(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00587R000200250003-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: May 12, 2011
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: June 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Secrct
~~ f?a
Iraq's Exiled Shia Dissidents
NESA 85-10120
June 1985
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Iraq's Exiled Shia Dissidents
This paper was prepared byl Office of
Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis, with
biographic information contributed by 0
Office of Central Reference. It was
on
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Persian Gulf Division, NESA,
Secret
NESA 85-10120
June 1985
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Summary
Information available
as of 3 June 1985
was used in this report.
Iraq's Exiled Shia Dissidents 25X1
Exiled Iraqi Shia dissidents remain a source of concern to Baghdad, but
they pose little threat to Iraq's stability. Baghdad's ruthless and effective
security services have arrested or deported most Shia activists and
intimidated the remainder. Iran's efforts to unify dissident factions in exile
into an effective force have left them weakened and more divided than
ever. They have largely resisted Tehran's attempts at domination and are
splintered by ideological, leadership, and strategic issues.
Tehran's greater interest in making the Iraqi Shias subservient than in
building an effective anti-Baghdad movement presents the dissidents with
a difficult choice. The acceptance of Iranian control gains them a nearby
base of operations, arms, and financial support, but it weakens their appeal
to Arab Shias in Iraq, many of whom harbor deep-rooted resentment
toward Iran. Independent Iraqi Shia dissident groups, on the other hand,
must locate their organizations far from Iraq and are too weak to capitalize
on their greater potential appeal.
These divisions are reflected in the rivalries evident in Tehran's umbrella
organization of Shia and Kurdish dissidents-the Supreme Assembly of
the Islamic Revolution in Iraq. It is composed of elements of the Dawa
Party, the Islamic Action Organization, the Iraqi Mujahidin, Kurdish
nationalists, and smaller groups. Moderate factions of Dawa and the
London-based Rabitat Ahl al-Bayt, on the other hand, remain largely
outside the Supreme Assembly of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq.
Syria probably has agreed to closer cooperation with Iraqi Shia dissidents
and may give them military aid, training, and support for cross-border
operations into Iraq.
The Shia dissident movement has limited appeal in Iraq. Most Iraqi Shias
of Arab origin back efforts to prevent an Iranian invasion and view the
Tehran-backed opposition groups as pawns of Iran.
Radical Iraqi Shia opposition elements will continue to engage in terrorism
against the United States, the West, and Arab moderates. Stymied at the
battlefront, Iran may direct those Iraqi Shia groups it controls to begin at-
tacking foreigners, including Americans, to reduce outside support for the
Baghdad regime.
iii Secret
NESA 85-10120
June 1985
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Creating An Umbrella for Iraqi Shia Dissidents
Shia Weaknesses
Iran's Puppets
The Primary Opponents of Iranian Domination
Dawa
Rabitat Ahl al-Bayt
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Iraq's Exiled Shia Dissidents
The success of Islamic fundamentalists in overthrow-
ing the Shah of Iran in 1979 emboldened some Iraqi
Shias to organize to oust the secular Ba`thist regime
of Saddam Husayn in Baghdad. Dissidents formed
clandestine cells, tapping the disgruntlement of Iraq's
disadvantaged Shias, who make up over half the
population but do not share proportionately in politi-
cal power or economic benefits. By 1980, Shia activ-
ists were mounting terrorist attacks against the re-
gime, including the attempted assassination of Iraq's
Foreign Minister.F_~
The ruling Bath Party responded in tough fashion by
deporting over 60,000 Shias of Iranian origin and
arresting and executing dissident leaders, including
Iraq's most respected Shia clergyman, Muhammad
Baqr Sadr. The success of Baghdad's efforts is reflect-
ed in the virtual absence of significant Shia-conducted
terrorist operations in Baghdad since then, according
to the US Embassy in Baghdad.'F---]
Although largely crippled inside Iraq, the dissidents
remain active in exile and have gained considerable
organizational and financial help from Iran and, to a
lesser extent, Syria. Iran has sought to forge the Iraqi
oppositionists into a single body that would conduct
terrorist and guerrilla activities inside Iraq and help
assure Iranian domination of Iraq after the defeat of
the Ba'thists. So far, Iran's efforts have met with little
success.
