(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00587R000300320002-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: June 14, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: June 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Intelligence
Syria and Arab-Israeli
Negotiations:. Spoiler
or Participant?
eNESA 85-10133
June 1985
Copy 375
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?- Secret
Erratum Notice to recipients of DI Intelligence Assessment Syria and Arab-Israeli
Negotiations: Spoiler or Participant?. NESA 85-10133,
Please affix the attached text to the top of p. 4 of your copy.
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
-Syria and Arab-Israeli
Negotiations: S oiler
or Participant?7 I
This paper was prepared by I Of the
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. It
was coordinated with the Directorate of
Operations. F]
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Arab-Israeli Division, NESA,
on
Secret
NESA 85-10133
June 1985
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Syria and Arab-Israeli
Negotiations: Spoiler
or Participant? F
Key Judgments Syrian President Hafiz al-Assad will continue to hold out for a comprehen-
Information available sive Middle East peace settlement and reject partial solutions to the
as of 6 May 1985 conflict. There are no indications that Assad feels a sense of urgency or
was used in this report.
that he is prepared to exchange the benefits to Syria of an uncompromising
position for the political risks of reversing course. On the contrary, Assad
and his senior foreign policy advisers appear genuinely convinced that the
passage of time will weaken Israel and strengthen the Arab position. F_
The Syrians can substantially raise the cost to King Hussein and PLO
Chairman Arafat of participating in a peace initiative that excludes
Damascus. Assad already is moving politically to block the emergence of a
moderate Arab alignment and to heighten divisions within the PLO. The
Syrians have supported nearly 40 terrorist operations against Jordanian
and moderate Palestinian interests since early 1983, and we believe
Damascus is prepared to up the ante. F__1
Assad's roughshod tactics make him the object of disdain and fear among
other Arab leaders, but Syria's so-called isolation is not a serious handicap
because its goals in the Arab-Israeli conflict do not differ significantly
from the public positions taken by many Arab governments. The impact on
Syrian policy of strains in its relations with the other Arab states is
minimal. Donor aid plays an important role in the Syrian economy, but
Syria has the advantage of receiving assistance from several mutually
antagonistic benefactors.
We believe Assad's near-term strategy is to maximize the gains of
prolonged stalemate. He extracts Arab financial support and Soviet arms
as the "price" of Syria's being a confrontation state while challenging
moderate Arab leaders to demonstrate any payoff from a policy of
compromise. Assad's call for continuing struggle against Israel is widely
accepted in Syria. It would be far more difficult for the regime to foster a
public commitment to peaceful coexistence than to maintain popular
support for the conflict. F__~
Several circumstances could prompt a shift in Syrian policies to a more vio-
lent approach. Progress toward Jordanian-PLO talks with Israel will
provoke an escalation of Syrian pressure on Jordan, and Assad might
instigate a major military crisis. Diminished Syrian involvement in Leba-
non over time might open the way for a more aggressive Syrian policy
toward Israel. Assad's death or removal from the scene will leave
iii Secret
NESA 85-10133
June 1985
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Damascus preoccupied with internal politics, but a less experienced
successor probably would not continue Assad's comparatively cautious
approach to the conflict. F__1
Damascus has not foreclosed the option of a negotiated settlement, but we
believe Assad, before embarking on negotiations, would insist on assur-
ances-verging on a guarantee-that concessions by the Arabs will be at
least matched by concessions from Israel. Meanwhile, the Syrians will
continue to probe Washington's willingness to support Arab demands over
Israeli opposition. Assad wants signals that the United States will adopt a-
more "neutral" role, but the Syrians probably regard any such steps as
only minimal preconditions for further dialogue.
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Key Judgments
Dialogue With the United States 4
Revision of the Reagan Initiative 5
Assurances That Pressure Will Be Brought To Bear on Israel To 5
Make Concessions
Syrian Strategy 6
Maximizing the Benefits From Prolonged Stalemate 6
Seeking a "Strategic Balance" 6
Implications for the United States 9
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OAMASCUSI
lir
W.es MBank Is
O r alt occupied e
-~ - status to eterm' e V
967,
C aee-Fire
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Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
aw / ,
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Syria and Arab-Israeli
Negotiations: Spoiler
or Participant?
