VIETNAM'S NAVY: DEFENDING TERRITORIAL CLAIMS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00590R000300430001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 14, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Vietnam's Navy:
Defending Territorial Claims
NGA Review Completed
Secret
?py 2 6 4
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Vietnam's Navy:
Defending Territorial Claims
This paper was prepared by
Office of
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East Asian Analysis
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It was coordinated with the Directorate of
Operations. Comments and queries are welcome and
may be directed to the Chief, Southeast Asia
Division, Office of East Asian Analysis,
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Secret
EA 85-10/SjC
IA 85-10053C
epte
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Secret
Vietnam's Navy:
Defending Territorial Claims) 25X1
Overview Faced with regional tensions, growing Chinese naval power, and competing 25X1
/n/ormation available claims for South China Sea territory, Vietnam has been steadily strength-
as oJ'30 July 1985 ening its ability to defend offshore territories and coastal waters.
_..__ ..__J :~ .L._ __-~-.
Vietnamese forces on strategically important islands near the coast present
formidable obstacles to an invasion force. However, despite modernization
efforts, we doubt that units defending the more distant Spratlys could
withstand a determined Chinese assault. China can commit overwhelming
forces while Vietnamese air support is largely unavailable and reinforce-
ment by sea is problematical at best. Furthermore, the Soviets almost
certainly have made no commitment regarding possible reactions to a
Chinese attack against the Spratlys, and Hanoi probably does not plan on
direct Soviet intervention. Both Hanoi and Moscow probably hope that
close military ties and the Soviet military presence at Cam Ranh Bay will
deter the Chinese. Should hostilities erupt, we believe the Soviets would
resupply the Vietnamese and provide reconnaissance, intelligence, and
advisory assistance.
Secret
EA 85-10153C
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China probably will not take military action against Vietnam's Spratly
Islands for at least the next few years. Their efforts to develop amphibious
assault capabilities, however, will increasingly place Chinese leaders in a
stroneer position to enforce their claims to the Vietnamese-held islands.
We do not foresee a Vietnamese military action to gain control of the other
islands in the Spratlys now occupied by the Philippines, Taiwan, and
Malaysia for at least the next few years. Nonetheless, as Vietnamese naval
capabilities improve, Hanoi will be in a better position to act militarily
should it decide to do so.
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Secret
Stressing Antisubmarine Warfare
Vietnam's Fledgling Marines
A. Competing Claims in the South China Sea
C. Major Vietnamese Warships
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China
Bay o
Of
Bengal
Andaman ?~
Sea ~~
`ea
Hanoi
Gulf
of
Thailand
hnom Pen
Gull
o!
Tonkin
name
,`lw'Hong Kong
Macau (U.K.)
(Port.)
Prates
Island
N
VG
F'~'c1 u s i ve ese\t?
b
tt?m
Kuala
Lumpur
9Kepulauan
Natuna
~fidone~sia
Parace/
Islands
South
China
Sea
Sprat/y
Islands
Bandar Seri
Begawan (~
Brunei a Celebes
Sea
Boundary representation ie
not necessarily authoritative.
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Secret
Vietnam's Navy:
Defending Territorial Claims
None of the several claimants to the disputed islands
in the South China Sea is soon likely to make
diplomatic concessions on the islands and the poten-
tially oil-rich surrounding seabed. Indeed, several
have taken extensive measures to build and maintain
island garrisons. Vietnam, in particular, has recently
reemphasized the strategic and potential economic
value of its island possessions and territorial waters.
Visits this year by Party Secretary Le Duan to Vung
Tau, a base for offshore oil exploration, and by
Defense Minister Van Tien Dung to the Spratly
Islands, underscore the imno~tance of these areas to
Hanoi (see appendix A).
China poses the strongest military threat to Vietnam.
Beijing has been steadily expanding and upgrading its
naval forces, in part to extend its operational range to
disputed territories including the Spratlys.~
Other claimants to the islands also pose military
challenges, which Hanoi cannot ignore. Although
distance largely rules out Taiwan military action, the
Philippines and Malaysia enjoy a modest geographic
advantage over the Vietnamese.
