ALGERIA-USSR: BENDJEDID CHANGES COURSE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00587R000300330002-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 29, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: July 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Intelligence 25X1
Algeria-USSR:
Bendjedid Changes Course
NESA 85-10138X
SOV 85-10120X
July 1985
Copy 4 7 7
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Directorate of
Intelligence
Algeria-USSR:
Bendjedid Changes Course
Office of Soviet Analysis. It was coordinated with the
Directorate of Operations.)
and
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis,
This paper was prepared by
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Arab-Israeli Division, NESA,
Secret
NESA 85-10138X
SOV 85-10120X
July 1985
25X1
25X1
25X1
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Secret
Algeria-USSR:
Bendjedid Changes CourseF__1 25X1
Key Judgments Algerian President Chadli Bendjedid is trying to loosen Algeria's close ties
Information available with the Soviet Union. Since coming to power in 1979, Bendjedid has:
as of 14 June 1985 ? Improved relations with the West, including the United States.
was used in this report.
? Reduced the number of Soviet military advisers from 2,500 to about 800.
? Sought Western and US military equipment and technology to supple-
ment Algeria's predominantly Soviet-made arsenal.
? Replaced pro-Soviet senior Algerian officials with men who are mostly
Western in their outlook, tastes, and style.F_~
An overall shift in Algeria's ideological perspective coupled with an
interest in diversifying Algeria's sources of arms are the major factors that
will continue to weaken ties between Algiers and Moscow. The growing
inadequacy of Algeria's Soviet-style economic institutions to meet increas-
ingly vocal consumer demands is pushing the government to adapt Western
business practices and to rely on private enterprise. Moscow's support of
Benjedid's rival after President Boumediene's death also continues to affect
relations.
At the same time, Algiers will need continued access to sophisticated
military equipment at a lower cost than obtainable from the West as well
as resupply and maintenance assistance. Algiers also believes a working
relationship with Moscow supports Algeria's commitment to nonalignment.
An Algerian decision to sharply downgrade ties to the Soviet Union would
occur only if the Algerians believed they had developed secure enough
military ties to the West to ensure its military needs.F_~
The Soviets have tried to slow the deterioration in relations with high-level
visits, offers of sophisticated military equipment, and rhetorical support but
have not offered concessionary terms. Moscow values the hard currency it
receives from its military and economic sales to Algeria.F_-]
Moscow also wants access to Algerian bases for its own naval and air forces
but has received permission for only limited use. Excluding Western
influence is a more realistic Soviet goal, and Moscow is unlikely to threaten
to cut off military supplies to avoid accelerating Algeria's turn toward the
West.
Secret
NESA 85-10138X
SOV 85-10120X
JULY 1985
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Moscow may use the threat of expanding cooperation with Morocco and
Libya to discourage Algeria from further improving relations with the
West, especially the United States. Relations between Moscow and Algiers
would be severely strained if the Soviets:
? Established significant military ties with Morocco.
? Provided Libya with a substantial quantity of more sophisticated equip-
ment than Algeria currently has in its inventory.
? Acquired permanent basing rights in Libya.F--]
Bendjedid's decision to put some distance between his government and
Moscow has uncovered possible areas of mutual interest with the United
States. Algeria is interested in US military training and equipment,
especially avionics and transport and fighter aircraft. Algiers also is
looking to the United States for aid in improving Algeria's agricultural
sector and increasing the availability of consumer goods.
