IRAN: THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE AND CONTROL FOREIGN POLICY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T00587R000200190004-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 13, 2011
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: May 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of i vuSczrez
Intelligence
Iran: The Struggle
To Define and Control
Foreign Policy
Tqpp See
NESA 85-10083C
a7fl y 1483
COPY 2 5 2
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Directorate of Top Secret
Foreign Policy
Iran: The Struggle
To Define and Control
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. It
was coordinated with the Directorate of
Operations. Comments and queries are welcome and
may be directed to the Chief, Persian Gulf
Division, NES
This paper was prepared by
Top Secret
NESA 85-10083C
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Iran: The Struggle
To Define and Control
Foreign Policy n
summary We believe that factions in the Khomeini regime are engaged in an
Information available intensifying struggle over the direction and objectives of Iran's Islamic
as Qf 10 April 1985 revolution that will keep its foreign policy erratic and in turmoil. Since the
was used in this report.
clerics consolidated their rule in late 1981, they have had to reconcile
Iran's national interests with often conflicting revolutionary goals. We
believe Iran is moving toward a more pragmatic approach to foreign policy,
primarily because of economic pressures and the war with Iraq.
These factors have forced Iran to seek ties with a growing number of
countries to ease its international isolation, sell its oil, and secure a steady
supply of arms. Iran has expanded relations with the Muslim states of Sub-
Saharan Africa and has sought better relations with Turkey and Paki-
stan-despite Ankara's secular government and both countries' close ties
to the United States. Economic relations have been cemented with several
OECD countries and with Eastern Europe as well. Iran is even pursuing
better relations with the moderate Arab regimes of the Persian Gulf as part
of its strategy to wean them from Iraq.
This movement toward more normal foreign relations is hotly contested by
rival factions in the regime, and the outcome will remain in doubt until the
succession to Khomeini is resolved. We believe the dispute primarily
involves three groups:
? Islamic radicals oppose relations with most governments, which they
consider oppressive and dominated by the superpowers. They advocate
export of the revolution through subversion and terrorism and believe
Iran's mission should be directed at the world's "oppressed masses." This
group is well entrenched in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the
Revolutionary Guard, and the Ministry of Islamic Guidance. Its leaders
are vehemently anti-Western but not pro-Soviet.
? Conservatives favor normal foreign relations and generally oppose active
measures to export the revolution. This group, however, supports aggran-
dizing Iranian power through propaganda, the appearance of military
power, and diplomacy throughout the Islamic and Third Worlds, particu-
larly in the Persian Gulf region. It favors good relations with most
Western countries, especially in economic matters, and is hostile to
Moscow.
iii Top Secret
NESA 85-10083C
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? A third group that we label pragmatists is willing to do whatever it deems
necessary to further Iran's interests-and their own. This group, which
includes some of the most powerful members of the regime, apparently
operates as a swing element and usually provides the winning margin in
policy formulation. When the pragmatists have sided with the conserva-
tives, they have sometimes been able to curb radical excesses. They,
however, have not hesitated to advocate use of terrorism and subversion
themselves when they believed them useful in advancing Iranian inter-
ests. As a result, terrorism continues to be part of Iran's policy options
despite disapproval from the conservatives.
We believe there is a better-than-even chance that the pragmatists will
emerge as the dominant force after Khomeini and will formulate Iranian
foreign policy on the basis of perceived state interests rather than
revolutionary aspirations. Pragmatism, however, is not synonymous with
moderation. Terrorism and subversion, for example, are likely to remain
useful tools, particularly for regime attempts to expand Iran's power in the
Persian Gulf-a traditional Iranian geopolitical goal that is now imbued
with religious legitimacy.
We do not believe that there is any sizable pro-Soviet group in Iran's
leadership. None appear to advocate closer relations with Moscow out of
ideological conviction. There is, however, a strongly anti-Soviet element-
the conservatives-who abhor Marxism not only as atheistic, but actively
anti-Islamic. Its members also fear Moscow's intentions toward Iran.
Nevertheless, we believe that many in the regime would favor a limited ac-
commodation with the Soviets if they perceive great danger to Iran. This
could occur if Iran's fortunes in the war with Iraq continue to sink or if the
perceived threat from the United States grows.
Relations between the United States and Iran are likely to remain bad and
could get worse. Tehran believes that the US interest in safeguarding
moderate Arab regimes in the Gulf is directed against Iran. Khomeini's
hatred toward the United States has been so strong and central to the
revolution that its legacy will be hard to overturn. Moreover, Islamic
radicals who share Khomeini's anti-American passion are well situated to
perpetrate terrorist outrages that would preclude the development of less
hostile relations even if others in Tehran were ready to move in that
direction.
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Khomeini's Conception of Foreign Policy
The Practice of Iranian Foreign Policy
The Persian Gulf 8
Pakistan and Turkey 10
Nicaragua and Cuba 12
Other Developed and Communist Countries 13
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Iran: The Struggle
To Define and Control
Foreign Policy F-1
Cyrus the Great, announcing the
formation of the Persian Empire,
sixth century B.C.
