SOUTH AMERICA: VIEWING THE TURMOIL IN CENTRAL AMERICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00589R000100010003-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 7, 2010
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: January 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Secret
South America:
Viewing the Turmoil
in Central America
An Intelligence Assessment
Secret
ALA 85-10001
January 1985
?Copy 377
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Directorate of
Intelligence
South America:
Viewing the Turmoil
in Central America
An Intelligence Assessment
This assessment was prepared by
and Office of African and Latin
American Analysis. It was coordinated with the
Directorate of Operations. Comments and queries
may be directed to the Chief, South America
Division, ALA
Secret
Secret
ALA 85-10001
January 1985
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Key Judgments
Information available
as of 27 November 1984
was used in this report.
South America:
Viewing the Turmoil
in Central America
Most South American leaders view with mild and somewhat detached
concern the protracted instability in Central America, the involvement
there of outside forces, and the threat of military escalation. For the
majority of South American countries, sheer distance, their own monumen-
tal economic problems, and dramatic ongoing domestic political change
combine to make Central America largely a peripheral issue. Indeed, we
expect the South Americans' preoccupation with local economic and
political concerns to grow.
Only Venezuela and Colombia?whose proximity to the volatile Caribbean
Basin gives them the most to lose if instability and insurgency spread?
have been consistently involved in Central American matters. These two
countries, in addition to working with Mexico and Panama in the
Contadora negotiating group, have undertaken a number of diplomatic and
economic initiatives of their own. Leaders of both countries have made it
clear that they regard Central American instability as a potential threat to
their own democratic systems. They also view the Central American
situation as an opportunity to enhance their countries' and their own
personal reputations as mediators and peacemakers.
Although their interest in Central American stability coincides with US
goals in the region, the Venezuelan and Colombian Governments have
sought to avoid being closely identified with Washington. They have done
this because of politically powerful nationalist and leftist constituencies at
home and to avoid compromising their positions within the Contadora
group.
At present, it is clear that many South American leaders, though
suspicious of the Soviets, the Nicaraguans, and particularly the Cubans, do
not fully share Washington's estimate of their troublemaking potential.
The steady growth of Nicaragua's military capabilities and the major role
of Cuban advisers have not occasioned a significant show of concern from
most South American countries. If Moscow or Havana dramatically
stepped up support for Salvadoran guerrillas or armed Nicaragua with
substantial numbers of sophisticated new offensive weapons such as MIG
fighters, we believe that most South American countries, including some
that have so far remained silent, would protest but do little or nothing
more. Only Venezuela and possibly Colombia would seriously consider
providing substantial arms aid to a beleaguered Central American govern-
ment.
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Secret
ALA 85-10001
January 1985
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If the United States were to sharply step up its activity in Central America,
South American public and probably governmental criticism?spurred by
traditional Latin wariness of US intervention?would be considerable even
if US actions were clearly in response to provocations by other outside
actors. We believe the South Americans' reactions would be limited to
rhetoric, as they were when the United States took military action in
Grenada. A few countries, such as Chile and Paraguay, would probably
applaud greater US activism in Central America, and the military in a
number of countries probably would also favor such US action.
Even at current levels of US activity, we expect official and private South
American criticism of Washington's policies in Central America to rise,
but without significant impact on day-to-day US relations with South
American countries. A number of South American societies, most notably
those of Brazil and Argentina, have been undergoing substantial relaxation
of political conditions as they undertake or consolidate transitions from
military to civilian rule. In such countries?where political spectrums
range from rightwing nationalists to radical leftists?many national civil-
ian leaders empathize with revolutionary movements struggling against
military-dominated authoritarian regimes. These attitudes are counterbal-
anced?to a greater extent in some countries than others?by fears of
Cuban-backed export of revolution from the isthmus. Under these circum-
stances, with public opinion and political groups in South America
becoming a growing factor in national life, US policy in Central America
will be a convenient political target.
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Contents
Page
Key Judgments
111
Scope Note
vii
Introduction
1
Varying Responses to Crisis
1
Venezuela and Colombia: The Activists
1
Argentina: Would-Be Activist
3
The Other Countries: Staying in the Background
4
Views on Contadora
5
Perceptions of Soviets and Cubans
6
Relaxed Attitudes Toward Moscow
6
Greater Uneasiness Toward Havana
6
Prospects for Stronger Reaction
7
Implications for the United States
7
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800183 (544170) 8-84
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South America:
Viewing the Turmoil
in Central America
Introduction
The nations of South America have traditionally
tended to regard Central America as largely removed
from their day-to-day interests. South America, like
the rest of the world, long viewed Central America as
a backwater and paid it little attention. As a measure
of this meager interest, South American diplomatic
missions have tended to be minuscule or even
nonexistent, with state-to-state economic and political
relations maintained at generally desultory levels.
