(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00587R000300290002-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: May 17, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: June 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of alt
Intelligence
Israel and the West Bank:
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Where Is the Occupation Heading? F-1
Se ""+
NESA 85-10125X
June 1985
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Directorate of Secret
Inte0igence
Israel and the West Bank:
Where Is the Occupation Heading?
This paper was prepared by
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis
with contributions b
(Office of
Global Issues. It was coordinated with the
Directorate of Operations
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Arab-Israeli Division, NESA,
Secret
NESA 85-10125X
June 1985
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Israel and the West Bank:
Where Is the Occupation Heading? I 25X1
Key Judgments Approximately 35,000 Israelis now live in West Bank settlements, and the
Information available Jewish population there may double by the end of the decade. Israel's
as of 1 May 1985 establishment of Jewish settlements, however, is not an irreversible process.
was used in this report.
Over half of the Jews on the West Bank live in 13 large settlements; most
of the other settlements are relatively small and poorly developed. Removal
of the smaller settlements would free large, cont. uous areas of Arab land
that could form the basis for a Palestinian entity.
The West Bank economy has stagnated under Israeli occupation, and the
poor economic conditions will contribute to an increase in Palestinian
violence. Despite Prime Minister Peres's commitment to improve the
quality of life for West Bankers, the Israeli Government will not condone
the development of an economic infrastructure that could form the basis
for an independent Palestinian state.
The Labor Alignment and several left-of-center parties favor a territorial
compromise on the West Bank, but Likud and its rightwing allies oppose
concessions and call for Israeli sovereignty over the entire territory. Any Is-
raeli government will pay a stiff domestic price for agreeing to territorial
compromise on the West Bank. Some Jewish extremist groups might even
undertake terrorist attacks against Israeli officials to obstruct a negotiated
settlement
Such opposition would severely constrain Israel's negotiating flexibility. As
a result, Israel will urge the United States to press Arab states for
significant concessions to help it overcome domestic opposition. These
concessions could include Israeli sovereignty over an expanded Jerusalem
metropolitan region, retention of large Jewish settlements elsewhere on the
West Bank, Jordanian control over local government on the West Bank,
and the normalization of relations between Israel and a Jordanian/Pales-
tinian confederation.
Whatever course Israel chooses on negotiations, Palestinian violence on the
West Bank is likely to increase, although it is unlikely to threaten Israeli
control of the territory. Already this year, violence on the West Bank is at
the highest level since 1982. Violence could pose a more serious security
problem for Israel if:
? Islamic fundamentalist groups, which are generating some appeal among
Palestinian youth, become more politically active.
iii Secret
NESA 85-10125X
June 1985
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? Israel's experience in Lebanon convinces Palestinians that a more
coordinated, violent resistance could drive Jewish settlers from the West
Bank.
? Jewish extremists carry out a successful attack against the Dome of the
Rock in Jerusalem, the third-holiest site in the Islamic world.
Israel and Jordan will try to foster a moderate Palestinian leadership in the
territory that could eventually challenge the PLO's dominance. These
efforts are unlikely to succeed, however, because of the two governments'
inconsistent and often incompatible policies, Hussein's reluctance to break
with the PLO, and entrenched West Bank support for the PLO under
Yasir Arafat.
If Hussein entered negotiations without official PLO backing, he and West
Bank moderates would be under constant threat of assassination from
Arafat loyalists, Syria, and Syrian-allied Palestinian radical groups.
Hussein and whatever Palestinian elements he might carry with him would
expect the United States to guarantee a rapid conclusion to negotiations
bringing about Israel's withdrawal from almost all of the West Bank.
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Contents
Quid Without a Quo? 4
Quality of Life 7
Prospects for Moderate Palestinian Leadership 8
What Could Change? 9
Prospects for West Bank Violence 12
Impact on Israeli Control 14
Implications for the United States 15
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Israel and the West Bank:
Where Is the Occupation Heading?
Israel's occupation of the West Bank has entered its
19th year. Successive governments have created
"facts on the ground" that will make it difficult to end
the Israeli occupation. Despite the large and active
Israeli presence, Palestinians living in the territory
and elsewhere in the Middle East continue to call for
the establishment of a Palestinian state on the West
Bank. All peace initiatives proposed by moderate
Arab states are centered on calls for Israel's with-
drawal from the West Bank and some form of
Palestinian sovereignty there.
The disposition of the West Bank will remain a
central issue for US relations with Israel and Arab
governments. Israel and moderate Arab states, in our
view, will continue to look to the United States to
broker a settlement of the area's final status.
We believe there are five key questions concerning the
territory that will largely determine the success or
failure of future diplomatic initiatives:
? Is the Israeli settlement process irreversible?
? Will the West Bank economy continue to
deteriorate?
? Will a moderate Palestinian leadership emerge to
challenge the PLO's claim to be the sole legitimate
representative of Palestinian interests?
? Will Islamic fundamentalism become a major politi-
cal force to channel the grievances of discontented
Palestinian youth?
? Will violence on the West Bank pose a significant
threat to Israeli control of the territory?
Permanence of Israeli Settlements
Current Status of Settlements. As of mid-April 1985,
Israel had established 159 residential settlements on
the West Bank. (This count, and subsequent numbers,
does not include that part of the West Bank annexed
by Israel as part of Jerusalem.) Of this number:
? 70 are located within the proposed security zone-
amounting to about 45 percent of the West Bank-
to be retained by Israel under the Labor Party's
Allon Plan of 1967.