Commercial ties, however, are not likely to translate into consistent
Algerian support of US foreign policy initiatives. Indeed, Algeria's policies
will often appear contradictory and erratic as Algiers tries to maintain its
nonaligned credentials as well as its role as an important participant in the
Middle East peace process.F_~
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Secret
Key Judgments
Dependence on Soviet Military Equipment
1
Bendjedid's Personal Dislike of the Soviets
3
Implications for the United States
9
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Secret
Algeria-USSR:
Bendjedid Changes Course
Algerian President Bendjedid has found that the pro-
Soviet policies that Algeria has followed since inde-
pendence in 1962 have not met Algeria's needs. The
Bendjedid government is taking steps to reduce Alger-
ia's dependence on the Soviet Union and has made
clear that its version of nonalignment includes im-
proved relations with Western Europe and the United
States.F --- 7
Dependence on Soviet Military Equipment
A major factor that has contributed to Algeria's
reevaluation of its relationship with the Soviet Union
is Algiers's concern over its dependence on Soviet
military equipment. In the late 1970s the Algerians
assessed the military relationship with Moscow and
concluded that the quality and sophistication of Soviet
military equipment no longer were sufficient for
Algeria's needs, according to the US Embassy in
Algiers. This was reinforced by dissatisfaction with
the lack of adequate training. Nevertheless, Algeria's
desire to move ahead with an ambitious military
modernization program prompted a $3.4 billion con-
tract with Moscow in 1980. Embassy sources in
Algiers reported that the Soviets were the only major
arms supplier willing to provide expeditiously the
equipment requested. This deal included such items as
MIG-23 Floggers, several regiments of SA-6 antiair-
craft missiles, T-72 tanks, a large number of BMP
personnel carriers, and probably two Romeo-class
submarines and five new missile patrol boats. In
addition, the Algerians have received an SCC-3 coast-
al defense missile system and one Koni-class frigate.
The 1980 arms agreement allowed Algeria to solidify
its predominance in the Maghreb. These arms deliver-
ies, however, make Algeria dependent on Soviet spare
parts and equipment for a long time. In the five years
that have passed since the Algerians negotiated the
Soviet arms deal, Algiers has been shopping around
for new contracts, according to US Embassy sources
in Algiers. When the Bendjedid government decides
to purchase new military equipment, we anticipate
that Algiers will deviate from past practice by consid-
ering Western equipment as well as Soviet arms. For
example, the Algerians signed last year a $1.9 billion
contract for air defense equipment from France.
Problems of a Socialist Economy
Another important factor in Bendjedid's decision to
put distance between his government and Moscow has
been the emergence of basic economic problems that
many Algerian officials attribute to a rigidly socialist
economy:
? The highly centralized industrial sector has run into
trouble. Modern business techniques, such as inven-
tory control, production scheduling, and distribution
have been poorly managed. Heavy industry has been
favored over production of consumer goods, much of
which are imported under strict government control.
Domestic availability of such goods as automobiles,
televisions, and refrigerators is low compared to
demand, and prices are high. Growth of disposable
income far surpasses availability of goods, leading to
a thriving black market. Guaranteed wages and
government disdain for private initiative have hin-
dered productivity gains. As a result, production
costs for locally made goods are considerably higher
than imported products, and the utilization rate of
existing industrial capacity, according to local ob-
servers, is only about 50 percent.
? The level of technology needed to develop the
hydrocarbon industry is often beyond the capability
of the work force, and this has fostered a reliance on
foreign technicians.
? Central planning proved ineffective in matching
production with demand, and, as a result, the output
of the country's industrial sector has not met grow-
ing consumer demand.
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Figure 2. Soviet-built MI-24
HIND on display during 1 No-
vember Revolution Day parade
last year.
Figure 3. Algerians parade
Soviet-built SA-6 surface-to-
air missiles on 1 November
Revolution Day last year.
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Figure 4. Soviet-built SA-8
surface-to-air missiles on pa-
rade at 1 November Revolution
Day celebration last year.)
? To industrialize the economy quickly after indepen-
dence in 1962, Algeria neglected to develop the
country's social and economic infrastructure, partic-
ularly agriculture, education, and social services.
Neglect of water resources has led to a serious
national shortage. The quality and availability of
housing also are an increasingly thorny issue for the
government, sparking recent civil unrest in parts of
Algiers. F_~
The growing disparity in living standards in Algeria
compared to the West and mounting pressures to
provide jobs and meet consumer wants have convinced
the regime to move away from centralized planning,
according to the US Embassy. Although Algeria
remains committed to socialism, particularly in the
heavy industries, the Bendjedid government is encour-
aging private-sector participation in the economy by
loosening restrictions on foreign investment and de-
centralizing the mammoth bureaucracy that runs the
state companies. Emphasis has shifted from heavy to
light industry, and the current five-year investment
plan focuses on starting new projects in housing,
agriculture, and education. The transfer of some
public land to private farmers has been met with great
enthusiasm.
