THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE: ARMING FOR EFFECTIVENESS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00587R000400480003-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 13, 2011
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: October 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
The Afghan Resistance:
Arming for Effectiveness
--Seeret
NESA 85-10200
October 1985
Copy 3 11
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
The Afghan Resistance:
Arming for Effectiveness
This paper was prepared by
Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. It was
coordinated with the Directorate of Operations.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, South Asia Division, NESA, on
Secret
NESA 85-10200
October 1985
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The Afghan Resistance:
Arming for Effectiveness 25X1
Key Judgments The Afghan insurgents' supplies of weapons and ammunition have in-
Information available creased considerably as the war has progressed, and their effectiveness in
as of 25 September 1985 using them has improved. Although the weapons situation varies signifi-
was used in this report.
cantly among guerrilla groups, in general they:
? Better understand the capabilities of their arms because of training and
combat experience.
? Waste less ammunition.
? Are integrating different types of weapons for better defense.
? Have improved their tactics and better coordinate their use of arms with
those of other insurgent groups.
Training is the key to improving insurgent weapons skills. The need for in-
struction will remain high as the resistance grows and obtains more
weapons and its commanders try to make the most effective use of their
arms.
ore
insurgent commanders, as they gain expertise, will also train their forces
inside Afghanistan to be close to the fighting. Many guerrillas lack
education and mechanical skills, hindering the scope and effectiveness of
the training.
The resistance probably will continue to have the most success with
weapons that can be transported easily, are simple to use and easy to
maintain, and for which ammunition is readily available. Overall guerrilla
effectiveness against the Soviets and Afghan regime forces, however, will
depend as much or more on leadership, organization, and morale as on
better arms and training. The insurgency's diffuse nature-particularly the
lack of central direction and inability to coordinate resistance efforts-
probably will forestall dramatic breakthroughs in the near term.
iii Secret
NESA 85-10200
October 1985
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Key Judgments
Light Infantry Weapons
Minelaying
9
Mineclearing
10
Training
10
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Figure 1
Afghanistan
200 Kilometers
200 Miles
Province boundary
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not nece0sarily aft5,oritative.
Area of
erilargelnent
meters
0 50Miles
/. Je~~e
I-Kapisa
Pestawai
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The Afghan Resistance:
Arming for Effectiveness
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The Afghan insurgents have acquired significant
amounts of arms and ammunition since the Soviet
invasion in 1979.' We believe that, in general, the
guerrillas' performance with light infantry weapons
has improved over time. Some arms, such as 20-mm
guns and 14.5-mm antiaircraft guns, however, are too
cumbersome for many groups to use effectively in
areas where great mobility is required. Insurgent
weapons skills also are uneven, and training will be a
key factor governing the resistance's ability to absorb
more and better arms.
Over the past few years the insurgents have learned to
use a variety of weapons that were unavailable to
them at the time of the invasion. They have captured
many from Soviet forces-including weapons like the
AK-74 5.45-mm assault rifle, RPG-22 light antitank
weapon, and AGS- 17 30-mm automatic grenade
launcher. Others-like mines, surface-to-air missiles,
and 107-mm rockets-have come from foreign donors
sympathetic to the resistance.
some guerrillas also are using longer
range antiaircraft weapons-20-mm guns-this year.
Heavy Machineguns
25X1 The insurgents' effectiveness with heavy machineguns
(HMG) has improved markedly.
25X1 early in the war the guerrillas fired at
success against low-flying aircraft.
aircraft far beyond the range of their guns, wasted
large quantities of ammunition, and failed to take the
movement of the aircraft into account when aiming.
