GUATEMALA: SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL ACTORS AND THEIR INTERACTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00589R000300430001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 45
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 30, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence 25X1
Guatemala:
Significant Political Actors
and Their Interaction
Secret
ALA 85-10099
CR 85-13566
October 1985
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Directorate of
Intelligence
and Their Interaction
Guatemala:
Significant Political Actors
Division, ALA,
coordinated with the Directorate of Operations.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Middle America-Caribbean
of African and Latin American Analysis, and
Office of Central Reference. It was
This paper was prepared by
Secret
ALA 85-10099
CR 85-13566
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Secret
Summary
Information available
as of 26 August 1985
was used in this report.
Guatemala:
Significant Political Actors
and Their Interaction
Guatemala will elect its first civilian government in 19 years on
3 November 1985. The country's gradual evolution toward democratic rule
has improved its image abroad, diminished its sense of international
isolation, and-from the standpoint of US interests in Central America-
increased Guatemala's potential as a strategic player. Nevertheless, the
military-which retains a decidedly rightist viewpoint and has dominated
the political system for much of this century-will remain the final arbiter
on most policy issues. The armed forces, however, are helping in the
transition and appear committed to free and open elections.
Until recent years, the frequently repressive military has had little
incentive to relinquish its control over the country. Guatemala has been
racked by decades of violence and a 25-year-old insurgency that stimulated
the armed forces' accumulation of power and resources. In March 1982,
however, a group of young Army officers, concerned over Guatemala's
growing isolation and escalating rebel activity and numbers, toppled the
regime and installed retired General Rios Montt to broker military and
political reforms. Under Rios Montt, a new counterinsurgency strategy was
formulated that attempted to address the socioeconomic causes of the
insurgency. At the same time, the administration tried to open a fledgling
political process to participation by moderate parties and new or previously
excluded groups.
Although Rios Montt was ousted after 17 months in part because he
miscalculated the strength of opposition to his reforms, he established a
new democratic direction for Guatemala, which his successor, Chief of
State Mejia, has largely followed. Central to this effort was the Constitu-
ent Assembly election in July 1984, in which moderate parties made an es-
pecially strong showing. We believe that the center will again prevail in the
election scheduled for November and in a possible runoff in December.
Some trends likely to shape the country's short-term political future are
becoming apparent:
? The center-leftist Christian Democrats and moderate National Centrist
Union are the frontrunners, and either party's presidential candidate is
acceptable to the military.
? The ultrarightist National Liberation Movement remains a potent
political force, but its propensity for violence and coup plotting has
contributed to a stormy-and increasingly violent-campaign period that
is dimming its electoral prospects.
iii Secret
ALA 85-10099
CR 85-13566
October 1985
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? The balloting is likely to erode further what popular support remains for
the radical left, which is divided over how it should respond to the
electoral process.
Mejia's generally conciliatory policies have encouraged Guatemala's vari-
ous interest groups to cooperate in the transition. Catholic Church leaders,
for example, while increasingly outspoken on human rights issues, have
generally attempted to avoid provocative actions so as not to imperil the de-
mocratization process. Nevertheless, because of the diversity and conflict-
ing priorities of the various interest groups, we expect periodic-and
sometimes serious-confrontations to continue. Government attempts to
institute badly needed austerity measures in 1985, for example, met strong
opposition from the business community, ultimately forcing retraction of
the measures. Even so, the confrontation seemingly is leading to stronger
private-sector involvement in the government's search for solutions to the
country's worsening economic situation.
The opening of the political process takes place at a time of diminishing
fortunes for the extreme left. ideological
and other differences continue to limit guerrilla effectiveness and to
frustrate Cuban and Nicaraguan efforts to unify the four rebel groups. In
addition, a burgeoning civilian defense program and civic action initiatives
have helped reduce insurgent ranks, according to our estimates, to about
1,500 full-time combatants-roughly half their force level in early 1982.
For now, however, the military's limited air and ground transport and other
logistic problems will make further reductions difficult, and we believe the
guerrillas will continue small-scale ambushes and economic sabotage in the
countryside and engage in sporadic terrorism in the cities.
Over the near term, the country's general volatility, diverse political
groupings, and serious economic problems are likely to complicate the
efforts of the new civilian government to consolidate a power base. As a re-
sult, competing interests and lack of political direction are likely to
preclude a dramatic or quick improvement in relations with the United
States, although many Guatemalans see the installation of a civilian-led
government as essential to eliciting increased US support. Within this
framework, centrist elements will look to the United States for material
assistance and political protection as a means of gaining leverage with the
armed forces, while rightists will resist any conditions-especially involv-
ing human rights demands-attached to such aid.
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Summary
iii
Recent Political History
1
Role of the Military
2
Moving Force in the Transition Process
2
Improving Political Climate
4
The Constituent Assembly and National Elections
5
The Guatemalan Political Spectrum
6
National Liberation Movement (MLN)
6
Guatemalan Christian Democracy (DCG)
9
Revolutionary Party (PR)
9
The Emerging Center
10
Major Insurgent Groups
Outlook and Implications for the United States
Politically Significant Organizations
Comprehensive Glossary of Guatemalan Organizations
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Guatemala:
Significant Political Actors
and Their Interaction
Guatemala, which has been beset by more than three
decades of violence from extremists on both the left
and the right, is making a transition to civilian rule
for the first time since the administration of President
Mendez Montenegro (1966-70). The transition re-
flects a gradual but pivotal change in the role of the
military and other traditional political actors, and has
led to the emergence and strengthening of moderate
groups that favor democratic solutions over violence.
The transition is fragile, however. Initially, it depends
on continuing cooperation from the military, as well
as on the commitment from moderate and other key
political sectors to peaceful and democratic balloting
during national elections scheduled for November
1985. Even with a smooth election, however, Guate-
mala will face additional challenges because of the
country's political diversity, lack of experience with
the democratic process, weakness of democratic insti-
tutions, economic problems, and the general volatility
of Central America itself.
This paper, the third in a series of reference aids on
the Central American nations,' provides a broad-
based description and analysis of Guatemala's politi-
cal spectrum, as well as the principal political actors
and their interaction. Like its predecessors on El
Salvador and Nicaragua, it offers in appendixes A, B,
and C capsule summaries of the key political groups
and major leaders, and a listing of politically signifi-
cant organizations currently or recently active.'
The Roots of Violence
Violence, armed revolt, and a rigid political structure
have been endemic to Guatemala for decades. Much
of the violence has its origins in the 1944 revolution,
which cast out the last in a line of traditional military
dictators. Although the government under the highly
personalistic rule of Jorge Ubico (1931-44) had re-
filled treasury coffers, balanced the budget, and built
more roads and hospitals than all of its predecessors
combined, it also relied on ruthless repression of all
political opposition. In addition, Ubico's economic
policies-based on the exploitation of Indian labor
and extravagant concessions to foreign businesses-
alienated and politicized large segments of the middle
and lower classes, while his tolerance of military
corruption antagonized some reform-oriented Army
officers.
Following Ubico's forced resignation on 1 July 1944,
the tenures of President Juan Jose Arevalo (1945-5 1)
and his successor, Col. Jacobo Arbenz (1951-54), were
characterized by widespread reforms that sought to
enfranchise the country's large Indian population,
promote social and labor legislation, and redistribute
the earnings of a plantation-based economy. As presi-
dent, however, Arbenz allowed members of a small
Communist group-the Guatemalan Labor Party-to
entrench themselves in the government and register
their organization as a legal political party. His land
reform policies also angered key sectors of society,
including much of the military and many of the
largest landowners.
Claiming that the reforms were Communist inspired,
the oligarchy-aided by disgruntled former Army
officers-ousted Arbenz in early 1954. The coup,
' There is a foldout table, A Guide to Key Political Groupg, at the
end of the paper containing a list of the political organizations, with
their abbreviation and orientation, discussed in the text.
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which brought to a close Guatemala's "decade of
revolution," reversed many of the reforms enacted by
Arevalo and Arbenz, and propelled the country into
an intensely anti-Communist phase that grew increas-
ingly violent. In the ensuing counterrevolutionary
period, the rightwing governments of Carlos Castillo
Armas (1954-57)-who had led the revolt against
Arbenz-and Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes (1958-63) an-
nulled land reform laws, outlawed leftwing parties,
removed restrictions on foreign investment, increased
police powers, and repressed or executed thousands of
politicians, labor leaders, and peasants.
The cycle of violence intensified in the 1960s and
1970s. In November 1960 a large group of young
Army officers, who resented what the public record
shows as US involvement in the 1954 coup and
Guatemala's cooperation in the training of Cuban
exiles for the Bay of Pigs invasion, staged an unsuc-
cessful revolt against the government, and some fled
to the mountains. Later they formed the first of
several leftist guerrilla groups that remain active
today. The Army's response was indiscriminate re-
pression, and vigilante groups-the precursors of
death squads-assisted in the counterinsurgency
function. In the two decades since 1963, virtually all
sectors of Guatemalan society participated in-and
were victimized by-political violence.
Role of the Military
Preeminent Political Institution. The insurgency pro-
vided the military with an added sense of purpose,
forced it to grow professionally, and reinforced insti-
tutional identity and loyalty. As the Army expanded
its presence into isolated guerrilla-infested areas, it
could justify command of more national resources and
became the fastest growing component of an other-
wise small public sector. As a result, the armed forces
consolidated their position as the preeminent power in
virtually all Guatemalan affairs. With the exception
of the Montenegro government, which was forced to
sign a pact that explicitly subjected its policies to
military veto, all Guatemalan chief executives since
1963 have been active-duty or retired Army officers.
During this period, the hold of the officer corps on key
executive and administrative posts-including lucra-
tive directorships of burgeoning state-owned corpora-
tions-has allowed it to accumulate wealth while also
enjoying virtual immunity from civil judicial author-
ity.
As military influence rose, traditional civilian struc-
tures and institutions fragmented. Most significantly,
the economic elite, once a tightly knit group of
plantation owners, became increasingly diversified
with the emergence of modern business entrepreneurs
and manufacturers, while rising expectations and
growing political awareness among the middle and
lower classes made these sectors increasingly less
responsive to the will of the oligarchy. Public restive-
ness reinforced the military's conservatism and its
view of itself as guarantor of security, thereby en-
abling it to rationalize the use of fraud to keep civilian
politicians out of office and justify its indiscriminate
repression against moderate reformists and radical
revolutionaries alike. Under the Lucas Garcia regime
(1978-82), for example, there were 400 to 500 politi-
cally related deaths monthly during January-March
1982, according to US Embassy estimates.
By early 1982, the country's polarization into extreme
rightist and leftist camps had caused the exodus and
decimation of moderate elements, inflated guerrilla
ranks, and further undercut Guatemala's already
tarnished international image. Determined to reverse
these trends and galvanized by reports of fraud in the
7 March presidential election, a group of young Army
officers toppled Lucas on 23 March and installed a
three-man junta headed by retired Gen. Jose Efrain
Rios Montt. A highly respected former Armed Forces
Chief of Staff with a reformist reputation, Rios Montt
had been a victim of electoral fraud as the Christian
Democratic presidential candidate in 1974 and, as
such, was perceived as an honest broker for the
reforms being pushed by junior and middle-level
officers.
Moving Force in the Transition Process. Although of
relatively short duration, Rios Montt's tenure as
president provided Guatemala with a new direction in
terms of the counterinsurgency campaign, the role of
the military in politics, and evolving options for new
political entities. His counterinsurgency strategy' em-
ployed innovative political, military, and psychologi-
cal measures that sought to gain the confidence of the
peasant and Indian populations, particularly in the
' The country's various guerrilla factions and the impact of the
government's counterinsurgency effort on them are discussed be-
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contested Western Highlands. For example, our ex-
amination
shows that small patro s were use o increase e
Army's presence in remote areas, to inculcate a sense
of trust in the local populace, and to help guard
against the indiscriminate actions attendant in larger
Army sweep operations. Civilian militia forces also
were organized to give villagers a stake in their own
defense and provide an intelligence and early warning
function for the armed forces, while amnesty and civic
action programs helped undercut popular support for
the guerrillas.
In our view, a major impulse for the new direction in
the counterinsurgency effort was the perception by
the armed forces that an improved human rights
image for
which was cut off in 1977. During
Rios Montt's tenure, the Army increasingly attempt-
ed to win the support of the local populace by offering
protection to villagers, who previously might have had
their homes burned or been executed for alleged
cooperation with the rebels.
nel were warned to honor human rights during mili-
tary operations, and several hundred policemen were
dismissed in an attempt to curb the activities of quasi-
official, rightwing death squads.