Close ties with the Soviet Union have generated fairly
strong anti-Soviet attitudes among many Algerian
officials, according to the US Embassy in Algiers.
These attitudes have several causes, including a reli-
giously inspired anti-Communism and negative per-
sonal experiences in dealings with Soviet officials.
Although most senior military officers who make up
the ruling elite have received training in the Soviet
Union, US Embassy officers report that many often
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make anti-Soviet statements. Algerian officials pri-
vately observed to US Embassy officials that sending
25X1 their countrymen to the Soviet Union for training has
"inoculated them against Communism."______
Support for the Policy Shift
Statements
prevailed under President Boumediene
made by Algerian officials suggest that Bendjedid's
second-term Cabinet is made up of loyal, like-minded
men whose moderate, anti-Marxist instincts will fur-
ther limit Algeria's relationship with the USSR. In
our view, most senior military officers are eager to
diversify Algeria's sources of arms, and the techno-
crats are convinced that national development re-
quires rapid access to Western technology and a
liberalization of Algeria's economic policies. We can-
not identify any senior Algerian officials who advo-
cate a return to the strongly pro-Soviet stance that
We believe that at lower levels of the party, bureau-
cracy, and military, however, there are people who
remain pro-Soviet. They will be critical of seeking
closer ties to the West at the expense of Algeria's ties
to the Soviet Union. In our view, however, Bendjedid
and his colleagues are in sufficient control and have
enough popular support to pursue their policies. =
Keeping Moscow Happy
Bendjedid's efforts to curtail Algeria's close relation-
ship with the Soviet Union should not mask the fact
that Algiers will continue to work with Moscow in
several areas. Bendjedid and his advisers are not free
to discard all of the radical policies of the past. The
underpinnings of the regime are in the revolution and
its anticolonial ideology, and these are still the basis
for the leadership's legitimacy. We believe that, even
though Bendjedid has no serious political competition,
neither he nor his colleagues believe in tampering with
Algeria's revolutionary heritage. As it cultivates clos-
er ties with the West, the Bendjedid regime is espe-
cially sensitive to preserving Algeria's commitment to
nonalignment. F_~
To this end, Algiers is careful to maintain the appear-
ance of good relations with Moscow and has denied in
public and to US officials that there has been any
cooling of relations. Asserting that Algeria intends to
have good relations with both superpowers, Algiers
allows both Soviet and Western access to its ports on a
case-by-case basis but refuses Moscow's requests to
establish permanent basing rights or hold joint mili-
tary exercises. The Bendjedid government also re-
mains committed to participating in such Soviet-
sponsored activities as the Afro-Asian People's
Solidarity Organization and Moscow's annual Inter-
national Youth Festival. A fairly steady stream of
low-level Soviet delegations passes through Algiers to
discuss bilateral issues and sign cooperation agree-
ments. The US Embassy in Algiers reports that
about 6,000 Soviet economic advisers and technicians
are participating in Algeria's development programs.
Their access to the local population, however, is
restricted.)
Despite the close military relationship between Al-
giers and Moscow, the Soviet Union has never been
one of Algeria's major trading partners. According to
the US Embassy, Algiers would like to reduce its
trade deficit with the Soviet Union but has little to
export other than wine and hydrocarbons, the latter of
which competes with Soviet production. F__1
Moscow and Algiers do not cooperate on natural gas
sales. According to US Embassy sources, Algiers has
pleaded with Moscow for a united front on marketing
natural gas in Western Europe but has been rebuffed.