Even Colombia and Venezuela, though historically
involved in Central America because of physical
proximity, were not very active there prior to the mid-
1970s.
Varying Responses to Crisis
The current protracted crisis in Central America has
attracted greater attention from the South American
countries because, in our view, of the impact of
outside actors, the threat of military escalation, and
the possible spread of insurgency. Virtually all South
American countries have responded in some way.
Many South American leaders?including the Presi-
dents of Venezuela, Colombia, and Argentina?have
publicly voiced concern over various aspects of the
situation. Central America is a recurring theme in the
press of South American countries?such as Venezue-
la, Colombia, Argentina, and Brazil?as well as a
subject addressed by politicians and intellectuals.
Moreover, it has on occasion sparked demonstrations
at US facilities, with incidents in Brazil and Uruguay
25X1 among the most recent examples. But, all in all,
Central American issues have been a serious foreign
policy concern only in Venezuela and Colombia, and
to a lesser extent in Argentina.
Venezuela and Colombia: The Activists. Venezuela
and Colombia clearly have the most at stake in
Central America. Their proximity makes them partic-
ularly vulnerable to the spillover of instability. Vene-
zuelan officials?mindful that their country faced a
Cuban-backed insurgency in the 1960s?have told
US diplomats that revolutionary violence in Central
America and the potential growth of still-minuscule
1
radical groups in Venezuela could threaten their
country. Leaders in Colombia, which also has faced
homegrown, Cuban-backed guerrillas, have voiced
similar uneasiness.
Through their activism in Central America, Venezue-
la and Colombia, we believe, seek not only to limit the
risks of spillover, but also have other goals and
motives as well. Both are functioning democracies,
and in our judgment their leaders are genuinely
committed to preserving and advancing open govern-
ment in Latin America. Moreover, Venezuela has
tended to see itself as a regional power, with an
obligation to guard and, if possible, expand its leader-
ship role. We also believe,
that presidents of
both countries-have looked upon Central America's
difficulties as an opportunity to enhance their own
personal prominence. Both governments have worked
outside as well as within the Contadora group?which
also includes Mexico and Panama?to try to help
resolve Central America's problems.
Regardless of the underlying reasons, recent govern-
ments in Venezuela all have tried to help strengthen
moderate political forces in Central America. During
the period 1979-83, Venezuela was?except for the
United States?the most active supporter of El Salva-
dor's Government. President Jaime Lusinchi, elected
in 1983, also repeatedly pressed Nicaragua's rulers to
hold elections
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The Venezuelan President has also given encour- 25X1
agement and advice to Nicaraguan opposition groups,
according to US Embassy and he
has publicly castigated the Sandinistas for their op-
pression of the Catholic Church. The US Embassy
reported that Lusinchi took advantage of a visit by the
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Soviet Ambassador last June to emphasize that his
25X1 government would view a decision by Moscow to
supply MIG aircraft or other sophisticated equipment
to Nicaragua as unhelpful to efforts to achieve a
peaceful regional settlement.
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Although Lusinchi continues privately to criticize the
Sandinistas, his recent congratulatory message to
President-elect Ortega connoted official acceptance of
the Nicaraguan elections by a Contadora group mem-
ber, in our view. Lusinchi's message probably reflects
growing concern that the United States may take
military action against Nicaragua and may have been
designed to distance Venezuela from such a move.
Lusinchi, we believe, probably also hopes that by
preventing relations with Nicaragua from deteriorat-
ing further, he can preserve some influence there to
try to dissuade the Sandinistas from cracking down
more forcefully on their domestic political opponents
In discussions with US officials on El Salvador,
Lusinchi has repeatedly insisted that another Marx-
ist-Leninist government in Central America in addi-
tion to Cuba and Nicaragua would be intolerable. His
desire to promote democratic forces has led him to
become a supporter of President Duarte. He hosted a
visit by Duarte in September 1984 and,
is enthusiastic
about the latter's performance thus far as President.