President Hafiz al-Assad's basic objective in the The Golan Heights and Palestinian issues are closely
Arab-Israeli conflict is to nullify Israeli annexation of linked in Syrian thinking, in our view.
the Golan Heights and restore Syrian sovereignty.
The Syrians assign almost equal importance to
achieving a settlement for the Palestinians. The fate
of the Palestinian people is a volatile issue in Syria,
where-despite the passage of time-popular resent-
ment remains high over the establishment of the state
of Israel and the disruption of numerous longstanding
family and commercial ties between Syria and Pales-
tine. Moreover, Vice President Khaddam's recent
complaint to US officials that a partial peace could
prompt an escalation of Palestinian resistance proba-
bly reflects a genuine security concern. With the
presence in Syria of nearly 300,000 Palestinian refu-
gees, Damascus long has found it necessary to balance
its rhetorical and material support for the Palestinian
cause with measures to enhance its control over the
Palestinian population. A key element of Assad's
policy is to keep a tight leash on the several thousand
armed Palestinian guerrillas inclined to fight where
and as they want and who are often contemptuous of
the authority of the states in which they reside. F_
Damascus has competed with Jordan and Egypt for
control of the Palestinian movement since the Bath
Party consolidated its hold on power in Syria in the
mid-1960s. The Syrians' pride in their country as the
birth place of Arab nationalism and the Bath Party's
credentials as heir to the Arab nationalist and anti-
Zionist causes are at stake. Assad's legitimacy rests
partly on his leadership of the Bath Party and his
articulation of the Syrian commitment to the Pales-
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Assad be-
lieves international indifference to Israeli occupation
of the Golan Heights means Israel would have little
reason to relinquish the territory if Syria's Palestinian
"card" is eliminated.
The Syrians are likely to continue to tell their Arab
neighbors and the United States that a resolution of
all issues in the conflict is impossible unless the Arabs
together offer Israel no alternative to a comprehensive
settlement. Damascus sees an international confer-
ence as the only negotiating format likely to advance
Arab aims. According to the US Embassy in Damas-
cus, however, the Syrians believe there is no hope now
for negotiations in which Israel can be expected or
pressed to make concessions. F__1
In our
view, Syria will continue to maneuver to block Arab
support for the Jordanian-PLO framework agreement
and to organize Palestinian factions opposed to Ara-
fat. We believe Syrian-supported terrorist attacks
against Jordan and the Palestinians also will continue
to be a prominent element in Syrian strategy. F___]
Syrian diplomatic moves since February have been a
continuation of efforts over the past several years to
counter political initiatives by the moderate Arab
states. One element of Assad's strategy has been to
revive the "Steadfastness Front" of radical Arab
states to block the emergence of an Arab consensus
favoring a Jordanian-PLO peace initiative, Egypt's
.return to the Arab fold, or the convening of an Arab
summit that might sanction either step. Syrian efforts
culminated in a meeting with senior officials from
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Until 1967 the region now known as the Golan
Heights formed about two-thirds of Al Qunaytirah
province, one of the country's most productive agri-
cultural regions. During and after the 1967 fighting,
much of the population-including an estimated
100,000 Syrians and some 13,000 Palestinian
refugees-fled or were expelled from the area.
The Golan Heights has both strategic and symbolic
importance for Damascus. The Israeli military pres-
ence deprives Syria of the terrain advantage on the
front, and Israeli electronic intelligence installations
and other observation posts give excellent coverage of
Syrian military activity at least as far east as
Damascus. The Israelis destroyed much of the town
of Al Qunaytirah before pulling back under the terms
of the 1974 Disengagement Agreement, and the Syri-
ans have left it unreconstructed and unpopulated as a
monument to Israeli "hostility and aggression. "I
Libya, South Yemen, and Algeria in late March,
although the participants in the meeting did not
achieve unanimity of views on inter-Arab disputes.
