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• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00587R000200240002-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: September 20, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: June 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of -Sect et
Intelligence
Iraq's Communists:
The Potential Threat
NESA 85-10119
June 1985
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Iraq's Communists:
The Potential Threat
This paper was prepared byl Office of
Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis, with
information contributed by the Office of
Central Reference. It was coordinated with the
Directorate of Operations.F--]
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Persian Gulf Division, NESA,
Secret
NESA 85-10119
June 1985
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Secret
Iraq's Communists:
The Potential Threat 25X1
Summary The Communist Party of Iraq (CPI), once a serious challenge to the Iraqi
Information available Government, continues to be regarded by Iraqi leaders as their principal
as of 3 June 1985 secular political threat. They have brutally repressed the party and have
was used in this report.
shaped domestic policies in part to undercut the Communists' mass appeal.
The Ba'thists have also penetrated the party's apparatus and have sought
to divide its members through a carrot-and-stick policy.
Despite the government's concerns, the party poses no immediate threat to
Iraqi stability. It suffers from internal divisions and has been weakened by
harsh repression, which has forced it largely into exile. Communist
guerrillas operate in northern Iraq with the support of Kurdish rebel
leaders Masud and Idris Barzani but can do little more than harass
government forces. They probably will be forced into exile when the Iran-
Iraq war ends and Baghdad can transfer troops from the front to regain
control of rebel-held territory.
Although weak, the CPI has the resiliency to stage a recovery if a
combination of several of the following developments occurs:
? Baghdad's financial situation continues to deteriorate, resulting in
unfulfilled popular expectations that the Communists can exploit-a
likely development after the war with Iran ends.
? A younger, more dynamic leadership emerges in place of the faction-
alized graybeards presently leading the party-improbable until the
Communists' longtime leader dies.
? The Iraqi security services become weakened by Ba'thist rivalries-
unlikely while Iraqi President Saddam Husayn remains in power; a near
certainty if he is removed.
? The Communist Party focuses its efforts on creating a clandestine
organization inside Iraq separate from the present apparatus, which is
widely penetrated by Iraqi security services-probable only if the
Communist leadership changes.
? The USSR significantly increases its support for the party-unlikely any
time soon because the Soviets regard the near-term prospects of a
Communist takeover as poor.
A resurgence of the Iraqi Communists would increase instability in Iraq,
weaken the Bath Party's grip on power, and perhaps encourage other
dissidents. The Ba'thists would hold the Soviets responsible, but Iraq would
not dramatically alter its policies because of its dependence on Soviet arms.
iii Secret
NESA 85-10119
June 1985
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Secret
Recent Subversive Efforts Inside Iraq
The Advocates of Armed Struggle 4
Soviet Pressures on Baghdad
Government Response
Suppression
Control of the Military
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Figure 1
z; AS _N,
ULAYMANIYAH
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ake Urmia
A L. A N B A R Al v l '~
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~~- U WASIT
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(t Communist guerrilla base
Kurdish- inhabited area
- Province boundary
Railroad
Road
Al
'Amarah
wfit
Persian
Gulf
50 100 Kilometers
50 100 Miles
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Iraq's Communists:
The Potential Threat
Iraq's Communist Party is a modern phoenix. Since
its creation 50 years ago, the party has been repeated-
ly repressed, only to rise again to challenge the
regimes in Baghdad. Quashed in the late 1940s, the
party became a serious threat to the government by
1959, only to go into decline in the 1960s because of
weak leadership and persecution by the Ba'thist gov-
ernment.
