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• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00589R000400480003-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: April 25, 2011
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: November 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Nicaragua:
Sandinista Foreign Policy
ALA 85-10122
November 1985
Copy 315
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 Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Nicaragua:
Sandinista Foreign Policy 25X1
Directorate of Operations.
This paper was prepared by Office
of African and Latin American Analysis, with
support from Office of
Central. Reference. It was coordinated with the
Division, ALA,
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Middle America-Caribbean
Secret
ALA 85-10122
November 1985
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Nicaragua:
Sandinista Foreign Policy 25X1
party organization and abroad.
Key Judgments Since their triumph in 1979, the Sandinistas have asserted their commit-
Int(ormation available ment to pluralism and nonalignment as a ploy to obtain vital economic aid
as of 1 November 1985 and political support from Western Europe and Latin America, while
was used in this report.
consolidating a Marxist-Leninist regime at home and building a strong
alliance with Cuba and the Soviet Bloc. The supremacy of the latter goal is
reflected in the dominance within the foreign policymaking apparatus of
the international affairs component of the party-the Sandinista National
Liberation Front (FSLN)-over the Foreign Ministry. To ensure its control
over all aspects of foreign relations, the Sandinista National Directorate
recently began to place party loyalists in key positions within the Foreign
Ministry and to emphasize ideological "purity" in appointments within the
Although their appeal to the West was initially successful, since 1983
many benefactors have become increasingly disillusioned by the Sandinis-
tas' failure to live up to their promises, resulting in a decline in Western as-
sistance and active political support. Managua has tried to halt this trend
by manipulating residual sympathy for the revolution, portraying itself as
the victim of "imperialist aggression," and using propaganda and solidarity
groups to influence Western governments. In Western Europe, the Sandi-
nistas have capitalized on and manipulated disagreements with US support
to the anti-Sandinista forces-equating any pressure on Managua with
backing for Washington's programs. Nicaragua has played on traditional
anti-US and nonintervention themes in Latin America, as well as using the
local left, to prevent governments from adopting anti-Sandinista policies.
Nonetheless, the regime's relations with Western Europe and Latin
America continue to falter-with many countries poised between passive
support and neutrality-and probably will erode further over the next year
or so.
The Sandinistas' military buildup, cross-border shellings and incursions
into Honduras and Costa Rica, and support for regional revolutionaries
have caused Nicaragua's relations with its Central American neighbors to
deteriorate sharply. The regime's long-term goals of spreading the revolu-
tion and anti-US sentiment have been supplemented since 1982 by its
efforts to deny support to the anti-Sandinista insurgents and undercut
backing for US policies in the region. In so doing, the Sandinistas have
made repeated efforts to engage the other Central American governments
in bilateral talks. Although largely unsuccessful in such initiatives, Mana-
gua has forestalled thus far the formation of an effective united Central
American front against it. Moreover, the regime has scored propaganda
Secret
ALA 85-10122
November 1985
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 gains by emphasizing its willingness to engage in a dialogue and participate
in the Contadora regional peace negotiations. The Sandinistas are likely to
maintain pressure on their neighbors to reach bilateral accommodations
and-if threatened by a more coordinated and hard-hitting Central
American strategy-probably will intensify their destabilizing activities.
As Western disillusionment has deepened, Nicaragua has looked increas-
ingly to the Soviets and their allies for vital economic aid as well as
military and political support. The Cuban connection is crucial, with
Havana serving as a revolutionary model, a source of assistance, a conduit
for ties to other nations, and a senior partner in exporting the revolution. In
addition, the Cubans have provided Managua with a model for its foreign
policy apparatus as well as advice in its pursuit of international sympathy
and legitimacy. For their part, the Soviets have replaced the United States
as Nicaragua's patron, providing a growing amount of vital economic and
military assistance, as well as political guidance. The East Europeans
furnish similar support-with security and ideological interests predomi-
nating-and non-Bloc radicals cooperate with Managua in joint efforts to
promote the thwarting of US interests and provide mutual support.
Although these relationships are not without difficulties-such as Cuban
paternalism and.Soviet caution in dealing with the Nicaraguans-we
believe they are likely to become even closer over the next year or so.
In our judgment, the Sandinistas' increasing attention to their ultimate
goal of consolidating domestic power has reduced their maneuvering room
in relations with the West and increased the importance of their ties to the
Communist states. Nevertheless, regime leaders still view the West as a
vital source of international legitimacy and opposition to US policies. The
Sandinistas probably will be forced to devote considerable energies to
minimizing the negative fallout from their domestic policies and growing
ties to the Soviet Bloc as they seek to maintain economic and diplomatic
support in the West. Managua almost certainly will continue to use
international organizations as propaganda forums, increase pressure on
West European governments through solidarity groups, and play on
traditional anti-US sentiment in Latin America. This strategy may yield
some additional successes and deflect potential sources of pressure. The
increasingly evident nature of the regime and its steady movement into the
Soviet orbit, however, are likely to make most West European and Latin
American states less and less enthusiastic about providing active support
and additional assistance.
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Competing Policy Mechanisms
Influencing the West Through Propaganda and Solidarity
14
Promoting Solidarity
14
Looking to Cuba and the Soviet Bloc
15
Eastern Europe and Non-Bloc Radicals
18
Losing Non-Bloc Support
19
Prospects and Implications for the United States
20
v Secret
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Figure 1
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Nicaragua:
Sandinista Foreign Policy
Just before seizing power in July 1979, representa-
tives of the Sandinista National Liberation Front
pledged to the Organization of American States
(OAS) their intention to pursue nonalignment, politi-
cal pluralism, and a mixed economy as guiding princi-
ples of the revolution. The Sandinistas did so to win
the backing of the OAS and, by association, that of
the Western democracies, marshaling such support to
defeat the Somoza dictatorship. Needing Western
assistance to rebuild Nicaragua's economy and estab-
lish de facto legitimacy, the regime has continued to
use the argot of nonalignment and pluralism in its
foreign policy pronouncements. Nevertheless, in the
last six years, the Sandinistas' actions have made
clear that their real goal is the implementation of
Marxist revolution at home and in the region with the
assistance of the Soviet Bloc and Cuba.' The chief
challenge of Sandinista diplomacy, therefore, has
been to keep relations with the West-minus the
United States-from unraveling completely as Mana-
gua cooperates more and more closely with the East.
This paper analyzes the nature of and motivation
behind Nicaragua's relations with Western Europe
and Latin America, on the one hand, and the Com-
munist Bloc-Cuba, the Soviet Union, and the War-
saw Pact countries of Eastern Europe-on the other.
It discusses the various mechanisms, such as interna-
tional organizations and solidarity groups, that the
Sandinistas use to further their foreign policy inter-
ests. Finally, it assesses the effectiveness of Nicara-
gua's foreign policy, the prospects for changes in its
direction, and the implications for the United States.
The Sandinistas' present foreign relations strategy
parallels the one they used to depose the Somoza
regime-using moderates to achieve radical ends.
Before 1979, the Sandinista National Liberation
Front (FSLN) nurtured an alliance with liberal busi-
nessmen and social democrats, both domestic and
foreign, to isolate Somoza, rally active support against
him, and finally to oust him. Nevertheless, the person-
al histories and writings of most of the Sandinista
leadership already indicated their Marxist-Leninist
bent. Similarly, since the formation of the regime,
Managua has attempted to cultivate Western ties to
help rebuild the economy, to establish and solidify its
international legitimacy, and to block international
support for US "aggression." Simultaneously, grow-
ing ties to the Communist states have demonstrated
the revolution's true ideological course.
