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• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00587R000200270001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: May 12, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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ptf~~wF Directorate of .'eFe4-
Intelligence
Lebanon's Maronite Christians:
The Politics of Intransigence
An Intelligence Asse$sment
met
NESA 85-10123
June 1985
385
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Directorate of
' Intelligence
Lebanon's Maronite Christians:
The Politics of Intransigence
This paper was prepared by Office
of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. It was
coordinated with the Directorate of Operations.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Arab-Israeli Division, NESA,
Secret
;A ES.4 N5-10123
June 1945
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Secret
Lebanon's Maronite Christians:
The Politics of Intransigence F-
Key Judgments A decade of sectarian violence has eroded Christian political ascendancy in
information available Lebanon and prompted Muslim demands for equality if riot supremacy.
as of 7 May 1985 There is no consensus among Christians on how to accommodate the
was used in this report.
changing political and military realities of Lebanon, but most remain
obsessed with parochial interests. Christian hardliners continue to oppose
reforms that would give Muslims a share of political power commensurate
with their demographic strength. Christian intransigence on this issue
threatens to reignite the civil war and eliminate the last vestiges of
Lebanese sovereignty.
Christian behavior since the outbreak of the civil war paints a picture of a
community so traumatized by its perception of Muslim ill will that
common sense approaches to their dilemma rarely come into play.
Hardline Christians will not voluntarily implement the political changes
necessary for the continuation of a unitary Lebanese state and would
rather court political disaster than see their opponents improve their
political lot. Sustained Syrian pressure will be necessary before Christian
extremists come to terms with their Muslim countrymen.
The rebellion in March by the Christian Lebanese Forces militia against
the leadership of President Amin Gemayel points up a longstanding dispute
within the Christian community. Moderates believe their long-term inter-
ests are best served by cooperating with Damascus and permitting some
political accommodation with Muslims. Hardliners, however, are prepared
to see Lebanon divided rather than give in to Muslim political demands.
Hardline Christians fail to recognize that the radicalization at work among
Muslims is related to Christian political practices, and many deny that
political equity is an issue. In their view, the maintenance of Christian
hegemony is a defensive reaction to thwart the "eternal Muslim goal" of
suppressing Christians. They believe that concessions would be construed
by Muslims as a sign of weakness that would encourage Muslim militancy
rather than increase prospects for dialogue.
The current Christian proposals for a federal system in Lebanon represent
the outer limits of their willingness to concede anything to an integrated
Lebanese state. Extreme decentralization, while in fact evolving, is opposed
Secret
V'L.S 185-10123
June 198.5
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by Syria and Lebanese Muslims, who see it as a disguised form of
partition. Nonetheless, continued factional fighting probably will lead to
the creation, either by accident or design, of territories that tend to be
confessionally exclusive. The question for Lebanon now appears to be the
extent and rigidity of evolving confessional separatism.
Syria probably is prepared to tolerate considerable political and adminis-
trative decentralization, but Syrian leaders apparently have not yet decided
how far decentralization should go. They have stated publicly that they will
not tolerate cantonization. Although Damascus cannot impose a lasting
solution on the Lebanese factions, continuing Syrian predominance in
Lebanon is necessary to avoid political collapse.
Prospects that Christian hardliners will adopt a conciliatory attitude
toward Muslims are dim. Younger Christian leaders whose political
awakening has taken place during the civil war show little inclination to
compromise with Muslims. Nurtured on extremist rhetoric, they are
cynical about reconciliation. In the near term, moves by hardline Chris-
tians to restart political dialogue would reflect a desire to preempt Syrian
action rather than a genuine effort to pursue national reconciliation. F_
The rise of militant Islam will severely restrict the scope of US influence in
Lebanon. Conspicuous US efforts to bolster moderate forces would draw
fire from the radicals and could stall US initiatives. The burden of the Leb-
anese albatross, moreover, could limit the implementation of policies on
other US interests in the area, particularly the broader Middle East peace
process.
Secret iv
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The Problem: The Immovable Object and the Irresistible Force
Maronite Maneuvering: A Zero-Sum Game
Dialogue Versus Violence
Federalism: The Maronite Model
7
Syria: Big Brother Is Watching
7
10
10
Generational Change
12
12
Christian Leadership Options
14
15
16
Outlook: The Labyrinth Revisited
16
Implications for the United States
18
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Secret
Lebanon's Maronite Christians:
The Politics of Intransigence F_
The Problem: The Immovable Object
and the Irresistible Force
A decade of sectarian violence has seriously eroded
Christian political ascendancy in Lebanon.' Muslim
demands for equality-if not supremacy-have called
into question the future political status of Lebanese
Christians. Despite political and military reverses that
have left Christians vulnerable to their Muslim and
Druze opponents, they continue to resist serious politi-
cal reforms that could alleviate growing hostility
toward them. Christian intransigence has led to in-
creasing militance among Muslims, particularly Shi-
as. We believe that failure to accommodate at least
some Muslim demands could reignite the civil war
and eliminate the last vestiges of Lebanese sovereign-
Christians, like other Lebanese factions, recognize
that the old Lebanon that functioned according to
deals worked out among political godfathers is over.
however, there is no
clear consensus among Christians on what the new
Lebanon should look like. Christian proposals thus far
tend toward arrangements designed to maximize their
parochial interests without adequate concern for the
consequences to the remainder of the population. F_
The rebellion in March 1985 by the Christian Leba-
nese Forces militia against the leadership of President
Amin Gemayel points up a longstanding and bitter
dispute between moderates and hardliners within the
Lebanon's Christian community consists of a half dozen religious
denominations. The Maronite sect is the largest and politically most
significant. Throughout this paper the terms Christian or Christian
community refer specifically to the Maronites and those non-
Maronite Christians who identify with the political views set forth
by the Lebanese Front-a coalition of Maronite political parties-
and, particularly, by the Phalange Party or the Lebanese Forces
militia, the two strongest institutions within the Maronite commu-
Christian community. Christian moderates believe
their long-term interests are best served by cooperat-
ing with Damascus and permitting some political
accommodation with Muslims. Hardliners, distrustful
of Muslim and Syrian intentions, are determined to
preserve their political dominance over other Leba-
nese factions and are prepared to see Lebanon divided
rather than give in to Muslim demands.
