NAMIBIA: TERRITORIAL ARMY COMING OF AGE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00589R000200150006-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 14, 2010
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: April 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Secret
Namibia: Territorial Army
Coming of Age
Secret
ALA 85-10034
IA 85-10027
April 1985
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Namibia: Territorial Army
Coming of Age
Intelligence
Directorate of Secret
An Intelligence Assessment
This paper was prepared by
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of African and Latin American Analysis, and
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Office of Imagery Analysis. It was
coordinated with the Directorate of Operations.
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Comments and queries are welcome and may be
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directed to the Chief, Africa Division, ALA,
or the Chief. Third World Forces
Secret
ALA 85-10034
IA 85-10027
April 1985
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Secret
Namibia: Territorial Army
Coming of Age
Key Judgments Over the past decade, South Africa has groomed an increasingly effective
Information available territorial army, the South West African Territory Force (SWATF), to
as of 15 March 1985
was used in this report. take over responsibility for Pretoria's counterinsurgency campaign in
Namibia. At present rates of growth, we believe this Namibian force could
take over all ground force operations against the insurgents in two to three
years. While remaining dependent on South African support, the SWATF
could by then rival or surpass the ground combat forces of most black
African states.
Gradually shifting the burden of the fighting to Namibian troops and
several units of mercenaries has spared South African casualties, reduced
costs, and defused opposition to the war at home.
Pretoria wants these territorial troops to police the
transition to independence in Namibia, rather than entrust the task to a
UN force they believe would favor the insurgents. Following independence,
Pretoria hopes the territorial units will become the core of a Namibian
national army, thus ensuring continued South African influence with the
regime.
SWATF has approximately 11,000 troops, including about 8,000 Namib-
ians and 3,000 South Africans. Although black volunteers fill the ranks,
most officers, sergeants, and technicians are whites seconded from the
South African Army. The SWATF is organized primarily as a light
infantry force for counterguerrilla operations against the South-West
Africa People's Organization (SWAPO). Most combat units are in north-
ern Namibia, where they block SWAPO's path from guerrilla bases in
southern Angola to targets among the white-owned settlements and
property in central Namibia. Operationally, SWATF supplements and
takes its lead from the South African Defense Force contingent in
Namibia, which numbers about 7,000 troops. SWATF also depends upon
South Africa for logistic, air, and naval support.
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In preparing SWATF for its new role, South Africa has been molding an
effective fighting unit. Whereas Namibians comprised about 20 percent of
all government troops in northern Namibia in 1980, they make up 61
percent today, according to senior officials in Windhoek. In 1984 alone,
SWATF grew by 3,000 men, according to the commander, and Windhoek
expanded the pool of available military manpower in October when it
raised the age limit for compulsory military service to 54 and began to reg-
ister males of all races. Pretoria has begun 25X1
Secret
ALA 85-10034
IA 85-10027
April 1985
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to equip SWATF with heavy equipment, and
some units now have artillery and armored vehicles. South Africa
began to reorganize its own border defenses near southern Namibia and
Botswana last year, probably in preparation for an eventual troop with-
drawal from the territory
Pretoria could bolster SWATF quickly by transferring to it most of the in-
dividually seconded South Africans and the mercenary units in Namibia.
South Africa offers bonuses to those officers and technicians who agree to
remain with SWATF permanently, and current plans call for most
seconded officers to remain with SWATF for some time following a
withdrawal from Namibia of South African units,
South African officials are considering a transfer of-the
South African Security Police's "Koevoet" force and the South African
Army's 32nd "Buffalo" Battalion
These two units comprise about 3,000 troops, most of whom are former
Angolans, Rhodesians, ex-SWAPO guerrillas, and Namibians.
The development and increasing capabilities of SWATF present Western
negotiators with a problem that probably was not envisioned in 1978 when
the UN plan for Namibian independence was drafted. That plan calls for a
7,500-man UN force to disband all territorial forces while confining to
bases in Namibia up to 8,000 SWAPO guerrillas and 1,500 South African
troops. The UN force appears inadequate for these tasks, and we believe
Pretoria has no intention of allowing SWATF to be disbanded.
Incorporating SWATF into a Namibian national army would be a difficult
undertaking that would require modifying the UN plan, but, if it could be
arranged, it would improve prospects for postindependence stability. Such
an integration of forces would avoid dispersing thousands of ex-combatants
disgruntled over their lost pay and poor prospects for reemployment. The
integration process would have to avoid combining units of hostile ethnic
and regional backgrounds, however, to lessen the risk of factious violence.
In our view, SWATF's growing maturity enhances South Africa's political
flexibility in Namibia. Pretoria could rely on SWATF, with South African
air and logistic support, to defend a puppet regime in Windhoek, thus
enabling a South African withdrawal without allowing SWAPO to take
over. Alternatively, it could use the force as a proxy to continue its
counterinsurgency campaign and postpone Namibian independence indefi-
nitely. If Pretoria believed that including SWATF in a national army
would guarantee leverage over any government that came to power in
Windhoek, such an integration of forces might encourage South African
acceptance of independence for Namibia.
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Contents
Key Judgments
Introduction
The South West African Territory Force
1
Strength and Organization
1
Recruitment and Training
7
Pretoria's "Foreign Legion"
13
Major SWATF Units 21
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Figure 1
Military Organization in Namibia
Namibe3
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Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative
SWAPO
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ise base
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51st Ogong
o_: hq ` 54th
Oshakati. 101st
53rd
~
SWA
52nd Sp Unit u jOndangwa
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Namibia: Territorial Army
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Coming of Age
Since about 1974, South Africa has been training and
equipping a territorial army in Namibia. Gradually
shifting the burden of the fighting to these territorial
troops, as well as to elite units of ex-Rhodesian and
Angolan mercenaries, has spared South African casu-
alties, reduced costs, and defused antiwar sentiment
at home. This paper describes and assesses that army,
the South West African Territory Force (SWATF),
along with the Namibian police and two mercenary
units that South Africa may transfer to Windhoek's
control. It discusses Pretoria's motives and progress in
grooming the Namibian forces and the implications
for US policymakers seeking to implement the UN
independence plan.