As the. government's carrot-and-stick strategy helped
the military regain control of the countryside, Rios
Montt also attempted to use the Army to weed out
administrative corruption and set the stage for a
return to civilian rule. Seeing the vulnerability of the
judicial system to extreme rightist and leftist threats,
Rios Montt established special secret tribunals to
remove large numbers of corrupt officials who had
operated under the Lucas regime, and to prosecute
captured insurgents and other antigovernment opposi-
tion. The Army was also concerned that radicals
might exploit the planned political liberalization, and
expanded its administrative districts from nine to 22
separate military zones plus the northern department
of El Peten, while local military commanders received
wide authority over nearly every facet of community
life in their zones, including political party activity.
On 23 March 1983, Rios Montt lifted the state of
siege he had imposed and announced the first steps of
the transition to civilian rule, especially encouraging
participation in the electoral process by moderate
leftist parties and new organizations representing
previously excluded social groups. He also took steps
to reduce the power of the traditionally predominant
rightist parties such as the National Liberation Move-
ment, whose programs and policies, we believe, were
viewed by reform-minded officers and civilian leaders
as unrepresentative and a continuation of the status
quo. Moreover, he delayed the announcement of an
election timetable to allow emerging political groups
time both to organize and to draw support away from
the established rightist parties, which historically
have had the money and organization that almost
certainly would have given them an edge in any early
vote. Revamped party registration procedures, imple-
mented largely as a means to eliminate existing -and
often fraudulent-voter lists, also helped to buy time
for the newer parties.
Nonetheless, in carrying out his political reforms,
Rios Montt managed to alienate nearly every influen-
tial sector of Guatemalan society. The Roman Catho-
lic hierarchy, publicly charging that the regime was
responsible for the growing militarization of the coun-
try, was particularly critical of the obligatory nature
of the civilian defense program and its alleged exploi-
tation of the Indian population. Similarly, the special
courts-whose membership and proceedings were
kept secret to protect judges from assassination-were
singled out by the Church and human rights groups
for violating due process. More directly threatening to
Church leaders, however, was the evangelical fervor
of Rios Montt, who promoted Protestantism and his
own religious beliefs by means of Sunday radio
"sermonettes."
Business and industrial groups grew uneasy over tax
reform plans that included a 10-percent value-added
tax needed to help Guatemala meet guidelines set
down by the International Monetary Fund and other
international financial agencies. Although many large
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landowners supported the tax proposals because agri-
cultural exports were excluded, rumored government
plans to institute modest land reform were vociferous-
ly opposed. Rightist political parties, perhaps sensing
that they could capitalize on their lead over moderate
parties in organizing for the elections, also soon joined
in the criticism of government policies by demanding
an early election.
If other key sectors of Guatemalan society found Rios
Montt's policies controversial, so too did a majority in
the military.
betrayed by the President's increasing reliance on
civilian advisers drawn from his small "Church of the
Word" sect and the junior officers who had brought
him to power. While more moderate-minded members
of the armed forces became fearful that his idiosyn-
cratic behavior was endangering the reforms sought
by the majority of the officer corps, still others-
especially those associated with the extreme right-
believed that the changes went too far. Finally, after
surviving several coup attempts, Rios Montt was
ousted on 8 August 1983, and Gen. Oscar Humberto
Mejia Victores was installed as Guatemala's new
Chief of State.
Improving Political Climate. Mejia shares Rios
Montt's goal of opening up the political system, and is
less encumbered with personal idiosyncracies and
controversial policies than his predecessor. Neverthe-
less, Mejia's efforts to foster the democratization
process must balance a variety of competing interests,
foremost among them the institutional prerogatives
and integrity of the armed forces. We believe that
there are limits to the military's tolerance of civilian
rule. The armed forces, for example, are unlikely to
permit any new government to investigate past abuses
of power, corruption, and other wrongdoing. In addi-
tion, in our view, the Army will strongly resist any
attempt to diminish its control over the civilian de-
fense patrols, military spending, and institutional
matters, including officer promotions and the naming
of the defense minister.
Nonetheless, Mejia's generally conciliatory policies
have had some success in encouraging Church, uni-
versity, and political leaders to cooperate in the
transition. For example, underscoring the govern-
ment's commitment to improve its human rights
image, Mejia in mid-1984 pardoned scores of prison-
ers convicted by the now-defunct special tribunals
established by Rios Montt. Subsequently, some 400
policemen were indicted for various crimes, and more
than 300 Treasury Police members were dismissed for
corruption and other abuses, according to government
statistics reported by the US Embassy. Responding to
a request by Church leaders and a highly active
human rights organization-the Mutual Support
Group (GAM)-Mejia also established a government
commission to investigate the unusually high number
of disappearances plaguing the country.
Mejia's conciliatory gestures are also directed at
Guatemala's insurgents. In September 1983, he an-
nounced an amnesty program-since extended to
January 1986-designed to entice the guerrillas, as
well as some 45,000 Guatemalan refugees in Mexico,
to return to their homes. Some 3,000 refugees, many
viewed by the government as guerrilla sympathizers,
had been repatriated by the end of 1984, according to
US Embassy estimates. Encouraged by the growing
numbers of returnees, the government has devised a
model-town program-"Poles of Development"-by
which it plans to reconstruct and resettle on or near
their original sites some 19 villages destroyed by the
fighting. Thus far, more than a dozen villages have
been completed and are inhabited.
Mejia also has used more conventional military meth-
ods to continue the government's strong push to
control the insurgency. In this regard, the prolifera-
tion of civilian defense units is probably the single
most important development in the counterinsurgency
program. Growth of the defense forces has continued
apace with the program numbering some 915,000
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members in 1985 and slated ultimately to reach 1
million. The Guatemalan armed forces, including its
various police organizations, also have continued to
grow, and active-duty personnel now number 44,600,
according to US defense attache estimates. As a
result, the Army's General Staff estimates,
that its coun-
terinsurgency strategy has reduced insurgent ranks to
some 900 to 1,200 full-time combatants. Correspond-
ingly, popular support for the guerrillas has continued
to plummet-a trend that, in our view, is likely to
accelerate if a moderate civilian government is in-
stalled in 1986.
Despite noticeable counterinsurgency gains, the
armed forces' continuing logistic problems-especial-
ly the lack of air and ground transportation-and the
country's stagnant economy are likely to hamper
significant further advances against the rebels. The
counterinsurgency effort depends heavily upon the
government's ability to garner popular support by
providing security and followthrough on promised
developmental assistance and social services. In this
regard, senior officers-weary of the military's pro-
tracted involvement in formally running the govern-
ment-accurately perceive that the armed forces lack
the expertise needed to bring about an economic
recovery. Economic data show that Guatemala has
not rebounded from the recent worldwide recession as
quickly as other Central American countries, in part
because it has not had access to as much foreign
assistance. The Armed Forces High Command is
optimistic, that the
planned return to civilian rule in January will help
end Guatemala's international isolation and improve
its chances of securing financial and military aid.
Mejia's efforts to improve his government's image
have already paid some dividends in the international
arena. In September 1984, Guatemala was selected as
a vice president of the 39th UN General Assembly,
and diplomatic relations with Spain-which were
broken in 1980 after Guatemalan security forces
raided the Spanish Embassy to evict protestors who
had seized the building-were formally reestablished.
In December, Mejia further reduced Guatemala's
international ostracism by his state visit to Costa
Rica, where he met with exiled leaders of the Guate-
malan Democratic Socialist Party and convinced
them to return home and participate in the national
elections.
The Constituent Assembly and National Elections
As the initial phase in his plan to return Guatemala to
civilian rule, Rios Montt announced in mid-1983 that
elections for a Constituent Assembly would take place
in July 1984. Despite Rios Montt's ouster soon there-
after, Mejia maintained his predecessor's electoral
blueprint. Some 17 political parties and three civic
comrhittees met the necessary registration guidelines,
and the elections were held on schedule on 1 July
1984. Election results showed that more than 2.5
million of Guatemala's estimated 3.5 million eligible
voters registered, with some 1,157 candidates compet-
ing for seats in the 88-member body. Nearly 1.9
million voters-some three-quarters of the registered
electorate-cast ballots. Three major parties-repre-
senting the right, center, and left-received almost 45
percent of the vote and obtained the lion's share of
seats in the new Assembly.
Official and independent observers from the Organi-
zation of American States, several foreign countries,
and the various parties themselves agreed that the
vote was conducted honestly and without interference
from the military. Some critics initially tried to
discredit the election by alleging that the large num-
ber of null or blank votes-some 23 percent-was a
protest against the regime. US Embassy reporting on
the election indicates, however, that many of these
appear to have been cast by illiterates, and they may
also reflect a confusing two-ballot system and the
inclusion of unused ballots among those voided by
election officials. Indeed, the only specific charge of
fraud-levied by perennial rightist coup plotter
Leonel Sisniega-was quickly discredited.
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To ensure continued control over the transition pro-
cess, the Mejia government has limited the Assem-
bly's authority to writing a new constitution and
associated laws regulating the judiciary and the na-
tional elections. Moreover, the Assembly presidency
has been rotated among the major parties-the Chris-
tian Democrats, National Centrist Union, and the
National Liberation Movement-to preclude one par-
ty from using the Assembly to bolster its election
prospects. These parties also chair the three main
commissions developed by the Assembly to draft the
new constitution, electoral codes, and civil rights
legislation, but a power-sharing arrangement has
permitted the smaller parties to chair several subcom-
missions.
Some parties have sought to delay the Assembly's
progress to gain time to organize, raise money, and
pursue coalitions or upset existing ones. Mejia, who
initially resisted fixing a date for the elections and
thus seeming to force the Assembly to speed up its
work, apparently became concerned by February
1985 that excessive delay could destabilize his own
regime; national elections are now scheduled for 3
November 1985, with an anticipated runoff election
for president set for 8 December. Swearing-in ceremo-
nies for the 100 congressional winners, as well as
inauguration of the new civilian president and vice
president, are set for 14 January 1986, when the
current Assembly will be dissolved.
The Guatemalan Political Spectrum
Traditional Parties
A review of their policies and pronouncements shows
that Guatemala's many political organizations are
generally personalistic without well-defined ideologies
or programs. Most are new and not deeply rooted in
society. In the past, expediency and the scramble to
win government positions and favor with the military
often dictated last-minute political realignments and
discredited most party leaders. The country's three
oldest groups-the ultrarightist National Liberation
Movement and the center-leftist Christian Democrat-
ic Party and the Revolutionary Party-thus far have
been the only ones capable of maintaining any signifi-
cant grassroots support.
National Liberation Movement (MLN). Historically
the strongest and best organized of Guatemala's
traditional parties, the MLN has been openly de-
scribed by its longtime leader, Mario Sandoval Alar-
con, as the "party of organized violence." Repeated
allegations by local politicians and other interest
group leaders link the MLN and Sandoval-who has
never denied the charges-with death squads such as
the Organized National Anti-Communist Movement
(MANO, Mano Blanca, or White Hand), the New
Anti-Communist Organization (NOA), and the Secret
Anti-Communist Army (ESA). Support for the party
traditionally has come from the most conservative
large landowners-especially coffee growers-and
from small merchants and more business-oriented
segments of the middle class.
waning.
The MLN allied itself in March 1984 with the
rightist but less extremist National Authentic Central
(CAN), with the coalition winning 23 seats and some
13 percent of the vote in the Constituent Assembly
election. MLN President Hector Aragon Quinonez is
one of the three rotating presidents of the Assembly.
In late 1984, the alliance was joined by several lesser
rightist parties, including the previously nonaligned
Democratic Institutional Party (PID), which won five
seats in the July 1984 Assembly vote. Even so, the
MLN's ability to garner only 14 of the Assembly's 88
seats was seen by many observers as a poor showing
by the party, whose longtime influence appears to be
We believe Sandoval's continued refusal to relinquish
control of the party to more moderate leaders and give
up his claim to the group's presidential candidacy is
likely to hamper the party's ability to contest the
elections in 1985. Earlier this year, Sandoval's auto-
cratic style led to the withdrawal of the CAN from
the rightist coalition, with CAN leaders publicly
criticizing Sandoval's unwillingness to apportion posi-
tions more equally among the members of the alli-
ance.
