Higher Profile
Indonesia's Foreign Policy:
Implications of Seeking a
This paper was prepared by I Office
of East Asian Analysis, with a contribution from
Office of Central Reference.
OEA
directed to the Chief, Southeast Asia Division,
Secret
EA 85-10165
September 1985
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Secret
Indonesia's Foreign Policy:
Implications of Seeking a
Higher Profile
Key Judgments Over the past two years, Indonesia has undertaken a more aggressive
Information available foreign policy in an effort that we believe reflects a desire for a more
as of 5 September 1985 prominent role in international politics, a return to "normalcy" following
was used in this report.
years of semiseclusion, and an attempt to redress major economic setbacks
resulting from.a soft world oil market and the global recession. Jakarta
has:
? Improved trade relations with China, the USSR, and Eastern Europe.
? Arranged talks between ASEAN and Hanoi on the Cambodian issue.
? Stepped up participation in multilateral organizations.
? Hosted several prominent international conferences to bolster its image
as a leader in the Third World.
In the coming months, Jakarta almost certainly will take other steps to
boost its nonaligned credentials. We believe its ambition to enhance its
prestige in the Third World and to demonstrate publicly that it is not a cli-
ent of the West-particularly the United States-could lead it to become
more aggressive in championing LDC causes, such as promoting access to
developed country markets and disarmament.
Nevertheless, we do not believe Jakarta's recent moves foreshadow a major
shift in its efforts to project an image of evenhandedness in its approach to
East-West issues or its pragmatic approach to economic affairs, at least as
long as President Soeharto remains in office. Indonesia's regional political
interests have broadly paralleled those of the United States, and Soeharto
appears intent on maintaining solidarity with ASEAN in dealing with
Vietnam about Cambodia. Further, Indonesian authorities privately admit
that they look to the US defense umbrella for protection against potential
external threats.
Jakarta's intense distrust of Moscow and Beijing means that it will try to
restrain Soviet and Chinese influences both domestically and in Southeast
Asia. Indonesian officials continue to regard China as the region's primary
security threat in the long term, and, despite some thaw in relations with
Beijing, we believe political relations will improve only gradually. Trade
with both Eastern Europe and China will probably increase as a result of
recent initiatives, but the prospects for substantial gains are constrained by
hard currency limitations in the Communist countries and Indonesian lack
of interest in barter.
Secret
EA 85-10165
September 1985
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In the longer term, Indonesia's Third World aspirations, strong sense of
nationalism, and concentration of decisionmaking in a narrow elite could
incline a successor to Soeharto toward a foreign policy course more
independent of the West. In the meantime, Jakarta will settle for image
building by hosting noncontroversial meetings of international forums and
increasing its participation in these bodies.
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Key Judgments
Undertaking Regional Initiatives 3
Looking Ahead: Continuity Under Soeharto 8
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Figure 1
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
7 e
Seo~lul J an,*
(Irea VTokyo
Rangoon
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Macau (Port.)
Vietnam
Thailand South
Bangkok *Mnila
Philippine North
-- T
Pacific
Ocean
0
i nra Seaa\~ opines
Bandar Seri
Kuala Begawan
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Singapore
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n. +d . "o n e.
> 1 ~
Port*
Moresby
AustraIila
puap Solomon
Neww Guinea avlslands
Coral J
Sea j
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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Indonesia's Foreign Policy:
Implications of Seeking a
Higher Profile
The New Assertiveness
Jakarta submerged itself in a protracted period of
low-profile foreign relations in the late 1960s follow-
ing the political and economic upheaval of the Sukar-
no era. President Soeharto concentrated on domestic
issues-promoting economic development and main-
taining political stability. Foreign relations under
Soeharto initially, consisted largely of rebuilding eco-
nomic ties to the West as a source of development
assistance, foreign investment and technology, and
access to commercial markets. Soeharto veered away
from Sukarno's flamboyant Third World polemics,
"froze" relations with China-a rejection of Sukar-
no's flirtation with Beijing-and played down deal-
ings with Moscow.
with China serves national economic interests, and in
the past year Indonesian security officials-almost
certainly at Soeharto's urging-one by one have
ended their opposition to direct trade. According to
the US Embassy, Indonesian trade officials hope
dealing directly will save the cost of using middlemen
in Hong Kong and Singapore to conduct trade with
China-estimated by the Indonesian Chamber of
Commerce at $750 million annually. In addition,
Jakarta hopes to increase substantially its sales of
plywood, cement, and primary commodities to China.