With Syrian encouragement, Palestinian factions op-
posed to Arafat's swing toward moderation an-
nounced in late March the formation of the "Palestin-
ian National Salvation Front." The groups and
prominent personalities comprising the new "front"
include George Habbash's Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine, the Syrian-backed Popular
Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Com-
mand, the Fatah dissidents led by Abu Musa, the
Popular Struggle Front, the Palestinian cadre of the
Syrian Bath Party known as as-Saiga, the Palestine
Liberation Front, and prominent individuals such as
former Palestine National Council Speaker Khalid al-
Fahum.
Damascus clearly hopes to use the "Salvation Front"
to increase political pressure on Arafat and to provide
an institutional basis to draw away Arafat's support-
ers. The founding declaration of the front specifies
that it does not seek to supplant the PLO and that it is
a "temporary framework for enabling the PLO to
regain its national line." Local observers, however,
note that its role as Syria's surrogate is transparent.
The Syrians also pose a direct threat to Arafat and his
The devastated town of Al Qunaytirah on the Golan Heights has
never been rebuilt.
Top: Remains of downtown section.
Bottom: Looking west over destroyed city toward Israeli positions.
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Is Syria Isolated?
Syria's roughshod tactics put Damascus at odds with
many of the moderate Arab regimes, but we believe
Syria's goals are not sharply at variance with popular
opinion in the Arab world or with the positions held
by many Arab governments on Arab-Israeli issues.
The US Embassy in Damascus notes that Syria's
"isolation" is more a matter of moderate Arab aver-
sion to the aggressive means the Syrians employ than
disagreements over substance:
? Syria's goal of removing the Israeli presence and
influence from Lebanon, the West Bank, and Jeru-
salem is shared by every Arab country.
? Assad's tough position on Palestinian rights is a
basic tenet of mainstream Arab opinion.
? Syrian insistence on comprehensive negotiations to
settle the conflict meets with widespread Arab
approval.
? Assad has accepted UN Security Council Resolu-
tions 242 and 338 and no longer challenges Israel's
right to exist. After opposing the 1981 Saudi peace
plan, Syria grudgingly accepted the 1982 Fez Dec-
laration and participated in the Arab League fol-
lowup discussions.
? Damascus is more outspoken in its criticism of
Cairo than most Arab regimes, but the continuing
failure to achieve progress toward Palestinian au-
tonomy lends credence to Syrian criticism of the
Camp David accords, in the eyes of many Arabs.
? Syria's radical stance on many issues in the United
Nations and other international forums leading to
frequent votes in opposition to US policy is typical
of many Arab and Third World countries.
Assad's success in forcing the abrogation of the
Israeli-Lebanese troop withdrawal accord last year
strengthened his political position in responding to
moderate Arab disgruntlement with Syrian tactics.
The subsequent Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon
allows Assad to trumpet the value of dealing with
Israel from a position of strength and to assert that
time is on the side of the Arabs. The recovery of
occupied Arab territory without having to make con-
cessions gives Syria a highly emotional political vic-
tory that it can exploit to undermine support for
moderate Arab maneuvers. F__~
The impact on Syrian policy of strains in relations
between Damascus and other Arab capitals is mini-
mal. US Embassy officials note that Assad simply
ignores Arab complaints about Syrian ties to Iran or
to the Soviet Union because the financial and military
support the Syrians extract from these relationships
costs little and breaking these ties would offer com-
paratively little benefit. The Syrians also balance
areas of disagreement with areas of agreement-
posing as potential mediators in the Gulf war, for
example, and claiming to impose a degree of modera-
tion on Iranian war strategy. In any case, we believe
Damascus is confident that, in the event of a war with
Israel, most of the Arab states would come to Syria's
aid.l
Despite the important role of donor aid in Syria's
economy, Syria's susceptibility to economic pressure
is also minimal. The presence of modest but sufficient
oil and gas reserves; relatively abundant water and
fertile agricultural land; and a surfeit of engineers,
doctors, and technicians give Damascus greater lati-
tude than many of its neighbors possess. The Syrians
receive assistance from a variety of sources-includ-
ing the Gulf Arab states, Iran, and the Soviet
Union-and the likelihood is low that all of these
donors would cut back aid simultaneously.
