THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN: FIVE YEARS AFTER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00587R000200200003-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 14, 2010
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: May 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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NESA 85-10084
SOV 85-10081
May 1985
Directorate of C?-v~T
The Soviet Invasion
of Afghanistan:
Five Years After F
An Intelligence Assessment
451
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Directorate of Secret
of Afghanistan:
Five Years After
The Soviet Invasion
An Intelligence Assessment
This paper was produced jointly by the Office of
Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis and the
Office of Soviet Analysis. It was prepared by
NESA, with major contributions fro
SOYA. Additional
contributions were made by
NESA. It was coordinated with the Directorate of
Operations. rT
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, South Asia Division, NESA, on
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NESA 85-10084
SOV 85-10081
May 1985
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The Soviet Invasion
of Afghanistan:
Five Years After
Key Judgments More than five years after the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, they are
Information available bogged down in a guerrilla war of increasing intensity. The Soviets have
as of 19 April 1985 had little success in reducing the insurgency or winning acceptance by the
was used in this report.
Afghan people, and the Afghan resistance continues to grow stronger and
to command widespread popular support. Fighting has gradually spread to
all parts of Afghanistan. The Soviets control less territory than they did in
1980, and their airfields, garrisons, and lines of communication are
increasingly subject to insurgent attack.
The serious shortcomings of the Afghan Army have forced the Soviets to
shoulder more of the combat burden than they anticipated. But the Soviets
have shown little imagination in developing counterinsurgency tactics, and
they have relied mainly on stereotyped search and destroy operations that
often give the insurgents advance warning of an assault. Poor intelligence
has also been a continuing problem.
Although Soviet military tactics are clearly designed to minimize losses of
personnel and equipment, we estimate they have suffered roughly 25,000
casualties, including about 8,000 killed, and lost over 600 helicopters and
fixed-wing aircraft and thousands of armored vehicles and trucks. We
estimate casualties in the Afghan Army at about 67,000 and insurgent
casualties at some 40,000, excluding civilian sympathizers.
Meanwhile, the Soviet program to transform Afghanistan into a reliable
Communist client state is having little impact:
? Efforts at media indoctrination of Afghans fail because of Afghan
illiteracy, distrust of the regime, religious beliefs, and adherence to
traditional values.
? The regime has bought only temporary loyalties by bribery and occasion-
al truces with insurgent groups.
? The Afghan school system is in a shambles, and trainees sent to the
USSR often become antagonistic toward the Soviet system. Many cannot
find appropriate or attractive positions upon their return to Afghanistan.
? The Afghan ruling party is riven by factionalism.
The insurgents have serious problems of their own. They have few local
leaders of quality; rivalries among insurgent leaders and factions inhibit
cooperation and often result in bloody fighting; and inadequate training
and supply shortages are common.
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NESA 85-10084
SOV 85-10081
May 1985
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We believe the fighting in Afghanistan will increase in the next two years.
The insurgents are likely to show greater aggressiveness as they receive
better weapons and more training. The Soviets are showing renewed
resolve to break the military stalemate and have begun to adopt a more ag-
gressive posture. They are stepping up efforts to halt insurgent infiltration,
and we expect to see a greater use of airpower along the Pakistani and
Iranian borders.
Over the next two years, as improvements in the insurgency become
evident, we believe it most likely that the Soviets will increase their forces
incrementally, perhaps by another 5,000 to 10,000 men. Such an augmen-
tation would probably include contingents of specialized forces, such as
security battalions and specialized combat and support units. Less likely-
either because of continuing frustration or if their situation deteriorates
more drastically than we believe probable-the Soviets could expand their
forces by several divisions, possibly as many as 50,000 men, and increase
efforts to garrison and hold large areas. Even then, however, they would
not have enough troops to maintain control in much of the countryside as
long as the insurgents have access to strong external support and open
borders.
We cannot rule out a more serious deterioration of the Soviet position in
Afghanistan, which could arise if the insurgents improve their coordina-
tion, adjust their tactics, and assimilate increased outside assistance more
rapidly than we anticipate. This train of events would probably force the
Soviets to review their basic options in Afghanistan and could result in a
greatly expanded military commitment and an even wider war.
We also cannot rule out greater progress by the Soviets in building a
political and military infrastructure in Afghanistan. This development
would be more likely if Soviet pressure or internal instability in Pakistan
resulted in Islamabad's limiting its support for the resistance. Even so, the
Soviets could not completely pacify the country and withdraw a sizable
number of forces.
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The Soviets, in our view, are unlikely to make real progress toward quelling
the insurgency in the next two years. The more aggressive Soviet tactics
over the past year, however, suggest that Moscow continues to hope its
policies will, over the long term, grind down the will of the insurgents to re-
sist and allow the Kabul government to consolidate Communist rule in
Afghanistan. Soviet officials claim and probably expect that their efforts to
rebuild the Afghan armed forces and gain converts by indoctrination,
bribery, and internal reforms will bear fruit in the long term.
War weariness does not appear to present a problem for either side, and the
Soviets have shown no interest in compromising their maximum demands.
Prospects for a political settlement remain dim because of Soviet
opposition.
Soviet losses, together with the strains of a counterinsurgency campaign,
have worsened morale and discipline problems in the Army and produced
some grumbling at home. We believe that Moscow's effort to limit the
human and financial costs of the war have held domestic political and
social dissatisfaction to a level acceptable to the leadership. Moscow
probably believes it has weathered the worst of the international censure
for its actions in Afghanistan.
Although the new CPSU General Secretary Gorbachev presumably will
want to solve the Afghanistan problem in some way and may eventually
put his stamp on Soviet Afghan policy, we believe that he will be occupied
over the next year or so with consolidating his power in the Soviet
leadership. In our view, he has a strong interest in avoiding positions that
might make him look weak or adventuristic. He is unlikely, therefore, to
seek sharp revisions in Soviet goals or strategy.