During the same period Jakarta also has demonstrat-
ed a new approach to Moscow.' Soeharto called for
better ties to the USSR and East European countries
Recently, however, Jakarta has undertaken a more
aggressive stance in what it has traditionally termed a
"free and active" foreign policy. We believe the new
focus in part reflects Soeharto's growing self-assur-
ance as a national leader who has made substantial
gains in domestic economic development in the last
five years and maintained domestic stability following
the tumultuous Sukarno era. We believe it also
reflects his strong desire to add the role of statesman
to his political legacy by participating more actively in
the international arena. Finally, as the financial boom
of the OPEC price runups of 1973-74 and 1979-80
has dissipated, the Soeharto regime appears suffi-
ciently hard pressed economically to cultivate trade
relations with both China and the Soviet Bloc in an
effort to diversify trade and promote Indonesia's
nonoil exports
A Different Profile on East-West Issues. Potentially,
Soeharto's most significant foreign policy initiatives
are his tentative steps since early 1984 to renew direct
contacts with Beijing. Soeharto, for example, met
briefly, but publicly, with Chinese Foreign Minister
Wu during the April 1985 Bandung Conference-the
first visit by a high-level Chinese official since rela-
tions were frozen in 1967. Soeharto has promoted a
consensus among Jakarta officials that direct trade
Since 1983, exchanges of high-level trade and diplo-
matic delegations with the USSR have increased.
Mochtar's visit to Moscow last year was the first by
an Indonesian foreign minister in a decade. In May
1984 Indonesia reopened to Soviet merchant vessels
four ports that had been closed since the 1982 expul-
sion of several Soviet officials for espionage. Indone-
sian officials have relaxed visa requirements for East
' Moscow for many years has sought to improve economic and
cultural relations through increased offers for joint commercial
ventures and favorable loans to finance trade.
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Under Soeharto's rule, Jakarta's approach to foreign
relations has been pragmatic, moderate, low profile,
and quietly pro-West. In addition, Indonesia's eco-
nomic ties are overwhelmingly to the West and
Japan:
? Indonesia has earned a reputation as a moderating
influence in Third World circles-its diplomats
frequently working behind the scenes to build con-
sensus and compromise. Jakarta champions a prac-
tical approach to Third World causes, shies away
from controversial issues, opposes politicization of
international conferences, and often strives to tone
down anti-Western rhetoric. The Soeharto govern-
ment avoids dealing closely with groups or govern-
ments it considers radical, such as Cuba and
Nicaragua. Dealings with Yasir Arafat, for in-
stance, are polite, but Jakarta refuses to allow the
PLO to open a local office. Jakarta appears to enjoy
the esteem of a number of Third World capitals for
its political moderation in the international arena.
Occasionally, however, its reluctance to denounce
such actions as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
irritates Third World partners.
? Jakarta is cautious about participating in interna-
tional meetings with a superpower orientation-
East or West. Recently, for instance, security offi-
cials canceled a youth delegation's participation in
a Jamaican conference, apparently concerned by its
pro-West focus. To a degree, this posturing is
intended to enhance Indonesia's nonaligned image.
In its concern not to appear anti-Soviet, Indonesia
usually soft-pedals criticism of Moscow, as when it
quietly expelled a Soviet attache for espionage in
1983. In practice, however, Indonesia is deeply
distrustful of Soviet and Chinese intentions.
? The focus of Indonesia's foreign relations is region-
al, particularly its role within ASEAN. Diplomatic
and military contacts with other ASEAN members
are frequent and cordial, and these generally sup-
portive relations enhance Jakarta's prestige and
diplomatic leverage in other international forums.
By virtue of its strategic location and being the
largest nation in Southeast Asia-with a popula-
tion of 170 million-Indonesia considers itself enti-
tled to regional leadership. Reinforcing this percep-
tion is a strong ethnocentric bias of Indonesia's
dominant Javanese.
? As the world's most populous Islamic nation, Indo-
nesia maintains multiple political and religious ties
to the Middle East. As a moderate in the Islamic
Conference and in OPEC, Jakarta strives for cor-
dial relations with fellow Muslim nations by being
supportive on Middle East issues and by seeking to
mediate disputes. In addition, Jakarta conducts a
substantial labor export program with the Middle
East, particularly with Saudi Arabia.