The deep-seated rivalry between the Communists and
the ruling Bath Party of Iraq stems from their bloody
struggle for political power in the late 1950s and early
1960s. the Ba'thists
regard the Communists as their greatest secular rivals
and respect their mass appeal and ability to organize
large street demonstrations, skills that the Ba'thists
have yet to master. Senior Ba'thists remain bitter over
persecution suffered during the Communist-backed
regime of Abdul Karim Qasim that followed the
overthrow of the monarchy in 1958. For their part,
the Communists are bitter over Ba'thist repression,
which was particularly brutal when the Ba'thists
overthrew Qasim and ruled for a brief period in 1963,
Communist strength revived after the return to power
of the Ba'thists in 1968 and the admission of the
Communists five years later into the Progressive and
Patriotic National Front, a grouping of Iraqi political
parties that nominally runs Iraq. The Communists
capitalized on rivalries in the Bath Party and the
diversion of Ba'thist attention to the Kurdish rebellion
in northern Iraq that subsequently collapsed in 1975.
The party's fortunes have fallen sharply since 1978
when widespread arrests, executions, and other gov-
ernment harassment forced the CPI underground and
its leaders into exile. Since then, most of the party's
leadership has remained abroad and the party has
been quiet, with the exception of approximately 800
guerrillas fighting in the mountains of northern Iraq.
Communist Party of Iraq Organization
Central Committee. This 41-person body meets irreg-
ularly outside Iraq and sets party policy. It last met
in June 1984. Members reside in the USSR, Eastern
Europe, Syria, and Iraq.
Politburo. This 15-person body of Central Committee
members runs the party between Central Committee
meetings.
Branches.
the party maintains centers in Moscow, Prague, and
Sofia, and regional headquarters in Damascus and
northern Iraq.
Finances Moscow
meets at expenses o party conferences and pays
medical expenses of senior officials.
Publications. The party publishes a newspaper Tariq
al-Sha'b (Path of the People) in Damascus.
Membership/Recruitment. The party is experiencing
no membership growth.
Communist Party membership also has followed a
roller coaster path and is now at its lowest point in
more than a decade. Although estimates of Commu-
nist strength vary widely, we agree with those =
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Figure 2
Estimated Membershipa of the Communist
and Bath Parties, 1947-85
Shaded portion indicates range
Legend 1. l Communist Party
L.J Ba'th Parts
Thousand persons
0 5 10 15 20
1947 p
1949
1953
1959
.I Full members onlc. Ba'thist candidate and
affiliate members outnumber lull memhers of the
Bath Party by several told.
the Communists
number 1,500 hardcore members inside Iraq and
about 1,000 abroad. By comparison,
ruling arty now has about 25,000 members.
When the Ba'thists seized power in 1968, they num-
bered about 3,000,
Communists still possess the organizational talent
that has long worried the ruling Ba'thists. Last May,
for example, 2,000 students at Mosul and Irbil Uni-
versities and the Technological Institute of Karkuk
participated in some of the largest organized public
demonstrations since the Ba'thists seized power in
Kurds and Communists who were protesting the
summer callup of male students to active duty in
Iraq's militia.
The propaganda efforts of the Communists also re-
main a source of concern to the government.
the party clandestinely distrib-
uted large numbers of antigovernment leaflets
throughout Iraq on a single night in April 1984. The
tracts called on former members to rejoin the party.
Iraqi security officials were particularly alarmed that
the leaflets received such widespread distribution
indicating an extensive Communist apparatus.
The Communist guerrillas operating in northern Iraq
are an irritant to the government as well.
Communist guerrilla
bands maintain four bases in Dahuk, Irbil, and As
Sulaymaniyah Provinces. Guerrillas began operating
openly near Zakhu in July 1984,
and have opened a head-
quarters 15 kilometers from Mosul, Iraq's third-
largest city. Bath Party officials in As Sulaymaniyah
in Kurdistan were concerned before the National
Assembly election last October that the Ba'thists
might lose a majority of their district's seats to
Kurdish Communists and backers of Jalal Talabani, a
popular Kurdish dissident leader.