Moving to consolidate a totalitarian state, the Sandi-
nistas have thus pursued ties to both the West and the
Soviet Bloc. To win Western economic and diplomatic
support, the regime has tried to project an image of
political moderation and adherence to democratic
forms. At the same time, Managua turned to Cuba,
the USSR, and their allies for military equipment and
instruction in the political indoctrination and control
of the population. Underscoring the deliberate nature
of these competing agendas, then Sandinista Political
Coordinator Bayardo Arce-in a secret speech that
later appeared in the press-told the Nicaraguan
Socialist Party in May 1984 that the regime has
found it useful to highlight a mixed economy and the
then upcoming elections to the international commu-
nity while strengthening ties to the Soviet Bloc and
consolidating power at home.
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Figure 2
Comparison of Nicaraguan and Cuban Foreign Policy Apparatus
- Policy directives
- Influence and interaction
- Nominal control
Ministry of
Foreign Affairs
Sandinista National
Liberation Front
Department of
International Relations
Ministry of
Foreign Affairs
h
Cuban Communist
Party
General Department for
Foreign Relations
As Western nations have become more skeptical of
Sandinista claims of pluralism and democracy, the
burden of ensuring the regime's economic survival
increasingly has fallen to Moscow and its allies.
Nonetheless, Managua continues to manipulate resid-
ual Western sympathies for the revolution and public-
ly to refute identification with the Soviet Bloc-
claiming ties to the Communists only serve to balance
relations with the West-even while adhering faith-
fully to the Soviet foreign policy line. In Latin
America, the Sandinistas cultivate support by appeal-
ing to regional solidarity, but,
covertly assist radical leftists to plant the
Competing Policy Mechanisms
Competition among its different components charac-
terizes Nicaragua's foreign policymaking apparatus,
which is modeled on the Cuban system. The govern-
ment's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) is charged
with carrying out official relations and representation-
al functions, while the FSLN's Department of Inter-
national Relations (DRI) is responsible for protecting
party interests in formulating foreign policy.
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The Sandinistas look to their Cuban mentors for
assistance in many fields, including foreign policy:
The similarities between the two regimes are striking,
although Managua has not yet institutionalized the
foreign policymaking process to the same extent as
has Havana.
Goals. Cuba and Nicaragua share common objectives
in their international relations, namely, ensuring
their survival, undercutting US influence worldwide,
and promoting revolution through subversion. With
the benefit of hindsight, Havana has counseled Ma-
nagua to follow a path of moderation in pursuing
these goals.
advised the Sandinistas early on to do all they could
to obtain and sustain Western economic aid.
Structure. The division in Nicaragua's foreign policy-
making apparatus between party organization-the
International Relations Department (DRI)-and a
government entity-the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(MFA)-mimics Cuba's structure. The Cuban Com-
munist Party has two departments specifically re-
sponsible for international affairs, which are reflected
in the DRI's overt and covert functions. Although the
Nicaraguans run a poor second compared with Cu-
ba's extensive global propaganda mechanism, they
have managed to build an effective organization
devoted to this task.
Advice. Havana has been active in developing specific
policy guidelines for Managua; we believe that most
of the guidance is given at a fairly high level. 0
Castro and
Manuel Pineiro, Chief of Cuba's America Depart-
ment, have broad influence with the Sandinistas. In
ister Alarcon plays the most direct role in managing
Cuban participation in Nicaraguan political affairs,
including foreign policy issues.
Frequent trips by Sandinista National
Directorate members, especially Daniel Ortega, to
Havana to consult with the Castro regime provide
further evidence of the high-level contacts.
Nicaraguan-Cuban collaboration on the Contadora
process provides the best example of Cuba's key
advisory role.
Cuba advised Nicaragua in mid-1983 to give
the impression of agreeing with the Contadora negoti-
ations simply as a device to gain time for the
strengthening of Nicaragua's defenses.
process has remained high. Daniel Ortega's visit to
Cuba last April probably was devoted in part to
discussing Contadora, as was his trip in June.
Style. Sources of the US mission to the UN have
reported on the similar strategies and style employed
by the Cuban and Nicaraguan delegations to meet-
ings of the Nonaligned Movement (NAM). The Sandi-
nistas also have adopted Castro's method of employ-
ing public relations campaigns to demonstrate
reasonableness and a willingness to negotiate with the
United States. For example, Daniel Ortega's peace
initiative in late February 1985 and the well-publi-
cized departure of 100 Cuban advisers from Nicara-
gua on 2 May were closely coordinated with the
Castro regime,
Moreover, Nicaragua's recent backing of Castro's
call for a Latin American debtors' cartel and its
successful bid to join the Latin American Parliament
appear clearly orchestrated with Cuba. Just like the
Cubans, the Sandinistas have sponsored a number of
international conferences in Managua to attract
world attention and bestow additional legitimacy on
the regime.
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Not unexpectedly, however, some friction exists be-
tween the two organizations and appears to stem from
the party's primacy in foreign policy decisionmaking.
delineated officially at that time,
the party mechanism retained consider-
able foreign policy influence, including responsibility
for relations with Cuba, the Soviet Union, and East-
ern Europe. Moreover, the Sandinista National Direc-
torate-the nine Comandantes-has the final say on
sensitive policy matters
A directorate-level Commission of Foreign Policy
meets on a regular basis to consider routine issues
based on recommendations from the MFA and DRI,
but its composition suggests that party interests domi-
nate. the
Commission consists of President Daniel Ortega,
Arce, DRI Director Julio Lopez, D'Escoto, and Vice
Foreign Minister Victor Tinoco-all except D'Escoto
are members of the inner circle of the FSLN. Indeed,
D'Escoto wields little real power and is
primarily useful as an image builder for the regime.
The Foreign Minister's hunger strike in July 1985-
publicly attributed to his concern over US policy
toward Nicaragua-prompted rumors of his immi-
nent departure, and we speculate that it may have
been an attempt to draw attention to his own role.
President Ortega appears to wield the most influence
in directing Nicaragua's foreign affairs, although the
other Directorate members do play influential roles.
We believe that the regime's foreign policy strategy is
an outgrowth of the Sandinistas' method of gaining
domestic and international support during their fight
against Somoza-that is, cultivating moderate back-
ing while pursuing Marxist-Leninist goals covertly-
which was promoted by the Ortega faction of the
important roles also are played
by two members of Interior Minister Tomas Borge's
more aggressively hardline faction within the Direc-
torate. Sandinista party administrator Arce and Min-
ister for Foreign Cooperation Henry Ruiz are fre-
quent regime emissaries to Western Europe and the
Soviet Bloc, respectively, probably affording them
substantial influence in policy formulation.
The Sandinistas apparently are seeking to reduce the
friction within the foreign policy apparatus by bring-
ing the MFA into closer touch with the party's
ideological concerns.
one of the party's
goals for 1985 has been to move skilled members into
all key political and administrative positions in the
MFA. This probably is seen as necessary because
initial appointees to the Ministry were young and
inexperienced guerrillas or revolutionary sympathiz-
ers, but not necessarily members of the FSLN. In
fact, press reports indicate some 16 MFA officials
"resigned" last summer. A DRI official told the US
Embassy last December that the government wanted
to replace many old diplomats with people who had
gained experience abroad and were more committed.
In addition, the DRI has been shuffled,
in an apparent
move to reinvigorate the revolutionary grounding of
this party component. Indeed, the regime's consider-
able use of personal diplomacy-that is, frequent trips
abroad by high-ranking Sandinistas-reflects the lea-
dership's desire to make sure that the revolution is
represented effectively and faithfully. The drive to
bring the MFA into ideological line also may portend
the eventual replacement of D'Escoto. We believe
that Tinoco, an adept revolutionary politician, would
be the most likely candidate to fill his position, but
any of the three vice foreign ministers are logical
choices, given their strong ideological credentials.