The Venezuelans have been receptive to Salvadoran
requests for military aid,
At the same time, Lusinchi faces important domestic
constraints that we believe cause him to shy away
from becoming more deeply involved in El Salvador.
Some leaders of his party oppose providing strong
25X1 support for Duarte, according to the US Embassy,
because of the Salvadoran President's longstanding
links to the major opposition party in Venezuela, the
25X1 Christian Democrats. Moreover,
Lusinchi is constrained by the continuing
loyalty to Salvadoran opposition leader Guillermo
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party.
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Under Lusinchi's predecessor, President Herrera,
Venezuela played a key role in the Contadora group,
where it served as a balance against Mexico's pro-
Sandinista leanings. More recently, however, Venezu-
ela has been of only limited help in countering
Mexico's activism in the group. This trend, we be-
lieve, stems partly from Lusinchi's deemphasis of
foreign policy because of pressing domestic economic
difficulties. But it probably also reflects his belief that
Venezuela would be viewed as a cat's-paw of the
United States if it were to champion in the Contadora
group the cause of the four pro-US Central American
governments.
While Venezuela historically has displayed the deep-
est South American interest in Central America,
Colombia maintains an equally high profile within the
Contadora group.
President Belisario Betancur is
determined to project both Colombia and himself as
key elements in the search for peace. In January
1983, Betancur, publicly seeking Latin American
leadership status for Colombia, ended his country's
passivity toward Central America and announced his
intention to act as a mediator. Shortly thereafter, the
Contadora peace initiative was born. When the effort
appeared stymied in April 1983, Betancur resuscitat-
ed it with a whirlwind 48-hour visit to the other
Contadora countries. This ultimately led to the first
negotiating session involving the Contadora four and
the five Central American nations. A similar tour of
Central America by Betancur in July 1983 also gave a
boost to flagging peace prospects.
Betancur, according to US Embassy reporting, favors
a negotiated solution in El Salvador. Yet, he also fears
that any scheme involving power sharing with the
guerrillas or their representatives would set a danger-
ous precedent for Colombia. Concerning Nicaragua,
Betancur's public statements suggest to us that he
sympathizes with the Sandinistas' revolutionary fer-
vor but fears their Cuban-backed expansionism, espe-
cially in view of Managua's claims to San Andres and
other Colombian island possessions. More generally,
according to the US Embassy, Betancur has empha-
sized that he believes Colombian interests are gravely
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endangered when the region's conflicts become en-
meshed in East-West politics. Thus, he aims to dimin-
25X1 ish the involvement of the superpowers in Central
America in order to reduce the risk of further interna-
tionalizing the conflict.
According to US Embassy reporting, Betancur is also
disturbed by the refusal of Nicaraguan leaders to
honor their initial promises to permit political compe-
tition and by their growing reliance on Communist
countries. In a meeting with Sandinista Directorate
member Bayardo Arce in October 1984, Betancur
strongly criticized preparations for the election in
Nicaragua and warned that the USSR would not aid
the Sandinistas in the event of a US military interven-
tion, prompting the Nicaraguan to break off the
conversation abruptly. Nevertheless, the Colombian
Government did not publicly criticize the outcome of
25X1 the election because of?in our judgment?a desire to
avoid damaging Bogota's credibility in the Contadora
group.
In our view, an important consideration for both
Venezuela and Colombia?even though their aims in
Central America tend to coincide with those of the
United States?has been to avoid close identification
with Washington. According to US Embassy report-
ing, Lusinchi has indicated a concern that becoming
identified with Washington?especially with the poli-
25X1 cy of using force against the Sandinistas?could be
politically damaging at home and could undercut
Venezuela's position in Contadora.
Colombia's Betancur also has publicly and privately
expressed his intention to distance his administration's
foreign policy somewhat from that of the United
States. Betancur, according to the US Embassy in
Bogota, has said that his predecessors' close ties to
25X1 Washington isolated Colombia from other developing
nations and fostered an image of the country as a "US
? satellite."
Argentina: Would-Be Activist. Other than Venezuela
and Colombia, Argentina is the only South American
nation that has sought significant involvement in
Central America, and its efforts to play a political role
there ultimately proved fruitless. Argentina's initial
interest in Central America was triggered by the fact
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that the Montonero terrorists were receiving support,
shelter, and training in Nicaragua following the San-
dinista victory in 1979. As a result, the Argentine
military, provided
training to the Honduran, Guatemalan, and Salvador-
an security forces, as well as assistance to anti-
Sandinista insurgents based in Honduras.
