THE SOVIET SOLDIER IN AFGHANISTAN: MORALE AND DISCIPLINE PROBLEMS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00587R000300390004-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 18, 2010
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: September 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/18 :CIA-RDP86T00587R000300390004-1
Directorate of Top Secret
Intelligence
The Soviet Soldier in Afghanistan:
Morale and Discipline Problems
Top Secret
NESA 85-10178CX
September 1985
Copy 2 ~ 1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/18 :CIA-RDP86T00587R000300390004-1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/18 :CIA-RDP86T00587R000300390004-1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/18 :CIA-RDP86T00587R000300390004-1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/18 :CIA-RDP86T00587R000300390004-1
Intelligence
The Soviet Soldier in Afghanistan:
Morale and Discipline Problems
This paper was prepared by of the
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis,
with a contribution by the Office
Soviet Analysis. It was coordinated with the
Directorate of Operations. Comments and queries
are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, South
Asia Division, Office of Near Eastern and South
Asian Analysis
Top Secret .25X1
NESA 85-10178CX
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/18 :CIA-RDP86T00587R000300390004-1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/18 :CIA-RDP86T00587R000300390004-1
The Soviet Soldier in Afghanistan:
Morale and Discipline Problems
as 4f 1 August 1985 and conscripts.
...__ ..__J .~ .L._ __-__.
Key Judgments Soviet military forces in Afghanistan over the past five years have
Information available experienced serious morale and discipline problems among both officers
25X1
25X1
25X1
Although morale and discipline problems are widespread, they have not
significantly hampered Soviet operations. Afghan insurgents have often
asserted that Soviet soldiers have been unaggressive in combat, but the
insur ents never have accused them of collapsing under fire or surrender-
ing. nearly all Soviet troops-including Central 25X1
Asians-obey orders, even though they dislike the war, because they fear
punishment 25X1
There is little prospect that Soviet morale and discipline in Afghanistan
will appreciably improve. Soviet authorities will instead rely on a combina-
tion of strict discipline and vigorous political indoctrination to keep the
situation from fundamentally affecting their approach to the war in
Afghanistan.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/18 :CIA-RDP86T00587R000300390004-1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/18 :CIA-RDP86T00587R000300390004-1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/18 :CIA-RDP86T00587R000300390004-1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/18 :CIA-RDP86T00587R000300390004-1
Top Secret
Key Judgments
Poor Training and Unit Cohesion
Impact on Combat Operations
Appendix
Morale and Discipline Problems in the Soviet Military: The Big Picture 9
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/18 :CIA-RDP86T00587R000300390004-1
25X1
25X1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/18 :CIA-RDP86T00587R000300390004-1
Top Secret
The Soviet Soldier in Afghanistan?
Morale and Discipline Problems ~ 25X1
The Soviet soldier in Afghanistan is confronted by
such morale-sapping factors as antagonism between
senior and junior conscripts and between officers and
conscripts, debilitating diseases, poor material condi-
tions, disillusionment, isolation, boredom, and inade-
quate training and unit cohesion.
25X1
25X1
We believe that friction between the older and youn- 25X1
ger conscripts,
results in part
because the army's regular officers are too removed
from the conscripts' lives.
25X1
25X1
Top Secret
NESA 85-10178CX
eptem er 1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/18 :CIA-RDP86T00587R000300390004-1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/18 :CIA-RDP86T00587R000300390004-1
Top Secret
of reprisals.
complain about mistreatment because they are afraid
Material Conditions
Soviet soldiers find living conditions in Afghanistan
usually worse than they have experienced elsewhere.
25X1 Hepatitis is the
most widespread ailment, although typhoid, malaria,
25X1 and assorted skin diseases are also common.
We believe the pervasiveness of these diseases reflects
poor hygiene, a general shortage of vaccines and
medical equipment, logistic deficiencies, as well as Disillusionment
Afghanistan's difficult climate. Hepatitis and typhoid In our view, the low state of Soviet morale stems in
are caused by nonpotable water, contaminated food, part from the frustrating nature of the Afghan insur-
inadequate mosquito control.
and shared eating utensils. Inadequate shelter forces gency.
troops to sleep on the ground, unprotected from the
cold and from insect-borne diseases. Malaria reflects
25X1 Top Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/18 :CIA-RDP86T00587R000300390004-1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/18 :CIA-RDP86T00587R000300390004-1
Top Secret
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Soviet soldiers see little reason to risk their lives in a
war that threatens to drag on indefinitely and does
not, in their opinion, involve vital Soviet interests.