Assad almost certainly concludes that Syrian "isola-
tion" is a transient result of current political maneu-
vering among the Arab states and that he has consid-
erable room to stake out a counterposition. He has
made a significant effort to block the formalization of
an Arab consensus that would ignore Syrian interests
or lead to a cutoff of Arab financial aid. Nevertheless,
he probably is confident that Syria can exert suffi-
cient pressure on its Arab neighbors to assure that its
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The Domestic Context of Syrian Policy
In a speech to the People's Assembly in mid-March
1985, Assad inaugurated his third seven-year term as
President by hammering at the theme that Israel-
with US support-will make few, if any, concessions
to the Arab states and that the struggle will go on. He
concluded that Syrians will have to make continuing
sacrifices to achieve Arab strength and unity. F - ]
Assad's call for continuing struggle has been well
received by the Syrian people, according to the US
Embassy in Damascus. Many Syrians regard Israel as
a dangerous enemy bent on expansion. Embassy
officials believe it would be far more difficult for the
regime to foster a public commitment to peaceful
coexistence than to maintain popular support for the
conflict. In contrast to the case of Egypt's unilateral
foray into peace diplomacy-made possible in part by
the acquiescence of a strong middle class in the view
that the Arab-Israeli conflict was obsolete-the Em-
bassy notes that even the most Westernized, moderate
Syrians support Assad's confrontation with Israel.
The minority sectarian character of the Assad regime
also is a limiting factor on the President's ability to
reverse course. Assad has a firm grip on power, but
his Alawite sect constitutes less than 15 percent of the
population and Alawite predominance is deeply re-
sented by the majority Sunni community.' In our
view, Assad has long feared that any concessions to
Israel without a significant return would be widely
viewed in Syria as a sellout of the Arabs by minority
Alawites and might generate coup plotting or popular
opposition to the regime.
In our judgment, Assad's leadership style also mili-
tates against bold departures in Syrian policy.0
Assad characteristically avoids risk,
carefully assessing potential costs and benefits and
waiting for a situation of maximum advantage before
committing himself. Assad's experience in Syria's
coup-prone politics of the 1950s and 1960s instilled in
him an instinct for caution.
Dialogue With the United States
The US decision in 1981 to conclude a "strategic
alliance" with Israel is cited by Syrian officials as a
watershed in Assad's evaluation of Washington as a
broker in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Despite the subse-
quent suspension of the agreement over an issue vital
to Syria-the Israeli Knesset's decision to extend
Israeli law to the Golan Heights in December 1981-
the chairman of the Syrian parliament's foreign. af-
fairs committee says Assad's mind was already made
up. The Syrian official says Assad had become con-
vinced that Washington would not grapple with the
problem of obtaining concessions from the Israeli side
that, in his view, any mediation would entail, accord-
ing to the US Embassy in Damascus. F__]
Nevertheless, in our judgment, Assad believes that
the United States must ultimately be involved if the
conflict is to be settled. Assad doubts that the United
States is prepared to support Arab demands, but he is
determined to maintain a dialogue. A former US
Ambassador to Syria has characterized Assad's am-
bivalent attitude toward the United States by quoting
an early leader of the Islamic community: "And even
if there be one hair binding me to my fellow men, I do
not let it break; when they pull, I loosen, and if they
loosen, I pull." The quotation can be cited to imply
that Assad at least wants to preserve links between
Washington and Damascus.
In effect, Assad wants a US role in the region, but on
his terms. Since the abrogation of the 17 May 1983
Israeli-Lebanese agreement, Assad has said that an
"unbiased" US role in the Middle East is needed and
would be welcomed by Syria. Syrian Foreign Minister
al-Shara' told US officials last February that, if the
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United States does not seek to achieve a comprehen-
sive peace in the region, there is no future for a peace
effort. Analysis
suggests that their
terms for improving relations between Washington
and Damascus include the following. F__]
Assad resents the West's depiction of him as a
spoiler. Vice President Khaddam is emphatic in insist-
ing that Syria cannot be excluded from a settlement.