Most guerrillas have learned from their mistakes, and
more and better training has contributed to mounting
we esti-
mate that the insurgents have destroyed or seriously
damaged some 750 Soviet and Afghan aircraft since
the invasion, mostly with 12.7-mm and 14.5-mm
heavy machineguns. More aggressive Soviet air as-
sault tactics, however, are making air defense more
difficult, altering the insurgents' needs. Soviet aircraft
also are using countermeasures more frequently, such
as releasing flares, and conducting attacks from just
outside the range of insurgent heavy machineguns
with longer range guns and rockets. F__1
The 12.7-mm heavy machinegun, which has an effec-
tive range of about 1,000 meters, is available to most
large resistance groups. Insurgents use the direct-fire
weapon against low-flying aircraft. Compared to
many air defense guns, it is light, can be quickly
dismantled, and requires minimal training. Some
insurgents, however, believe the 12.7-mm HMG is no
longer as useful as earlier in the war because Soviet
and Afghan helicopter pilots conduct their attacks
from longer ranges.
the 12.7-mm HMG successfully keeps helicopters at
distances that reduce their accuracy against insurgent
targets. Guerrillas in western Afghanistan claim they
need more sophisticated antiaircraft weapons because
of difficult terrain features, more frequent air as- 25X1
saults, and more aggressive Soviet tactics,
Almost any heavy
machinegun-unless it has a great range and is
capable of very rapid fire-will be of limited effec-
tiveness against fast-flying fixed-wing aircraft.
Some guerrillas consider the 14.5-mm antiaircraft
gun-which has a slightly greater range than the
12.7-mm HMG but is in the hands of fewer groups-
too heavy for mountain fighting and the aiming
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Table 1
Weapons Commonly Used by the Insurgents
Caliber: 7.62 mm
Weight, empty: 3.14 kg
Maximum range: 2,500 in
Effective range: 300 in (semi); 200 in (auto)
Feed: 30-round magazine
Caliber: 40 mm (launcher); 82 mm (warhead)
Weight: 7.9 kg
Effective range: 100 in
Ammo type: HEAT
Armor penetration (0? obliquity): 180 mm
Caliber: 40 mm (launcher); 85 mm (warhead)
Weight: 7.9 kg
Effective range (against armor): 300 in
Ammo type: HEAT
Armor penetration (0? obliquity): 330 mm
Caliber: 82 mm
Elevation: 45? to 85?
Weight in firing position: 56 kg
Weight of projectile: 3.1 kg
Maximum range: 3,040 in
Minimum range: 90 in
Maximum operational range: 3.7 km
Minimum operational range: 1 km
Maximum effective altitude: 3,000 in
Minimum effective altitude: less than 10 m
Guidance: passive infrared homing
Reaction time: 4 to 5 seconds
Missile weight: 9.1 kg
Warhead weight/type: 1.17 kg/HE
82-mm recoilless rifle (B-10) Caliber: 82 mm
Weight: 71.7 kg
Elevation: -20? to +35?
Traverse: 360?
Rate of fire (practical): 4 to 6 rounds/min
Practical range (against armor): 400 in (est.)
Armor penetration: 240 mm
Mines Types: vary (homemade, Chinese, Egyptian, Soviet, double-impulse
varieties, Claymore-type, and others)
12.7-mm heavy machinegun Caliber: 12.7 mm
Elevation: -10? to +85?
Traverse: 360?
Tactical antiaircraft range: 1,000 in
Weight of projectile: 0.044 to 0.052 kg
Weight of machinegun: 35 kg
Weight of mount: 119 kg
Caliber: 14.5 mm
Elevation: -8.5? to +90?
Tactical antiaircraft range: 1,400 in
Weight: ZPU-2: 620 kg; ZPU-4: 1,770 kg
Weight of projectile: 0.06 kg
Used against armor and other
vehicles, especially in convoy
attacks
Used against armor and other
vehicles, especially in convoy
attacks
Used defensively to protect
bases and camps; offensively to
harass posts and garrisons
Hand-held, portable air de-
fense. The insurgents also may
be receiving the SA-76 which
provides improvements in range
and altitude.
Used defensively and offensive-
ly for direct-fire support
Used defensively to protect base
areas, against convoys and road
traffic, and to slow and control
the movement of advancing
enemy forces
Air defense and attacks on
posts and convoys
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system poorly adapted for use against fixed-wing
the 14.5-mm antiaircraft guns are used mostly in
the east, noting that the guns' bulk makes them useful
only where the resistance is well organized.