Algeria, which views Western Europe as the most
logical area for it to expand natural gas exports in the
next decade, has been unable to reduce the USSR's
large share of West European gas markets primarily
because of its refusal to lower its price and Western
Europe's perception that the Soviet Union is a more
reliable supplier. If Algeria cuts its price-unlikely at
this time-competition for West European gas mar-
kets could become a contentious issue.F___1
Algeria continues to send some students to the Soviet
Union for higher education and professional training,
25X1
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Secret
Figure 5
Algeria: Merchandise Trade With the USSR,a 1974-84
L 1 -1
IIIIII 1111H%
a Excluding military imports.
Source: Official Soviet trade statistics.
although its high-level technocrats are predominantly
French-educated. Language problems and the gener-
ally low opinion of education in Communist countries
contribute to a lack of strong Algerian interest in
pursuing higher education there, according to the US
Embassy in Algiers. Most Algerian students believe
that a Western education will open up greater oppor-
tunities for them in Algeria, where French is still
considered the professional language. Some students
have turned down scholarships to the Soviet Union in
anticipation of a scholarship in the West. This trend is
likely to continue and even accelerate as Algeria looks
more to Western technology for its development
programs.F__-]
Algiers has generally remained silent when it dis-
agrees with Soviet policies. The Bendjedid govern-
ment, however, has departed dramatically from the
previous regime by repeatedly abstaining on the UN
resolution condemning the Soviet invasion of Afghani-
stan rather than voting with Moscow. According to
Embassy reporting, Algiers periodically criticizes the
invasion in private to both Soviet and US officials. We
I
I
Algerian imports
from the USSR
? Algerian exports
to the USSR
believe this attitude typifies the approach the Bendje-
did regime will take on Soviet policies it considers
contrary to its interests.F_~
Preventing the intervention of outside powers in Arab
and North African affairs has been one of Bendjedid's
major foreign policy objectives. The Algerians are
suspicious of Libya's ties with the Soviet Union and 25X1
were extremely troubled by Qadhafi's public threat in
March 1984 to give Moscow access to Libya's mili-
tary facilities,
Algiers wants to maintain military parity with
Libya and would view efforts by the Soviets to sell
more sophisticated weapons to Algeria's neighbors as
threatening regional stability.
The Bendjedid government has not displayed concern
over Moscow's ties with Tunis and Rabat. Algiers
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probably welcomes the recent increase in Soviet con-
tacts with Tunis as enhancing Tunisia's nonaligned
credentials. We believe that a Soviet military relation-
ship with Morocco, however, would be viewed by
Algiers in the context of the Moroccan-Algerian
25X1 rivalry for regional leadership and would further
strain ties between Algiers and Moscow. F__-]
We believe the Algerians do not want direct Soviet
military involvement in the Western Sahara conflict.
Algiers, however, would like Moscow to extend stron-
ger diplomatic support for Algeria's position on the
Western Sahara issue. An Algerian decision to re-
quest direct Soviet support for the Polisario conflict
cannot be ruled out, especially if Algiers believes that
such support might bring Rabat to negotiate a solu-
tion to the conflict.)
becoming a burden, and the government probably
believes these jobs should go to Algerians anyway.
ing the Soviet presence in Algeria. The US Embassy
in Algiers reports that the number of Soviet military
advisers has been reduced over the past five years
from 2,500 to about 800. The cost of employing Soviet
technicians in Algeria's armed services probably is
The Bendjedid government has been gradually reduc-
Moscow has been concerned by Algeria's efforts to
readjust its relationship with the Soviet Union since
the late 1970s, according to the US Embassy in
Moscow. We believe Algeria's interest in the West as
an alternative supplier of military equipment has
disturbed Moscow most, as this strikes at the very
heart of the Soviet-Algerian relationship. Moscow
probably believes that this could eventually lead to a
loss of other benefits. At a minimum, we believe that
Moscow wants to preserve its naval access to Algerian
ports and air transit privileges as well as access to
emergency maintenance facilities. The Soviets also
value the hard currency they get from economic and
military cooperation. Moscow probably believes its
image in the Third World and among Arab states has
been enhanced by its generally perceived closeness to
Algeria. F_~
Since 1979 the Soviets have been trying to prevent
further erosion in their position. They have made it
clear that they want military cooperation to continue
and demonstrated this by giving Algeria's arms re-
quests special consideration, providing what they be-
lieved was an adequate flow of spare parts for existing
inventories and trying to improve their contacts with
the Algerian military. A visit by the Commander in
Chief of the Soviet Navy, Admiral Gorshkov, in 1979
soon after Bendjedid's election probably led to the
1980 military assistance deal. In late 1983, Moscow
sent then Soviet Armed Forces Chief of Staff Ogar-
kov-the highest ranking Soviet official to visit Alge-
ria in two years-to dissuade Bendjedid from acquir-
ing Western military hardware.