The success of Iran's Islamic revolution in 1979
fundamentally altered the strategic alignment of the
Persian Gulf. A nationalist regime that supported a
pro-Western status quo in the area was replaced by
one whose chief foreign policy theme has been vehe-
ment opposition to the United States. The Iranian
regime of Ayatollah Khomeini is today the most
aggressively anti-American of any in the world
Iran's Islamic revolution shares with other major
modern revolutions a belief in both its historical
uniqueness and its universal applicability. In the eyes
of Ayatollah Khomeini, the Iranian revolution was to
create a system administered according to fundamen-
tal Islamic principles that are timeless and valid for
all mankind. Thus, the new regime in Tehran quickly
shifted from a foreign policy based on Iranian nation-
alism and the extension of Iranian national power to
one based on theocratic principles. Iran's clerical
regime, for example, early and repeatedly vowed to
work for the overthrow of regional regimes whose
policies it condemned as non-Islamic and whose legiti-
macy it disputed.-]
As long as Iran's activist clerics were fighting for
power-first against the provisional government of
Mehdi Bazargan and then the presidency of Abol
Hasan Bani-Sadr-they could remain true to a revo-
lutionary Islamic ideology. Indeed, they used that
ideology as a weapon against their opponents who
were struggling to impose order on Iran's postrevolu-
tionary chaos. F__1
If the revolution fundamentally altered Iran's per-
spectives, it could not change regional realities or
Tehran's continuing geopolitical interests. Once in
power, the clerics and their secular allies had to deal
with the problems of governing and with providing for
Iran's security and well-being. Many clerics who had
used revolutionary ideology when it served their pur-
poses now were ready to reshape that ideology to fit
their new positions of authority. Others, however,
remained committed to their revolutionary goals. This
issue remains a source of controversy in Iran and is
intertwined with the general jockeying for power in
anticipation of the post-Khomeini era, resulting in an
unsettled and at times contradictory foreign policy.
Analysis of Ayatollah Khomeini's prerevolutionary
writings and speeches indicates that his views on
foreign affairs were shaped by traditional Islamic
concepts that differ fundamentally from Western
political thought. Western ideas place separate, terri-
torially defined nation-states at the center of a com-
plex interplay of international relations. Islamic tradi-
tion views the "house of Islam" (dar al-Islam) as a
single community of believers in which ethnic, linguis-
tic, and national differences are irrelevant. The only
recognized division of mankind is between Muslims
and unbelievers-dar al-harb ("the house of war").
This division is temporary, as there can be no perma-
nent polity outside the bounds of Islam, the one true
faith. According to classical Islamic doctrine, the
Muslim state is in a constant state of war with the
non-Muslim world, pursuing a holy crusade (jihad) to
turn dar al-harb into dar al-Islam)
Khomeini has asserted his belief in this struggle and
has often called for "worldwide Islamic revolution."
In a speech on the first anniversary of the overthrow
of the Shah, for example, Khomeini said that, "We
will export our revolution to the four corners of the
world because our revolution is Islamic, and the
struggle will continue until the cry of `there is no God
but Allah, and Muhammad is his Messenger' prevails
throughout the world.'~~
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Khomeini sees Iran's revolution as more than just a
struggle with the non-Islamic world. For him, it is a
Jihad to purify the Islamic world from Western
influences and corrupt rulers. He believes that the
threat to Islam takes two forms. The first is a direct
threat: the West and their clients in the Muslim world
have carved up the Islamic community of believers
into a number of nation-states, an act that is against
God's design as presented in the Koran. In his book
Islamic Government, Khomeini wrote that "together
the imperialists and the tyrannical self-seeking rulers
have ... separated the various segments of the Islamic
umma from each other and artificially created sepa-
rate nations.... This nationalistic tendency ... is
against Islam and the good of the Muslims and is
among the deceits of the foreigners who suffer from
Islam and its expansion. "F--]
The second threat to Islam from the West is indirect
but is regarded by Khomeini to be even more danger-
ous. This is the cultural seduction of the West's
materialism, secularism, and sexual liberalism that
leads Muslims away from traditional Islamic values.
A Persian word has been coined to describe the
poisonous nature of this attraction that is best ren-
dered in English as "Westoxication." For Khomeini,
this second threat is particularly invidious because it
is an invisible, persistently corrosive influence on
Islamic life.)
Khomeini views the revolution in Iran as a starting
point for the formation of a new Islamic order. In his
writings he spelled out how the unification and purifi-
cation of Islam were to be accomplished. There would
have to be revolutionary upheaval throughout the
Muslim world to install a truly Islamic government:
We have ... no choice but to destroy those
systems of government that are corrupt ... and
to overthrow all treacherous, corrupt, oppres-
sive, and criminal regimes. This is a duty that
all Muslims must fulfill in every one of the
Muslim countries to achieve the triumphant
political revolution of Islam.)
Khomeini's views on the superpowers are derived from
his division of the world into the faithful and the
unbelievers and from his belief in the need to purify
Islam and transform the world into dar al-Islam. The
two superpowers are seen by Khomeini as forming an
antagonistic front against Islam. The liberal human-
ism of the West and the Communism of the East are
"human ideologies" that contradict the divine revela-
tion of Islam.)