Surface-to-Air Missiles
Some insurgent groups are using SA-7 surface-to-air
missiles effectively against helicopters and fixed-wing
aircraft, and,
larger supplies of the man-
portable missiles would dramatically improve their air
defense capabilities,
ing off and landing.
the number of their air-
craft lost to SA-7s will increase. The weapon serves as
a powerful deterrent. Soviet aircraft pilots, made
more cautious because of fears about the presence of
SA-7s in Afghanistan, are using evasive tactics and
countermeasures-such as dropping flares when tak-
Despite some successes with surface-to-air missiles,
less than 1 percent of the insurgents have them and
appear able to make effective use of them. Larger
supplies of the missiles probably would not improve
resistance effectiveness substantially unless more
guerrillas are trained in their use. The system itself is
susceptible to countermeasures and limited in effec-
tiveness by a guidance system that sometimes cannot
discriminate spurious heat sources from targets.
25X1 Moreover, its battery has a short life, and the weapon
can be damaged easily while being transported
through rugged terrain in Afghanistan.
The SA-7 is a man portable, shoulder-launched sur-
face-to-air missile system that can be used most
effectively against slow, low-flying aircraft. The
missile is aimed from a launch tube and locks on to a
target through a passive infrared guidance system.
Although the SA-7's portability makes it an ideal
weapon for small, mobile insurgent groups, it has
serious limitations. The system is not effective
against high-speed targets. Missiles usually are fired
from behind a targeted aircraft so they can home in
on the heat from the aircraft's exhaust. The gunner,
because he must be behind the aircraft, consequently
cannot easily engage aircraft until the later stages of
attack. The aircraft must bellying at a slow speed-
usually no more than 500 knots-as well as at a low
altitude if the missile is to overtake it. Because the
SA-7 uses an uncooled infrared detector, it is vulner-
able to countermeasures such as flares, and it cannot
filter out other heat sources. It may, for example,
home in on the sun or even geothermal heat if not
fired at the proper angle. The missile's inability to
distinguish between geothermal heat and the infrared
radiation from aircraft significantly reduces its effec-
tiveness against helicopters flying nap-of-the-earth. F_
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Insurgent supplies of weapons and ammunition vary
widely. Most guerrillas obtain their supplies from the
seven major Peshawar-based resistance organiza-
tions, but they also capture some from Soviet and
Afghan forces, steal arms from rival groups, and
purchase supplies directly in arms bazaars in Paki-
stan and Afghanistan. Foreign suppliers channel aid
to the insurgents through the Pakistani Government,
which in turn distributes it to the Peshawar organiza-
tions and, in some instances, to especially active field
commanders. Most of the military supplies are pro-
vided to the fundamentalist Peshawar groups-which
generally have the most active field commanders. The
Peshawar organizations authorize arms shipments to
the field commanders and arrange for transporting
materiel to depots close to the border, where field
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Afghanistan.F-l
The Hizbi Islami (Gulbuddin) and Jamiat-i-Islami
probably have the best armed insurgents in Afghani-
stan. Guerrilla groups belonging to Sayyaf's Ittihadia
organization probably are also well supplied, but they
are few in number and tend to be less active than
Jamiat or Hizbi groups. Other insurgents claiming
allegiance to fundamentalist resistance organizations
tend to be comparatively well armed only in selected
areas-usually the provinces bordering Pakistan.
Guerrillas belonging to the moderate resistance par-
ties, with some exceptions like the well-armed insur-
gents in Paktia Province who belong to Gailani's
Mahaz-i-Milli-Islami organization, are among the
most poorly armed groups in Afghanistan.)
25X1 Even some large insurgent groups have difficulty
obtaining and using SA-7s.