? 127, or 80 percent of the settlements, were estab-
lished by Likud governments between 1977 and
1984.
Figure 2. Ma'ale Adummim is the largest Jewish
settlement on the West Bank, about a 10-minute
? 47 were established following the US Middle
Eastern peace initiative of September 1982, which
suggested a settlement freeze.
? The 13 largest contain 55 percent of the settler
population.
? 28 are unpopulated, and 12 of these have had no
construction beyond site and road clearance.
? At least 60 have no more than 25 families living in
mobile homes or prefabricated units.
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ly 35,000 Israelis now reside in West Bank settle-
ments. (Recent Jewish Agency figures of more than
42,000 settlers, and the settlers' own estimate of more
than 51,000 are probably inflated for political rea-
sons). On the basis of our analysis, there is capacity
for 20,000 additional settlers. Much of the excess
capacity is in unfinished neighborhoods in the larger
settlements, which will be occupied in the near future,
but many of the older, more remote settlements also
contain unoccupied units.
Until last summer, new unit construction had pro-
gressed at rapid rates. Between September 1982 and
September 1984, some 4,400 units were started, of
which about 3,200 were completed. Developers con-
centrated on building substantial houses and apart-
ment buildings for settlers who had been living in
cramped mobile homes.
Since the National Unity government took office,
construction has slowed dramatically. Political and
economic constraints account for this decline. As part
of the National Unity agreement between Labor and
Likud, the government has agreed to establish six new
settlements this year. Of these, however, four already
were in preliminary stages of development.
Figure 5. New single-family home at Givon Ha-
dassa, northwest of Jerusalem. Young Israeli
couples, who can afford only apartments inside
Israel, can often buy up if they move to the West
Nongovernment settlement agencies have not been
able to take up the slack; the budget for the World
Zionist Organization, which funds new nonurban
settlements, is 25 percent lower than last year. World
Zionist settlement officials say their limited funds will
be funneled into existing settlements.
Given these constraints, we do not believe that Israel
will achieve its current goal of placing 100,000 Jewish
settlers on the West Bank by the end of the decade.
Israel's economic crisis has limited funds for new
settlements. Housing Ministry loans that assisted the
construction of single-family homes have been re-
duced because of government austerity measures.
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Unlike settlement construction, seizure of Palestinian
land has continued apace under the National Unity
government. Land seizures are not affected by eco-
nomic constraints; they usually involve only the
reclassification of property as "state land" and the
erection of a perimeter fence. Land is being expropri-
ated for military purposes, future settlement expan-
sion, and a modern transportation network. At pre-
sent, about 40 percent of the West Bank is in Israeli
hands-almost all controlled by the Israeli Govern-
ment
This goal has already been pushed back; originally the
Likud government and the World Zionist Organiza-
tion envisaged 100,000 settlers in place by the mid-
1980s. Some construction of residential units-espe-
cially by private developers-will continue, however,
allowing the Jewish population, in our view, to double
by 1990 to 70,000
Are the Settlements Permanent? Many observers,
both proponents and critics of Israeli settlement poli-
cy, maintain that the settlements are too numerous
and too entrenched to permit their dismantlement.
The most well-known espouser of this view is Meron
Benvenisti, the former Israeli Deputy Mayor of Jeru-
salem. Benvenisti argues that the "political debate has
been overtaken by events," that most Israeli settle-
ments will never be removed, and, thus, that Israel
has achieved de facto annexation of the territory.
On the basis of our analysis of settlement population
and location, however, we believe that the majority of
Israeli settlements on the West Bank could be re-
moved. Over half of the Jewish population in the
territory resides in only 13 communities. The urban
settlement of Ma'ale Adummim is home to approxi-
mately one-sixth of the Jewish settler population.
Many of the remaining settlements are merely collec-
tions of temporary residences (mobile homes, prefabri-
cated units) housing fewer than 30 families each.
We believe, therefore, that it may not be too late for a
territorial compromise based on the dismantling of at
least some Israeli settlements. Although the larger
Israeli settlements would be difficult to dismantle, the
removal of most of the smaller settlements would free
large contiguous Arab areas that could form some
kind of Palestinian homeland.
Any Israeli government that agreed to such a territo-
rial compromise would face stiff political opposition.
Although the Labor Alignment backs a territorial
compromise on the West Bank, party hardliners, in
our view, would attempt to limit land concessions.
Likud and its rightwing political allies strongly sup-
port retention of the entire West Bank.
Nevertheless, a Jewish Agency official believes that,
for the right price and housing elsewhere, the majority
of West Bank settlers would move. Most home and
apartment owners there have insurance policies guar-
anteeing payment should Israel leave the territory.
During the Israeli evacuation of the Sinai in 1982, for
example, the Israeli Cabinet voted to reimburse the
6,000 settlers $256 million-some $43,000 each. The
majority of Sinai settlers accepted the decision to
withdraw and moved without resistance.
Some 1,500 Sinai settlers, however, refused to leave
voluntarily, and the Israeli military finally had to
intervene and forcibly remove them. Most of these
settlers supported Gush Emunim-the religious-
nationalist organization that also has been instrumen-
tal in settling the West Bank. Gush Emunim leaders
believe that it is a Jewish religious obligation to settle
and keep all of the West Bank. The Consulate
estimates that about 20 percent of the settlers on the
West Bank support the goals of Gush Emunim. Many
of the Gush Emunim settlers live in the smaller, more
isolated settlements that would most likely be disman-
tled by the government as part of a future territorial
compromise.