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European commercial representatives and recently
agreed to permit Czechoslovak National Airlines to
begin weekly flights to Jakarta.
At the same time, Jakarta is positioning itself to
champion more forcefully nuclear and disarmament
issues in international-particularly Third World-
forums. Soeharto has stressed superpower disarma-
ment and nuclear arms control in a number of recent
speeches, and in recent months Mochtar has repeated-
ly encouraged international support for Indonesia's
proposed regional Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone
(NWFZ)-a condensed version of ASEAN's long-
standing Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality
(ZOPFAN) concept. Mochtar has also indicated Ja-
karta's participation in the upcoming International
Disarmament Conference Preparatory Committee
and a possible bid this year for chairmanship of the
UN General Assembly Disarmament and Security
Committee.
Pursuing Third World Ambitions. Another major
thrust of Jakarta's reinvigorated foreign policy is to
enhance its stature as a leader among the Third
World, and Soeharto himself appears to be behind
these efforts. According to the US Embassy, Soehar-
to's keynote address at the 30th anniversary of the
Bandung Conference in April 1985 was clearly in-
tended to enhance his prestige by minimizing conten-
tious issues such as Afghanistan and Cambodia.
Jakarta is building on its successes at Bandung by
more openly expressing to US and other foreign
diplomats its interest in eventually chairing the Non-
aligned Summit. Mochtar recently admitted to US
Embassy officials that Jakarta wants the Nonaligned
Movement chairmanship, but that Soeharto remains
reticent about making an open bid for the position,
preferring to be drafted by a consensus of nonaligned 25X1
members. The US Embassy report 25X1
that Mochtar has begun to seek backing for Indone-
sia's candidacy. Jakarta, we believe, would have to
lobby intensively between now and the September
1986 Nonaligned Summit in order to chair the 1989
summit.
to doubt Jakarta's reliability
Undertaking Regional Initiatives. Soeharto appears
to share the concern of some of his subordinates that
protracted confrontation with Hanoi undercuts
ASEAN interests by isolating Vietnam and driving it
ever closer to the Soviet Union, and simultaneously
reinforces Chinese influence in the region. Jakarta
has thus refrained from formal ASEAN military aid
to the Cambodian resistance, and Soeharto has al-
lowed Mochtar, Armed Forces Commander Murdani,
and the Center for Strategic and International Stud-
ies (CSIS)-a quasi-official think tank-substantial
leeway in maintaining a dialogue with Hanoi in order
to explore initiatives for settling the Cambodian issue.
Mochtar in particular has recently pursued initia-
tives-his so-called new dimension, which envisages
stepped-up US-Vietnamese cooperation to clear up
the MIA issue and normalized relations following a
Cambodian settlement-to break ASEAN's impasse
with Hanoi. Although Indonesia is ASEAN's desig-
nated "interlocutor" with Vietnam, some of Jakarta's
initiatives and statements-such as Murdani's re-
marks that he believed Hanoi's claims about with-
drawing from Cambodia-irritate some other
ASEAN capitals, particularly Bangkok, leading them
The Foreign Policy Apparatus
The precise shape of Jakarta's "new look" in foreign
policy is a reflection of Soeharto's dominance as
president and the interaction among his key depu-
ties-particularly the intense rivalry between Foreign
Minister Mochtar and Armed Forces Commander
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Domestic Political Imperatives
Any Indonesian regime must appear mindful ofpopu-
lar sensitivities in conducting foreign relations. Ja-
karta's nonaligned orientation, in particular, enjoys
broad support from a majority opposed to appearing
too close to either superpower. US Embassy officials
report that activist elements have criticized Jakarta
for working too closely with Washington.
Jakarta's moderate diplomatic style appeals to Java-
nese cultural imperatives of avoiding both extremism
and open confrontation. Some 90 percent of the
population is at least nominally Muslim-predomi-
nantly Sunni, as opposed to the more radical Shiite
sect. Although the moderate mainstream rejects the
radicalism of Iran and Libya, it feels a degree of
religious fraternity with Muslim countries of the
Middle East-a sentiment the regime cannot afford
to ignore or
instance, Foreign Department officials maintain pro-
Palestinian positions in the United Nations-thus
often taking anti-Israeli stands-in part for fear of
provoking domestic reaction. Jakarta is under no
pressure from its conservative, anti-Communist Mus-
lim masses to reestablish ties to China. Indeed,
Soeharto's cautious approach to improving ties may
in part be to avoid reawakening popular suspicions of
Beijing and widespread resentment of Indonesia's
financially powerful, ethnic Chinese minority.