Table 2
Alliance of Afghan Resistance
Parties Based in Pakistan
Ethnic
Composition
Islamic Fundamentalist
Hizbi Islami (Islamic Gulbuddin Hekmatyar Pushtun
Party) (Gulbuddin)
Hizbi Islami (Islamic Mohammad Yunus Khalis Pushtun
Party) (Yunus Khalis)
Islamic Union for the Abdul Rasul Sayyaf Pushtun
Liberation of
Afghanistan (Ittihadia)
Jamiat-i-Islami (Islamic Burhanuddin Rabbani Tajik
Society)
Harakat-i-Inqilab-i- Mohammad Nabi Pushtun
Islami (Islamic Mohammadi
Revolutionary
Movement)
Jabha-i-Najat-i-Milli Sibghatullah Mojadedi
Afghanistan
(Afghanistan National
Liberation Front)
Mahaz-i-Milli-Islami Sayed Ahmad Gailani
(National Islamic Front)
Rocket-Propelled Grenade Launchers
The rocket-propelled grenade launcher (RPG) has
become the standard weapon used by the resistance to
attack convoys. Guerrillas have used RPG-7s and
RPG-2s against Soviet and Afghan trucks and ar-
mored vehicles since the beginning of the war, but
their effectiveness has improved dramatically with
training and experience. Early in the war the insur-
gents often missed targets because they failed to
compensate for the rise of the rocket during its
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racy considerably.
trajectory. By 1982 most had learned to aim at the
lowest point on a target-the bottom tread on an
armored vehicle, for example-improving their accu-
even some 14-year-old boys can aim and fire
Although the rocket-propelled grenade launchers and
rockets are easily portable by one person and can be
25X1 fired quickly and accurately with little training, the
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short ranges of the RPGs-insurgents usually fire the
weapons at a range of 75 to 100 meters from the
target, require a
close approach to targets and limit their role in rear-
guard actions or in defense of bases. Transporting
large amounts of ammunition to support an attack
also can be difficult for some groups.
on average, guerrillas need four or
disable armored personnel carriers.
five rockets to destroy or stop tanks and one rocket to
most guerrillas believe
that their accuracy with the 82-mm mortar is improv-
ing but that they do not use them with much effective-
ness in offensive roles.
tion that can be transported more easily.
a result of insufficient stocks of ammunition, many
insurgents regard the weapons as useful only for
defensive actions or for harrying government posts.
For example, during 1984, insurgents in Paktika
Province reduced their fire against the local regime
garrison from a steady barrage to three to five rounds
a day as a harassing action to conserve rounds.
Moreover, even when mortars have been available, the
insurgents have chosen other weapons and ammuni-
Most insurgents use mortars only in observed-fire
roles because they want to see the impact of the
mortar rounds on their target.
many guerrillas, because they are
illiterate and can neither read maps nor understand
fire-direction plotting techniques, do not grasp indi-
rect fire techniques.
some groups are learning to use forward observ-
ers to direct the fire, communicating with the crew by
signal mirrors.)
since last March the insurgents have been receiving
greater numbers of recoilless rifles. Some groups
apparently consider them more useful than mortars in
offensive operations, probably in part because the
recoilless rifles are direct-fire weapons, and, although
heavy, the weapons and their ammunition can be
moved more easily. In our view, larger supplies of
recoilless rifles and ammunition would improve the
guerrillas' ability to launch attacks against Soviet and
Afghan posts and convoys by providing them with
additional direct-fire support for their attacks. F_
an increasing number
of guerrillas in eastern Afghanistan consider the
Chinese-made 107-mm multiple rocket launchers and
rockets excellent for barrages against Soviet and
Afghan bases and airfields. The insurgents have also
used the rockets against targets in Kabul City. Resis-
tance forces probably like the rockets because they
can be fired from long distances-some 8,000 me-
ters-and because the rocket launcher system is
lightweight and easy to move. F___]
The 107-mm rockets are not very accurate. They are
designed to provide suppressive fire over a wide area,
not to hit a narrowly defined target.
in November 1984 a Jamiat-i-
Islami group fired 27 rockets at Qandahar Airfield,
but none hit the target. Four rockets struck the Soviet
barracks nearby, causing some casualties and spark-
ing a large Soviet sweep in the area. US Embassy
sources in Kabul report that 107-mm rockets fired at
Jalalabad airport in April also missed their target by
a wide margin. The guerrillas appear to have their
most success with the rockets in urban areas like
Kabul, where the rockets, although usually causing
little damage, have a psychological impact.