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Improving Coastal Defenses
The Vietnamese Navy is primarily a coastal defense
force, reflecting Hanoi's chief maritime security con-
cern. The 200-nautical-mile Exclusive Economic
Zone declared in 1977 and expanded offshore inter- 25X1
ests have increased substantially Vietnam's claimed
territorial waters and, consequently, the Navy's coast- 25X1
al patrolling responsibility. Most vessels acquired
since 1978 are patrol craft intended for coastal opera-
tions. Some are equipped with Soviet-made SS-N-2
Styx antishipping and SA-N-S Grail surface-to-air
missiles, providing limited antiship and antiaircraft
capabilities. Soviet- and Polish-made minesweepers 25X1
provide some defense a ainst efforts to close impor-
tant Vietnamese ports.g 25X1
While expanding the surface fleet, Hanoi has taken
other measures to reinforce coastal defenses. Vietnam
in 1980 acquired the Soviet-made SSC-IB Sepal
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cruise missile system, providing for the first time a
lon range antiship capability.
~tew garrison and support facilities with four
launchers at Do Son, southeast of Haiphong, indicat-
ing the missiles would be deployed there in wartime.
From Do Son, the Sepals could strike targets any-
where in the Gulf of Tonkin up to 300 km distant,
including ships operating off the west coast of China's
Hainan Dao (Hainan Island).' Although primarily
intended to protect the sea approaches to Haiphong,
the missiles probably would also play an important
role in defending Vietnam's Dao Bach Long Vi
(Nightingale Island), which lies midway between the
mainland and Hainan.
In addition, Hanoi has deployed at least one Army
division to the island chain that is part of Quang Ninh
Province. The province has been designated the
Quang Ninh Special Zone, forming a separate defen-
sive region within the military command and control
structure. Army troops equipped with field and anti-
aircraft artillery occupy heavily fortified positions on
the islands. These are the only islands garrisoned by
Army units, indicating that Hanoi has devised a
special interservice defensive plan for this zone to
counter a potential Chinese amphibious assault.
Meanwhile, the Vietnamese moved earlier this year to
bolster the Navy's capabilities in the south, probably
to protect offshore oil-drilling operations.
Stressing Antisubmarine Warfare
Responding primarily to the threat posed by China's
growing submarine force, we believe the Navy's anti-
submarine warfare (ASW) program has top priority
and will receive most naval resources for the next
several years. Chinese- submarines already have a
substantial advantage over Vietnamese defenses and
the submarine force will
remain key to Beijing's naval defense strategy. Al-
though Hanoi will be hard pressed to close the gap,
some improvements have been made in recent years.
The three Petya II-class frigates Vietnam has ac-
quired since 1983 are primarily ASW ships and are a
marked improvement over the two modified Petya I's
delivered in 1978. All five warships are equipped with
torpedoes, depth charges, and antisubmarine rockets.
Together with several SO-1 subchasers, they form the
bulk of Vietnamese ASW forces.
We expect the Vietnamese eventually to establish a
submarine force to bolster its ASW capabilities. We
believe the Soviet-made Whiskey-class submarine is
the most likely candidate. The Whiskey is the closest
Soviet model to China's Romeo-class submarine, the
most likely adversary of Vietnamese ASW forces.
According to
a Soviet Whiskey that participated
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'For the Sepals to be effective at maximum range, a midcourse
correction is required. Lacking the proper equipment, Vietnam
would depend on Moscow to provide the course adjustment: Cam
Ranh-based TU-95 Bear D aircraft have this capability. Should
hostilities erupt in the Gulf of Tonkin, we believe the Soviets would
help Vietnam target the Sepals. Hormone "B" helicopters also have
this radar but we cannot confirm that any of Vietnam's Hormones
are the "B" variant.
The Vietnamese have established a naval air unit at
Cat Bi and Kien An airfields near Haiphong to
su ort ASW o erations.
~he regimental-size unit
is equipp~rt 13 A- 5 Hormone) helicopters and
four BE-12 (Mail) amphibious aircraft that can per-
form maritime reconnaissance and deliver torpedoes
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Vietnamese warships and helicopters
conducting antisubmarine warfare
ever
indicate that several of the Hormones are inoperable
and the helicopter's limited range largely restricts
combined surface/air ASW operations to a maximum
of 170 km. The Hormone must operate from land
bases as none of Vietnam's warships can accommo-
date helicopters
Since 1982 we have noted increased emphasis in the
military press on the role of Vietnam's Marines, or
naval infantry, which serve as the primary ground
defense force for coastal areas and offshore islands.
These articles stress the need to improve and expand
the Marine forces and to develop amphibious landing.
capabilities.