President Raul Alfonsin, elected in late 1983,
sought?in our view?to use Central American issues
both to distance himself from the military regime that
preceded him and to bolster his country's and his own
reputation. By this time, the Montoneros were largely
a spent force and Alfonsin, according to diplomatic
reporting, had received credible assurances from Ma-
nagua that its support to the remaining Argentine
terrorists had ended. He decided that the time was
ripe to declare an end to Argentina's aid to the anti-
Sandinistas and to the Government of El Salvador,
although he stopped short of canceling existing mili-
tary sales contracts with the latter country.
Alfonsin also attempted to join the Contadora group
but was rebuffed by the group's members. We believe
they resented what they saw as his effort to use such
an association for image-building purposes. Undaunt-
ed, Alfonsin undertook bilateral efforts in Central
America, dispatching high-level emissaries for talks
with government and opposition leaders in El Salva-
dor and Nicaragua. Because he regards Nicaragua as
key to regional peace, he sought to improve ties with
Managua, to diminish the Sandinistas' sense of isola-
tion from Latin America and the West, and to
encourage democratic processes in Nicaragua. Thus,
he met personally with key Nicaraguan leaders and
launched several trade and investment initiatives,
including a multimillion dollar line of credit for
Nicaragua. He urged outside powers, such as Venezu-
ela, to be more supportive of the Sandinistas, and he
criticized superpower involvement in Central Ameri-
ca,
By mid-1984, however, Alfonsin had begun to scale
down these efforts.
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We
believe he also became more pessimistic about Argen-
tina's ability to influence the Sandinistas. In addition,
after President Duarte was inaugurated in El Salva-
dor, Alfonsin began to seek improved ties with this
regional adversary of Nicaragua.
We believe that Alfonsin is unlikely to launch any
further significant moves in Central America, given
his lack of success to date and the growing press of
25X1 domestic problems, particularly the continuing eco-
nomic and financial squeeze his government faces. In
November, Alfonsin
commented that his country has "no effective voice"
on key Central American questions, and that these
issues will inevitably be resolved by the major powers.
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The Other Countries: Staying in the Background.
The remaining South American countries appear to
believe that there is little reason to focus on Central
America. In our view, these countries have not sought
significant involvement in Central American issues
25X1 because of distance from the region and their own
domestic preoccupations. In most cases, moreover,
they have only meager resources to apply even if they
did wish to be more active.
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Brazil, the region's major power, supports the Conta-
dora process but has publicly made clear that it
eschews a larger role for itself. Official comments on
Central American issues have been limited to en-
dorsements of nonintervention and self-determination.
From diplomatic reporting and public statements, it is
clear that the Brazilians regard the region as suffi-
ciently far away that the advent of leftist regimes
would not pose a danger. This view contrasts sharply
with Brasilia's vigorous overtures in 1983 to
Suriname, on Brazil's northern border. In addition,
Brazil's commercial interests in the isthmus are small,
and neutrality carries the benefit of demonstrating
independence from Washington. As the military gov-
ernment of President Figueiredo nears the end of its
tenure, we believe it is highly unlikely to alter this
hands-off approach.
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A civilian government is to be inaugurated in March,
and we judge that in the increasingly open political
environment the new administration will be more
subject to pressure from political groups critical of US
olicies.
Figueiredo's probable successor, Tancredo
Neves, has said that, if elected, he may on occasion
need to placate the domestic left by voicing at least
pro forma criticism of some US policies abroad. Even
so, we doubt that Central America will become a
significantly larger issue for the Brazilians or that
they will greatly modify their stance. The transition
process itself, along with Brazil's ongoing financial
difficulties, will more than fill the plate of the new
administration. Moreover, we do not believe that the
politically cautious Neves will want to alter Brazil's
traditionally low-profile foreign policy by seeking
greater involvement in the morass of Central Ameri-
ca.
The conservative, military-dominated governments of
Chile, Uruguay, and Paraguay have tended to support
US policy in Central America. Chile's President
Pinochet occasionally has publicly condemned the
Sandinista regime, with which his government does
not maintain relations, and according to a US diplo-
matic source has promised to help Honduras reequip
its Air Force. Diplomatic sources note that Chilean
Government and military officials view Central
America as a battleground in the struggle against
Communist expansion and support US involvement
there. Chile has long had military ties, including
exchanges and training programs, with the armed
forces in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.