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Nicaragua's relations with the West have deteriorated
over the last few years, reflecting Western preoccupa-
tion with the regime's growing totalitarian cast and
closer ties to the Soviet Bloc. The Sandinistas' initial
pledges to maintain political pluralism, a mixed econ-
omy, and nonalignment in their foreign affairs proved
successful, in our judgment, as long as the intended
audience was willing to give the regime the benefit of
the doubt. As Managua's domestic actions increasing-
ly failed to meet its public commitments, however,
many Western leaders became disillusioned. Such
disappointment was reflected, for example, in 1982
when Venezuela suspended oil sales and in 1983 when
West Germany froze its substantial aid package. In
response, Managua has become more aggressive in
trying to maintain the backing it still has. Moreover,
opposition in Western Europe and Latin America to
some US policies in Central America still provides
Nicaragua with an issue from which it can draw
support.
Western Europe
On coming to power, the Sandinistas-counseled by
the Cubans and Soviets-saw Western economic aid
as a necessity
Through 1982
they almost effortlessly reaped the benefits of the
good will extended to them, especially by West Euro-
pean social democrats, and stressed the themes of
reconstruction and moderation in soliciting assistance.
Even as Managua's democratic facade was tarnished
by the jailing of private-sector leaders and its persecu-
tion of the Miskito Indians in 1981, aid levels from
the Sandinistas played on Western fears that the
regime might be drawn too readily into the Soviet
orbit by exploiting the Europeans' belief that political
support and economic aid could be used as leverage to
force moderation on Managua. For example:
? The US Embassy reports that President Ortega told
a Finnish newspaper that the multilateral support
Nicaragua had received during his trip through
Western Europe last May would guarantee that the
Sandinistas would be able to keep their promise of
maintaining a mixed economy.
? During the same trip, Nicaraguan sources told the
press that, if Nicaragua were left isolated, it would
turn to those countries willing to help-such as the
Soviet Union.
insurgents.
In spite of such Sandinista manipulation of European
sympathy for the regime, their domestic actions
prompted growing Western disenchantment and
forced a reorientation of their foreign tactics. The
imposition of the state of emergency in 1982, as well
as the Sandinistas' belligerent behavior during the
Pope's visit in 1983, increased European skepticism
about Nicaragua's adherence to democratic princi-
ples. In addition to private admonitions from Western
leaders, Managua saw OECD aid drop by $9 million
from 1983 to 1984. Responding to this downturn in
relations-as well as to the growing threat of the anti-
Sandinista insurgency-the regime tried to refocus
West European attention on the "aggression" Nicara-
gua suffered at the hands of the United States. For
example, Vice President Ramirez countered Austrian
criticism of the regime's human rights record last
spring by contending that the "abnormal situation"
imposed by the United States "created conditions
under which individual excesses were more likely to
occur," according to the US Embassy. Managua also
used its seat on the UN Security Council in 1983 and
1984 to draw attention to US activities in the region
and cast itself as the besieged party. More recently,
the regime justified its expansion of the state of
emergency measures-suspending additional civil
rights-as a consequence of stepped-up US aggression
against Nicaragua in the form of renewed aid to the
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West European disagreements with US policies in
Central America have provided fertile ground for
Nicaraguan maneuvering, and the Sandinistas have
turned such attitudes to their advantage by equating
any pressure on the regime by West Europeans with
support for US policy. Daniel Ortega, for example,
capitalized on negative Western reactions to the
imposition of US economic sanctions in 1985 to obtain
assurances of political support, although appeals for
increased economic aid generally failed. Indeed, Ital-
ian officials did not press the regime for internal
reforms and made an effort to avoid appearing to
support the sanctions,
In a less successful gambit-but perhaps intended as
an implicit threat to image-conscious West European
leaders-Ortega accused the Kohl administration of
giving in to US blackmail when West Germany froze
aid to Nicaragua in late 1983.
On balance, Sandinista foreign policy toward Western
Europe has had mixed results. Managua has failed to
stem growing disillusionment with the regime's poli-
cies-no West European leaders attended President
Ortega's inauguration last January. Moreover, a num-
the Sandinistas' Marxist-Leninist bent and have met
with anti-Sandinista leaders such as Eden Pastora.1-
Nevertheless, West European attitudes toward some
US policies and skillful Nicaraguan maneuvering
have prevented the disappointment from becoming
translated into concerted pressure on and active oppo-
sition to Managua. Relations currently appear to be
settled on a shaky plateau. Aid levels have dropped
further-to about $80 million in 1984, in part due to
large Nicaraguan debt arrearages-although Nicara-
gua is still the third-largest recipient of French aid in
Latin America. Similarly, West European political
attitudes have become increasingly noncommittal.
Most states tacitly accepted the Nicaraguan elections
in November 1984 as legitimate, although a number
of leaders, such as Gonzalez of Spain, viewed them as
disappointing, according to US Embassy reporting.
Nicaraguan relations with Spain over the years illus-
trate the trend in Managua's ties to the rest of
Western Europe. Prime Minister Gonzalez's initial
wholehearted support for the Sandinistas afforded
Managua substantial political backing and economic
assistance. By 1983, however, during a visit to Spain,
D'Escoto encountered some pressure for political
moderation, according to the US Embassy. He coun-
tered with the argument that Nicaragua, an aggrieved
nation, had a "right" to international solidarity.
Despite rising Spanish disillusionment, the Sandinis-
tas continue to play on residual sympathies and
portray Spain as a staunch ally. The hesitancy of the
Gonzalez government to apply significant pressure-
beyond some private remonstrations-was demon-
strated last spring when Madrid was quick to note
that its suspension of export credits was economically
and not politically motivated. Moreover, Gonzalez
limited his reaction to the Sandinistas' recent imposi-
tion of expanded emergency measures to an expres-
sion of mild concern, adding that US policies had
given hardliners in Nicaragua sway, according to the
US Embassy.
The Sandinistas have placed particular importance on
the Socialist International (SI) in their bid for West-
ern support, largely because backing from the organi-
zation has the effect of bestowing legitimacy on Third
World parties. We believe Managua views the SI as a
barometer of its ability to play to the West, and have
reasoned that failure to gain support from the SI-
whose ideology is clearly to the left of center within
the democratic political spectrum-would make moot
their chances for cultivating the more conservative
forces in Western Europe and Latin America.
Managua has aggressively pursued SI approbation
and consistently sends high-powered delegations to SI
meetings, but the organization's backing has faltered
in recent years. For example, former Venezuelan
President Carlos Andres Perez-an SI Vice President
for Latin America and former staunch Sandinista
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The Sandinistas have made active use of internation-
al organizations to promote their interests, pose
diplomatic challenges to the United States, and con-
fer legitimacy on their regime. Moreover, internation-
alforums provide Nicaragua the opportunity to
initiate and maintain contacts with a wide range of
nations without bearing the added expense of sup-
porting resident missions in countries of marginal
importance to Nicaragua. The United Nations and
the Nonaligned Movement (NAM) clearly hold the
greatest importance for the Sandinistas.
The UN serves as an effective means of communicat-
ing Nicaragua's overt policies and grievances to the
rest of the world. After an abortive attempt to secure
a seat on the UN Security Council in 1980, Managua
emerged victorious in 1982 and used its position to
both amplify its voice in the organization and bolster
its legitimacy.
Managua has also found the UN a useful and fairly
receptive forum for its complaints against the United
States and has called for no less than nine Security
Council meetings to discuss some aspect of US
involvement in Central America. Its greatest victory
came in March 1984 when it forced a US veto of a Se-
curity Council resolution on the mining of Nicara-
guan ports. Notably, several Security Council ses-
sions have been called by the regime apparently in
anticipation of US Congressional votes or to deflect
supporter-publicly scored the regime last January
and declined to attend Ortega's inauguration. None-
theless, the SI still provides some positive payoff, such
as its lukewarm endorsement of the elections last
November and recommendation of continued econom-
ic aid to Nicaragua. Moreover, the organization pro-
duced a communique at a meeting last June that
reflected none of its private criticisms of the Sandinis-
tas, while it forcefully condemned US policies in the
region.
attention from events such as the abortive Libyan
attempt to send arms to Nicaragua via Brazil in
1983. The Sandinistas have also used the General
Assembly and other UN bodies and procedures to
promote their cause. Daniel Ortega's bitterly anti-US
address to the Assembly in 1979 set the tone, and in
1983 Nicaragua successfully placed Central America
on the Assembly's agenda. Moreover, the Nicara-
guans tirelessly support their case at the UN by
circulating items such as protest notes to their neigh-
bors and the CIA manual on guerrilla warfare as
Security Council and General Assembly documents.