13,000 men.
the overall size of
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"The Marines werejormed above all (to conduct)
amphibious landin o erations."Quan Doi Nhan
Dan, Feb 84.~~
...Marine units must know how to takejull
advantage ojthe firepower q/'... various kinds 4f
accompanyin artillery ...."Quan Doi Nhan
Dan, Feb 84.~~
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At present, at least two Vietnamese Marine brigades
plus one battalion are deployed to defend the Viet-
namese-claimed Spratly Islands and Hon Tho Chau
(Tho Chau Island) in the South China Sea, and on
Dao Bach Long Vi (Bach Long Vi Island) in the Gulf
of Tonkin. The Marines defending Bach Long Vi-
with amaze of concrete-hardened trenches, bunkers,
and caves and well within the range of supporting
Vietnamese air, naval, and cruise missile forces-
would present a formidable obstacle to any invasion
force. Defense of the Spratlys, on the other hand,
would be more problematical. Although fortifications
give the Marines an important tactical advantage over
invading troops, they would be forced to operate
without air support and, at least initially, without
naval support. Faced with these circumstances, we
think it is unlikely that the Vietnamese Marines could
withstand a determined Chinese attack. At best,
Hanoi could expect the Marines to delay assault
forces on any of these islands, allowing time for
reinforcements to arrive.
Vietnamese military writers often point to the Soviet
Naval Infantry (SNI) as a model for future develop-
ment, and we expect Hanoi to dedicate more re-
sources to,the further development of the Marines
over the next few years. The current table of organi-
zation and equipment of the Vietnamese Marine
force, however, bears little resemblance to the SNI, as
the Vietnamese lack adequate mechanized amphibi-
ous landing craft and amphibious transport vessels.
The Vietnamese press also reports the existence of
elite, naval special operations teams. According to
these reports, such teams have existed for at least 10
years and participated in the capture of South Vietna-
mese-held islands in 1975. An April 1985 article in
the Vietnamese Army newspaper discussed a recent
training exercise in which naval commando teams
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The Marines are armed and equipped similarly to
conventional Vietnamese Army irtlantry, although
they wear naval uniforms and are trained to operate
in naval vessels in seaborne assault tactics. Our
analysis oJtwo of thefve Marine brigades shows that
both contain~ve rifle battalions and an artillery/an-
tiaircraft battalion. The artillery/antiaircraft battal-
ion provides~re support, under the direct control oJ'
the Marine brigade commander, jor operations con-
ducted beyond the range oJnaval gunfire or air
support, or for static island defense where there
would be little or no naval guerre support. Essays in
the Vietnamese military press have discussed the use
of organic tank battalions in Marine operations, and
occasionally have included photos ojMarines train-
ing with Soviet-built PT-761ight amphibious tanks,
but we have not ident~ed any operational armored
units with Vietnamese Marine brigades to date. Re,1-
erences have also been made to the,future develop-
ment of'airborne units within the Marines.
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Table 2
Vietnam's Garrisons
in the Spratly Islands
mainland.' Moreover, Air Force MIG-21 s and
SU-22s could provide air superiority and ground-
attack support for the nearby islands, althoueh these
aircraft lack modern antiship weapons.
Amboyna Cay
4 37/57-mm antiaircraft
artillery (AAA)
2 heavy machineguns
Central Reef
5 heavy machineguns
Namyit Island
?
2 130-mm field guns
2 100-mm field guns
4 122-mm howitzers
6 37-mm AAA
2 heavy machineguns
8 T-34 tanks
Helicopter pad
Pearson Reef
4 37-mm AAA
4 heavy machineguns
1 ZPU-4
Sand Cay
2 85/100-mm field guns
6 37/57-mm AAA
9 heavy machineguns
Helicopter pad
Sin Cowe Island
2 100/85 field guns
6 37/57-mm AAA
Helicopter pad
Southwest Cay
4 PT-76 tanks
1 heavy machinegun
6 37-mm AAA
Helicopter pad
Spratly Island
4 130-mm field guns
6 37/57-mm AAA
4 heavy machineguns
550-meter landing
strip
practiced beach landings from rubber boats; the ob-
ject of the training was to harass a notional enemy
amphibious landing force. Although we have no data
regarding the strength or organization of Vietnamese
naval special operations units, we believe they are an
inte ral art of Hanoi's coastal and island defense
plane
Distance largely dictates Hanoi's ability to reinforce
and defend its island holdings. We believe the Viet-
namese Navy could easily transport men and material
to Dao Bach Long Vi and other islands close to the
Unlike the coastal islands, we do not believe a con-
certed Vietnamese effort to reinforce the Spratlys is a
certainty. Faced with overwhelming odds, Hanoi
could well decide to let the island garrisons stand on
their own rather than risk limited naval assets and
broader conflict in a potentially futile effort.
