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• Publication Date: February 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Angola's Civil War:
Outlook for 1985 F
An Intelligence Assessment
I/
ALA 85-10019C
February 1985
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Directorate of Top Secret
Intelligence
Angola's Civil War:
Outlook for 1985 F
Branch, Africa Division, ALA,
may be addressed to the Chief, Southern Africa
Office of African and Latin American Analysis. It
was coordinated with the Directorate of
Operations. Comments and queries are welcome and
This paper was prepared by
Top Secret
ALA 85-10019C
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Angola's Civil War:
Outlook for 1985 1 25X1
Key Judgments UNITA insurgents have made steady gains in Angola's nearly 10-year civil
Information available war, despite being outnumbered and outgunned by the Cuban- and Soviet-
as of 1 February 1985 supported Angolan Army. The insurgents have made good use of their
was used in this report.
advantages in quality of manpower and leadership to take and hold the
military initiative.
We do not believe, however, that either side will make decisive gains in the
coming year, although the intensity of the fighting is likely to increase
throughout the country. UNITA probably will make some gains but not at
the pace it has enjoyed in the past, nor will it be able to take the key posi-
tions the government chooses to hold and defend.
Last year, UNITA continued its offensive operations and secured solid
control of southeastern Angola and stepped up operations in the northern
part of the country to the point where it now threatens the outskirts of
Luanda. These gains came despite the fact that the Angolan Army was
strengthened by substantially increased Soviet military deliveries, more
Cuban troops, and reorganization and restructuring of its security estab-
lishment. On at least two occasions the Angolan Army struck back at the
insurgents in major offensives intended to win back areas held by UNITA.
Neither offensive was successful.
During 1984 the insurgents showed that they could sustain offensive
operations with substantial forces at increased distances from their bases of
support and at the same time defend territories won against the govern-
ment offensives. Some UNITA weaknesses were exposed, however, when
its efforts to capture government positions were blocked by Angolan
advantages in firepower and air support and resistance of government
troops in well-defended positions.
For the coming year, UNITA publicly promises more of the same sorts of
operations, particularly in the Luanda area, where substantial insurgent
forces have been dispatched to increase the pressure on the capital.
UNITA also promises to increase attacks on Angola's economic resources
with special attention to the multinational oil companies. The government,
we believe, will try to block or even push back UNITA's extended
operations. The role of the Angolan Air Force is likely to increase in the
coming year, as the government probably will strike insurgent supply lines
and base areas and provide air support for ground offensives against
UNITA-held territory.
Top Secret
ALA 85-10019C
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This relatively even match despite an imbalance of forces, we believe, could
be changed significantly by such outside factors as Namibian indepen-
dence and some form of Cuban troop withdrawal, Savimbi's death, or
sharply increased Soviet and Cuban involvement:
? A Namibian settlement that resulted in the withdrawal of South African
troops would deprive UNITA of its main lines of outside support,
eliminate South Africa as a deterrent to Angolan action, and open
UNITA's base areas to Angolan attack.
? A total Cuban withdrawal would be a disaster for Luanda, only slightly
alleviated if accompanied by a South African withdrawal from Namibia.
? A partial Cuban withdrawal without a South African withdrawal from
Namibia. would likewise be a disaster for Luanda, in our judgment, but
slower to develop as UNITA would move to gain control of most of the
country.
? On the other hand, we believe a partial Cuban withdrawal with a South
African departure from an independent Namibia probably would hurt
UNITA more than the government, although the war would be likely to
continue for years.
? Savimbi's death or incapacitation would be a major blow to the insurgent
cause and, although UNITA has an experienced cadre, the insurgents
probably would lose much of the momentum they have generated in the
last two years.
? Soviet and Cuban escalation that directly committed Cuban combat
troops to battle and was supported by more Soviet weapons could make
inroads into UNITA's heartland. We believe that such an escalation is
not likely under present circumstances, but that it could take place if
Moscow or Havana saw a precipitous decline in Luanda's fortunes and
decided to block a victory-bound insurgent force.