Nevertheless, Nicaragua has reaped diminishing re-
turns through its repeated use of this forum. In our
judgment, many moderate nations are beginning to
look upon the Sandinista maneuvers, their initiation
of poorly conceived and inconclusive Security Council
sessions, and their repeated claims of an imminent
US invasion-including Daniel Ortega's citing of a 15
October 1984 invasion date in the Assembly last
year-with increased skepticism.
UN officials and delegates
reacted negatively to Nicaragua's call for a Security
Council debate in September 1984 on the downing of
an anti-Sandinista insurgent helicopter with two US
civilians aboard, believing that the meeting wasted
time and resources. Perhaps sensing waning support,
Nicaragua staged its last foray into the Security
We believe the gradual erosion of West European
support is likely to continue as the direction of
Sandinista domestic and foreign policies becomes
even more obvious. Despite increased dependence on
the Soviets and their allies, Managua is unlikely to
abandon its attempts to press the West Europeans for
at least a neutral stance on US policies. Unwillingness
to provoke their own domestic left probably will
forestall West European governments from exerting
significant pressure on the Sandinistas.
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Secret
Council in May 1985 to condemn the US imposition
of economic sanctions by appealing to internationally
respected principles and playing down its radical and
Bureau prior to a UN meeting to generate an official
communique that invariably supports Nicaragua's
position and carries over into the UN.
Soviet Bloc ties.
The NAM has been a useful ally and tool of Nicara-
gua in the UN and elsewhere in boosting world
opinion. Managua has succeeded in pushing through
language critical of US policies in Latin America
beyond that with which many more moderate mem-
bers were comfortable. For example, in January
1983, the Sandinistas sponsored a highly effective
meeting-from their perspective-of the NAM Coor-
dinating Bureau in Managua to discuss Latin Ameri-
ca. The holding of an extraordinary meeting to
discuss the regional situation was a departure from
normal procedures, and the Nicaraguans presented a
harshly anti-US draft resolution to participants with-
out providing sufficient time for discussion. In 1984,
the Sandinistas again set precedent by initiating the
formation of a "Friends of the Chairman" group-
overwhelmingly biased in favor of Managua-within
the movement that would inform the NAM Chairman
on Central American developments and assist in the
preparation of communiques.
In its dealings at the UN, the Sandinista regime has
made ready use of the NAM to set the stage for
UNSC or UNGA debates. The Nicaraguans custom-
arily call for a meeting of the NAM Coordinating
South America
South American attitudes toward the Sandinistas, like
those of Western Europe, are changing from accep-
tance to disillusionment, and for the same basic
reasons. Nevertheless, Nicaragua's strategy in the
region has been conditioned by cultural affinities and
geographic proximity. We see Managua's foreign
policy as operating on two levels-through overt,
official ties and through covert cultivation of local
leftists. Overtly, the regime plays on anti-US feelings
and emphasizes its claims to legitimacy. Economic aid
is sought but generally is less available than in
Ironically, the Organization of American States
(OAS)-which took the unprecedented step of calling
for Somoza's removal in 1979 and to which the
Sandinistas promised a mixed economy, nonalign-
ment, and pluralism-has been largely shunned by
the Sandinistas. In fact, Nica- 25X1
ragua has used the UN to avoid Central American
issues being brought to the OAS. We believe that
Managua views the OAS as not serving its interests
because of its limited international scope, its histori-
cal identification with the United States, and the
presence of more conservative governments.
Managua has aggressively pursued membership in
other international bodies and frequently seeks
decisionmaking positions. Nicaragua's diplomacy fol-
lowing the imposition of US sanctions last May
provided an illustration of its tactics of getting a vote
of support from every possible forum, whether or not
the topic was germane to the organization's agenda.
The Sandinistas sought resolutions condemning the 25X1
US action from the UN, NAM, World Health Orga-
nization, Latin American Economic System, General
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs, and International
Labor Organization, among others.
Western Europe and is less important to the Sandinis-
tas in this area. The accession of new liberal democra-
cies to power in South America generally has helped
to give Managua the benefit of the doubt and, at least
temporarily, more room to maneuver.
Managua initially nurtured the overwhelming support
it received from the democratic sectors of Latin
America by playing up its revolution as an assertion of
national sovereignty. The regime appealed to the
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traditional Latin distrust of "Yankee imperialism"
and adherence to nonintervention in internal affairs.
The Sandinistas also played up their triumph over the
hated institution of Latin dictatorship, although this
won them no points with conservative governments.
Repressive Sandinista policies at home, however,
eventually began to drain Latin support. Venezuela-
formerly a staunch backer-cut off oil exports in
1982, and Mexico reduced its supplies in 1984, for
both political and economic reasons. In response, the
Managua regime changed its tactics, playing less on
its symbolic status-although continuing to hammer
away at anti-US themes-and gradually promoting
issues important to Latin American solidarity. For
example, we believe the Sandinistas saw their support
for Argentina during the Falklands crisis in 1982 as a
means of enhancing their regime's legitimacy in the
region. This year Nicaragua emerged as a vigorous
proponent of Latin issues when it joined Havana in
advocating a moratorium on the Latin debt. In addi-
tion, the Nicaraguan National Assembly recently
applied for and obtained membership in the Latin
American Parliament, not only attempting to boost
Managua's claims to democracy but also integrating
itself into an organization where the United States
has no voice and little sympathy.
In their bid for Latin American support, the Sandinis-
tas have courted the moderate left-and used their
ties to the extreme left-in a number of countries. In
our view, the regime has had moderate success in
using the local left to exert internal pressure on
politically sensitive governments to prevent the imple-
mentation of anti-Nicaraguan policies, although such
efforts have not stemmed official disillusionment with
Sandinista policies. For example:
? The Ecuadorean Foreign Minister told the US
Ambassador in late 1984 that his government hesi-
tated to take action against the meddlesome Nicara-
guan Ambassador because of possible reaction from
the domestic left, although Quito later expelled the
Nicaraguan consul and most recently broke rela-
tions with Managua.
raguan Embassy in the Dominican Republic has
used the local left to intensify anti-US and pro-
Sandinista attitudes through the orchestration of
demonstrations, peace marches, and the like.
? Managua's Embassy in Caracas contacted a wide
range of Venezuelan leftists last May to organize
solidarity groups and activities to promote sentiment
against US economic sanctions and US policy in
general,
? In Ecuador and Venezuela, the Nicaraguan Embas-
sy has utilized contacts with local leftist organiza-
tions to arrange pro-Sandinista demonstrations,
? During the festivities marking the inauguration of
civilian presidents in Argentina and Uruguay,
the Nicaraguans
mobilized local leftist groups for large demonstra-
tions of solidarity with visiting President Ortega.
The recent accession of liberal democracies in Latin
America has given Managua new opportunities to
cultivate backing. For example, the newly installed
Garcia administration in Peru has expressed strong
support for the Sandinistas, although it presumably
will come to recognize the regime's shortcomings. For
their part, the Sandinistas have launched an aggres-
sive campaign to cultivate these avenues of support-
opening an Embassy in Montevideo, soliciting coordi-
nated South American backing for the Contadora
peace negotiations, and personally carrying explana-
tions of their positions to each capital.
the Nica-
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Managua's relations with Buenos Aires over the last
six years illustrate several facets of Nicaragua's ap-
proach. The Sandinistas maintained correct-al-
though somewhat strained-relations with the Argen-
gua's political support for Argentina during the 1982
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Falklands conflict won it some diplomatic points and
economic aid. The subsequent installation of the
liberal Alfonsin government prompted Nicaraguan
petitions for both economic and political support, to
which Argentina responded positively.