The Soviets have also been annoyed by Bendjedid's
efforts to pursue a more evenhanded foreign policy.
Especially irritating were Algeria's active role in the
release of the US hostages from Iran; its abstention on
UN votes calling for withdrawal of Soviet forces from
Afghanistan; its more conspicuously nonaligned
stance than the other foreign delegates at the 26th
Soviet Communist Party Congress; and its modera-
tion and diminishing role in the Arab Steadfastness
Front.F___1
The Soviets recently have stepped up their efforts to
reverse Algeria's turn to the West. US defense atta-
che reports from Moscow state that the Soviet Union
is making extra efforts to improve the supply of spare
parts and to fulfill contracts and is leaving open the
possibility of the sale of the latest version of the T-72
tank and additional combat aircraft. Moscow proba-
bly believes that too much time has lapsed since
Bendjedid's last visit to the Soviet Union in 1981, and
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25X1
25X1
Figure 6. Soviet President
Brezhnev welcomes Bendjedid
during his only visit to the So-
viet Union in 1981i
-
it would like to schedule an official visit soon. Bendje-
did's visit to Washington this year will certainly cause
the Soviets to press even harder for a visit.F__1
Soviet attempts to influence Algerian politics do not
come during arms negotiations but when Algerians
need spare parts or maintenance equipment,
last year, Moscow successfully protested the
Algerian Navy's intention to replace the engines in its
Nanuchka and Osa-class patrol boats with West
German MTU models. New Soviet engines will be
used instead.)
We believe Moscow values the hard currency it
receives from technical and military assistance and
the few large-scale development projects it has in
Algeria. Its concern over growing Algerian arms
purchases from the West has not yet prompted Mos-
cow to relax hard currency repayment terms. Last
November a deal to
balance bilateral trade by selling oil to the Soviet
Union fell through most likely for that reason. The
Soviets have also been unresponsive to rescheduling
Algeria's arms debt.F_
Soviet media coverage of Algeria suggests Moscow
recognizes that future ties may be less substantial
than in the past. Instead of asserting unequivocally, as
was once the case, that Soviet-Algerian relations will
continue to improve, several articles have appeared
since November 1983, which state that there are just
"good prospects" for expanded relations. Algeria,
however, is still grouped with Syria, the Peoples
Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen), Lib-
ya, Angola, and Ethiopia as "socialist-oriented, non-
aligned countries with which the USSR has good
relations."I
Moscow's desire for good relations with Algiers has
not prevented the Soviets from seeking to improve its
position with Tunisia or Morocco and Libya-Alge-
ria's regional rivals. In our view, the Soviets probably
hope cordial ties with Morocco will reduce the
chances that Rabat would move closer to the United
States or provide the US Central Command with
facilities that could be used to project power in the
Mediterranean region.
