ETHIOPIA: POLITICAL AND SECURITY IMPACT OF THE DROUGHT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00589R000200160004-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 1, 2010
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: April 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/20: CIA-RDP86T00589R000200160004-5
Directorate of saccat
Intelligence
Ethiopia: Political and
Security Impact of
the Drought
rhay-wat
ALA 85-10039
April 1985
Copy 3 5 4
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/20: CIA-RDP86T00589R000200160004-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/20: CIA-RDP86T00589R000200160004-5
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/20: CIA-RDP86T00589R000200160004-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/20: CIA-RDP86T00589R000200160004-5
Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Ethiopia: Political and
Security Impact of
the Drought
This paper was prepared by
Office of African and Latin American Analysis. It
was coordinated with the Directorate of
Operations. Comments and queries are welcome and
may be directed to the Chief, Africa Division,
ALA,
Secret
ALA 85-10039
April 1985
i m i Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/20: CIA-RDP86T00589R000200160004-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/20: CIA-RDP86T00589R000200160004-5
Secret
Ethiopia: Political and
Security Impact of
the Drought
Key Judgments Ethiopia's continuing drought has presented the Mengistu regime with a
Information available human crisis of monumental proportions. Hundreds of thousands of
as of 3 April 1985 peasants from Ethiopia's northern regions died during 1984, and at least as
was used in this report.
many are expected to die from famine-related causes this year, despite a
massive outpouring of aid from the international community. Estimates of
people at risk probably will rise by midyear. To the extent this occurs, more
pressure will be placed on aid donors to increase the existing level of effort,
which was itself based in part on earlier Ethiopian projections.
In our judgment, the crisis has not yet undermined Mengistu's military
power base, and the stability of his regime does not appear seriously
threatened thus far. Mengistu, nevertheless, is almost certainly mindful of
the role famine played in the overthrow of his predecessor, Haile Selassie,
and concerned over potential challenges to his rule. He has attempted to
shield his vital military and urban constituencies from the full effects of the
drought, while monitoring both closely for signs of discontent.
Mengistu, in fact, has attempted to use the famine to strengthen his
position, especially in the longstanding conflict with the Eritrean and
Tigrean insurgents. He relies on international donors to support the rural
population in government-controlled areas of the north but vehemently
opposes all efforts to provide aid to the drought victims in regions held by
the insurgents. At the same time, he is trying to move nearly 1 million peo-
ple from the contested northern regions to western and central Ethiopia.
His stated rationale of relocating peasants from their devastated homeland
to more fertile lowland areas has some merit, but his coercive tactics
emphasize his political intent to undercut the dissidents' base of support
and perhaps hasten collectivization of agriculture. The program, however,
is a two-edged sword. While a secure resettlement program would hurt the
rebel cause by disrupting its support base, the insurgents are likely to try to
rally support by playing to the popular opposition stirred up by the prospect
of forced resettlement.
Nowhere have the political and security aspects of the drought been more
obvious than in the issue of cross-border feeding operations by internation-
al organizations. We believe Mengistu is prepared to use military force to
disrupt the flow of food from Sudan to the rebel-held northern areas, as
well as to stem the tide of refugees into Sudanese relief camps; indeed, both
these flows have been exploited by the rebels to sustain their insurgency-
by feeding their people and recruiting among the refugees. From the
iii Secret
ALA 85-10039
April 1985
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/20: CIA-RDP86T00589R000200160004-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/20: CIA-RDP86T00589R000200160004-5
insurgents' viewpoint, any diversion of these flows would hamper their
military capabilities. Despite the potential for both government- and rebel-
initiated flareups of the fighting in the north, however, we believe the
military situation there is unlikely to change dramatically.
So far, the worst famine-related problems have been limited to rural areas
where Mengistu can play off conditions in government- and insurgent-
controlled areas at little cost to his regime. The intensifying food crisis over
the coming year, however, is likely to lead to worsening food shortages in
the cities, forcing the government to adopt more stringent austerity
measures that could affect Mengistu's political base. We believe the urban
population probably will adjust stoically to increasing hardship, but, if civil
disturbances occur, the regime almost certainly will turn to the army for
support.
We believe that Mengistu probably will survive the crisis politically,
sustained by a combination of Western humanitarian assistance and Soviet
military and security aid and supported by his own military and security
apparatus. Indeed, Mengistu will remain closely tied to the USSR, despite
its tightfisted economic policies, since he perceives Moscow's military
support.as vital to his own survival. Although the United States and other
Western donors have poured in enormous amounts of aid, relations
between the West and Ethiopia are unlikely to improve significantly. In the
case of the United States, tensions with the regime over aid to the north al-
most certainly will increase and are likely to lead to a further deterioration
in relations. Mengistu views the United States as his main threat and is
convinced that Washington not only directly supports the rebels, but also
encourages similar assistance to them by Sudan and Somalia.