Murdani. The policy inclinations of Soeharto, Moch-
tar, and Murdani, in turn, reflect Indonesia's econom-
ic ties to the West and the basic conservatism of the
Armed Forces-the country's dominant political
force.
The Preeminence of Soeharto. As a now retired
general.who came to power as head of the Army's
Strategic Command, Soeharto shares the military's
foreign policy views, particularly its deep-seated anti-
Communism, suspicion of China and the Soviet
Union, wariness of Third World and Muslim radical-
ism, strong sense of nationalism, and sensitivity to
perceived slights and foreign meddling in Indonesian
internal affairs.' Although mindful of military sensi-
tivities, Soeharto is not hostage to them. Such recent
initiatives as coaxing security officials to relax their
veto of direct trade with China and cracking down on
corruption and inefficiency in the ports and customs
service-formerly a financial fiefdom of the mili-
tary-demonstrate Soeharto can move confidently
against established institutions when he sees vital
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Soeharto's style of decisionmaking is an important
component of the foreign policy process. He retains
ultimate authority over foreign policy and, although
he allows his deputies substantial leeway to maneuver
and express their often opposing viewpoints, no signif-
icant decisions are made without his approval. Often
working behind the scenes in what some US academic
observers call a "puppet master" style, Soeharto
manipulates his deputies and competing institutional
interests against each other to keep them off balance
and to reinforce his own position. This style occasion- 25X1
ally gives outsiders the impression of serious disarray
in Jakarta's foreign policy-an impression compound-
ed by the frequent overlap of personal and bureau-
cratic responsibilities and the thin veneer of talent at
the top of the bureaucracy
The Foreign Department-Military Rivalry. Ostensi-
bly Jakarta's official spokesman for foreign policy
matters, Mochtar-a civilian and Soeharto's foremost
deputy for foreign affairs-actually has limited au- 25X1
thority. Mochtar sometimes finds himself out of step
with the palace because of Soeharto's manipulative
style and frequent lack of clear instructions, as well as
Mochtar's own tendency to get out ahead on initia-
tives.
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Murdani is the spearhead for the military's viewpoint.
He is a forceful spokesman who is frequently-and
often publicly-at odds with Mochtar. To demon-
strate his own authority and difference of view,
Murdani occasionally tries to best Mochtar on a wide
range of issues, including Vietnam, relations with 25X1
China, foreign access to East Timor, and border
relations with Papua New Guinea.
Although neither the Foreign Department nor the 25X1
Armed Forces (ABRI) can unilaterally dictate Jakar-
ta's foreign policy, ABRI has near-veto authority
when national security interests are involved-a pow-
er it uses to rein in the Foreign Department and other 25X1
civilian agencies, particularly in their contacts with
Communist governments.4
The major points of contention between ABRI and
the Foreign Department, however, continue to be 25X1
China and Indochina. Murdani and many of his
colleagues in the military see Vietnamese dominance
' ABRI's influence extends from the highest levels of policy forma-
tion down to the working level. The access of senior military
officials to Soeharto reinforces their foreign policy influence, as
does the assignment of ABRI personnel to the diplomatic service.
Military officers are consistently appointed as ambassadors to key
countries such as the United States, other ASEAN members, South
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of Indochina as Hanoi's natural right and a fait
accompli. Murdani minimizes the Vietnamese threat
to Southeast Asia and,
is emphatic that Hanoi poses no danger
to Indonesia. He disparages ASEAN efforts to dis-
lodge Vietnam from Cambodia as encouraging con-
tinued Soviet presence in Vietnam and harmful to
concentrating on the real threat to the region-
China-and argues for ASEAN-Vietnamese accom-
modation in order to counter China. Mochtar and the
Foreign Department, on the other hand, downplay the
China threat-seeking eventual restoration of diplo-
matic relations with Beijing-and seek to lead
ASEAN in negotiating a Vietnamese settlement on
Cambodia
US Embassy officials report Mochtar is under heavy
domestic pressure to show progress in resolving the
Cambodian problem or risk Soeharto's giving greater
sway to the military's views. Mochtar's countermoves
to this pressure probably contribute to his alternating
between courting and chastening Hanoi, depending on
its responsiveness to his initiatives. Recently, the
Foreign Department appears to have reversed itself
and is playing down the urgency of reaching agree-
ment with Hanoi. In recent press remarks, Mochtar
reaffirmed Jakarta's solidarity with ASEAN and
squarely blamed Hanoi for the lack of progress-a
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move probably intended to undercut Murdani's ac-
commodating remarks about Vietnam. Despite his
apparent zigs and zags, we agree with US Embassy
expectations that Mochtar will continue to push for
breakthroughs to protect his image in ASEAN and at
home-through proposals such as normalization of
US-Vietnamese relations and MIA negotiations-to
create at least the impression of progress in dealing
senior military intelligence leadership. Jakarta fre-
quently uses CSIS to make diplomatic contacts, to
host high-level seminars, to prepare policy studies,
and to float the government's tentative proposals to
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with Hanoi.