Moreover, Soviet authorities tell conscripts going to
Afghanistan that they will be fighting, at least indi-
rectly, Americans and Chinese. But even the most
uneducated lout quickly discovers that he is fighting
Afghans who hate Russians and who are defending
their villages against foreign invaders,
most of their free time sleeping, washing clothes, and
singing songs about their loved ones and their fear of
death.
Isolation and Boredom
Isolation also contributes to poor morale.
conscripts are afraid of contacts with Afghans,
which, in any case, are forbidden by Soviet authori-
ties. Conscripts can correspond with loved ones and
friends but cannot return to the Soviet Union during
their two years of duty.
Conscripts find their tours of duty extremely boring
when not faced with combat because authorities have
made little effort to provide entertainment.
Poor Training and Unit Cohesion 25X1
Soviet troops are poorly prepared for the rigors of
fighting the Afghan insurgency.
they are not provided training appropriate
to guerrilla war and are informed of their destination 25X1
only just before they leave or after they arrive in
Afghanistan.
Moreover, every six
months, about 25 percent of most unit members leave 25)(1
military service (after two years of service) and arc
replaced by new conscripts. We believe this high
foreign newscasts, althou h some officers allow their
25X1 troops to listen to them. troops spend
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/18 :CIA-RDP86T00587R000300390004-1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/18 :CIA-RDP86T00587R000300390004-1
Top Secret
turnover, which occurs throughout the Soviet mili-
tary, hinders the growth of cohesion through shared
experiences and hardship.
Drug Abuse
We believe drug abuse is a worrisome problem for the
Alcohol Abuse
Soviet troops in Afghanistan also turn to alcohol, a
solace both within the Soviet armed forces and Soviet
society as a whole. conscripts make
Soviet armed forces in Afghanistan.
about half the conscripts smoke hashish,
roadblock.
which is cheap and widely available in Afghanistan;
significantly fewer conscripts consume opium and
cocaine. Soldiers barter clothing and gasoline; some
are so addicted that they trade weapons. Narcotics
will often buy an Afghan's way through a Soviet
25X1 Top Secret
vodka from stills or buy imported vodka from officers.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/18 :CIA-RDP86T00587R000300390004-1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/18 :CIA-RDP86T00587R000300390004-1
Top Secret
Corruption
Poor morale and the desire to make money-some-
times to pay for drugs or alcohol-have led to exten-
sive black marketeering.
the most frequent
25X1 transactions m A g amstan involve trading Soviet
small-arms ammunition, fuel, vehicle batteries, and
tires for hashish, cigarettes, Western clothing, radios
Soviet soldiers steal from Afghans as well as trade
with them. Soviet soldiers often
extort petty cash and hashish from Afghan truck-
drivers and car passengers at checkpoints along the
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/18 :CIA-RDP86T00587R000300390004-1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/18 :CIA-RDP86T00587R000300390004-1
Top Secret
Soviet authorities appear to have made progress only
in curbing the sale of arms.
no longer see Soviet soldiers selling
small arms in the bazaars, and Panjsher Valley leader
Ahmad Masood said in 1982 that his men could no
longer buy weapons from Soviets in nearby garrisons.
We believe strict penalties and better accounting
procedures explain the decline.
(separate
accounting procedures for Soviet and Afghan weap-
ons in the Kabul garrisons also have reduced illicit
arms sales.
Impact on Combat Operations
Although the Soviets have serious morale and disci-
pline problems, we believe these problems have had
only a small impact on combat operations. We have
not found evidence that morale and discipline prob-
lems have forced cancellation of any operations or
directly caused significant insurgent gains. Although
Afghan insurgents have often described Soviet sol-
diers as being unaggressive in combat, the Afghans
have never accused them of collapsing under fire or
surrendering.
to the Soviet troops' compliance with orders and the
failure of poor morale and discipline to adversely
affect combat operations. Poor military performance
leads to extra work, reduced rations, and problems
with future employers in the USSR; outright insubor-
dination leads to lengthy prison sentences. The pres-
ence of informers inhibits troops from expressing
opposition, although not apathy, toward the war.
defected to the insurgents.
Soviet troops indulge less in drugs and alcohol when
faced with combat, and only a small number have
fear of punishment is the key
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/18 :CIA-RDP86T00587R000300390004-1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/18 :CIA-RDP86T00587R000300390004-1
Top Secret
25X1
25X1
only a handful oj" the more
in Afghanistan have defected, and
the Soviet Central Asians have
conducted themselves in a relatively disciplined fash-
ion. Most Soviet Central Asians serve in the noncom-
bat support roles that they have traditionally filled
throughout the Soviet military.