=CAN's financial backers were withholding their
support in the mistaken belief that they could pressure
Sandoval to abandon his presidential plans. Ironically,
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Table 1
The March Toward Elections
Party/Coalition Presidential Candidate Running Mate
DCG/FCD-5 a Vinicio Cerezo Arevalo Roberto Carpio Nicolle
UCN Jorge Carpio Nicolle Ramiro de Leon Carpio
PDCN/PR Jorge Serrano Elias Mario Fuentes Pieruccini
MLN/PID/FDP Mario Sandoval Alarcon Jaime Caceres Knox
8 December 1985 Presidential runoff election (if necessary)
14 January 1986 Inauguration of president and vice president; Constituent Assembly dissolved and National Congress
sworn in; new Constitution enters into force
Eligible voters 3.9 million c (3.5 million) d
Registered voters c 2.8 million c (2.5 million)
Registered parties 14 (17 parties, 3 civic committees)
Congressional seats 100 (88)
Governorships None (none)
a Supports DCG but not in formal coalition.
b Civic committee led by Quixtan; did not meet registration
requirements.
c Estimate.
d Figures in parentheses are for July 1984 Constituent Assembly
election.
c Voting is mandatory for literates 18 to 70 years old; active duty
military personnel are barred from voting.
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Figure 2
The Political Spectrum'
Extreme
Left
Center
Center
Center
Right
Extreme
Left
Left
Right
Right
Parties
PGT/O
PSD
DCG PR
UCN
PNR
CAN
MLN
FUR
FN PDCN
PP
FDP
PID
PUA
FCD-5
FPO AD
MEC
FUN
PUD
CND
Paramilitaries
URNG
ESA
EGP b
MANO
ORPAb
NOA
FARb
PGT/Db
MRP
PRTC
Front groups
FP-31e
CR
CDP
CUC
FERG
NOR
CGUPb
FDCPb
CCDAd
Unions
CONUS
CUSG
CTF
CNTd
FENATRAACf
FENCAIGr
FTQ
FASGUAe
FTGr
FCGf
FTR
FCI f
FTI f
CNUS
FENOCAM
FTA
Private
FUNDESA
CACIF
Official bodies an
GAM
AGSAEMP
social groups
CDHG
(nongovernmental)
n For discussion of these and other significant organizations see appendix A.
b Member of the URNG insurgent umbrella group.
e Associated with the EGP.
d Associated with the FAR.
e Associated with the PGT/O.
rAssociated with the CUSG.
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campaign contributions from less wealthy MLN mid-
(FCD-5). The National Centrist Union (UCN), creat-
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dle-class backers also had been dropping,
because of objections to CAN's
ties to the oligarchy. For their part, PID leaders have
demanded a more equitable distribution of power and
candidacies in exchange for their continued participa-
tion in the coalition.
Sandoval-who, according to various polls, appears to
be running a distant third or worse in the campaign-
seems increasingly concerned over his fading electoral
prospects. The MLN's propensity for violence, elec-
toral malpractice, and involvement in coup attempts,
has contributed to an unsettled presidential campaign
in which Sandoval, according to US Embassy sources,
was implicated in coup plotting in April 1985. At that
time several interest groups with strong ties to the
MLN sought to capitalize on a dispute between Mejia
and business leaders over highly contentious austerity
measures. The MLN also employed its rightwing and
media contacts to foment public unrest and antigov-
ernment propaganda in 1983, when it contributed to
the overthrow of Rios Montt.
Guatemalan Christian Democracy (DCGA Despite the
decimation of its leadership by death squads during
the late 1970s and early 1980s, the center-leftist DCG
probably most closely rivals the MLN as a national
organization. The party not only finished first on the
national list in the July 1984 balloting with more than
16 percent of the vote, but it also garnered 20 seats in
the Constituent Assembly. As the country's de facto
voice for the legal left and the principal left-of-center
opposition party, the DCG shares interests, objectives,
and philosophy with numerous labor and student
groups. Many Catholic Church leaders, according to
US Embassy also quietly sympa-
thize with the party's political orientation and ideolo-
gy, which are largely consistent with those of other
reformist Christian Democratic parties in Latin
America.
Like many Guatemalan parties, however, the DCG
has suffered from publicly documented internal splits
and personal rivalries. Before the Constituent Assem-
bly election, several prominent party leaders-includ-
ing former DCG Secretary General Danilo Barillas-
quit the party to form the Democratic Civic Front
ed in July 1983, also is a DCG offshoot.
The DCG has attempted to rally support around its
former secretary general, Vinicio Cerezo Arevalo,
who was proclaimed the party's standard bearer at the
national convention in July 1985. We believe Cerezo,
however, may have already prejudiced the party's
chances in the elections by his refusal to negotiate a
power-sharing arrangement with pivotal centrist par-
ties. The wide range of groups present at a party
gathering in February suggests that the DCG will
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Cerezo, however, apparently has rejected a more
formalized left-of-center coalition.
Revolutionary Party (PR). Although for many years
one of the most powerful political groups in Guatema-
la, constant internal bickering and a leadership taint-
ed by association with the corrupt regimes of the past
have forced the PR to seek electoral help. According 25X1
to US Embassy widespread
differences of opinion over which presidential candi-
date would maximize the PR's electoral chances in
November have caused further fragmenting, leading
various PR leaders to support three separate presiden-
tial nominees.
The party's heterogeneous nature-with both left-
and right-leaning wings-was evident in early 1985,
when several longtime party leaders rejected the PR's
formal alignment with the UCN-led centrist coalition.
Those opposed to the alliance-mostly the "Old
Guard" dissidents-were led by Mario Fuentes
Pieruccini, who outmaneuvered party moderates to
gain the secretary general post last March. In ex-
change for delivering roughly one-quarter of the
party's adherents to Jorge Serrano's centrist Demo-
cratic Party of National Cooperation (PDCN), Fuen-
tes received the PDCN's vice-presidential spot. Ser-
rano's following among evangelical and peasant
groups, in our view, exceeds the recognition level of
the PDCN, and thus his party's association with the
more widely recognized name and symbol of the PR
could make Serrano the campaign's darkhorse or
perhaps its spoiler.
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The Emerging Center
While rightist parties such as the MLN almost
certainly will remain a potent political force, we
believe the trend in Guatemala is increasingly toward
the political center. The strong showing by both the
reformist Christian Democrats and the moderate Na-
tional Centrist Union, in our view, reflects popular
rejection of years of military dominance, violence
from both the left and the right, and extremist
"solutions" to the country's ills. Indeed, these two
largely centrist parties finished one and two with 30
percent of the popular vote and 41 seats in the 88-
member Assembly between them. Despite these gains
by the country's more moderate political elements,
their need over the longer haul to accommodate a
variety of competing sectors, including the wishes of
the military, suggests the path to democratization will
be slow.
For the near term at least, the National Centrist
Union (UCN) has emerged as a pivotal moderate
political force. Following its securing nearly 14 per-
cent of the vote on the national list and 21 seats in the
Assembly, the UCN was perceived by many local
political observers as the favorite in the 1985 elec-
tions. The party's subsequent alliance with other
centrist parties, together with a weakened left and the
continued factionalization of the right, further boost-
ed its early electoral stock. Polls taken earlier this
year, for example, indicated that the UCN-led coali-
tion was favored to win the November balloting, with
the DCG close behind, and rightist hopefuls running a
distant third. Nonetheless, the alliance-already
weakened by the earlier "official" defection of the
Revolutionary Party to the PDCN-collapsed in July
this year when the UCN's other major electoral
partner, the National Renewal Party (PNR), with-
drew to pursue an independent candidacy. As a result,
many of these same local observers now give Christian
Democratic candidate Cerezo the nod as frontrunner.
Despite these setbacks, we believe the UCN is rela-
tively resilient. The extensive public relations machin-
ery of UCN newspaper publisher and presidential
candidate Jorge Carpio Nicolle apparently has helped
the UCN campaign coffers remain solvent, while
generating significant publicity for his campaign.
Carpio still could be hurt, however, by numerous
allegations that the UCN is the "official" party of the
current de facto military regime. Although untainted
by past connections with the armed forces, the UCN
is heavily in debt to an Army-controlled bank and
therefore presumably susceptible to military influ-
ence. We have no evidence that the UCN has become
Mejia's "official" choice to lead the new civilian
government, but it is likely that the party's moderate
platform, together with its largely business-oriented
presidential slate, would provide the Army with the
centrist victory that we believe it prefers.
Contributing to centrist electoral hopes is the articu-
late, professional leadership of the National Renewal
Party. Supported by moderate industrialists and seg-
ments of the middle class, and led'by its well-known
secretary general, Alejandro Maldonado Aguirre, the
PNR won some 7 percent of the vote and five seats in
the Assembly last year. In exchange for his party's
support, Maldonado had held the vice-presidential
spot on the UCN-led ticket until mid-1985 when he
withdrew his party to pursue his own candidacy, a
move that precipitated the already described collapse
of the UCN's centrist coalition. The decision to
renege on the agreement, however, apparently was
prompted by the adoption of a constitutional provision
that prohibits the sitting vice president from seeking
the presidency in the following term. Maldonado
previously had shown vote-getting ability as the presi-
dential candidate on a joint PNR-DCG ticket in
1982.
Interest Groups
Guatemala's key economic and social groups-busi-
ness, labor, and the Church-are represented by a
variety of competing organizations that share the
military's disdain of the country's politicians, whom
they regard as inept and disorganized. Although also
sharing with the armed forces support for a free
market economy and opposition to Communism,
many business and professional leaders openly ac-
knowledge their lack of contact with and understand-
ing of the armed forces, whose members they regard
as their social and intellectual inferiors. For labor's
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part, private business hostility and government repres-
sion have prevented the development of a strong labor
sector. Despite choosing to remain largely on the
periphery of political activism, Catholic Church lead-
ers in recent years have become more outspoken than
in the past on the military regime's human rights
record.
The Private Sector. Guatemala's economic elite-
industrialists, retailers, financiers, and planters-are
second only to the armed forces in terms of organiza-
tion and political clout. The private sector traditional-
ly has served as a key source of ideas and candidates
for the government, even though the latter generally
has been reluctant to consult with business leaders in
an effort to limit their influence on economic policy.
The most prominent organization is the Coordinating
Committee of Agricultural, Commercial, Industrial,
and Financial Chambers (CACIF). Although formed
to coordinate the views of the private sector with those
of the government, the diverse interests of the 14
different business chambers under the umbrella orga-
nization make consensus rare, and members often
operate independently on specific policy issues, ac-
cording to the US Embassy.
Their traditional individualism aside, however, pri-
vate-sector leaders in recent years have found them-
selves increasingly-and collectively-at odds with
the government over economic policies. Their
staunchly conservative economic and social philoso-
phy clashes sharply with the government's counterin-
surgency strategy, which depends on increased public
spending in the impoverished highlands. The govern-
ment believes such spending will enable it to regain
peasant loyalties, to attract Guatemalan refugees now
residing in Mexico to return to their homeland, and to
politically and socially integrate Guatemala's large
Indian population into the national mainstream.
Meanwhile, steadily deteriorating economic condi-
tions during the last half of 1984, together with the
government's imposition of unpopular tax adjustments
in October 1984 after only perfunctory consultations
with the private sector, have strained relations be-
tween the government and private business. Since the
beginning of 1985, the relationship has become even
more contentious, and is now, in our judgment, at the
point of threatening political stability. In April 1985,
for example, an outpouring of criticism and the threat
of a general strike by the private sector against the
government's attempt to impose austerity measures
forced Mejia to repeal the tax measures and fire the
Ministers of Finance and Economy. Guatemala thus
remains one of the least taxed countries in Latin
America. Indeed, on the basis of partial economic
data reported this year by the US Embassy, we
believe the private sector would have to submit to
unprecedented levels of taxation if the government is
to sustain the momentum against the insurgents and
finance programs to redress the country's social and
economic ills. Because of his confrontation with the
private sector earlier this year, however, we believe it
unlikely Mejia will propose any new bold economic
reforms-including higher taxes-through the re-
mainder of his tenure, thus leaving the new civilian
government the unenviable task of wrestling with the
country's mounting economic problems.