Creating an Umbrella for Iraqi Shia Dissidents
The Iranians created the 40-member Tehran-based
Supreme Assembly of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq
(SAIRI) in 1982 as an umbrella organization for most
Iraqi Shia and Kurdish dissidents.' It was designed to
coordinate their activities and ensure Iranian influ-
ence over them. Iran is disappointed by the ineffec-
tiveness of the organization, however,
Principal Iraqi Shia Dissident Organizations
Pro-Iranian or Leaning
Toward Iran
Supreme Assembly of the
Islamic Revolution in
Iran (SAIRI)
The Iraqi Mujahidin
(The Iraqi Fighters)
Islamic Action
Organization
Jund al-Imam (Soldiers
of the Imam)
The Iraqi Hizballah
(Party of God)
Dawa (The Islamic Call
Party)
Rabitat AN al-Bayt
(League of the Descen-
dants of the Prophet)
Al-Fatah al-Islami
Movement (The Islamic
Conquest Movement)
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Muhammad Baqr al-Hakim
Leader, Supreme Assembly of
the Islamic Revolution in Iraq
access to the SAIRI-controlled military training camp
at Ahvaz and are not allowed to publish magazines or
propaganda leaflets,
the Interna-
tional Relations Department of Iran's Revolutionary
Guard has set up an organization that appears to rival
SAIRI, the 10-member Council for Iraqi Affairs. The
Council, composed of Iraqi Shias and Kurds, seeks to
gain influence in Iraq and export Iran's revolution to
the Persian Gulf states, which have large Shia popula-
tions. The creation of the Council probably reflects in
part Iran's frustrations over SAIRI.
activities.
Shia Weaknesses
Tehran's efforts to make the Iraqi Shia opposition
subservient to Iranian concepts and control are partly
to blame for the fact that they are divided and weak.
According to the US Embassy in Baghdad, many
Iraqi Shia dissidents oppose Iran's concept of
velayat-efagih, which holds that Ayatollah Khomeini
is the supreme guide of all Shias, including those in
Iraq. Others resist Tehran's attempts to control their
factionalized support base in Iraq.
middle-class Iraqi Shias
favor Iraqi independence and therefore support the
more independent groups such as Dawa and the
Rabitat Ahl al-Bayt, a relatively moderate London-
based organization. Lower-class Iraqi Shias and those
of Iranian origin, on the other hand, are more recep-
tive to Khomeini as their supreme guide and back pro-
Iranian groups such as the Islamic Action Organiza-
SAIRI can take no independent action without the
approval of the Iranian Committee for Iraq. It is
composed of representatives from the Iranian Prime
Minister's office, the Ministry of Interior, the Majles
(National Assembly), the Revolutionary Guard, and
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Iran uses a carrot-and-stick approach to gain domi-
nance over the Iraqi Shia opposition. Iraqi dissidents
who refuse to accept SAIRI's control are denied
tion (IAO).
Shia religious leaders in Iraq have misgivings about
Iran as well. US diplomats in Baghdad report that,
even though many of these leaders desire the over-
throw of President Saddam Husayn, they are con-
cerned that his ouster would bring an influx of
Iranians into Iraqi cities that house some of Shia
Islam's most revered shrines. They also are worried
that Iranian religious leaders would demand prece-
dence over their Iraqi counterparts.
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Iran's Puppets
Just as they have formed an alternative to SAIRI, the
Iranians are trying to form new mass movements
among Iraqi Shia exiles in Iran to supplant the older
groups, such as Dawa, that are resisting Iranian
dominance. they have
created several organizations, including the Iraqi Mu-
jahidin, Hizballah, and Jund al-Imam (Soldiers of the
Imam) in the hope that they will gain popular support
in Iraq for an Islamic republic on Iranian lines.
The Mujahidin is SAIRI's primary military wing.
The Mujahidin, headed by Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim,
and the Iraqi Hizballah Party, headed by Sadri
Qobbanchi, are composed at least in part of Iraqi
prisoners of war and expelled Iraqi refu ees of Iranian
origin. both
groups receive military and paramilitary training
from the Revolutionary Guard to prepare them for
intelligence and paramilitary operations inside Iraq.
We believe that members of these organizations num-
ber at most only a few thousand. The Jund al-Imam,
headed by Abdullah Shirazi, is another small group
that is in the Iranian camp,
Increased Syrian support for the Mujahidin will
enhance its terrorist capability inside Iraq, but such
activity will remain little more than an irritant to
Baghdad. Mujahidin leader Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim
headed a delegation that met with Syrian President
Hafiz al-Assad in February, according to the US
Embassy in Damascus. The visit received prominent
coverage in Syria's press, and we believe that Damas-
cus agreed to closer cooperation with Iraqi Shia
dissidents and may give them military aid, training,
and support for cross-border operations into Iraq.
Such action is consistent with other Syrian efforts to
weaken the Baghdad regime such as increased mili-
tary support for Iraqi Kurdish rebels.
The Iranians have considerable control over the Is-
lamic Action Organization as well. The IAO, an
offshoot and rival of Dawa, is headed by Muhammad
Taqi al-Modarasi, an Iranian cleric. The IAO has
conducted terrorist operations inside and outside Iraq,
but we know of none that has been directed at US
The Primary Opponents of Iranian Domination
Dawa. Dawa, the Islamic Call Party, is the oldest,
largest, and most prestigious Iraqi Shia dissident
group. Dawa's moderate majority faction has sharp
ideological differences with Iran. In particular
this grouping rejects the
principle of velayat-e fagih, because it would provide
Iran with political and religious control over the party
and over Iraq if Dawa overthrew the regime in
Baghdad.