Muslims.
We believe Soviet Central Asians are not moved to
support or join the insurgents because oj.language
barriers, strict control of conscript time and activi-
ties, and physical isolation. These overcome any
sense of shared religious beliej'and ethnic solidarity
they might have with the Afghans. Most Soviet
Central Asians speak Turkic languages and cannot
communicate with the afghans any better than the
Soviet soldiers of Slavic origin. Soviet Tajiks, who
speak a Persian dialect intelligible to a majority of
afghans, represent less than 10 percent ojall Soviet
The only unrest among Soviet Central Asians that we
have observed occurred in the USSR at the beginning
0.1 the war. There were spontaneous demonstrations
at military recruitment centers in two Kazakh cities,
a reported riot at a Tashkent induction center, and a
report ojcivil unrest among Uzbeks and Tajiks when
the co.JJins o.1 their dead began to arrive,
We also believe that the apolitical outlook of most
conscripts leads to their relatively docile behavior.
nearly all conscripts are preoccu-
pied with surviving the war and are uninterested in
world politics.
Soviet authorities have tried to improve morale and
discipline through punishments, criticism of officers,
and moderate rewards for good performance. The
authorities have resorted to strict, but not brutal, 25X1
punishments. selling weap- 25X11
ons, desertion, and engaging in assaults that cause
death or serious injury are punishable by death but
that penalties for lesser infractions are similar to those
elsewhere in the Soviet armed forces:
? Loss of weapon: up to three years' imprisonment.
Theft of weapon: up to seven years' imprisonment.
Large-scale theft: up to 10 years' imprisonment.
Theft with armed assault: up to 15 years'
imprisonment.
A moderate number of rewards have been used to
improve morale. Soviet officers are credited with
three years of service toward retirement for every two
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/18 :CIA-RDP86T00587R000300390004-1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/18 :CIA-RDP86T00587R000300390004-1
Ton Secret
years of service in Afghanistan; concripts usually
receive better food in Afghanistan than do Soviet
forces elsewhere; and veterans do not have to Hass
sonnel are praised in the press, although they are not
usually lavished with praise in public ceremonies.
Conscripts, however, are paid no better than con-
scripts who serve in the USSR, and disabled soldiers
do not receive pensions,
We believe that Soviet morale and discipline problems
will remain a prominent feature of military life in
Afghanistan and that the existence of these problems,
which are prevalent throughout the Soviet armed
forces, in a combat zone illustrates their deeply rooted
nature. On the other hand, morale and discipline
problems will not have a serious enough impact on
combat performance to inhibit Soviet authorities from
pursuing their present course in Afghanistan, and we
doubt these problems will play a decisive role in future
decisions on strategy and tactics.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/18 :CIA-RDP86T00587R000300390004-1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/18 :CIA-RDP86T00587R000300390004-1
Appendix
Morale and Discipline
Problems in the Soviet
Military: The Big Picture
Although 98 percent of the Soviet armed forces do not
serve in Afghanistan, these forces experience the same
kinds of problems as those fighting the war. Most
problems result from "normal" life in the Soviet army
and in Soviet society at large.
Soviet youth today are reluctant
soldiers whether they serve in Afghanistan or Germa-
ny. The "decline of patriotism" has evoked much
concern and public commentary by Soviet leaders. To
the extent that morale and discipline within the
military reflect underlying problems within Soviet
society, they are not amenable to solutions that apply
only to the military. The Soviets, however, seem to
expect morale and discipline problems with a con-
script army, and their system is designed to endure in
spite of them.
the general harshness of living conditions are evident
in Soviet military units from East Germany to the
Soviet Far East.
Many articles in the Soviet military press are devoted
to exposing specific acts of misuse of authority,
dereliction of duty, or other infractions of military
discipline. The articles also discuss in more general
terms what commanders should do to create better
morale and discipline in their units, and are invariably
peppered with examples of units that do not measure
up. Increased Soviet sensitivity to these kinds~of
problems dates at least to the mid-1970s when several
major incidents-including a mutiny aboard a Baltic
Fleet destroyer and the defection of a Soviet pilot with
a MIG-25-prompted high-level concern in Moscow.
The "stariki" system, whereby senior soldiers hold
sway over new recruits, is probably the single most
significant factor in contributing to poor morale,
and drug abuse, corruption and black marketeering,
brutality toward subordinates, ethnic tensions, and
Alcoholism
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/18 :CIA-RDP86T00587R000300390004-1
25X1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/18 :CIA-RDP86T00587R000300390004-1
Top Secret
Top Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/18 :CIA-RDP86T00587R000300390004-1