Although the Lebanese Forces and the less militant
Phalange Party are the best organized units within
the Maronite community, neither represents the com-
munity as a whole. Lebanese Maronites, however,
have few options for sources of leadership. The Leba-
nese Forces rebellion discredited Amin Gemayel's
attempt to speak for all Christians and may force him
to assume the traditional presidential role of broker
among Lebanese confessional factions. Christian
moderates have not been able to organize themselves
into an effective political force. As a result, leadership
of the community has gone to the hardline organiza-
tions by default.
We believe that a relatively stable, confessionally
mixed, unitary Lebanese state can only be achieved if
the Christian community drops its opposition to gov-
ernment reforms that would benefit Muslims and if
Muslims acknowledge legitimate Christian fears. Ac-
cording to US Embassy reporting, the present hard-
line Maronite leadership believes that concessions
would be construed by Muslims as a sign of weakness
that would encourage Muslim militancy rather than
increase prospects for dialogue. The inability of mod-
erates to develop a political alternative has crippled
the Christian community's ability to take actions that
could reduce the appeal of factions like the radical
Shia Hizballah movement that preach an end to all
Christian privileges.
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*I-
Figure 1. Who Speaks for Christians? President Amin Gemavel, a
political godfather (le*), Samir JaJa, a rebel leader and Chris-
tian zealot (middle), Elie Hubaivga, a Lebanese Forces chief and
The period during which potential concessions could
have a meaningful effect on reducing confessional
strife is ending. The demographic shift in favor of
Muslims and the growing appeal of radical Islamic
fundamentalism, if unchecked, will eventually place
the Christian community in jeopardy.
The pattern of Christian behavior since independence
and especially since 1975 reveals a community so
traumatized by its perceptions of Muslim ill will that
logic and common sense approaches to its dilemma
rarely come into play. Hardline Christians are com-
mitted to the civil war ethic of mutual denial. They
will not voluntarily implement the political changes
necessary for the continuation of a unitary Lebanese
state and would rather court political disaster than see
their opponents improve their political lot.
The rise of the Shia fundamentalist Hizballah (Party
of God) has added a new dimension to the "tradi-
tional" Muslim threat to Christian supremacy in
Lebanon. Hizballah adherents reject the Lebanese
political process and are committed to fomenting an
Islamic revolution in Lebanon. Central to this goal is
the elimination of Western, especially US, influence
in Lebanon and ending all residual Israeli presence in
the south. Hizballah views Lebanese Christians, par-
ticularly Maronites, as agents of Western and Israeli
influence.
Hardline Christians view the radicalization at work
among Muslims and Druze as unrelated to Christian
political practices, and many deny that political
equity is an issue. In their view, the maintenance of
Christian hegemony is necessary to thwart the
"eternal Muslim goal" of suppressing Christians.F
The Maronite leadership, in our judgment, is operat-
ing on two levels. According to US officials, they
relate in dramatic terms the desperate situation of the
Christian community, which they perceive to be under
constant threat from aggressive Muslims. Yet the
political behavior of these leaders suggests they be-
lieve they can still manipulate the situation to Chris-
tian advantage.
Despite their challenge to Christian preeminence in
Lebanon, we believe that mainline Muslim groups still
regard Christians as an essential partner in the Leba-
nese political process. As long as a siege mentality
prevails among Christians, however, a genuine return
to political dialogue is unlikely.
We believe the eventual emergence of a new power
structure will be determined by Syria, the predomi-
nant political force in Lebanon, and by the forces
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Secret
Figure 2
Lebanon: Estimated Distribution of Confessional Groups
( on In.,iomil Group Population
l NIu'linl sects
( hr iktian sect,
Other Catholic
Other Christian 2
lllhcr (atIluli1
Other (hri~lian
Shia
ly?S
Total 2.31) million
llaronit~
currently being unleashed by a militant and uncom-
promising brand of Islam determined to end Christian
privilege.
Maronite Maneuvering: A Zero-Sum Game
At the outset of the civil war, Christians viewed the
domestic crisis as a challenge to Lebanese sovereignty
posed by the armed Palestinian presence, which they
denounced for functioning as a state within a state.
Espousal of the Palestinian cause by Muslims, partic-
ularly leftists, solidified opposition to Christians ini-
tially over the question of Palestinian prerogatives in
Lebanon. This Muslim-Palestinian alliance soon al-
tered the focus of the problem, however, to one of
Christian prerogatives and shifted the emphasis from
Lebanese sovereignty to political equity among Leba-
nese factions.
Maronites have opposed Muslim calls for the secular-
ization of Lebanon because a government based on
numerical majority would relegate them to the role of
a political minority. Christians fear dhimmi status-
the traditional lot of non-Muslims in an Islamic state,
in which the well-being of the dhimmis is tied to
Muslim tolerance. We believe efforts aimed at secu-
larizing the political system would prompt Christians
to renew efforts at withdrawing into a garrison state
that could exist only with outside backing.
Christian efforts to maintain their hegemony have led
them to pursue varying strategies that generally have
been conditioned by their perceptions of Syrian and
Israeli policies toward them. At various times Maro-
nites have supported the status quo, as represented by
the 1943 pact. Those most alarmed by growing
Muslim stridency advocate a retreat into a Christian
ministate. Even those committed to maintaining Le-
banon's pluralist society support some sectarian sepa-
ration.
Christian views on the future of Lebanon and their
role in it have been affected by the social and political
transformation that has taken place as a result of the
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Figure 3
Traditional Distribution of Lebanese Religious Groups
Maronite
Greek Orthodox
= Greek Catheiic
\N-N Mixed Greek rite and
Shia Musi,m
Sunni Musr rrm
Druze
Mixed Dr.ne and
Greek Orthodox
District (S ad,i 1 boundary
O District igada) r. rite,
20
Kilometers
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative,
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Secret
Lebanese Christians, particularly the Maronite sect,
have been the dominant politicalforce in Lebanon
since the French created the modern state in 1920.
Initially, their claim to political preeminence was
holstered by a slim numerical superiority, established
in a census conducted by French authorities in 1932.