Revision of the Reagan Initiative. The Syrians were
critical of the Reagan initiative on several counts.
Damascus took the position that the initiative was
flawed because it failed to consider the Golan Heights
or recognize those Palestinians who have been refu-
gees since 1948. The Syrians rejected the language in
the initiative on Israel's need for defensible borders,
arguing that history has shown Israel to be the
aggressor. F__1
Assurances That Pressure Will Be Brought To Bear
on Israel To Make Concessions. We believe that
Assad will continue to balk at Middle East peace
negotiations unless he is confident of the outcome. He
wants the United States to exert strong pressure to
extract Israeli concessions that Arab leaders can use
politically to distract attention from concessions they
make. Saudi Foreign Minister Saud told US Embas-
sy officials in Riyadh in late March that the Syrians
are not opposed to negotiations but that Assad-
unlike Sadat-will not enter into negotiations unless
he has a clear understanding of the extent of US
support for Israel. F__]
Syrian comments on the nature of its dialogue with
the United States, in our view, reflect an effort to
probe Washington's willingness to support Arab posi-
tions over Israeli opposition. Assad is deeply skeptical
that he can afford to run any political risks by relying
on the United States to achieve a settlement he can
sell to the Syrians, the Palestinians, and his Arab
ton and Damascus are a "dialogue of the deaf."
A "Balanced" US Role. Assad argues that, if the
United States is not neutral, talks between Washing-
Clarification of US Positions. In a meeting with the
US Ambassador in Damascus in mid-February, For-
eign Minister Shara' probed for US views on the
Golan issue, as well as US reaction to the Hussein-
neighbors.
The Soviet Factor
Soviet leverage over Assad's decisions is limited and
has not swayed Syrian decisionmaking on critical
national security issues. The extensive Soviet military
support for Syria since the Israeli invasion of Lebanon
in June 1982 has helped Assad pursue more assertive
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policies, and a slowdown or threat to cut off military
aid is one Soviet step that might have some effect.
The one time Moscow tried this option-to oppose
Syria's intervention in Lebanon in 1976-proved
counterproductive. The Soviets probably would at-
tempt it again only as a last resort.F_~
Syrian support for an international conference under
UN auspices signals a slight shift in its approach to
Soviet involvement in the peace process. The Syrian
response to the Soviet international conference pro-
posal of July 1984 was lukewarm-in part because
Damascus almost certainly saw the initiative as an
effort by Moscow to curry favor with Jordan and the
Arab moderates. Nevertheless, US Embassy officers
speculate that the Syrian reaction and subsequent
Syrian support for a UN-sponsored conference reflect
a preference for broader international participation
that might reduce the potential for Soviet disruption
of a Geneva conference. According to the Embassy,
Arab concern about the Geneva formula-that it
carries the danger of polarization between Americans
and Israelis on one side and Soviets and Arabs on the
other-is shared in Damascus.
25X1 Syrian Strategy
The Syrians almost certainly recognize that the
chances for a negotiated settlement on terms they will
accept have diminished steadily since Sadat's visit to
Jerusalem in 1977 and the signing of the Camp David
accords in 1978. In their view, Egypt's separate peace
with Israel has divided the Arab states, reduced the
incentives for Israel to make concessions on the Golan
Heights or the Palestinian issue, and diminished US
willingness to consider Syrian or Palestinian interests.
Syrian strategy in light of their interpretation of the
prevailing conditions is likely to continue to include at
least three elementsF___1
25X1 Maximizing the Benefits From Prolonged Stalemate.
The continuing confrontation between Israel and the
Arab states serves several Syrian interests. Damascus
extracts roughly $700 million a year from Saudi
Arabia and the Gulf states under the terms of an
agreement concluded in Baghdad in 1978 to support
the confrontation states. Continuing Soviet arms de-
liveries on highly favorable terms and the attention
directed to the threat from Israel probably contribute
to the apparently low interest on the part of the
Syrian military in challenging Assad. Assad's call in
his recent inaugural address for "sacrifices" by his
countrymen illustrates the usefulness of the Arab-
Israeli conflict as a justification for or distraction
from the poor performance of the Syrian economy.