Despite Moscow's broad political-military commitment to the Marxist
Mengistu regime, the Soviets have not come forward with significant new
economic assistance to Ethiopia, probably because they believe Western
willingness to foot the bill will not alter Ethiopia's military and political de-
pendence on Moscow. The minimal Soviet aid-primarily in the transport
sector and in support of the resettlement program-has received extensive
publicity in Ethiopia. We believe the Soviets harbor some concern that
Western generosity could undermine their position, and are encouraging
Mengistu's deep suspicions of US motives in supplying aid.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/20: CIA-RDP86T00589R000200160004-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/20: CIA-RDP86T00589R000200160004-5
Secret
If, however, Mengistu is overthrown, instability surrounding the seating of
a new government could offer some opportunity for improving relations
with the United States, particularly as the successor regime would struggle
with the same intractable economic problems. The Soviets would move
quickly to restore their position, however; and any effort to strengthen ties
with Washington will be limited by the extent to which the government in
power believes that continued military and security ties to the USSR are
vital to its own survival.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/20: CIA-RDP86T00589R000200160004-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/20: CIA-RDP86T00589R000200160004-5
Secret
Key Judgments
Scope of the Present Crisis
Mengistu's Strategy
The Rural Population
5
Foreign Relations
6
The USSR and Eastern Europe
6
Prospects and Implications
9
Ethiopia Without Mengistu
10
__ Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/20: CIA-RDP86T00589R000200160004-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/20: CIA-RDP86T00589R000200160004-5
Secret
Ethiopia: Political and
Security Impact of
the Drought
The Marxist regime in Ethiopia faces growing pres-
sures from the worst drought and famine in decades.
Hundreds of thousands of peasants died from famine-
related causes in 1984, and, given the poor harvest
prospects, conditions almost certainly will worsen in
1985. The northern regions, (see map following text)
the site of longstanding insurgencies,' thus far have
borne the brunt of the tragedy and have become the
focus of international attention-factors that have
both complicated Mengistu's prosecution of the war
and created opportunities to weaken insurgent sup-
port. Famine-induced migration has worsened al-
ready-strained relations with neighboring states, and
Mengistu's increasing dependence on Western-par-
ticularly US-humanitarian assistance has raised po-
litical problems for a regime that is deeply distrustful
of the United States and closely allied with the Soviet
Union. The next six months pose difficult challenges
to Mengistu as he attempts to placate the military and
the potentially volatile urban population, hitherto
largely protected from the famine.
Recurrent drought has plagued Ethiopia in recent
years, particularly in the strife-torn northern prov-
inces, which traditionally have not produced enough
food to feed their population. While the specter of
hunger is always present, the failure of the midyear
rains in 1984 aggravated Ethiopia's chronically pre-
carious food situation'and created famine conditions
in a large part of the country. Estimates by interna-
tional observers of the people threatened with death
by starvation and related causes vary from 7.7 million
Counterproductive government policies, in our judg-
ment, have exacerbated the problems of drought,
deforestation, soil degradation, rapid population
growth, and primitive farming techniques that tradi-
tionally have made Ethiopia susceptible to famine.
By emphasizing collectivized agriculture and state-
run farms and by keeping food prices low in order to
maintain urban support, the Mengistu regime has
reduced incentives for private farming. State farms-
mainly used to grow corn and wheat for urban
consumers and cotton and sugar for export-have
failed to pick up the slack. Poor management, lack of
skilled personnel, and equipment breakdowns have
limited output, and most state farms have been
financially unsuccessful. Moreover, transportation
difficulties, an inefficient marketing system, and in-
adequate storage facilities have further hampered
productivity.
social services.
25X1
on the government's ambitious but overburdened 25X1
Ethiopia, which until the early 1970s grew most of its
own food, has become increasingly unable to feed
itself. As a result, dependence on food imports-
mostly aid from Western governments, private volun-
tary organizations, and multilateral organizations,
rather than commercial purchases-has grown. Stag-
nating coffee production-in part caused by Addis
Ababa's low producer prices-has limited the
amount of foreign exchange available for even mini-
mal commercial food purchases. The regime's poli-
cies also have compounded budget problems because
of the need to cover the operating costs of inefficient
state-run enterprises and maintain urban food subsi-
dies. Finally, policies have contributed to increased
migration to the cities, which has caused rural labor
shortages, increasing urban food demand, and strains
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/20: CIA-RDP86T00589R000200160004-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/20: CIA-RDP86T00589R000200160004-5
to 9 million.' The US Embassy reports that even
Ethiopian Government estimates-consistently lower
than international donor projections of people at
risk-have continued to climb and are likely to rise
further by midyear.
According to Ethiopian Government estimates, more
than 80 percent of those affected by the famine live in
the north. Many of these people are now in or moving
toward the cities, towns, and feeding stations of the
northern provinces that are under the control of the
Mengistu regime, and a large number are crossing the
border into relief camps in Sudan, according to the
US Embassy. As many as 2-3 million, however, have
remained in insurgent-controlled territory. Food sup-
ply is particularly critical in the northern provinces of
Eritrea and Tigray and in Welo, northern Shewa, and
parts of Gonder.
The US Embassy reports that relief efforts in the
north have been seriously hampered as road transport
throughout the region is vulnerable to attack from
both government and insurgent forces. Authorized
deliveries of supplies to government-controlled popu-
lation centers and feeding camps are frequently de-
layed until large armed convoys are formed; even
then, vehicles can operate only during daylight hours.
On the other hand, cross-border international relief
efforts into insurgent-held areas, as well as insurgent
food and refugee convoys, must move at night to avoid
government air attacks.
The northern provinces are not, however, the only
areas affected; the drought also has spread southward.
Harerge in southeastern Ethiopia is especially hard
hit, according to the US Embassy. Conditions appar-
ently are not yet as bad in southern Shewa, Bale,
Gamo Gofa, and Sidamo, but the Embassy believes
they are likely to worsen. A drought assessment team
sent by the Embassy to this area last October found
that rainfall, crop production, and food and livestock
supplies were below normal and that food aid soon
would be needed. Assistance to the southern regions
has been lagging, however, because donors have been
concentrating on the hard-hit north.