Since this census-the last taken in Lebanon-the
demographic balance has shifted dramatically in
favor of Shia Muslims. Christians now justify their
ascendancy as necessary for their cultural and reli-
gious survival.
Lebanon's political system is founded on the so-
called national pact concluded in 1943 between Mar-
onite and Sunni Muslim political leaders. This oral
agreement was an effort to promote stability in the
new state by calming Christian fears of being
drowned in a Muslim sea and to assure Muslims that
Christians would not serve Western interests. The
practical byproduct of the agreement was the appor-
tionment of government positions on the basis of
religious affiliation, specifically that the president of
the republic would be a Maronite Christian; the
prime minister, a Sunni Muslim; and the speaker of
parliament, a Shia Muslim.
Lebanese law recognizes 17 religious sects. Every
Lebanese is registered as a member of one of these
sects, and legally there is no Lebanese who does not
belong to a confession.
Until 1943 there were periodic readjustments in
ratios of confessional representation and allocation of
speck offices. Since 1943, however, there has been
only one modest adjustment. The current 99-man
parliament, elected in 1972, has only 19 seats allo-
cated for Shia Muslims, who constitute an estimated
40 percent of the population, while 30 seats are
reserved for Maronite Christians, who make up less
than 20 percent of the population. Academic sources
note that 26 Lebanese families have held 35 percent
of all parliamentary seats, a clear demonstration of
the strength of clan politics.
This system grew out of the need to balance the
competing interests of numerous religious groups.
During the early stages of the civil war, most factions
still believed the 1943 formula provided a serviceable
basis for sectarian cooperation. While the antagonists
were prepared to abide by the spirit of the pact, which
sought to offset Christian fears by recognizing a
degree of political preeminence. Muslims and Druze
were seeking revisions that would give power to non-
Christians more in line with Lebanons demographic
realities.
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civil war. We believe that Christian militants, buoyed
by their ability to withstand assaults by Muslim
adversaries for the last decade, may have unrealistic
expectations of their ability to continue to thwart the
aspirations of their opponents.
Dialogue Versus Violence
Prospects that the Phalange and Lebanese Forces will
adopt a conciliatory attitude toward Muslims are dim.
Despite new attitudes and approaches that have
emerged as a result of the civil war, the core issue for
Maronites continues to be whether or not they trust
Muslims. The answer, at least from the Maronite
leadership, has been a resounding "no."
Younger leaders whose political awakening has taken
place during the civil war have become accustomed to
violence and show little inclination to compromise
with Muslims. Extremist rhetoric has reinforced sec-
tarian distrust, and a whole generation has come to
maturity without having had contact with their non-
Christian countrymen.
Many young Christians have never left the relatively
orderly existence of Christian areas and regard war-
ravaged West Beirut as savage and alien. A Western
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yy
Figure 4. Life in East and West Beirut. Harrods open for business
as usual in East Beirut; swimmers enjoy the beaches (top photos);
rebuilding once fashionable West Beirut must await stability;
journalist captured the essence of the way these
communities view each other when he described the
"green line" separating Christian East Beirut from
Muslim West Beirut not like the Berlin Wall, keeping
citizens apart, but, like the Hoover Dam, holding each
other back. We believe these attitudes have made
many young Maronites skeptical about the utility of
dialogue or reconciliation and further diminish the
prospects that they will abandon violence as a political
tool.
The views of the six-man Lebanese Front directorate
form the philosophical base for much of the Maronite
community. Typical are the views of Charles Malik, a
Greek Orthodox Christian long associated with the
Maronite position, who embodies the traditional dedi-
cation to the concept of a pluralist society.
he is nonetheless
consumed with distrust of Muslim intentions and sees
the safety of the Christian community as an absolute
priority.
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Secret
Directorate member Fuad Boustani, who regards the
creation of greater Lebanon as a mistake and wants
no part in a Muslim-Christian accommodation, repre-
sents the extremist Christian position. Boustani advo-
cates a Christian homeland and sees Lebanon as a
refuge for Christians and only Christians from
throughout the Middle East who sooner or later will
be victimized by Muslims.
Federalism: The Maronite Model
Hardline Christian leaders now advocate the estab-
lishment of a highly decentralized federal system for
Lebanon in which each community would be virtually
autonomous. Following the collapse of the Lebanese
National Reconciliation Conference at Lausanne in
March 1984, the Lebanese Front issued a paper
calling for the creation of a federal republic in
Lebanon. Christian proposals, though couched in gen-
eral terms calling for political decentralization, ex-
pressed the recurrent Maronite theme of their need
for geographical guarantees.
The outlines of the proposed federation were left
purposely vague. Some Christians envisioned the
withdrawal of their coreligionists into the Maronite
heartland. Others, particularly those from areas out-
side the heartland, envisioned the creation of a multi-
tude of cantons throughout Lebanon. This version,
they argue, would avoid uprooting a large segment of
the Christian population and enable them to maintain
their property and presence in areas long regarded as
Christian.
Some Christians argue that the latter plan is not
feasible from a security standpoint. Others, however,
see advantages in avoiding Christian isolation and
breaking up what otherwise would be large, contigu-
ous Shia-dominated areas.
is to reduce the traditionally
weak central government to the role of a coordinating
bureau among self-governing religious factions. Virtu-
ally all significant functions of government would be
reserved for the local confessional administrations.
This extreme decentralization, while in fact evolving,
is opposed by Syria and Lebanese Muslims, who see it
as a disguised form of partition.
We believe that proposals for a federal system in
Lebanon represent for hardline Christians the outer
limits of their willingness to concede anything to an
integrated Lebanese state. The Lebanese Forces re-
bellion against the Phalange Party and the leadership
of Amin Gemayel was an attempt to reassert hardline
views in the Christian decisionmaking process. The
mutiny was an affirmation of Lebanese Forces inflexi-
bility regarding political concessions to Muslims.