Government issued a statement against the US sanc-
tions. it did
so in an effort to show Latin solidarity and prevent
domestic political forces from applying pressure.
Moreover, the Sandinistas were quick to parlay even
reluctant support into propaganda advantage. For
example, although Buenos Aires advised the Nicara-
guan Ambassador not to interpret its statement on the
sanctions as a victory, according to the US Embassy,
the envoy returned to Managua to tout continued
Argentine support in the face of the embargo. F_
Even while seeking official support, Managua-in
close collaboration with Havana-has helped the ex-
treme left in South America prepare for eventual
armed revolution,
? Some Latin extremists, such as exiled Argentine
Montoneros, Uruguayan Tupamaros, and Chilean
leftists, enjoy safehaven in Managua and work in
the governmental bureaucracy,
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Over the near term, Managua probably will continue
to receive at least nominal support from most of the 25X1
new civilian democracies in Latin America, which will
want to placate their own leftist groups and to 25X1
demonstrate independence from Washington. None-
theless, we believe Sandinista movement toward the
consolidation of a Marxist-Leninist state will erode
such support further. Economic assistance, moreover,
is likely to continue at its current level, an estimated
$120 million in 1984, comprised primarily of oil from
Mexico and of credits from Argentina, Brazil, and 25X1
Colombia. The Sandinistas, for their part, probably
will continue to stress solidarity issues and raise the
specter of a potential US intervention, while main- 25X1
taining covert involvement with the radical left in
South America.
Central America and Contadora
The Sandinistas' relations with their Central Ameri-
can neighbors have deteriorated steadily because of
Managua's increasingly hardline domestic policies,
aggressive military buildup, cross-border incursions
into Honduras and Costa Rica, and clandestine ef-
forts to promote subversion. For example, Costa
Rica-a sympathetic ally during the revolution-is
now expressing unprecedented levels of anti-Sandinis-
ta sentiment, despite its official policy of neutrality.
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a spokesman for a Colombian guerrilla
In our view, the regime's objectives in the region are
to erode support for the United States and to spread
the revolution. Toward the latter end, the Sandinistas
have aided the Salvadoran rebels since 1979 by
providing arms, training, safehaven, advice, and logis-
tic support, as well as permitting them to maintain 25X1
group publicly admitted in early December 1984
that members of his group were fighting the insur-
gency in Nicaragua and had been there since 1979.
potential of Honduran and Costa Rican leftists,
their headquarters and communications systems in
Nicaragua. Similar assistance has been afforded to
Guatemalan insurgent groups on a smaller scale, and
Managua also continues to develop the revolutionary
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Since the anti-Sandinista insurgency began in earnest
in 1982, the regime has doggedly sought to engage the
other Central Americans in bilateral talks in an effort
to relieve mounting pressures generated by regional
support for anti-Sandinista forces and by US policies.
We believe Managua seeks not only to deny the
insurgents safehavens but also to achieve individual
accommodations to prevent the coalescence of a unit-
ed Central American front against it. During the first
year of its UN Security Council tenure in 1983,
Managua repeatedly tried to use the organization to
press both the United States and the Central Ameri-
can countries into one-on-one negotiations, according
to diplomatic reporting. Continuing this strategy,
after the imposition of US economic sanctions in May
1985, Vice Foreign Minister Talavera made the cir-
cuit of Central American capitals in an attempt to
arrange bilateral deals.
Although Costa Rica on several occasions has agreed
to direct negotiations, neither these nor a joint border
commission created in early 1984 has significantly
reduced the insurgent threat to Nicaragua. Neverthe-
less, the Sandinistas have propagandized these con-
tacts as a demonstration of their willingness to settle
differences through peaceful means.
Despite Managua's preference for addressing regional
issues bilaterally, we believe it has actively participat-
ed in the Contadora peace negotiations in an effort to
enhance its international image and thwart US inter-
ests in Central America. Initially, the Sandinistas
resisted the multilateral approach of the Contadora
mediators-Colombia, Mexico, Panama, and Venezu-
ela-and accepted the process only as a forum for
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Figure 3
Nicaragua's Trade With Its Central
American Neighbors, 1979-84
1984 draft treaty's provisions and the public relations
coup it scored by accepting the draft without modifi-
cation. The regime almost certainly viewed the lack of
adequate verification and control provisions as benefi-
cial loopholes in an agreement that would ultimately
force the United States to remove its military advisory
presence from both Honduras and El Salvador. In
addition, the Sandinistas have effectively introduced
bilateral issues-such as the call for talks with Costa
Rica last June-into the Contadora process in what
we believe is an effort to thwart the attempts of other
Central American states to coordinate their strate-
gies. Recent rounds between the mediators and the
Central American countries have produced a new
draft treaty-more responsive to the concerns of
Nicaragua's neighbors but still weak on verification
and control provisions. Managua has indicated some
disagreements with the document and seems less
concerned about appearing accommodating. The San-
dinistas probably would welcome continued, inconclu-
sive negotiations, believing such sessions ward off a
US invasion but require no Sandinista concessions.
bilateral talks. In April 1983, Nicaragua publicly
called on the Contadora nations and the United
Nations to sponsor dialogues between the United
States and Nicaragua, and between Honduras and
Nicaragua. When pressures mounted against them in
late 1983, however, the Sandinistas-and their Cuban
mentors-decided to use the process to ward off the
United States,
Such pressures included the US intervention
in Grenada, the initiation of joint military maneuvers
by the United States and Honduras, the opening of
the US Regional Military Training Center in Hondu-
ras, and increased anti-Sandinista activity on both
borders. We believe Managua judged that its partici-
pation in regional talks could make it appear reason-
able and willing to achieve peace, thus forestalling
international-or domestic US-support for a US
intervention.
Since becoming an active participant in the Conta-
dora process, Managua has benefited handily from
the negotiations-both in terms of the September
The likelihood of improved relations between Mana- 25X1
gua and the other Central American capitals appears
slim. Viewing Sandinista calls for bilateral talks as
deliberately divisive, the other Central American
countries-minus Guatemala, which has followed its
own agenda-probably will continue to attempt to
coordinate diplomatic efforts, particularly in the Con-
tadora negotiations. The Sandinistas are unlikely to 25X1
retreat from their policy of pressing their neighbors
for accommodation and probably will seek to involve
actors from South America and Western Europe to 25X1
dissuade the other Central Americans from their
tough stance toward Nicaragua. Moreover, preoccu-
pation with the anti-Sandinista insurgency over the
medium term is likely to continue to sap the regime's
ability to significantly step up its efforts to spread the
revolution beyond its borders.
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Influencing the West Through
Propaganda and Solidarity
The Sandinistas have effectively used propaganda and
contacts with solidarity groups in Western Europe
and Latin America to promote Nicaragua's interests.
Much of the Sandinista media effort has been devoted
to mobilizing international pressure against alleged
US destabilization efforts and polishing Managua's
claim to pluralism. Its ties to solidarity committees
help spread favorable propaganda and create local
pressures on governments for continued support of the
regime.
Nicaraguan propaganda themes focus on portraying
the Sandinistas as peace-seeking Davids besieged by
the US Goliath. In so doing, Managua's apparatus
has emphasized the regime's role in the Contadora
peace negotiations and the alleged atrocities commit-
ted by US-backed insurgents against Nicaraguan
citizens. In addition, the Sandinistas have capitalized
on newsmaking events such as Foreign Minister
D'Escoto's "peace" fast last July and the US-based
"Witnesses for Peace" boat ride down the San Juan
River last August to generate sympathy for their
The Propaganda Apparatus
Managua employs a variety of its own media organs
as well as access to international wire services to
disseminate favorable information and generate sym-
pathy. The regime established a department of Propa-
ganda and Political Education to coordinate the flow
of information shortly after seizing power in 1979. A
monthly international edition of the party's official
newspaper Barricada is produced in Spanish and
English, along with a bilingual monthly magazine
called Soberania. The regime set up the New Nicara-
guan News Agency and entered a pool of nonaligned
wire services to extend its reach.