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We believe that many of these settlers are prepared to
resist violently any attempt by the Israeli Government
to return portions of the West Bank to Arab rule.
Most of the Jewish settlers accused of being members
of the Jewish terrorist underground are Gush
Emunim members or supporters. Recent articles in
Gush Emunim settlement publications have speculat-
ed about what the settlers should do to forestall
territorial compromise. Some argue that settlers un-
der certain circumstances would be justified in taking
the law into their own hands by forcibly resisting
relocation. We believe that such Israeli extremists
might consider carrying out terrorist attacks against
Israeli officials to prevent implementation of a territo-
rial compromise.
Because of this opposition, we expect that any Israeli
government would demand maximum territorial con-
cessions from Palestinian and Arab representatives at
the negotiating table. Such concessions probably
would involve retention of Israeli sovereignty over an
expanded Jerusalem metropolitan area, retention of
large Jewish settlements throughout the West Bank
and the Jewish right to settle individually anywhere in
the territory, Jordanian control over local Palestinian
governments, and the normalization of relations be-
tween Israel and a Jordanian/ Palestinian confedera-
tion. In addition, Tel Aviv would remind the United
States of the domestic risks involved in agreeing to a
negotiated settlement and would expect the United
States to play a major role in underwriting the costs of
a negotiated settlement. Israel would, in our view, ask
the United States to help provide major financial
compensation for displaced settlers in the hopes of
muting domestic opposition.
Future of the West Bank Economy
Continuation of the status quo does not bode well for
the economic development of the West Bank. The
economic interaction between Israel and the West
Bank provides some benefits for local residents, but
the occupation retards the potential for indigenous
economic progress.
Occupation Economics. Israel, in our view, is not
following any "grand design" for the economic devel-
opment of the West Bank other than to seek to
minimize the economic burden of the occupation. To
this end, Israeli authorities have acted over the years
to integrate West Bank economic activity with that of
Israel, while avoiding formal annexation. Israel there-
by has made use of relatively cheap Arab labor, while
excluding the West Bank from coverage under the
extensive and costly social welfare system that pro-
tects Israeli workers
Israel's success in minimizing occupation costs is
reflected in West Bank expenditure data. Israeli
statistics show that until FY 1983/84 most municipal
outlays on the West Bank were covered by revenues
generated within the territory. Israeli spending in the
territory, moreover, serves Israeli as well as local
interests. Although expanding roads, communication
lines, and power supplies improve the lot of local
residents, these programs are undertaken largely to
improve Israel's access to the area for security reasons
and to tighten links between Israel and Jewish settle-
ments on the West Bank.
Quid Without a Quo? Israel's economic policies do
provide benefits for the Palestinian residents of the
West Bank. Approximately 45,000 laborers from the
West Bank, for example, commute daily to work in
Israel. Some West Bank farmers have adopted more
productive agricultural methods partly as a result of
exposure to the more highly developed farming tech-
niques employed in Israel and the Jewish settlements.
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Figure 7
Economic Trends: Israel and the West Bank, 1983-84
Unemployment
Percent
West Bank
i
(projected)
i i
0 I 11 III IV 1 II III IV
1983 1984
Consumer Price Index
Fourth quarter 1982=100
1,500 // West Bank
/ (projected)
i I I i i
0 1 II III IV I II III IV
1983 . ' 1984
Productivity has advanced markedly since 1967, ac-
cording to official Israeli statistics, because of the
introduction of chemical fertilizers, pesticides, im-
proved seeds, and mechanization.
The most visible result of these economic benefits is
the improved living standards on the West Bank. The
lot of the average West Banker has improved signifi-
cantly since 1967 and, in our view, at a faster pace
than it would have under Jordanian tutelage. Real
incomes and consumption have grown. Not only has
the provision of basic necessities-especially
housing-improved, but per capita consumption of
most consumer durables has also risen dramatically.
No Free Lunch. Although the West Bank populace is
much better off economically, the improvement is
largely due to external trade and payment factors.
Foreign economic relations-especially those with
Israel and Jordan-are the linchpin of the West Bank
economy:
? Net imports of goods and services account for more
than one-fourth of resource use. Trade with Israel
makes up over 80 percent of total trade turnover.
Israel enjoyed a $286 million trade surplus with the
West Bank in 1983.
? About half of the West Bank labor force is em-
ployed in foreign countries. Israel hires about half;
the rest are employed in Jordan and the Gulf states.
? Wages remitted from those working abroad com-
prise nearly half of total hard currency earnings,
while other transfer payments amount to an addi-
tional 12 to 15 percent.
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These statistics contrast sharply with poor economic
performance. Economic growth probably has stagnat-
ed during the past few years, due largely to the lack of
growth in the industrial sector. Israeli occupation
policies, continued uncertainty over the region's politi-
cal future, and the conservatism of local businessmen
have stymied industrial initiatives. Capital investment
remains a small share of GNP, given the West Bank's
needs, and is dominated by residential construction at
the expense of productive assets.
Few large-scale industrial projects have commenced
during the Israeli occupation. Most growth has been
limited to small cottage industries or tourist-oriented
enterprises. Israeli statistics reveal that more than 90
percent of the industrial enterprises in the West Bank
employ fewer than 10 workers. Agricultural output, in
our view, has also suffered because of land expropria-
tion, water resources diverted to Israeli settlements,
and restrictions on sales of agricultural products to
Israel or Israel's traditional markets.