Assad also takes advantage of the continuing unre-
solved issues in the Arab-Israeli conflict to keep his
Arab opponents off balance and strengthen his claims
to Arab leadership. Assad's argument that negotia-
tions now would only lead to Arab "surrender" is a
public slap at Egypt and challenges Hussein and
Arafat to show how the strategy they have adopted
will produce, results equal to the comparative "suc-
cess" of Assad's uncompromising stance in Lebanon.
The Syrian press regularly gloats over the "failure" of
Egypt's "enormous concessions," pointing to the unre-
solved Palestinian issue and continued strong US
support for Israel. Likewise, Syrian media manipulate
popular ideological themes-anti-Americanism, anti-
Zionism, and Arab unity-to portray Jordan's rela-
tionship with the United States as willingness on
Hussein's part to betray the Arab cause and facilitate
US "hegemony" in the region.
Playing a Spoiler Role. Despite Syrian aversion to
the charge that Damascus plays the role of spoiler, we
believe Assad is determined to prevent progress in any
peace initiative in the region that excludes Syria or
does not meet Syrian conditions. Damascus almost
certainly believes King Hussein's negotiations with
PLO Chairman Arafat are vulnerable to Syrian coun-
termaneuvering politically and Syrian terrorist
threats, although a scholar who recently interviewed
Assad believes he is worried that US support for the
initiative will encourage the King and Arafat to
proceed despite Syrian opposition. Progress toward
talks between Israel and a joint Jordanian-Palestinian
delegation almost certainly would prompt increased
Syrian pressure. F__]
Seeking a "Strategic Balance." The Syrian concept
of "strategic balance" was coined by President Assad
following the removal of Egypt from the ranks of the
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confrontation states to signal a shift in Syria's ap-
issues and choose renewed conflict, a new Arab peace
initiative, or a combination of both. When Assad dies,
a weaker, less experienced successor probably could
not continue Assad's adept balancing of threats and
accommodation.)
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We believe that at a minimum Damascus uses the
concept of an evolving "strategic balance" to convey
publicly and privately that there are alternatives for
the Arabs to immediate negotiations. Assad probably
uses the term to sum up his view that, without a
unified Arab position, Israel has no reason to make
concessions now but that time is on the side of the
Assad appears in no hurry to move toward a resolu-
tion of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Syrians on
numerous occasions have shrugged off the suggestion
that there is any urgency in starting talks. Early this
year, a senior UN official told US Embassy officers
that the Syrians expect no peace with Israel for at
least 10 years and that the UN command for forces
on the Golan Heights has been urged to build a new
headquarters near Damascus in anticipation of a
lengthy stay.
Alternative Scenarios
Syrian strategy in the Arab-Israeli conflict could shift
to a more activist-and probably more dangerous-
approach in response to several developments. If talks
between Israel and a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation
aimed at a settlement on the West Bank appear
imminent, we believe there is a high probability that
Assad will at least threaten a military crisis. If Syrian
involvement in Lebanon diminishes over time, Damas-
cus might focus greater attention on Arab-Israeli
Conflict With Jordan. Damascus has used military
forces to apply pressure on Jordan on two occasions-
during the Jordanian-PLO crisis in 1970 and in late
1980-and could undertake military action again to
thwart a new peace initiative by King Hussein and
Arafat. In November-December 1980 the Syrians
fielded two armored divisions, totaling about 28,000
troops, on the Jordanian border to warn Hussein not
to pursue an anti-Syrian alliance with other Arab
leaders then meeting in Amman. Jordan countered by
deploying at least two and possibly three divisions to
its northern border. At the height of the crisis, Syria
had about 500 tanks, 400 armored personnel carriers,
and 270 artillery pieces facing an approximately equal
Jordanian force.
Syria's lowest risk military option in response to a
Jordanian-PLO peace initiative would be a show of
force along the border. Combined with a terrorism
campaign, a demonstration of force would show Syri-
an resolve to oppose Jordan's diplomatic moves and
create a crisis atmosphere that might disrupt them.