SWATF's full-time combat force includes 10 light
infantry battalions trained and equipped for counter-
insurgency, according to embassy reporting. Six of the
battalions are ethnically distinct, that is, each is
recruited from a different black tribe, and averages
850 soldiers. The other four battalions are ethnically
mixed and contain about 700 troops each. A multira-
cial brigade of reservists is available in Windhoek as a
territorial reserve. This combined-arms brigade al-
ready has about 1,500 troops, and its structure indi-
The South West African Territory Force
SWATF headquarters in Windhoek ordered all units
in February 1985 to plan for a withdrawal of South
African forces by January 1987 and for SWATF to
take over the defense of Namibia at that time,
The Embassy
believes Pretoria accelerated preparations last year,
and that substantial progress in enlarging the force
has been made. In 1980 the SWATF Commander
stated publicly that Namibians constituted only 20
percent of the government troops in northern Namib-
ia; in February 1985, the territorial Administrator
General announced that they totaled 61 percent.
Republic on short notice.
Strength and Organization
SWATF has about 11,000 troops, including approxi-
mately 3,000 South Africans individually seconded as
officers and technicians, or members of South African
Army units attached to SWATF on a rotational basis,
according to senior officers in Windhoek. A separate
contingent of about 7,000 soldiers from the South
African Defense Force (SADF) reinforces SWATF in
Namibia, and additional forces can arrive from the
cates,t eventually will include several thousand.
According to US officials, all government forces in
Namibia are commanded by Maj. Gen. George
Meiring, a career South African Army officer.' As
the commander of SWATF, he is required to clear
military operations with Administrator General
Willem van Niekerk, who reports to the president of
South Africa. As the commander of the South Afri-
can Army contingent in Namibia, however, Meiring
takes orders directly from the head of the South
African Army in Pretoria, Lieutenant General
Geldenhuys.
Military command is centralized in Windhoek.
' In South Africa, the Air Force, Navy, and Medical Corps are
separate services not under the Army's authority. Although their
units in Namibia-along with those of the South African Security
Police-report directly to the appropriate service headquarters in
Pretoria, they also cooperate closely with the Arm commander in
Windhoek,
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Pretoria first used black territorial troops in Namib-
ia about 1974 when it began to organize
several ethnically distinct battalions, each in a differ-
ent tribal homeland, to replace white South African
units near the Angolan and Zambian borders. It
hoped that the locally recruited troops would gain
civilian cooperation in stemming guerrilla infiltration
from the neighboring states,
Infiltration soon increased, however,
when Portugal withdrew from Angola in 1975, and
the new regime in Luanda permitted SWAPO to set
up military bases close to the Namibian frontier.
As a consequence of the stepped-up infiltration, plans
for a few wholly black battalions evolved into a
design for a 30,000-man, multiracial Namibian
army,
Major General Geldenhuys, who took com-
mand of all government forces in Namibia in 1977,
began implementing the ambitious scheme. In the
north, he strengthened the existing territorial battal-
ions and created new multiethnic units made up of
Namibians of different tribes along with white and
black troops from South Africa. In central Namibia,
he recruited whites, coloreds, and blacks for part-
time service in a territorial reserve. Members of all
ethnic groups also were enlisted into the expanding
67 military units were transferred from the South
African Army to SWATF. These included the black
battalions, the multiracial reserve, local militia
units, and various headquarters and support ele-
ments, according to the government gazette. Although
the force was placed under the nominal authority of
the Administrator General in Namibia, a South
African general exercises operational control of all
Namibian troops, and SWATF remains part of the
South African Defense Force until independence.
Pretoria has future roles in mind for the Namibian
soldiers. Since 1977, South African officials have
urged allowing them-rather than a UN force-to
monitor the transition to independence. A senior
military officer in Windhoek said last October that
the plan to use UN troops for the purpose remains
"unacceptable. " If SWATF. were incorporated into a
Namibian national army at independence, Pretoria
might use the army to defend a client regime. Alter-
natively, the loyalist troops could be a counterweight
to the guerrillas if SWAPO were to join in a coalition
government. Rather than allow SWATF to come
under the control of a SWAPO-dominated govern-
ment, however, the force would be stripped of its
equipment and abandoned,
police and militia forces.
With great fanfare, South Africa consolidated the
Namibian units in August 1980 to form the South
West African Territory Force (SWATF). In doing so,
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since
the police and usually has a South African Air Force
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1980 Namibia has been divide for military purposes
into eight area commands-seven sectors and one
separate battalion zone. Each command is a tactical
headquarters that controls counterinsurgency opera-
tions by all SWATF and. South African Army units
within its area. The four northern commands closely
approximate the administrative boundaries of tribal
homelands, and together they make up the Border
Operational Area (BOA). Within the BOA, each
sector headquarters also coordinates the activities of
element attached for support.'
The SWATF Commander told US officials in De-
cember 1984 that nearly two-thirds of all government
forces in Namibia,-, including all SWATF full-time
' US officials visited the headquarters of Sector 10 in the BOA in
early 1984 and reported it included a military command post and
separate air operations center in adjacent concrete bunkers. Police
headquarters and army centers for interrogations and communica-
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Government Forces in Namibia
O Chain of Command and composition of Control and organization of remaining forces
the South West African Territory Force
President of
South Africa
Administrator General
Willem Van Niekerk
in Namibia
Minister of
Defense
South African
Defense Force
South West
African Police
As commander
SWA Territory Force
Ethnic Battalions
101,102,201,202,
203,701
Mixed Battalions
5 1,52,53,54
As commander
SA contingent in Namibia
Conventional
Brigade 91
SA
Air Force
Mechanized
Battalion 61
SA
Navy
Elements
SAAF
Expatriate units in South African
Army and Police, Foreign Legion
Minister of
Law and Order
South African
Police
SA
Medical Service
Marines
SAN
Elements
SAMS
Infantry Battalions
911,912,913
Supporting
Arms
Northern
Logistic Command
Buffalo
Battalion 32
Reconnaissance
Commandos 5,6
Koevoet
Security Police
SA-South African
SWA-South West African
1st
Ist
l st
SWA
SAAF-South African Air Force
SWA
Area Force Units
Reconnaissance
SWA
SWA
Logistics
SAN-South African Navy
Regiment
Specialist Unit
Squadron
Command
(minimum 26)
SAMS-South African Medical Service
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units-that is, standing units in contrast to reserve
forces-were assigned to the BOA. Most combat
units are in Sectors 10 (Owambo), 20 (Kavango), and
70 (Caprivi Oos). There are relatively few government
forces in sparsely populated Kaokoland because the
South-West Africa People's Organiz ti on (SWAPO)
historically has not been active there.
however, that South Africa is build-__
ing a new base in northern Kaokoland to counter a
SWAPO buildup across the border. Kaokoland was
separated from Sector 10 in 1981 and designated the
102nd Battalion area, but it may now be known as
Sector 80, according to attache reporting.