Consequently, Moscow has avoided involvement in
the protracted Algerian-Moroccan dispute over the
status of the Western Sahara. Although the Soviets
sympathize with the Polisario's efforts to gain inde-
pendence and have acquiesced in Algeria's transfer of
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Soviet-made arms to the guerrillas, they have not
officially recognized the Polisario's self-proclaimed
republic. The Soviet Ambassador in Rabat told the
US Ambassador that Soviets did not travel through
Western Sahara because the Algerians are sensitive to
any indication of Soviet support for Morocco's
25X1 position.F__-]
Libyan moves to gain influence in the Maghreb, such
as the union between Morocco and Libya, have
heightened Algerian fears and have placed the Soviet
Union in the difficult position of supporting two
adversaries. Although the Soviets have avoided public
comment on the union, the Soviet Charge in Tunis
told the US Ambassador in mid-September that
Moscow is worried the union will further strain the
frosty relations between Tripoli and Algiers and in-
crease regional tensions. Moscow may also believe
that the union could lead to closer ties between
Algiers and Washington.F_~
The number of high-level visits between Moscow and
Algiers has increased since the Moroccan-Libyan
union. In our view, Moscow was aware of Algeria's
anger over the union and probably hoped to dissuade
Algiers from improving its relations with Morocco's
Western friends-France and the United States-
who were equally disturbed by the union. The US
Embassy in Algiers reports that little substance ap-
pears to have come out of any of these meetings.
A sharp deterioration in Algerian-Soviet relations is
unlikely so long as the Algerian armed forces are
heavily dependent on Soviet supplies-which they will,
be for some time. We believe that Algeria's armed
forces would begin to feel the effects of a cutoff of
Soviet spare parts and maintenance in less than a
year, severely weakening Algeria's security. Personnel
would have to be trained on new and technologically
unfamiliar equipment, and any attempt to diversify
suddenly would be accompanied by logistic problems.
Moreover, the high cost of Western equipment proba-
bly would restrict the quantity the Algerians could
purchase quickly.F_~
Nevertheless, the Bendjedid government is committed
to reducing Algeria's dependence on Soviet arms and
is unlikely to change this policy even if the Soviets
threaten to cut off Soviet equipment. We believe
Algiers will continue to reduce the number of Soviet
military advisers and technicians and will move ahead
with its plans-already in progress with France and
the United States-to diversify its sources of military
assistance, concentrating first on naval and air pur-
chases. Algiers almost certainly would tolerate incon-
veniences such as'delays in deliveries of spare parts
and maintenance equipment, a tightening up of pay-
ment schedules, and insistence on receiving hard
currency payments that are likely to result from
Moscow's efforts to dissuade Bendjedid and his advis-
ers from turning to the West. Bendjedid is unlikely to
approve longstanding Soviet requests for military base
rights or to sign a friendship treaty with Moscow,
which would be viewed by the current regime as
compromising Algeria's nonaligned position. 0
Algiers will be cautious not to alienate Moscow or
jeopardize its Soviet arms relationship as it develops
ties to the West, particularly the United States. The
Bendjedid regime probably is confident that Moscow
will not cut off arms deliveries so long as Algiers does
not try to dramatically change the relationship. Alge-
ria almost certainly will continue to grant the Soviets
limited access to Algerian ports as well as overflight
privileges. Algerians probably will also refrain from
publicly criticizing Soviet policies that they believe
are peripheral to Algeria's interests, such as Soviet
support for Nicaragua. Algiers may increase the
number of low-level delegations and ship visits as a
way to reassure Moscow that relations have not
changed. F__]
The Algerians would radically change their ties to the
Soviet Union-such as expelling Soviet advisers or
canceling Soviet port visits-only if they believed they
had developed secure enough military ties to the West
25X1
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Figure 7
Military Deliveries to Algeria, 1980-84
United States
Other Non-Communist
Communist~
u Primarily from the USSR.
b Estimated.
to ensure their military needs. Excessive Soviet med-
dling in internal Algerian politics-highly unlikely at
this time-or an alignment between the Soviet Union
and Morocco could also provoke Algiers to downgrade
relations with Moscow. The Algerians probably have
looked closely at Egypt's experience in 1972 when
Cairo expelled most of the Soviets and would want to
avoid similar difficulties.