Labor. Guatemala's labor and peasant organizations,
which flourished between 1944 and 1954, have failed
to exert significant political influence since the over-
throw of the Arbenz regime. Private-sector hostility
and government repression-which, by the early
1980s, saw many labor and peasant leaders either
killed, in exile, or operating clandestinely in antigov-
ernment political and insurgent organizations-have
prevented the development of strong labor and peas-
ant movements. The armed forces have seen orga-
nized labor-in which the left traditionally has played
a strong role-as an extension of Communist subver-
sion and thus pursued a policy of periodic repression
of the free trade unions. As a result, the military's
view of labor unions as Communist fronts often
became a largely self-fulfilling prophecy, as Marxist
elements-better able to function in a repressive
climate-wrested control of the unions from more
moderate leaders.
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The government deals with both the union and the
nonunion labor force primarily through the 1947
Labor Code. Although the Code recognizes the right
of workers to organize and strike-except in the
public sector ?--it prohibits union participation in
partisan politics. Nevertheless, a principal impedi-
ment to labor organizational efforts stems from the
seemingly intended inefficiency of the bureaucratic
process required to certify a labor union. In 1983, the
Mejia government publicly recognized the problems
in the application of the Code, and a major review
purportedly was begun, although no results have been
announced. Some 645 trade unions are legally recog-
nized by the Ministry of Labor, but, according to
government statistics, only 381 were active during
1984. According to US Embassy estimates, only
about 10 percent of Guatemala's 2.5 million workers
are organized.
The Mejia government's lifting in August 1983 of the
state of siege imposed under Rios Montt has led to a
gradual renewal of trade union activity despite con-
tinuing obstacles, and to increased dialogue between
labor and the military. The major trade union devel-
opment during the past two years was the formation
of the new democratic Confederation of Syndicalist
Unity of Guatemala (CUSG) in May 1983. Although
not legally recognized by the government until No-
vember of that year, the CUSG has rapidly expanded
its membership. By mid-1985, it consisted of some 11
urban and rural trade union federations representing
over 75 percent of the country's organized work force,
according to US Embassy reporting. In addition,
CUSG organizing efforts in the first quarter of 1984
accounted for 13 of the 24 new or reorganized unions
that had applied for legal status.
Efforts to create a more cohesive union movement by
the largely centrist-oriented CUSG have been imped-
ed, however, by allegations from labor's left wing
that-because of its leaders' generally more concilia-
tory policies-it is a "government" union, a charge
that has prompted CUSG leaders to seek ways to
assert their political independence. CUSG leaders, for
example, initiated a vigorous public campaign earlier
' The new constitution, completed by the Constituent Assembly last
May and scheduled to enter into force in January 1986, includes an
article giving public-sector workers the right to strike. Open
opposition by the military and other interest groups, however,
caused the provision to be sufficiently weakened to accommodate
this year to influence the drafting of labor-related
clauses of the new constitution-winning greater rec-
ognition for workers' rights from the government-
and to protest rising prices. They also have held talks
with several political parties, including the Christian
Democrats, in an effort to barter CUSG support in
the 1985 elections for more say in formulating labor-
related policies. As a result, the CUSG appears to
have been moderately successful in distancing itself
from the government and seeking a higher profile.
The left wing of Guatemala's labor movement also
has been attempting to reorganize. In May 1984,
seven leftist trade unions announced the formation of
the Coordinating Committee of National Organiza-
tions of Syndicalist Unity (CONUS). Led by the
Communist federation FASGUA (Autonomous Trade
Union Federation of Guatemala) in conjunction with
the Marxist-dominated CNT (National Workers'
Center), CONUS is a reincarnation of the National
Council for Syndicalist Unity-CNUS.' Union locals
affiliated with either FASGUA, CNT, or CONUS
are frequently active in labor disputes such as the
Coca-Cola and San Carlos University workers' strikes
in 1984, but the three groups themselves seem to focus
primarily on the issuance of antigovernment bulletins
and manifestos outside the country. Of potentially
greater significance, however, are the defections of
several federations and unions formerly tied to
FASGUA and CNT to more democratic CUSG
affiliates, reflecting the country's general trend to-
ward more politically moderate leaders and institu-
tions.
The Church. The Catholic Church lost much of its
secular power in Guatemala as a result of the anticler-
ical reforms of the mid-19th century, and the Church
hierarchy generally has elected to remain on the
political sidelines. In recent years, however, govern-
ment repression against militant priests and lay mis-
sionaries working with Indians in the insurgent-
contested Western Highlands and other areas has
placed the Church in an increasingly adversarial role.
' The defunct CNUS-long tainted by ties to the radical left that
made it a target of rightist hit squads-has ceased to operate
publicly in Guatemala, but it periodically issues press releases
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The violent nature of government rule under the
Lucas regime, aggressive counterinsurgency tactics
employed by the Army during the Rios Montt era,
and the failure of the conservative archbishop, Cardi-
nal Mario Casariego, to protest widely perceived
social injustices alienated many of the clergy from
both the government and the Church. In some cases
the clergy themselves became the targets of violence
in the 1970s and the early 1980s. In the past,
suspicions by Army officers that Church activities
were subversive were reinforced by highly publicized
cases of priests joining Guatemala's various insurgent
factions. Even so, the US Embassy estimated in 1981
that there were no more than five priests with Guate-
mala's approximately 3,000 guerrillas, but concluded,
on the basis of interviews with local villagers and
parishioners, that some 80 percent of the 400 priests
in the countryside were generally sympathetic to the
insurgents.
The restoration of a government headed by a Roman
Catholic after 17 months of evangelical Protestantism
under Rios Montt has, however, helped generate some
accommodation. Mejia has carefully pursued a non-
confrontational policy with Archbishop Prospero Pen-
ados del Barrio, who assumed office in January 1984
following Casariego's death in June 1983. Although
the Church has since publicly criticized the level of
violence and challenged UN Special Rapporteur Lord
Colville's finding that the human rights situation is
improving, Penados generally has followed a policy of
moderation and low-key activism in an effort both to
encourage the democratization process and to recipro-
cate for Mejia's more conciliatory approach toward
Church officials.
Church leaders also have expressed concern over
recent Protestant inroads among the population,
though they have not raised it as a major political
issue since Rios Montt's ouster in August 1983.
Although no religious census has been conducted in
Guatemala since 1970, there was a significant surge
of converts to Protestantism after the 1976 earth-
quake, and by 1983 Protestants claimed over 20
percent of the total population. The Catholic hierar-
chy's concern over Protestants gaining political power
increased during the tenure of Rios Montt, whose
Sunday "sermonettes" served only to exacerbate divi-
sions within the religious community, according to
publicly documented cases of animosity between the
two religious sectors. Nevertheless, the strength of
evangelism-represented in the current presidential
campaign by PDCN candidate Serrano-is confined
largely to segments of the lower classes, who exercise
only minimal political power.
The country's small, generally center-right Jewish
community has declined from a peak of some 1,200
members in 1979 to roughly 800 in early 1984,
according to the US Embassy. Although there is little
anti-Semitism, the Embassy reports that Israel's role
as a major arms supplier to the Guatemalan military
has caused at least some Jews to shun public office for
fear of guerrilla reprisals.
The Guatemalan Insurgency
The roots of Guatemala's insurgency can be traced to
the early 1960s when disgruntled former Army offi-
cers, students, and members of the Guatemalan Labor
Party first joined in guerrilla warfare against the
government. Although the conflict has ebbed and
flowed in the intervening years, the insurgency steadi-
ly intensified from 1979 to early 1982, when the
guerrillas increased their ranks from less than 1,000
to probably more than 3,000 full-time combatants.'
During these years, the insurgents' recruitment efforts
benefited greatly from the military's indiscriminate
repression under the Lucas Garcia regime. In addi-
tion, the guerrillas' commitment to their struggle was
bolstered by promises of increased financial and mate-
rial assistance from Cuba, which was encouraged by
the 1979 Sandinista victory in Nicaragua and insur-
gent gains in El Salvador in the early 1980s.
we believe our strength
estimates match credibly with the type and territorial extent of
rebel operations and reflect the mounting guerrilla casualties and
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Despite these gains and the resiliency of the insurgen-
cy, the inability of the major guerrilla groups-
described below-to overcome widespread ideological
and person lit differences has limited their effective-
ness.
As a
consequence, decisions on military actions generally
are uncoordinated-an insurgent failing that we be-
lieve has helped the Guatemalan military by mid-
1985 to carve back the insurgency to what we esti-
mate are about 1,500 full-time combatants, roughly
half its 1982 force level. Even though the rebels are
unlikely to reverse the momentum now favoring the
government, we nevertheless expect that they will
retain their ability to conduct urban terrorism, carry
out assassinations, and sabotage economically impor-
tant targets.
Major Insurgent Groups. The Rebel Armed Forces
(FAR), Guatemala's oldest insurgent group, was
founded in 1962 as a breakaway faction of the pro-
Moscow Guatemalan Labor Party (PGT). Although
decimated during the counterinsurgency campaign of
the late 1960s, the FAR reemerged in 1977 and now
operates principally in the remote northern depart-
ment of El Peten. Headed by the Cuban-trained Jorge
Ismael Soto Garcia, the FAR is a small but highly
effective combat force of some 400 to 500 members,
and it may be the only insurgent group to have grown
since Rios Montt initiated the country's innovative
counterinsurgency program in 1982. The resurgence
in early 1985 of insurgent activity in the Las Minas
Mountains area of eastern Zacapa Department is
probably the work of FAR guerrillas trying to exploit
the Army's thinly stretched logistic and transporta-
tion lines. The government's limited presence in the
Zacapa area may be an added enticement for the
FAR. In similar circumstances the FAR has built
what we judge-on the basis of its apparent fore-
knowledge of troop movements and success in evading
government sweep operations-is an excellent intelli-
gence and supply network in the Peten.
its continuing problems with the FAR is likely to
make this guerrilla group a major counterinsurgency
Perhaps the major reason behind the FAR's relative
success, however, is its location within a sparsely
populated and economically unimportant area and the
concentration of government counterinsurgency assets
elsewhere. However, the Army's growing concern over
target.
that four infantry battalions-one composed of units
on rotation from other commands-are dedicated to
the Peten this year, and that tighter security measures
around Santa Elena Airbase and other military instal-
lations also have been noted in recent months.
The Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP), headed by
Ricardo Ramirez de Leon, is Guatemala's largest
insurgent group with an estimated 600 to 850 full-
time members. Originally formed by FAR dissidents
in the early 1970s, the EGP began military operations
of its own in 1975 and has been one of the most
effective of the insurgent factions because of its
emphasis on working among Guatemala's large Indi-
group's tactics are similar to those of other insurgent
groups. It ambushes small Army units when it can,
collects "war taxes" at makeshift roadblocks, tempo-
rarily occupies small towns and farms for propaganda
purposes, and periodically destroys selected economic
targets, such as specialized farm machinery.
The EGP emphasizes the establishment of extensive
local supply networks and the creation of a part-time
militia. Its operations focus largely on the northwest-
ern highlands area of Huehuetenango and Quiche
Departments, where it recruits among the Indian and
peasant populations. In early 1982, the EGP was in de
facto control of much of Huehuetenango Department,
where it overran a small military garrison-the first
and last such success by any insurgent group. In
response, US defense attache
shows that the Rios Montt government concentrated
its heaviest counterinsurgency effort against EGP
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Figure 3
Insurgent Operating Areas, 1985
Rebel Armed Forces (FAR)
Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP)
Revolutionary Organization of the
People in Arms (ORPA)
All areas of guerrilla activity are not shown.
Guerrilla control is confined to relatively
small areas and is not shown.
Q
i. ~
North
Pacific Ocean
J .~ JC,
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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strongholds during the remainder of 1982. The gov-
ernment's subsequent introduction of patrol bases in
remote areas, civilian defense units, and model vil-
lages into the highly contested area, in our judgment,
has since severely disrupted the EGP's base of support
by undercutting its ability to rely on the population
for supplies and safehaven. The EGP has retaliated by
attacking the ill-equipped and poorly trained civilian
defense patrols to demonstrate that the military can-
not protect their villages.
The Revolutionary Organization of the People in
Arms (ORPA), led by Rodrigo Asturias Amado, is
Guatemala's second-largest insurgent organization.