Most SWATF reserve and support units are located
south of the BOA. Pretoria probably intends for
SWATF's 91st Brigade at Windhoek in Sector 40 to
become the primary reaction force in the event of a
large-scale attack on Namibia. The requirement for
reliable and quick response would explain why the
91st is the only SWATF unit directly subordinate to
General Meiring's headquarters, rather than to a
sector command. Until the brigade's recruitment,
training, and equipping are completed, however,
South Africa's powerful 61st Mechanized Battalion
Group at Operet in Sector 30 will remain the terri-
tory's primary reserve. Most logistic facilities are in
Sector 50, and SWATF forces in Sectors 30 and 60
are limited to only a few militia units
Operations
SWATF operations are focused on preventing infil-
tration into Namibia by insurgents based in Angola.
Sector 10, Owambo, is the most heavily defended
region in Namibia, and SWATF units are deployed
throughout the sector to form a defense in depth
against the guerrilla threat from Angola. Owambo is
the area of greatest tribal support and primary infil-
tration routes for SWAPO.
Forward units assigned to Sector 10 include special
forces teams on extended patrols in southern Angola
that gather intelligence and carry out covert opera-
tions, They
include elements of SWATF's small and secretive 1st
South West Africa Reconnaissance Regiment (1st
SWARR), as well as the South African Army's 32nd
"Buffalo" Battalion and 5th Reconnaissance Com-
mandos. Their tactics include "pseudo operations" in
which black troops disguised as guerrillas interrogate
and terrorize local residents in order to turn them
against SWAPO,
Sector 10's main defenses near the border are manned
by four SWATF battalions, the 51st through 54th,
according to embassy reporting. These units also
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guard the hydroelectric facility at Ruacana and the 25X1
roads, powerlines, and water pipelines that lead from
there deeper into Owambo. They are SWATF's most
capable battalions, composite units of ethnically
mixed Namibian units and strong South African
contingents
Other light infantry units saturate Sector 10 with
patrols for area and route protection. They are the
ethnically distinct 101st (Owambo) Battalion, most of
the 201st (Bushman) and 202nd (Kavango) Battalions,
and special tracker units with horses, motorcycles,
and dogs, according to US officials. Aiding them are
SWATF's part-time commandos and the Namibian
police.
The increasingly capable SWATF played a major role
in Operation Askari, the last major South African
incursion into Angola, which took place from Decem-
ber 1983 to January 1984 and was intended to disrupt
SWAPO's then imminent annual rainy season infil-
tration. Prior to Askari, SWATF rarely was commit-
ted outside Namibia,
Troops from SWATF's 101st and 201st
Battalions, and possibly other Namibian units, joined
nearly 2,000 South African soldiers in the Askari
operation and together penetrated more than 100
kilometers north of the border,
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At the same time, SWATF's ethni- 25X1
cally mixed battalions at the border probably con-
ducted numerous sweeps a short distance into Angola.
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soldiers annually.
Many Namibian blacks volunteer for military service
because of the attractive pay. Pay scales in SWATF
are on a par with those in the South African Army
and are far higher than civilian wages.' Eight years
ago, when the first black battalions were established
and conditions of service were unknown, the authori-
ties were forced to assign recruitment quotas to the
village headmen
Again, when conscription of nonwhites was 25X1
introduced south of the BOA in 1981, and the first
intake of draftees fell short of expectations, press-
gangs were used to.fill the ranks, according to visiting
US officials. Today, however, coercion is unnecessary.
The commander of Sector 10 told US officials last
year that he routinely gets 10 times as many volun-
teers as he is authorized to accept.
Recruitment and Training
In our judgment, the stepped-up pace of SWATF
recruitment and training since last year gives cre-
dence to the view that South Africa is hastening the
transition to full Namibian responsibility for counter-
insurgency operations. Windhoek's claim that
SWATF expanded last year by about 3,000 troops is
probably close to the mark. According to the govern-
ment announcement, SWATF accepted 3,000 re-
cruits-from the 9,000 who volunteered-and 1,500
conscripts. In the same period, some 1,500 troops
completed their active-duty obligation, and 26 securi-
ty force members were killed, according to govern-
ment announcements. Until last year, South African
officials indicated that SWATF accepted fewer vol-
unteers and probably grew by only about 1,500
SWAPO's guerrilla ranks
Namibian males of all racial groups 16 to 25 years old
have been liable for the draft since 1981, but conscrip-
tion has always been implemented selectively, accord-
ing to embassy reporting. Virtually all white males
enter the armed forces or police for two years upon
completing high school or university, according to
embassy reporting. Exemptions are available on medi-
cal and narrowly drawn religious grounds. A small
percentage of nonwhite males living outside the BOA
are drafted by use of a random draw, according to the
US defense attache. Nonwhites living in the BOA
have never been conscripted, apparently because
Windhoek wants to avoid stimulating an exodus of
black Namibian draft dodgers that might swell
The South African authorities paved the way for
expanding conscription in October 1984. They en-
larged the pool of available military manpower by
raising the age limit to 54 for compulsory service, and
they began to register males 17 and over regardless of
race, political sympathies, or prior service. An Army
announcement in mid-November claimed that over
17,000 whites, blacks, and mixed-race Coloreds had
registered at centers set up in Sector 30. When the
first of these registrants are inducted, they probably
will become reservists in conventional reserve and
local militia units. The SWATF Commander favors
increasing such part-time forces because they are less
expensive to maintain than are a large police force
and professional standing army.