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Figure 5
Major Insurgent Groups in Afghanistan
LJ Harakat-i- Ingilab-i- Islami
Harakat-i-Islami
Hizbi Islami (Gulbuddin)
Hizbi Islami (Yunus Khalis)
Islamic Union
Jabha-i-Najat-i-Milli Afghanistan
Jamiat-i-Islami
Mahaz-i-Milli-Islami
Sazman-i-Nasr and Sepah-e Pasdaran
Shura-Inqilab-i-Itifaq-i-Islami
Independent fronts
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Figure 6
Estimated Insurgent Arms Strengths in Afghanistan
Very poorly armed
Poorly to moderately well armed
Moderately well armed
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most insurgents say
they have much larger supplies of small arms than
ever before, but they complain about ammunition
shortages. Although the guerrillas have a variety of
rifles-some predating World War II-the majority
use the Soviet 7.62-mm Kalashnikov assault rifle
(AK-47), for which ammunition is most readily avail-
able. Some insurgents still use early 20th-century
Lee-Enfield (.303) rifles, which, if in good condition
and supplied with good quality ammunition, provide
greater range than the AK-47. Many groups also use
Soviet light machineguns, like the 7.62-mm Kalashni-
kov and 7.62-mm Degtyarev. In general, we believe
the insurgents use small arms effectively. F___]
The insurgents have gradually and significantly in-
creased their effectiveness with mines over the last
several years. Soviet
and Afghan forces have a healthy respect for guerrilla
mining techniques.
Ex-
25X1 tensive mining in the Panjsher Valley area over the
last few years has also resulted in a substantial
number of Soviet and Afghan casualties.
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Resistance forces use a variety of mines, including
plastic, metallic, and other types (including home-
made mines). a
widely used homemade device consists of 5 kilograms
of plastic explosive, a battery, and a matchbox deto-
nator having two electrical contacts on opposite sides
of the box. When a passing vehicle crushes the
matchbox, its electrical circuit is closed and the device
explodes. Mines sometimes are made from undetonat-
ed Soviet and Afghan bombs.
insurgents in Balkh Province are
against Soviet KMT 5 mine rollers.
now using double impulse mines, which are effective
guerrillas in some areas also are using
Much of the insurgents' success with mines is due to
improved tactics and minelaying techniques. In some
areas-such as Herat and the Panjsher Valley-the
mines have been used defensively to slow the advance
of Soviet and Afghan forces.
some Hizbi Islami insurgents now defend
areas where they have planted mines. If hostile forces
enter the area with dogs to detect or deactivate the
mines, the guerrillas harass the Soviets and try to kill
the dogs. In the Qandahar area insurgents have had
some success in "double mining." Boobytrapped
mines are laid with antivehicle mines in the hope that,
if Soviet sweepers find and try to extract a mine, the
boobytrap will kill them. Even when the mine and
boobytrap are discovered and exploded in place, the
road is damaged, hindering travel.
Along the roads from Kabul to Gardeyz and Qanda-
har, insurgents have adopted another common mining
technique to ensure the success of their convoy at-
tacks. they
mine not only the roads but also the shoulders where
vehicles will detonate mines if they try to pursue
insurgents in ambush positions.
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sistance problems with scatterable mines.
Despite their growing proficiency with mines, the
insurgents' equipment and efforts aimed at mineclear-
ing generally tend to be rudimentary. Their inability
to adequately clear Soviet and regime minefields has
resulted in high casualties and prevented them from
overrunning some posts and garrisons. Mines also cut
off resistance escape routes, make the insurgents more
vulnerable to attacks by hostile forces by slowing their
movements, and cause resupply caravans to use alter-
native routes. New Soviet equipment that can lay
hundreds of mines over broad areas-such as BM-27
multiple rocket launchers-probably will increase re-
The resistance has resorted to several tactics to clear
mines. Some insurgents use animals to detonate the
mines. an insur-
gent group in western Afghanistan drove a flock of
500 sheep ahead of them through a minefield. The
insurgents cleared an escape route, but about 200
sheep-a major source of food and a sign of wealth-
were killed. In other areas insurgents try to clear
paths through minefields using a sharpened stick to
poke the ground and probe for soft areas where the
earth appears freshly dug. If they find a mine, they
carefully dig around it, looking for a wire leading to
other mines in a series with the first. After uncovering
the single or series of mines, the guerrillas remove the
detonators manually.