Beyond its own media coverage, the regime capital-
izes on the presence of international journalists and
visitors to disseminate its positions. For example,
Managua announced at a press conference arranged
for visiting US solidarity group members that they
were there to prove "the lies of the Reagan adminis-
tration's policies," according to the US Embassy. On
another occasion, in 1983, Interior Minister Borge
assembled journalists to listen to his praise of Latin
American patriot Simon Bolivar, in what we view as
an attempt to cultivate Latin favor. Managua also
uses the regime-sponsored Commission for the Promo-
tion and Protection of Human Rights as an arm of the
MFA, to maintain contact with international human
rights groups and improve Nicaragua's image interna-
cause.
The Sandinistas also have originated disinformation
about US policies and activities on a regular basis.
Two recent examples were Nicaraguan accusations
last April that the CIA was planning to kill Miskito
Indian leaders in order to disrupt ongoing talks with
the regime, and allegations that the CIA at one time
planned to use anti-Sandinista insurgents to attack
Honduran villages, thereby justifying an invasion of
Nicaragua.
Promoting Solidarity
Sandinista contacts with international solidarity
groups help the spread of such propaganda but also
serve as visible reminders to other governments of the
revolution's reach through their staging of demonstra-
tions, vigils, press conferences, and letter-writing cam-
paigns. According to US diplomatic reporting, Nica-
raguan Education Minister Cardenal-a frequent
emissary and well-known figure among Western and
Third World literati-recently told a gathering of
Austrian youth in Salzburg that the international
solidarity movement was of great importance to Ma-
nagua in view of what he called the threat of a US
invasion, and solicited their support. According to the
US Embassy, Managua announced on 4 October the
initiation of an international campaign, called "Nica-
ragua Must Survive," to mitigate the effects of US
trade sanctions through international solidarity. As a
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further indication of the importance ascribed to soli-
darity, both the Foreign Ministry and the DRI have
offices dedicated to promoting ties, and Nicaraguan
embassies are in routine contact with such groups. For
example, an official of the Christian Democratic
International told a US Embassy representative in
Brussels that the Nicaraguan Ambassador to Belgium
is active in providing propaganda to dozens of sympa-
thetic church and other groups, as well as sponsoring
group visits to Nicaragua to see the revolution first-
hand.
Solidarity with Nicaragua is promoted through
friendship societies, cultural organizations, human
rights groups, and peace associations, among others.
The Nicaraguan People's Solidarity Committee es-
tablished in 1979 has as a primary duty the promotion
of "internationalism and ties with national liberation
groups." The Anti-Imperialist Tribunal of Our Amer-
icas, publishers of Soberania, is a Sandinista-
sponsored international solidarity group based in
Managua that claims over 20 chapters in Latin
America.
Looking to Cuba and the Soviet Bloc ]
In contrast to its deteriorating standing with the
West, Nicaragua-not unexpectedly-has made sig-
nificant strides in its relations with the Soviets and
their allies. The Sandinistas had ties to Cuba and the
Soviet Bloc before their revolutionary victory,
and, on coming to
Figure 4
Nicaragua: Summary of Economic Aid
Disbursements and Military Deliveries
by Source, 1980-84
Million US S
ing its ties to the West.
power, set out to solidify relations. Managua has
explained its contacts with these nations as in keeping
with its commitment to nonalignment and as balanc-
Expanded relations with the Soviet Bloc have been
crucial for the regime's consolidation, but are not
without their shortcomings. Bloc military aid in-
creased from a negligible amount in 1979 to some
$250 million in 1984, according to our calculations.
As the West became disillusioned with the Sandinis-
tas, the regime turned increasingly to the Communist
states for its economic, as well as military, needs. In
late 1983, Nicaragua obtained observer status in the
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA),
underscoring, in our judgment, a more coordinated
and long-term commitment to economic dealings with
the Soviets and their allies. Moreover, despite Mos-
cow's caution and protestations that it could not meet
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Managua's economic requirements,
the Bloc has taken up the slack
when Western economic aid has faltered-supplying
close to $300 million in 1984 alone. Nevertheless,
increased Sandinista ties to the Bloc have contributed,
in turn, to further Western disillusionment, as evi-
denced most recently by the negative Western reac-
tion to President Ortega's trip to Moscow last April.
Although the Sandinista regime increasingly depends
on the Communist states, they cannot address all of
its needs and vulnerabilities. Both Havana and Mos-
cow have indicated to Managua,
that in the event of a US interven-
tion they will not send combat troops-beyond the
Cubans already stationed in Nicaragua-to aid in its
defense.
Cuba
As Nicaragua's most important ally, Cuba serves as
its revolutionary model, a source of assistance, a
conduit to other nations, and a senior partner in
exporting the revolution. Nevertheless, the close rela-
tionship does produce some bilateral tensions.
The Sandinistas admire the Cuban leader as a role
model, his revolution as a goal for which to strive, and
his defiance of the United States as appealing. In
presenting Castro the highest Sandinista award in
January 1985, Daniel Ortega described him publicly
as an "inspiration for our daily struggle" and a
successful example of defying the United States. The
Castro regime also has served as a ready source of
Cuban assistance to the Sandinistas dates back years
before the revolution, and Castro's push to unify the
FSLN helped them to achieve victory. Cuban advisers
present in the party when it came to power were
joined by some 200 military personnel and some
1,200 teachers in late 1979. We estimate that some
2,500 to 3,500 Cuban military and security personnel
and some 3,500 to 4,000 Cuban civilians currently are
based in Nicaragua; most,
are able-bodied males with military
experience. These advisers are involved in the imple-
mentation of numerous cooperation agreements cover-
ing agricultural development, education, public
health, construction, and communications, as well as
providing military training, advising the state security
apparatus, and engaging in combat support. Material
aid from Havana has consisted primarily of transfers
of Soviet military equipment-mainly small arms and
minesweepers-agricultural products, consumer
goods, and school supplies. In addition, the Castro
regime has provided military, political, and education-
al training to several thousand Nicaraguans over the
last six years.
The Sandinistas have benefited from Cuban willing-
ness to serve as a conduit in promoting Nicaragua's
interests abroad. Evidence over the years has shown
Havana consistently defending Managua's interests in
its propaganda, in international forums, and in private
meetings with foreign officials and journalists. Occa-
sionally, the Castro regime has tried to protect Sandi-
nista equities by cautioning other countries-primari-
ly the more radical nations-to be more circumspect
cerned by the Sandinistas' deteriorating standing with
the West and have cautioned regime leaders not to
alienate such supporters.
To promote their joint ideological interests, Nicara-
gua and Cuba have engaged in cooperative and
complementary efforts to encourage the rise of like-
minded regimes in Latin America. In our judgment,
one of the motivating factors for Sandinista participa-
tion in subversion-beyond ideology-is a desire to
pay back the debt owed to Cuba and other regional
radicals for assisting in the overthrow of the Somoza
government. Shortly after taking power in 1979, the
Sandinistas began to provide the Salvadoran rebels
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with arms and equipment transported to Nicaragua
by the Castro regime. Managua and Havana have
worked jointly in their attempts to unify leftist groups
in El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Costa
radicals often receive preliminary training in Nicara-
gua and then are sent to Cuba for additional instruc-
tion.
and we believe that they make similar comments
occasionally in their private dealings with the Cubans
At times, however, the Nicaraguans chafe under
Cuban tutelage. Their admiration of and dependence
on Havana notwithstanding, Sandinista leaders fre-
quently assert publicly that they are their own bosses,
almost every matter and generally follow Cuban
advice, at times they choose an independent course,
even though this usually leads to adverse results.P
expand their activities in Central America.