Bleak Outlook. Prospects are poor for indigenous
economic development as long as the status of the
West Bank remains in limbo. Indeed, the economy is
likely to deteriorate in the near term, given the
unpromising outlook for the economies of the coun-
tries upon which the West Bank depends:
? We expect Israel's austerity to continue for at least
another year. The construction industry in Israel,
which employs over half of the West Bankers
working there, is suffering a recession.
? The poor oil market is hurting the Gulf state
economies, forcing many Palestinian workers to
return home. According to Israeli officials, the
number of Palestinians leaving the, West Bank last
year for jobs in the Gulf dropped dramatically.
? The Jordanian economy cannot absorb more work-
ers; it, too, depends heavily on remittances from its
citizens working abroad. King Hussein has limited
the influx of Palestinians and, like the Israelis, has
discriminated against the import of West Bank
goods.
Figure 8. Trucks carrying West Bank agricultur-
al goods being unloaded in Jordan. The Israeli
Other sources of outside revenue are few. The one
other significant inflow to the West Bank is the
approximately $100 million annually assigned to the
Jordan/PLO Joint Fund for the Occupied Territories
by the Baghdad accord of 1978. Few of the signato-
ries have kept current on their payments, and, in our
view, Jordan and the PLO have not adequately man-
aged the funds at their disposal. The US Consulate in
Jerusalem reports that what few funds remain are
destined for existing projects.
In addition, the West Bank faces the prospect of
reduced funding from the United .Nations Relief and
Works Agency, which provides services for the 90,000
Palestinians still living in West Bank refugee camps.
Although that agency hopes to avoid reducing its .
services, the General Commissioner recently told Jor-
danian officials that cutbacks are likely if current
deficits 'are not covered. Finally, although funding
from private voluntary organizations appears to have
picked up in the last six months or so, these contribu-
tions remain small, disorganized, and eventually sub-
ject to Israeli controls.
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Economic difficulties in Israel, Jordan, and the Gulf
have led to growing unemployment in the West Bank.
Israeli statistics already show some increase, but they
understate the problem because they do not account
for all West Bankers seeking work in Israel nor those
working in Arab states who have recently returned
and are jobless. US Embassy reporting and press
articles attest to numerous signs of the worsening
labor market, such as the reduced number of busloads
of workers heading westward each day as well as
results of informal surveys of the unemployed
The nest egg that these workers have acquired will not
last long, and unemployment compensation is not
available for most. In addition, Israel's rapid inflation
has spread to the West Bank, further eroding in-
comes. Even if more West Bankers chose to return to
agriculture, the US Embassy quotes agricultural ex-
perts as saying that many vacated fields would require
at least two years of preparatory work to become
productive again. The West Bank and East Jerusalem
press report that numerous Palestinian industrial con-
cerns are closing because they cannot compete with
heavily subsidized Israeli goods
Quality of Life. In both public statements and
discussions with US officials, Prime Minister Peres
has stressed his concern about the political implica-
tions of the West Bank's worsening economy and his
determination to ameliorate conditions. Peres and
other Labor leaders also believe that the improvement
of economic conditions in the West Bank would
strengthen the hand of West Bank moderates and
improve Israeli-Palestinian relations.
Israeli officials have already approved in principle
several projects-such as construction of new hospi-
tals and the development of a Palestinian bank-that
had been rejected or indefinitely postponed by previ-
ous Likud governments. The US Consulate in Jerusa-
lem reports that the Peres government has also be-
come somewhat more flexible in approving projects
proposed by private voluntary organizations despite
longstanding Israeli concerns that these charitable
groups cooperate with PLO supporters on the West
Bank.
Figure 9. Tourist gift shop operated by Jewish
settlers residing in the Hebron area. Arab mer-
chants resent the business, which is attracting
many of the large tour groups that come to the
Despite this change in philosophy, the Consulate
believes that Israeli occupation authorities continue to
disapprove many projects and delay implementation
of those already authorized. The Israeli Government,
in our view, does not want an economic infrastructure
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for an independent Palestinian state. In addition, Tel
Aviv continues to reject economic development 25X1
schemes that would compete with Israeli economic
interests. Defense Minister Rabin recently reiterated
this point when he told Knesset members that "no
permits will be given for expanding agriculture or
industry which may compete with the State of Israel."
Not all the blame, however, can be placed at Israel's
doorstep. Economic aid projects often fall prey to
competing Israeli-Jordanian interests in the territory.
The newly formed Jordanian Government has stated
its desire to boost its role in the West Bank but
acknowledges that financial constraints limit what it
can do. Moreover, Amman wants to ensure that the
West Bank's economic progress is not made at the
expense of the East Bank and continues to reject
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Palestinian development schemes that might compete
with Jordanian businesses. The PLO, in our view, is
wary of those kinds of economic activity in the
territory that could, over time, foster independent,
successful West Bank businessmen who might not
follow the PLO's lead.
If some form of Palestinian self-rule is granted to the
territory, the West Bank would still be economically
unviable. Although Arab governments probably will
initially offer financial assistance to a Palestinian
West Bank entity, we believe that their enthusiasm
for extending such aid will eventually wane, particu-
larly if it is confederated with Jordan. Palestinian
residents of the West Bank and the Jordanian Gov-
ernment might then look to the United States to
finance the long-neglected economic development of
the territory.
Prospects for Moderate Palestinian Leadership
Among those individuals hurt most by the continued
expansion of Israeli settlements and the bleak eco-
nomic conditions on the West Bank are those Pales-
tinian leaders who want to cooperate with Jordan and
Israel to establish some form of Palestinian self-rule.