Other Players. Other participants in Jakarta's foreign
policy process include the military's National Defense
Institute and the more prominent Center for Strategic
and International Studies, which has close ties to the
CSIS's influence has apparently declined
somewhat since it was headed by the late Ali Moer-
topo-former Chief of Intelligence, Information Min-
ister, and longtime key member of Soeharto's inner
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circle. It is now headed by Sujono Humardani and
Lim Bian Kie (an ethnic Chinese known also by his
Indonesian name, Yusuf Wanandi, who also has
demonstrated the ability to influence key decision-
makers, including the palace). Lim serves as an
intermediary between the Indonesian Government
and the military, business, and intellectual communi-
ties, and frequently meets with US officials in Jakarta
and Washington.
State Secretary Sudharmono, Technology Minister
Habibie, and Trade Minister Saleh exercise substan-
tial influence on foreign economic relations.' Al-
though they do not participate directly in foreign
policy formulation, their close ties to Soeharto and
their broad institutional authority over foreign com-
mercial investment, trade, government spending, in-
dustrialization policy, and technology transfer give
them significant discretionary authority over Indone-
sia's foreign business dealings. All three men are
friendly toward the United States.
Looking Ahead: Continuity Under Soeharto
Soeharto's future plans for a more prominent personal
role on the world stage will depend heavily on interna-
tional receptivity to his initial performance. His low-
key style probably will handicap him with internation-
al audiences accustomed to more dynamic spokesmen.
In addition, oe arto s middle-of-the-road approach
may draw broad backing initially from nonaligned
states, but it could quickly fade if he fails to produce
clear gains for the Third World. We believe Soeharto
may forgo his ambitions if response to him from Third
World leaders is unenthusiastic.
Nonetheless, as long as Soeharto remains President,
we anticipate that Jakarta's priority on protecting its
standing among the Third World mainstream and
Soeharto's ambitions for a higher international profile
will lead Indonesia in the next few years to become
more outspoken on popular Third World concerns-
such as access to developed country markets, technol-
ogy transfer, encouraging more foreign economic aid,
and disarmament.' Jakarta will be at pains not to
appear to be a client of the West, and may be
somewhat more inclined to take stands intended to
demonstrate its independence.
As Jakarta becomes more active internationally, we
believe it will continue to promote an image of
balance and nonconfrontation, largely for economic
reasons. For the near future, Indonesia will remain
heavily dependent on foreign markets and external
sources for investment, technology, skilled manpower,
and military equipment and supplies. On the other
hand, Indonesia will probably be disappointed, in our
judgment, about the growth of economic relations
with Communist countries. Trade with the USSR, 25X1
Eastern Europe, and China together now accounts for
less than 5 percent of Indonesian exports, and we
believe it is unlikely to reach significant levels soon.
Jakarta will probably find China to be as much a
trade competitor as a trade partner, especially in
products such as textiles. Some Indonesian trade
officials fear that China will be more attractive to 25X1
foreign investors, and petroleum officials in Jakarta
are concerned that China will become a major com- 25X1
netitor for Asian oil markets.