Such strains are minor irritants, however, and are
unlikely to impair the mutually beneficial relationship
the two countries enjoy. In our view, the Sandinistas
consider the Cubans fraternal revolutionaries, and
both share an ideological mind-set that provides them
with ample common ground. Indeed, the Nicaraguans
probably will draw even closer to Havana for advice
on manipulating international opinion, dealing with
the pressures of the insurgency, and warding off
pressures from the United States. The Cubans, for
their part, view the Nicaraguan revolution as their
most successful achievement in more than two de-
cades of support to radical revolutionaries, in our
judgment, and intend to continue their extensive aid
to the Sandinistas. In addition, Nicaragua represents
a secure base from which the Cubans can monitor and
Nevertheless, Managua has admitted publicly-and
has been advised by Havana-that it would have to
face a US invasion without any prospect of being
reinforced by additional Cuban forces. In making this
admission, the Sandinistas have indicated, in our
assessment, that they recognize and accept the con-
straints that Castro faces and do not expect him to
sacrifice the Cuban revolution for Nicaragua's-in
much the same way the Sandinistas view their com-
mitment to the Salvadoran insurgents.
The USSR
The Sandinistas' relationship with the Soviet Union
has been driven foremost by the need for military,
political, and-increasingly-economic assistance.
The Nicaraguans clearly have been the supplicants, as
demonstrated by their repeated high-level visits to the
USSR and its allies to solicit aid. Moreover, their
voting record in international organizations shows
their broad support for Soviet foreign policy.
In our judgment, the Sandinistas look less to the
Soviets as role models-reserving that distinction to
Cuba-and more as patrons, in effect replacing the
United States in its historical role. Publicly, Moscow
has minimized its ties to Managua, probably to avoid
antagonizing the United States. Nevertheless, the
Soviets have offered some public political support and
established close party-to-party ties to the FSLN.
The Nicaraguan-Soviet relationship has not been
without its difficulties, however, with Managua lob-
bying for aid and military commitments and the
Soviets cautioning the Sandinistas to remain flexible,
keep their options open, and avoid jeopardizing their
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access to Western economic and political support. For
example, a well-informed Mexican diplomat told US
officials in Moscow that the Soviets were not pleased
with Daniel Ortega's visit in June 1984 because it was
thrust on the Kremlin at an inopportune juncture in
Nicaraguan-US relations. In our view, the Sandinis-
tas are probably somewhat frustrated by the Soviets'
caution, given their ideological closeness. On several
occasions, Soviet leader Gorbachev has pledged sup-
port for Managua, and since last spring Moscow has
increased its commitment of economic assistance to 25X1
the Sandinistas, possibly smoothing over some of the
tension inherent in their relations.
Despite the contrast between the staid Soviets and the
zealous Sandinistas, their relationship has deepened,
as evidenced by a sharp rise in Soviet military and
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economic assistance. In 1984, then Minister of Plan-
ning Henry Ruiz visited Moscow four times to discuss
Soviet aid, supplemented by the visits of regime
leaders Humberto Ortega, Daniel Ortega, and Tomas
Borge as well as lower level delegations. Ruiz re-
turned to the USSR in April 1985 with President
Ortega's highly publicized aid-seeking mission. That
trip was generally successful in obtaining increased
Soviet aid commitments-including a bilateral eco-
nomic agreement, almost $60 million in hard curren-
cy, and a guarantee to meet some 80 percent of
Nicaragua's oil needs-but it cost the Sandinistas
substantial political capital in the West.
Sandinista relations with the Soviets almost certainly
will deepen further, although Moscow probably will
be cautious to maintain a lower profile than Havana.
Having raised their economic and military assistance
to the regime considerably in the last year, the Soviets
probably hope to make future increases incrementally
as a low-cost means of maintaining an ally in Central
America. For their part, however, the Sandinistas will
continue to press Moscow for more substantial com-
mitments.
Eastern Europe and Non-Bloc Radicals
The Sandinistas look to Warsaw Pact countries in
Eastern Europe for assistance to supplement that
provided by the USSR and Cuba, and in some specific
cases seek help in consolidating revolutionary institu-
tions. In our judgment, these countries primarily
represent an extension of Moscow's influence and
largesse to the Sandinistas and are cultivated as such.
In the last two years, tours of the Bloc by Nicaraguan
representatives to request economic grant aid and
donations of foodstuffs and consumer goods have
increased in frequency. In some instances, relations
appear fairly pro forma in nature, as with Hungary
and Romania. Other East European nations-East
Germany and Bulgaria, in particular-clearly hold
more interest for the Sandinistas by virtue of their
contributions to the institutional aspects of the revolu-
tion, as well as their service as Soviet surrogates in the
delivery of military equipment. Berlin and Sofia
provide Managua with help in party organization and
political indoctrination, according to US Embassy
reporting. Moreover, the Sandinistas appear to de-
pend on these Bloc countries-along with the Cu-
bans-in building their security apparatus.
In contrast to the West, where the Sandinistas have
tried to play down their ideological predilections, the
Nicaraguans emphasize their Marxist credentials in
contacts with the Bloc . In 1981, Managua established
the Association of Friendship with Socialist Countries
in an apparent attempt to cultivate domestic receptiv-
ity of closer ties to Eastern Europe. Accordingly, in
visits to Warsaw Pact nations, Nicaraguan officials
often drop their pretenses of aspiring to Western
social democracy and reiterate strong support for
Soviet and Bloc positions. For example, Ortega
praised the German Democratic Repubic as a "for-
tress of peace" and endorsed Soviet disarmament
proposals while in Czechoslovakia during his visit last
May. We expect that, as Sandinista credibility in the
West decreases, Managua will turn increasingly to
Moscow's allies for economic aid, as well as continued
political support.
Nicaragua's ties to Middle Eastern radicals have
deepened over the years and appear motivated by a
desire both to cultivate aid and to defy the United
States. Before coming to power, the Sandinistas ob-
tained guerrilla training from the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO), and since that time have benefit-
ed from their Middle East connections in terms of
economic, technical, and military aid. In our judg-
ment, the Nicaraguans are attracted by the radical
Arabs' cavalier attempts to thwart US interests and
envy the lack of constraints-such as proximity to the
United States-that their Islamic allies face in doing
so. In fact, some Nicaraguan officials reportedly are
concerned that contacts with the radicals in the
Middle East not undercut the regime's efforts to
appear moderate in Western eyes.
Managua's relations with Middle Eastern radicals are
mutually beneficial, with the Sandinistas providing
diplomatic and other political support while receiving
substantial material assistance. Nicaragua broke dip-
lomatic relations with Israel in 1982, in part, we
believe, to curry favor and aid from the Arab states.
Further catering to their radical allies' concerns,
Managua has become host to the PLO's only embassy
outside the Arab world and regularly supports Pales-
tinian issues in international forums. In return, the
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PLO has provided pilots, pilot training, and other
aviation assistance to the Sandinistas. Similarly, Nic-
aragua looks to Libya for financial aid-based on
available data, we estimate that Tripoli has provided
$250 million or more in loans-agricultural assistance
and military equipment. For its part, Nicaragua has
become the focus of Libyan efforts to undermine US
influence in Central America through support to the
Sandinistas and other regional radicals, according to
public statements made by the regime in Tripoli.
Managua's ties to Tehran also have been mutually
supportive. President Ortega recently condemned
Iraqi aggression, and Iranian officials publicly ex-
pressed support for Nicaragua during Prime Minister
Musavi's visit last January, stating that such solidari-
ty stems from a shared struggle against the United
States. Moreover, Iran has provided foreign exchange
through third-party oil deals and reportedly has at-
tempted to ship arms to the Sandinistas via North
Korea. We expect Nicaragua's Middle East relation-
ships to continue apace, but-in the absence of a
shared ideological basis-to remain founded on more
concrete reciprocal interests.