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Contents
Key Judgments
A Developing Insurgency
I
The Spread of the Insurgency
2
Intensity
2
Weaponry
2
Tactics
3
Political Development
3
Popular Support
4
Intelligence
4
Territorial Control
4
Goals of the Soviets and the Afghan Regime
6
The Soviet Counterinsurgency Effort
7
Expanding Soviet Military Commitment
7
The Reluctant Afghan Military
9
The Frustrated Sovietization Process
10
The People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan
12
The Domestic Impact on the Soviets
12
Impact on the Soviet Military
12
The Costs of the Fighting
12
Aircraft and Equipment Losses
13
Morale and Discipline
14
International Impact of the Soviet Involvement
An Alternative Scenario: Communist Rule Is Threatened
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This assessment examines the position of the Afghan insurgents and Soviet and
Afghan forces five years after the Soviet invasion. It discusses their strengths and
weaknesses and the likely course of the fighting over the next few years, and it pro-
vides an evaluation of the military, economic, and political costs to the Soviets and 25X1
prospects for the growth of the insurgency.
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of Afghanistan:
Five Years After
The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December
1979, assassinated its Communist Prime Minister,
and installed a new Communist regime.
Moscow expected that the
accession of a more malleable regime in Kabul under
Babrak Karmal, coupled with the Soviet military
presence, would bolster the Afghan Army, intimidate
the insurgents, and allow Moscow to avoid a protract-
ed military engagement.
The insurgents are stronger than at any time
since the invasion, and the overwhelming majority of
Afghans continue to oppose the Soviet presence.
A Developing Insurgency
The Afghan resistance consists of hundreds of fight-
ing bands who often place parochial interests ahead of
any national effort. They generally share a tradition
of opposition to central government authority, a ha-
tred of the Soviets, a desire to preserve local customs,
a culture that glorifies warfare, and an interest in the
profits to be made from guerrilla fighting. They
disagree widely on the goals and strategy of the war
and have no clear idea of what they would put in place
of the Soviet-style regime.
the Communists came to power.
Most Afghans have never had much sense of national
identity, and many bands-probably the majority-
tend to place local interests first. Some bands follow
Islamic fundamentalists, who say they want to make
Afghanistan into a theocratic state. A smaller number
voice allegiance to moderate Islamic figures, who
envision a secular government similar to those before
The number of insurgents has grown steadily, and the 25X1
total would be much higher if we included villagers
who have arms but fight only when attacked.
]We estimate the 25X1
number of full- and part-time insurgents at 150,000,
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and probably many times that number have aided the
resistance in some capacity. We believe that there are
about 30,000 full-time Afghan insurgents at any
given time. Many of the insurgents hold jobs in the
civilian economy during the day and fight at night;
the fighting time of others is limited by the agricultur-
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little difficulty replacing combat losses.
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The Spread of the Insurgency
Before the Soviet invasion, the Afghan Government
had lost effective control of central Afghanistan, and
the insurgents were highly active in the eastern
provinces. Despite some serious outbreaks of fight-
ing-such as the uprising in Herat in March 1979-
western and northern Afghanistan were generally
quiet. Six months after the invasion there was armed
resistance in every province.
Intensity. The intensity of the war-as in all guerrilla
struggles-varies in different areas and at different
times of the year. Some commanders-particularly
those in the eastern provinces-maintain fairly con-
stant pressure on government outposts and convoys.
Others, because of lack of nerve, ammunition, or
weapons, only occasionally challenge the Commu-
nists. Some insurgents simply wait for the enemy to
make the first move. Fighting is normally at its most
intense in the late spring and early fall, when good
weather permits improved mobility and more rapid
resupply. Many insurgents withdraw from the fight-
ing to harvest crops or to winter with their families in
Pakistan or in Afghan cities.
We judge,
(that the intensity of the overall insurgency
has gradually increased. In 1983 and 1984, insurgents
increased attacks on airfields, garrisons, and other
military targets. Major roads remain insecure despite
patrolling and periodic Soviet and regime sweeps and
retaliatory strikes. In 1984,
resistance actions were responsible for tempo-
rary but significant shortages of food, fuel, and
electricity in Kabul. Several large-scale sweeps since
the invasion have not notably decreased insurgent
activity in Herat and Qandahar.
Factors Influencing
Military Fffectiveness
Weaknesses
Many disorganized
groups
Political/religious
differences
Shortages and un-
equal distribution
of weapons
Many poorly trained
groups
Fighting among
groups
Strengths
High morale
Broad civilian
support
Increasing mili-
tary expertise
Increasing
manpower
Afghan
Govern-
ment Units
Weapons and tactics Unlimited man-
unsuited to terrain power and
and counter- equipment
insurgency warfare High mobility in
Poor intelligence open areas
and command and Superior
control firepower
Unreliable, incompe- Reliable, well-
tent ally trained troops
Air superiority
Desertions No major
Seriously under strengths
strength
Lack of equipment
Political
factionalism
Weaponry. Over the past five years, travelers from the
countryside have reported that the insurgents have
gradually become better armed as their antiquated
weapons have been supplemented from outside
sources and by weapons captured from Soviet and
regime forces-including heavy machineguns, mines,
rockets, and a small supply of heat-seeking missiles.
Despite differences in skills and supplies of weaponry,
the insurgents are growing
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Tactics. Most insurgent operations are quick, small-
scale attacks on road convoys and military posts. The
guerrillas usually disperse before Soviet and Afghan
forces can strike back, and, as in most guerrilla wars,
these attacks generally result in little crippling dam-
age.
Although the insurgents are gradually improving as a
result of increased experience, guerrilla bands fre-
quently show little expertise in small-unit operations,
A few
leaders such as Panjsher commander Masood in
Kapisa Province, Abdul Haq in Kabol Province, and
Ismail Khan near Herat are improving tactical train-
ing. Masood, who has communications equipment,
has shown he can coordinate attacks, withdraw in
good order before superior forces, and sustain rudi-
Political Development. In our judgment, the insur-
gency is gradually improving its cohesiveness. US
Embassy sources indicated that in 1983 insurgent
groups began cooperating in attacks on Kabul. F_
ethnic Tajiks belonging to the
Jamiat organization have been most effective in over-
coming local differences and in developing cohesive
intergroup military structures that have demonstrated
an ability to plan and orchestrate operations. We
believe even the fractious Pushtuns are more often
cooperating in attacks against government garrisons
in provinces along the eastern border.
mentary political structures.