2 Estimates of the numbers at risk in Ethiopia-compiled by the
government and donors-are complicated by imprecise population
data; sizable refugee movements out of the country into Sudan,
Somalia, and Djibouti; and the internal flow of hundreds of
The spreading drought and wandering refugees have
made it especially difficult to determine the level of
food shortfalls. In December 1984, Ethiopia's Relief
and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC)-the govern-
ment organization monitoring the crisis-announced
that food requirements for 1985 would be 1.3 million
metric tons and that the country also needs logistic
support, clothing, shelter, and medicine. A higher
estimate appears more likely, however, as the crisis
intensifies.
North America, Western Europe, Australia, and
Japan have responded by mounting a massive relief
effort. Approximately 220,000 metric tons of relief
aid were delivered between October and December
1984, and foreign donors have pledged 718,000 metric
tons for 1985, according to World Food Program
statistics in February. Ethiopia's East European and
Soviet allies have concentrated their response on
boosting the capacity of the transport sector. UN
officials have publicly expressed their belief that
international food assistance will meet Ethiopia's stat-
ed needs; we disagree, however, and expect-on the
basis of the rising population at risk-a significant
shortfall between projected aid levels and actual
requirements.
As far as the internal logistics are concerned, the
United States reached an agreement with the Govern-
ment of Ethiopia last fall that lets the RRC handle
US Government assistance directly. In addition, large
amounts of food relief are being distributed by the
FAO's World Food Program and through nongovern-
mental organizations such as the International Com-
mittee of the Red Cross, Catholic Relief Services,
Save the Children Federation, Lutheran World Fed-
eration, Church World Services, World Vision, and
Oxfam.
Mengistu's leadership skills clearly will be severely
tested over the coming year by the drought-induced
crisis. Although we believe the stability of the govern-
ment is not immediately threatened, Mengistu almost
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/20: CIA-RDP86T00589R000200160004-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/20: CIA-RDP86T00589R000200160004-5
Secret
certainly is concerned over potential challenges to his
rule and is mindful that a similar crisis contributed to
the ouster of Haile Selassie in 1974. As a result, we
expect him to attempt to shield important constituen-
cies-particularly the military and the potentially
volatile urban population-from the full effects of
famine by allocating scarce resources and, if neces-
sary, diverting famine relief supplies. This is not to
say the urban areas will go unscathed. The regime is
implementing-probably reluctantly-some austerity
measures that will affect the cities. Even so, most of
the burden will fall on the countryside where Addis
Ababa is content to let international relief efforts take
care of the politically less influential rural population
and thus help prevent refugees from further burden-
ing urban areas. In our judgment, the government
also will continue to focus its energies on a massive
rural resettlement program designed to expand Addis
Ababa's control over the countryside and to advance
agricultural collectivization.
The Military
Ethiopia's 200,000-strong army plays a pervasive role
in running the country and is the backbone of Mengis-
tu's support. The US Embassy reports that the armed
forces dominate the new Ethiopian Workers Party,
formed last September ostensibly to lay the ground-
work for a Communist society, and officers loyal to
Mengistu hold most key senior government positions.
Nevertheless, according to the Embassy, military
morale is low because of the prolonged conflict in the
north and the inability of government troops to win
major victories.
Given the vital importance of military support, the
regime's priority almost certainly is to ensure the
army's loyalty by protecting it from food shortages.
Soldiers and their families receive rations of basic
foodstuffs from the government, including commod-
ities no longer available to civilians in the capital,
according to the US Embassy. We believe,
that the military
gets first crack at some goods purchased commercial-
ly by the regime and some agricultural commodities
supplied by farmers and state farms to meet govern-
ment quotas.
We believe Mengistu will continue to placate the
army at the expense of other sectors of the population.
Even so, a senior Ethiopian official recently told US
Many observers have noted that the Mengistu regime
faces a famine similar to that which contributed in
1974 to the downfall, after 44 years in power, of
Emperor Haile Selassie. Despite some parallels, how-
ever, including the current food crisis, we believe
other factors-largely absent in Ethiopia today-
were more important.
The Ethiopian revolution occurred as modernization
processes were accelerating, creating pressures that
the conservative monarch could not contain. The
Arab-Israeli war of 1973 led to a sharp rise in
petroleum prices beyond Ethiopia's ability to pay. In
addition, the illness of the crown prince raised public
uncertainly about the aging Emperor's successor. F_
The revolution itself began in January 1974 as an
army mutiny at Negele over poor food and water.
Military mutinies over issues of low pay and living
conditions spread to other troops in the Ogaden,
Eritrea, and eventually Addis Ababa itself. At the
same time, opposition to fuel price increases, low
salaries, and curriculum changes throughout the
educational system set the stage for repeated confron-
tations between numerous pressure groups and the
government. In addition, evidence that the regime was
suppressing news of the severe famine in the northern
highlands-which by the end of 1973 had claimed
between 100,000 and 300,000 lives in only two of the
hardest hit regions, Tigray and Welo-led to severe
criticism from Ethiopians both inside and outside the
government. Teachers, students, workers, and eventu-
ally soldiers-all demanding higher pay and better
working conditions-also adopted other causes such
as land reform and famine relief and finally insisted
on a new political system. Haile Selassie proved
unable to reassert his control and was deposed in
September 1974.
Embassy personnel that the government probably will
have difficulty providing sufficient food to the army
later this year as available stocks are exhausted.
25X1
25X1
i FIT-;- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/20: CIA-RDP86T00589R000200160004-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/20: CIA-RDP86T00589R000200160004-5
International observers have been unable to substanti-
ate frequent rumors that relief aid is being diverted to
the military, but Mengistu almost certainly would
authorize the military to siphon off food aid covertly if
shortages became critical.