25X1
25X1
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Unless there are such dramatic changes in the situation, we believe the
current stalemate is likely to persist. However, gradually mounting insur-
gent pressure could lead to a failure of will on the government's part which
is severe enough to cause Luanda's backers to abandon the fight, leaving
the field to UNITA, or cause a political realignment in Luanda that would
pave the way for reconciliation talks. We do not believe that such a
development is likely in the next year or so. If, in coming years, Luanda is
unable to reverse the trend and its situation continues to deteriorate, a
dramatic change in Angola's internal dynamics becomes increasingly
likely, almost certainly resulting in a major shift in the military and
political equation.
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Key Judgments
Key 1984 Military Developments
Military Prospects for the Coming Year
1
Namibian Independence
4
Long-Term Prospects
6
A. Major Military Developments in 1984
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Figure 1
Angolan and Cuban Forces
it Angolan/Cuban headquarters
0 Angolan/Cuban garrison
IP+ Government offensive,1984
4 Airbase
v Military region designation
V Military region with council
Zaire
Boundary presentation is
ne rpy aulhon,at e.
25X1
25X1
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Angola's Civil War:
Outlook for 1985P
Introduction
The Angolan civil war that pits the Popular Move-
ment for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) govern-
ment in Luanda against Jonas Savimbi's Union for
the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) is now in
its 10th year of steadily increasing violence. UNITA
has made its most impressive gains in the last two
years and now controls at least a quarter of the
25X1 country and operates to some extent throughout most
of the remainder.
We believe battlefield developments over the coming
year will be critical for both contestants, as each side's
political strategy requires military momentum for
success.' If the government could slow or even show
some realistic hope of reversing the trend of UNITA's
battlefield successes, the dos Santos regime probably
would gain significant flexibility-both internally and
externally from its Soviet and Cuban backers-to
negotiate the withdrawal of Cuban troops. UNITA,
for its part, cannot afford to relinquish the military
initiative that buttresses Savimbi's demand for a part
in any regional settlement. With both sides apparently
ready to commit substantial forces to battle, 1985
promises to be the hardest fought year to date.F_~
Key 1984 Military Developments
Beginning with its "second general offensive,"
launched in November 1983, UNITA greatly expand-
ed the civil war in both scope and intensity during
1984.2 Among the key military actions during the
year were:
? Seizure of the Cazombo Salient, which gave
UNITA total control over the border with Zambia
and, for the first time, control of some of the border
with Zaire.
? Deployment of UNITA's regular forces in apprecia-
ble strength'into the northern half of the country
and sustained operations throughout the region.
? Continued pressure on urban areas, including the
temporary capture of the provincial capital of
Sumbe;.start of an effort to target Cuban, Soviet,
and government officials marked by the car-bomb-
ing of Cuban headquarters in Huambo; and raids
near Luanda itself.
? Aggressive attacks on such important economic
targets as diamond mines, roads, and rail lines, and,
for the first time, raids on Angolan oil facilities.
These actions showed that UNITA could deploy,
support, and sustain conventional and guerrilla forces
far from its base in southeast Angola and could
seriously disrupt government and economic targets
with growing frequency.
For its part, the government was unsuccessful in
wresting territory from UNITA. Buoyed by an in-
,crease in Soviet military deliveries and Cuban troops,
Angolan forces tried first to win back the Cazombo
Salient. Luanda also launched a major offensive later
in the year to recapture key points in UNITA's
southeastern area of control; the Angolan forces were
able to penetrate UNITA-held territory, but pulled
back without achieving any permanent gains. None-
theless, government offensive and defensive actions
pointed up potential UNITA vulnerabilities to Ango-
la's growing air strength and the difficulty lightly
armed insurgents face in attacking dug-in MPLA
units.