The Air Force, meanwhile, could do little to help
defend the Spratlys. The MIG-21's limited range
rules out effective air cover and, while the SU-22s can
reach the islands, time over target is severely limited.
' Available craft include three Polish-made Polnocnys, a few aging
ex-US landing craft, and several coastal transports that could 25X1
deliver hundreds of tons of cargo and several hundred troops to one
or more besieged islands. 25X1
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Moscow almost certainly has made no commitment to
the Vietnamese regarding possible reactions to a
Chinese attack on the Spratlys, and Vietnamese strat-
egists probably do not plan on direct Soviet interven-
tion. The Soviets probably calculate that close ties
with Hanoi and their own military presence at Cam
Ranh Bay serve to deter Chinese military action
against Vietnam. If faced with hostilities in the
Spratlys, we believe Moscow would try to strike a
balance between the assistance required to ensure
continued close ties to Vietnam and its desire to avoid
a military clash with China. At a minimum, a Chi-
nese attack against the Spratlys probably would
prompt the Soviets to issue statements warning Beij-
ing of the "dangerous implications" of their actions
while leaving vague Soviet intentions. The USSR, '
however, probably would resupply the- Vietnamese,
conduct reconnaissance operations, and provide intel-
ligence and advisory assistance. They probably would
also reinforce their naval forces in the South China
Sea and conduct operations to demonstrate support
We do not foresee any substantial improvement in
Vietnam's ability to defend the Spratlys for the next
few years. Although we doubt that Hanoi considers
present capabilities adequate for the long term, most
of the Navy's already limited budgetary resources will
be dedicated to securing Vietnam's coastal waters.
Once Hanoi believes these waters are adequately
secured, we expect more attention to be focused on
ground attack support any time soon.
extending the Navy's operational range. In any event,
we doubt that the Air Force will acquire aircraft
capable of providing long-range air superiority and
We do not expect a Chinese military action to seize
control of the Vietnamese-held Spratlys or coastal
islands for at least the next few years. Although it
maintains constant military pressure against the Viet-
namese along their common land border, Beijing has
limited the fighting to a relatively narrow area in
Vietnam's Ha Tuyen Province and we see no indica-
tion that China intends to expand radically the scope
of the conflict.
In the long term, however, we believe Sino-Vietnam-
ese tensions could be manifested at sea, where Beijing
could seize one or more of Vietnam's Spratlys or
numerous coastal islands under the pretext of a
"second lesson" despite potentially exorbitant political
costs. Efforts to develop amphibious assault capabili-
ties place China in an increasingly stronger position to
exercise this option, in our judgment.
they decide to do so
On the other hand, we believe a Vietnamese assault
against any of the other occupied islands in the
Spratlys is extremely unlikely. Preoccupied with re-
solving the Cambodia issue, Hanoi will not risk
further damage to its international image or become
involved in another conflict by attempting to enforce
militarily its territorial claims. As naval capabilities
improve, however, Vietnamese leaders will be in a
better position to exercise the military option should
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Appendix A
Competing Claims in the
South China Sea
Vietnam claims nearly all the South China Sea
islands, including the Spratlys and the Chinese-
occupied Paracels. In addition, Hanoi has along-
running dispute with Indonesia over sea boundary
demarcation in the Kepulauan Natuna (Natuna Is-
lands) area. Hanoi has expanded its offshore claims in
recent years and now occupies nine islands in the
Spratlys, Bach Long Vi Island (Nightingale Island) in
the Gulf of Tonkin, and numerous undisputed islands
along the coastline.
The Spratlys: Vietnam, China, the Philippines, Tai-
wan, and Malaysia claim one or more of approximate-
ly 100 islands, shoals, and reefs in the Spratlys group
spread over 64,000 square miles of ocean. China is the
only nation with a claim that does not have military
forces on any of the islands. Hanoi in 1975 wrested
control of five islands from the South Vietnamese as
the Saigon government neared collapse. The Vietnam-
ese since then have occupied four more islands in the
group.