A Party Divided
The Communists are divided by religious and ethnic
favoritism and patronage along religious lines
are increasing both in the Central Committee and
among the guerrillas.
most party members are Sunni Kurds, Shia
Arabs, and, to a lesser extent, Christians rather than
Sunni Arabs who dominate the government and the
military. We believe that more than half are Sunni
Kurds from northern Iraq. The next largest segment
is composed of Shias from southern Iraq. The Com-
munist appeal and activities are strongest in these two
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areas. We have little information on the social and
economic composition of the membership. Although
the Communist guerrilla units are ethnically mixed,
they tend to break down into ethnically homogeneous
subgroups. at-
tempts to craft party doctrine to meet the demands of
Kurdish nationalism while not offending the Shias
The Old Guard. The predominant, Soviet-backed
moderates call for reconciliation with Baghdad. =
the old guard, which
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The effectiveness of the Iraqi Communist Party is also
seriously weakened by quarrels about overall leader-
ship of the party. These disputes have divided the
Communists into three main factions.)
includes the Moscow-based Secretary General Aziz
Muhammad and several Politburo members, general-
ly follows the Soviet line that calls for the party's
return to Iraq.
however, reconciliation with the government is a
contentious issue even among some members of the
old guard. Most Communists doubt-with good
reason-Ba'thist promises that they will not be perse-
cuted.
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The Kurdish Faction. Former Politburo member
Baha al-Din Nuri has broken with the party to head
the Corrective Movement, a faction composed largely
of Kurdish Communist guerrillas in northern Iraq
near As Sulaymaniyah. He has cooperated with leftist
Kurdish dissident leader Jalal Talabani's Patriotic
Union of Kurdistan and favors an accommodation
with Baghdad and rejoining the National Front,
Corrective Movement
leaders argue that the CPI can never be strong until it
reestablishes itself in Iraq, giving it the opportunity to
penetrate the Bath Party and the military. The
Movement claims that the party in exile is doing
nothing to combat the threat of a takeover by Iranian-
sponsored Shias.
Nuri's ambitions led to his expulsion from the CPI.
He had waged a vigorous campaign to regain the
leadership of the party that he held during 1949-53,
His ouster occurred at
the Central Committee meeting in June 1984 over
efforts to give the party a Kurdish orientation,
Nuri's ambitions have alienated a
number of Central Committee members, even those
who advocate a greater role for military activities in
the party's strategy.
The Advocates of Armed Struggle. Many guerrilla
leaders and young members call for continued armed
struggle against the Iraqi Government and oppose
efforts at reconciliation,
They blame the party's top leadership
for joining the National Front in 1973 and making the
party's overt apparatus vulnerable during the subse-
quent Ba'thist crackdown. These fighters also resent
the risks they are taking while the old leadership leads
a life of perceived ease and inaction abroad,
Domestic Allies
The Communists' domestic allies are largely Kurdish
nationalist groups. Although the Kurds are the most
effective dissidents in Iraq, they are factionalized and
operate almost exclusively in remote mountainous
regions. The CPI's relations with these groups are in
flux, reflecting the continually shifting loyalties of the
Kurdish groups.
The Communists' marriage of convenience with their
closest ally, the pro-Iranian Kurdish Democratic
Party (KDP), is strained. The KDP, led by Masud
and Idris Barzani. is the largest Kurdish dissident
Communist armed cadres resent
their domination by the KDP, and Tehran's persecu-
tion of the Communist Tudeh Party of Iran limits the
Iraqi Communists' willingness to cooperate with
Tehran's Kurdish allies.
We believe that the CPI has reached a tacit truce
with its traditional Kurdish ally, the leftist Patriotic
Union of Kurdistan (PUK) led by Jalal Talabani.
PUK turned on the old guard in 1983 as Talabani
improved relations with Baghdad in preparation for
autonomy negotiations.
the PUK captured and turned over to Iraqi
authorities 24 Communists, including two senior offi-
cials in June 1983. Communist and PUK fighting
continued until last fall when Talabani's autonomy
negotiations and cease-fire with Baghdad broke down.