Government recruiters appear to be making headway
in Owambo, a traditionally difficult area for recruit-
ment. According to journalists and South African
officials, the 101st Battalion was chronically under
strength for years due to the reluctance of Owambos
to fight their fellow tribesmen in SWAPO. With
nearly 2,000 soldiers today, however, the 101st ap-
pears to be SWATF's largest battalion. South African
officers claim the civilians will support whichever side
has control of the local area. If so, that would help to
explain the government's success in recruiting troops
for the 101st Battalion. It has been difficult for
SWAPO to infiltrate Owambo ever since South Afri-
ca occupied southern Angola in 1981, and, in our
judgment, matters got worse for the guerrillas when
Luanda agreed in February 1984 to restrain SWAPO 25X1
in exchange for Pretoria's promise to withdraw its
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Until recently, SWATF's recruits received their train-
ing from South Africans. Trainees were sent to the
South African center at Walvis Bay for four months
of basic training followed by six months of instruction
in a speciality, according to embassy reporting. Spe-
cialized instruction not available in the territory has
SWATF recruits earn over $180 per month, a private over $360,
and a company sergeant over $600. Moreover, civilian unemploy-
ment in Namibia has risen over recent years due to contraction of
the economy and uncertainty about prospects for independence.
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Figure 3
Ethnic Groups in Namibia
\,.Rehoboth TS WA
>Baste r and
BASTERS,
Otjiwarongo
nunau -v
O WA KAVANG
:tavangoland
Eroshaj/-d'
Pan
Tsumeb
H M A N
R Grootfontein' B U Busnmanland
r
Hereroland
Namibia e
\ y_J %Okahandja
~weRoP i
v ~.
*WINDHOEK
i Homeland
LOZI Major tribe
0 100 200 Kilometers
0 100 200 Miles
\~ueecese p~esen'a1~on .s
1 n ar,lY au tro~~l alive
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Botswana
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year since 1979.
been given in South Africa. The airborne training
center at Bloemfontein, for example, probably has
turned out at least a few Namibian paratroopers each
This year, SWATF will take over virtually all of its
own training.
Walvis Bay phased out most basic training for
SWATF sometime ago, and
ly declined after peaking in early 1982.
nized and armored units.
they would accept no more Namibian infantry re-
cruits and only one more cycle of trainees for mecha-
reporting
In virtually all phases of its activities-training, oper-
ations, and administration-SWATF is handicapped
by a shortage of Namibian commissioned and non-
commissioned officers. South Africans blame their
failure to qualify more Namibian blacks as leaders on
the trainees' generally low educational levels. The
SWATF Commander last December cited insuffi-
cient leaders and funds as factors that would prevent
a rapid expansion of the force, according to embassy
Namibian forces at independence.
many seconded white South Africans plan to take
advantage of attractive bonuses and transfer to the
major. Moreover, the
The shortfall has been reduced at least a little since
1980, however, when a military school was established
at Okahandja to train lieutenants and sergeants for
SWATF. The press reported that only 14 of the first
75 trainees successfully completed the course, and
three years later the
officer corps remained almost entirely white and
mostly seconded from the South African Army. How-
ever, the SWATF Deputy Commander recently said
he now has black lieutenants, a few captains, and a
SWATF headquarters has advised SADF
South African Army.
officers with the force that they are to remain with
SWATF for an undetermined period following the
withdrawal of South African units, but that eventual-
ly they may reclaim their status and seniority with the
Support
SWATF is organized and equipped like the South
African Army but has little heavy equipment, accord-
ing to 25X1
Most infantry units are partially motorized with 25X1
trucks and mine-resistant troop carriers, but they
have no tanks and few infantry fighting vehicles. They 25X1
generally rely on mortars rather than artillery for fire
support. The force has a unit of 20 light aircraft flown
by their private owners who are army reservists, but it
has no combat aircraft or navy.
now are acquiring vehicles and artillery. South Afri-
can forces appear to be passing along used Buffel
armored personnel carriers and 140-mm guns, per-
haps as they receive new Ratel infantry fighting
vehicles and G-5 155-mm artillery. The first Namib-
ian units being equipped are the ethnically mixed
battalions on the Angolan border and the convention-
al brigade in Windhoek. In mid-1984, the Walvis Bay
training center was preparing Namibian armored and
artillery specialists primarily for the 51st Battalion,
the unit's main base has 20 or more
Buffels, a few Ratel vehicles, and a four-gun artillery
battery.
lat least 40 Buffels and
eight 140-mm guns. Fifteen Eland armored cars were
parked a short distance away and might belong to the
brigade.
SWATF's logistics support is centralized at Grootfon-
tein, south of the BOA. SWATF officers say that a
Namibian support brigade is colocated there with the
South African Northern Logistical Command, and
they expect it to take over the facility when the South
Africans depart.
Ibut the base
includes a rail-to-road transfer point, which is essen-
tial because 80 percent of all military supplies from
South Africa arrive at Grootfontein by rail and are
trucked on to operational units. It also has a vehicle
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press.
depot, workshop, ammunition bunkers, petroleum
tanks, and engineer unit. SWATF plans to build a
$1.5 million vehicle depot at the 91st Brigade's base
at Luiperdsvillei south of Windhoek, according to the
manually
The administration of support for SWATF is separate
from that for the South African forces in Namibia,
which might simplify a South African disengagement.
General Meiring's otherwise integrated SWATF and
South African staff in Windhoek has separate sec-
tions for personnel, finance, and logistics because of
the different sources of manpower and funding.