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Ahmad Shah Masood, Abdul Haq, Kabul area uer-
Panjsher Valley guerrilla com- rilla commander)
25X1 Popular Support.) while
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there is occasional war weariness among civilians,
support for the insurgents remains high. Sustained
Soviet military pressure has only temporarily reduced
civilian support for the resistance in some areas-the
Panjsher Valley in 1983, and Qandahar and Herat in
1982 and 1983-but the Soviets have not been able to
permanently pacify any area.
In much of Afghanistan, the relationship between the
resistance and civilians is such that distinctions are
artificial. We believe that the migration and periodic
displacement of perhaps half the population have had
mixed effects. Villagers who remain in Afghanistan
apparently grow enough to feed the guerrillas, and
some insurgents return from Pakistan or the cities
both to fight and to farm.
Intelligence. Because they enjoy the support of the
overwhelming majority of the population, resistance
intelligence on Soviet and regime plans is superior to
that of the Soviets and the Kabul regime. Good
intelligence has been critical to the insurgents' success
in avoiding enemy offensives and launching attacks.
Panjsher commander Masood claims to have had
weeks or months of warning before Soviet offensives
into the Panjsher Valley, permitting him to prepare
his defenses and mine approaches. Before last year's
offensive, he succeeded in covertly evacuating the
civilian population from the valley.
Afghan party factionalism has prompted
members of the Afghan armed forces to collaborate
with insurgents, in some cases helping them to ar-
range assassinations or prepare sabotage.
Ismail Khan, Herat area guer-
rilla commander)
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Territorial Control. We believe that the Soviets have
less control over Afghan territory today than they had
five years ago (see figures 1 and 2). By late 1983,
Afghan Government statistics indicated that the in-
surgents controlled almost twice as many local dis-
tricts in Afghanistan as the government. We believe
the regime lost further ground in 1984 because of
increased insurgent activity in the cities and the
decline in security in some areas of the countryside.
convoys remain subject to 25X1
frequent insurgent attacks and that no Af han town is
completely free of the insurgents 25X1
In our view, after five years, regime control is greater
than it was in December 1979 in Konarha, Kapisa,
and Kabol Provinces because of extensive and repeat-
ed Soviet operations and the flight of civilians to
Pakistan or Kabul. Control is significantly less, how-
ever, in Faryab, Jowzjan, Balkh, Samangan, Baghlan,
Takhar, Konduz, Nimruz, and Helmand Provinces.
The insurgents have made minor gains in the rest of
the country-except in provinces in which the regime
presence was already limited to the provincial capital
at the time of the invasion.
Casualties.
we believe that the insurgents have suffered some
40,000 casualties over the past five years. The esti-
mate, however, does not account for casualties among 25X1
civilian sympathizers who aid the insurgents with
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Figure 1
Afghanistan: Insurgent Versus Government
Control of Local Districts, 1980-84
Insurgent
controlled
Soviet and regime surveillance networks and infor-
mants also hamper the insurgents.
according to US Embassy sources, the Afghan intelli-
gence service (KHAD) maintains a system of infor-
mants who are street urchins recruited and trained at
Government
controlled
Disputed
0 1980 81 82 83 84
intelligence and provision of food and shelter, and
thus, in a sense, belong to the insurgency. Because
medical care is so limited, the insurgents' killed-to-
wounded ratio is very high. We believe civilian deaths
from the fighting may exceed 150,000.
Insurgent Vulnerabilities
Weaknesses in local leadership and economic con-
straints make it difficult for the insurgents to create a
cohesive force or pursue sustained objectives. Part-
time insurgents usually cannot be spared from agri-
cultural production for long periods; some groups fear
heavy casualties that would make it even more diffi-
cult to sustain agriculture. Many groups cease fight-
ing during the winter, when bad weather limits
mobility. Rivalries among tribes, clans, and religious
and political factions result in bloody bickering and
hinder effective military coordination. Rivalries be-
tween Jamiat-i-Islami and the Hizbi Islami, for exam-
ple, have hampered operations and resupply efforts of
Masood's Panjsher Valley insurgents.F___1
The threat of air and artillery retaliation on civilians
prevents guerrillas from continuing operations in a
single area. In the countryside, insurgents sometimes
cease operations to avoid retaliation against nearby
villages. F_~
the regime-run orphanage.
Despite the improvement in the insurgents' weapons
and skills, we believe they are still handicapped by
lack of expertise with weapons such as rockets and
mortars as well as by occasional shortages of weapon-
ry and ammunition. The thousands of vehicle losses
testify to their skills with mines and antitank rockets,
but they still have little technical knowledge of explo-
sives and how to use them for maximum effect.
Despite improved supplies, insurgent groups periodi-
cally suffer from unequal distribution of weaponry
and ammunition.
Thus far, the insurgents have not been seriously
hampered by shortages of food,
Food shortages, especially in rural areas,
sometimes occur because of local crop failures, distri-
bution problems, private stockpiling and hoarding,
and the destruction of some food in storage. Local
observers nevertheless indi- 25X1
cate that the destruction of crops and farms caused by
military operations affects only a small portion of
cultivated land. Food supply would deteriorate if the
Soviets embarked on a deliberate crop destruction
policy and if increasing numbers of farmers were
dislodged from their land.
The Afghan resistance continues to be hampered by a
lack of overall unity, despite initiatives to achieve that
objective. We believe the absence of an organization
able to speak for the resistance as a whole limits its
efforts to influence international opinion, to have a
voice in negotiations on an Afghan settlement, to
ensure continued diplomatic and material support,
and to coordinate military efforts.
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Figure 2
Control in the Afghan Provinces, 1979-84
Boundary representation is
not neceeserily authoritative.
Goals of the Soviets and the Afghan Regime
Moscow's goals in Afghanistan have changed little
since the invasion. The Soviets are seeking to create a
situation where the Afghan Communists can rule on
their own without a large Soviet military presence-
and do so at the lowest possible cost in terms of Soviet
lives and resources. We believe the Soviets realize
that accomplishing this goal requires both political
and military measures that combine military suppres-
sion of the resistance with longer term efforts to
train a new generation of more effective Communist
leaders
Province with increased Afghan Government
control since 1979
Province with firm insurgent control since 1979
(no change since Soviet invasion)
Province with significant insurgent gains since 1979
The primary Soviet goal in Afghanistan is to maintain
a Soviet-dominated regime. This enables Moscow to:
is At a minimum, ensure against chaos and anarchy or
the emergence of another fundamentalist Islamic
state on Soviet borders.
is Ensure that there is no drastic setback to Soviet
international prestige that would follow the fall of
the Afghan Marxists.