Mengistu also will continue to rely on demonstrations
of Soviet support to ensure his control of the military.
High-level Soviet military officials periodically visit
Ethiopia, and Soviet military advisers are attached to
each Ethiopian division headquarters and to almost all
brigades, according to US Embassy reporting. Arms
shipments have continued to arrive during the famine
crisis, according to US Embassy reporting, underlin-
ing Moscow's commitment as the regime's primary
military backer.
In the event that dissatisfaction emerges despite Men-
gistu's efforts to ensure the loyalty of the military, we
believe he will not hesitate to use more repressive
measures. Mengistu and his commanders are certain-
ly sensitive to the threat that an angry, frustrated, or
ambitious military poses to the regime and make
extensive use of the network of political commissars
throughout the armed forces to detect signs of dissent,
according to the US Embassy. While the regime has
attempted to defuse resentment by meeting some of
the army's demands in the past-such as increasing
pay and reducing the number of Cuban troops in
Ethiopia-it has also been quick to arrest and execute
suspected troublemakers to avert serious disorder.
The Urban Population
While Mengistu's strategy for dealing with the ad-
verse political consequences of the food shortages
focuses on the military, he also appears concerned
with isolating the potentially restive urban population
from the crisis. Deteriorating economic conditions,
the protracted northern conflict, and the increasing
Soviet role in Ethiopia already have contributed to
eroding urban popular support for Mengistu, accord-
ing to the US Embassy. We believe, however, that the
government's attempts to provide adequate food sup-
plies for the cities, the regime's pervasive security
apparatus, and the public's memory of the bloody
days of the "red terror" in 1977-78 will continue to
deter urban unrest.'
' During the government's successful struggle to consolidate its
power in 1977-78, it arrested and killed thousands of its civilian
opponents, effectively breaking the back of its internal political
In its continuing efforts to insulate the cities from the
effects of famine, the regime has even used scarce
foreign exchange to buy food for urban distribution
and has asked the United States for a loan of food
under the US PL 480 Title I program for this
purpose, according to the US Embassy. Addis Ababa
recently arranged to buy 100,000 metric tons of wheat
from France for urban consumption this year. In
addition, troops have been used to prevent refugees
from entering Addis Ababa, and those few that
straggle into the capital are taken promptly to camps
outside the city. The government-controlled media
occasionally report on efforts to combat the drought
and on foreign relief contributions-particularly from
the Soviet Bloc-but have not revealed the actual
magnitude of the crisis. Even when government offi-
cials are pictured visiting refugee camps, the refugees
themselves are never shown.
We believe, however, that Mengistu will lose ground
in his effort to shelter the urban population. Already
last fall, it was publicly announced that the authority
of the kebeles (neighborhood associations to which all
urban Ethiopians belong) was being expanded, proba-
bly in expectation of distribution problems. The re-
gime closed private bakeries in November and turned
bread sales over to the kebeles, making receipt of the
bread ration dependent on attendance records at
compulsory political meetings, according to the US
Embassy. In January, the kebeles also assumed re-
sponsibility for the distribution of fruits and vegeta-
bles to urban residents. Even so, the US Embassy
reports that some food shortages already have oc-
curred, and in mid-February Mengistu announced
further austerity measures that clearly would affect
city dwellers. Workers are to be assessed a national
drought relief tax equaling one month's pay, and all
Ethiopians are supposed to serve tours at relief
shelters and resettlement camps. In addition, the
regime announced that, to limit the drawdown of
critical foreign exchange, it was going to cut imports,
including automobiles, luxury goods, and textiles and
impose petroleum rationing-all steps that affect the
cities most directly.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/20: CIA-RDP86T00589R000200160004-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/20: CIA-RDP86T00589R000200160004-5
Secret
The Rural Population
Mengistu's strategy for dealing with those most di-
rectly affected by the famine-the rural population-
appears to us aimed more at using the crisis to weaken
the insurgencies than at meeting the food needs of
starving peasants. The regime has established feeding
centers at major cities and towns under its control in
the north, but has refused to authorize the movement
of relief supplies to insurgent-held areas and has
hindered international efforts to reach those most at
risk, according to US Embassy reporting. We believe
Addis Ababa's promise-made during the March UN
Conference on the Emergency Economic Situation in
Africa-to expand feeding in the north is little more
than a ploy to quiet Western donor criticism of
government famine policy. In addition, the Embassy
reports the government gave priority to Soviet ships
unloading military cargo at least twice in January at
The regime continues to implement its massive reset-
tlement plan to move nearly 1 million northerners to
more fertile areas in western and southwestern parts
of the country by the end of 1985. Under the pro-
gram-an expanson of a scheme from the late
1970s-the government already has moved approxi-
mately 250,000 people since November, according to
numerous press, US Embassy, Ethiopian, and foreign
donor reports. The government has touted the pro-
gram as a means of breaking the cycle of famine and
drought in the north, an area most observers agree is
unable to feed its population. In our judgment, Addis
Ababa also believes that moving peasants from the
combat areas will cut deeply into the direct support
provided to the insurgency, as well as pressing the
resettled farmers to establish collective farms and
peasant associations that are used by the government
as a means ofpolitical and economic control. The US
Embassy reports that over 2,000 party members have
been sent to organize the new settlements.
Difficulties with the resettlement program, however,
have forced hundreds of civilian personnel and vehi-
cles to be diverted from other drought-related pro-
jects because of peasant resistance, logistic con-
straints, and financial problems associated with the
plan, Addis Ababa
also reduced the number of people to be resettled in
1985 from 1.5 million to 0.9 million. Some 12,000
metric tons of food aid from northern programs were
diverted to resettlement areas last March, according
to a US Embassy official, suggesting that Addis
Ababa cannot provide adequate food for the new
settlers from domestic stocks. The local population
also has been pressured into providing assistance to
the new arrivals,
the expense of Western relief shipments.