Military Prospects for the Coming Year
Although an increase in the intensity and extent of
the civil war is likely in 1985, we do not expect either
side to make any decisive breakthroughs in the ab-
sense of major changes in the diplomatic setting.
UNITA'c Plans. At the special party congress held at
UNITA's headquarters in early November 1984,
Savimbi publicly claimed that the movement's defeat
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Figure 2
UNITA Fronts
V-<
CABI~1DA
Angola
Congo
Brazzaville
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~% a /CUANZA
Luanda NORTE
IUige
/Eii Cuanza
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South 'ouibala
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Lobito 1 ~'~~/tHUAMB5
Bl a f
enguear9o p 11 liY a la
HfamO
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HUILA
Mulondo.1 ruvelai
Zaire
NAMIBE I c-, Strategic
J
C afunfo
Malanje '' I
Northers
MALANJE
;enIFfr4
An9of
,
Munhang0"
Kuito
BIE
J I / j Tempu;;
~enong e
Operet
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Road
0 100 200 Kilometers
0 100 200 Miles
LUNDA
NORTE
Saurimo
C u ito
iCuanavale
\Luena P
*Baixd
ront Long'a
CUANDO CUBANGO
.Savate ` Rito
LUNDA
SUL
Eastern fr nt
MOXICO
Lumbala
N'guimbo.
"'~% Chiume
Mavinga
t`?
eti~
F~ eCazombo
ti
Okavango
Swamps
Zaire
mbia
Etosh
Pan
Namibi
Botswana
oun scres68presentetion s
to rily euteoritetive.
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UNITA control
a
Coffee-growing area
Province boundary
D
Diamond mining
-r- Railroad
Oil production
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Comparative Strengths
Substantial Soviet military deliveries over the past
several years have equipped the ground forces with a
full range of Soviet conventional weapons. In addi-
tion, the Soviets recently have accelerated aircraft
deliveries, and the Angolan Air Force, augmented by
Cuban pilots, now has almost 200 modern jet fighters
and helicopters.
The government enjoys manpower and firepower ad-
vantages over the insurgents. Despite the larger gov-
ernment army, Soviet military equipment, and Cuban
support, however, UNITA has managed to make
steady gains over the years. The insurgents have
gained the initiative because much of the Angolan
advantage in manpower and firepower is tied down in
defense offixed positions and not available for
25X1 offensives against the insurgents. Furthermore,
UNITA enjoys
25X1 advantages in quality of manpower and, in general,
its troops probably are better trained, better led, and
more dedicated.
country's northwestern provinces.
of the government offensive the month before meant
that Luanda no longer had the military capacity to
launch major offensives against UNITA-controlled
areas. UNITA claimed that its whole military appa-
ratus was ready to launch an offensive against the
In a press interview during the congress, Savimbi
claimed that, by late December, 7,000 fully trained
and equipped troops would be ready to reinforce
UNITA's forces in the north to "close strongly on
25X1
25X1
Government Responses. The government almost cer- 25X1
tainly will attempt to use its newly acquired military
muscle to try to block or even push back UNITA's
extended operations. Luanda also may attempt to cut
insurgent supply lines to the north through increased
ground operations along the central portion of the
Benguela rail line.
there is a strong concentration of government forces
near Munhango where UNITA's supply route crosses
the rail line.
An attempt to strike at the supply lines would be even
more serious for the insurgents if the Angolans were
to commit their growing air strength to the operation.
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Angolan aircraft
attacked some UNITA vehicle convoys and base
camps during 1984; Savimbi himself publicly admit-
ted that Angolan aircraft bombed one of his field
hospitals, suggesting that at least one of the larger
base camps was struck. Nonetheless, the air opera-
tions were not sustained long enough to impair
but pressure on these positions probably will be
sustained through guerrilla raids. UNITA's opera-
tions against economic targets are likely to worsen the
country's deteriorating economy. However, the insur-
gents are not strong enough to sustain attacks on oil
facilities, and we do not expect that they will be able
to significantly disrupt oil production in the coming
year, despite probable raids or hostage taking.