On the basis of US Embassy
reporting, we estimate that ORPA has 450 to
600 full-time combatants. Originally formed in 1971
as a splinter group of the FAR, ORPA did not begin
military operations until 1979, presumably using the
intervening period to establish its infrastructure and
support base among the Indian population. According
to this group's periodic publications and public pro-
nouncements, ORPA appears to be less ideologically
rigid than the other major insurgent groups. Unlike
the larger EGP, ORPA also does not advocate a
broad-based rural structure, preferring instead to
concentrate on training and equipping its cadre.
ORPA conducts its operations along the southern
edge of the Western Highlands from the Mexican
border in San Marcos Department eastward toward
the slopes of the Atitlan Volcano in Solola Depart-
ment-a traditional insurgent stronghold.
ORPA's reliance on small, well-trained units-a fac-
tor that reduces its vulnerability to penetration-thus
far has allowed it to escape entrapment by the
military. In contrast to 1983, however, when insurgent
and military communiques alike show ORPA guerril-
las were responsible for some of the most damaging
attacks against the government, large-scale sweeps by
the Army in San Marcos Department in mid-1984
seriously hurt this guerrilla grow
PA's ability to conduct
urban terrorist operations was severely damaged in
early 1984 after counterterrorist raids by government
security forces decimated the leadership of three other
small terrorist groups and forced ORPA to withdraw
its urban units to the countryside. Even so, ORPA
appeared to be recovering from its rural setbacks by
early 1985, when local press accounts show that it
briefly occupied the important resort town of Santiago
Atitlan in Solola Department and soon afterward
seized another small town in San Marcos Depart-
ment.
The dissident faction of the Guatemalan Labor Party
(PGT/D) was formed in 1978 by veteran Communist
Jose Alberto Cardoza Aguilar, when the party's long-
time leadership-fearing government retaliation-re-
fused to join the armed revolution. Despite being the
newest and smallest member of the insurgency, the
PGT/D, which maintains close ties to the EGP,
periodically has carried out bombings, assassinations,
and kidnappings, according to communiques issued by
the party. Cardoza, however, has failed to recruit
noticeable numbers of new adherents to the party,
probably because he has attempted to guide the
PGT/D from his sanctuary in Mexico. As a result, we
believe the group has now probably dwindled to only
several dozen diehard followers.
The orthodox Moscow-line faction of the Communist
Guatemalan Labor Party (PGT/O), which has operat-
ed underground since the mid-1950s, is led by Ricar-
do Rosales Roman. Active membership is probably
less than 200, although the party probably has some
sympathy among unionized labor. Unlike the PGT/D,
it has not yet openly adopted armed revolution and is
not a member of the insurgent alliance.
the PGT/O is attempting to outfit a
small armed contingent suggests, however, that party
leaders may have finally succumbed to the longtime
pressures from members of the rebel alliance and
their supporters in Havana, Managua, and Moscow to
have them join the struggle.
a small dissident
group of young militants, in an action similar to the
PGT/D breakaway in 1978, split with Rosales and
other party leaders in January 1984-again over the
issue of armed insurrection. Although the small mili-
tant faction is disorganized, it could later rejoin the
party if efforts to form a military arm prove success-
ful.
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Secret
Searching for Unity: The URNG. The Guatemalan
National Revolutionary Unity (URNG) was formally
established in Havana in February 1982 and publicly
proclaimed to exercise joint command and control
over all Guatemalan guerrilla forces, much as the
Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN)
attempts in El Salvador. Despite
pressure over the years from its Cuban and Nicara-
guan patrons to unify-including periodic threats of
an arms cutoff-the URNG remains little more than
a propaganda shell. Its members-the FAR, EGP,
ORPA, and PGT/D-probably resent Havana's at-
tempts to force them to stifle their strong ideological
and personality differences to ensure continued Cu-
ban aid.
cooperation among the various insur-
gent groups may be increasing. The apparent simulta-
neity of insurgent attacks across several departments
in early 1985, for example, suggests that some of the
actions were coordinated in advance.
the guerrillas also are now
carrying out limited joint operations in some areas.
We believe such cooperation stems largely from the
rebels' dwindling ranks, increasing loss of popular
support, and the need to demonstrate that they re-
main a viable military threat.
Outlook and Implications for the United States
We anticipate no major shifts in the positions of the
key political actors and groups discussed in this paper
over the near term. Moreover, we expect Guatemala's
policymaking process on major issues will continue to
be based on broad, enduring national values that
historically have colored the country's outlook toward
the United States.
Guatemalans believe, for example, that size, popula-
tion, and relative economic and military strength
entitle Guatemala to a preeminent role in Central
America. Contributing to this sense of national pride
is the awareness that Guatemala's military successes
against leftist guerrillas have taken place without US
military aid. Guatemalans also do not view themselves
as having any worse a record than the Hondurans or
the Salvadorans in the area of human rights. Thus,
they contend that they are being victimized by a
double standard, and argue that US human rights
policy has discriminated against Guatemala and cre-
ated an imbalance between the treatment received b
their country and the
The resulting "go it
alone" attitude and resentment of the United States
color Guatemala's policy perspective, and in our
opinion, is reflected in an ambivalent willingness to
cooperate with Washington, particularly among mili-
tary leaders.
Regardless of who wins the election, we believe that
Guatemalans regard the US role in influencing their
country's political fate as crucial and that they want
to deal directly with Washington on a multitude of
bilateral and regional issues. In this regard, we expect
that centrist-oriented groups will seek moral and
material support from Washington as a means of
obtaining and sustaining leverage with the Guatema-
lan armed forces. Although we believe that obtaining
US economic and developmental assistance will be
given the highest priority by the new government,
virtually all of Guatemala's announced presidential
candidates have at one time or another proclaimed
their support for more than a
however, that the renewal of such aid must be contin-
gent on a continuation of the democratization process.
These same leaders are quick to add,
The military establishment is likely to be anxious
about its future no matter what the outcome of the
presidential election. We believe that many officers
are deeply concerned that a DCG victory might bring
reprisals against them for past abuses, or that the
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Army's ability to conduct its counterinsurgency pro-
grams will be seriously curtailed by a civilian-led
government. Still others fear any outcome-for exam-
ple, a Sandoval victory-that might jeopardize US
aid. The military, in our view, is overwhelmingly
compelled by the need to shed its role of international
pariah in order to pave the way for increased military
and economic assistance. As a result, it will continue
to try to adhere to its pledged neutrality in the
contest, and-unless its institutional prerogatives are
severely threatened-will honor the vote's outcome.
While the military and the key parties are working
toward a smooth transition to civilian rule, the poten-
tial for violence during the presidential campaign
appears greatest from groups that occupy both ex-
tremes of the political spectrum. The guerrillas proba-
bly are fearful that a successful election in November
will brin increased levels of
urther jeopardizing their prospects. As
a resu t, we expect that Guatemala's various guerrilla
organizations may attempt to carry out more wide-
spread ambush and harassment operations designed to
lower voter turnout and discredit the election.
believe further that the 1984 Constituent Assembly
election caused an active debate within some armed
factions about whether or not to continue the armed
struggle. If, as is likely, the insurgents are unable to
disrupt the vote, these ideological fissures almost
certainly would widen, thus further weakening the
insurgency.
The left's perspective is closely mirrored by many
elements of the Guatemalan right, which see a victory
by the left-either by force of arms or at the ballot
box-as totally unacceptable. As the political opening
grows and activism from all sectors increases, the
potential for violent action by the right against politi-
cal figures, labor leaders, university professors, and
others could escalate as rightwing extremists try to
limit the gains and slow the momentum of their
reform-minded competitors. Such an occurrence, in
our judgment, would seriously jeopardize the democ-
ratization process and set back progress made by the
current military regime in improving Guatemala's
image at home and abroad.
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Secret
Appendix A
Politically Significant Organizations
AD Democratic Action Small centrist party expected to back the DCG presidential
candidate in coming elections. Received slightly more than
Leopoldo Antonio Urutia Beltran 1 percent of the vote in the July 1984 Constituent Assembly
(secretary general) election.
AEG Evangelical Alliance of Guatemala Represents six different evangelical groups. Greatest number of
associates are pentacostal churches; does not include the
Virgilio Zapata (president) Church of the Word.
Rev. Guillermo Galindo
AGSAEMP General Archives and Supporting Services Presidential intelligence arm established in 1977. Monitors and
of the Presidential Staff reports on internal political, subversive, and other antigovern-
ment activity. Expected to be replaced, or reduced to strictly
Lt. Col. Marco Antonio Gonzalez Taracena analytical functions, once a civilian president is installed.
Operational aspects likely to be transferred to military intelli-
gence (D-2), or reconstituted in a separate organization.
ASIDE Indigenous Association of Evangelization Conference of Indian churches associated with AEG. Some 27
to 29 denominations with 800 churches reportedly in the
Domingo Guitz Cuxil (director) conference.
Coordinating Committee of Agricultural, Founded in 1957. Umbrella organization for 14 business cham-
Commercial, Industrial, and Financial bers in Guatemala. By the early 1980s, the largest organization
Chambers of private-sector interests in Central America. Most powerful
members are agricultural interests, which keep a low profile and
Alejandro Botran (president) exert influence from behind the scenes. Most publicly outspoken
Andrew Rogers (secretary general) member is the Chamber of Commerce. CACIF lost credibility
through its identification with the extreme right and support for
the Lucas regime. Attempted to regain credibility in 1984 by
softening the government's proposed tax adjustments, but failed
and later disassociated itself from the tax package. Relations
with the Mejia regime in 1985 have been contentious.
CEDEP Center for Political Studies Private institution set up to encourage open political dialogue.
Sponsor of the 1985 presidential debates; conducts other public
Marco Antonio Cuevas del Cid meetings and debates, and publishes a journal. Has approached
the US National Endowment for Democracy for funds to
support the Guatemalan electoral process. Originally estab-
lished by DCG dissidents, but now apparently nonpartisan.
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Politically Significant Organizations (continued)
Gen. Carlos Arana Osorio (president)
Mario Roberto Aguilar Arroyo
(secretary general)
Mario David Garcia (presidential candidate)
Gustavo Anzueto Vielman
Julio Lowenthal
Carlos Molino Mencos
Peter Miguel Lamport Kelsall (president)
Peasant Committee of the High Plateau
Villagers' Coordinating Committee
" Trinidad Gomez Hernandez"
Luis Cardoza y Aragon
(head of coordinating committee)
Guillermo Toriello Garrido
Manuel Galich
Carlos Paz Tejada
Jose Miguel Barrios Ortega
(secretary general)
Rightist party founded in the early 1970s and controlled by a
former president (1970-74), General Arana-competes with the
MLN for hardline "law and order" vote. Main support is from
the business community; has a more well-thought-out economic
policy than other parties. Won nine seats in the July 1984
Constituent Assembly election while in coalition with the MLN.
Withdrew from the rightist alliance in January 1985 citing
uneven distribution of positions within the coalition. MLN
leader Sandoval's refusal to name Aguilar as vice president on
the coalition's election ticket, together with reluctance of finan-
cial backers of both parties to support the alliance, presumably
contributed to the breakup. Creation of a four-member coordi-
nating commission in early February by General Arana, which
publicly criticized Aguilar's leadership, is likely to lead to
further factionalization and undercut party electoral hopes.
CAN, which advocates free market capitalism, fared well in the
1980 municipal elections, largely as a result of its organizational
efforts among industrialists, some segments of the middle class,
and landowners in eastern departments.
Reportedly an URNG front group. Mexican based; a nongov-
ernmental humanitarian organization accredited at the UN and
at the European Council. Specializes in disinformation on
human rights and has purportedly been nominated for the 1986
Nobel Prize, presumably the peace prize. Member of the
International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) and the
Commission for the Defense of Human Rights in Central
America. Successor to the Guatemalan Commission for the
Defense of Human Rights founded by journalists and academics
and disbanded in 1980.
Established in February 1982 by some 26 prominent Guatema-
lan exiles of various political affiliations as the political arm of
the URNG.
Rightist. Won less than 1 percent of the vote in the July election
in coalition with the FCD-5. Founded to back Gen. Angel
Anibal Guevara, the winner of the 1982 elections who was
subsequently ousted. Members characterized as grizzled veter-
ans of Guatemalan politics.
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Secret
Politically Significant Organizations (continued)
CNT National Workers' Center Headquartered in Mexico City, an ad hoc group of some 4,000
members without legal recognition. Founded by the DCG in
Miguel Angel Albizures Pedroza 1964. Marxist infiltration successfully removed the Christian
(secretary general) Democratic leadership in the mid-1970s, leading to withdrawal
from the hemispheric Christian Democratic Latin American
Workers' Central (CLAT) in 1978. Controlled by the FAR, but
the PGT has attempted to gain control through CONUS.