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? Transform Afghanistan into a Communist society.
showed a continued unwillingness to risk high combat
losses. The Soviets have gradually increased their role
in combined operations with the Afghan Army and
tailored their tactics to suit a counterinsurgency.
The Soviets generally have relied on search and
destroy operations so stereotyped that the insurgents
have ample warning and can depart before the initial
assault. A persistent lack of intelligence about insur-
gent groups or their plans hampers Soviet offensives
and has made it difficult to organize ambushes and
other small operations
? Ensure a regime that is responsive to Soviet political
and strategic concerns and enhance Soviet ability to
apply military and political pressure on Pakistan,
Iran, and other regional states; reduce Western
influence in the region; and contribute to isolating
China.)
The Soviet Counterinsurgency Effort
The shortcomings of the Afghan Army and the scope
of the insurgency soon forced Moscow to shoulder
much of the combat burden. The Soviets invaded with
the intention of using their forces to secure major
cities, strategic civilian and military facilities, and
major lines of communication
Soviet forces intended to leave as much of
the a counterinsurgency as possible to the Afghan
The Soviets have tried two basic tactical military
approaches, but so far neither has paid off. After
finding little initial success in large sweep operations
in 1980, the Soviets resorted to small-unit actions.
The change in tactics did not work well, and by late
1981 the Soviets were again emphasizing large sweeps.
Increased use of heliborne assaults in the Panjsher
and Andarab Valleys in the spring of 1984 had
limited effect because of poor intelligence on insur-
gent positions and movements, and the Soviet forces
an unprece- 25X1
dented high-altitude bombing during the Panjsher
Valley campaign in spring 1984 was inaccurate and
ineffective. Soviet intelligence apparently failed to
discover that most guerrillas and their civilian sup-
porters had left the valley.
Expanding Soviet Military Commitment
Over the past year, the Soviets have made changes in
their approach to the war that suggest growing impa-
tience with the stalemate and a new resolve to gain
the military initiative. The Soviets have augmented
their troop strength, introduced more capable artillery
and aircraft, stepped up their efforts to restrict infil-
tration routes, increased pressure on Pakistan and
Iran, and tried new organizational and tactical ap-
proaches to improve their performance. Many of the
changes were implemented after Konstantin Cher-
nenko replaced Yuriy Andropov in February 1984,
but they were probably in the planning stage for some
time and almost certainly reflect a leadership consen-
sus that more must be done to make headway against
the insurgency.
In our opinion, tactical force adjustments have so far
been implemented on only a limited basis and have
not materially improved the security situation. The
Soviets have not been willing to adopt the aggressive,
potentially costly tactics-for example, low-altitude
bombing and helicopter attacks-that could increase
their effectiveness against the insurgents
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Figure 3
Major Afghan and Soviet Forces in Afghanistan
Tashkent
f f\ 1 r `~
*ISLAMABAD
India-
PO' istan.
Afghan Soviet
Airborne regiment
Air mobile assault brigade
Armored division
Infantry division
0wA- Motorized rifle division
- Motorized rifle brigade/regiment
Mountain division
T Airbase
+Kondaz
Baghlan OA
f . 9p
hndar9b Valley
C~Z
Qe
Bapram Asadaba
Airfield
f pKABUL
C
Ghazni4I TKhowst'
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Soviet Force Adjustments in 1984
? Augmented their forces by 4,000 men, bringing
their troop strength to 110,000, and launched their
largest military operation of the war in the
Panjsher Valley.
? Mounted a more aggressive military effort to re-
strict infiltration routes from Pakistan and Iran,
relaxed restrictions on cross-border strikes against
insurgent targets, and stepped up diplomatic pres-
sure on Islamabad and Tehran to reduce their
support for the insurgents.
? Significantly increased the number of missions
their air forces fly in support of ground forces in
Afghanistan. For several days in April 1984, the
Soviets for the first time used medium and light
bombers flying from bases in Soviet Central Asia
for saturation bombing of resistance targets in
Afghanistan. The Soviets' use of more aggressive
air tactics and improved coordination of air support
with ground operations have been limited, however,
by concern about growing aircraft losses.
? Deployed a second SU-25 attack squadron in Octo-
ber and upgraded airpower across the border in the
Turkestan Military District. The most effective
The Reluctant Afghan Military
Despite continued Soviet and regime efforts, the
Afghan military has remained ineffectual over the
past five years. the
regime is still troubled by its inability to conscript
sufficient soldiers and to retain their allegiance. Fac-
tionalism in the Afghan ruling party affects all ranks
of the armed forces but especially the officer corps. It
hinders the development of military cohesion and the
emergence of competent, dependable commanders,
and morale remains low.
Although the regime has managed to stabilize the size
of the force at about 50,000, desertion rates remain
high.
Soviet fixed-wing combat aircraft in Afghanistan, the 25X1
SU-25 is particularly useful in mountainous terrain
because of its weapons load and high
maneuverability.
? Replaced older Soviet helicopters by newer variants
of MI-8s with more powerful engines and more
firepower and more modern MI-24s.
? Introduced a limited number of special forces to
assist in difficult small-unit combat assignments.
? Replaced and restructured some ground units to
provide greater tactical flexibility and improve
firepower.
we believe desertion rates are about 30,000
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shortages of
equipment, low equipment-readiness rates, and the
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technical inability of many soldiers to use much of the
available equipment diminish the military's effective-
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Table 1
Changes in the Soviet Air
Order of Battle, 1984 a
Afghanistan
a Soviet fixed-wing combat aircraft in Afghanistan on 1 January
1984 included 45 MIG-21s, 15 SU-17s, and 12 SU-25s.
Regime units often participate in joint operations with
the Soviets but frequently leak word of pending
operations to the resistance and desert under fire.
Soviet com-
manders take extensive precautions to try to prevent
Afghan informants from passing operational informa-
tion to the insurgents, and the Soviets have increas-
ingly conducted independent operations to prevent
damaging leaks of their plans.
the
Soviet effort to transform Afghanistan into a reliable
Communist client state is having little impact. Lack
of security prevents Communist workers from trying
to implement regime programs in more than two-
thirds of the country. Even in areas of regime pres-
ence, Sovietization measures have failed to develop
significant support for the Afghan Government:
? The Afghan education system, which in 1979
reached no more than 20 percent of the school-age
population, now
reaches a smaller proportion of the population and is
widely distrusted.