We believe Moscow would respond to such measures
by slowing spare parts deliveries but would cut them
off only if Algiers stopped repayment on its debts. The
Soviets could also threaten to sell arms to Morocco,
provided the Moroccans were interested. In Moscow's
view, however, that might accelerate a closer align-
ment between Algeria and the United States.F__1
Algiers probably has not yet determined the extent to
which it is willing to develop contacts with Washing-
ton. Algeria's need for Soviet spare parts, its commit-
ment to nonalignment, and its revolutionary legacy
will limit the current regime's willingness to readjust
its ties to the Soviet Union. Bendjedid's efforts to
develop a foreign policy that encompasses these con=
flicting goals will result in a policy that often appears
inconsistent and erratic. We can expect Algeria to
continue to reflect a sharper anti-US position in the
United Nations and in the press than Algerian policy-
makers adopt in private. F__1
From Algeria's perspective, closer cooperation with
the United States will depend in part on how Wash-
ington responds to Algerian requests for military and
economic assistance. As the Bendjedid government
feels more confident in its relationship with Washing-
ton, Algiers is likely to be more willing to acknowl-
edge publicly its cooperation with Washington. To
show their good faith in enhancing US-Algerian
military cooperation, Algerian officials escorted US
officials through several vessels and the port facilities
at Mers el Kebir earlier this year. The Algerian press
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covered Bendjedid's visit to the United States in mid-
April in surprising detail, partly as a signal that US-
Algerian relations will proceed despite Moscow's con-
cerns. Algiers, however, was careful not to overplay
the prospects for military cooperation. F_~
Prospects for increasing US cooperation at the ex-
pense of the Soviets are good in some areas:
? The Bendjedid government has told US officials
that it is particularly interested in obtaining US air
training and equipment such as avionics, large
transport aircraft, and possibly fighter aircraft.
? Partly to ensure against an interruption in Soviet
military supplies, the Algerians have requested US
assistance in modernizing and maintaining Algerian
MIG-21 aircraft.
? In the economic sphere, Algiers is looking into
agricultural assistance and developing a more for-
mal mechanism for economic cooperation under a
Joint Economic Commission established this year.
Algeria is more concerned with economic develop-
ment, regional affairs, and nonalignment than with
East-West issues. Bendjedid is likely to prefer the role
of "impartial" mediator in most issues to that of
taking sides with one of the superpowers. We believe
Bendjedid's efforts to step away from Soviet policies
in the Middle East and elsewhere have helped to bring
Algeria into the Arab mainstream and improve Alger-
ia's role as an effective negotiator between the moder-
ate and radical Arab states. As a result Washington
has gained Algeria's tacit support for some US poli-
cies in the Middle East. Although adverse develop-
ments in the region could inhibit the current dialogue,
Bendjedid's strategies for pursuing regional stability
and a peaceful solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict are
not necessarily incompatible with those of the United
States.
Algeria-USSR: Indicators of
Change in Relations
We expect the Bendjedid government to maintain
cautious but correct relations with Moscow as it
pursues closer ties to the West, including the United
States. Nevertheless, we have identified several indi-
cators that we believe would signal a change in
Algeria's policy toward the Soviet Union, either
toward building closer ties or rapidly curtailing
relations. These indicators are ranked from most
significant to least signtficant.
Algeria Grows Closer to the Soviet Union.
? Signs major arms deal with Moscow to include
MIG-29 and other Soviet equipment not yet avail-
able to Eastern Europe or Cuba.
? Increases number of Soviet advisers in Algeria.
? Grants Soviet basing rights and access to Algerian
military facilities.
? Signs a friendship and cooperation treaty with
Moscow.
? Sanctions direct Soviet military sales to the Poli-
sario guerrillas and a Soviet presence, such as
military advisers, doctors, or teachers, in Tindouf
area where Polisario are given sanctuary.
? Encourages Tunisia to accept Soviet military
advisers.
? Restores legal status of Communist Party in Alge-
ria.
Algeria Moves Rapidly To Curtail Ties to Moscow.
? Expels most Soviet military advisers and
technicians.
? Denies Soviet access to repair facilities even on
emergency basis and denies Soviet overflights.
? Agrees to cooperate with other Arab countries to
support Afghan rebels.
? Bendjedid consistently refuses to meet high-level
Soviet officials.
? Prevents Algerians from receiving Soviet training.
? Increases public rhetoric against Soviet policies,
including condemning Soviet presence in
Afghanistan.
? Criticizes Soviet relations with Libya and Morocco.
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