Among the differences, for example, is that logistics
records for the South African contingent are comput-
erized, but those for the Namibian units are handled
In our view, Pretoria is minimizing the risks of the
transfer of security responsibility to Namibia by
maintaining the readiness of mercenary and police 25X1
forces. South Africa could bolster the territorial
forces quickly by transferring to Namibian control
some of its units in northern Namibia that are
composed mostly of non-South Africans; this could
involve as many as 3,000 troops of the South African
Security Police's "Koevoet" force and the South
African Army's 32nd "Buffalo" Battalion. These
units, along with SWATF, are responsible for most of
the day-to-day fighting. The Namibian police also
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participate in counterguerrilla operations. They sup-
port SWATF in the BOA and are in charge of
counterinsurgency efforts elsewhere in Namibia
South African officers in these all-volunteer units-
the 32nd Battalion, Koevoet Police, and Reconnais-
sance Commandos-complain that they remain al-
almost all the fighting
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Conscripted troops, on the other hand, serve
Pretoria's "Foreign Legion"
South Africa has organized a virtual "foreign legion"
of veterans of earlier wars in Africa to fight as
mercenaries in northern Namibia. The notorious
Koevoet police are mostly black Namibians and for-
mer SWAPO guerrillas led by white South African
officers. The Buffalo Battalion is made up mainly of
Portuguese-speaking Angolans, many of whom once
belonged to the South African-backed FNLA guerril-
la movement in Angola
Although elements of the 5th and 6th
Reconnaissance Commandos and South African Ma-
rines, which also include many ex-Rhodesians, are
also in northern Namibia, we believe that they are not
likely to be transferred to Namibian control.
most permanently in the war zone and involved in
only four months in the zone and tend to avoid
combat. Several Angolans deserted from the 32nd
Battalion several years ago complaining of being
compelled to fight as mercenaries for South Africa.
Nonetheless, there is no evidence that dissension has
ever disrupted combat operations or threatened the
loyalty of any Namibian or South African unit.
Koevoet. Formed in 1979 by a South African police
officer experienced with police counterinsurgency
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in Namibia. South African officers credit it with
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Pretoria's Effective
Counterinsurgency Strategy
South Africa's militarily effective strategy in Namib-
ia is designed to counter SWAPO, which we believe
has about 8,000 armed insurgents, mostly at bases in
Angola. A review of SWAPO's operations over recent
years, however, shows that only about 10 percent of
the guerrillas attempt to infiltrate Namibia each
year. Incapable of a military victory over far stronger
South Africa settled on a defensive strategy of
exclusion and containment, executed with aggressive
tactics and an economical level of effort that we
.believe can. be sustained indefinitely.
SWATF counters SWAPO first by attempting to
prevent insurgent infiltration into Namibia. SWAPO
has no military bases in the territory, and, in our
judgment, it cannot conduct large-scale infiltration
from Zambia or Botswana because of vast distances,
inhospitable terrain, and the unwillingness of those
governments to risk South African retaliation for
aiding the insurgents. Because SWAPO has no choice
but to operate from bases in Angola, SWATF is
concentrated near the Angolan border behind fences,
cleared strips, watchtowers, and minefields. The force
is lightly equipped and well suited to patrol on foot,
on horseback, or in mine-resistant vehicles to locate
and destroy the infiltrators and their arms caches.
With few exceptions, those guerrillas who manage to
cross the border are contained in the northern Border
Operational Area, where South African sources claim
most of the insurgents are eliminated by incessant
government patrolling. Military containment suc-
ceeds in Namibia in part because it reinforces social,
political, and geographic barriers that isolate
SWAPO from the general populace. Owambo domi-
nance of the insurgent group, for example, hinders
SWAPO's efforts to gain wide support among Nami-
bia's tribally fragmented people. Great distances and
difficult terrain within Namibia also obstruct efforts
to reach many groups. Although SWAPO correctly
claims that it operates among the majority of black
Namibians-concentrated as they are in the remote
Border Operational Area-the guerrillas actually are
confined to less than 15 percent of Namibia's territo-
ry. The BOA is important to South Africa only as a
labor reserve and a buffer zone between SWAPO's
Angolan sanctuaries and the guerrillas' targets
among the white settlements and the modern sector of
the economy located farther south.
Neither side can defeat the other, but SWATF and
South African forces hold the initiative on the battle-
field. Most firefights between the insurgents and
territorial forces are initiated by the government side,
or published in the press.
SWA TF participates in cross-border raids into
SWAPO's sanctuaries to disrupt plans andWestroy
bases, retaliate for guerrilla attacks, and intimidate
the insurgents' Angolan hosts. In Namibia, the
government's aggressive patrolling denies the guerril-
las rest, spoils their attacks, causes high attrition,
and prevents the establishment of insurgent bases or,
areas of durable control.
SWATF is efficiently structured and employed. Non-
South Africans are doing most of the fighting, and
the use of Namibian troops saves transportation
funds and reduces demands on scarce white manpow-
er needed to run the South African economy.
SWA TF and the South African Army use reservists
to increase force levels quickly in time of need, and to
reduce payrolls and economic disruptions at other
times. Because most guerrilla infiltration takes place
during the November to March rainy season when
clouds and foliage enhance concealment and drinking
water is available in the and countryside, SWAPO's
attacks take on a seasonal rhythm. The predictable
pattern of infiltration, and good South African intel-
ligence, enable Pretoria to avoid being caught unpre-
pared.
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wounded.
causing 80 to 90 percent of the SWAPO casualties in
Namibia, The
South African Minister of Law and Order told Parlia-
ment in early 1984 that the force had by then killed
1,624 guerrillas while suffering only 43 dead and 370
Notorious for its brutality-the name is Afrikaans for
crowbar-Koevoet achieves high body counts but
damages the effort to "win hearts and minds" in
Although SWATF's Deputy Commander
police.
told a US official in September that Koevoet will be
disbanded when hostilities cease, he added that select-
ed personnel will be incorporated into the Namibian
Koevoet has
between 1,000 and 2,000 men, of whom less than 200
are South Africans. The unit's headquarters is at
Oshakati in Sector 10, with major bases at Rundu in
Sector 20 and Opuwa in the 102nd Battalion area.
Ex-SWAPO members probably comprise about one-
third of the force, although South Africans claim they
total an improbable 70 percent, according to US
officials in Windhoek. We do believe South African
claims that most of the insurgents captured each year
agree, albeit under pressure, to join the unit. Most
Namibian members are Owambos because Koevoet
recruits and operates mainly in Sector 10. Koevoet
generally takes its pick of the constables graduated by
police schools in the north each year, according to the
press.
Koevoet operates in 25- to 40-man groups in four
armored personnel carriers, one supply vehicle, and a
fuel truck, according to an authoritative South Afri-
can defense journal. These self-sufficient units typi-
cally patrol for a week or more searching for signs of
the guerrillas. Once on a trail, they will pursue
relentlessly, ignoring military and political bound-
aries. Koevoet units frequently call for Air Force or
other help once the guerrillas are run to ground
northern Namibia.
the unit tortures civilians to gain information and
uses teams disguised as insurgents to terrorize the
local residents and turn them against SWAPO.