Panjsher
Valley insurgents use grappling hooks that they toss
ahead of themselves and then pull in to trigger
tripwire mines. The grappling lines usually consist of
about 40 meters of nylon line attached to a four-
pronged metal hook.
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The number of insurgents with at least nominal skills
in the use of various weapons available to the resis-
tance has increased dramatically since 1980. Roughly
50,000 fighters now have, or will obtain by the end of
this year, at least some formal training. Still, because
time for instruction is limited and most Afghans are
illiterate and lack mechanical knowledge, relatively
few insurgents have been trained in sophisticated
techniques.
=last about 10 days and include instruction in the
use of small arms and light machineguns, RPG-7s,
and mines, Groups that
are especially active also receive training on heavier
weapons-such as mortars, recoilless rifles, and heavy
machineguns.
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The camps are staffed with insurgent instructors
and are designed to provide basic training to about
200 guerrillas each month.
their men during lulls in the fighting.
Since early in the war, some insurgent field com-
manders also have conducted training courses for
training in remote
and time required for the trip.
regions generally is poorer than in areas close to the
border, in part because weapons and ammunition are
in shorter su 1 . Few fighters from remote areas are
sent or instruction because of the cost
Major resistance organizations, because of their in-
25X1 creasing supply of instructors and to be closer to the
fighting, are beginning to train more of their insur-
25X1 gents inside Afghanistan.
men have received any weapons training
because of the long distance
Guerrilla groups continue to depend mainly on small
hit-and-run attacks. Insurgent commanders in several
areas, among them Masood in the Panjsher Valley,
Mohammad Anwar in Kabol and Nangarhar Prov-
inces, and the late Zabiullah Khan in Balkh and
Samangan Provinces, have successfully used lightly
armed 15-to-30-man mobile groups to assault convoys
and other Soviet or regime targets. The size of the
groups allows them to better maintain the element of
surprise and to react more quickly than larger forces.
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machineguns, and 82-mm recoilless rifles-to provide
air defense and direct-fire support for their attacks.
Insurgents in some areas are also developing better
tactics to attack regime and Soviet posts, in part a
25X1
25X1
Most Afghans have afundamentally different concept
of time than Westerners. According to experts on
Afghanistan, Afghans are indifferent to time; hurry-
ing is foreign to them; and the timing of their
activities is unpredictable and rarely planned. Their
view of time complicates resistance operations and
25X1 hinders the guerrillas' ability to wage war.
Because the notion of dividing a day into 24 segments
is alien to the insurgents-watches are worn for
ornamentation and prestige-scheduling and coordi-
25X1 nating operations are difficult. An attack is launched
when all members of a group are "ready --a feeling,
not a time.
insurgents, in general, keep time through their daily
prayers. Prayer time usually differs among groups,
however, so attacks rarely can be coordinated more
precisely than within a two-hour time frame.
25X1 The guerrillas believe that an attack begins when the
first shot is fired. Random shots,
25X1 thus have occasionally
started assaults before all groups committed to par-
25X1 ticipate in an attack are in place.
Insurgents in some areas of Afghanistan are learning
to integrate different types of weapons for more
25X1 effective attacks and to coordinate the use of their
arms with those of other groups for better defense.
25X1 insurgent
to attack convoys.
groups in Balkh Province have developed a comple-
mentary air defense system that includes 18 12.7-mm
and 14.5-mm heavy machineguns positioned at inter-
vals in caves along a valley to concentrate or provide
overlapping fields of fire on aircraft entering the area.