UNITA's operations.
We believe the government also may attempt air-
strikes on major UNITA bases in the southeast and
even on the insurgent headquarters at Jamba. The
government may now be persuaded that its strength-
ened Air Force, as well as improved air defenses, gives
it less reason to worry about a possible South African
response.
It is also likely that the government will launch more
major offensives to reclaim UNITA-controlled terri-
tory. Although the offensives in 1984 were not suc-
cessful, government forces were not routed; and the
Angolan Army, despite Savimbi's boast of having
rendered it impotent, retains the capability to launch
future attacks.
Likely Outcome. We do not believe that either side
will make decisive military gains in the coming year,
although the strengthened military capabilities of
both sides are likely to increase the intensity of
fighting throughout the country. UNITA's increasing
manpower,
has changed the fighting into a more conventional
conflict with more of the insurgents organized in
larger, battalion-sized units. We also believe that the
government forces are better deployed and equipped
25X1 than they were a year ago.
UNITA probably will make additional advances in
the coming year, but more slowly than in 1984. The
insurgents' supply lines are extended farther than they
have been in past years. Improved government de-
fenses and likely offensive operations against
UNITA's supply lines and base areas probably will
cut into UNITA's ability to supply its forces and may
even require the insurgents to pull back some troops to
guard rear areas.
Effects of External Factors
Progress in the regional negotiations leading to inde-
pendence for Namibia and some form of a Cuban
troop withdrawal from Angola would have a signifi-
cant impact on the civil war. The situation would also
be changed by Savimbi's death or by shifts in the
degree of involvement by each side's foreign backers.
Namibian Independence. A Namibian settlement, by
itself, that resulted in the withdrawal of South Afri-
can but not Cuban forces, we believe, would hurt
UNITA for the following reasons:
? UNITA would lose the deterrent value of South
African forces deployed in Namibia, leaving its base
area vulnerable to sustained Angolan ground and
air attacks. We believe the Angolan Government
strongly desires to initiate attacks in this area.
? UNITA would lose its easy and secure arms supply
and outside contact, which, in our view, are largely
irreplaceable. Although we believe Zaire is friendly
to UNITA, it keeps a low profile and probably
would permit only relatively small amounts of aid to
be covertly infiltrated. Furthermore, continuing im-
provements and expansion of Angola's air defense
system would make covert air delivery more diffi-
cult and risky.
The likely reduction in South African support, cou-
pled with UNITA's increased vulnerability, would
weaken UNITA's ability to sustain the conflict at its
UNITA, in our judgment, will not be able to capture
and hold any of the key provincial centers or garrisons
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present levels and would threaten UNITA's northern
expansion, in our judgment. UNITA claims to have
reserve supplies for several years of operations, but,
without an alternative to the South African supply
line, the need to husband resources probably would
25X1 force UNITA to cut back on its level of activity.
25X1
most government and party circles
in Luanda are convinced that loss of South African
support would take away most of Savimbi's military
capability. While we do not share this extreme view,
we do believe that if UNITA were separated from its
South African backers by an independent Namibia-
and Soviet and Cuban support for Luanda contin-
ued-UNITA would lose momentum and within sev-
25X1 eral months would begin to lose territory to govern-
ment forces.
'25X1
Cuban Withdrawal. By contrast, a Cuban withdraw-
al-either partial or total and without a Namibian
settlement-would be disastrous for the Angolan
Government. Angola's dependence on Cuban combat
units to defend the key provincial centers and on
Cuban advisers and technicians in key support posi-
tions is, we believe, too great to be compensated for, in
either the short or long term, without a significant loss
of Angola's military capability.
control of most of the country.