CNUS National Council of Syndicalist Unity Marxist-Leninist umbrella trade organization established in
1976 by CNT and FASGUA. Now defunct inside Guatemala,
No leaders currently identified but occasionally issues press releases through Havana on trade
union conditions in the country. Replaced in May 1984 by
CONUS.
COCIEG Coordinating Commission of the Evangelical Protestant umbrella organization claiming to represent more
Church of Guatemala than 2 million Guatemalan evangelicals.
CONDECA Central American Defense Council Established in 1963 as military arm of the Organization of
Central American States. Original full members were Guate-
Individual country representatives mala, Nicaragua, and Honduras, with Panama and Costa Rica
(usually resident defense attaches) as observers; El Salvador joined as full member a year later.
The 1969 "Soccer War" between El Salvador and Honduras
resulted in the latter's withdrawal. Remained largely dormant
until 1979 Nicaraguan revolution, which led to Managua's
withdrawal as well. Efforts by Mejia to revive CONDECA in
October 1983 met with limited success at first, but efforts have
since faltered. CONDECA permanent council is headquartered
in Guatemala City.
CONUS Coordinating Committee of National Successor to CNUS. Formed in May 1984 as a leftist umbrella
Organizations of Syndicalist Unity organization for affiliates of CNT and FASGUA. Funding
appears to come largely from the FAR-controlled CNT. Indi-
No leaders currently identified vidual CONUS, FASGUA, or CNT locals frequently active in
labor disputes, but themselves are not particularly active inside
Guatemala, preferring instead to issue press bulletins and
manifestos outside the country. Probably less than 3,000 mem-
bers in total.
CSG Trade Union Council of Guatemala Some 200 members. Small trade union federation affiliated
with CUSG.
Pio Rueda Ortega (secretary general)
Central Organization of Federated Workers Rightist. Some 4,000 members in 1984. Democratic orientation,
but not affiliated with any political party, nor with CUSG.
Romeo Hernandez (secretary general) Guatemala's largest trade union federation by the mid- I970s
but violently repressed after 1976.
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Politically Significant Organizations (continued)
No leaders currently identified
Confederation of Syndicalist Unity
of Guatemala
Juan Francisco Alfaro M. (secretary general)
Adolfo Hernandez C.
Guatemalan Christian Democracy
or Christian Democratic Party
Rene de Leon Schlotter (president)
Roberto Carpio Nicolle (vice president,
Constituent Assembly copresident, and
DCG vice-presidential nominee)
Alfonso Cabrera Hidalgo (secretary general)
Vinicio Cerezo Arevalo (presidential candidate)
Jose Ricardo Gomez Galvez
Rodolfo Maldonado
Secret Anti-Communist Army
No leaders currently identified
Rebel Armed Forces
Jorge Ismael Soto Garcia
Member of the EGP front group FP-3 1. Originally founded as
an independent peasant trade union but was eventually taken
over by the EGP.
Represents roughly 75 percent of all organized workers. Com-
posed of 11 federations and some 150,000 members in mid-
1985. Formed in May 1983; obtained legal recognition in
November 1983. Democratic orientation that emphasizes eco-
nomic unionism. Not affiliated with any political party but has
held talks with several regarding support in coming election,
including the DCG. Publicly pledged to work within Guatema-
lan labor law but insists the Labor Ministry enforce the law and
end delays that prejudice cases brought by workers against
management. Leadership publicly complains there are insuffi-
cient guarantees for trade union freedom for reactivation of
trade unionism in Guatemala. Granted membership in the
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) and
Inter-American Regional Organization of Workers (ORIT)
earlier this year.
Center-leftist party with considerable grassroots support, but
leadership ranks, particularly in rural areas, decimated by death
squads. Party discredited by its past support for military
candidates, a tactic now refuted by its current president and
leaders. Won 20 seats in July Assembly election, finishing first
with more than 16 percent of vote on national list. DCG was
allied with the PNR in 1982 election, when current party
standard bearer Cerezo-faced with assassination threats-
opted not to run. Favors agrarian reform that would force
otherwise idle landholdings capable of production into use.
Financial fortunes of party were revived in 1984 after family of
supermarket magnate Rodolfo Paiz Andrade, who heads
FUNDESA and was at one time considered a possible DCG
vice-presidential candidate, announced its support.
Guatemala's largest insurgent group with an estimated 600 to
850 full-time members. Badly hurt as the main target of Army
counterinsurgency campaign during the early 1980s. Member of
the URNG; has a higher proportion of indigenous members
than the other insurgent groups. Broke away from the FAR in
1975.
Established in 1976-77 and considered largely responsible for
the killing of numerous political, labor, and student leaders
whose names appeared on regularly published "death lists."
Allegedly linked to the MLN.
Probably some 400 to 500 full-time combatants. Smallest of the
three main guerrilla groups but possibly the only one growing in
strength. Separated from the PGT in 1962. Member of the
URNG.
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Secret
Politically Significant Organizations (continued)
Autonomous Trade Union Federation
of Guatemala
No leaders currently identified
Democratic Civic Front
(Victor Ivan) Danilo Barrillas Rodriguez
(secretary general)
Jorge Gonzalez del Valle
Peasant Federation of Guatemala
Legally recognized trade union arm of the illegal PGT. Some
6,700 members; operates under CONUS umbrella. Affiliate of
the Soviet-dominated World Confederation of Trade Unions
(WCFTU). Most leaders presently in exile.
Small social democratic party formed in 1983. Unofficial DCG
coalition partner since January 1985. Received around 1 per-
cent of the vote in the July 1984 Constituent Assembly election,
but what little support it has comes from urban areas. Some
members suspected of involvement with insurgent groups.
National peasant union federation of some 6,100 members
affiliated with the CUSG.
Raymundo Del Cid Del Cid
(secretary general)
Peasant union federation in Juitiapa Department of some 4,800
members. Affiliated with CUSG.
CNUS and other Marxist-dominated trade unions were instru-
mental in its formation in March 1979. Operates as a political
front for the URNG with representatives in the United States.
At one time, purportedly consisted of some 160 regional and
national organizations, including trade unions, campesino and
religious organizations, as well as university and professional
groups.
Ismael Barrios Rabanales (secretary general)
FENATEXVCS National Federation of Commercial
Textile Workers
National Federation of Agricultural
Workers and Peasants
Nicolas Francisco Tomas (secretary general)
National Federation of Agricultural and
Indigenous Communities of Guatemala
Small center-rightist party formed in 1983; garnered less than
1 percent of vote in July election. In coalition with the MLN
since November 1984. US Embassy officers describe members
as idealistic neophytes.
Small CUSG federation of urban and industrial trade unions
with about 500 members.
Formerly associated with FASGUA but now an affiliate of
CUSG. Approximately 22,600 members.
Large-some 87,500 members-peasant federation organized
under CUSG.
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Politically Significant Organizations (continued)
FENOCAM
National Federation of Peasant Organizations
Peasant federation of some 16,500 members. Formerly affiliat-
ed with FASGUA and, more recently, with CUSG.
Felipe Cachupe Cornelio (secretary general)
FERG
Revolutionary Student Front
No leaders currently identified
Founded in 1979. Also referred to as FERG-U (university) and
FERG-S (secondary schools), which are EGP fronts under the
FP-31 umbrella organization.
FESEBS
Trade Union Federation of Guatemalan Bank
and Insurance Employees
Approximately 2,500 members. Left-of-center but non-Marxist
trade union federation associated with the regional Christian
Democratic Latin American Workers' Central.
FGTE
General Federation of Entertainment Workers
A democratic trade union federation with about 2,500
members.
Carmen Quezada de Bonilla (secretary general)
New Force Small center-leftist party. Expected to support the DCG in the
elections.
FP-31 31 January Popular Front EGP front group founded in January 1980. A Marxist-Leninist
terrorist umbrella organization consisting of the CUC, CDP,
No leaders currently identified CR, FERG, and the NOR. See individual groups for further
information.
FPO Popular Front Organization Small social democratic party previously aligned with the
PDCN.
FRTOCC Regional Federation of Workers of the West Located in the Quezaltenango area. Its 200 members are
affiliated with the CUSG.
Humberto Alejandro Sarti Zuniga
(secretary general)
FTA Federation of Agricultural Workers Federation of agricultural workers' unions located in Chimal-
tenango Department. Former CUSG affiliate of about 11,000
Magdaleno Cutzal Ichaj (secretary general) members.
FTG Guatemalan Workers' Federation Member of CUSG with about 6,500 members. Formerly part of
the leftist CNT.
Juan Raymundo Lopez Martinez
(secretary general)
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Politically Significant Organizations (continued)
National Unity Front
(or Nationalist United Front)
Roberto Alejos Arzu
Gabriel Giron Ortiz (secretary general)
Enrique Peralta Azurdia
Foundation for the Development of Guatemala
Carlos Paiz Andrade (president)
Jaime Camhi (executive director)
Mario Priay
Luis Edmundo Lopez Duran
Cesar Augusto Toledo Penate
Hugo Quan Ma
Rightist party that, as part of the victorious PR-PID-FUN
alliance, supported "official" candidate Guevara in 1982 elec-
tions. Three factions emerged after the March 1982 coup, each
blaming the other for its ties to Guevara. Originally inscribed in
1978 and first to register for the July 1984 vote. Longtime party
figure Colonel Peralta is a former Chief of State (1963-66).
Founded in 1984 to promote Guatemalan interests abroad. An
outgrowth of the Guatemalan American Chamber of
Commerce's public relations committee. A serious, blue-ribbon
group whose small membership includes some of Guatemala's
most respected and successful businessmen. Paiz family is a
significant financial backer for the DCG.
Leftist party with small base of support but had been gaining
strength under popular leftist Colom Argueta, assassinated in
1979. Leadership deeply divided over participation in the
electoral process. Considered the most left wing among those
parties that participated in the 1984 election. Main support is
from urban proletariat. Small group of leftist parties that
includes PSD dissidents; had hoped to contest 1985 elections
but failed to meet registration requirements. Expected to even-
tually back the DCG.
Group of Mutual Support for the Reappearance, Formed in July 1984. Receives support from the Canadian-
With Their Lives, of Our Children, Spouses, based International Peace Brigades, and is a "source" for the
Parents, and Siblings CDHG. Some 150 members; has met with government officials,
including Mejia, prompting formation of an official investiga-
Beatriz Valaquez de Estrada tive commission composed of the Attorney General and Vice
Maria Choxom de Castanon Ministers of Defense and Interior. Generally believed to have
Aura Farfan links with the various insurgent factions; some funding report-
Nineth Montenego de Garcia edly originates with the guerrillas. So far has relied upon
peaceful weekly demonstrations, an active newspaper campaign,
and one highly publicized march last October to bring its
complaints to the government.
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Politically Significant Organizations (continued)
Organized National Anti-Communist
Movement
Col. Francisco Luis Gordillo Martinez
Ruben Dario Chavez Rios
Francisco Bonilla Padilla
Dr. Hector Aragon Quinonez (president and
Constituent Assembly copresident)
Mario Sandoval Alarcon (secretary general
and presidential candidate)
Rodrigo Valladares Molina
Arturo Ortiz Saenz de Tejada
No leaders currently identified
Movement of Popular Unity
Formed in March 1984 to ensure that basic human rights are
enjoyed by all Guatemalans. General ineffectiveness, however,
led its first chairman-the rector of the University of San
Carlos-to resign after only two months. Revival of activities
noted in early 1985, including efforts to initiate an international
campaign.
Rightwing terrorist organization now thought to be defunct.
Also called Mano Blanca or White Hand-a name occasionally
used by death squads in other Latin American countries. Grew
out of government-created vigilante squads during the 1966
counterinsurgency campaign. Known to have engaged in tor-
ture, extortion, robbery, and other illegal activities, including
abduction of the Archbishop of Guatemala in 1968.
Small center-rightist party. A new group originally intended as
a personal vehicle for Gordillo-a member of the triumvirate
that took power following the 1982 coup, which was then
displaced by Rios Montt. Received about 2 percent of the
national ticket vote in the July 1984 election, but won no seats.
Formally allied with PUA and FUN for 1985 elections. No
discernible ideological principles.