The Paracels: Competing Chinese and South Viet-
namese claims to the Paracels stretch back to the
1950s. In 1956, South Vietnamese troops replaced
French units stationed on several of the islands,
prompting Beijing to construct a naval base on one
island and garrison 200 troops on two others. After
Saigon occupied additional islands in 1973, China in
early 1974 launched a successful air and naval attack
against the South Vietnamese and seized control of
the entire group. Hanoi at that time did not protest
China's action but continued to claim dominion over
Kepulauan Natuna: Territorial disputes with Indone-
center around delineating the seabed boundary near
Kepulauan Natuna. Seven rounds of negotiations
conducted since 1979 have failed to produce an
agreement. Diplomatic relations between the two
countries have not been seriously affected, however.
Vietnam's Case
The Vietnamese have attempted to build a case
around detailed historical, geological, and geographic
data to support their South China Sea island claims.
A Foreign Ministry whitebook issued in 1982 re-
counts Vietnamese activities in the Spratly and Para-
cel Islands over the past several hundred years and
cites documents purportedly validating Vietnamese
ownership. Similar evidence submitted by Beijing to
back Chinese claims is dismissed as only "semioffi-
cial" by Vietnam which contends it was the first
nation to discover and occupy the two disputed island
groups.
Although publicly based on legal right, the strategic
and possible economic value of South China Sea
islands and surrounding seabed areas are major fac-
tors behind Hanoi's claims. The Spratlys and Paracels
are situated near vital air and sea lines of communica-
tion across the South China Sea and important
approaches to Vietnam. Hanoi also has closely moni-
tored offshore oil exploration throughout the region.
In addition to the Philippines exploration around
Palawan Island, Hanoi probably has kept careful tabs
on Indonesian operations.in the Natunas area and
Chinese activities around the Paracel Islands.
Vietnamese geologists and oil
experts have conducted studies of the Spratlys since
1979 but financial constraints have precluded test
drilling. Meanwhile, Hanoi's plans to explore areas
around the Paracels have been blocked by China's
military presence there, while failure to reach agree-
ment with Indonesia on the sea boundary has cur-
tailed offshore exploration in the Natunas area
Despite competing claims with other Southeast Asian
nations, Vietnam has concentrated on quarrels with
China, in our opinion, to gain maximum propaganda
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Rangoon
*i
Andaman
Sea
China
Hanoi ~ ~ ~`I
* a~""'1
Ha phongl
Gull alb
Tonkin I
southern extent
1 unknown
Cambodia
Phnom Penh
??; U Hong Kong
Macau (U.K.)
(Port.)
Paracel
i/stands
~ ~
~~lndon sia -Vietnamese
Pratas
Island
S o u t h
C h i n a
S e a
Kepulauan
Natuna
tsrunet
Malaysia
}~
Bandar Seri
Begawan
Maritime Claim Line
Chinese ---- Malaysian ---- Thai
?.??? Indonesian---Philippine --'- Vietnamese
Negotiated maritime boundary
Claimed straight baseline
0 200 Kilometers
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
Luzon
Strait
Celebes
Sea
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value in light of larger disputes between the two
countries. As relations soured in 1978, Hanoi began to
proclaim publicly Vietnamese territorial claims vis-a-
vis China and to denounce Chinese occupation of the
Paracels. Since then, harsh Vietnamese rhetoric on
the issue has been aimed almost solely at Beijing. In
open writings, Hanoi lumps China's offshore claims
and holdings with Sino-Vietnamese border tensions
and Chinese support for Cambodian resistance forces
to back charges of Chinese "expansionism" in South-
east Asia.
Hanoi has taken aloes-key approach toward territori-
al disputes with other nations. Although Malaysia,
the Philippines, and Taiwan maintain military garri-
sons in the Spratlys, the 1982 whitebook and subse-
quent public statements make only passing reference
to these claimants. In fact, Hanoi on at least one
occasion, called on Southeast Asian nations to set
aside their disagreements and unite against the Chi-
nese. Vietnam also has avoided inflammatory public
statements against Indonesia; Hanoi is on better
terms with Jakarta than with any other ASEAN
member. With Vietnam and ASEAN at loggerheads
over Cambodia, Hanoi undoubtedly strives to avoid
damaging relations with this key ASEAN member by
playing down differences over a clearly secondary
issue.
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Disputed Islands in the South China Sea
z,': ~Q
Islands occupied by
O China ? Taiwan
Pratas~} Malaysia ? Philippines
Island
? Vietnam
O Islands
Spratly
Islands
Central Ree
Spratly lsland~
0 50 100 150 Kilometers
t i-~
0 50 100 150 Miles
South
China
Sea
Southwest Cay$Northeast Cay
Thitu /slan~? ,?West York Island
Lankiam Flat Island
Loaita /slan~Cay Nanshan Island
ltu Aba lsland~. Sand Cay
~ ~Q/Vamyit Island
Sin Cowe Island~`~nname8 Cay
.}
~Imboyna Cay
?Swallow Reef
Because of possible oil deposits and their strategic location in the South China Sea, the Spratlys in recent
years have taken on a significance disproportionate to their size. Five nations have claims in this area.