Total Cuban withdrawal probably would lead to an
immediate breakdown in the ability of the Angolan
Army to prosecute the war. A partial withdrawal that
left Cuban forces and technicians holding a few key
points, such as Luanda, a few other provincial centers,
and important oil-producing areas, would have less
immediate impact, but would allow UNITA to con-
centrate on the few remaining areas of government
strength and probably give the insurgents effective
If, however, a Cuban withdrawal were accompanied
by the withdrawal of South African forces from
Namibia, the impact on the civil war is more difficult
to assess:
? Total Cuban withdrawal, even with Namibian inde-
pendence, probably would spell the end of the
MPLA regime, in our judgment. At this stage of the
war, compensating for the loss of the 25,000 Cuban
combat troops guarding the main garrisons and,
more important, the advisers and technicians that
run Angola's war machine probably would be an
insurmountable problem for Luanda. Although
UNITA would lose its sustaining long-term support,
it probably would be tempted, in the event of a
Cuban withdrawal, to strike quick and hard to settle
the civil war before supply shortages cut into its
capabilities.
? A partial Cuban withdrawal-of one-half to two-
thirds of the 35,000 Cubans, for example-in the
wake of a Namibian settlement that left behind the
Cuban technicians and advisers and sufficient com-
bat troops to guard Angola's key facilities, we
believe, would hurt UNITA more than the govern-
ment. Although the Angolan Army would be weak-
ened and possibly lose some territory initially, Sovi-
et weapon deliveries and economically vital oil
production would continue. UNITA would lose the
support necessary to sustain the conflict at the
present level, its relatively secure sanctuary, and
eventually its momentum. The conflict, we believe,
would continue for some years, but the trend would
not be in UNITA's favor.
Savimbi's Removal. Savimbi's death or incapacitation
would be a major blow to the insurgent cause. We
believe Savimbi's dynamic personal appeal and excep-
tional leadership qualities would be impossible to
replace and his abrupt removal from the scene proba-
bly would lead, in the short term, to considerable
disorganization within the insurgent leadership.
Savimbi has no widely recognized successor of his
stature, but UNITA does have an experienced cadre
who are tough, able, and committed to the cause. This
leadership probably would be able to retrench and
continue the battle, although probably at considerably
reduced levels.
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Luanda apparently believes that Savimbi's death
would ensure a government victory; several press
reports suggest the MPLA has tried to assassinate
Savimbi. In December, according to one report, the
regime sent aircraft to bomb a rally where Savimbi
was believed to be speaking. Although unsuccessful,
the attempt may have generated the recent rumors
reported by the press in Luanda that Savimbi had
been killed.
Cuban and Soviet Escalation. To make an apprecia-
ble difference in the military situation, we believe
Cuban troops would have to take on a major, direct,
and sustained role in the fighting. As they did in 1975,
the Cubans would have to deploy for conventional
operations against UNITA's forces. In the southeast,
for example, where the war has taken on a more
conventional character, Cuban brigades-supported
by armor, artillery, and air support-could make
inroads into UNITA-controlled territory and capture
or cut insurgent bases and supply lines. To sustain
these operations, the Cubans probably would also
have to augment substantially their troop strength in
25X1 Angola and be prepared to accept the higher casual-
ties that would result.
We believe Soviet assistance, particularly in stepped-
up deliveries of weapons and aircraft, would be
necessary to support a substantial expansion in the
Cuban combat role. The Soviets probably also would
be required to raise their advisory and technical
presence in the country to support a greater intensity
Moscow's and Havana's evident preference for limit-
ing their direct involvement in the civil war, however,
could be challenged if Luanda's fortunes were to
decline precipitously, either through rapid UNITA
military advances or an internal collapse of the regime
leadership. We believe the Soviets and the Cubans
would move quickly to try and stabilize the situation.