Over the past few years, Amman and Tel Aviv have
fitfully attempted to support pragmatic leaders will-
ing to seek a negotiated solution even in the face of
PLO opposition. Many West Bankers, usually busi-
nessmen who hope political stability will improve the
economic climate, have also approached the Jordani-
an and sometimes even the Israeli governments to
seek support for their own plans to develop indigenous
West Bank leadership.
Recent Moves. The US Consulate in Jerusalem re-
ports that several West Bank leaders attempting to
organize a broad, independent Palestinian movement
traveled to Amman last March to seek Jordanian
Government support. According to the Consulate,
Amman chose not to back their efforts actively. The
tepid response of Jordanian officials was particularly
surprising to the West Bank delegation, given their
intention to support Amman's efforts to organize a
Jordanian-Palestinian delegation that would partici-
pate in future peace negotiations.
Prime Minister Peres has attempted to develop a
pragmatic West Bank leadership by seeking to ap-
point moderate Palestinians to the empty mayoral
posts in key West Bank towns, including Nablus and
Hebron. Last year, the Israeli
Government believed Jordan had agreed to support
the appointment of mayors even though Amman had
previously insisted that municipal elections be held to
fill the vacancies. Tel Aviv apparently convinced
several Palestinian community leaders to accept the
jobs, but the announcement of the appointments has
been delayed by Jordanian refusal to endorse this
action.
Obstacles. These incidents highlight some of the
problems confronting West Bank moderates who be-
lieve they must become more politically active. King
Hussein, in our view, realizes that a more active role
for influential moderates would boost his efforts to
bring PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat to the bargaining
table. But Hussein also knows that Arafat and other
PLO officials are concerned Hussein might try to
squeeze them out of future negotiations by encourag-
ing the emergence of an indigenous West Bank
Palestinian leadership. Active Jordanian support for
Palestinian independents might convince Arafat to
break off his dialogue with Hussein and risk depriving
the King of broad Arab support for engaging Israel in
peace negotiations.
At the same time, many non-Palestinian East Bankers
and even some members of the King's government are
concerned that West Bank independents would have
too much influence if the territory were eventually
returned to Jordan. Consequently, they are primarily
interested in ensuring that the West Bank remain
politically unorganized. These conflicting motives re-
sult in mixed signals that make it more difficult for
West Bank Palestinians to justify taking the risks
involved in cooperating too closely with Israeli occu-
pation authorities.
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According to the US Consulate, West Bank moder-
ates believe they need unequivocal Jordanian support
because they realize that their involvement would
encounter strong resistance from many of the terri-
tory's residents and from the PLO. Polls of West
Bank political opinions are not available, but most
observers, including the US Consulate, believe that
the majority of the territory's residents strongly sup-
port the PLO's claim to be the sole legitimate repre-
sentative of Palestinian national aspirations.
Support for the PLO among West Bankers appears to
be at an alltime high as a result of the convening of
the Palestine National Council in Amman last No-
vember. The proceedings of the Council were broad-
cast daily to the territory by Jordanian television, and
most
West Bankers were favorably impressed by seeing
their national representatives in action. We believe
that most West Bankers want a negotiated solution to
their problems, but they believe that only the PLO has
sufficient Arab and international credibility to repre-
sent their interests.
In our judgment, King Hussein is aware of the depth
of West Bank support for the PLO. He will, therefore,
probably use the specter of independent Palestinian
leadership to prod Arafat into making additional
concessions. Hussein is not ready to draw upon West
Bank moderates to support an independent Jordanian
entry into negotiations. We believe that Jordan, which
already has a majority Palestinian population, could
ill afford to resume control of 800,000 West Bankers,
most of whom proclaim allegiance to the PLO and
believe Hussein has sold out Palestinian interests.
Jordan's political stability, in our view, remains Hus-
sein's first priority.
What Could Change? Without Jordanian support, the
prospects are slim that West Bank moderates would
be willing to represent Palestinian interests in negotia-
tions. Several developments, however, could lead King
Hussein to seek the participation of West Bank
leaders rather than the PLO:
? Further PLO factionalism, particularly in Arafat's
Fatah organization, could begin to erode support for
the organization among Palestinians and moderate
Arab governments. Additional splits in the PLO
could make a mockery of the organization's claim to
be the sole legitimate representative of Palestinian
interests. Hussein and West Bank moderates might
then be tempted to fill the leadership vacuum.
? Arafat's assassination might also lead to the PLO's
collapse. West Bank moderates, in our judgment,
initially would be reluctant to step forward for fear
of inviting Syrian and radical Palestinian reprisals.
Over the long term, however, Syrian attempts to
dominate the Palestinian movement could backfire
if Damascus continued to block peace negotiations.
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? Significant Israeli concessions before the beginning
of actual negotiations, such as an agreement to
return most of the West Bank to Arab rule and to
consider an international solution for the question of
Jerusalem, could also dispel West Bank and Jorda-
nian doubts about the outcome of peace negotia-
tions. If the PLO still refused to abandon terrorism
and unequivocably recognize Israel's right to exist,
we believe King Hussein and many West Bank
leaders would be willing to abandon Palestinian
unity to pursue a negotiated settlement.
In our view, none of these developments is likely. We
believe that Arafat is intent on preventing further
erosion of the PLO's organizational integrity, particu-
larly in his own Fatah group. Although Arafat's
assassination will always be a possibility, the PLO
chairman has had an uncanny instinct for survival.