Ultrarightist party. MLN-CAN coalition won 23 seats in July
election, but squabbles over financial problems and Sandovai's
refusal to step aside for more moderate leaders apparently led
CAN leaders to break with the party in January. Joined by
lesser rightist parties in late 1984. Registered initially in 1960,
MLN is heir to the National Democratic Movement, founded in
1955 by supporters of President Carlos Castillos Armas. Many
current MLN leaders helped Castillo carry out the 1954 coup
that toppled the Arbenz government. The MLN gained strength
and importance under the government of Col. Enrique Peralta
Azurdia (1963-66) by providing much of the regime's initial
backing. Became an opposition party in 1966 after its candidate
failed to gain official endorsement. No longer has the close ties
to the military it previously enjoyed.
ORPA splinter group which surfaced in 1982. Responsible for
kidnaping daughter of Honduran President Suazo and abduc-
tion of nephew of former Guatemalan President Rios Montt.
Marxist-Leninist group founded in 1983 with special interest in
the trade union movement.
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Politically Significant Organizations (continued)
NOA New Anti-Communist Organization Extreme rightwing group which emerged in 1982.
No leaders currently identified
Revolutionary Workers' Cells Marxist-Leninist trade union organization formed in 1980.
"Felipe Antonio Garcia" Member of the EGP front group FP-31.
Carlos Humberto Mazariegos M.
(secretary general)
OCAS Peasant Organization of Social Action Confined to Quezaltenango Department. Won one seat in the
July 1984 Constituent Assembly election. Quixtan is PNR vice-
Mauricio Quixtan presidential candidate.
Revolutionary Organization of the Guatemala's second-largest insurgent group with some 450 to
People in Arms 600 full-time combatants. Member of the umbrella organization
URNG. Less ideologically rigid than either the EGP or FAR.
Rodrigo Asturias Amado Although separated from the FAR in 1971, it did not begin
military activity until 1979.
PDCN Democratic Party of National Cooperation Best known as an umbrella organization for several parties ti.at
did not register for the July 1984 election. Formed in 1983 and
Jorge Serrano Elias (presidential candidate) based in the agricultural movement, it may have some strength
Nery Noel Morales Gavarrete in the rural indigenous population. Serrano, a former member of
(secretary general) the now-defunct Council of State that operated under Rios
Montt, is the presidential candidate for the small centrist party.
PGT/D Guatemalan Labor Party, Dissident Faction Small moribund militant faction of the PGT, which separated
from the party in 1978. Member of the insurgent umbrella
Jose Alberto Cardoza Aguilar organization URNG.
PGT/O Guatemalan Labor Party, Orthodox Faction Guatemala's illegal Moscow-line Communist Party. Tradition-
ally has favored political rather than military tactics, but has
Ricardo Rosales Roman (secretary general) been under pressure to adopt armed revolution. Small group of
young militants broke with the party leaders in January 1984,
but-like the PGT/D-have been ineffective. Almost entire
leadership is in exile in Mexico. Probably less than 200
members and falling.
PID Democratic Institutional Party Rightist party organized by conservative businessmen in mid-
1960s as the official government party. Support base small, but
Jose Adan Herrera Lopez (president) includes wealthy landowners and coffee growers. In disarray
Hector Humberto Rivas Garcia after March 1982 coup; many leaders fled the country, fearing
(secretary general) prosecution for corruption and association with the Lucas
regime. Ran alone in July Constituent Assembly election-
winning five seats-but has formed coalitions in order to "win"
four elections since 1970. Joined MLN-led alliance in Septem-
ber 1984.
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Politically Significant Organizations (continued)
National Renewal Party or National
Renovation Party
Alejandro Maldonado Aguirre
(secretary general and
presidential candidate)
Ascisclo Valladares Molina (secretary general)
Revolutionary Party
Mario Fuentes Perruccini
(secretary general; also PDCN
vice-presidential candidate)
Jose Angel Lee Duarte
(former Guatemala City mayor)
Central American Workers' Revolutionary
Party
Democratic Socialist
Party
Juan Alberto Fuentes (president)
Dr. Mario Solorzano Martinez
(secretary general; presidential candidate)
Dr. Carlos Gallardo Flores
Haroldo Rodas Melgar
Centrist party formed in 1972 by a PR splinter group; later
taken over in 1977 by MLN dissidents loyal to Maldonado.
Lacks resources and organization, and has neither business nor
military backing. Nonetheless, won 7 percent of the vote and
five seats in the July 1984 Constituent Assembly election.
Formerly part of the tripartite alliance formed in early January
between the UCN and the PR. Maldonado-a capable leader
who teamed with the DCG in the 1982 election-was to have
run as vice president on the UCN-led presidential ticket, but
reneged when a constitutional provision was adopted that would
have precluded his seeking the presidency in the following term.
Small centrist party with a narrow base of support limited
mainly to Guatemala City.
Centrist party with substantial popular base of support-mainly
in rural areas-and good organization, but hurt by past associa-
tion with military regimes. Won slightly over 7 percent of the
vote and 10 seats in July 1984 Constituent Assembly election.
"Old Guard" members led by Fuentes, together with other
dissidents headed by Lee, gained control of the party in March
1985. Fuentes abrogated party's alignment with UCN-PNR
coalition; later sided with PDCN and is that party's vice-
presidential nominee for 1985 elections. Founded in 1957 by
veterans of the reformist governments of Juan Jose Arevalo
(1945-51) and Jacobo Arbenz (1951-54). Current party philoso-
phy is generally supportive of a strong legislature and judiciary;
does not favor inclusion of the Belize border dispute in the new
constitution and would disdain negotiations with insurgents.
Marxist-Leninist regional organization formed in 1976 and
headquartered in San Jose, Costa Rica. Guatemalan branch
formed in 1981; other branches located in Nicaragua, Hondu-
ras, and El Salvador, which has the most active branch.
Leftist party affiliated with the Socialist International. In the
past, has provided support to the guerrillas, which some rank
and file have joined. Went underground after assassination of
leader Fuentes Mohr in 1979, and many leaders-including
Solorzano and Gallardo-were in voluntary exile in Costa Rica
until January 1985. Both Solorzano and Gallardo-who head
competing factions-met with Chief of State Mejia during his
state visit to Costa Rica in December, apparently prompting the
decision to return home. Party will participate in the coming
election, but ultimately is likely to endorse, or otherwise asso-
ciate itself with, the DCG. As a PR breakaway which ran
candidates for Congress in 1978 under a borrowed DCG label,
it won three seats-as many as were allocated to the DCG.
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Politically Significant Organizations (continued)
Leonel Sisniega Otero (presidential candidate)
Luis Alfonso Lopez
Danilo Roca Barillas
National Centrist Union
or Union of the National Center
Jorge Carpio Nicolle
(presidential candidate)
Ramiro de Leon Carpio (secretary general
and vice-presidential nominee)
Antonio Arenales Forno
Roberto Castaneda Peniche
(assassinated in August 1985;
successor not identified)
Extreme rightwing party formed in 1983 by former MLN Vice
President Sisniega-a perennial coup plotter against Rios
Montt. Gained one seat in the Constituent Assembly with just
over 3 percent of the national list vote. Draws members from
both the MLN and CAN; has not succeeded in identifying itself
separate and distinct from the MLN. Funds come mainly from
the private agrarian sector. Advertising proclaims its opposition
to both "conservatism" and "Communism," while claiming it
stands for justice-and "justice knows no extremes."
Affiliate of FTI. Part of the democratic trade union movement,
a strong advocate of economic unionism. With some 3,700
members, the strongest local labor union in Guatemala and
within the CUSG.
New centrist party founded in 1983 by former DCG member
Jorge Carpio in order to advance his own presidential candida-
cy. Main support comes from urban middle class. Finished
second in both percentage of votes-13.7 percent-and number
of seats-21-won in the July 1984 Constituent Assembly
election. Until the collapse of the UCN's coalition with the PR
and PNR earlier this year, Carpio-as the alliance's presiden-
tial candidate-had been considered by many as the favorite in
the 1985 elections.
Formed in November 1984. Represents more than 20 agricul-
tural and livestock-raising associations, including the Guatema-
lan Chamber of Agriculture, the general association of agricul-
turalists, and all of its unions and related associations.
Insurgent umbrella organization formed in 1982 under Cuban
pressure. Largely a propaganda front composed of representa-
tives from the EGP, ORPA, FAR, and the PGT/D.
Central campus in Guatemala City with seven regional campus-
es and a total student body of nearly 50,000 in 1984. Faculty
and administrative staff number an additional 10,000. Academ-
ic freedom respected by government and political climate on
campus has improved with less dogma and more learning.
Student and faculty nevertheless continue to be object of
kidnapings, other political violence. PGT traditionally involved
in campus politics via both students' and workers' unions.
Recent student protests over autonomy and budget issues were
the most vocal in recent times though police did not interfere.
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Secret
Appendix C
Comprehensive Glossary of Guatemalan Organizations
AECB
Asociacion de Estudiantes de Ciencias Basicas
Association of Basic Sciences Students
AEG a
Alianza Evangelica de Guatemala
Evangelical Alliance of Guatemala
AEU
Asociacion de Estudiantes Universitarios
Association of University Students
AEUO
Asociacion de Estudiantes Universitarios
de Occidente
Association of University Students of the West
AGA
Asociacion Guatemalteca de Agricultura
Guatemalan Agricultural Association
AGSAEMP a
Archivo General y Servicios de Apoyo
del Estado Mayor Presidencia
General Archives and Supporting Services of the Presi-
dential Staff
AGUAPA
Asociacion Guatemalteca de Productores de Algodon
Guatemalan Association of Cotton Producers
AIRG
Asociacion Independiente de Radiodifusores
Guatemaltecas
Independent Association of Guatemalan Radiobroad-
casting Stations
ANACAFE
Asociacion Nacional del Cafe
National Association of Coffee
APAE
Asociacion de Productores de Aceites Eseuciales
Association of Essential Oils Producers
APG
Asociacion de Periodistas de Guatemala
Association of Guatemalan Journalists
APROFAM
Asociacion por Bienestar de la Familia
Family Welfare Association
ARD
Action Radical Democrata
Democratic Radical Action
ARN
Accion Radical Nacionalista
Nationalist Radical Action
ASCIN
Asociacion Social Cristiana de Integracion
Revolucionaria
Social Christian Association for Revolutionary
Integration
ASIDE a
Asociacion Indigena de Evangelizacion
Association of Indigenous Evangelization
ASIDES
Asociacion de Investigaciones y Estudios Sociales
Association of Investigation and Social Studies
ATAGUA
Asociacion de Tecnicos Azucareros de Guatemala
Association of Guatemalan Sugar Technicians
BANDEGUA
Compania de Desarrollo Bananero Guatemala, Ltda.
Guatemalan Banana Development Company, Ltd.
BANDESA
Banco Nacional de Desarrollo
National Development Bank
CACIF a
Comite Coordinador de Asociaciones Agricolas,
Comerciales, Industriales, y Financieras
Coordinating Committee of Agricultural Commercial,
Industrial, and Financial Chambers
CADEG
Consejo Anticomunista de Guatemala
Anti-Communist Council of Guatemala
CAN a
Central Authentica Nacionalista
National Authentic Central
CC a
Camara de Comercio
Chamber of Commerce
CCDA a
Comite Campesino del Altiplano
Peasant Committee of the High Plateau
CCL
Comite Clandestino Local
Local Clandestine Committee
CDAG
Confederacion Deportiva Antonoma de Guatemala
Autonomous Athletic Confederation of Guatemala
Note: Footnote at end of table.