Syria: Big Brother Is Watching
The traditional reliance by Lebanese factions on
outside powers to guarantee their political survival
theoretically was given up with the adoption of the
1943 national pact. In fact, mentorship by external
powers remains a primary feature in Lebanese domes-
tic politics. In the minds of all Lebanese, the actions
of their opponents are dictated by, and dependent on,
powers beyond Lebanon's borders. The corollary to
this tenet is the belief that opposition groups can be
brought to heel whenever the mentor states wish it.E
Lebanese are so convinced of the omnipotence of
external powers that they ascribe all internal events to
the machinations of these powers. They see them-
selves as helpless-even blameless--for Lebanon's
political condition. This mentality has enabled Chris-
tians to temporize on central issues of political reform,
choosing instead the centuries-old pattern of reliance
on an external patron--Syria, Israel, the United
States, and, once again, Syria to avoid a significant
divestiture of political power.
The present Lebanese Government has, for all practi-
cal purposes, charged Syria with responsibility for
Christian survival. At best, relations between Leba-
nese Maronites and Svria have been mercurial. Maro-
nites harbor a deep mistrust of Syria but grudgingly
accept its protection when they believe that is their
only alternative to annihilation.
Syrian policy toward Lebanon is a carefully crafted
attempt to maintain a balance among contending
forces. This policy has led Damascus to pursue prag-
matic relations with most Lebanese factions to pre-
vent a complete victory by any one group. In the years
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Figure 5
Approximate Distribution of Lebanese Religious Groups
Secret 8
Syria
* DAMASCUS
Christian
Shia Muslim
Sunni Muslim
Druze
Mixed Druze and
Christian
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Syria and the Maronites: Coming Full Circle
The present understanding between the Christian-
dominated government in Beirut and Syrian leaders
in Damascus is the second since the outbreak of
hostilities a decade ago. Syria's alliance with the
Palestinian resistance movement and Lebanese left-
ists faltered in 1976 when the Druze-led National
Movement decided to abandon Syrian-backed media-
tion efforts in favor of a military campaign against
the Maronites.
Syria, fearing that the Maronites would use this
opportunity to make good their earlier threats to set
up a ministate, decided upon military intervention to
bring the factions under control and, ironically, to
defend the Maronites. By mid-October, Syria had
defeated its former Muslim and Palestinian allies
and was in control of Lebanon north of the Litani
River. Syria also achieved a political victory when
the Arab summit meeting, called in Riyadh to halt
the fighting, legitimized the Syrian role in Lebanon,
making Damascus the final arbiter in Lebanese poli-
tics.
The struggle between the Maronites and Syria was
reignited with the political and military ascendancy
since the outbreak of the civil war, Syria has champi-
oned Muslim demands for expanded political power
while at the same time trying to avoid panicking
Christians into establishing an Israeli-backed mini-
state.
Despite the rising tide of opposition to the Maronites,
especially from an increasingly radical Shia popula-
tion, Maronites behave as if they are confident that
external support will enable them to reshape the
political system to the extent necessary to maintain
their preeminence. We believe the Maronites have
failed to recognize that the growing fundamentalist
movement, despite its heavy reliance on Iranian back-
ing and Syrian cooperation, is primarily an indigenous
movement that Syria may be hesitant or unable to
control.
Maronite-Israeli alliance.
of Bashir Gemayel and the Lebanese Forces militia.
Bashir utilized the alliance with Israel to promote his
bid for renewed Christian hegemony, a goal that was
nearly realized following the Israeli invasion of June
1982 and the temporary devastation of leftist ele-
ments opposed to Christian domination. Bashir's
assassination in September 1982, a matter of'days
before he was to assume the Lebanese presidency,
contributed to the ensuing breakdown of the
The souring relationship quickly sobered Maronites
into reassessing their prospects and unleashed a
power struggle within the community between those
who sought to maintain Israeli backing and those
who preferred a less polarizing solution. Amin Ge-
mayel, elected to the presidency in place of his
assassinated younger brother, attempted to use US
support to steer a middle course between Israel and
Syria. With the abrogation of the US-mediated
Lebanese-Israeli withdrawal accord and the subse-
quent departure of the US Marines in February 1984,
Christians once again became grudging supplicants to
Damascus.
Despite changing tactics, Syria's goal of achieving
relative stability in Lebanon remains constant. Syria's
search for stability in Lebanon, however, has been
thwarted by Maronites exercising options such as
reliance on Israel and the United States-that leaders
in Damascus perceive as detrimental to Syria's vital
interests.
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The present entente between Beirut and Damascus
apparently is based on a belief among those pragmatic
Christians who back the President that Syria is
capable of protecting them from their adversaries but 25X1
will not halt Maronite political maneuvering.
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optimistic and fear that the end to direct US and
Israeli involvement in Lebanon signals the exhaustion
of Maronite options. Once Damascus is certain that
Christians have no recourse, hardliners argue, Syria
will be free to force Christians into political subservi-
ence.
In our judgment, Syria will not significantly reduce
Christian political rights, although we believe Damas-
cus wants to redress some of the political imbalance in
Lebanon. These efforts could gain impetus if Syria
sees major Christian political concessions as vital in
derailing the growing threat from radical Shia funda-
mentalists.
The Christian Shadow Government
Syrian efforts to coerce Maronites into cooperating in
an integrated Lebanese state are complicated by the
existence of a firmly entrenched self-governing mech-
anism that operates in the Maronite heartland as a
virtual state within a state. The existence and develop-
ment of this structure have reinforced Maronite sepa-
ratist tendencies and serve as a daily reminder of the
central government's inability to provide for their
needs or to protect them
The trend toward Maronite autonomy began with the
collapse of the central government during the early
stages of the civil war and the decision by the
Lebanese Forces to take over security and administra-
tive functions in Christian areas. These efforts were
initiated by the Phalange Party to enlist cooperation
and participation of nonparty members in mobilizing
community resources to support the Christian militia
and fill the void left by the government. Although this
was envisioned as a temporary necessity, it became a
self-perpetuating mechanism. By 1978 the Maronite
Christian heartland was beginning to acquire the
social and economic characteristics of an autonomous
political entity.
The Maronite shadow government boasts a foreign
affairs department that actively promotes Maronite
interests abroad and seeks support from expatriate
Maronites. The heart of the domestic program is the
public services department and its system of popular
committees that operate at the grassroots level
throughout the Christian heartland. By 1982 more
than 120 popular committees were handling services
related to health, education, finance, environment,
civil defense, planning, information, social affairs, and
youth programs, as well as problems related to public
transport, water, electricity, telephone, and police
functions.