Khomeini has argued that because of the
superpowers' immense power in the world, their con-
trol is everywhere. "One cannot find a country today
whose motto is `neither East nor West'; [all countries]
rely officially or unofficially either on the Eastern
bloc or on the Western bloc.... All the countries in
all the regions of the world are under their domina-
tion.'I
Based on Islamic tenets, Khomeini probably should
have been more at odds with the USSR, which
officially endorses atheism, than with the United
States. Nevertheless, it is the United States that
Khomeini has held in special contempt. He has
repeatedly asserted that the United States is Iran's
"number-one enemy" and the "Great Satan."F
We believe Khomeini's visceral hatred of the United
States was formed by his perception of both the US-
Iranian relationship under the Shah and the greater
threat that the West-and the United States as its
leader-presented to Islam. Khomeini believes and
has often stated that, under the Shah, Iran had
become the handmaiden of the United States, giving
up its resources, its values, and its interests to satisfy
the "world-devouring" United States and its stepchild
in the region, Israel. The USSR's involvement in Iran
since 1946, by contrast, was never so total as that of
the United States. The USSR also was considered less
threatening because it had fewer regional clients and
possessed a less attractive ideology that made it less
able to achieve its "evil intent" in the world.
The Practice of Iranian Foreign Policy
International Pariah
When the clerics consolidated their control in 1981
after nearly three years of struggle, the Khomeini
regime was viewed by much of the world as a
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collection of erratic and violent Islamic fanatics.
Tehran's actions had left the Islamic Republic severe-
ly isolated:
? It had incurred near universal condemnation for
holding US diplomats hostage.
? The war with Iraq had solidified Gulf Arab support
behind Baghdad.
? Most other Muslim regimes considered Iran a men-
ace to their stability and rejected Tehran's preten-
sions to judge their Islamic credentials.
? Iran's claim to be the only really nonaligned nation
and its assertion that Islam offered the only true
path between East and West had alienated many in
the Third World.
? The postrevolutionary Iranian diplomatic corps was
filled with personnel whose chief qualification was
their commitment to Islamic revolution. Their crude
and unruly behavior and their insistence on reaching
out to the "oppressed masses" in their host countries
further strained Iranian ties in the Islamic and
Third Worlds.)
Until they consolidated their power, the activist cler-
ics welcomed Iran's isolation
the clerics exploited the efforts of their
secular rivals to restore normality to Iran's foreign
relations as proof that their rivals lacked true revolu-
tionary fervor.F_~
The Clerics Divided
The clerics' struggle for power in Iran masked serious
philosophical disagreements over the proper direction
the existence of three broad factions
representing different philosophical approaches to for-
eign policy. The terms we apply to these groups-
radicals, conservatives, and pragmatists-relate only
to their approach to foreign policy:
? Islamic radicals advocate active measures to export
the revolution. They remain true to Khomeini's
prerevolutionary philosophy, preferring minimal re-
lations with other governments in favor of ties to the
"masses." They support "Islamic liberation" groups
and are generally vehemently anti-US-but not pro-
Soviet. Their strong anti-Americanism has caused
them to push for stronger identity with "anti-
imperialist" Third World countries, such as Nicara-
gua. this group has
many adherents in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
the Ministry of Islamic Guidance, and the Interna-
tional Department of the Revolutionary Guard.
? Islamic conservatives favor an end to radical activi-
ty and the restoration of more normal foreign
relations. This group supports enlargement of Irani-
an power through diplomacy, propaganda, and the
appearance of military power, particularly in the
Persian Gulf region. It encourages strong trade with
the Arab Gulf states and favors good relations with
the West, especially in economic matters. It is
hostile to Moscow.
? The pragmatists are willing to do whatever they
believe necessary to further Iran's interests-and
their own. Those decisionmakers whom we include
in this group presented a uniformly radical Islamic
front early in the revolution because this was the
best way to oust other claimants to leadership in
Iran. Since the consolidation of clerical control,
however, this group has increasingly sided with
conservatives on the need to expand Iran's interna-
tional relations, recognizing their importance to
Iran's development. The pragmatists, however, have
not shied away from using terrorism and subversion
as primary tools of statecraft.
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The Trend Toward Pragmatism
Despite the persistent differences between these
groups-made possible in part by the multitude of
competing power centers '-we believe a trend has
developed over the past three years toward a more
pragmatic foreign policy.
= Iran's key leaders are pragmatists and have felt
compelled to reduce Iran's severe diplomatic isolation,
even at the expense of revolutionary goals, because of:
? Economic necessity. Iran's faltering economy has
become even more dependent on foreign oil sales
and imports of basic goods than it was under the
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Shah. Tehran has been forced to try to end its
international isolation to obtain consumer goods and
military materiel and to export its oil in the current
soft world oil market.
? The war with Iraq. Iran's isolation has hurt its war
effort in several ways. With the exception of Libya
and Syria, Tehran could muster almost no diplomat-
ic support even though it was the victim of aggres-
sion. At best, Iran was offered studied neutrality.