Egyptian or Saudi support for Amman almost certain-
ly falls short of willingness to get involved in an open
conflict between Syria and Jordan. In the context of a
military confrontation, we believe the moderate Arab
alignment is likely to evaporate. At the same time, a
show of force would not commit Syria to open war-
fare, although Damascus would have to be willing to
accept the risk that border clashes might occur that
could lead to war.
Damascus could step up the pressure on Jordan by
initiating low-level border clashes on the pretext of
preventing terrorist infiltration into Syria. Jordanian
support for anti-Assad Muslim Brotherhood terrorists
was one of the pretexts for the 1980 crisis. Border
clashes, if carefully controlled, could stop short of a
major conflict and offer Damascus the option of
launching airstrikes or ground attacks if Assad con-
cludes that greater pressure is necessary.)
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Airstrikes on Jordan would raise the ante considera-
bly and could embroil Iraq or Israel in the conflict.
Syri-
an airstrikes into Jordan would force Amman to
implement contingency plans for attacking Syrian
airfields, which are hardened against airstrikes and
are well protected by Syrian air defenses. Despite the
qualitative superiority of Jordanian pilots, the Jorda-
nian Air Force would take heavy losses unless the
Iraqi Air Force provided substantial support. Bagh-
dad probably would begin moving an armored or
mechanized division and send air and air defense
forces to aid Amman within a day or so, although the
Iraqis might have difficulty resupplying them. Only
Israel, however, could bring the necessary force to
bear quickly enough to thwart Syria's attacks.)
As a last resort, Syria could conduct a limited offen-
sive aimed at destroying a substantial part of the
Jordanian armed forces and seizing northern Jordan.
Outnumbered and outgunned, and without significant
reserves to call upon, the Jordanian Army might slow
the Syrians, but Amman ultimately would have to sue
for peace. The risks of this option would be substan-
tial, particularly as the Israelis would be tempted to
attack Syria's flank, but so would be the rewards-
upsetting the status quo and derailing any moves
toward peace negotiations.F--]
With Soviet assistance, Damascus has fielded new
armored units, nearly completed the mechanization of
its infantry, added new air squadrons equipped with
some of the latest Soviet aircraft, and significantly
improved its air defense capabilities. The Syrian
military, with Soviet help, also has built up its
electronic warfare capability and improved training in
all services.' Improved capabilities might encourage
Damascus to act more aggressively, pursuing policies
that might lead to war or accidently touch off a
conflict.)
Assad's Death. Assad's disappearance from the scene
is unlikely to have positive implications for the peace
process. His relatively cautious and pragmatic ap-
proach to policy contrasts sharply with the more
radical policies of his predecessors. His successor
almost certainly will lack even the marginal negotiat-
ing latitude that Assad has gained from providing
Syria with stable rule for the past 15 years.F
A less stable successor regime and Israeli concern
about the reliability of an untested leader will compli-
cate-not simplify-reaching a negotiated settlement.
An unstable regime in Damascus would be unlikely to
risk compromises with the United States and Israel
and might adopt more aggressive policies in Lebanon
or in support of Palestinian terrorist operations that
would risk an Israeli response or a war by miscalcula-
tion. Conflict within the leadership of a new regime
might contribute to erratic shifts in policy, heighten-
ing Israeli concerns about Syrian intentions.)
We believe that, if the advantages for Damascus of a
prolonged stalemate steadily diminish or if Assad's
death leaves the regime under the leadership of an
inexperienced successor, there is a significant risk that
the Syrians might miscalculate and initiate a conflict.
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Implications for the United States
In our view, Syrian policy in the near term is most
likely to center on maintaining a stalemate in the
Arab-Israeli conflict. Damascus will seek to forestall
the emergence of an Arab consensus favoring a
Jordanian-PLO peace initiative. The Syrians also will
continue to support terrorist attacks against Jordanian
and moderate Palestinian officials to signal their
determination to up the ante if there is progress
toward peace negotiations over Syrian objections.