? It is often counterproductive to send Afghans to the
USSR for training, since they frequently become
antagonized rather than indoctrinated. Upon return,
many cannot find positions to spread regime influ-
ence and become cynical as a result, according to
US Embassy sources.
? Soviet and Afghan media are ineffective instru-
ments for indoctrinating Afghans because of Af-
ghan illiteracy, distrust of government-controlled
sources, religious beliefs, and adherence to tradi-
tional values.
? The Kabul regime has bought only temporary loyal-
ties by bribery and temporary truces with the
insurgents.
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The Soviet Basmachi Experience and Afghanistan
Since its invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, Moscow has
combined military pressure with conciliatory policy
changes intended to win popular support and thus secure
long-term control. The Soviets apparently are applying
lessons learned in Central Asia during the basmachi
(bandit) rebellions against the Bolsheviks following the
October 1917 revolution that lasted until the late 1920s.
Soviet media call afghan resistance fighters basmachi-
a derogatory term with the implication of unprincipled
predators-indicating that Moscow sees parallels be-
tween its experiences in Central Asia and Afghanistan.
There are many similarities between the two resistance
efforts:
? In both instances the Soviets underestimated the size
and intensity of the resistance and blundered through
the first years of the fighting.
? Resistance is Islamic centered, but without ideology;
the chief objective is to expel the Soviets, who threaten
the traditional way of life.
? Resistance consists of numerous small tribal groups
with narrow, local aims.
? Fighting is mainly on a small scale with resistance
groups ambushing Soviet units and attacking garri-
sons, then taking refuge in the mountains.
? The major weakness of the resistance is lack of
organization and internecine fighting, with splits along
tribal lines.
? The Soviets moderate Communist rule and soften
policies most antagonistic to local religion, custom,
and tradition-such as increasing women's rights;
land reform; and non-Islamic-based educational,
government, and legal systems.
? The Soviets use troops, divide-and-rule tactics, intro-
duction of Soviet institutions, tolerance for Islam, and
carrot and stick policies to control the country.
Despite these similarities, the Soviets so far have failed
to successfully quell the Afghan resistance. Religion has
not been neutralized as an issue, nor has tribal support
been secured for the Kabul regime. Basic differences
between the two insurgencies help to explain the lack of
progress:
? Central Asia had been subject to Russian rule before
the Bolsheviks upset accustomed patterns. Afghani-
stan had never been welded into a unified state under
foreign control and was only lightly controlled from
Kabul before 1978.
? Central Asia had succumbed to invasions throughout
its history; Afghanistan had always resisted external
forces.
? The Bolsheviks initially respected Muslim figures on
their side-most died in Stalin's camps later; the
Afghan Commynists were detribalized, atheistic poli-
ticians who failed to see the value of building broad
coalitions in the opening phase of the revolution.
? Bolshevism was new in the 1920s; when it reached
Afghanistan in the 1970s, some of the local population
were children and grandchildren of basmachis who
had fled the USSR and were raised on family memo-
ries of hatred for the Soviets.
? Although Soviet media have in recent years resurrect-
ed old charges of British and American aid to basma-
chis, the resistance 60 years ago was largely isolated
and self-sustaining. The Afghan guerrillas get aid and
shelter from Pakistan, Iran, and other nations.
? The Soviets have been unable to build an effective
Muslim fighting force to counter the resistance. The
appearance of the Muslim Red Army in Turkestan in
the early 1920s had a considerable psychological
impact on the local population and led to the creation
of native Muslim militias. The Afghan Army is inef-
fective, few Soviet combat troops are Muslims, and the
regime has had little success recruiting tribes to form
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Longer term obstacles to Sovietization include
Afghans' history of resistance to foreign domination
as well as distrust of central government institutions
and attempts to change traditional ways. Afghans
widely disapprove of Soviet society as well as the
limits. On the whole, according to accounts from the
US Embassy and Western visitors to the USSR,
Soviet citizens accept the government's rationale for
their country's involvement in Afghanistan and view
the conflict as a necessary evil.
Moreover, the international costs of withdrawal with-
out securing a reliable regime are greater than the
costs associated with remaining. Soviet diplomats
Soviet presence.
The People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan
The Soviets are no closer than they were in 1979 to
resolving the split in the People's Democratic Party of
Afghanistan, which is the principal instrument for
reshaping the Afghan Government and society along
Soviet lines. The schism between the Parcham (Ban-
ner) and Khalq (Masses) factions-rooted in social
and ethnic differences-has caused armed clashes,
desertions from the military, collaboration with insur-
gents, assassinations, and diversion of government
leaders from the tasks of formulating and implement-
ing government policy,
Although the war in Afghanistan has entailed signifi-
cant military, economic, and political costs for the
USSR, we believe the costs have not reached a point
where they would force the Soviets to reduce their
objectives in Afghanistan or take more draconian
measures. In our view, friction within the Soviet elite
and popular dissent have remained within tolerable
almost certainly believe that
acceptance of a settlement that did not preserve the
Communist regime in Kabul would have an even more
damaging international impact than continued occu-
pation, weakening their international posture, damag-
ing Soviet credibility as an ally, and encouraging the
West to increase its pressure on Soviet interests
around the globe
Impact on the Soviet Military
The Costs of the Fighting. We believe that Soviet
casualties and equipment losses are a source of con-
cern to the leadership and that Soviet military tactics
are chosen with an eye to minimizing them. For
example, Soviet bombers conduct attacks from alti-
tudes too high to permit precision bombing; the Soviet
military leadership shows great sensitivity to aircraft
losses; and most Soviet ground operations generally
have demonstrated a reluctance to chase the insur-
gents into the hills or fight outside the protection of
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we estimate that Soviet casualties
since the invasion amount to about 25,000, one-third
of whom were killed. Inadequate medical care in the
field makes the Soviet killed-to-wounded ratio (1:2)-
comparable to the US experience in World War II-
much higher than the 1-to-5 ratio the United States
experienced during the Vietnam war. Afghan regime
forces, in our judgment, have suffered some 67,000
casualties. Adding to Soviet problems,
are an inadequate water supply,
insufficient preventive medicine, and poor sanitary
procedures, which have resulted in a high incidence. of
disease among Soviet troops-perhaps triple the num-
ber of combat casualties.