Despite initial contacts and upgraded trade relations,
we do not anticipate resumption of diplomatic rela-
tions with Beijing in the near future. Soeharto,
continues to separate 25X1
trade from diplomatic normalization. In recent re-
marks to visiting Prime Minister Thatcher of the
6 Even if Soeharto were to leave the scene unexpectedly, we would
expect his successor-most likely a Javanese Muslim general, such
as State Secretary Sudharmono, but possibly Murdani, a Catho-
lic-would continue such a course, at least initially. Over the longer
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United Kingdom, Soeharto reiterated his longstand-
ing position that Beijing must publicly renounce
support for the Communist Party of Indonesia as a
precondition to restoring diplomatic relations-a de-
mand the Chinese say they will not meet.' Although
the Indonesian military has acceded to direct trade
ties to China for national economic interests, US
Embassy reporting indicates Murdani remains ada-
mantly opposed to any broader relationship, probably
because of his fears of China as an external threat and
his concern about Indonesia's ethnic Chinese minority
as an internal threat to stability. Even Foreign De-
partment officials-intent on reestablishing full diplo-
matic relations with China-concede they must pro-
gress slowly and in stages to accomodate the
opposition of the military. Relations may improve
through cultural and sports contacts, and Jakarta will
continue to get around the lack of formal relations
with Beijing via ad hoc contacts in third countries and
at the United Nations.
Prospects for substantially improved economic or
political relations with the USSR also are limited, in
our judgment. Out of concern for domestic security,
Indonesian authorities continue to oppose any pro-
grams that would substantially increase the presence
of Soviet and East European personnel. Jakarta's
exchange of diplomatic and trade delegations with
Eastern Europe have produced only limited trade
agreements and appear largely intended to affirm
Indonesia's nonaligned image. Indonesian trade offi-
cials have been dissatisfied with previous barter ar-
rangenfents and consider their East European coun-
terparts inflexible in trade dealings.
Soeharto and Mochtar will have to build further
consensus both domestically and among ASEAN
before effectively pushing ahead with nuclear and
disarmament issues. Mochtar's Nuclear-Weapons-
Free Zone proposal, for instance, lacks broad domes-
tic or regional support and is unlikely to make
substantial progress as it now stands. In remarks to
' Possibly to signal to domestic observers that it is not relaxing its
hard line against Communism, Jakarta recently executed several
long-imprisoned former Indonesian Communist Party activists sen-
tenced to death in the early 1970s for participation in the 1965 coup
attempt.
US officials, senior Indonesian military officers indi-
cate they oppose the NWFZ concept, disparaging it
as Mochtar's initiative, and authorities in several
other ASEAN capitals have expressed similar skepti-
cism of the proposal. Indonesian diplomatic and de-
fense officials concede that an NWFZ is a long-term
goal that would have to accommodate the defense ties
of Thailand and the Philippines to the United States,
and, at any rate, regional states could not unilaterally
curtail passage of nuclear-powered or -armed naval
vessels in international waters
Relations With the United States. We do not antici-
pate a significant change in Indonesia's basically
positive assessment of its relations with the United
States in the near term. Indonesian authorities pri-
vately admit that they look to the US defense umbrel-
la for protection against such potential adversaries as
Vietnam, the Soviet Union, or China. They likewise
look to Washington as a preferred source of military
equipment and are currently negotiating procurement
of F-16s. Nonetheless, Jakarta remains steadfastly
opposed to any overt military relationship that would
compromise its nonaligned image. In addition, some
senior military officials-in particular Murdani-
question Indonesian reliance on US defense technol-
ogy and the applicability of US military doctrine to
Indonesia's Armed Forces, which remains concerned
with defending an archipelago against external
threats and continues efforts to contain insurgencies
in Irian Jaya and East Timor.
Jakarta has its differences with Washington. Indone-
sian authorities have repeatedly complained to US
officials over what they see as preferential treatment
for China on a variety of issues. Indonesian authori-
ties, for example, have expressed concern about US
assistance for China's military modernisation, partic-
ularly technology that could enable Beijing to project
force in the region. On the other hand, the Soeharto
regime's pragmatic interest in continued good politi-
cal and economic relations with the United States will
probably remain paramount over these concerns and
Third World polemics, and we believe it will limit
direct criticism of US policy.
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Figure 2
Timor's Regional Setting
Philippines
Mindanao
) Davao.
Philippine
Sea
on Keats
250' Kilometers
250 Miles
-~~Ma~nado S
\"" 'Celebes %
Ceram .Bola
Buru~~
Palau j
lslands
(?Trust Territory of
the Pacific Islands
(U.S.)