PUK now is allied with Barzani in opposition to the
government and Kurdish forces loyal to Baghdad.
Foreign Ties
The party is supported by the USSR, East European
countries, and Syria and receives limited aid from
People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (South
Yemen) and radical Palestinian groups.
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We believe that the CPI obtains its arms largely from
its Kurdish allies, who in turn obtain them from
Syria, Iran, and perhaps Libya.
the Bath Party informed its
members in 1980 that Bulgaria and other Communist
countries were providing arms to Iraqi Communist
guerrillas. Even though we have no confirmation of
such shipments, we do not rule them out, given the
poor state of Iraqi-Soviet relations at that time
because of Moscow's courtship of Iran. We doubt that
the Soviets have approved more recent arms ship-
ments, but they could resume indirect transfers if
Moscow decides to improve relations with Tehran.
Syria has increased its aid to Iraqi Kurdish guerril-
las-probably including some Communists-as part
of its campaign to bring down Iraqi President Saddam
Husayn,
Politically, Syria has publicly backed the formation of
a front composed of Iraqi Kurds, nationalists, and
Communists opposed to Baghdad. This front is the
secular counterpart of the Supreme Assembly for the
Islamic Revolution in Iraq, the umbrella organization
of largely Iraqi Shia opposition groups based in Iran,
from which Iraqi Communists are excluded. Neither
group poses more of a threat to Iraq than numerous
predecessors. Syria also permits the Iraqi Communists
to operate an office openly and publish a newspaper
Tariq al-Sha `b in Syria.
Soviet Pressures on Baghdad
Soviet pressure on the Saddam regime to treat the
Iraqi Communist Party more favorably has had little
success since the mid-1970s. The Soviets now are
urging the party and Baghdad to reconcile.
the USSR renewed pressure on
exiled Iraqi Communists to return home after Iraqi
Deputy Prime Minister Ramadan visited Moscow in
April 1984.
We believe that the Soviets generally try to balance
two conflicting policy goals: maintaining good ties to
the Iraqi regime while rebuilding Communist influ-
ence in Iraq.
Soviet support for the Iraqi Communists has lately
waned because of the party's ineffectiveness and
Moscow's desire for warmer relations with Baghdad.
Moscow, however, has not given up its desire for more
influence.
the USSR advocates reconciliation because it believes
that a legal Communist presence in Iraq after the
Iran-Iraq war would be better situated to exploit
weaknesses in Saddam's regime-a view we share.
pressure last year when,
Despite Moscow's efforts, we do not believe Baghdad
views the Communist threat or Soviet pressure as
sufficiently strong to compel it to legalize the party.
The Iraqis gave the appearance of bowing to Soviet
they agreed in principle to the return
Iran does not support the Iraqi Communists, although
it has tolerated the party's use of Iran as a base from
which to harass the regime in Baghdad. Iraqi Shia
dissident groups supported by Iran have refused to
cooperate with the party, largely because of its atheis-
of the Iraqi Communists and to allocate a cabinet post
to the Communists. We believe, however, that Bagh-
dad probably placed unacceptable limitations on the
type of activities the Communists could engage in if
they returned. Should the Iraqi Communists accept
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strict conditions for their return, Baghdad probably
would welcome them because the Ba'thists are eager
to bolster an image of widespread acceptability.
Government Response
We believe that the Bath Party has shown remark-
able skill and discipline in countering the Commu-
nists.
In our
judgment, the regime's concerns about preempting
the appeal of Communists and preventing their rise to
power heavily influence domestic policies.
Penetration. The security services have extensively
recruited Communists in Iraq to aid in the identifica-
tion of exiled members who return,
Suppression. Baghdad deals harshly with those who
fail to cooperate, deterring prospective Communists.
Iraq execut-
ed 152 Communist prisoners in late 1983, most of
whom had been detained since 1980-81. Similar
executions of Communists in Iraq's military in 1978
persuaded many Iraqi Communists to flee the
country.