Moreover, Iranian isolation greatly complicated the
search for reliable sources of arms and sent Iranian
arms buyers scurrying to the black market. Poor
Iranian military fortunes during the past two years,
and especially since the Iraqis began attacking oil
tankers in the spring of 1984, have caused the
pragmatists to pursue a diplomatic offensive that
requires the appearance of moderation.
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Iran: Foreign Policy Positions of Key Factions
Use of terrorism and subversion A tool of statecraft to fur-
ther Iranian interests
Policy toward Persian Gulf Currently set by war with
Iraq; aimed at weaning
these states away from eco-
nomic and political support
of Baghdad
Policy toward radical Arab states Favor good relations be-
cause of war with Iraq; see
need for military and politi-
cal support of these states
Policy toward Third World radical
states
Strongly favor wide use to Strongly oppose
export revolution and expel
the United States from the
Muslim world
Favor export of revolution Favor Iranian dominance, but
by all means good trade relations
Mixed. Recognize current Recognize benefits because of
benefits because of war with war but reject close relations
Iraq and approve anti-impe-
rialism, but disapprove of
Syrian secularism and see
Libya as an Islamic rival
Favor good relations to less- Favor association with Strongly oppose close ties
en international isolation "anti-imperialist" countries
Policy toward Musim states in Africa Favor increased Iranian
presence to lessen interna-
tional isolation
Urge export of revolution Uninterested
Policy toward Soviet Union Mistrust, but urging im-
proved relations because of
declining fortunes of war
with Iraq and increased per-
ception of US threat
Reject relations for the fore-
seeable future
Strongly support good economic
ties
Mistrust, but willing to deal Strongly oppose close ties
with Soviets. Nevertheless,
interested in exporting revo-
lution to Soviet Muslim
population
Strongly object to any con- Willing to lessen hostility over
nection and urge terrorism time
to expel the United States
from the region
Pragmatism and moderation, however, are not identi-
cal. We believe the conservatives oppose terrorism in
principle, for example, whereas the pragmatists' oppo-
sition to it is only tactical, and they are quite ready to
resort to it if they believe it will advance their goals.
As the pragmatists have exerted more control over the
government, the use of terrorism and subversion
appears to have been more carefully directed at
specific objectives and has become more lethal. At-
tacks on US installations in Lebanon and elsewhere in
the region are cases in point. Pragmatists, recognizing
Iran's need for allies in its war against Iraq, have led
Iran into closer relations with Syria and a shared
effort to expel US forces from the region.F_~
Current Foreign Policy Objectives
The shift to a more pragmatic foreign policy is a
trend, not a completed process. Even though the trend
toward pragmatism is apparent, countervailing pres-
sures continue, and no issues appear to have been
finally resolved. At this point, the pragmatists appear
to operate as the key swing group, supporting conser-
vatives on some issues, radicals on others. Their
support usually provides the winning margin.)
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"Neither East Nor West. "This maxim is central to
Iran's revolutionary foreign policy, but it has been
reinterpreted by the pragmatists in one of their most
important victories. The new interpretation has al-
lowed Iran to seek expanded foreign relations
throughout the world and the economic and military
goods essential for the political survival of the regime
and the continuation of the war against Iraq.
A review of the immediate postrevolutionary phase
indicates that "Neither East nor West" originally was
intended to avoid the dependency and resulting cor-
ruption that existed under the Shah by maintaining
only minimal relations with foreign governments.
With the appointment of Ali Akbar Velayati as
Foreign Minister in October 1981, however, the prag-
matists began a quiet campaign to change the empha-
sis of "Neither East nor West." Velayati and other
pragmatists argued that the key element of the maxim
was Iran's ability to maintain a balance between East
and West to avoid reliance on either bloc while
pursuing relations with both to its own advantage.
Velayati launched Iran
on an ambitious campaign to increase its diplomatic
representation abroad and to convince the rest of the
world that Iran could be a stable trading partner and
a country worthy of international investment. His
efforts, as reflected in foreign trade statistics, have
been successful. In 1981 Iran's foreign trade was
estimated at $22.7 billion, while in 1983 trade was
estimated at $37.7 billion]
It was not until the fall of 1984, however, that
Velayati's approach clearly emerged dominant (al-
though not yet triumphant). During the previous
summer, Velayati went through grueling reconfirma-
tion hearings for the Iranian Cabinet by the newly
elected Consultative Assembly (Majles). He was
sharply questioned, according to the Iranian press, on
the wisdom of a policy that so heavily stressed
expanding diplomatic and economic ties to both the
West and the East. Velayati responded by declaring
that "the destiny of the world is determined on the
diplomatic scene. If we are not present, it will be
determined without us. If we are there, we will get a
share proportional to our capability and activity."
Velayati also charged that those who argued that
Khomeini had ordered a policy of isolation forgot that
this was at the start of the revolution. "The direct
guidelines I have received from the Imam are diamet-
rically opposed to this [isolation]."
Even though Velayati was reconfirmed, we believe
that the considerable opposition he encountered led
the pragmatists to take to the offensive. They pre-
vailed upon Khomeini in October 1984 to deliver a
major foreign policy address endorsing the Velayati
approach. In his speech, Khomeini abandoned much
of his prerevolutionary rhetoric on foreign relations.