The committees handle everything from garbage col-
lection to repairing water mains and finding housing
for Christian refugees. They regulate consumer
prices, and inspectors protect the community from
consumer fraud. Those arrested for profiteering are
likely to have their names broadcast over the Chris-
tian radio station.
Other social services include special programs for
war-traumatized children, drug rehabilitation, and
career counseling. A communications department op-
erates Arabic and French presses and radio and
television stations. There is also a special task force
made up of technicians and experts who study
Lebanon's social and physical infrastructure and pre-
pare plans for reconstruction and future development.
An oversight department keeps the work of the other
departments and committees accountable to the lead-
ership and to the Christian public.
Throughout the civil war, Lebanese Muslim factions
did not develop similar structures, although the Pales-
tinian "state within a state" was a close parallel. The
process of political and social disintegration in Leba-
non has accelerated since the Israeli invasion in June
1982 and is leading other factions, willingly or not, to
establish autonomous arrangements in areas under
their control. Lebanon is being reconstituted into a
series of sectarian fiefdoms. According to an Embassy
officer in Beirut, the process in the Druze-dominated
Shuf is approaching that of the Christian heartland.
The "minicantonization" process is under way on a
smaller scale in major urban centers such as Tripoli
and Sidon, and West Beirut endures an almost daily
subdivision by contending militias.
The Maronite Challenge
The result of this Maronite initiative has been the
creation of a structure that encroaches on the prerog-
atives of the central government. The Lebanese
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Figure 6
Maronite Shadow Government
Counter-Intelligence
and Security
Commander-General
Lebanese Forces Militia
Studies and Plans
( Gamma)
Radio Free Lebanon
TV Free Lebanon
The Voice of Lebanon
Financial Affairs Social Relief Military Foreign Relation, Public Sersices
Source Lewitt N' Snider, the Lchanese Forces Their Origins and Role in Lebanon's Politics.
the Middle East Journal. Volume 38, No I. Winter 1984.
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Forces militia directly challenges government author-
ity in the areas of military conscription and taxation.
The militia levies a small household tax as well as
taxes on meals, gasoline, and cinemas. Tariffs are
collected on goods transiting checkpoints on the "bor-
ders" of the Maronite heartland.
The civilian structure, originally created to support
the militia, has been so effective that the political
strength of the Lebanese Forces now rests not with
the militia itself, but in the effectiveness of its social
programs, which probably can be sustained even if the
militia ceases to function.
The operations of the Maronite shadow government
have closed down voluntarily on several occasions,
indicating a willingness to cooperate with the central
government. I::ach time. they have been reactivated
when government actions have brought it into conflict
with the Lebanese Forces. Muslims have tended to
vicw these periods of cooperation as conspiratorial
rather than genuine militia subservience to the gov-
ernment, confirming their suspicions that the govern-
ment is the instrument of one community s interests.
The real significance of growing Maronite autonomy
is the emergence of a new concept among younger
leaders that government Should serve the governed.
phis view stands in stark contrast to the Ottoman
tradition adhered to by older leaders that government
exists for the benefit of those who hold power and the
governed serve the governors. The change in attitude
among young Christians adds to their determination
not to return to old political patterns. This determina-
tion not only reduces prospects for reconciliation with
non-Christians but also has established new patterns
of political behavior that bypass old loyalties and
patronage systems. This in turn has repercussions for
the future course of Christian leadership and actions.
Generational Change
The social transformation of the Maronite community
as evidenced by the adoption of new attitudes of self-
reliance and responsible government has resulted in
alienation from traditional leaders and a rejection of
clan politics. Increasingly, young Maronites are estab-
lishing their leadership base through participation in
party or militia affairs. Family connections are still
useful and convey a dimension of legitimacy, but they
are no longer sufficient to establish leadership rights.
At the outset of the civil war, Lebanon's political
leaders were the same men who had presided at the
country's independence 30 years earlier. Lebanon's
political elite consisted of feudal warlords who were
the absolute rulers of their communities, the dis-
pensers of patronage, the final arbiters in personal
conflicts, and the backroom dealers who kept Leba-
non running.
Many of these octogenarian statesmen remain promi-
nent, but none any longer commands real political
power. Power has passed from the politicians to young
militia leaders who are increasingly removed from the
old feudal loyalties. This new generation of Maronite
leaders is defined partly by age and outlook, but, we
believe, primarily by their gradual adaptation to
institutional, rather than clan, political structures.F
Although the rise of the Lebanese Forces was depend-
ent upon the Gemayel name and the charismatic
personality of its young leader, it has established an
institutional structure that enabled it to survive
Bashir's assassination. Moreover, the continuation of
its social programs ensures the militia a political role
that is independent of both its military function and
its increasingly tenuous ties to the Phalange Party and
the Gemayel clan. Other Maronite factions, such as
those associated with the Shamuns and Franjiyahs,
have not developed political and military structures
that can exist independently of clan association.
The Christian Power Struggle
The tough stance of Christian leaders has been based
on their belief that they have a viable military option
to obtain their political goals. During the period of
Lebanese Forces ascendancy under Bashir Gemayel,
this attitude was predicated on the belief that Israeli
backing was unconditional. Since Bashir's death, the
militia has lost significant Israeli support and suffered
a series of military reverses.
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The Rise of the Lebanese Forces:
Changing of the Guard
The emergence of the Lebanese Forces militia as a
major political and social force among Maronites is
the most dramatic example of the breakdown of
traditional clan politics and the transfer of political
power to militia leaders. At the outset of the civil
war, the Christian political parties formed a loose
alliance known as the Lebanese Front. Each of the
parties maintained a separate militia that acted at
the behest of the parent organization and indepen-
dentlr of one another.
The militias joined for the first time in June 1976
with the siege of the Palestinian refugee camp at Tal
al-Zataar. The two-month campaign was conceived
hr militia leaders to break the Muslim ring around
Christian East Beirut and create a land link with the
Maronite heartland of Mount Lebanon. The offen-
sive--which claimed the lives of as many as 2,000
Palestinians- was significant because it was planned
by the militia commanders independently of the party
leaders and helped to establish the credentials of a
new generation of leaders.