On the Israeli side neither Labor nor Likud appear
ready to make far-reaching concessions in advance of
negotiations.
Under the most favorable of circumstances, Hussein
and West Bank moderates would be under constant
threat of assassination from Syrian-backed radical
Palestinian groups and perhaps even from mainline
Fatah units once they chose to represent Palestinian
interests. We believe Syria would also threaten Jor-
dan militarily and actively support East Bankers
opposed to Hussein's policies. Given the risks in-
volved, Hussein and Palestinian moderates would
expect the United States to push for a rapid conclu-
sion to negotiations and to guarantee that Israel make
significant concessions
Israeli-Imposed Autonomy? The Israeli Government
might also make a concerted effort to develop a
moderate Palestinian leadership by unilaterally grant-
ing greater local authority to West Bank communi-
ties. The US Embassy in Tel Aviv reports that Israeli
political leaders have again begun to speculate along
these lines.
Most Israeli leaders, regardless of political affiliation,
believe that Israel must develop some form of local
rule on the West Bank to allow an easing of the
military occupation. Likud and Labor politicians,
however, differ on how extensive local authority
should be. Likud leaders publicly argue for a sharply
limited autonomy that would grant West Bankers
only municipal authority, while Israel would retain
control over key sovereignty-related matters, includ-
ing land and water utilization, defense and foreign
affairs, security, and the regulation of trade. Accord-
ing to US Embassy reporting, Likud officials also
would prefer that local leadership positions be filled
by more traditionalist, rural Palestinians opposed to
PLO influence. The Likud government of Prime
Minister Begin created the now largely defunct Vil-
lage Leagues in an attempt to develop such Palestin-
ian leadership.
Labor leaders envisage broader Palestinian self-rule.
They would prefer that autonomy arrangements be
worked out in coordination with Jordan and West
Bank Palestinians. We believe, however, that Labor
leaders are pessimistic that a negotiated solution can
be reached any time soon, and they realize Israel may
have to proceed independently.
Both Labor and Likud leaders hope that experience
with self-rule would encourage West Bank indepen-
dence from the PLO and less antagonism toward
Israel. Israelis could continue to settle large areas of
the territory, but the military nature of the occupation
over time would become less visible. Eventually, West
Bank leaders would represent Palestinian interests at
peace negotiations.
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We believe the chances are poor that an Israeli-
imposed autonomy plan would succeed:
? The stark differences between Labor and Likud
goals mean that successive Israeli governments will
adopt contradictory policies toward the territory.
West Bankers understand the realities of Israeli
politics, and they are unlikely to participate in
autonomy schemes that could be dismantled after
the next election.
? Given the changing nature of Israeli governments,
most West Bank leaders probably would want Jor-
danian support before participating in a self-rule
plan. Unless King Hussein had decided to ignore the
PLO, such support would not be forthcoming.
? Most West Bank Palestinians would believe that an
Israeli autonomy plan was merely a scheme to
perpetuate Israeli control of the territory. According
to press reports and US Consulate reporting, many
West Bankers view local autonomy as a synonym
for apartheid. Instead of developing a generation of
moderate West Bank leaders, we believe that an
Israeli-imposed autonomy plan would, in West Bank
eyes, only create a new group of traitors to the
Palestinian cause.
The Future for Islamic Fundamentalism
The US Consulate in Jerusalem reported last year
that Islamic fundamentalism was making slow but
steady growth throughout Palestinian society on the
West Bank. Although its influence can be seen in all
age groups, its greatest impact has been among
Palestinian youth. About 90 percent of female stu-
dents in primary and secondary grades now wear
funds of the Islamic Waqf, are building social and
cultural facilities that offer opportunities for close
contact between local Muslim religious figures and
Palestinian youth.
This growth in Islamic influence is particularly strik-
ing, given the West Bankers' reputation for being one
of the most Westernized Arab populations. Most
West Bankers are Sunni Muslims, although approxi-
mately 7 percent are Christians. Muslim or Christian,
West Bankers have long had one of the highest
literacy and education rates in the Arab world.
Many academic observers believe the increased inter-
est in Islam reflects personal Palestinian frustrations.
Dissatisfied with their external conditions, West
Bankers are looking for solace in traditional religious
practices. According to this view, Islamic fundamen-
talism on the West Bank does not yet have a political
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Brotherhood claim their goals are long term and that,
although Islamic fundamentalism has religious and
social importance, it does not yet have political salien-
cy.
supports the fundamentalists.
Islamic Fundamentalism on the University Campus.
Although such views apparently hold true for most
West Bankers involved in the current religious revival,
we believe that university students increasingly view
Islamic piety as a means of expressing their opposition
to Israeli occupation and their adherence to Palestin-
ian nationalist goals. Although the US Consulate.
reports that the Fatah-associated Student Youth
Movement continues to command the most support
among Palestinian students, Islamic fundamentalist
groups are becoming increasingly influential on West
Bank campuses, particularly at an-Najah University,
the territory's largest university. The Consulate esti-
mates that a third of an-Najah's student body actively
Islamic groups and Fatah supporters are not always
opponents. As a result of the recent splits in the PLO,
fundamentalists and Arafat supporters joined to
counter radical Palestinian attempts to gain support
among university students. The US Consulate be-
lieves, however, that this tactical alliance may be
ending and that Islamic groups may begin to chal-
lenge all secular Palestinian parties for control of the
student governments at West Bank universities.