He turned on the radical opponents of Velayati who
had remained loyal to Khomeini's earlier formula-
tions, even accusing them of being agents of the
United States:
The superpowers and America din particular]
supposed that Iran desired through its revolu-
tion to secure an independence and freedom,
which would be a novel thing and contrary to
the ways of all governments, and would thus be
isolated. If isolated, it could not exist. But they
saw that this was not the case, and Iran's
relations with other countries increased. Now
they are asking why we should deal with gov-
ernments. They are unjust, and we should have
relations with nations. This is a fresh and very
dangerous plot.... We should act as it was
done in early Islam when the Prophet ... sent
ambassadors to all parts of the world to estab-
lish proper relations.... We should have rela-
tions with all governments with the exception of
a few (the United States, South Africa, and
Israel).... So my advice to you is to strengthen
your relations wherever and in whatever coun-
try you are.... As long as our relations with
the Almighty God are steadfast, no one can hurt
us.
The Persian Gulf. Hegemony in the Persian Gulf has
been a traditional Iranian aim. We believe that all
three foreign policy factions in the regime share the
ultimate goal of extending Tehran's power into the
Persian Gulf but disagree over tactics.
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The debate over Iranian foreign policy continues
despite Ayatollah Khomeini's strong endorsement of
Foreign Minister Velayati's policy of expanding dip-
lomatic relations. On 5 December 1984, several
weeks after Khomeini's endorsement, the newspaper
Jomhuri-e Islami devoted its lead editorial to a
restatement of the Islamic radicals' viewpoint. The
newspaper is the party organ of the Islamic Republic
Party-nominal home of Iran's activist clerics-and
one of the most influential newspapers in Iran.)
In the planning for the foreign policy of the Islamic
Republic, we must set a share for the acquaintance
of the people of the world with the Islamic revolu-
tion.... What frightens the satanic powers from
the Islamic revolution is its influence on the people
of the world [and] not having good relations with
governments.... This does not mean that the
government of the Islamic Republic of Iran ought
not to attempt to consolidate its relations with the
governments with which it can have relations on
the basis of Islamic principles and criteria of the
Islamic revolution. It means that the priority ought
to be attached to nations.... Islam is the religion
of nations, and relations with the government in
permitted cases is a means for opening the way for
relations with the nations.
The Islamic and popular liberation movements
ought to be given much more attention by the
Islamic Republic
Islamic radicals continue to advocate publicly and
privately "active export of the revolution."
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of their supporters-bazaar merchants-views such
efforts as a threat to critical trade links with the Gulf.
regime pragmatists 25X1
view the war with Iraq as the crucial determinant of
their Gulf strategy. Their primary goal has been to
separate the Gulf Arab regimes from Iraq. Iranian
spokesmen have repeatedly indicated their belief that
Baghdad could not continue the war without Gulf
financial, logistic, and political support. As Iran's 25X1
apparent military options have dwindled over the past
two and a half years, separating Iraq from its Arab
supporters has taken on increased importance.
Iranian threats to use military force or subversion
against Gulf regimes, however, have failed to loosen
their ties with Baghdad. Since the start of Iraq's
campaign against Gulf shipping in the spring of 1984,
the pragmatists have largely employed the carrot
instead of the stick.
Islamic conservatives also wish to see Iran's influence
in the Gulf grow, according to their own writings and
speeches. None disagree with Iran's extensive propa-
ganda efforts aimed at Gulf Shias, and many conser-
vative theologians in Qom, Iran's theological center,
teach religious subjects to Gulf Shias. Nevertheless,
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We doubt that Iran's apparent moderation will suc-
ceed any more than did its threats, especially so long
as its military options appear limited. If Iran's econo-
my continues to deteriorate, the pragmatists probably
will again consider using terrorism and subversion
against the Gulf states to stop their aid to Iraq and
force an end to the war.
Pakistan and Turkey. In the aftermath of the revolu-
tion, even personal links to officials from these neigh-
boring states were considered cause for suspicion by
the revolutionary government
These states were suspect primary y
because of their links to the United States and
because both had been close to the hated Shah.
Iranian radicals still try to rouse the Muslim popula-
tions of both countries against their regimes, and
some meddling continues
Both pragmatists and conservatives are seeking close
economic and political ties with Pakistan and Turkey
because of Iran's international isolation and its eco-
nomic concerns. By late 1983 Iran was taking the lead
in pushing for the establishment of a tripartite Eco-
nomic Cooperation Organization, according to the US
Embassy in Islamabad. The Iranians had ended a
similar association, the Organization for Regional
Cooperation and Development, shortly after the revo-
lution.
Official statistics reveal that close to 10 percent of
Iran's imports come from Turkey and Pakistan. Much
of Iran's trade is conducted on a barter basis, which is
attractive to Tehran because of its foreign exchange
shortages. According to reliable information from the
US Embassy in Ankara, Iran and Turkey recently
have completed a $3 billion barter agreement for the
next year and a half, doubling the 1983 level of
bilateral trade.