Aircraft and Equipment Losses. Experience and the
influx of heavy machineguns and SA-7 missiles have
made the insurgents more adept at protecting them-
selves from air attacks and at shooting down Soviet
and Afghan aircraft. We believe that aircraft losses
began to increase significantly in 1983.
e estimate that
since 1979 the Soviets and Afghans have lost more
than 600 helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft in com-
bat. Soviet and Afghan equipment losses, including
armored vehicles and trucks, run into the thousands
(see figure 5).F--]
Morale and Discipline. The strains of the counter-
insurgency in Afghanistan have worsened morale and
discipline problems among Soviet conscripts who serve
there. The Army's inefficiency in providing adequate
food, potable water, clothing, shelter, and medical
care for troops has contributed to those problems,
Neverthe- 25X1
less, the morale and discipline problems have re-
mained manageable, and maintaining a force of some
100,000 has not significantly reduced the overall
readiness of the Soviet military.
The Soviet military's outlook on Afghanistan's poten-
tial as a testing ground for arms and military tactics
probably is mixed. A small but growing group of
career military personnel now have combat experi-
ence. Despite continuing Soviet problems in applying
counterinsurgency techniques in Afghanistan, the So-
viets have learned some lessons about the performance
of specific weapons and equipment that may be
helpful elsewhere. Although some of the lessons being
learned in Afghanistan could apply in other Soviet
counterinsurgency campaigns in the Third World, the
nature of Afghanistan and of the conflict and Soviet
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Figure 4
Afghanistan: Soviet/DRA Casualties,
December 1979-Present
Figure 5
Afghanistan: Soviet/DRA Aircraft
Losses, December 1979-Present
250
20-0-
,t Estimated Soviet presence in Afghanistan is 110,000
troops.
frustrations and ineffectiveness probably limit the
relevance of that experience to a war in Europe or
China-the theaters on which Soviet planning is
primarily focused.
Economic Costs
For Moscow the economic costs of the war in Afghan-
istan have been much higher than ever anticipated.
Direct military expenditures in Afghanistan account
for about 1 percent of the USSR's annual outlay for
defense.
we estimate the direct Soviet military costs of the
conflict from 1980 through 1984 at some $16 billion.
The military costs have increased slowly over the
course of the war, in our view. Manpower and con-
struction costs generally stabilized after rising sharply
in 1981 and 1982.
we estimate that direct expenditures
for the replacement of equipment destroyed in combat
or lost to noncombat accidents are rising. About 90
percent of these are replacement expenditures for
aircraft, especially helicopters.
Soviet
combat
losses
DRA
combat
losses
Preparations for the invasion temporarily caused a
significant disruption to the civilian economy in the
region just north of Afghanistan. Trucks carrying
Soviet troops and supplies into Afghanistan were
commandeered from the civilian economy, and the
callup of reservists idled some factories,
Military priorities in Afghanistan
periodically disrupt transportation and construction in
the same area, but
overall these disruptions have not been a serious drain
on the Soviet civilian economy.
In addition to these costs, Moscow has had to provide
increased economic support to Afghanistan since the
invasion in 1979. The Soviet Union has largely re-
placed Western lenders and donors, delivering about
$1.5 billion in economic assistance-including about
$1 billion in grants and $400-500 million in develop-
ment assistance. They also settled an outstanding
Afghan debt of $100 million in needed hard currency.
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Western aid, meanwhile, has declined to almost noth-
ing. The Soviets import about 90 percent of Afghanis-
tan's gas production-about 2.8 billion cubic meters
in 1984-its only major industry. Most of the pro-
ceeds go to pay for Soviet imports or repay prerevolu-
tionary debts to the USSR.
returning casualties from
Afghanistan continue to trigger isolated popular dem-
onstrations against the government. Reports from
returning troops
increased popular cynicism about regime propaganda.
Western visitors report that ordinary Russians do not
relish risking the lives of their children in Afghani-
stan, and the lack of media coverage of the casualties
indicates the regime is sensitive to their concerns.
Events in Afghanistan, along with those in neighbor-
ing Iran, have increased regime concern about the
loyalty of Soviet Central Asians. In May 1984 a
Moscow lecturer told a public audience that Islam
represented a serious internal problem and that the
regime was worried about the impact of events in
Afghanistan on Soviet Tajiks. In addition, there are
reports that members of other ethnic groups in the
USSR complain they are bearing a disproportionate
share of the combat burden. (Because of local mobili-
zation, Central Asians were prominent among the
Soviet invasion force, but the ethnic breakdown of
Soviet forces now appears to reflect the population as
a whole.) F_-]
Soviet media have acknowledged increased class ten-
sions resulting from the fact that children of the elite
can avoid service in Afghanistan. The leadership has
also publicly shown concern over the growing alien-
ation of youth in the USSR because of the Soviet
involvement.
Soviet involvement in Afghanistan has tempted more
Soviets into illegal activity and introduced elements of
the population to new kinds of drug abuse. There have
been several major contraband scandals involving
civilian and military personnel and hundreds of minor
ones. Soviet
conscripts in Afghanistan regularly barter gas and
military equipment for food, scarce consumer goods,
The Afghan Economy at a Glance
The compilation of national income statistics for
Afghanistan involves a considerable degree of estima-
tion because much of the information is unavailable
or unreliable. The government's lack of access to
much of the countryside and the fact that most of the
food production is for on farm consumption compli-
we have compiled the following list of key
Population-midyear 1984
Natural gas production-FY 1984
Natural gas exports-FY 1984
Balance of payments-FY 1984
Exports (f.o.b.)-FY 1984
Imports (f.o.b.)--FY 1984
Foreign exchange reserves-FY 1984
Foreign debt-FY 1984
14 million
2.8 billion cubic meters
2.4 billion cubic meters
-$170 million
$680 million
$940 million
$205 million
$2.4 billion
To limit the impact of these problems, the regime has:
? Sought to dilute popular skepticism about the war
by playing up US involvement and emphasizing the
dangers to Soviet security of an insurgent victory.