The Cubans probably would be able to hold out in
Luanda and major provincial centers until Moscow
and Havana decided their next move. As long as
Cuban troops were available to do the fighting, we do
not believe the Soviets would commit their own
combat troops. Even then, comments from Soviet
officials suggest that Moscow does not believe Angola
is of such importance as to warrant the direct engage-
ment of Soviet combat forces and prestige. Moreover,
Moscow almost certainly realizes that only massive
numbers of Soviet forces could decisively alter the
military balance, and even then, as Afghanistan has
proved, such actions could not guarantee the defeat of
UNITA's forces.
In our view, any future Soviet and Cuban escala-
tion-other than continued Soviet arms deliveries-is
likely to be a response to further deterioration in the
government's military position and would be primarily
aimed at stabilizing the existing standoff between
Luanda and the insurgents. We believe the Soviets
and Cubans will act to prevent the MPLA regime
from losing the civil war, but are unlikely to accept
the costs, largely Cuban casualties that would be
suffered in direct combat, required to win the war.
in the combat operations.
We do not believe the Soviets or the Cubans are
prepared at this time to take such a step. Despite the
slow but steady decline in government fortunes, the
Cubans apparently have not committed substantial
forces directly to combat operations. On at least
two occasions of self-proclaimed emergencies for
Luanda-the South African invasion of Angola in
late 1981 and UNITA's capture of Cangamba in
August 1983-Havana responded by sending addi-
tional forces, not by changing the rules of engage-
ment. We believe Soviet advisers in Angola are
prohibited from participating in combat situations
and limit their presence to headquarters or positions
Long-Term Prospects
In the absence of dramatic changes in the diplomatic
situation, the leadership of either side, or the military
dimensions of the conflict, we believe the current
situation is likely to persist: in effect, an overall
stalemate with UNITA holding the upper hand in the
countryside, and the government, with Cuban back-
ing, holding the main urban areas and key economic
facilities.
out of the line of fire
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Without external factors or developments to change
the situation, we do not believe that either side has the
strength or the ability to defeat its opponent without a
protracted conflict. The insurgent military forces are
too strong and their support within the country is too
deep to be eliminated without a long-term military
and political effort on the part of the government. On
the other hand, UNITA lacks, and is unlikely to gain,
the capability to capture the major Angolan centers or
to take on, in direct combat, major Angolan or Cuban
military units.
This stalemate, however, could be ended, not by any
specific military defeat or battle but by gradually
mounting and sustaining pressure by either side until
its opponent lost the will to continue the conflict. In
such a situation, we believe Luanda would break first.
We believe the MPLA regime is more fragile than
UNITA and has less potential for generating support
among Angola's rival ethnic groups than do the
insurgents.
Under these circumstances, a failure of will in Luan-
da and a severe decline of morale within the dos
Santos regime could lead Luanda's backers to wash
their hands of the whole enterprise and leave Luanda
open to conquest. Alternatively, there also could be a
major political realignment within the regime, such
that Luanda was willing to compromise its power in
negotiations with UNITA that lead to a reconcilia-
tion.
Neither event is likely in the next year or so, in our
judgment. The Angolan military seems convinced that
all of its Soviet military hardware will make a
difference when fully committed to battle. However,
if in the next two years Luanda is unable to reverse
the military trend in UNITA's favor and its prospects
remain bleak, a dramatic change in Angola's leader-
ship dynamics becomes increasingly likely.
i
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Appendix A
Major Military
Developments, in 1984
During the past year, UNITA continued its thrust to
the north which it initiated in late 1982 when insur-
gent forces broke out of their southeastern stronghold.
The insurgents capped their first general offensive
when they seized Cangamba in August 1983-the
first major setpiece battle by UNITA against a
prepared and apparently well-defended government
strongpoint. The capture of Cangamba-which was
not permanently occupied by the insurgents-demon-
strated the growing strength of Savimbi's convention-
al forces and was a major blow to Luanda's morale.
On the other hand, the heavy casualties suffered by
UNITA in the battle
made the insurgents wary of further attacks on
government strongpoints.
UNITA Operations
After the victory at Cangamba, UNITA announced
the start of a second general offensive in November
1983 that was intended to extend the war northward
into hitherto relatively unaffected areas of Angola.