Pinochet's own domestic political and economic crises,
however, have distracted him from Central America
over the last two years. Uruguay has been quietly
supportive of US policy and provided observers for the
presidential elections in El Salvador. Incoming civil-
ian President Julio Sanguinetti is cooler toward US
policy in Central America, according to US Embassy
reporting. We believe, however, that the transition to
civilian government and Uruguay's economic prob-
lems will be his main concerns, at least during 1985,
precluding major attention to foreign policy, particu-
larly such remote issues as Central America.
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Paraguay's actions have been limited to formally
opposing the Contadora process on the grounds that a
key participant, Nicaragua, is a Communist state.
Judging from his past statements, we believe that
President Stroessner?who hosted Nicaragua's Presi-
dent Somoza after his ouster from power in July 1979
and in whose country Somoza was assassinated?
would endorse strong US intervention against the
Central American left.
Ecuador has a conservative new President, Leon
Febres-Cordero, who, according to US Embassy re-
porting, has indicated he will be more supportive of
US policies in Central America than were his two
leftist predecessors. Febres-Cordero is highly con-
cerned about a domestic Ecuadorean insurgent group
which, received
promises of guerrilla training in Nicaragua. He has
told US diplomats that he would like to work with the
political opposition in Nicaragua, and he personally
urged anti-Sandinista presidential candidate Arturo
Cruz not to participate in the Nicaraguan elections
last year without meaningful guarantees. His govern-
ment also recently expelled one Nicaraguan diplomat.
Nevertheless, Febres-Cordero is a strong nationalist
who criticized the US invasion of Grenada, and we
25X1 doubt he would support a major increase in US
military involvement in Central America.
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Peru's President Belaunde has been far too preoccu-
pied with domestic problems, including a thriving
insurgency, to involve his administration in external
issues. In any event, Belaunde has only a few months
left in his term. His probable successor in July 1985,
Alan Garcia, is a center-left nationalist who, we
expect, will quickly try to establish his Third World
credentials. We expect him to be more active in
international forums than Belaunde, more inclined
publicly to support the Sandinistas and Central
American revolutionary groups, and more likely to
take anti-US positions.
Bolivia, also beset by serious political and financial
problems, has limited its role in Central America to
publicly supporting the Contadora effort and endors-
ing United Nations resolutions criticizing human
rights abuses in El Salvador. Left-leaning President
Siles sympathizes with the Sandinistas, who treated
him well when he visited Nicaragua as an exile, and
5
he restored diplomatic ties with Managua soon after
his inauguration in 1982.
Views on Contadora
Despite the relative detachment of most South Ameri-
can countries from Central American issues, there is
widespread public and governmental support for the
Contadora process throughout the hemisphere?pri-
marily, in our view, because it is internationally
respectable, promotes dialogue, and entails no entan-
glements for South America. As reflected in numer-
ous public statements by officials and others, all
countries except Paraguay endorse the Contadora
effort. The Contadora negotiations have received
broad international support, and this in itself has
generated a measure of pride among Latin nations
generally.
widely held perception in South America that the
Contadora countries have been instrumental in keep-
ing the peace process alive. Moreover, we believe that
most South American countries find Contadora's
"noninterventionist" approach consistent with their
own efforts to chart independent foreign policies.
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Over time, however, we believe that other factors will
militate against most South American nations giving
energetic support to Contadora or to other multilater-
al efforts to resolve the crisis. Diplomatic reporting
indicates that even Venezuela has become increasing-
ly frustrated with the obstacles placed by both Nica-
ragua and pro-US Central American governments to
achieving a regional settlement and wants to bring the
process to a close as quickly as possible without losing
face. The Colombian Government has demonstrated
greater patience, largely because of Betancur's per-
sonal stake in promoting his image as peacemaker.
We believe, however, that he may well be forced to
divert his attention from foreign policy issues by
pressure at home to deal with overriding difficulties,
including a deteriorating economy and continuing
terrorist-inspired rural violence. The importance of
these issues to most Colombians, in our judgment, will
not allow Betancur to use foreign policy initiatives as
a diversion.