To date, Islamic fundamentalists have fought mainly
against their secular Palestinian foes. Religious
groups apparently have not sought to attack Israelis.
the Israeli
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Government has not moved against the fundamental- 25X1
ists because it believes they serve Israeli interests by
fracturing the Palestinian national movement.
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ready foiled several attempts by Jewish terrorists.
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Roles and Restraints. We believe that, at least for the
short term, Islamic fundamentalist groups will contin-
ue to play a more important role in intra-Palestinian
rivalries than in anti-Israeli violence. We recognize,
however, that Islamic piety is growing on the West
Bank and that more conventional political forces, such
as the PLO, may be unable to provide the answer to
Palestinian national aspirations. As long as Palestin-
ian political groups remain ineffective, Islamic funda-
mentalists will have broad scope to gain converts and
greater opportunities for political influence.
The fact that most West Bank Palestinians are Sunni
Muslims-who have not generally been carried away
by Shia fervor-will militate against Islamic funda-
mentalism becoming the driving force behind West
Bank violence. We believe there are two develop-
ments, however, that could lead Islamic fundamental-
ist groups to turn to violence against Israelis:
? A successful attack by Israeli Jewish extremists
against the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem-
Islam's third-holiest shrine-would radicalize the
fundamentalists on the West Bank. The Israeli
Government is aware of the need to protect the
? Successful cross-border attacks by Shia radicals
operating out of Lebanon might also lead some
Islamic fundamentalists to imitate the Lebanese
example. Such attacks, in our view, would have a
particularly powerful impact on religious West
Bankers if they led to an exodus of Israeli Jews from
northern Israel. Devout Palestinians might then
consider launching suicide attacks in the belief that
Israeli settlers could also be forced to leave the West
Bank.
Prospects for West Bank Violence
During the Israeli occupation of the territory, Pales-
tinian violence has not increased steadily. Instead,
West Bank violence has been cyclical in nature.
Immediately after the 1967 war, Palestinians engaged
in numerous attacks against Israeli targets, but effec-
tive security measures dampened the violence. During
the late 1970s and early 1980s, the number of attacks
again increased, but the Israeli crackdown on the
PLO-supported National Guidance Committee-
which had.been coordinating West Bank resistance-
led to a slackening in violence
Current Trends. Our study of incidents of violence in
the West Bank reveals that attacks by Palestinians
against Israeli targets began to increase again in the
fall of 1984. During March, the level of monthly
incidents was the highest since 1982. Our data also
substantiate Israeli claims that West Bankers are
making greater use of bombs, firebombs, and Molotov
cocktails.
The recent increase in West Bank violence is particu-
larly significant because it has not followed previous
yearly patterns. Historically, violence in the West
Bank has been highest during the spring, when several
Palestinian and Israeli national holidays occur, and in
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Figure 12
West Bank Violence, 1983-85
Arab and Jewish Violence
Number of incidentsa
Arab
125
2510
0 I 11 111 IV 1 11 111 IV 1
1983 84 85
Types of Arab Bombs
Number of bombs
>u
30 1
toe -
Stonings
Other
The number of violent attacks or West Bank violence follows yearly patterns. West Bank Palestinians are increasingly
demonstrations increased significantly The highest number of incidents occurs in using Molotov cocktails, firebombs, and
during the first four months of 1985. The March. Several holidays take place during other types of explosive devices. Despite
165 incidents so far this year is almost March, the most significant of which is this increase, however, there has not been
equal to the total number of incidents for Palestinian Land Day. a concomitant rise in Israeli casualties.
1984. Incidents of Arab and Jewish
violence tend to rise and fall together.
Regional Breakdown of Arab Violence
Number of incidents
City incidents versus total Arab
violence
rr ^
City percentage compared to
total city violence
? Bethlehem t Nablus
? Jerusalem Ram Allah
M Hebron
Y I
1
Types of Arab Violence
Percent
0 1983 1984 1985 0 1983 1984 1985
Although West Bank Arab violence has increased, the violence does not appear to have
become more widespread geographically. Despite its reputation as the most tense Arab
city in the West Bank, Hebron statistically ranks below both Jerusalem and Nablus in
incidents of violence.
Note: The data on West Bank violence were compiled from the West
Bank Media Reports prepared by the US Consulate in Jerusalem.
All of the incidents were originally reported in West Bank or
Jerusalem newspapers.
? Bombings
? Shootings
a Number of incidents may not agree with the
total for various types of violence due to multiple
events for some incidents.
b 1985 includes data for January through April.
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the fall, when the start of the school term is often the
occasion for violence by youths. The number of
incidents last January and February, however, was
over twice as high as the number for the same months
last year.
We believe there are several reasons for the sudden
spurt in West Bank violence:
the most important
factor has been the competition between Arafat's
supporters and opponents on the West Bank. The
various PLO components are trying to attract ad-
herents by outdoing each other in attacking Israeli
targets. This competition has caused all Palestinian
groups, including Fatah, to increase their activities
on the West Bank.
? The demonstration effect of the Shia guerrilla cam-
paign against Israeli forces in Lebanon may also, in
our view, have encouraged some West Bankers to
resort to violence. The US Consulate in Jerusalem
reports that even some moderate West Bankers are
concerned that the Lebanon example may galvanize
Palestinian youth and generate permanently higher
levels of violence.
? The economic decline in the territory and the
concomitant increase in unemployment-particular-
ly among the young-have also, in our view, led to
rising tensions.
now pa}
Israelis.