After agreeing last fall to allow Western donors to
provide food aid to all parts of the country, Addis
Ababa more recently has made strong protests to the
United States over private donors' relief shipments
into insurgent-held territory from Sudan and has
implied it could not guarantee the safety of interna-
tional relief workers in the region. In January, securi-
ty forces boarded at least three ships in Ethiopian
ports to seize relief shipments destined for the cross-
border effort, and Mengistu personally-and public-
ly-rejected a plea to allow international donors to
operate in insurgent-held areas. On the basis of their
public statements and discussions with US officials,
we believe the Ethiopians are convinced that such
assistance is intended to strengthen the regime's
enemies and further weaken its position in the north.
Mengistu has publicly rejected repeated calls for a
"food truce." The regime clearly is prepared to use
force, including airstrikes, to keep supplies from
reaching insurgent areas and to disrupt refugee flows
to Sudan, which has long provided safehaven and
logistic routes for the rebels,
Indeed, several air strikes have al-
ready been reported. The Ethiopian Air Force last
November strafed a large group of refugees moving
toward the Sudanese border in the company of a small
group of armed insurgents and,
in March attacked up to 10
transit centers along the major refugee route.
Mengistu's continuing emphasis on the relocation
effort is likely to alienate further the rural popula-
tion, both those being moved and those having to 25X1
accept new arrivals. For example, the new settlers,
mostly Amharas and Tigreans, have long been resent-
ed as colonizers by the Oromo inhabitants of the
southern region. In addition to rekindling ethnic
tensions, the relocation scheme will sharpen competi-
tion for water as the government appropriates tradi-
tional grazing lands for the northerners.
25X1
25X1
25X1
---- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/20: CIA-RDP86T00589R000200160004-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/20: CIA-RDP86T00589R000200160004-5
While Mengistu is apparently trying to weaken the
insurgencies by interfering with relief efforts, other
actions of his may inadvertently help the insurgent
cause. For example, we believe Mengistu's commit-
ment to the massive resettlement program almost
certainly will increase peasant support for the insur-
gencies. Many northerners are joining the rebels to
avoid being relocated,
In addition, several US Embassy sources
report that refugees have been escaping from reloca-
tion sites and that, in many instances, government
forces have been needed to prevent the new settlers
from returning to their ancestral homes. At a bare
minimum, this will increase resentment against the
regime. The insurgents will also benefit from rampant
allegations that the regime is excluding from feeding
centers people who are not members of peasant
associations or who are suspected of being rebel
sympathizers.
The northern insurgent organizations, for their part,
have also been using the famine and relief efforts for
their own purposes. The Relief Society of Tigray
(REST), an arm of the Tigrean People's Liberation
Front (TPLF), has helped move large numbers of
refugees to Sudan-at least 120,000 to 130,000 ac-
cording to US Embassy sources in Sudan. The TPLF
uses the refugee camps to provide sanctuary, medical
care, food, and money to its fighters and their fam-
ilies-some of whom work in the camps-according
to the US Embassy in Khartoum. Many send small
sums and food home, and some "drought victims"
return to Ethiopia periodically with supplies. Some
funds that insurgent organizations are raising for
relief operations, as a result of increased world public-
ity, are almost certainly being diverted for military
purposes. Moreover, the guerrillas probably have re-
cruited additional troops from among victims of the
famine and as a result of their control of the refugee
camps in Sudan. The rebels' ability to absorb the new
recruits, however, will continue to be restricted by a
shortage of weapons and other military supplies. Their
military activities also are hampered by the need to
divert troops to guard refugee convoys and deliver
food supplies within Ethiopia. International relief
officials now fear that the TPLF is hindering move-
ment of refugees to government-controlled areas to
induce more Tigreans to flee to Sudan.
Just as Mengistu's domestic strategy for dealing with
Ethiopia's drought and famine goes well beyond
simply meeting the food needs for the populace, so,
too, do Ethiopia's foreign relations. Mengistu appears
to be adeptly using Western humanitarian gestures to
supply needed food for a country unwilling to offer a
political quid pro quo. At the same time, he heaps
praise on Moscow for an occasional bagatelle to
acknowledge Ethiopia's political and military
dependence.
The USSR and Eastern Europe
Despite Moscow's close relationship with the Men-
gistu regime, Soviet food deliveries last year were
limited to 10,000 tons of rice-equal to the amount
given in 1983, according to the US Embassy. In-
creases in Soviet economic aid since the onset of the
present crisis have been largely in the transport sector.
the Soviets have so
far delivered 300 trucks, 24 transport aircraft, and 24
helicopters-equipment that can be used not only for
food delivery but also for military purposes. The
trucks and aircraft are being employed primarily in
the resettlement program, and the US Embassy re-
ports Moscow has demanded that Addis Ababa pay
for Soviet fuel and personnel expenses incurred in
transporting relief supplies. The Soviets also supplied
a mobile hospital and 150 medical personnel in re-
sponse to Mengistu's plea for aid during a sudden trip
to Moscow last December. East European countries-
East Germany and Bulgaria-have provided some
relief aid, including airlift assistance. For its part,
Cuba has limited its assistance largely to the military
sector, despite Mengistu's request for famine relief
during his visit to Havana in December, according to
the US Embassy. The Cubans promised to send
20,000 tons of sugar and to increase the number of
Cuban doctors but explained they were constrained by
their own economic difficulties from doing more.