Koevoet troops are
paid bounties for those they kill, and the unit has been
authorized to execute prisoners under certain circum-
stances. Hardened veterans of the 32nd Battalion and
Reconnaissance Commandos have been shocked at
discovering evidence of Koevoet atrocities,
The Windhoek Supreme
Court condemned a Koevoet policeman to death in
December 1983 for murder, and it sentenced a second
policeman to jail for his role in a murder, rape, and
robbery.
Should Pretoria decide to transfer to the Namibian
police only a portion of Koevoet's personnel, it would
be difficult for us to detect. Koevoet and a territorial
police unit known as the Special Task Force are both
territorial equipped with armored personnel carriers
and infantry weapons, and they would be virtually
indistinguishable in the field. Moreover, the transfer
could be arranged easily. US officials report that
Brig. Sarel Strijdom, who commands the South Afri-
can Security Police in Namibia, including Koevoet,
also controls the Special Task Force in Windhoek.
32nd Battalion. Another unit that may not withdraw
from Namibia after independence is the Army's
"Buffalo" Battalion. The SWATF Deputy Com-
mander has claimed that the battalion probably will
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be disbanded after independence, but Pretoria might
try only to feign a demobilization and to transfer to
SWATF some or all of the 32nd Battalion.
The Buffalo unit is an all-volunteer motorized infan-
try battalion of about 1,000 black Angolan soldiers
and 200 South African officers and sergeants,F-
It was formed from hundreds
of Portuguese-speaking former guerrillas of the
FNLA, who fled to Namibia in 1976 after losing their
struggle with the Soviet-supported MPLA. The atta-
che reports that the battalion's headquarters is at
Buffalo Base in the western Caprivi Strip. Its forward
base at Rundu is in western Kavango, and a mobile
command post probably is in southern Angola.
The battalion has participated in every major incur-
sion into Angola since 1978, and it penetrated the
deepest of all South African units in January 1984
when it spearheaded Operation Askari,
According to the US attache,
three or four of the battalion's seven infantry compa-
nies are normally on six-week patrols in southern
Angola. Deployed units are controlled by Sector 10's
headquarters and resupplied by helicopter. Four com-
panies from the battalion were temporarily assigned
as the South African contingent to the Joint Monitor-
ing Commission in Angola in May 1984, according to
the attache.
Last year's sudden training of black officer candidates
from the 32nd Battalion may signal that Pretoria
intends to withdraw South African officers and leave
the unit in Namibia. Pretoria brought 15 trainees to
the Republic for English-language instruction, ac-
cording to the South African Army newspaper. They
returned to the battalion in November to become
training and administrative officers.
Territorial Police
South Africa also has strengthened the territorial
police to block a SWAPO takeover in Namibia,
according to US embassy reporting. Efforts to enlarge
the police force circumvent the UN independence
plan, which calls for confining to bases in Namibia or
removing all military forces during the transition to
independence while employing the police alongside
UN troops to maintain order. Even as South Africa
was agreeing to the UN plan in 1978, the Namibian
Commissioner of Police announced that the territorial
police were being strengthened, mainly in Owambo.
Several months later, US officials reported that South
Africa tried to conceal an expansion of the territorial
police. At that time it transferred to them about 1,500
Namibian home guards, previously trained and com-
manded by the South African Army. The new police-
men were renamed Special Constables, dressed in
camouflage, and employed as a paramilitary counter-
insurgency force
In September 1980, one month after SWATF was
formed, the South-West Africa Police (SWAP) was
established under the authority of the Administrator
General, according to the government gazette. All
functions of a national police force were transferred to
it, except that Pretoria retained control of the Securi-
ty Police and all intelligence units. According to the
US Embassy, seconded South African policemen were
given the choice of joining SWAP permanently or
returning to duty in the Republic. Maj. Gen. Dolph
Gouws, then head of the South African Police in
Namibia, was among the first to accept a permanent
position with SWAP-as its commander
SWAP operates only in
Namibia, and we believe that operations into Angola
indeed are generally left to the military.
SWAP has three principal elements, according to US
officials in Namibia. The small and lightly armed
Criminal Investigation Division handles detective
work. The Special Task Force, equipped with armored
personnel carriers and crew-served weapons, is re-
sponsible for riot control and counterterrorism in
urban areas. Similar to the Koevoet unit in firepower
and mobility, it is a significant supplement to the
military's counterinsurgency capabilities. The para-
military Special Constables are armed with infantry
weapons and guard government officials, buildings,
At present rates of growth, training, and equipping,
we believe Namibian forces could take over all ground
force operations against SWAPO in two or three
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years. They might do so in one year if Pretoria
permanently transferred to Namibian control most of
the 6,000 South African Defense Force and Police
personnel already serving in SWATF, the 32nd Bat-
talion, and the Koevoet Police. We expect SWATF to
accept more volunteers and expand conscription in
1985. South Africa could begin to reduce its separate
military contingent in Namibia as soon as mid-1985,
when the current rainy season and heightened insur-
gent activity ends
'South Africa began to reorganize its border defenses near south-
ern Namibia and Botswana last year, probably in anticipation of an
eventual troop withdrawal from Namibia. Chief of the Army
Lieutenant General Geldenhuys told 11,000 troops participating in
a major training exercise near the border in September that the site
at Lothatlha was to become the western headquarters of South
Africa's border defenses, according to the press. The exercise, in
our view, tested procedures and forces earmarked for the command.
While SWATF also is developing into a formidable
conventional army, it remains dependent upon South
African support. Assuming continued infusions of
funds, equipment, and training, it could soon rival or
surpass the ground combat forces of most black
African states. Namibia has no domestic arms pro-
duction, however, and SWATF will remain dependent
upon foreign equipment and technical services. It also
relies on South Africa to provide all combat air and
naval support, and SWATF's dependence on Pretoria 25X1
for transport, communications, intelligence, and medi-
cal support is likely to persist. Although ample mili-
tary manpower is available, low educational levels
among nonwhite Namibians will slow the force's
development. Requirements for foreigners to fill
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The model for a merger of guerrilla units and
government forces into a Namibian national army
would be the relatively successful integration of
guerrillas and government troops at independence in
Zimbabwe. At that time, insurgents of Robert
Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union
(ZANU) and Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African
People's Union (ZAPU) were combined with troops of
the Rhodesian Government. The mainly Shona
speaking and Chinese-supported ZANU had long
opposed the mostly Ndebele-speaking and Soviet-
backed ZAPU, while both groups waged war on the
white supremacist government.