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Historically, a tradition of distrust among the South
American nations?stemming from nationalistic ri-
valries and longstanding boundary disputes?has
made them generally reluctant to participate whole-
heartedly in joint efforts. Thus, while Latin doubts
about US motives may well have spurred the creation
of the Contadora initiative outside established chan-
nels such as the OAS, the Latins' own differences will
increasingly tend to weaken the group's effectiveness,
in our judgment. Finally, it is always highly tempting
for a South American president to choose a policy
approach that potentially glorifies him personally, his
party, or his country.
Perceptions of Soviets and Cubans
Relaxed Attitudes Toward Moscow.
ments of various leaders,
The public state-
make it clear that
no South American government doubts the increas-
ingly Marxist cast of the Nicaraguan regime or the
reality of Sandinista aid to Salvadoran guerrillas.
Betancur, for example, has told US officials that the
Contadora group members work on the assumption
that Managua clears its major policy moves with
Moscow. Ecuador's Febres-Cordero, according to the
US Embassy in Quito, also is highly wary of the
Nicaraguan regime.
Nonetheless, South American views of Soviet inten-
tions and capabilities in Central America tend to
differ considerably from those of Washington. Al-
though many South American leaders and officials
harbor some distrust of Moscow and, according to
various diplomatic sources, fear the installation of
pro-Soviet regimes in Central America, the Soviet
role in the region has not been a major source of
25X1 South American concern. Diplomatic sources indicate
that many South Americans tend to believe US
claims of Soviet involvement in Central America are
overstated and politically motivated.
In our judgment, this relaxed attitude is partly attrib-
utable to a South American perception that Soviet
military activity in the Caribbean region is limited
and nonthreatening. Moreover, we believe the Soviets
have behaved circumspectly in the South American
countries themselves, avoiding conspicuous support
for opposition groups and stressing state-to-state dip-
lomatic and trade ties. The two largest nations,
Secret
Argentina and Brazil, also maintain important com-
mercial relations with the Soviets that they do not
want to jeopardize, while Peru relies heavily on Soviet
military equipment and training. Finally, we believe
most South Americans tend to take the US security
umbrella over the hemisphere for granted.
Greater Uneasiness Toward Havana. While South
American governments are relatively relaxed about
Soviet intentions,
these governments have stronger views about
the nature of Cuban activities in Central America.
The more conservative leaders have voiced concern
about Havana's military presence in Nicaragua. Yet
there are significant variations among South Ameri-
can countries over how to deal with Cuba:
Colombia's President Betancur likes to deal person-
ally with Fidel Castro, according to US Embassy
eporting, and is close to such Colombian
leftists as Nobel Prize winner Gabriel Garcia Mar-
quez, a fervent pro-Cuban sympathizer. Betancur,
has expanded his
government's political and cultural contacts with
Havana, even though formal diplomatic relations
with Cuba remain suspended. These moves are
generally in line with his policy of emphasizing the
impartial treatment of all countries involved in the
Central American region. Moreover, Betancur ap-
parently believes that warmer ties with Havana will
give him some leverage in seeking a peaceful solu-
tion through the Contadora process.
? In Venezuela, diplomatic sources report, opinion
within the government and ruling party is divided
between hardliners, who deeply distrust Cuban ini-
tiatives in the region, and more leftist groups seek-
ing ways to minimize the chances of bringing
Caracas into direct confrontation with Havana.
President Lusinchi, himself a hardliner, has publicly
expressed concern about Cuban meddling in the
area.
Argentina's new government has been openly criti-
cal of all foreign involvement in Central America,
but has not singled out Cuba.
Argentine bilateral relations with Ha-
vana have continued to improve since President
Alfonsin took office in December 1983.
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Brazil has perceived a serious Cuban threat only in
Suriname, according to diplomatic
sources. It has applied bilateral pressure on
the Surinamese Government to lessen Havana's
influence.
? Conservative South American governments, such as
those in Chile and Ecuador, have been critical of
Cuba's military presence in Nicaragua, but their
opposition has been largely rhetorical. Chilean Pres-
ident Pinochet has openly criticized Havana's role in
Central America, and Ecuador's Febres-Cordero
almost certainly takes a dim view. of Havana and
will be watching for any signs of Cuban involvement
with Ecuadorean terrorists.