Economic Development. Although they would have
implemented their socialist policies in any event, the
Ba'thists have taken pains to assure that the benefits
of economic projects reach the masses, in part, we
believe, to deny the CPI an exploitable issue. The
Ba'thists used sharply higher oil income during the
1970s to finance ambitious development programs
and have been careful to continue this policy despite
reduced income because of the war. The government
transformed the Thawrah slums of Baghdad, a former
stronghold of Shia Communists, into Saddam City, a
modern suburb with full utilities. Similar development
projects have taken place throughout the country,
particularly in Kurdistan and Shia areas of southern
Iraq.
Control of Education. In recognition of the significant
role that the military and students have played in past
Communist political bids in Iraq, the Ba'thists tightly
control the Army- and the educational establishment.
All teachers are Ba'thists, according to the Embassy.
The Bath Party also controls the National Union of
Iraqi Students and Youth, the only authorized student
organization. According to US diplomats, students
are pressed to join and sometimes are harassed if they
do not. Representatives of the union wield enormous
influence on the governing boards of universities in
the granting of scholarships.
The Ba'thists' concern is not misplaced. A Western
academic study on Iraqi Communists says that during
the 1940s and 1950s the Communists concentrated
their recruitment efforts on schoolteachers who in
turn recruited students. The Communists found stu-
dents more receptive to recruitment than workers or
peasants, in part because they were better educated
and more willing to take chances. The Communists
closely monitor the loyalty of the military.
the party ruthlessly
weeds out military officers with Communist sympa-
thies, promotes Ba'thist officers rapidly, and rotates
and transfers officers frequently to prevent command-
ers from building personal followings. Guidance offi-
cers report directly to the Directorate of Political
Guidance in the Defense Ministry, bypassing the
normal military chain of command.
CPI recruitment efforts within the armed forces have
not been successful. as of
1982 the Communists had no members in the armed
forces. The death sentence prescribed for such mem-
bership is doubtlessly a strong deterrent.
at the height of their power in
1959, the Communists had at least 235 military
officers as members, including the commander of the
Air Force.
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Prospects
We believe that the Communists do not pose a threat
to the stability of Saddam Husayn's regime in the
near term and are not likely to gain much strength as
long as the Ba'thists retain popular support for repel-
ling Iran. We would expect them to make another
comeback if several of the following developments
take place after the war:
? Iraq's economy cannot fulfill popular expectations.
If the government cannot adequately resume its
development program after the war because of low
oil revenues in a depressed world oil market, the
Communists are certain to exploit this weakness.
The Communists also could capitalize on any hous-
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caused by Baghdad's rapid growth.
mid-1970s, the party depicted itself as the only
political element genuinely concerned with improv-
ing the working and living conditions of the common
citizen.
during its last resurgence in the
We believe that Ba'thists are likely to face consider-
able economic problems during the next five years
despite the likely doubling of Iraq's present oil
exports of 1 million barrels per day. The Ba'thists
probably will have to deal with a populace frustrat-
ed that Iraq's economy has not resumed the rapid
growth of the 1970s. Iraq's need to import capital
goods to rebuild its economy and military equip-
ment to maintain Iraq's substantial edge over Iran
will limit Baghdad's ability to import consumer
goods.
? Iraq's security services are weakened by rivalries
within the Bath Party or the removal of Saddam.
The Bath Party has retained power in large part
because of its effective security forces. Saddam
purged the services during the past two years to
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establishing a rival base of power,
The Embassy reports that
observed no deterioration in the effectiveness of the
services. If, however, the divisions deepen or Sad-
dam is removed, the capabilities of the services to
suppress the Communists would be curtailed.
rivalries between the maternal and paternal sides of
Saddam's family continue. To date, we have
Whether divisions within the Bath Party or Sad-
dam's family reach serious proportions is problemat-
ical. Saddam has a firm grip on power and has
repeatedly demonstrated his ability to preempt
moves against him by potential rivals. His assassina-
tion, however, is an ever-present risk as demonstrat-
ed by repeated attempts on his life. We believe that
none of his likely successors would match Saddam's
cunning or skills in manipulating the party, the
military, and the security apparatus.'