The Zimbabwe experience was not without incident,
but, in our view, it reduced the potential for factional
strife. Tribal-based violence disrupted several of the
integrated battalions, and the ZANU government
aggravated the situation by purging white Air Force
officers and discriminating against former ZAPU
guerrillas when it reduced the Army's size by one-
third. Nonetheless, only a few hundred of the 20,000
veterans who were discharged or deserted turned to
armed dissidence, and Zimbabwe's integrated battal-
ions sent to protect transportation routes in Mozam-
bique have performed effectively against the Mozam-
bican insurgents
A merger of Namibian guerrillas and government
troops would have a fair chance of success if it took
account of strong ethnic divisions within SWATF.
These divisions persist because Namibian society,
like that in Zimbabwe, is fragmented into regionally
concentrated tribal groups and because most SWATF
units have been recruited from a single locality rather
than from the territory as a whole. Every northern
homeland, for example, has one or more battalions of
blacks, each formed from a single tribe. Where
different ethnic.groups have been combined in the
same SWATF unit, factious violence has sometimes
occurred. The ethnically mixed 51st Battalion was
disrupted by tribal fighting in February 1984,
A sound plan for a merger would also have to
consider tribal tensions within SWAPO. Since the
purge in 1980 that expelled SWAPO Vice President
Mishake Muyongo and most of his Caprivianfollow-
ers, most guerrillas have been recruited among the
Owambo and Kavango tribesmen living near the
Angolan-Namibian border. These northern guerrillas
resent SWAPO members from central and southern
Namibia whose ethnic groups do little fighting but
hold prestigious positions in the organization's politi-
cal wing. Moreover, Kavangos also resent the Owam-
bos for monopolizing all senior posts in SWAPO s
military wing. Even the Owambos are divided; the
large Kwanyama subgroup controls most key posi-
tions in SWAPO, to the irritation of the second-
largest subgroup, the Ndongas.
Any scheme that kept former units intact would
preserve tribal identities and unit loyalties, and a
simple merger that combined similar whole units to
match compatible skills and equipment-thus simpli-
fying operations, maintenance, and training-would
create volatile combinations. In addition, putting
SWAPO's guerrilla detachments with SWATF s l'ght
infantry battalions would mix combat-hardened vet-
erans from those units that have been at the forefront
of the fighting and enemies for 18 years. Virtually all
members of those units are northern Namibians, so
recriminations probably would be harsh. At the same
time, combining conventionally organized units
would produce the uncomfortable combination of
SWAPO's northern blacks and SWATF's central
Namibians, who are mainly whites and mixed-race
Coloreds.
More complicated, but potentially less factious,
would be a merger that reconstituted units on a
national basis. This formula would disband
SWATF's and the guerrillas' units, integrate person-
nel of various ethnic groups, and carefully balance all
leadership positions. Individual S WA TF and
SWAPO commanders undoubtedly would resist al-
tering unit structures, however, because total integra-
tion would eliminate their personal power bases.
Once formed, the national army could occupy
SWATFs existing facilities economically and efi-
ciently. Initially concerned with internal security and
order, the new army would be well located at
SWATF s installations in the north among the ma-
jority of the population. As the regime consolidated
control and formulated its own perceptions of securi-
ty threats and needs, it could construct new facilities
and move forces there
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senior command, administrative, and technical posi- succeed, however, it must take into account the make-
tions will diminish but not disappear over the next few up of both armies, and avoid combining units with
years, and the willingness of seconded South Africans volatile ethnic, regional, and political differences.
conditions at independence
to remain in the force permanently will depend on the
Implications for the United States
In our view, SWATF's growing maturity enhances
South Africa's political flexibility in Namibia.
Pretoria could rely on SWATF, with South African
air and logistic support, to defend a puppet regime in
Windhoek, thus enabling a South African withdrawal
without allowing SWAPO to take over. Alternatively,
it could use the force as a proxy to continue its
counterinsurgency campaign and postpone Namibian
independence indefinitely. If Pretoria believed that
including SWATF in a national army would guaran-
tee leverage over any government that came to power
in Windhoek, it might encourage South African
acceptance of independence for Namibia.
Incorporating SWATF in a Namibian national army
would, however, be a difficult task that would require
modifying the UN independence plan. UN Security
Council Resolution 435 provides for an international
force of 7,500 men to monitor a cease-fire, to ensure
the departure of all except 1,500 South African
troops, to repatriate as many as 8,000 insurgents
located outside Namibia, to confine to bases all
guerrillas and South African forces, and to dismantle
the territorial units. A UN force of that size would be
outnumbered by the Namibian troops, and we doubt
South Africa-after investing so heavily in
SWATF-will agree to its dissolution. The SWATF
Commander said publicly in 1978 that his troops will
turn in their heavy weapons-but not individual
arms-to unit armories, and that an demobilization
would be temporary.
Nonetheless, a merger of SWAPO guerrilla forces
with the larger and well-trained SWATF units into a
national army might improve prospects for post-
independence stability. It would avoid dispersing
thousands of ex-combatants disgruntled over their lost
pay and poor prospects for reemployment. Later, a
phased demobilization in step with programs to em-
ploy ex-servicemen could more safely reduce the force
to a reasonable and affordable size. For a merger to
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Appendix
Major SWATF Units
The South West African Territory Force (SWATF)
consists of full-time, reaction, and area defense units.
Full-time forces include 10 infantry battalions and
specialized units for reconnaissance and tracking.
They are all based in the Border Operational Area
(BOA) and committed to day-to-day counterinsur-
gency operations. The reaction force is the 91st
Brigade, a unit of reservists based in Windhoek as a
territorial reserve. Area defense units are the 26 or
more militia detachments located throughout Namib-
ia and used for local defense."