The offensive also was aimed at disrupting.the Ango-
lan economy by attacks on economic facilities and
resources. In addition, UNITA announced that it
would lay siege to the cities through commando raids
while regular and guerrilla forces secured control of
the countryside.
As a first step, UNITA's forces seized the Cazombo
Salient before the end of the year, giving UNITA
total control of Angola's border with Zambia and, for
the first time, control of a small portion of the border
with Zaire. In January 1984, UNITA tried unsuc-
cessfully to follow up this victory by capturing Luau,
a key border town on the Zairian border and an
important symbolic target for the insurgents.
UNITA began to deploy its regular forces in appre-
ciable strength north of the Benguela rail line begin-
UNITA had, by the end of that year, 10 battalions of
regulars operating north of the rail line with the
western and northern fronts. Troops from these fronts
pushed northward and continued hit-and-run raids on
small government centers, ambushes of government
convoys, destruction of bridges, and general disrup- 25X1
tion of the counry's internal transport. Insurgent
forces in the. north,
also established permanent base camps and
continued their attempts to recruit the local popula-
tion.
UNITA kept its promise to threaten Angola's major
urban areas when the insurgents successfully conduct-
ed, in March, a hit-and-run attack on lightly defended
Sumbe on Angola's western coast. Sumbe was the
first provincial capital to be captured, albeit briefly,
by the insurgents. In April UNITA raiders exploded a
car bomb outside a Cuban headquarters and housing 25X1
area in Huambo that killed a number of Cubans and
probably some civilians. This event,
marked the start of a campaign to target
of the MPLA government.
By the end of the year, UNITA's forces were closing
on Luanda. Raids on small outlying cities and the
attacks on the powerlines into the city beginning in
October increased jitters in the capital,
UNITA forces also set up base
camps in the mountainous area east of the city,
apparently to support continued operations aimed at
cutting Luanda off from the rest of the country. 7
of the road,
UNITA's attacks on Angola's economy were equally
aggressive. UNITA, forces repeatedly cut the road to
the northeastern diamond-producing area. Although
the government publicly claims it has reopened parts
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ning in late 1983.
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supply convoys have
been reduced from three per month in 1983 to one
every three months, and then only with strong mili-
tary escorts. The diamond industry has been forced to
rely on frequent and expensive airlift to maintain
what the managers say is a money-losing operation.
UNITA also struck twice at the diamond mine at
Cafunfo in February and December 1984. On both
occasions, foreign nationals working at the mines were
captured. In the December attack, the aircraft operat-
ed by a charter US air cargo company was burned,
and two Americans were captured and a third was
killed.
In 1984 UNITA conducted its first raids on Angolan
oil facilities. In April it attacked and burned storage
tanks at a small well site on Angola's mainland
southwest of Luanda, and in July the insurgents
damaged an onshore pipeline in oil-rich Cabinda
Province. Neither attack significantly damaged Ango-
la's oil industry-the mainstay of the Angolan econo-
my-but the raid in Cabinda marked one of the first
UNITA operations in this Angolan exclave province.
Government Responses
Stung by the fall of Cangamba in August 1983, the
Angolan Government initiated a series of steps to
strengthen its armed forces.
Moscow-trained Iko Carriera, Ango-
la's Air Force chief, was the driving force, if not the
architect, of the reorganization of the Angolan mili-
tary and security forces aimed at improving the
coordination of military and civilian resources in
counterinsurgency operations. For example, regional
military councils were established in six of the 10
military regions where the government said the insur-
gent threat was the greatest. In addition, in a move
designed to consolidate decisionmaking on national
security matters, senior government officials with
responsibilities for military and counterinsurgency
matters were organized into a Defense and Security
Council, chaired by President dos Santos.