Africa. According to public statements, the pragma-
tists view Africa as a key Third World battleground in
their efforts to enhance Iran's international influence
and ease its isolation.' They particularly hope to win
African support against the Iraqis in international
forums. The conservatives support these aims but do
not appear particularly interested in Africa, while the
radicals see it as fertile ground for exporting the
revolution.
the number two years ago. The opening of the new
embassies has been at Iranian initiative.
the pragmatists have exploit-
ed the radicals' interest in exporting the revolution to
Africa as a pressure tactic against African regimes.
The Radical States. We believe Iran's need for allies
and assured sources of military equipment for the war
against Iraq is the primary factor behind its close
relations with such radical states as Syria, Libya, and
North Korea.
Syria. So long as the war with Iraq continues, Syria
will remain a crucial foreign ally. Damascus has aided
Iran by:
? Closing the Iraqi oil pipeline that transits Syria.
? Serving as a conduit for military supplies.
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? Providing important political support and prevent-
ing the war from becoming characterized as an
Arab-Persian conflict.
We estimate that Libya has provided Iran with $300-
500 million in military equipment since the start of
the war.
We believe most in the Khomeini regime-including
most conservatives and radicals-recognize the bene-
fits of Iran's current pragmatic relationship with
Syria. Senior Iranian clerics publicly condemned the
Muslim Brotherhood's uprising against the Assad
We believe that fundamental differences between
Iran and Syria will strain relations over time. Conser-
vatives oppose close Iranian ties to any of Moscow's
allies, and radicals oppose Syria's secular and Arab
nationalist ideology. Even for the pragmatists, Iran
and Syria have radically divergent goals for both Iraq
and Lebanon. Damascus wants secular regimes sub-
servient to it in both, while Iranian pragmatists want
to establish Islamic regimes subservient to Iran.F-
Libya. Despite the pragmatists' recognition that the
war with Iraq raises the importance of gaining allies
in the Arab world, relations with Libya-the only
other Arab state willing to support Iran-have been
rocky. Libya has backed Iran more out of antipathy
toward the Iraqi regime than out of sympathy for
Iran's war aims.
although Libya wants the ouster of Iraqi President
Saddam Husayn, it does not share Iran's goal of
Still, the common antipathy toward Saddam Husayn
and the United States and both states' hardline
positions on the Arab-Israeli conflict will continue to
push the two together. As Iran's sense of isolation has
grown and as the war with Iraq has gone from bad to
worse over the past year
L-Iregime pragmatists have sought to increase Irani- 25X1
an relations with Libya. Iran, for example, quickly
and publicly came to Qadhafi's support following the
attack by Libyan dissidents on his barracks in May
1984. They also have pushed for more high-level
visits, and Tripoli was the second stop on President
Khamenei's first official trip abroad in September
1984. We believe Libya has provided limited numbers
of Scud-B missiles since late 1984.
Although Libya has praised the use of terrorism
against the United States in Lebanon, we have no
evidence that Iran and Libya have ever conducted a
joint terrorist operation. There have been times in
which the two have been involved in subversive activi-
ty in the same country-Lebanon, for example-but
even here there is no evidence of coordination
imposing a Shia Islamic regime on Baghdad
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North Korea. We believe that Iranian-North Korean
relations are based more on economic realities than on
any sense of common struggle against "imperialism."
Though a shared antipathy toward the United States
probably helped nurture the relationship, each coun-
try's national interest played a far more important
role. When the war with Iraq began, Iranian pragma-
tists recognized that Iran desperately needed a secure
supplier of arms and was willing to buy them from
any source-including Israel. North Korea wanted
cheap oil. As a result, P'yongyang has been Iran's
largest source of military materiel since the start of
the war. It delivered an estimated $860 million worth
of equipment between 1980 and 1983, more than
double the amount of Iran's next largest supplier,
Libya. We have seen no other joint activity aside from
standard condemnations of "world imperialism" in
communiques issued following visits to discuss arms
sales.
We do not believe that Iran's arms relationship with
North Korea is a point of factipnal disagreement in
Tehran. Nor has there been any reporting to suggest
that anyone in Tehran is seeking to upgrade the
relationship. F___-]
Nicaragua and Cuba. We believe that Iran is seeking
to create the impression of improved relations with
Nicaragua and Cuba as part of its effort to end its
international isolation. Prime Minister Musavi visited
the two countries earlier this year in a tour that also
included Turkey, Spain, and Venezuela.
Iranian radicals have given the Sandinistas strong
rhetorical support since they took power in 1979,
stressing their common anti-US attitudes, but ties
remained at a relatively low level through 1982. Once
pragmatists began to feel the need to lessen Iran's
isolation, however, some increase in relations began to
shipments of oil, financed by a $60 million credit
arrangement. Managua resold the oil and has since
supplied Iran with sugar and beef as partial repay-
Relations with Cuba have been similarly low-key.
Havana has supported international efforts to mediate
an end to the Iran-Iraq war, much to the displeasure
of Tehran, according to Iranian regime spokesmen.