A Syrian decision to join in a peace initiative, al-
though unlikely given Syrian preconditions, cannot be
ruled out. Assad might calculate that evolving cir-
cumstances are reducing the benefits to Syria of
continuing confrontation and lessening the political
risks of reversing course. A strengthened Arab con-
sensus-including Syria and incorporating Syrian de-
mands-favoring negotiations, together with assur-
ances of a financial payoff from Saudi Arabia and the
Gulf states in return for Syrian moderation, could
contribute to a shift in Syrian thinking. The involve-
ment of other Arab states would strengthen Syria's
negotiating position and enable Assad to share the
blame for unpopular compromises or lack of progress.
Assad has a well-deserved reputation as a tough
negotiator, but he is a pragmatist who has concluded,
and abided by, both a formal agreement with Israel-
the 1974 Golan Disengagement Agreement-and nu-
merous tacit understandings. There is no indication
that he has ruled out indefinitely the possibility of a
negotiated settlement. Indeed, Assad periodically has
floated trial balloons for a multilateral conference
alternative to the step-by-step approach. In mid-1984,
Assad publicly expressed support for UN Security
Council Resolution 338, calling for an international
conference, and in an interview recognized Resolution
242 as a context for a settlement. In the interview,
Assad claimed that Syria "is just as eager to seek
peace as we are to achieve military parity."I
Moreover, in our judgment, Syria's harsh rhetoric
obscures some tactical flexibility in the Syrian posi-
tion. Vice President Khaddam disputes the US inter-
pretation of the meaning of "land for peace," for
example, claiming that UN Resolution 242 means
simply that Israel should withdraw from all occupied
territory in return for a state of nonbelligerency. Yet,
on the Golan Heights issue, we believe the Syrians
probably would accept UN peacekeeping forces and
demilitarization on both sides of the border. They
might also agree to a prolonged withdrawal that.could
leave Israeli forces on the western rim of the Golan
for some time. Similarly, the Syrians endorse the
Palestinians' right to self-determination, but we doubt
they are committed to an independent state. If strains
in Syrian-Jordanian relations ease, Assad might ac-
cept a political link between the West Bank and
Amman. FI
Nevertheless, we believe the Syrians are unlikely to
commit themselves to any peace initiative without
assurances prior to negotiations that concessions by
the Arabs will be matched or exceeded by concessions
from Israel. Assad's current strategy makes Syria a
central player in inter-Arab politics-notwithstanding
the moderate Arabs' resentment of his tactics-and
the payoff for Syria's role as a confrontation state is
considerable. The benefits to Syria of a hardline
policy, in any event, exceed what Assad expects he
might gain by risking a reversal of Syrian policy.
In our view, Syrian criticisms of US support for Israel
and US policy on the Palestinian issue reflect genuine
Syrian concerns. Israel's proximity to major Syrian
population centers, its demonstrated military superi-
ority, and the fusion in Israeli politics of religion and
nationalism have given rise to a conviction on the part
of Syrian leaders that Israel is a dangerous enemy
bent on expansion or on weakening its neighbors.
Palestinian radicalism threz.ens the internal stability
of the Arab states and also could draw Syria into
renewed conflict with Israel at a time and place of the
Palestinians' choosing.F__1
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Syrian expressions of confidence that a policy de-
signed to isolate Damascus cannot work probably are
genuine. Syria's long border with Jordan-and the
numerous Palestinians who oppose Arafat's negotia-
tions with King Hussein and are willing to accommo-
date Syrian demands in exchange for Syrian sup-
port-gives Assad a range of options to impede
moderate Arab political maneuvering. In the unlikely
event that economic pressure is brought to bear on
Syria, Damascus almost certainly is confident that
belt-tightening, heavier dependence on the Commu-
nist countries or Iran, or manipulation of the Gulf
states will see the country through.F_~
Mve see
little prospect of a reversal of Syrian policy in the
immediate future. The Syrians probably would wel-
come signals of a more "neutral" US role-abandon-
ment of a step-by-step Middle East peace process that
excludes Damascus; a restatement of US opposition to
Israel's annexation of the Golan Heights; or stronger
recognition of Arab, as well as Israeli, security inter-
ests-but Assad probably would regard such steps as
only minimal preconditions for further dialogue.
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