Prospects for Stronger Reaction
Given this relatively relaxed outlook toward Moscow
and the differing attitudes regarding Havana, we
believe that even a dramatic new escalation by the
Soviets or Cubans?for example, a new introduction
of large numbers of advanced offensive weapons
systems such as MIG fighters?would not incline
most South American nations to become more in-
volved. To be sure, a Soviet or Cuban move on that
scale would draw criticism. Nonetheless, we believe
that, except for Colombia and Venezuela, no South
American government would perceive a direct threat
to its vital interests.
This limited reaction is strongly suggested by the
consistent lack of significant South American re-
sponse to the steady increase to date in the size of
Nicaragua's Army, the presence of thousands of
Cuban advisers in that country, and the provision of
large amounts of Communist military hardware to
Managua. Moreover, whereas the United States was
highly concerned in the fall of 1984 about the possible
arrival in Nicaragua of MIG aircraft, South Ameri-
can officials generally did not express particular
concern. We do believe that, in the event of a major
escalation by Cuba or the USSR, Venezuela and
possibly Colombia?if only out of concern for the
potential threat to its island possessions?would seri-
ously consider providing substantial arms assistance
to one or more beleaguered Central American govern-
ments.
7
Implications for the United States
By contrast, we believe that a major expansion of US
activity?such as the presence of US troops to support
the Salvadoran Government, or renewed support for
anti-Sandinista forces in Nicaragua?would draw sig-
nificant criticism from South American governments,
even if such a move were clearly in response to a
Cuban or Nicaraguan provocation. Latin nationalism
would virtually guarantee this. We also judge, howev-
er, that official criticism would be limited to rhetoric
and would prove to be only a temporary irritant in
relations with the countries involved.
Distance and the press of their own domestic
problems make Central America largely peripheral
for almost all South American countries. Moreover,
we believe that leaders in these countries recognize
they have little to gain by trying to challenge Wash-
ington.
The mixed but predominantly circumspect reactions
of South America to the US military action in
Grenada in 1983 also suggest that, at worst, negative
reaction to heightened US activity in Central Ameri-
ca would be rhetorical and its effects transitory.
Outright public condemnations of the move into Gre-
nada were very few?emanating only from the leftist
government of Bolivia and the then left-leaning ad-
ministration in Ecuador. Venezuela carefully avoided
condemning the United States, calling simply for an
end to all foreign intervention in Grenada. President
Lusinchi, then campaigning for office, privately re-
ferred to Grenada's previous rulers as a "pack of
bandits," according to the US Embassy in Caracas.
Colombia's Government publicly criticized the United
States but did so only once and in relatively low-key
fashion. Argentina, at the time still under military
rule, issued a pro forma criticism, and Brazil, while
publicly critical, was not strident and did not belabor
the point. Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay all support-
ed the United States. Civilian officials in Peru, ac-
cording to the US Embassy, privately expressed sym-
pathy with Washington on Grenada.
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Although South American leaders will continue to
feel obliged publicly to condemn much of what the
United States may do in Central America, we also see
some potential for South American support?in pri-
vate?for increased US activism. We believe, for
example, that the military in a number of countries
would feel reassured by a still higher level of US
activity against Central American insurgents. In fact,
tnilitary lead-
ers in Chile and Argentina privately applauded US
actions in Grenada, and we believe that this attitude
was shared by officers in numerous countries.
The Gov-
ernments of Chile and Paraguay would be likely to
offer public support for a higher US profile in Central
America, but backing from these internationally iso-
lated regimes would, in our view, fuel criticism of the
United States from abroad.
While the military's response could be positive, with
the opening up of political systems?already accom-
plished in Argentina, Peru, and Ecuador and under
way in Brazil and Uruguay?we expect to see an
increasing tendency among political groups to criti-
cize the United States on Central America, even if
Washington does not step up its involvement. A leftist
demonstration in late November at the US Consulate
in Sao Paulo, Brazil, to protest Washington's stance
25X1 toward Nicaragua is a recent example. South Ameri-
can governments considering supporting the United
States on Central America will have to assess the
growing political costs of doing so, in our view.
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We also believe that the present level of US involve-
ment in Central America has the potential over time
to affect, in subtle but noticeable ways, South Ameri-
can countries' perceptions of their fundamental rela-
tionships with Washington. The US presence in Cen-
tral America and the US military action in Grenada
provide vivid reminders that Washington can and will
act vigorously in the hemisphere to protect its inter-
ests. Even though US actions in Central America to
stem the spread of instability and insurgency benefit
South America, from a Latin perspective they tend at
the same time to deepen already existing wariness of
the United States.
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