? Punished military officials who engage in black
marketeering or perform ineptly and rewarded those
who served well with higher pay, better benefits,
decorations, and faster promotions. Many senior
officers appear to have been promoted following
service in Afghanistan.
? Appealed to the patriotism of ordinary Soviets by
more candid media coverage of conditions Soviet
troops face there.
? Cracked down on elite draft dodgers by tightening
draft deferments.
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Figure 6
Afghanistan: Changing Trade Patterns",
1979-84b
Billion US $
1.1
?' Trade is based on government statistics and does not include smuggling
or trade in areas controlled by insurgents. The increase in exports between
1979 and 1981 is attributable in large part to a near tripling of prices paid
for natural gas by the Soviet Union.
Fiscal year ends 20 March.
? Launched new efforts to improve discipline within
the military and combat the problem of youth
alienation.
? Increased antireligious propaganda in Soviet Cen-
tral Asia.
? Taken steps to relieve ethnic tensions, particularly
in the military.
? Cracked down on Afghan drug traffickers and
tightened security to prevent drug imports into the
USS
We believe these steps-together with the relatively
limited human and financial costs to date-have kept
the war's domestic political and social consequences
under control
Soviet Popular Protests Against the War
Reports of Soviet popular protests against the war in
Afghanistan were more re uent shortly after the
invasion.
spontaneous, short-lived popular dem-
onstrations against the war occurred, generally in
response to the sight of coffins returning from Af-
ghanistan. demonstrations in 1980
in Alma Ata, Tashkent, Dushanbe, and other cities in
Soviet Central Asia. Subsequently, antiwar demon-
strations occurred in the Baltic republics, Ukraine,
Azerbaijan, and the RSFSR.
sariat in Kazan (450 kilometers east of Moscow)
jTASS and Novosti that they have received thou-
sands of letters from Soviet citizens complaining
about casualties and asking for further explanations
of Soviet policy
Charges of criticizing the occupation of Afghanistan
have figured in the trials of Soviet dissidents. Andrey
Sakharov and other dissidents condemned the inva-
sion in January 1980. Sakharov was arrested five
days after his interview with Western media and
exiled to Gorkiy. An unusual incident of dissent
within official ranks-albeit at a low level-occurred
in 1983 when a Moscow Radio announcer, Vladimir
Danchev, altered official news broadcasts on Afghan-
istan for foreign audiences to express opposition to
Soviet involvement.
The international community imposed unprecedented
economic and political sanctions on the USSR be-
cause of the invasion of Afghanistan, and these
endured much longer than sanctions imposed after
other Soviet international misdeeds. Soviet actions
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also reinforced international perceptions of Soviet
aggressiveness; fueled increased Western, Chinese,
and Japanese defense efforts; made Third World
countries more wary of Soviet intentions; and ham-
pered Moscow's efforts to exploit the Nonaligned
Movement. In Southwest Asia in particular, the inva-
sion of Afghanistan disrupted Soviet efforts to culti-
vate the Islamic regime in Iran and turned Pakistan
into a major supporter of the Afghan resistance.
Moscow does not like being regularly condemned in
the United Nations because of its Afghan policies, but
it has reason to believe that it has weathered the worst
of the international censure. Last year most of the
remaining countries that had chilled relations with the
USSR because of events in Afghanistan moved to
resume more normal economic and political contacts.
Afghanistan does not figure prominently in the public
or the private remarks of the Soviet leadership.
Moreover, the leadership has recently promoted some
key military figures who, it can be argued, are most
responsible for the USSR's lack of progress. Newly
appointed Defense Minister Sokolov, Chief of the
General Staff Akhromeyev, and Commander of the
Southern Theater of Military Operations General
Maksimov all come to their jobs after having spent
the better part of the past five years grappling with
the war in Afghanistan. It seems unlikely that they
would have been promoted had there been fundamen-
25X1 tal leadership dissatisfaction with their performance
or the strategies they have followed.
It is possible that the leadership has a less-than-
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ghanistan.
Second, the Soviet leadership, like most political elites
that have paid a high price for a policy that is not
working, probably is reluctant to admit it made a
mistake and face the consequences that might result.
Third, Soviet ideology dictates that most people want
the kind of revolution the Afghan Communists are
attempting to impose, and the Soviet leadership prob-
ably cannot accept the proposition that the Afghan
people do not want such a revolution. Finally, and
perhaps most important, the Soviet leadership has
experienced a steady depletion in its ranks during the
past five years, and the ill health of successive Gener-
al Secretaries and their need to address more pressing
problems at home and abroad probably have limited
the time they devoted to the Afghan problem.
and strategy.
The new CPSU General Secretary, M. S. Gorbachev,
like all other top leaders, has avoided significant
direct comment on Afghanistan in public. As a key
figure in the leadership during the last year, Gorba-
chev has presumably developed a degree of commit-
ment to current Soviet goals and strategy in Afghani-
stan. He used his meeting with Pakistan's President
Zia at Chernenko's funeral to chastise Islamabad over
its policy toward Afghanistan. He would naturally
wish to solve the Afghanistan problem in some way,
but, while he is consolidating his power in the Soviet
leadership over the next year or so, he has a strong
political interest in avoiding positions that might
make him look weak or open him to charges of
adventurism. He, therefore, does not seem to have an
immediate interest in seeking to revise Soviet goals
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We believe the fighting in Afghanistan will increase
in intensity in the next two years. The more aggressive
Soviet tactics of the past year are likely to continue,
and the insurgents are likely to demonstrate greater
aggressiveness and skill as they receive better weapons
and more training. Soviet casualties and equipment
losses will continue to increase, although not dramati-
25X1 cally unless Moscow adopts a far more aggressive
strategy.
The Soviets probably calculate that they will be able
to adjust to improvements in insurgent strength to
avert an unacceptable increase in casualties. We are
likely to see a slight increase in force structure in the
near term, perhaps another 5,000 to 10,000 men.
These are likely to include mostly specialized forces
such as airborne troops, security battalions, and mo-
bile combat and support units.