SWATF's primary tactical formation is the motorized
light infantry battalion. Ethnically mixed battalions,
numbered in the 50 series, are the best equipped and
apparently most capable SWATF battalions, partly
because they contain large components of South
African troops. The ethnically distinct battalions,
with unit designations in the hundreds, appear to have
less equipment. Although black volunteers fill the
ranks, most officers and sergeants are whites seconded
from the South African Army.
Full-Time Multiracial Units
The 51st through 54th Battalions are deployed from
west to east just south of the Angolan border in Sector
10. They were formed in the late 1970s to bar
infiltration into Owambo.
(that a mixed battalion
usually consists of four companies-two each of
South Africans and Namibians
each of the four battalions
consists o a ou troops. F_ I
for the mixed battalions are orderly and
defense journals. In all,
five full-time battalions, the 1st South West Africa Specialist Unit,
and the 91st Brigade.
secure. They usually are cleared of surrounding vege-
tation, enclosed by an earth wall and fence, and
feature dispersed trenches and weapons positions.
51st Battalion. The battalion is based at Ruacana,
and elements are deployed at several smaller camps in
the area,
It has four infantry companies
(one of ethnically mixed Namibians, one on rotation
from the 101st Battalion, and two on rotation from
South Africa), an armored car company, and three
artillery batteries.
The bat-
talion guards the border, a nearby hydroelectric in-
stallation, powerlines, and the water pipeline into
Owambo
52nd Battalion. The unit is based at Ogongo and
includes a motorcycle unit, according to the press. It
protects the border and the road to the Ruacana
hydroelectric facility.
53rd Battalion. The battalion is based at Ondangwa
and guards the border and a key road intersection.
this is the most concentrated of
SWATF's four ethnically mixed battalions. Buffel
mine-resistant vehicles and a few Eland armored cars
have been seen there.
guards the border.
one infantry company from the 701st Battalion nor-
mally is attached.
Full-Time Ethnically Distinct Battalions
The ethnically distinct battalions were organized in
the mid- 1970s and based in all four area commands of
the BOA. Battalion personnel strengths vary widely,
and their bases appear less organized and secure than
those of the multiethnic battalions. The surrounding
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battalions are intended to become.
vegetation frequently has not been cut back, often a
single fence marks the perimeter, and fewer vehicles
are parked inside. Photography of the 101st Battalion
shows that it has been expanded and motorized since
1983, and it may serve as a model of what these
101st (Owambo) Battalion. The 101st is the largest
and best equipped ethnic battalion.
in 1974, it was known as the 35th Battalion
the battalion has over
2,000 men assigned, mostly Ndonga Owambos.' It
apparently has overcome early recruitment problems
among the historically pro-SWAPO Owambos. The
battalion has four operational infantry companies,
another four companies in training, plus communica-
tions, maintenance, and supply units. When or anized
talion.
102nd (Kaokoland) Battalion. The battalion probably
consists of only about 250 Kaokolanders, Hereros, and
Ovahimas at Opuwa in the separate battalion area.
The 102nd remains small due to Kaokoland's sparse
population and little SWAPO activity. It was formed
in the mid-1970s and later designated the 37th Bat-
operating primarily in Sector 10,
201st (Bushman) Battalion. The unit has about 900
mostly Baraqewena (Kung) Bushmen based at Omega
base in the western Caprivi Oos (Sector 20) but
At least one company is at Ondangwa,
1974 as the 31st Battalion.
combined with South African paratroopers as a rapid
reaction force. The 201st also provides scouts to other
units. It was the first Bushman unit, formed about
Sector 20,
202nd (Kavango) Battalion. The 202nd has about
1,200 troops, mostly Kavangos with one South Afri-
can Army company attached, based at Rundu in
that are invariably in the field.
only about 950 troo s assumin that SWATF assigns four to six
men per squad tent, normal
for South African units in Namibia. In our judgment, however,
SWATF may assign more men than that to a tent. Moreover, it
probably does not have spare tents for the two or more companies
it had expanded to six companies
y e ruary 1 5 The
battalion has a few armored cars and a horse-
mounted element, and was formed in 1975 as the 34th
Battalion.
203rd (Bushman) Battalion. The battalion's 300 most-
ly Vasekela Bushmen troops are based 90 kilometers
west of Tsumkwe but are mostly deployed in small
numbers guarding wells throughout the Bushman
homeland (Sector 50), according to press accounts.
Others are on duty in the BOA. It is the former 36th
Battalion formed in 1978.
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701st (Caprivi) Battalion. The 701st has about 600
mostly Lozi troops at Mapacha in Sector 70 and is
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with Angola, It has 25X1
a few armored cars, and was known as the 33rd
Battalion when formed in about 1977.
1st South West Africa Reconnaissance Regiment. The
1st SWARR is a small and newly formed unit of elite
reconnaissance personnel based in Kavango, accord-
ing to embassy reporting.
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South West Africa Specialist Unit. This special unit
for tracking based at Ondangwa in Sector 10 has
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a small cadre of full-time professionals, and it has
more heavy equipment than is normally seen with
Namibian counterinsurgency units. SWATF also has
a unit of light aircraft and at least 26 militia units for
local defense.
91st Brigade
The 91st is a multiracial unit of at least 1,500 men at
Windhoek in Sector 40,
It is directly subordinate to General Meiring,
ra~than to an intermediate sector command. The
brigade's fully manned 911th Infantry Battalion has
taken part in counterguerrilla operations in the BOA,
but the greatly understrength 912th and 913th Battal-
ions probably are not operational. Forty Buffel vehi-
cles and eight 25-pounder (140-mm) guns
as the 41st Battalion.
1st South West Africa Squadron
The squadron has 20 privately owned light aircraft
and 40 volunteer reserve pilots at Eros Field outside
Windhoek in Sector 40. Pilot reservists fly their own
aircraft and provide SWATF with a limited capabili-
ty for aerial reconnaissance, search and rescue, and
administrative and logistic support. The unit was
formerly known as the 112th Air Commando
Squadron.
Area Force Units
At least 26 units of local militia, formed from all
ethnic groups, are located throughout Namibia and
subordinate to the various sector commands, accord-
ing to official announcements. Because the sectors
south of the BOA have no full-time SWATF units
assigned, they rely on the area force units for local
defense against guerrilla attack.
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