Despite its low level of food aid, Moscow has attempt-
ed to extract maximum publicity from its minimal
relief activities in Ethiopia, undoubtedly hoping to
boost its credibility as a reliable supporter of client
states and to detract from Western relief efforts.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/20: CIA-RDP86T00589R000200160004-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/20: CIA-RDP86T00589R000200160004-5
Secret
Soviet-Ethiopian Ties
Mengistu's alliance with Moscow provides him the
military equipment and advisory support essential to
combat the northern insurgents and counter Somali
irredentism. He almost certainly sees no alternative
source of supply. We believe that Mengistu also looks
to the Soviet Union as a model for building a new
society to bridge the country's traditional ethnic
divisions and transform the economic social and
political order and to justify total political control by
a small self-appointed leadership group.
For its part, Moscow values its relationship with
Mengistu because it provides access to naval facilities
near the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf, which
enhances Soviet capability to project air and naval
power in the region and beyond. Moreover, the Sovi-
ets probably view Ethiopia as a potential springboard
from which to support or promote other leftist move-
ments in Africa.
Moscow has provided the Mengistu regime with over
$3 billion worth of military assistance-including
large quantities of armor and modern jet aircraft-
and maintains approximately 1,700 military advisers
and 1,000 civilian technicians in the country. Moscow
almost certainly subsidizes the approximately 5,500
Cuban military personnel-reduced from 11,000
since late 1983-that are stationed in Ethiopia. The
Cuban forces have served largely as a strategic
Mengistu-although probably disappointed over the
lukewarm Soviet response to his country's plight-has
publicly heaped praise on the Soviets and their allies,
while largely ignoring Western relief efforts. The US
Embassy reports that each donation from Moscow
and its allies is publicized three times-at the time of
commitment, on delivery, and again at distribution.
We believe, however, the Soviets are at least some-
what concerned that Western generosity could weak-
en their position in Ethiopia.
reserve to deter Somali irredentism in the Ogaden
and have not engaged in combat since the hostilities
with Somalia ended in 1978. Addis Ababa also is the
second-largest recipient of Soviet economic credits
and grants in Sub-Saharan Africa, receiving about
$360 million during 1980-83, according to CIA
estimates.
Despite Addis Ababa's heavy dependence on Moscow,
longstanding differences persist in several areas, in-
cluding strategy for resolving the Eritrean insurgency
and the composition of the official (Marxist-Leninist)
Ethiopian Workers Party, established last fall. The
Soviets wanted a party dominated by civilians-
because it might have been an easier one. to influ-
ence-rather than by armed forces personnel, as was
engineered by Mengistu.
consider-
able opposition in the Ethiopian military to Moscow's
influence in the country's domestic and military
affairs. In addition, many officers reportedly are
dissatisfied with the level of Soviet economic assis-
tance and Moscow's repayment terms of military aid.
The Ethiopians realize, however, that only the USSR
is willing and able to provide the military hardware
and political support that Ethiopia needs, and we
have no evidence of any significant sentiment for
breaking Ethiopia's close ties to Moscow.
has
focused on the West's allegedly subversive motives for
providing aid. We believe the Soviets probably en-
courage Mengistu's deep suspicions of US motives by
emphasizing Washington's role in relief efforts in
insurgent-held areas. While some misgivings probably
exist, we suspect that, in the final analysis, the Soviets
and their surrogates probably believe the West will
foot the bill and Soviet stinginess will not alter
Ethiopia's continued military and political
dependence.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
-- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/20: CIA-RDP86T00589R000200160004-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/20: CIA-RDP86T00589R000200160004-5
Relations With the West
Although Ethiopia has accepted massive amounts of
Western, particularly US, famine assistance, relations
between the Mengistu regime and the West have not
improved significantly and, indeed, appear to be
deteriorating over US efforts to ensure relief for all of
Ethiopia. According to diplomatic reporting, Addis
Ababa recently threatened to break relations with the
United States if Washington follows through on its
plans to increase substantially relief operations from
Sudan to the northern, mostly rebel-held, regions of
Ethiopia. Mengistu and other key government offi-
cials, according to the US Embassy
view the United States as the main threat to
its Marxist revolution and the driving force behind
efforts to subvert it. Embassy reporting indicates that
Mengistu and his key advisers believe Washington
already aids insurgent groups directly, uses relief
efforts to channel additional aid to the rebels, and
encourages Sudan and Somalia to assist them. F_
Mengistu appears less hostile toward most other
Western countries and'probably does not view them as
a direct threat to Ethiopia. Nevertheless, according to
the US Embassy, the government continues to place
tight limits on Western donor access-particularly in
the contested regions of the north-and has threat-
ened to patrol the Bab el Mandeb strait to interdict
foreign ships carrying supplies destined for transship-
ment to rebel-held areas. In addition, while the
regime has afforded some publicity to international
relief efforts, it has publicly charged that the current
crisis is the result of the inadequate response from
donor countries to Addis Ababa's earlier warnings
about the seriousness of the drought. While the
government is obstructing Western relief efforts in the
north, the US Embassy reports that Western donors
and international donor organizations operating in
Ethiopia have been approached by government offi-
cials to aid the resettlement program. Thus far,
however, only the United Nation's Food and Agricul-
ture Organization, the Catholic Church, and Austra-
lia have agreed, although other Western donors, such
as Canada, Norway, and West Germany, are consid-
ering assistance for those already resettled, according
to the US Embassy.