At the time of the Tal al-Zataar campaign, the
militias and the Lebanese Front were organized
under a single directorate. In /977 the party leaders
decided that the Lebanese Front directorate should
he separate from that of the militias, which then
organized themselves in a Joint command council
under the name of the Lebanese Forces.
The decision to separate the party from the militia
was apparently an attempt by the old politicians to
keep power in their own hands, but, in fact, power
flowed in the other direction. Under the dynamic and
brutal leadership of Bashir Gemavel, the Phalange
militia established its dominance over competing
Maronite militias and forged them into an integrated
conventional military force separate from the politi-
cal parties. Eventually, the joint command council of
the militias became the executive for both the Leba-
nese Forces and the Lebanese Front.
The decline in their fortunes, however, did not dis-
suade Lebanese Forces militants from launching the
rebellion in March 1985 against the President and his
Phalange Party backers. In our view, the willingness
of the mutineers to undercut President Gemayel at a
time of heightened Christian vulnerability reflects the
failure of Christian militants to recognize changed
circumstances that have seriously limited their op-
tions.
The rebel leaders to date have made few tangible
gains. Despite general disgust among rank-and-life
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the community at large was not prepared
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retribution. The mutineers have been forced to modify
their political agenda and have reversed their earlier
opposition to Gemayel's cooperation with Syria.
The rebellion, nonetheless, has damaged what re-
mains of Gemayel's dwindling credibility. lie proba-
bly will have to associate himself even more closely
with Damascus if he is to counter Christian extremists
and maintain his relevance within the Lebanese politi-
cal process.
Lebanese Forces objections to even limited adjust-
ments in the political system have sent a strong
negative message to non-Christians and pushed into
the open the sensitive issue of intra-Christian ditTer-
ences concerning political control in Lebanon. The
rebellion, moreover, confronted Muslims with even
more evidence to support their belief in the permanen-
cy of Christian intransigence, further undermining
prospects for national reconciliation.
The President, in our judgment, never intended to
implement substantive political reforms. In our view.
Gemayel believes Syrian backing for his regime obvi-
ates the need to make concessions to his domestic
opponents. Gemayel probably believes that limited
concessions, similar to proposals made by Syrian
President Assad in 1976, would satisfy Damascus, if
not its Lebanese clients.
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Christian Leadership Options
Sentiment in the Christian community against the
Phalange Party, the Lebanese Forces, and Amin
Gemayel is widespread,
Christians assail the President and party officials for
taking large profits from government and private
economic projects and claim that the highest paying
jobs go only to Phalange Party members. Many resent
Gemayel for his perceived attempt to increase his
personal power in the Matn, his home district,
through the use of his private militia.
The Lebanese Forces is becoming increasingly un-
popular among rank-and-file Maronites for its free-
wheeling behavior that is reminiscent of activities for
which the militia criticized the Palestine Liberation
Organization a decade ago.
Maronites are fed up with arbitrary arrests,
detentions, kidnapings, and hooliganism by the
militiamen. Moderates are particularly concerned by
the provocative behavior of the Lebanese Forces
toward Syria as well as toward other factional militias
and believe that the community as a whole will suffer
because of Lebanese Forces irresponsibility.
Most Lebanese Christians recognize the vulnerability
of attempting a separate existence, and a common
adage among Lebanese is that, if it is difficult for
them to live together, it is impossible for them to live
apart. Despite the growing frustration among rank-
and-file Christians, we believe it will be difficult for
Christian moderates to summon the collective will to
challenge the present Maronite leadership. Prospects
for the development of a less militant alternative to
the Lebanese Forces or the Phalange depend on the
outcome of the current political maneuvering between
Gemayel and hardline leaders within the Lebanese
Forces, as well as the extent to which other Christian
factions are willing to deal with Syria.
If Phalange leaders are sufficiently unnerved by the
Lebanese Forces challenge, we believe they might try
to outmaneuver the militia by bringing their views
more into line with those of rank-and-file Christians.
Barring an attempt by the Phalange to increase its
grassroots appeal, moves by political moderates to
challenge domination by the Phalange and the militia
probably would have to develop around traditional
Figure 7. Christian Voices of Moderation. Maronite patriarch
Cardinal Khuraysh (left); National Bloc spokesman Raymond
The Maronite patriarch, traditionally a major politi-
cal actor in Lebanon, has been cited by some Leba-
nese as a possible foil to the militants. The patriarch
commands the respect and loyalty of about 80 percent
of all Christian religious leaders and their communi-
ties and, has the
potential to rally opposition to Phalange and Lebanese
Forces domination. The patriarch, along with the
lower Maronite clergy, has long opposed the hardline
extremism espoused by the Maronite Order of Monks,
whose teachings provide the philosophical foundation
for Lebanese Forces thinking. The current patriarch
is elderly and has avoided political involvement. We
doubt, however, that even a politically active succes-
sor could be effective in the face of opposition from
Some Lebanese believe that moderate clan leaders,
such as National Bloc elder statesman Raymond
Edde, could rally the Maronite rank and file. Edde,
who has lived in self-imposed exile in France since the
outset of the civil war, does not share in the blame for
the Lebanese tragedy that is attributed to other
Maronite leaders. His absence, however, has also
meant that he has not shared in the suffering brought
on by the civil war. Syrian opposition to Edde,
moreover, is likely to be an insurmountable political
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Federalism: Pros and Cons
While federalism may satisfy the requirements of the
Maronite leadership, some political observers contend
it is impractical for many reasons. Religious sects are
not territorially isolated, except for Maronites in the
enclave dominated by the Lebanese Forces militia
and, increasingly, Druze in much of the Shuf. More-
over, two-thirds of all Christians still live outside the
Maronite heartland. Boundaries cannot be drawn
without including large numbers belonging to sects
whose territorial base would be elsewhere.
Federalism would allow the majority in each area to
negate the demands of the minority or require massive
population exchanges. Those unwilling to move to
their own area would risk discrimination by the
majority confessional group. Moreover, mixed areas
would be contested by the major forces, producing
further sources of conflict. Continuing fighting, how-
ever, could lead to major population shifts as minor-
ities flee areas of conflict to seek refuge with their
coreligionists in more secure areas. This process could
reach such proportions that confessional exclusivity
would eventually spread to additional areas of Leba-
non, ultimately negating many of the arguments
against federalism.