Losing Non-Bloc Support
Managua in recent years has run into greater difficul-
ties in trying to maintain good relations with the West
while proceeding with internal consolidation and clos-
er alignment with the Soviets and their allies. Indeed,
the Sandinistas have lost considerable ground from
the overwhelming international support they claimed
in 1979. Although we believe that FSLN strategists
saw an ultimate end to Western benevolence, they
probably calculated that the regime's security would
be assured and its consolidation substantially achieved
before they lost that support. Contrary to such expec-
tations, however, the regime presently faces a persis-
tent threat to its consolidation from the anti-Sandinis-
ta insurgents while its backing from the West is
Figure 5
Nicaraguan Imports of Crude Oil and
Petroleum Products by Supplier, 1979-85
14
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1VP'
"~C
I2
to
8
6
4
In an effort to minimize the impact of Western
disillusionment, Managua has effectively employed
some aggressive new approaches, especially in inter-
national forums. For example, Nicaragua's election to
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making and propagandizing tactical concessions with- 25X1
out surrendering their ultimate objectives. Managua's
the UN Security Council for the 1983-84 session
bestowed substantial legitimacy on the regime and
gave it a high-profile platform for attacks on the
United States, including the resolution condemning
the mining of Nicaragua's ports in March 1984.
Similarly, the regime's resort to the International
Court of Justice over US involvement in the mining
incident helped shore up Nicaragua's victim image
and boosted its claim to the moral high ground when
the United States rejected the forum's jurisdiction.
Moreover, the Sandinistas have been fairly skillful in
Antilles (Neth.)
Mexico
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acceptance of the Contadora draft treaty in Septem-
ber 1984 scored it political points as a peacemaker
and painted the other four Central American nations
as obstacles to a regional settlement.
Nonetheless, in our judgment, events thus far in
1985-such as the absence of Western leaders from
its inauguration and anniversary festivities, as well as
negative Western reaction to Ortega's trip to Mos-
cow-indicate that Managua has had waning success
in mustering active political or economic support from
Western Europe, in thwarting external support to the
anti-Sandinistas, and in scoring big successes in inter-
national forums. We view most of the Sandinistas'
non-Bloc support as increasingly passive to neutral. A
some West
European social democratic leaders view their back-
ing for Nicaragua merely as an obligation, indicating
a lack of strong political convictions in their support
for the Sandinistas.
The Sandinistas' maneuvering room and margin of
error in their international dealings is becoming more
narrow, in our judgment. Their disruption of the
Contadora peace talks on two occasions-the impasse
with Costa Rica last February and walking out of the
talks in June 1985-highlighted Nicaraguan intransi-
gence. Moreover, the embattled and defensive out-
bursts of some of the Nicaraguan leaders in response
to Western prodding for democratic reforms indicate
that minimal concessions are becoming more difficult
for the regime to make. In fact, the Sandinistas
sometimes have acted as revolutionary bulls in diplo-
matic china shops, such as in Ortega's impolitic and
caustic remarks describing President Reagan as a
"fascist" while touring Europe or their blatant med-
dling in another nation's domestic affairs. Nicara-
gua's Ambassador to Bolivia, for example, publicly
urged students, workers, and politicians in late 1983
to convert that nation into a "free" country like his
own.
We believe that the Sandinistas' flagging success in
cultivating the West is due in part to greater ideologi-
cal rigidity as they consolidate the revolution. Al-
though some blunders also are attributable to inexpe-
rience or frustration at growing external pressures, a
review of Managua's diplomatic gaffes suggests that
the Sandinistas' sometimes myopic world view-that
is, that the world owes them support and will under-
stand their actions-and their lingering guerrilla siege
mentality are also to blame. For example, we believe
that the belligerent behavior on the occasion of the
Pope's visit to Managua in 1983 was due to their
desire to assert their authority-above that of the
Pontiff's-in providing spiritual, as well as political,
guidance to the revolution.
Prospects and Implications for the United States
Because the Sandinistas view the consolidation of the
revolution as a long-term goal, we believe they will
continue to pursue their current foreign policy strate-
gy over the next year and beyond.
In our assessment,
Managua, at a minimum, will continue playing to the
West for support as long as the insurgency remains a
threat. Even if the insurgency were defeated, we
believe the Sandinistas would maintain their facade of
"balance" and avoid full identification with the Com-
munist states to continue receiving whatever assis-
tance the West is willing to offer.
Nevertheless, given the shifting trend of the last few
years, we believe the Sandinistas will be less effective
in maintaining Western support, their relations with
the Bloc will become more obvious, and they will be
engaged increasingly in efforts to limit damage to
their image in the West. We assess that the Sandinis-
tas probably will increasingly become victims of their
own mistakes, as ideological considerations cloud
their calculations of Western tolerance for the regime.
Because the anti-US theme is basic to Sandinista
ideology, we expect the United States to continue to
be the whipping boy in most of Managua's foreign
campaigns, although such appeals seem likely to
decrease in effectiveness. Having reaped considerable
success and sympathy from international forums such
as the United Nations and the Nonaligned Move-
ment, the regime probably will maintain a high profile
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and persevere in its efforts to rally international
condemnation of US policy in Central America. De-
spite varying degrees of West European opposition to
some US policies in that region,
significant fatigue with the Sandinistas'
frequent rhetorical outbursts and appears to portend
less sympathy for their cause in the future. In fact, its
foray into the Security Council last May on the issue
of US sanctions produced mixed results. If Managua
meets with lukewarm support, we expect that it may
strike out at the United States on issues of a more
sensational nature-such as the antinuclear cause-in
which it has a lesser stake but can muster significant
and wide-ranging international backing.
We expect Managua to shift its official diplomacy to
concentrate on the new Latin democracies while
increasing its emphasis on nonofficial lobbying in
Western Europe. The regime probably will assign
more aggressive diplomats to Latin America, as in the
recent appointments of two highly competent Ambas-
sadors to Brazil and Venezuela. The receptivity of the
new administrations in Peru and Uruguay to Mana-
gua's ministrations is a bright spot that the Sandinis-
tas will seek to exploit. Nicaragua probably will
expand its use of propaganda and solidarity groups in
Western Europe as its effectiveness at the official
level wanes.
Based on its past behavior, we judge that the regime
will keep trying to reach bilateral accommodations
with its neighbors in Central America while still
participating in the Contadora peace negotiations.
The Sandinistas will try to undermine the Central
Americans' confidence in the United States and al-
most certainly will augment diplomatic pressure with
continued support for regional insurgents and subver-
sives. Moreover, if the Sandinistas find their maneu-
vering room in negotiations is shrinking and their
manipulation of the process yielding fewer benefits,
they may increase-within the limits ascribed by the
needs of their own counterinsurgency efforts-such
covert backing to heighten the pressures on neighbor-
ing governments.
Managua's plans for further consolidation of Marxist
rule make continued close military, political, and
increasing economic ties to the Soviet Bloc and Cuba
a necessity. Nevertheless, Managua and its socialist
allies will seek to avoid full identification, such as
acceptance as a member in CEMA or publicized 25X1
bilateral friendship treaties, until they perceive the
West as having definitively written off the Sandinis- 25X1
tas. Both Nicaragua and its allies will continue to try
to avoid the kind of political and economic isolation
that Cuba has faced.
Although we believe the current trends in Nicara-
gua's foreign policy will continue at least over the next
year, the following are indicators that may point to a
shift toward a strategy guided solely by ideology:
? Total abandonment of the Contadora process and
refusal to enter into future multilateral negotiations.
? More active, concerted support to South American
radicals.
? Reduced efforts to cultivate the Socialist Interna-
tional and address Western concerns with even
cosmetic gestures, such as periodic demonstrations
of political flexibility.
? Less frequent trips by the Sandinista leadership to
Western nations.
? Public statements by regime leaders admitting
Marxist-Leninist goals.
? The conclusion of one or more bilateral friendship
treaties with the Soviet Union or its allies.
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