Neighboring States
The political, economic, and military spillover of the
consequences of the Ethiopian drought means that the
country's neighbors face severe refugee problems in
addition to their own food shortages. This is increas-
ing bilateral tensions and, we believe, could threaten
stability in the Horn.
Relations between Ethiopia and Sudan have long been
strained, mainly over the support each provides for the
other's insurgency. The Eritrean and Tigrean rebels
have their headquarters in Khartoum and use Suda-
nese territory for supply routes into areas they control
inside Ethiopia,
Mengistu recently condemned publicly Sudan and
other Arab states-particularly Saudi Arabia-for
aiding the insurgents, following the announcement in
Khartoum in January of the merger of three minor
Eritrean dissident groups.
provides only limited aid to the rebels, but Mengistu's
public statements suggest he is convinced that aid to
the insurgents from the US-backed government in
Khartoum and Sudan's Arab friends is responsible for
the failure of his northern military campaigns. In
turn, Addis Ababa, in close cooperation with Libya,
supplies aid and training to Sudanese dissidents and
allows them to operate against southern Sudan from
bases in southwestern Ethiopia, according to a variety
of Embassy, attache, F--Iand press sources. F__-]
The enormous new influx of Ethiopian refugees-
mainly from Eritrea and Tigray-into Sudan over the
past six months will strain relations further, in our
view. Over a quarter of a million Ethiopian refugees
have converged on Sudan since late 1984, and UN
workers estimate that up to 3,000 people cross the
border daily. Mengistu has publicly expressed concern
that the refugee camps in Sudan offer fertile ground
for rebel recruitment and that cross-border relief
efforts are really intended to aid the rebel forces. The
government threatened in January to take action
against countries involved in "hostile and conspirato-
rial acts" against Ethiopia and has said it would
attack any rebel installation or activity it could locate
and target, according to US State Department offi-
cials. We believe Addis Ababa is likely to take
military action to end relief efforts to the rebel-held
areas, particularly when cross-border programs are
increased.
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/20: CIA-RDP86T00589R000200160004-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/20: CIA-RDP86T00589R000200160004-5
Secret
The huge refugee population has increased the burden
on the fragile Sudanese regime, which has drought
and famine problems of its own and a growing
insurgency in the south. The influx of some 700,000
Ethiopians and numerous other nationalities, accord-
ing to US State Department estimates, is seriously
straining Sudan's already overburdened relief organi-
zations; recent reporting from the US Embassy in
Khartoum indicates that shortages of water, lack of
proper sanitation and housing, and disease are con-
tributing to an alarmingly high death rate in the relief
camps. President Nimeiri has complained to US
officials that Sudan cannot continue to accept massive
numbers of new refugees and has called for interna-
tional efforts to stem the flows from Ethiopia: and
Chad. The US Embassy in Khartoum estimates that
by this summer, if the influx continues unabated,
almost a million refugees will compete with 4. million
hungry Sudanese for a decreasing supply of food and
water, a competition for scarce resources that can
cholera will spread. Even if the drought ends, harvests
probably will be small for some time because of labor
migration away from agricultural regions, the lack of
agricultural inputs, and continuing marketing and
transport problems. Moreover, Addis Ababa faces
serious difficulties in making the newly resettled
peasants quickly productive and is unlikely to change
its generally counterproductive socialist agricultural
only stimulate further unrest in Sudan.
Ethiopia's other neighbors also face refugee problems
and food shortages that could threaten regional stabil-
ity. Addis
Ababa still regards Somali forces as a military threat
and believes US assistance encourages Mogadishu's
designs on the Ogaden. While many refugees from the
1978 Ogaden war and the 1982 drought were repatri-
ated to Ethiopia from Djibouti and Somalia over the
past year, Mogadishu and Djibouti fear that many of
these people will return and tax overburdened facili-
ties, according to US Embassy reports. Serious finan-
cial problems plague both countries, while Somalia
also faces growing Ethiopian-supported dissident ac-
tivities in the north. Kenya, although not threatened
with a similar refugee influx, fears that Addis Aba-
ba's domestic resettlement program might shift a
potentially troublesome population close to its border
and increase regional tensions, according to the US
Embassy.
Prospects and Implications
We. agree with most observers that Ethiopia's food
crisis is likely to worsen over the coming year. The US
Embassy reports that, even if normal rains do return
in 1985, hundreds of thousands more people could die
this year and that diseases such as measles and
policies.
The regime is likely to face worsening food shortages
in the cities that could spark urban unrest despite
government price controls and the expansion of au-
thority over food distribution. In our judgment, the
regime will be able to provide some food but will have
to rely increasingly on the kebeles-already involved
in every aspect of urban life-to maintain order.
Mengistu may be forced to call for further austerity in
urban areas-and to a lesser extent by the military- 25X1
under the pretense of solidarity with the famine-
stricken rural population.
In our judgment, the deepening food crisis also may
intensify the conflict in the north. We believe that
Addis Ababa may conclude that the famine and 25X1
resulting diversion of insurgent resources to relief
efforts have increased the vulnerability of the rebels.
Mengistu may launch his long-postponed northern
offensive in the hopes of winning significant victories
that would enhance morale in the military and deflect
attention from the growing food crisis.
The insurgents, for their part, are likely to resist 25X1
strongly in order to safeguard their access to relief
supplies, as well as to obstruct government pro-
grams-particularly resettlement-aimed at destroy-
ing their base of support. As Addis Ababa increases
pressure on the rebels, and as each side maneuvers to
blame the famine crisis on the other and publicize its
own relief efforts to win public support, we believe
that the potential for bitter fighting in the north will
rise. Additionally, the risk to noncombatants-includ-
ing foreign relief workers-in the region is bound to
grow, particularly if Mengistu carries out his threat to
attack unauthorized relief efforts, that is, relief to
rebel-held areas.
__ Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/20: CIA-RDP86T00589R000200160004-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/20: CIA-RDP86T00589R000200160004-5
Despite the likelihood of intensified fighting, we
believe the military situation in the north is unlikely
to change dramatically. Even if a government offen-
sive were successful, which we think is unlikely
because of inadequate training, poor logistics, and low
morale, the insurgents would not be defeated. The
effects of the resettlement program, in our judgment,
will be only temporary, as over time many of those
moved probably will filter back into the northern
regions from the resettlement areas, in addition to
returning refugees from Sudan. Moreover, the reset-
tlement program could backfire on the government by
spreading the insurgencies into new regions.
Over the long run-and in the absence of major
changes in the regime's economic policies-we believe
Ethiopia will suffer recurrent famines resulting from
periodic droughts. Although recurring food crises will
force Mengistu to rely on Western humanitarian
assistance to survive, we doubt that Western generos-
ity will yield significant political gains in Addis
Ababa. Mengistu, in our view, will remain closely tied
to the USSR, despite its tightfisted economic aid
policies, since Moscow's military support is vital to his
own survival.
On the political front, we believe Mengistu probably
will weather the current crisis without serious opposi-
tion, even though we expect growing discontent
throughout Ethiopian society. The regime will contin-
ue to monitor the military closely for signs of dissent
and, in our judgment, will move quickly and effective-
ly against potential troublemakers. Even if mounting
food shortages lead to disorder in the capital, the
kebeles and the army probably could maintain order,
at least initially. Moscow is likely to continue its
unwavering support of the Mengistu regime and,
along with the Cubans, probably would supply addi-
tional security assistance to contain any serious threat
to the regime.
Under these circumstances, we see scant prospect for
a significant improvement in Ethiopia's relations with
Washington-at least as long as Mengistu remains in
power. Relations between the two countries are likely
to remain rocky as Washington continues to criticize
regime policies, including Addis Ababa's commitment
to resettlement and its refusal to allow aid to reach
insurgent areas. Ethiopian attacks on cross-border
relief convoys no doubt would aggravate tensions,
particularly if any foreign personnel were injured or
killed. Moreover, Mengistu may attempt to use the
United States as a scapegoat for his failed policies as
the famine situation worsens. In our judgment, how-
ever, Ethiopia is unlikely to carry out its threat to
break relations with the United States over increased
cross-border operations, because of its dependence on
Western economic and humanitarian aid. Addis
Ababa might, nonetheless, expel some US Embassy
officials to indicate its displeasure.
In our judgment, despite increasing coup rumors in
Addis Ababa, it is unlikely that Mengistu will be
overthrown, although certain events could converge to
precipitate a successful coup. If prolonged civil disor-
der accompanied major government military defeats
in the north, Mengistu would lose credibility as a
leader and be more susceptible to coup attempts.
While a successor regime probably also would be pro-
Soviet, the instability in the country before a new
government could consolidate its power would offer
some opportunity for improved relations with the
United States. Nevertheless, as long as Addis Ababa
views the northern insurgencies as a serious threat, it
will be unlikely to loosen its ties to the USSR.
Since Mengistu has already moved against any obvi-
ous "heirs apparent," we believe that a new leader
almost certainly would be selected through a power
struggle within the military. possibly among Mengis-
tu's inner circle.
Ithe army's actions to date
suggest that a successor regime most likely would
remain dependent on the USSR for security assis-
tance, fearing that any weakening of Ethiopian mili-
tary power could encourage both the insurgents and
Somalia to increase their pressure.
Barring the unexpected emergence of a Sadat-type
leader, we believe it unlikely that a successor regime
would make major changes in Ethiopia's leftist, pro-
Soviet orientation. The country's military dependence
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/20: CIA-RDP86T00589R000200160004-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/20: CIA-RDP86T00589R000200160004-5
Secret
countercoup.
on the USSR, as well as its intractable economic and
political problems, point to continuing links with the
Soviet Bloc for security purposes. Only reduced ten-
sions in the north-due to military victory or the
prospect for a negotiated settlement-are likely to
lead to meaningful efforts by a successor regime to
lessen military dependence on Moscow. In this event,
the Soviets almost certainly would move quickly to
restore their position and probably would encourage
and support pro-Soviet elements in the military in a
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/20: CIA-RDP86T00589R000200160004-5
 J
- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/20: CIA-RDP86TOO589ROO0200160004-5
Insurgents and Drought in Ethiopia
Ethiopian I d
refugee camps Port Sudan
Saudi
Arabia
Eritrean insurgents
Tigrean insurgents
Intense drought
Drought stricken
Resettlement camp
Eritrea
Mi twa a
(Mas wa)
Ethiopian
Asmera'
Teseney
Refuges
Tana
ldyk'
Tigray '\
Welo
*Sanaa
Y.A.R.
~a (North Yemen)
Assab~.
bjibou~1
Welega (,'Shewa
Nek'emtil ,Addis Ababa
Gamo
G ofa
Uganda
704730(544695)4-85
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
I
Bale
N 0 e
Sidamo
Kenya
Harerge
Mogadishu
22000Kilometers
200 Miles
P.D.R.Y.
(South Yemen)
Somalia
Indian
Ocean
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/20: CIA-RDP86TOO589ROO0200160004-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/20: CIA-RDP86T00589R000200160004-5
Secret
Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/20: CIA-RDP86T00589R000200160004-5