? A younger, more dynamic leadership emerges with-
in the CPI. We believe that current Politburo
members, most of whom are in their sixties, lack the
dynamism, fresh ideas, and perhaps the courage
needed to run effective clandestine operations in the
face of brutal repression. The chronically ill Secre-
tary Aziz Muhammad has headed the party for 20
years. His leadership has been weak and indecisive,
in our judgment. No other leader has demonstrated
the qualities needed to reinvigorate the party. Baha
al-Din Nuri is renowned for his energy and ambi-
tion, but we believe that his appeal is limited
primarily to Kurdish Communists.
? The party concentrates its organizational talents on
construction of a clandestine network in Iraq. To be
effective, the party-whether legal or illegal-must
create an underground network divorced from the
existing one, which has been compromised. Building
on the present nets or relying on an overt structure
would leave the party vulnerable to roundups by the
security services. Similarly, devoting too much ener-
gy to guerrilla activity would divert energy from the
creation of cells within the military and security
forces. We believe that a Communist armed rebel-
lion centered in the north and far from the center of
power in Baghdad is unlikely to threaten the regime
significantly. We believe that such a dramatic poli-
cy change will occur only under younger leadership,
a development that is likely only when Aziz Mu-
hammad dies or is otherwise incapacitated.
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On balance, the CPI's fortunes are likely to rise only
after the war if Iraq's economy is weak and either
Saddam is removed or the CPI gains new leadership.
A resurgence of the CPI would increase instability in
Iraq, weakening the Bath Party's grip on power and
perhaps encouraging other dissidents. In foreign rela-
tions, the Ba'thists would hold the Soviets largely
responsible for Communist successes, and Iraqi-Soviet
relations would become strained. US-Iraqi ties proba-
bly would not benefit proportionately because the
Ba'thists would be likely to increase criticism of the
United States to counter Communist accusations that
they were pro-West.F__1
A Communist takeover would severely damage US
interests. The new regime would improve ties to the
USSR, but probably not to the satisfaction of the
Soviets. Iraq's Communists have a reputation for
being among the most independent in the Arab world.
We would expect the Iraqi Communists to back Arab
and Iranian Communists and to support leftist efforts
to subvert moderate, pro-US regimes.F_~
The Communists, however, would be preoccupied
with containing the considerable opposition to their
rule. Iraqi Kurds would press their claims for greater
autonomy and funds from a weakened central govern-
ment and would resort to armed rebellion when their
demands were not met. We would not expect the
Communist economic program to differ substantially
from that of the Ba'thists, with the exception of less
reliance on Western economic development and a
reversal in the present policy that encourages a great-
The Soviets significantly increase support for the er role for the private sector. Communist attempts to
Communists with the aim of overthrowing Saddam. purge Ba'thists and other opposition elements from
We believe this is highly unlikely over the next few the military and government would be countered by
years because Moscow regards the near-term pros- coup attempts and outbursts of popular unrest such as
pects for a Communist seizure of power as thin. those that occurred in Iraq in the 1960s.
Moreover, although Moscow has no love for Sad-
dam, it has repaired relations with him since 1982
and also does not appear to see an urgent need to
work for his ouster. The Soviets, however, might
significantly step up support for the CPI if their
relations with Iraq deteriorate or if the death or
ouster of Saddam leads to domestic political
turmoil.
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 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/28: CIA-RDP86T00587R000200240002-0
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/28: CIA-RDP86T00587R000200240002-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/28: CIA-RDP86T00587R000200240002-0
Secret
Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/04/28: CIA-RDP86T00587R000200240002-0