Tehran has tried to undercut the influence of Dawa's
moderate leadership. until
SAIRI was formed, Dawa's principal leaders were
influential in Iraqi exile politics and in Iran itself.
They were particularly strong in Iran's Ministry of
Islamic Guidance and broadcast Arabic-language
programs from Ahvaz. Since the formation of SAIRI,
Iran has shifted the limelight to pro-Khomeini leaders
such as Muhammad Baqr al-Hakim.
Rabitat AN al-Bayt. Rabitat Ahl al-Bayt, the League
of the Descendants of the Prophet, is another Shia
group reluctant to accept orders from Tehran. It is
based in London and brings together factions from
SAIRI, Dawa, and other groups not resident in Iran.
Its leader, Mahdi al-Hakim, elder brother of SAIRI's
leader, Muhammad Baqr al-Hakim, was formerly
closely identified with Dawa, but,
he and his followers resented Iranian
attempts to dominate SAIRI and Dawa. Mahdi failed
in his bid to gain substantial support from Ayatollah
Khomeini in 1981, probably because he refused to
interests.
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accept Iranian domination. Prospects
he also was frustrated over Kho- The Iraqi dissidents pose no immediate threat to the
meini's support for other Shia exile leaders, including Baghdad regime, and we see little chance of an
his brother Muhammad. effective Shia dissident movement emerging from the
We believe that Rabitat AN al-Bayt's independence
from Iran gives it more potential appeal in Iraq than
rival organizations headquartered in Tehran. We have
no confirmation, however, of its effectiveness inside
badly splintered rebels. The differences between the
groups are too numerous and wide to be easily
bridged. The emergence of a native Iraqi Shia leader
with widespread popular support among Iraq's Shias
would improve the rebels' prospects, but no candidate
with the necessary appeal is on the horizon. Even if
one were to emerge, Iran probably would view him as
a challenge and undermine his influence.
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Mahdi Abd al-Muhsin al-
Hakim
Leader of Rabitat AN al-Bayt
Mahdi Abd al-Muhsin al-Hakim and his brothers, Muhammad
and Abd al-Aziz, were prominent in the Dawa Party. Mahdi,
25X1 however, subsequently put distance between himself and Dawa and
25X1 the group is composed of relatively moderate Iraqi
Iraqi Shia dissident leaders who accept Iranian con-
trol gain a secure base of operations, financial and
logistic support, and weapons. They pay a price for
such support, however, because we believe their repu-
tations are tarnished among Iraq's Arab Shias, who
harbor deep-seated resentment toward Iran. This
animosity stems from repeated wars and national
rivalries for regional influence. Independent leaders,
on the other hand, keep their reputations intact but
lack the practical support that their rivals enjoy.=
Bogged down in a stalemated ground war, Iran will be
tempted to direct the Iraqi Shia dissident groups that
it controls to conduct terrorist operations against
foreigners, including US citizens, in Iraq. The Irani-
ans doubtless were encouraged by the departure of
many dependents of diplomats and foreign contractors
from Iraq during the recent Iranian Scud missile
attacks. Terrorist attacks would have a similar impact
25X1 in weakening foreign support for the Iraqi regime as
well as its economy.F___1
As the bombing of the US Embassy in Kuwait
demonstrates, Iraqi Shia dissidents have the assets to
strike outside Iraq. Large indigenous and Iranian-
origin Shia populations and proximity to Iran make
the Persian Gulf the most likely location for such
Developments That Would Improve
Exiled Shias'Prospects
The fortunes of Iraqi Shia dissidents would rise
under the following conditions:
? The removal of Iraqi President Saddam Husayn or
other events that fuel rivalries within the ruling
Bath Party.
? A significant upsurge infighting by Kurdish rebels
in northern Iraq that diverts the attention of Iraqi
security services.
? Drastic Iraqi Government austerity measures ne-
cessitated by the war that create resentment toward
the regime.
? Major Iraqi military setbacks that embolden some
Iraqi Shias to engage in antiregime activity and
lead others to hedge their bets by becoming less
anti-Iranian.
? The emergence of a powerful Iraqi Shia dissident
leader with widespread appeal in Iraq.
? A shift in Iranian policy that encourages the inde-
pendence of Iraqi dissidents.F--]
attacks. Iran might order terrorist attacks against US,
other Western, and Arab moderates' interests there,
particularly if it believed its military situation was
desperate. Despite the fact that Dawa moderates give
primacy to political action over terrorism, radical
Shias are prepared to engage in such acts either on
their own or as Iran's surrogates. Although divisions
have weakened the dissident movement and reduced
its troublemaking potential, Iraq's Shia opposition
will possess a terrorist card that they can play for
years to come.F_~
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