The most compelling reason against federalism is its
rejection by Lebanese Muslims. The Shias, Lebanon's
largest and most deprived religious group, oppose
decentralization because it would prevent them from
transforming their main asset, demographic superior-
ity, into political power. Political decentralization
would produce a national government that had little
commitment to protecting the predominantly Shia
population of the south from Israeli retaliation, if not
direct occupation.
Despite Muslim opposition to geographic
and political division, some segments of the com-
munity apparently recognize the need to develop
administrative structures to cope with the govern-
ment's inability or unwillingness to provide basic
services.
Moreover, Shia political activists--particularly those
associated with the fundamentalist movement - in-
creasingly proselytize through traditional self-help
and mosque-centered welfare services that require a
growing administrative cadre to function. While these
are a far cry from the self-sustaining mechanisms
developed by Christians and Druze--and are not
associated with an attempt at geographic separa-
tism they add to the Christian argument that sectar-
ian separatism is appropriate for all of Lebanon's
communities.
some Maronite gov-
ernment officials believe that, with Israel's troop
withdrawal from the south, the Shias will engage in a
power struggle with other forces in the area aimed at
solidifying their control. Once they establish preemi-
nence, the Shias will have taken
the first step toward the creation of a Shia canton,
setting a precedent that Maronites will use to
strengthen their argument that there is no other
alternative for Lebanon.
been nurtured by Amal.
The Maronites, in our view, have not seriously ad-
dressed the possibility that Shia moderates interested
in pursuing their destiny within the Lebanese political
system could lose out to extremists whose primary aim
is to transform Lebanon into an Islamic state. The
radical Hizballah movement is not indigenous to the
south, however, and its ability to make inroads in an
area that is the traditional stronghold of the more
moderate Amal movement will be a significant indica-
tor of the strength and appeal of radical Shiism. Amal
leaders-and apparently Maronite leaders as well-
are gambling that radical attempts to "transfer" their
brand of religious zealotry to the south will be
rejected by the more nationalistic forces that have
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Political Reform: Some Practical Suggestions
Practical steps could be taken to restore Lebanon to
some semblance of stability if Christians recognized
that their survival depends on acceptance of political
reform. As long as hardline Christians believe they
have a military option that would enable them to
sustain a separate existence, we see no possibility for
Christian compromise without sustained Syrian pres-
A Lebanese scholar concerned with Lebanon's politi-
cal reconstruction has suggested a series of steps to
expand the resources and rewards of the political
system to make room for emerging elites. This could
be done by increasing the size of the parliament and
creating a senate and a vice-presidency. Lowering the
voting age would encourage Lebanon's highly politi-
cized youth to recognize options other than militia
service and violence.
As a compromise between the 1943 formula and calls
for complete secularization, arguments have been
made for the retention of religious groups as Leba-
non's constituent political units. But, to bolster equali-
ty among all Lebanese, sectarianism would have to be
abolished in the bureaucracy. Removing the reference
to confessional membership on identity cards would
have symbolic significance. Christian fears could be
allayed in part by retaining the present confessional
distribution among the top three posts, with adjust-
ments such as the prime minister's being nominated
by the parliament and the extension of the speaker's
present one-year term to four years.
Other proposals include the acceptance of the princi-
ple of administrative decentralization and an increase
in the number of "governorates," or administrative
districts in which one confessional group is predomi-
nant. Elected provincial councils would help increase
local participation and preserve the identity of indi-
vidual regions without risking the drawbacks associat-
ed with federation. Moreover, the new infrastructure
demanded by decentralization would create jobs that
could absorb a number of militiamen.
Even if such revisions were adopted, we believe it is
unlikely that Lebanon could move toward the com-
plete disestablishment of religion or the abolition of
sectarian laws. Nonetheless, progress toward the
adoption of common civil law in matters of personal
status and the promotion of a national system of
secular public education is essential to achieve some
concept of Lebanese nationality.
In our judgment, any solution that is to have a chance
at restoring order to Lebanon must be based on the
recognition that the Muslim majority cannot remain a
political minority. Muslim grievances must be re-
dressed, but at the same time security guarantees
must be given to the Christian community if any
formula is to work.
Outlook: The Labyrinth Revisited
Lebanon's decadelong march toward de facto parti-
tion will be reversed only by a dramatic change in the
leadership of the Christian community or swift action
by Syria to block the emergence of semiautonomous
cantons. We believe the eventual outcome of contin-
ued factional fighting will be the creation, either by
accident or design, of territories that tend to be
confessionally exclusive. The question for Lebanon
now appears to be the extent and rigidity of evolving
confessional separation.
In our judgment, Christian extremists are pressing for
a confessionally segregated Lebanon consisting of
four cantons-one Christian, one Druze, and two
Shia. The Sunnis, who are more dispersed geographi-
cally, probably would not have a separate territorial
base. Most Christians live outside the heartland, and
a move toward formal separation could produce mas-
sive population shifts as Christians are forced to
relocate to the mountain enclave. This possibility also
raises prospects for renewed warfare as Christians
attempt to expand their territory to accommodate the
population influx.
A more flexible form of confessional separation could
result through a federation among numerous gover-
norates. This arrangement would produce a multitude
of "minicantons" that of necessity would recognize
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the authority of the central government. Theoretical-
ly, this would produce a more cohesive state, but it
would be subject to all the disadvantages of federal-
ism.
If the pattern of violence currently being played out in
the predominantly Shia south escalates, the results
are likely to parallel earlier rounds that have produced
distinctly Christian and Druze territories. The Shias
have few means to block the trend toward de facto
cantonization. Either they must assuage Christian
fears by dropping their political demands, or they
must fight those Christians seeking cantonization,
thereby validating Christian arguments that terri-
torial security is essential for their survival.
We believe a confrontation between Muslim and
Christian militiamen in the south could be crucial in
determining the extent of Christian separation from
their Muslim countrymen. Druze leader Walid Jum-
blatt and Amal chief Nabih Barri have stated publicly
that coexistence with Christians is necessary to pre-
serve Lebanon's sovereignty. Both leaders have reiter-
ated that their quarrel is not with Christians per se,
but with that segment of the community that has
joined forces with Israel.