Insurgent groups also are using a variety of weapons
menting their use of small arms, grenades, mines, and
rocket-propelled grenade launchers with comparative-
ly heavy weapons-82-mm mortars, 12.7-mm heavy
insurgents in Kabol Province are aug-
result of improvements in their ordnance.
insurgents in the
Panjsher Valley have developed new tactics for as-
saulting government posts using paired mobile and
stationary units of about 30 men each. The units
target several outposts in the same general area, but
with the intention of overrunning only one of them.
Stationary units fire rockets, mortars, and 12.7-mm
heavy machineguns from several locations to suppress
the outposts' artillery, allowing the lightly armed
mobile units to approach the outpost they are at-
tempting to overrun with less worry about interdicting
fire from other outposts. Guerrillas in Paktia Province
have used a variety of weapons to keep Afghan units
under siege, blocking their aerial resupply much of
the time and preventing them from stopping insurgent
infiltration.
The insurgents probably will be able to maintain their
supply routes into Afghanistan and increase their
arms holdings. More weapons and better training in
their use will enable many guerrilla groups to achieve
greater tactical flexibility than earlier in the war.
Larger supplies of ammunition already are helping
some groups to prolong attacks against garrisons and
stage larger, more effective attacks against convoys.
The weapons that probably will be the most useful for
the resistance over the coming months will be those
that can be transported easily by one to three men or
a small number of animals, are simple to use and easy
to maintain, and for which ammunition is readily
available. Larger supplies of arms considered presti-
gious by the insurgents-such as surface-to-air mis-
siles or 107-mm rockets-will enhance the perfor-
mance of the resistance only as more guerrillas are
trained to use them.
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Variations in Tactical Effectiveness
The insurgents' ability to develop and implement
effective tactics against Soviet and Afghan forces
varies widely. In general, the groups in urban areas
and regions where Soviet and Afghan forces stage
more frequent operations tend to be the best fighters.
a growing gap
Training will be the key to improving insurgent
weapons skills in Afghanistan. The rapidly growing
number of guerrillas with arms expertise and the
increased supplies of weapons and ammunition flow-
ing into the country will allow more live-fire training.
The need for instruction will increase as the resistance
grows and obtains new weaponry and its commanders
25X1
axes.
in effectiveness between the experienced guerrillas in
the "war zones, " who are becoming more professional
and have access to better arms, and the amateurish
conduct of some insurgents where fighting is less
frequent. Some groups continue to fight according to
traditional tribal warfare patterns-most of these
tend to be part-time and will fight only so long as
village life remains undisturbed. Other insurgents,
including groups in the Hazarehjat and parts of
northwestern Afghanistan, are trying to develop orga-
nizations imitating regular armies. Still others, most
notably Masood in the northeast, are attempting to
broaden the war by creating autonomous mobile
groups capable of acting far from their bases. In
theory, such light units will enable commanders to
coordinate simultaneous attacks on communications
The insurgents most likely will continue to have high
rates of success against Soviet and Afghan ground
forces with RPG-7s and mines-weapons the Soviets
and Afghans have often complained have caused the
greatest percentage of their losses-and heavy ma-
chineguns will remain a mainstay of resistance air
defense. New and longer range air defense weapons
being made available to the insurgents-such as 20-
mm guns-will allow the resistance to hit aircraft
previously out of range and force Soviet aircraft to
attack from greater distances. Nonetheless, the 20-
mm guns may prove too cumbersome for effective
insurgent use in areas where great mobility is re-
quired. F__1
try to make the most effective use of the arms.
Increases in weapons holdings and training, however,
will not alone improve the insurgents' long-term per-
formance. The effectiveness of resistance operations
will depend as much on leadership, organization, and
morale. Relatively poorly armed but well-led and
-organized groups-such as the Jamiat-i-Islami insur-
gents in Herat Province-have already demonstrated
more success than their better armed counterparts.
Resistance groups will have to take steps to achieve
greater cohesiveness among their own members and
foster at least tactical cooperation with other bands,
although, paradoxically, the lack of a central insur-
gent authority means that, even if the Soviets deci-
mated one or two key groups, they will not have dealt
a knockout blow to the insurgency. F_~
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 Secret Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP86T00587R000400480003-1
Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/13: CIA-RDP86T00587R000400480003-1