The Angolans also sought assistance from their key
backers. A high-level Angolan delegation visited Mos-
cow in early September 1983 to ask for more arms,
The Angolans also
told Havana in September they might ask for more
troops, and the Cubans said publicly that more would
be sent if needed:
Soviet military. deliveries accelerated rapidly after
mid-1983, and Cuba,
began to augment its forces. By early 1984 the
Cubans, had
sent an additional 5,000 troops, bringing the total to
as many as 35,000 military personnel.
Angolan garrisons also re-
vealed a major effort to upgrade facilities and de-
fenses-at bases and provincial centers in northern and
eastern Angola where UNITA forces were expanding
their operations. Substantial improvements were
made to the defenses of Luena, Malanje, and Huam
bo, for example, and
additional defenses at numerous smaller regional
centers.
Apparently encouraged 'by their growing strength, the
Angolans tried at least twice in 1984 to win back
territory controlled by UNITA. The first effort,
launched in April, was,
intended to recapture the Cazombo Salient. At least
four Angolan brigades attempted in a series of opera-
tions to take Cazombo, the primary town in the
salient. Although the Angolan forces regained some
ground, UNITA's forces, consisting primarily of its
regular battalions, apparently were able to block
further moves
the fighting had been heavy, and
abandoned Angolan strongpoints and equipment were
seen along the main road in the area.
the Angolans called off the opera-
recapture the salient.
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moves only with difficulty or is nonexistent.
Civilian traffic
UNITA continued to maintain an aggressive presence
in the countryside and conduct frequent raids on
roads or rail lines, economic targets, or small govern-
ment administrative centers. Surface transportation in
Angola remains risky, and even military resupply
convoys are forced to travel with substantial escort.
Most important, UNITA showed that it could defend
regions it deems important-its area of control in 25X1
southeastern Angola-from government offensive ef-
forts to retake the territory. On at least two occasions
last year, UNITA's conventional forces drove back
major conventional. military offensives by Angolan
forces. 25X1
take Luau despite the apparent high priority placed
On the other hand, UNITA failed on at least two
occasions to capture positions the government was 25X1
willing to defend. In January f984, UNITA failed to
on its capture. In July two UNITA battalions,
tried to capture the small garrison at Baixo
Lessons Learned
UNITA thus held on to the initiative last year, turned
back two government offensives, and was able to score
some impressive gains. However, a strengthened An-
golan military establishment, bolstered by increased
arms support from the Soviet Union, enjoyed success
on a few occasions and was able to expose some of
UNITA's military weaknesses.
In 1984 UNITA showed that it could deploy, support,
and sustain conventional and guerrilla forces at great
distance from its base of supply in southeastern
Angola. In doing so, it had to maintain and defend a
lengthy supply line from enemy attack, despite occa-
sional problems such as food shortages and air raids
on supply convoys. UNITA also proved by its raid on
Sumbe that it could organize attacks on government
positions with multibattalion regular forces augment-
Longa in southeastern Angola. Although UNITA
overran the relatively undefended dirt airstrip, it was
unable to capture the government position. Rather
than risk further casualties, the UNITA forces called
off the battle.
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The ability of government forces to resupply the
isolated garrisons by air and deliver sustained close
air support against attacking UNITA forces has
rendered the insurgent troops vulnerable if they
Angolan use of air support
increased significantly in 1984 and probably will
increase even more in 1985. UNITA has no signifi- 25X1
cant defense against government air attacks.
ed by indigenous guerrillas.
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? The lack of fire support in sufficient quantities to
overcome well-dug-in and protected government
forces limits UNITA's ability to capture defended
Angolan positions. The light infantry weapons and
light mortars upon which UNITA relies are not
adequate to blast out government troops in carefully
bunkered and entrenched positions with multiple
lines of defense. Most UNITA successes have re-
sulted from attacks on isolated and ill-prepared
government positions.
These weaknesses are magnified by an increasing
willingness of Angolan troops to fight from well-
defended positions, especially if assured of air support
and resupply.
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