Druze and Muslim efforts to distinguish between
"good" and "bad" Christians are aimed at achieving
the political and military defeat of the Lebanese
Forces and the Israeli-backed Army of South Leba-
non without stampeding the resident Christian popu-
lation into the heartland or to an Israeli-protected
canton along Lebanon's southern border.
Many Christians are not likely to be reassured. Panic
has spread among Christians in the south in the wake
of attacks in late April on Christian villages near
Sidon. The attacks, which came after assurances that
Christians would be unharmed following the with-
drawal of Lebanese Forces militiamen from the area,
have reinforced the siege mentality among Christians.
Protracted violence could set in motion a Christian
exodus. According to the Embassy, Christian refugees
from the south are trickling into the heartland.
We believe Syria is prepared to tolerate considerable
administrative and political decentralization in Leba-
non but is leery of confessional separation. The adop-
tion of a federal system aimed at lessening contacts
among constituent groups is likely to encourage evolu-
tion toward partition. Syria opposes the concept of
cantonization because it is concerned that it would
have difficulty countering the influence external pow-
ers would develop in Lebanon's cantons.
Syria, in our judgment, will not permit confessional
factions to flaunt their independence or to compro-
mise Syrian interests in Lebanon. The Syrians will not
tolerate Maronite-Israeli ties and will demand an end
to Maronite reliance on Israel as the price for Syrian
tolerance of a decentralized system. Eventually, we
believe Syria will be forced to exert greater control
over non-Christian factions as well, particularly those
with ties to Iran, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt.
We doubt that Syrian leaders have determined where
they will draw the line on Christian efforts to force
decentralization. Syrian leaders have stated publicly
that they will not tolerate cantonization. In the near
term, we believe the evolution of more realistic strate-
gies among hardline Christians would reflect a desire
to preempt Syrian action rather than a genuine desire
to pursue national reconciliation. Continued Lebanese
Forces recalcitrance, however, will prompt Syrian
action.
Christian leaders have told US officials they fear that
Syria plans direct intervention to bring hardline
Christians under control. We expect Damascus would
employ techniques of intimidation and, if necessary,
assassination to bring the militia to heel. We believe
Damascus will avoid for as long as possible military
strategies that could reignite the civil war.
Although Damascus cannot impose a lasting solution
on Lebanese factions, we believe that Syrian predomi-
nance in Lebanon is permanent and necessary to avoid
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complete political collapse. Prolonged domestic insta-
bility in Syria could prevent Damascus from actively
pursuing its policies in Lebanon. Under such circum-
stances, Lebanon could be dramatically restructured.
We believe that Christian hardliners would take
advantage of Syrian preoccupation to establish a
separate, and possibly independent, entity.
We believe that any government in Damascus would
pursue the same policy goals in Lebanon as the Assad
regime. The resolution of domestic crisis in Syria
would result in a reassertion of Syrian influence in
Lebanon including the stationing of Syrian troops in
Lebanese territory, if necessary, to restore the status
quo. We do not believe that Syria wishes to annex
Lebanon; Syria wants to project the image of a
defender of Lebanese interests, not an aggressor
against a weak neighbor.
Political uncertainty surrounding Syria's intentions
following the Israeli withdrawal, continuing violence
in Beirut and South Lebanon, and growing Shia
extremism raise prospects for imminent and possibly
dramatic change in Lebanon. Confessional alienation
has reached such proportions in Lebanon that we
doubt any group is prepared to seize the opportunities
presented by these events to halt Lebanon's political
dissolution. As a result, Lebanon's chaos could con-
tinue without change or resolution for some time.F_
Centuries-old patterns of political hostility and gener-
ations of ingrained confessional hatred suggest that a
Lebanese modus vivendi-if one is ever achieved-
probably will not be reached through the conscious
effort of the factions, but rather will evolve as hostile
factions gradually accommodate each others' "red
lines."
Implications for the United States
The Government of Lebanon and the Christian com-
munity continue to solicit US support. The rise of
militant Islam, however, will severely restrict the
scope of US influence in Lebanon. Shia fundamental-
ists are implacable enemies of the United States.
Suicide bombings of the US Embassy in April 1983
and September 1984, at the US Marine barracks in
October 1983, and the assassination and kidnapings
of US citizens in Lebanon bear grim witness to the
effectiveness of Shia fanaticism. The greater their
influence in Lebanon, the fewer will be the opportuni-
ties for the United States to implement policies
designed to bolster moderate forces there.
US efforts to support and strengthen legitimate
authority in Lebanon are viewed by Shia radicals and
other regime opponents as a partisan effort to defend
narrow Christian interests at the expense of the rest of
the population. We believe both Christians and their
Druze and Muslim opponents perceived US reluc-
tance to press the Lebanese Government during the
period of conspicuous US involvement from August
1982 until February 1984 as an indication of US
backing for the Christian community.
In our view, Christian perceptions of outside commit-
ment to their security encouraged them to pursue
more aggressive policies rather than use external
support to underpin a negotiated settlement. We
judge that the Lebanese Government will continue to
temporize on moves aimed at solving the domestic
crisis as long as it perceives that Western support is
not dependent on political reform.
US or Western efforts to stabilize Lebanon depend
upon the perception by Lebanese factions that initia-
tives are "evenhanded." In their view, benefits should
extend to broader segments of the Lebanese polity
and avoid strict identification with legal authority,
which we believe most Lebanese view as different
from legitimate authority. Such efforts, however,
would have to be discreet to avoid violent reaction
from Shia extremists and would have to complement
Syrian goals.
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The rise of militant Islam and the determination of its
adherents to eliminate Western, especially US, influ-
ence in Lebanon severely limit the opportunities for
Western initiatives that could ameliorate Lebanon's
continuing domestic tragedy. Conspicuous US efforts
would draw fire from pro-Iranian Shia extremists,
possibly forcing a US retreat from commitments to
Lebanon. Moreover, the continuing burden of the
Lebanese albatross could limit-and possibly pre-
clude----the development of effective policies on other
US interests in the area, particularly the broader
Middle East peace process.
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