Cuban Foreign Minister Malmierca was a member of
the Nonaligned Movement's mediation team that was
active in the early days of the war. Tehran and
Havana have agreed to set up a joint economic
There is no evidence that Iran is participating with
either Cuba or Nicaragua in sponsoring subversion in
Latin America,
The Superpowers. We believe all factions wish to
avoid Iranian dependence on either superpower. All
oppose Communism as antithetical to Islam. Islamic
radicals are most vehemently opposed to the United
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States, and Islamic conservatives appear most anti-
Soviet. The pragmatists are willing to consider im-
proving relations with Moscow but also wish to avoid
close relations.
United States. Opposition to the United States is
more strongly stated, more universally parroted, and
more emotively symbolic than any other aspect of
Iranian foreign policy. Even those conservatives who
favor lowering the level of hostility toward the United
States recognize that saying so publicly is still politi-
cally risky.
Islamic radicals in the Khomeini regime view the US
presence in the Middle East as the major impediment
to successful export of the revolution, according to
their own words and writings.
USSR. Although officially the number-two "Great
Satan," Iran's attitude toward the USSR is qualita-
tively different than toward the United States.
We do not believe that there is a sizable group in
Iran's leadership-or generally among the clergy-
that supports improved relations with Moscow out of
ideological conviction. The clerics view Communism
as an atheistic philosophy antithetical to Islam.F_
their speeches and writings indicates that they are
committed Muslims who derive their social philoso-
phy from their understanding of Islam-not Marx-
ism. Many of them have publicly condemned the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and supported the
Islamic struggle there against the Soviets. We believe
they would attempt to export the Islamic revolution to
the USSR's Muslim population if given the opportu-
nity
Other Developed and Communist Countries. The
pragmatists' reinterpretation of "Neither East nor
West" has allowed Tehran to pursue expanded rela-
tions with these states as a way to secure the economic
and military goods essential for regime stability and
continuation of the war with Iraq. Despite the limita-
tions imposed by Iran on its relations with the two
superpowers, relations with allies of each are general-
ly flourishing. Iran's largest trading partners are
Japan and West Germany, and about two-thirds of its
trade is with OECD countries. Senior Iranian prag-
matists, including Rafsanjani and Velayati, have
sought to convince Western visitors of their modera-
tion and have even refrained from strong criticism of
the United States on some occasions, according to
these visitors.
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Islamic radicals who favor such measures as land
reform and the nationalization of industry have been
labeled Communists by their opponents. Analysis of
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Song Of Songs
AMERICA, AMERICA, SHAME ON
YOU9 THE FOUL FIEND
OVERTNRE
Ta ? _ L ~ ?oL re ?oL
P. 91 i i 'a
It
la ?oL a.1 -;L V _ --w-
America, America, shame on you, the foul fiend,
From your evil claws, the blood of our youngsters drips.(2)
The ferocious flames of your fetid deeds,
Aflame have set the entire world.
The global safety and security,
Upset have been by your fraudulent tricks.
Every corner of the world, far and nigh,
Bears the cruel tint of your cantankerous crimes.
Your hoarded riches, superfluous as they are,
Upon the pains of the world deprived have been built.
The daggers of your hatred deep,
Many a brave breast apart have tom.
A world-devouring pilferer of low descent,
A truculent, savage ghoul you are.
A lethal, venomous-natured scorpion,
A cool-hearted, cunning fox you are.
Replete with treachery, pure perfidy,
Deplete of compassion and love you are.
Of devilry and dread your being reeks,
Vainly void of the elixir of good you are.
Through the entire history of man,
re Si J.a - - r ^i re
.nn.
Surpassed you have all in desperate diablery.
Entangled in every net of conspiracy you are.
No token of love in your hate-laden heart.
America, America, shame on you, the foul fiend.(4)
In every corner of the whole wide world,
Your fickle flames of frenzy fly.
Nauseated to death, the whole wide world,
Weeps in agony by your so-called "Human Rights"
An index of satanic brutality indeed,
An indelible stain of shame you are.
A devil incarnate, a crime-ridden imp,
Rebellion seethes in your polluted blood.
In mind, you only nurture the notion how
To lay waste the globe entire.
Befogged, benighted by your ruses dark,
The whole wide world does mourn and cry.
You, the enemy of every nation
You, the cause of every abjection
You, the shade of every shame
You, the disrupter of every heart
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Relations with East European countries are also on
the rise. Since Iraq began attacking tankers in the
Persian Gulf in the spring of 1984, Foreign Minister
Velayati has traveled to Romania and Hungary, and a
deputy foreign minister has discussed trade in East
Germany and Czechoslovakia. The Minister of Heavy
Industries visited several East European countries in
early 1985. One result has been a sharp increase in
Iranian weapons purchases from Eastern Europe. In
1984 these amounted to roughly $285 million, double
the value in 1983, and about 25 percent of Iran's
weapons purchases. Most sales involve small arms,
ammunition, and spare parts, but we believe Iran
hopes these purchases will lead to the acquisition of
tanks and aircraft it needs to reduce Iraq's military
advantages.