We believe the Soviets will place more emphasis on
efforts to halt insurgent infiltration, mainly through
greater use of airpower along Afghan borders with
Pakistan and Iran. More bombing of suspected insur-
gent routes, efforts to upgrade intelligence by use of
more informants and remote sensors, and more sys-
tematic use of special forces to ambush insurgent
convoys are all likely. The Soviets may also attempt to
increase their presence near the border, since past
efforts by regime forces to do the job have not been
successful.
Less likely, the Soviets might try to radically
improve performance by introducing a few additional
divisions-possibly as many as 50,000 men-to in-
crease efforts to garrison and hold large areas after
sweep operations. Such an increase, however, would
require the kinds of regular ground force units that
have been least effective so far. Moreover, the units
would have to be mobilized and provided with refresh-
er training and a logistic base-a process that would
take many months. We believe that in such a situation
the Soviets would be likely to consider larger scale
incursions into Pakistan or Iran than we have seen
thus far
Nevertheless, the Soviets, in our view, are unlikely to
make real progress toward quelling the insurgency in
the next two years. Given the mountainous terrain
and the numerous passes throughout the border area,
we believe that even with a few additional divisions
the Soviet force level would be too small to stem
insurgent infiltration appreciably. Although the Sovi-
ets can drive insurgents from any area temporarily
and will occasionally score victories against individual
bands, they will be unable to establish control over
much of the country
We do not believe the Soviets foresee an early
"victory" in Afghanistan or have any compelling
reason to seek one. In our view, they probably cling to
the hope that-despite the dismal results thus far-
their efforts to buy support for the Kabul regime,
rebuild the Afghan armed forces, and seek converts
by promoting social and economic reforms will even-
tually bear fruit
The Soviets probably believe that, with the exception
of a few leaders such as Masood, most insurgent
commanders can carry out military operations but
have no disciplined political cadres capable of build-
ing an underground political and administrative struc-
ture. They probably see many insurgent leaders as
local warlords who would like to get Soviet forces out
of Afghanistan but who also are opportunists seeking
to get what they can from both sides. The Soviets
believe that most Afghans are apathetic and that war
weariness will gradually erode the insurgents' support.
Although the temptation in Kabul to become passive
and accept the Communist regime will probably
increase as the younger generation grows up with an
impression of regime pervasiveness, the insurgency-
with continued outside support-is likely to prevent
progress in Sovietization in the countryside over the
longer term. Insurgent morale has remained high.
when evidence of war
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mount a national effort against the Soviets.
weariness appears among the people, it leads to
thoughts of emigration rather than acquiescence to
the Communists and the foreign invaders. Moreover,
traditional Afghan resistance to any central govern-
ment may prove insuperable. At the same time,
although the slow evolution toward cooperation and
coordination among commanders in various parts of
the country is likely to continue, the myriad differ-
ences that have long divided Afghans will prevent the
formation of an organization coherent enough to
Prospects for a political settlement are dim. The
Soviets contend that the war can only be solved
politically, but they remain uncompromising in their
maximalist demands for a negotiated settlement. We
believe Moscow will continue to use the UN talks on
Afghanistan to portray itself as responsive to interna-
tional criticism and probe for concessions by Islam-
abad, but the inability of any Soviet-backed regime to
survive without the presence of Soviet troops renders
the path to a political settlement highly perilous.
25X1 Islamabad will feign interest in talks to relieve Soviet
pressure.F__~
support to pro-Khomeini groups
Iran is not likely to become an important factor in the
Afghan conflict so long as it continues to limit its
An Alternative Scenario:
Communist Rule Is Threatened
We cannot rule out a more serious deterioration of the
Soviet position in Afghanistan than we have estimated
above. Such a deterioration could occur if the insur-
gents improved their coordination, adjusted their tac-
tics, and assimilated increased outside assistance more
rapidly than we anticipate. This train of events would
probably force the Soviets into another basic review of
their options in Afghanistan. We believe that a serious
challenge to Soviet rule in Kabul would result in a
move, not toward a political settlement, but toward an
25X1 expanded Soviet military commitment and a wider
war.
If the Soviet hold in Afghanistan were seriously
threatened, we do not rule out a much more sizable
reinforcement than those we have discussed:
? An increase of perhaps 100,000 to 150,000 men
might allow the Soviets to clear and hold major
cities and large parts of the countryside or block
infiltration from Pakistan and Iran, although it
probably could not do both. Reports of Soviet
estimates of the force necessary to seal the border
with Pakistan have varied from nine to 17 divisions.
? An even larger reinforcement of 200,000 to 400,000
men probably would allow Moscow to make serious
inroads against the insurgency, if the effort could be
sustained.
Either of these options would require a long-term
buildup involving large-scale mobilization of forces in
Soviet Central Asia. A major reinforcement of Soviet
troops would substantially raise the political and
economic costs of the war, but we believe Moscow
would bear them rather than face the consequences of
a victory by the insurgency.
Some close observers of Afghanistan, among them
strong supporters of the resistance, believe that Mos-
cow will inevitably prevail in Afghanistan. Basing
their judgments on open literature, observations in
Kabul, and knowledge of Afghan society, these ob-
servers argue that Soviet efforts to build a viable
regime in Kabul are making slow but steady progress.
They assert that divisions among the resistance groups
will prevent them from providing an alternative to the
pro-Soviet regime.
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Drawing on observations in Kabul and conversations
with regime officials, these observers point to the
thousands of Afghans-estimates range up to
375,000-who are now in some way part of the
Communist government. They are convinced that the
Afghan Army already includes a core of highly
motivated junior officers and is gradually increasing
its effectiveness. They also share the Soviet view that
the insurgents have no capability to build a political
and administrative structure that could rule Afghani-
stan and suggest that war weariness will increasingly
erode support for the insurgents.)
We believe that this view underestimates insurgent
morale and military performance in Afghanistan and
exaggerates the progress of Moscow's effort to Soviet-
ize the country. We believe that Soviet efforts to
implement their political program on a large scale will
remain handicapped by the continuing lack of security
in the countryside.F--]
Nevertheless, we cannot rule out greater progress
than we predict by the Soviets in building a political
and military infrastructure in Afghanistan. This de-
velopment would be more likely if Soviet pressure or
internal instability in Pakistan resulted in a move by
Islamabad to limit its support for the resistance. Even
so, the Soviets could not completely pacify the country
and withdraw a sizable number of forces.F_~
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