PLO activists in the West Bank are
Although Israeli security crackdowns on Palestinians
are.likely.to dampen violence temporarily, we believe
that the level. of violence will gradually increase. In
bun-view :.the factors that have, led to the recent sharp
'rise in incidents arejikely to endure for the next few
years. We do not anticipate a near-term improvement
resolution to the PLO's factional problems
It is not yet clear how longlasting or pervasive the
effects of the Shia radical resistance to Israel's mili-
tary presence in southern Lebanon will be, but we
believe that cross-border Shia attacks causing many
Israelis to leave the northern towns would have a
powerful impact on Islamic fundamentalist groups
and throughout the West Bank. If the Israeli with-
drawal from Lebanon brings an end to Shia violence,
however, local conditions are likely to be more critical
in influencing patterns of violence in the territory.
Impact on Israeli Control. Despite the upsurge in
Palestinian violence, there has been no proportionate
increase in Israeli casualties. West Bankers may be
using more Molotov cocktails, but most of the violence
is still carried out by amateurs who apparently do not
have access to sophisticated explosives and who are
not prepared to risk their lives to maximize the
number of Israeli victims.
As long as the increase in violence is gradual and does
not result in significant increases in Israeli casualties,
we do not believe that violence will deter Israel from
expanding its presence in the territory. Young,
middle-class Israelis will continue to move from Israel
proper to bedroom communities on the West Bank.
We believe, however, that there are early indications
that Palestinians may be attempting to inflict greater
casualties in their attacks. In addition to the increas-
ing use of Molotov cocktails, the Israeli press reported
in March that a bomb was found inside a West Bank
settlement-an extremely rare occurence-and that
the first remote control explosive discovered in the
territory was defused alongside a West Bank road.
Most Israeli settlements, particularly large suburban
communities such as Ma'ale Adummim, are easily
accessible and lax in their security measures. A car
bomb detonated in one of the densely populated
settlements could result in significant loss of life.
Several such attacks might lead some Israelis who
settled in the West Bank solely for economic reasons
to return to Israel. At a minimum, such violence
almost certainly would cause a drop in the number of
new settlers moving to the West Bank and thus keep
Israel from reaching its near-term goal of 100,000
Israeli residents in the territory.
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Figure 13. Former Arab bus station in downtown
Hebron. Israeli military government closed the
Any Israeli government, whether led by Labor or
Likud, would react harshly to an escalation in Pales-
tinian violence in the West Bank. Occupation authori-
ties would resort to a broad range of security mea-
sures-such as the deportation of Palestinian leaders
and lawbreakers, the punishment of entire villages,
and the imposition of extensive curfews-to combat
West Bank violence. The Israeli Government proba-
bly would also seek out Palestinian targets in neigh-
boring states, such as Jordan and Syria, and it would
probably conduct raids against PLO bases even if Tel
Aviv could not prove that the PLO was directly
responsible for the West Bank violence. Such actions
would prompt sharply increased international criti-
cism of Israel and lead to renewed Arab requests that
the United States restrain Israel and bring it to the
negotiating table.
Palestinian radicals, in our view, would be hard
pressed to continue an effective terrorism campaign in
the face of such an extensive Israeli crackdown.
Unlike the Shias in southern Lebanon, West Bankers
do not have easy access to arms and explosives.
Jordan, in our judgment, also would impose tighter
controls on PLO members residing there in hopes of
mollifying Israel and precluding disruption among its
harsher security measures, such as limiting the areas
where Palestinians could travel and live or even
forcing West Bankers to leave the territory. Right-
wing leaders probably would urge the government to
annex the territory formally while at the same time
denying Palestinians basic political and civil rights.
Advocates of such a policy would argue that formal
annexation would convince West Bankers that Israel
will never relinquish control of the territory and
eventually cause many Palestinians to immigrate to
other Arab states
A Labor government, however, would resist adopting
such draconian policies. We believe many Labor
leaders would view the imposition of a harsh police
regime on the West Bank as tantamount to admitting
the failure of the socialist Zionist dream of an ideal
Jewish state. Labor politicians would also be more
sensitive to the international repercussions of such
policies. In addition, Labor leaders would be con-
cerned about the impact these actions would have on
Western Jewish immigration rates to Israel. For these
reasons, we believe that a Labor government would be
more likely to explore a negotiated solution to Israel's
West Bank dilemma, while taking all necessary secu-
rity measures to protect Israeli equities in the occu-
pied territories.
Implications for the United States. Regardless of
which policy course it took, the Israeli Government
would want active US support. We believe that Labor
leaders would expect the United States to broker a
negotiated solution that minimized the concessions
required of Israel. A Labor government that attempt-
ed to pursue negotiations would face intense rightwing
opposition, however, and probably would assume a
tough public posture that would complicate US diplo-
matic dealings with moderate Arab states
Likud leaders would attempt to convince the United
States that it had no choice but to implement harsh
policies on the West Bank and would expect the
United States to insulate it from international criti-
cism. A Likud government would argue that any
own population.
If these measures failed to contain Palestinian vio-
lence, Israeli leaders would have to make some diffi-
cult choices. A Likud government would be under
pressure from its rightwing allies to adopt even
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weakening in US support for Israel would only en-
courage Palestinian radicals, weaken Jordan's resolve
to control PLO activities, and lead to even more
violence on the West Bank. Although Likud leaders
might pay lipservice to US requests that it explore
negotiation options, we believe that a rightwing Israeli
government would view negotiations only as a way to
buy time until it brought West Bank security under
control.
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