Terrorism and Subversion. Although the radicals
continue to exercise some freedom of action to initiate
terrorism and subversion, pragmatists have sometimes
joined conservatives-who vigorously oppose these
tactics-to curb radical excesses. We do not believe,
however, that the pragmatists will gain total control
over the activities of the radicals for, the foreseeable
Iran's foreign terrorism has been directed primarily
against three targets-Iranian exiles opposed to the
Khomeini regime, Gulf Arab states supporting Iraq,
and the US and French presence in the Middle East.
Iranian-backed terrorism retains a heavily anti-
Western focus because Islamic radicals view the West
as the key threat to Islam and believe Western 25X1
support for Tehran's enemies is a major obstacle to
the successful export of the revolution. French and US
installations in the region have been the major West-
ern targets. Pragmatists have been willing to go along
with radical attacks against French installations be-
cause France is host to numerous Iranian exiles and
because it supports Iraq. The pragmatists may also
believe that terrorist attacks on the French will put
pressure on Paris to improve its relations with Iran.
Lebanon, Kuwait, and Bahrain have been the sites of
major Iranian terrorist acts in the Middle East.
Nearly all Iranian attempts against Baghdad have
been suppressed because of the ruthlessness of the
Iraqi security services and because of Baghdad's
threats to execute relatives of prominent Iraqi Shias
exiled in Iran.
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creased by some 30 percent in 1984 over the previous
year. 25X1
The radicals' ideological aims are often abetted by the
pragmatists. We believe that the pragmatists view
Iranian involvement in Lebanon as a relatively cheap
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way to maintain revolutionary fervor and to expand
Iranian influence in the Islamic world, especially
against moderate Arab regimes that are standing on
the sidelines in the fight against the "opponents of
Islam." Pragmatists recognize as well that, should the
Shias in Lebanon succeed in establishing an Islamic
republic subservient to Tehran, Iran's influence
throughout the region would increase. Similarly, the
pragmatists have gone along with efforts to build
Iran's subversive capabilities in the Gulf states, but
we believe more as a way to intimidate those states
than to export the revolution
Iranian foreign policy continues to be influenced by
the struggle for power in anticipation of Khomeini's
death and is a focus of that struggle. Although we
believe the pragmatic trend is on the ascendancy, key
pragmatists, including Majles Speaker Rafsanjani
and President Khamenei, are rivals for power. Thus,
their cooperation in foreign affairs may be temporary.
We believe, moreover, that Islamic radicals will con-
tinue to press for actions-or initiate them-that will
increase the difficulties for any one faction to consoli-
date its control over foreign policy.
Nevertheless, we believe that certain elements of
Iranian foreign policy are likely to remain in effect for
the foreseeable future. Iranian relations with the
United States will be hostile long after Khomeini dies.
Official Iranian media reveal that Khomeini has
written a 60-page sealed will that almost certainly
condemns the United States and explicitly rules out
relations until Washington "becomes human." That
legacy will be difficult to overturn, even if conserva-
tives could wrest full control of the government.
ton
US interests in the Persian Gulf and elsewhere in the
Middle East are likely to continue to push Iran and
the United States apart. Iran's goal of hegemony in
the Gulf runs counter to US support for moderate
Arab regimes. Many in Tehran, including both radi-
cals and pragmatists, view US aid to those regimes as
directed against Iran. US support for Israel will also
ensure continuing Iranian hostility toward Washing-
previous terrorist actions.
We believe Islamic radicals will encourage further
terrorist actions against the United States as part of
their strategy to retain influence in foreign affairs.
We also believe that pragmatists would go along
with-or initiate-such actions if they perceived a
growing threat from the United States. Pragmatists
have openly threatened to use terrorism against the
United States, in part to deter US retaliation for
The need to sell oil, import consumer goods, and
generate economic development, however, is likely to
impel Iran to foster relatively good economic relations
with most OECD nations, Eastern Europe, and neigh-
boring Turkey and Pakistan. Both the pragmatists
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and conservatives favor such a course. Ultimately,
Iran's dealings with these states could lead to reduced
hostility toward the United States, but that probably
is far in the future. None of the several US allies who
are currently well positioned in Iran-Japan, West
Germany, Pakistan, and Turkey-appear willing to
jeopardize their good relations to press Tehran strong-
ly over this issue.
Over the near term, we believe that Iran is much more
willing to consider improving relations with the
USSR.
We believe that continuing
problems in the war, the economy, and growing labor
unrest at home are likely to strengthen Iran's desire to
improve relations with Moscow.
Any improvement, however, is likely to be tactical.
The USSR's military support for Iraq, the Soviet
occupation of Afghanistan, its ties to the Tudeh party,
and the near universal Iranian suspicion of Moscow's
intentions limit prospects for substantially better ties.
The Soviets apparently recognize Iran's limitations as
well but may be willing to supply some military
equipment to Iran as a way to keep open the prospect
for better relations.
None of the foreign policy factions will want to be
seen as dominated by either superpower. "Neither
East nor West" is, in our judgment, a generally
popular slogan in Iran, and regardless of which
faction becomes dominant, Tehran is likely to adhere
to its own brand of nonalignment.
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