Indonesia
Pu/au
Weta I
*Dili formerly
Portuguese Timor
Timo!
r
Ti
mo
a
rfkupang' Sea Melville
Island
, >
Arafura
Sea
CJ = Hoskins Islands
P a .p u .,a --
Jae
Bougainville
J
wG u i we a
PO rt,*-
Torres Strait MOresby ~~ ~yy 4 iti
Bama~a f _ + .s
Jayapu/a?-
Irian
Jaya
FM
? New Britain, a 4
?Madang Solomon
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Secret
Appendix
East Timor and Other
Regional Stumblingblocks
Jakarta undercuts its aspirations to regional leader-
ship and good relations by its frequently condescend-
ing approach to its neighbors and heavyhanded do-
mestic security policies. Efforts to counter
international reaction to Indonesia's 1975 invasion
and subsequent annexation of Timor Timur (East
Timor), in particular, have disproportionately preoc-
cupied Indonesian diplomats and irritated Jakarta's
relations with Australia and a number of African and
West European nations! Jakarta has dampened criti-
cism of Moscow over such controversial issues as
Afghanistan, in part to ensure the Soviet Bloc's
continued abstention on the East Timor issue in UN
committees and the General Assembly. Similarly,
Jakarta has gone along with Syria and other Arab
Middle East initiatives as a trade-off for their votes in
the United Nation on East Timor. The issue has
become mired in Third World polemics beyond the
control of Indonesia and Portugal
Several radical African and
Middle Eastern countries, in particular, are reluctant
to let Jakarta and Lisbon resolve it between them-
selves.
We believe Indonesia will have to resolve East Timor
as an issue in the United Nations before it can
effectively promote itself on the world and regional
stage. Growing Indonesian confidence about internal
conditions in East Timor is prompting authorities to
permit greater access by diplomats and journalists in
an effort to move the issue off the agendas of the
Apprehensive of East Timor's vulnerability to external influences
in the wake of Portugal's decolonization, Indonesian forces invaded
in December 1975 and Jakarta declared East Timor a province in
July 1976. In an effort to pressure Indonesia to conduct a referen-
dum on self-determination, Portugal introduced censures in the
United Nations that are still pending and have become an annual
diplomatic hurdle for Jakarta in the General Assembly. For several
years the Indonesian military waged an intense counterinsurgency
campaign against the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East
Timor (Fretilin) and an estimated 100,000 Timorese died as a result
of hostilities and starvation. Sporadic fighting with Fretilin contin-
ues
a aria s quiet negotiations wit 25X1
Lisbon have contributed to a more cooperative atmo-
sphere.
Elsewhere in the region, mutual suspicions, fueled by
ethnic tensions and its own condescending attitude,-
continue to undermine Jakarta's relations with bor-
dering Papua New Guinea. The Indonesian military
effectively dictates policy in the border province of
Irian Jaya-the western half of New Guinea ab-
sorbed by Indonesia in 1963-often disregarding Pa-
pua New Guinean sensitivities and thwarting Foreign
Minister Mochtar's efforts to improve relations with
Port Moresby. Indonesian military operations against
residual insurgents and resettlement of Javanese into
the relatively empty province distresses the native
Melanesians and continues to drive refugees into
Papua New Guinea. Last year some 10,000 refugees
fled across the border.
Diplomatic relations between Indonesia and Australia
are generally cordial, but are vulnerable to frequent
differences arising from such issues as Jakarta's
heavyhanded approach to maintaining domestic or-
der, its policies in East Timor, and criticism of
Indonesian policies in the Australian media. There is
strong public interest and sympathy in Australia for
what are seen as small ethnic cultures threatened by
Indonesian dominance in Irian Jaya, Papua New
Guinea-a former Australian trusteeship-and East
Timor, and there is intense distrust of Jakarta's
intentions and policies, particularly within the Austra-
lian Labor Party. For its part, Jakarta is quick to
resent any Australian criticism-official or in the
media-as outside meddling in Indonesia's internal
affairs.
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Jakarta also draws criticism from international orga-
nizations and governments in the region and beyond
that regard some of its approaches to social and
domestic order as repressive. Recent criticism has
targeted such issues as transmigration, the suppres-
sion of-crime by executing criminal. suspects without
trial,: the execution-of several long-jailed Communist
activists, and restrictions on domestic labor and legal
aid groups. Amnesty-International recently published
a detailed study critical of Jakarta's. policies in East
Timor. In addition, the Soeharto regime's efforts to
suppress Islam as a domestic political force make it
increasingly vulnerable to criticism from other Mus-
lim nations.
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