China, Taiwan, and Vietnam claim all of the Spratlys, the Philippines claims a major portion of them, and
Malaysia claims the southern portion. Of the claimant states, all but China maintain military garrisons in the
area That have often opened fire on the air or naval craft of rival claimant states, IhuS keeping tensions at a
high level.
Su/u
Sea
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Appendix B
China, Vietnam, Taiwan, Malaysia, Vietnam
Philippines
China, Vietnam, Taiwan, Malaysia, Philippines
Philippines
Flat Island China, Vietnam, Taiwan, Philippines Philippines
Itu Aba China, Vietnam, Taiwan, Philippines Taiwan
Lankiam Cay China, Vietnam, Taiwan, Philippines Philippines
Laoita China, Vietnam, Taiwan, Philippines Philippines
Namyit China, Vietnam, Taiwan, Philippines Vietnam
Nanshan China, Vietnam, Taiwan, Philippines .Philippines
Northeast Cay China, Vietnam, Taiwan, Philippines Philippines
Pearson Reef China, Vietnam, Taiwan, Philippines Vietnam
Sand Cay China, Vietnam, Taiwan, Philippines Vietnam
Southwest Cay China, Vietnam, Taiwan, Philippines Vietnam
Spratly Island China, Vietnam, Taiwan, Philippines Vietnam
Swallow Reef Malaysia Malaysia
Unnamed Cay China, Vietnam, Taiwan, Philippines Vietnam
West York Island China, Vietnam, Taiwan, Philippines Philippines
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Appendix C
Class Name/Type
Number
Home Port
Range (nm)
Full Power/
Economical
Armament
Petya-II FFL
3
Da Nang
Vung Tao
450/4,800
2 2x76.2-mm dual-purpose guns
2 5x40-cm torpedo tubes
2 RB4 6000 ASW launchers
2 depth charge racks
Export Petya FFL
2
Da Nang
Vung Dao
450/4,800
2 2x76.2-mm dual-purpose guns
1 3x53-cm torpedo tube
4 RBU 2500 ASW launchers
2 depth charge racks
Ex-US Savage PGF
1
Ho Chi Minh
City
6,120/11,500
2 1x76.2-mm dual-purpose guns
2 2x37-mm guns
I US HEDGEHOG ASW
1 depth charge rack
Ex-US Barnegat
Class
1
Ho Chi Minh
City
?/22,000.
1 1x127-mm dual-purpose gun
3 2x37-mm guns
2 SS-N-2 launch rails
Turya PTH
3
Da Nang
650/1,420
1 2x57-mm dual-purpose gun
1 2x25-mm gun
4 1x53-cm torpedo tubes
Ex-US PGM's
16
Various
1,100/1,400
Various
Osa-II PTG
8
Ha Tao
500/750
4 SS-N-2 missile launchers
2 2x30-mm guns
S.O. I PCS
8
Da Nang
340/1,900
2 2x25-mm guns
4 RB4 1200 ASWs
Shershen PT
16
Ha Tao
Da Nang
460/1,000
2 2x30-mm guns
4 1x53-cm torpedo tubes
2 depth charge racks
Ex-US Admirable
PC
2
Ho Chi Minh
City
1 unit
unknown
4,500/6,800
1 1x57-mm gun
2 1x40-mm guns
1 2x37-mm gun
Shanghai-II PC
8
Haiphong
440/725
2 2x37-mm guns
2 2x25-mm guns
LST-1/LST-511
LST
3
Unknown
15,000/
18,000
Note:
1. Vietnam operates numerous riverine patrol craft not included in
this table because they are not suited for open ocean operations.
2. An unknown number of coastal transports are operated by the
Navy. At least six have been seen. at Cam Ranh.
ecret
May no longer be
operational.
SS-N-2 system installed on
fantail. May no longer be
operational.
Number operational
unknown.
Only one ship may be
marginally operational.
At least two ships operation-
al. Seen at Cam Ranh and
Ho Chi Minh City.
Seen at Haiphong, Ho Chi
Minh City, and Cam Ranh.
25X1
25X1
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Secret
Secret
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