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Comprehensive Glossary of Guatemalan Organizations (continued)
CDAP Centro para el Desarrollo
CDHG a Comision de Derechos Humanos de Guatemala
CDP a Coordinadora de Pobladores
"Trinidad Gomez Hernandez"
CEDEP a Centro de Estudias Politicos
CGP or GPC a Comision Guatemalteca para la Paz
CGUP a Comite Guatemalteco de Unidad Patriotica
CND a Coordinadora Nacional Democratica
CNT a Central Nacional de Trabajadores
CNUS a Consejo Nacional de Unidad Sindical
COCIEG a Comision Coordinadora de la Iglesia
Evangelica de Guatemala
CONAP Consejo Nacional de la Publicidad
CONDECA a Consejo de Defensa Centroamericana
CONSIGUA Confederacion Sindical de Guatemala
CONTRAGUA Confederacion de Trabajadores de Guatemala
CONUS Coordinadora de Organizaciones
Nacionales de Unidad Sindical
CORFINA Corporacion Financiera Nacional
COSDEGUA Confederacion de Sacerdotes Diocesanos de Guatemala
CR a Cristianos Revolucionarios "Vicente Menchu"
CSG a Consejo Sindical de Guatemala
CSG Confederacion Sindical Guatemalteca
CSU Consejo Superior Universitario
CTF a Central de Trabajadores Federados
CUC a Comite de Unidad Campesina
CUCO Comite de Unidad Civica Organizado
CUSG a Confederacion de Unidad Sindical Guatemalteca
CUU Club de Unidad Universitaria
DCG (or PDC) a Democracia Cristiana Guatemalteca (or Partido
Democratico Cristiano)
EGP a Ejercito Guerrillero del Pueblo (or de los Pobres)
ESA a Ejercito Segredo Anti-Comunista
EXIMBAL Exploraciones y Explotaciones Mineras Izabal, S.A.
FAN Frente de Avance Nacional
FANO Frente Aranista Nacional Obrera
FAR a Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes
FAR-PGT Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarios-Partido Guatemalteco
del Trabajo
FASGUA a
FCD a
Federacion Autonoma Sindical de Guatemala
Frente Civico Democratico
Public Administration Development Center
Guatemalan Human Rights Commission
Villagers' Coordinating Committee "Trinidad Gomez
Hernandez"
Center for Political Studies
Guatemalan Peace Commission
Guatemalan Committee for Patriotic Unity
National Democratic Coordinator
National Workers' Center
National Council of Syndicalist Unity
Coordinating Commission of the Evangelical Church of
Guatemala
National Council for Publicity
Central American Defense Council
Trade Union Confederation of Guatemala
Confederation of Guatemalan Workers
Coordinating Committee of National Organizations of
Syndicalist Unity
National Financial Corporation
Confederation of Guatemalan Diocesan Priests
Revolutionary Christians "Vicente Menchu"
Trade Union Council of Guatemala
Guatemalan Trade Union Federation
University Higher Council
Central Confederation of Federated Workers
Committee of Peasant Unity
Organized Civil Unity Committee
Confederation of Syndicalist Unity of Guatemala
University Unity Club
Guatemalan Christian Democracy (or Christian
Democratic Party)
Guerrilla Army of the Poor (or of the People)
Secret Anti-Communist Army
Izabal Mining Exploration and Exploitation, Inc.
National Advancement Front
National Pro-Arana Workers Front
Rebel Armed Forces
Revolutionary Armed Forces-Guatemalan Labor Party
Autonomous Trade Union Federation of Guatemala
Democratic Civic Front
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Comprehensive Glossary of Guatemalan Organizations (continued)
FCI a Federacion Campesina Independiente
FDCR a Frente Democratico Contra la Repression
FDG Frente Democratico Guatemalteco
FECETRAG a Federacion Central de Trabajadores de Guatemala
FEG Federacion de Educadores de Guatemala
FEGUA Ferrocarriles Nacionales de Guatemala
FENATEXVCS a Federacion Nacional de Obreros en la Industria Textil del
Vestido Comercio y Similares
FENATRAAC a Federacion Nacional de Trabajadores Agricolas y
Campesinos
FENCAIG a Federacion Nacional de Comunidades Agricolas e
Indigenas de Guatemala
FENOCAM a Federacion Nacional de Organizaciones Campesinas
FENSIL a Federacion Nacional Sindical Libre de Esquintla
FESC Frente Estudiantil Social Cristiano
Independent Peasant Federation
Democratic Front Against Repression
Guatemalan Democratic Front
Central Federation of Guatemalan Workers
Federation of Guatemalan Educators
Guatemalan National Railways
National Federation of Commercial Textile Workers
National Federation of Agricultural Workers and
Peasants
National Federation of Agricultural and Indigenous
Communities of Guatemala
National Federation of Peasant Organizations
Free National Unions Federation of Esquintla
Social Christian Student Front
FESEBS a
Federacion Sindical de Empleados Bancarios y de Seguros Trade Union Federation of Guatemalan Bank and Insur-
de Guatemala
ance Employees
FERG a
Frente Estudiante Revolutionario "Robin Garcia"
Revolutionary Student Front "Robin Garcia"
FFS
Frente Federativo Sindical
Federated Trade Union Front
FGATE
Fundacion Guatemalteca-Americana de Television
Educativa
Guatemalan-American Educational Television
Foundation
FGTE a
Federacion General de Trabajadores del Espectaculo de
Guatemala
FLOMERCA
Flota Mercante Gran Centroamericana
Greater Central American Merchant Fleet
FMG
Federacion Magisterial Guatemalteca
Federation of Guatemalan Teachers
FMN
Frente Nacional Magisterial
National Teachers Front
FOSA a
Frente Organizado de Sindicatos de Amatitlan
Organized Front of Amatitlan Unions
FP-31 a
Frente Popular 31 de Enero
31 January Popular Front
FPO a
Fuerza Popular Organizada
Popular Front Organization
FRE
Frente Revolucionario Estudiantil
Student Revolutionary Front
FREU
Frente Revolucionariol Estudiantil Universitario
University Student Revolutionary Front
FRTOCC a
Federacion Regional de Trabajadores de Occidente
Regional Federation of Workers of the West
FRU
Frente Revolucionario Universitario
University Revolutionary Front
FTA a
Federacion de Trabajadores Agricolas
Federation of Agricultural Workers
FTG a
Federacion de Trabajadores de Guatemala
Guatemalan Workers' Federation
FTI a
Federacion de Trabajadores de Izabal
Izabal Workers' Federation
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Comprehensive Glossary of Guatemalan Organizations (continued)
FTQ e Federacion de Trabajadores de Quezaltenango
FTR s Federacion de Trabajadores de Retalhuleu
FUEGO Frente Unido del Estudiantado
FUEP Frente Universitario Estudiantil Progresista
FUMN Frente Unido del Magisterio Nacional
FUN a Frente Unido Nacionalista
FUNA Frente Unido Nacional Anticomunista
FUNDESA a Fundacion para el Desarrollo de Guatemala
FUR a Frente Unido de la Revolucion
FUS a Federacion de Unidad Sindical
FYDEP Empresa Nacional de Fomento y Desarrollo
Economico del Peten
GPC or CGP a Comision Guatemalteca para la Paz
GUATEL Empresa Guatemalteca de Telecommunicaciones
ICTA Instituto de Ciencia y Tecnologia Agricola
IGE Iglesia Guatemalteca en el Exilio
IGSS Instituto Guatemalteco de Seguridad Social
Quezaltenango Workers' Federation
Retalhuleu Workers' Federation
University Revolutionary Front
Progressive University Student Front
National Teachers United Front
Nationlist United Front
Anti-Communist National United Front
Foundation for the Development of Guatemala
United Revolutionary Front
Federation of Labor Unity
National Enterprise for the Economic Promotion and
Development of the Peten
Group of Mutual Support for the Reappearance, With
Their Lives, of Our Children, Spouses, Parents, and
Siblings
Guatemalan Peace Commission
Guatemalan Telecommunications Enterprise
Agriculture Service and Technology Institute
Guatemalan Church in Exile
Guatemalan Social Security Institute
INAD Instituto Nacional de Administracion para el Desarrollo National Institute of Administration Development
INAFOR Instituto Nacional Forestal
INDECA Instituto Nacional de Comercializacion Agricola
INEN Instituto Nacional de Energia Nuclear
INFOM Instituto de Fomento Municipal
INFOP Instituto de Fomento de la Produccion
INGUAT Instituto Guatemalteco de Turismo
INSIVUMEH Instituto Nacional de Sismologia, Vulcanologia,
Meteorologia e Hidrologia
INTA Instituto Nacional de Transformacion Agraria
INTECAP Instituto Tecnico de Capacitacion y Productividad
INVA Instituto Nacional de Vivienda
JPT a Juventud Patriotica del Trabajo
MANO a Movimiento Anticomunist Nacional Organizado
National Institute of Agricultural Marketing
National Institute of Nuclear Energy
Municipal Development Institute
Production Development Institute
Guatemalan Institute of Tourism
National Institute of Seismology, Volcanology,
Meteorology, and Hydrology
National Institute of Agrarian Reform
Technical Institute for Training and Productivity
National Institute of Housing
Patriotic Labor Youth
Organized National Anti-Communist Movement
Guatemalan Cooperativist Movement
Independent Peasant Movement
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Comprehensive Glossary of Guatemalan Organizations (continued)
MUP a Movimiento de Unidad Popular Movement of Popular Unity
NGR Nuevas Generaciones Revolucionarias New Revolutionary Generations
NOA a Nueva Organizacion Anticomunista New Anti-Communist Organization
NOR a Nucleos de Obreros Revolucionarios Revolutionary Workers' Cells
"Felipe Antonio Garcia" "Felipe Antonio Garcia"
OCAS a Organizacion Campesina de Accion Social Peasant Organization of Social Action
ODECABE Organizacion Deportive Centroamericana y del Caribe Central American and Caribbean Sports Organization
ONAM Oficina Nacional de la Mujer National Women's Office
ORPA a Organizacion Revolucionaria del Pueblo en Armas Revolutionary Organization of the People in Arms
OSOS Organizacion Secreta de Oficials Secret Organization of Officers
PARN Partido de Accion y Reconstruccion Nacional National Action and Reconstruction Party
PNR a Partido Nacional Renovador National Renewal Party (or National Renovation Party)
PP Partido Populista Populist Party
PRAM Partido Revolucionario Abril y May April-May Revolutionary Party
PRI Partido Revolucionario Independiente Independent Revolutionary Party
PRO Partido Revolucionario Ortodoxo Orthodox Revolutionary Party
PRUN Partido Republicano de Unidad Nacional National Unity Republican Party
PSD a Partido Socialista Democratica Democratic Socialist Party
PSG Partido Social Guatemalteco Guatemalan Socialist Party
PUA a Partido Unido Anticomunista United Anti-Communist Party
PUCO Partido Unificacion de Campesinos y Obreros Workers and Peasants Unification Party
PUD a Partido Unificacion Democratica Democratic Unification Party
SITRABI a Sindicato de Trabajadores Bananeros de Izabal Banana Workers' Union of Izabal
STEGAC Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Embotelladora Coca-Cola Bottlers' Union of Guatemala
Guatemalteca
UCN a Union de Centro Nacional National Centrist Union (or Union of the National
Center)
UCU Union Cultural Universitaria University Cultural Union
UEI Union de Estudiantes Independientes Independent Students Union
UNAGRO a Union de Agricola Nacional National Agricultural Union
UNEPAR Unidad Ejecutoria de Acueductos Executive Unit of Rural Aqueducts
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Comprehensive Glossary of Guatemalan Organizations (continued)
UNITEGUA Union de Transportistas Terrestres de Guatemala
UPG Union Patriotica Guatemalteca
URD Union Revolucionaria Democratica
URG Union de Radioperiodicos de Guatemala
URNG a Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca
USAC a Universidad de San Carlos
Union of Land Transportation Workers of Guatemala
Guatemalan Patriotic Union
Democratic Revolutionary Union
Union of Radio News Shows of Guatemala
Guatemalan National Revolutionary Union
University of San Carlos
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Table 2
A Guide to Key Political Groups
Coordinating Committee of Agricultural, Commercial,
Industrial, and Financial Chambers
CAN
National Authentic Central
Rightist
CNT
National Workers' Center
Leftist
CTF
Central Confederation of Federated Workers
Rightist
CUSG
Confederation of Syndicalist Unity of Guatemala
Centrist or center-leftist
DCG
Christian Democratic Party
Center-leftist
EGP
Guerrilla Army of the Poor
Extreme leftist
FAR
Rebel Armed Forces
Extreme leftist
FASGUA
Autonomous Trade Union Federation of Guatemala
Leftist
FUN
National Unity Front
Rightist
FUR
United Revolutionary Front
Leftist
MLN
National Liberation Movement
Rightist or extreme rightist
ORPA
Revolutionary Organization of the People in Arms
Extreme leftist
PDCN
Democratic Party of National Cooperation
Centrist or center-leftist
PGT
Guatemalan Labor Party
Extreme leftist
PUA
UCN
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Secret
Secret
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